Military Support Research Design Paper-PS211

Running Head: MILITARY SUPPORT 1
Bailey Schoenbeck
Elizabethtown College
What Drives the Public’s Appreciation For the Military and Public Support for Military
Spending?
This paper was prepared for Political Psychology, taught by Dr. April Kelly-Woessner.

Introduction
The federal budget has been a hot topic of concern in recent years. Specifically, people
are concerned about the national deficit, which has reached an all time high, and despite
numerous efforts, shows little signs of diminishing. The current state of the nation’s budget has
created great concern over U.S government spending and has prompted numerous budget cuts
and a vast decrease in spending in certain areas, defense or military spending being one of them.
Although the United States budget has always allotted spending on defense, over time,
that allotment has vastly expanded. Historically, in times of peace, the U.S would spend very
little on defense (only about 1% of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product or GDP). After World
War II, however, the budget for defense spending increased, reaching an all time high of 41% of
GDP (Chantrill, n.d). After World War II, and during the height of the Cold War, the spending
on defense to GDP ratio hovered around ten percent (Chantrill, n.d). During the Vietnam era in
the mid to late 1960’s, military spending reached ten percent of GDP (Chantrill, n.d).
Spending on defense then fell and stayed in the three to five percent (of GDP) range, with
fluctuations in the 1980’s, during President Ronald Reagan’s attempt at defense build-up, and
again in 2001 after the terror attacks of September 11 (Chantrill, n.d). In 2005, however at the
height of the war on terror, and at the time of the U.S’s Iraqi invasion, defense spending
increased to just over four percent and then increased again to five percent in 2008 during the
‘Iraqi Surge’ (Chantrill, n.d). In 2011, when the U.S chose to step up military efforts in
Afghanistan, defense spending reached well over five percent of GDP. The U.S’s defense
spending has since declined, as the efforts for the War on Terror have also seen a decline; experts
expect the number to fall even more and hover around just below four percent (Chantrill, n.d).
Dinah Walker, a Geoeconomics analyst, stated that in the calendar year of 2013, military
spending declined from $671 billion to U.S dollars to $619 billion U.S dollars, the largest decline

in terms of U.S dollars, since 1991 (2014). That number is expected to drop further, as President
Barack Obama’s budget proposes that by the year 2024, defense spending will fall to just above
two percent of GDP, which would represent the lowest allocation of GDP to defense spending in
the post World War II era (Walker, 2014).
The military spending budget consists of many different categories. Benefits for veterans
and active military personnel both fall under that category. With the national military spending
budget set to steadily decrease, veterans and active military personnel could see major cutbacks.
Unrest among our nation’s military (both active and inactive) has begun to increase as a result of
the budget cuts defense has already seen, along with the allocation of what little resources they
have. These proposed budget cuts could cause a rise in this unrest. Military members are not the
only ones who suffer at the hands of executed cutbacks; the support the military receives from
the general public suffers as well.
On September 11, 2001, the United States suffered a devastating blow when nineteen
militants allegedly associated with the Islamic extremist groups al-Qaeda hijacked four airplanes
(History.com, n.d). Two of the planes flew straight into the World Trade Center Towers in New
York City, the third flew into the Pentagon in Washington D.C, and the fourth crashed in a field
in Pennsylvania. For the fist time since the Pearl Harbor Bombings during the World War II era,
the United States was under direct attack. It was estimated that over 3,000 people were killed
during the terrorist attacks, including more than 400 police officers, firefighters, and first
responders (History.com, n.d).
The events that took place in 2001, prompted the Bush Administration to take action, waging
what can be referred to as “The War on Terror”, an effort that had been widely supported until
only recently (Pew Research Center, 2011).

One of several reactions Americans had to the terrorist attacks on September 11 was a
stronger impulse to display the American flag (Skitka, 2005). The flag symbolizes unity, unity
of a people, unity of a nation, and can draw a sense of patriotism and also a sense of nationalism.
Patriotism can be defined as love or pride for country, and is often associated with an emotional
attachment to that country, while nationalism is defied as uncritical acceptance of national, state,
and political authorities combined with a belief of superiority and dominance of one’s nation,
and is often associated with aggression (Stitka, 2005).
What drives senses of nationalism and patriotism? Is it fear of foreign threat? Does public
support for the military increase when one’s sense of nationalism and/or patriotism increase?
What drives public support for the military in general? What drives support for military action?
This research design will attempt to answer the posed questions.
Literature Review
In the past the United States employed a fairly balanced and equal budget, allocated fairly
evenly among all areas of spending. Today, the economy struggles to weather such a feat. The
United States economy continues to recover from the Great Recession of 2008, the greatest
recession since the Great Depression in the 1930’s. Although the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) reports some major improvements in the U.S economy, with the rise of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), and the declining unemployment rate, the budget continues to suffer
from cutbacks in major areas of spending in terms of GDP, as a way to compensate for the losses
that ensued as a result of the Great Recession (2016).
Defense or military spending, which are often used interchangeably, has recently suffered
a great deal of cutbacks. Military spending makes up a large portion of the budget, and is very
extensive in terms of what is considered to be included in the defense budget. One important

