1. Delays in the European New Build Renaissance
Ben Williams (ID: 24691925)
SESG6043: Nuclear Energy Technology
Physics
University of Southampton
May 9, 2015
Abstract
Since 2001 the term nuclear renaissance has been used to refer to a possible revival in nuclear power. This
revival has been fuelled by concerns about global climate change, spiralling energy demand and excessive
import dependency on fossil fuels. However, in 2012 nuclear electricity generation was at its lowest level since
1999. This is due to two main reasons: (i) Many reactors are reaching the end of their operational lifespan
and new reactors aren’t being built in time to replace the outgoing ones. (ii) The 2011 Fukushima disaster has
increased anti-nuclear opposition and several governments have changed their stance on nuclear power. In
addition to these delays in the nuclear revival, current ‘new build’ projects all over Europe are severely behind
schedule and over budget. This paper aims to explore, explain and categorise these delays.
Keywords: Nuclear power, New build projects, Fukushima consequences, construction delays
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Construction Delays 2
2.1 EPR delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2 VVER delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 Neutral Delays 3
3.1 Stress tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2 Change in public opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3 Effect on the European nuclear industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4 Energy policy changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4 Conclusion 5
References 6
1

2. Delays in the European New Build Renaissance 2
1 Introduction
As of February 2015 there are currently 6 nuclear reactors under construction in Europe (excluding Russia),
with plans to build a further 29 reactors and proposals for another 36. However, many of the currently operat-
ing nuclear reactors (currently there are 152 operating reactors in Europe, excluding Russia) are reaching the
end of their operational lifespans. Thus for the nuclear renaissance to be successful then a rapid expansion of
nuclear power capacity is required [5, 11]. But a recent worldwide review of all the reactors currently under
construction has shown that 74% of them are behind schedule and over budget. In addition to construction
delays, the public and governments have begun to question their nuclear strategies after recent events, such
as the Fukushima disaster; ultimately causing further delays to the nuclear renaissance [8, 5].
Within industry, delays are separated into 4 categories: Neutral, Client fault, Contractor fault and Concur-
rent delays. This paper will look at the first 3 categories (the fourth does not really apply to the nuclear
renaissance). Client and Contractor fault delays can occur because of several reasons and usually impact the
completion date and budget of the project. Neutral delays are usually unforeseen delays that occur by outside
forces, in the case of the nuclear renaissance we look at the Fukushima disaster as the primary neutral delay,
from which there are several secondary and tertiary effects [4].
2 Construction Delays
This section explores the construction delays in the four main reactors currently under construction in Europe.
The EPR, European (Evolutionary) Pressurised Reactor is the first 3rd generation reactor to be built in Europe
and has faced many problems resulting from being the ‘first-of-a-kind’. The VVER, a Russian designed PWR,
has been under construction since the mid-80’s and has been severely delayed due to funding issues.
2.1 EPR delays
There are currently 2 EPR’s under construction in Europe, one in Finland and one in France both are severely
behind schedule.
Olkiluoto 3, in Finland, began construction in August 2005 with an aim of being online by 2009, it is now
not expected to start producing grid electricity until 2018 [14]. The construction is a joint effort between
Areva and Siemens. There have been various problems with planning, supervision and workmanship, these
are summarised below [2, 12]:
• Irregularities in the foundation concrete have been found.
• Substandard forgings were delivered to the site, these had to be re-cast.
• Problems constructing the double-containment structure. This is a feature unique to this type of reac-
tor but will probably become a standard design feature on all future reactor builds. It is designed to
withstand a terrorist attack and can resist a direct hit by an aeroplane.
• Unfamiliar welding instructions. It has been stated that during the construction welding instructions
have not been observed and that the supervision carried out by the subcontractor have not dealt with
these issues.
• Because of safety concerns and poor practices construction has been halted at least a dozen times.

3. Delays in the European New Build Renaissance 3
These delays are main due to the fact that this is the first EPR to be built (‘first of a kind’ problems) and that
subcontractors have not fully understood the very strict requirements for a nuclear build project.
Flamanville 3, in France, began construction in December 2007 with a start-up date of 2012. In November of
last year EDF (the architect engineer of the project) announced that construction was delayed to 2017. The
origin for this delay seems to lie with Areva, which is providing the nuclear steam supply system. Areva
has had problems delivering the reactor vessel head and many components for the internal structure of the
vessel. Again these delays seem to have been caused by substandard welding which has led to defects on the
vessel head [12].
Financial implications
The original fixed price for the construction of Olkiluoto 3 was at 3 billion, thus any additional cost due
to construction delays would have to be paid by the main contractor, Areva. As of 2014 the Chief Executive
of Areva (Luc Oursel) has estimated that the overall cost is going to be close to 8.5 billion, this would
make it the sixth most expensive structure in the world. Because of the delays both Areva and the eventual
operators (and current owners) of Olkiluoto 3, TVO (Teollisuuden Voima, a Finnish nuclear power company)
are currently seeking compensation from each other. This has caused further delays when Areva shut down
construction in February 2014 due to the escalating dispute over compensations, TVO is demanding 1.8
billion from Areva, and Areva is demanding 2.7 billion from TVO [16].
To put the cost of Olkiluoto 3 into comparison the LHC (the Large Hadron Collider in Geneva) cost 7.5
billion, and ITER (the forefront in experimental fusion technology) is expected to reach a cost of 20 billion.
Thus one could argue that if the money spent building Olkiluoto 3 had been channelled into fusion research
we would be roughly 0.5 ITER’s closer to replacing nuclear fission power plants with clean ‘limitless’ power!
Flamanville 3 has also faced similar cost inflation, originally EDF had put the cost at 3.3 billion but by the
beginning of 2013 this cost had risen to 8.5 billion [12].
2.2 VVER delays
The two state owned, 440MWe Water-Water Energetic Reactors, under construction in Slovakia, hold the
title for the longest construction of a commercial nuclear reactor in Europe. Construction began in 1985,
however due to lack of funds work was halted in 1991. In 2004 the Slovak government privatized 66% of the
company owning the power plants, an Italian utility company (Enel) won the bid and committed an additional
1.6 billion to the initial investment of 576 million for the completion of the partially built reactors [13].
In November 2008, 17 years after construction began, construction restarted with the aim of having both
reactors completed by the end of 2013. However, again things have not gone to plan and the completion date
has now slipped back to 2016 and is 3 billion over budget with no explanation being offered as to the reason
behind the delays and cost overruns [15].
3 Neutral Delays
On the 11th March 2011 the Fukushima nuclear accident occurred, it is the largest nuclear incident of this
century and changed not only the public’s perceptions of nuclear power but also governments policy’s on
nuclear expansion [7]. Below some of the consequences of the Fukushima disaster are briefly explored.

4. Delays in the European New Build Renaissance 4
3.1 Stress tests
Stress tests were one of the main programmes introduced because of the Fukushima disaster. Developed by the
EU, their goal is to ensure that all operating nuclear reactors in Europe follow the same safety standards and
have the same safety level. The safety level covers a wide range of catastrophe events such as: (i) Earthquakes,
(ii) Floods, (iii) Terrorist attacks. The results from these tests have shown that most of the reactors will have to
undergo “a program of safety upgrades”[6]. In 2012 the cost of the upgrades were estimated to be somewhere
between 30-200 million for each reactor unit, this gives an overall cost of around 10-20 billion. The time
and money required for these upgrades will mean that any new build projects will inevitably be delayed and
possibly cancelled.
3.2 Change in public opinion
The 2012 study by Siegrist et al. [7] stated that following the Fukushima disaster there was “a moderate change
towards less acceptance and more negative attitudes towards nuclear energy.” Although the study also goes on
to say that “it seems that people mainly base their interpretation of a technological accident on their prior beliefs
and perceptions of related risks.” This suggests (and in fact was shown to be true in the study) that people’s
prior views on nuclear power had not changed but their beliefs and convictions had become stronger. Before
the Fukushima disaster Europe was almost equally divided on the issue of nuclear power, with slightly more
people opposing. After Fukushima the proportions largely remained the same, however the faction opposing
nuclear power became significantly more vocal [10].
3.3 Effect on the European nuclear industry
The economical fallout from Fukishima has had a huge effect on the nuclear industry. The smaller businesses
have been hit the hardest but even the large corporations such as EDF have suffered losses and negative public
opinion. In March 2012 two of the UK’s ‘big 6’ power companies, RWE npower and E.ON announced they
were pulling out of the nuclear industry; at the time both companies had projects involving new builds in the
UK [9]. The Horizon Nuclear Power project that both energy companies were involved in has subsequently
transferred ownership to Hitachi and instead of 3/4 EPR’s there will be 2/3 ABWR’s built at the sites in
North Wales and Gloucestershire. In addition to power companies abandoning the nuclear industry many
large engineering firms have followed suit. Engineering ‘giant’ Siemens declared (in September 2011) their
withdrawal from the nuclear industry stating it was due to “the clear positioning of German society and
politics for a pullout from nuclear energy”[1] (political changes in Germany will be explored in the next
section). At the time of withdrawal, Siemens was a major contractor for the construction of many new builds
across Europe, they have subsequently sold off that responsibility.
3.4 Energy policy changes
Fukushima has made many governments rethink their Energy policy’s, and in some cases restructure their
entire nuclear strategy.
Germany
In Germany immediately after the Fukushima disaster anti-nuclear opposition intensified. In response to this
the German government announced a radial change to its energy policy in August 2011. They immediately

5. Delays in the European New Build Renaissance 5
and permanently shut down 8 out of 17 of their nuclear reactors and stated that the rest of the reactors would
be shut down by 2022, with the aim of making renewable energy the prime source of electricity generation
in Germany [11].
UK
The UK’s two major political parties are both pro-nuclear power. Before Fukushima the British government
announced plans to build eight new nuclear power plants. However with the pull out of RWE npower and
E.ON there is now some doubt whether all these reactors will be built, although EDF still has plans to build
4 new reactors in the UK. For new reactors to be built in the UK the reactor design must first pass the UK’s
GDA (Generic Design Assessment) which usually takes around 5 years per reactor design. Currently, the
only 3rd generation reactor to have passed the GDA is the Areva EPR, with Hitachi’s ABWR presently under
assessment and Westinghouse’s AP1000 failing the GDA (the GDA report highlights 51 issues to be addressed
in the AP1000 design) [10, 8].
Other European countries:
• Switzerland had plans (before Fukushima) to replace their ageing nuclear power plants. However
these plans have now been abandoned and the reactors will not be replaced when they complete their
operating lifespan [8].
• Italy voted in 1987 to shut-down all its nuclear power plants, and following Fukushima they have
continued to oppose nuclear power [8].
• Spain has 7 nuclear reactors producing approximately a quarter of the country’s electricity. Pre-2011
the government had a 40 year limit on reactors, this has since been lifted (owners can apply for exten-
sions in increments of 10 years). The country has no new build plans [5].
• Belgium also has 7 nuclear reactors, however they provide over 50% of the country’s electricity. In
2009 the Belgium government extended the operating lifespan of all their reactors in order to meet
CO2 reduction commitments. However, with the reactors reaching the end of their operating lifespan
and because of Belgium’s 2001 federal act (which prohibits the building of any new nuclear plants), a
phase out of their nuclear reactors is currently in operation with all their reactors to be shut-down by
2025 [10].
• France receives about 75% of its electricity from nuclear power. However, owing to technological
constraints they are at their maximum nuclear capacity and are therefore experiencing a ‘lull’ in new
build projects [8].
4 Conclusion
Construction delays and the impacts of the Fukushima disaster have caused significant delays in the European
nuclear renaissance. The effects (political) of Fukushima will have long term effects that we are only starting
to see now, and it is now unclear whether nuclear power will hold a significant place in our energy future.
Despite this and the financial problems experienced by the current new build projects in Europe, Areva (with
the general contractor being ‘China Guangdong Nuclear Power Company’) is also building two EPR’s in
China, these started construction in 2009 and 2010 and are expected to be completed on budget by 2016/2017
which would make them the first operational EPR’s in the world [3]. Therefore, this suggests that the mistakes

6. Delays in the European New Build Renaissance 6
and delays from the first two attempts have been rectified and future EPR’s are more likely to be on budget
and on-time, which is good news for EDF’s Hinkley Point C’s EPR, currently about to begin construction in
Somerset.
References
[1] BBC. Siemens to quit nuclear industry, September 2011. URL http://goo.gl/4HdswF. Accessed:
31 March 2015.
[2] BBC. Finland’s olkiluoto 3 nuclear plant delayed again, July 2012. URL http://goo.gl/zGWmYM.
Accessed: 30 March 2015.
[3] Bloomberg Business. China builds french reactor for 40% less, areva says, November 2010. URL http:
//goo.gl/0AvX8X. Accessed: 30 March 2015.
[4] CIOB. Delays on construction projects, Feburary 2014. URL http://goo.gl/mQuPfx. Accessed:
1 April 2015.
[5] Ecologist. Three in every four nuclear power builds worldwide are running late, September 2014. URL
http://goo.gl/TEF8z7. Accessed: 30 March 2015.
[6] P. P. Povinec, K. Hirose, and M. Aoyama. Fukushima Accident. 2013. ISBN 9780124081321. doi: 10.1016/
B978-0-12-408132-1.00005-X.
[7] M. Siegrist, Visschers, and H. M. Vivianne. Acceptance of nuclear power: The fukushima effect. Energy
Policy, 59:112–119, 2013. ISSN 03014215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.07.051.
[8] A. N. Stulberg and M. Fuhrmann, editors. The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security. Stanford
University Press, 2013.
[9] The Scotsman. Nuclear disaster casts shadow over future of uk??s energy plans, March 2012. URL
http://goo.gl/OgLX9D. Assessed: 31 March 2015.
[10] Visschers, H. M. Vivianne, and L. Wallquist. Nuclear power before and after fukushima: The relations
between acceptance, ambivalence and knowledge. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 36:77–86, 2013.
ISSN 02724944. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvp.2013.07.007.
[11] World Nuclear Association. The nuclear renaissance, January 2014. URL http://goo.gl/ZTGhZ1.
Accessed: 1 April 2015.
[12] World Nuclear News. Olkiluoto pipe welding ‘deficient’, says regulator, October 2009. URL http:
//goo.gl/Ip8yCm. Accessed: 30 March 2015.
[13] World Nuclear News. Contracts signed for completion of mochovce, June 2009. URL http://goo.
gl/jJURk5. Accessed: 31 March 2015.
[14] World Nuclear News. Olkiluoto 3 delayed beyond 2014, July 2012. URL http://goo.gl/hqYW8a.
Accessed: 30 March 2015.
[15] World Nuclear News. Slovensk elektrrne expects mochovce 3 to start up in 2016, January 2015. URL
http://goo.gl/J30YmD. Accessed: 31 March 2015.
[16] yle. Claim for olkiluoto 3 delays explodes to 2.7 billion, December 2013. URL http://goo.gl/
EuxYm7. Accessed: 30 March 2015.