aspect that is categorized as military spending is foreign assistance, which is defined by the
federal government as aid given by the United States to other countries. “Foreign assistance
attempts to both promote and support peace, security, and development efforts, and provide
humanitarian relief during times of crisis” (Foreignassistance.gov, n.d). Such an aspect of
military spending is imperative in maintaining national security. During the Cold War for
example, the United States as well as the then Soviet Union used foreign aid to acknowledge and
address the possibility of international threats. In this case, foreign assistance was used to
maintain allies in the fight against the spread of Communism (Poe & Meernik, 1995, p. 399).
Historically, in times of war, the defense budget sees an increase in terms of allocation of
funds; conversely in times of peace, cutbacks can be and typically are employed (Chantrill, n.d).
Fluctuations in defense spending are not uncommon. For example, during former President
Ronald Reagan’s time in office, the defense budget experienced many fluctuations. Former
President Reagan saw the end of the Cold War while in office, yet still refused to cut defense
spending or raise taxes. Both the president’s unwillingness to cut defense spending, and the
Democrats in Congress refusal to cut low-income programs called for a different solution. The
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) sought to break the dead end legislators had reached in
terms of federal budgetary processes and concerns (Hahm, Kamlet, and Mowery, 1992).
Although many studies have focused on GRH and its effect on the budget in general, few
have focused specifically on the effect it had on the defense budget. Cranford (1989) evaluated
the change of the defense budget after the implementation of GRH. The ending result revealed
that the Act was responsible for the stunted growth of defense spending. Miller (1989), in a
similar study, was also able to deduce that GRH reduced defense spending drastically.

Another study compared the post- GRH presidential defense budget proposals with
projections from the year 1984. He concluded that, “in 1984 President Reagan proposed a
defense buildup which would have resulted in budget authority of $421.6 billion by fiscal year
1988. Just three years later, the president proposed budget authority of $312 billion also for fiscal
year 1988. This is a major concession, even in the light of lower defense inflation costs” (Kee,
1988).
There are many sub-categories that can be considered under the defense budget. The Su-
Kamlet-Mowery (SKM) Model created by the authors of this study, disintegrated the defense
budget into seven different categories as outlined in the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) classification: military personnel; operation and maintenance (O&M); procurement;
military construction; research development test and evaluation (RDT&E); family housing; and
atomic energy defense activities (Su et al., 1992). This study sought to analyze the defense
budget for fiscal years 1962 to 1987, however because this fiscal year time period contained a
two-year period (1985-1987) post-GRH, re-estimation was necessary to examine only pre-GRH
years (1962-1985). Consistent with previous work (Kamlet and Mowery, 1987; Su et al., 1992)
the results suggested a strong correlation between fiscal policy and defense spending. Defense
spending is more responsive to changes in revenues than any other spending category (Su et al.,
1992).
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was implemented in 1986 and continued its reign
over the federal budget until 1989. To fully determine the effect of GRH, an analysis of defense
spending was necessary. Results showed that defense spending under the implementation of
GRH were lower, suggesting that GRH did restrict defense spending. All results suggest that

defense spending was lower than it would have been without the execution of GRH (Hahm et al.,
1992).
Aside from increases in defense spending in times of war, and thus decreases in defense
spending in times of peace, the defense budget fluctuates without considerable explanation.
Richardson (1960) suggests that the driving force between such fluctuations is a derivative of the
action and reaction of two rival nations. Although dated, a more elaborate model of the
Richardsonian Paradigm1, which emphasizes the internal processes of the state, in this case the
United States and the Soviet Union, suggests that the organizational and fiscal factors play an
important role in these fluctuations (Nincic and Cusack, 1979).
Nincic and Cusack (1979) in their study concluded that military spending fluctuations are
driven by a means to stimulate the economy, and also as a means for compensation for shortfalls
in private consumption and investment. They explain that because military spending is so
complex, and it requires such a large budget to support all categories2, it is able to withstand such
fluctuations. Rises in taxes, and increases in government spending are not typically favored by
the general public. Both politicians and the general public alike can easily justify an increase in
defense spending; an increase in national security will never be viewed as negative, and will
likely always be welcomed more so than an arbitrary rise in taxes to compensate for economic
frailty (Nincic and Cusack, 1979).
Although it is unlikely that the general United States public would not support more
national security, it is unclear how supportive the general public really is of military spending,
more specifically increases in military spending. Many scholars have discussed public opinion
and its effect on government processes. Ostrom and Marra (1986) found that policymakers seem
1 For every action is a greater reaction.
2 Previously cited and determined in the Hahm et al. (1992) study.

to consider public support or opposition to increases in military spending (where public opinion
is defined as plurality favoring either an increase or decrease in military spending). Other studies
find that changes in public opinion tend to precede change in policy (Page and Shapiro, 1983).
Hartley and Russet (1992) take a different approach in analyzing public support and its
effect on military spending. The two hypothesize that public opinion does not influence the
government, but rather that the government systematically manipulates public opinion. Upon
conducting their own research and analyzing previous research studies, Hartley and Russet found
no evidence to support their claim (1992). They found that public opinion was systematic over a
period of years. It is important to note that the systematic manner of public opinion may be
correlated, although not necessarily caused by the happenings of the times. In an era where the
Soviet Union, a Communist super power was building up its military, the U.S’s countervailing
military buildup and therefore increase in military spending might have been seen as necessary in
order to maintain a strong sense of national security. Frank Newport (2003) however, had this to
say about public opinion (in relation to the Iraq War) :
“Additionally, most of those who support military action do so because they approve of
the general policy aims of the war. More than eight out of ten of those who favor the war
say they do so because it is the right thing for the United States to do, while only about
two out of ten say they support it not because it is the right thing to do, but because they
want to show support for the troops in Iraq.”
In 1955, the United States would begin what would turn out to be the longest war in
United States History. The Vietnam War is arguably one of the most highly criticized conflicts in
which the U.S was involved. This conflict stems as far back as the Truman Administration,
however President Eisenhower placed military advisers and CIA operatives in Vietnam, while
Kennedy was responsible for deploying American soldiers to Vietnam (ushistory.org, 2014). The
conflict would formally end during the Nixon Administration upon the signing of a ceasefire

(ushistory.org, 2014). Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy received broad support for their
initiatives, but the scrutiny did not come from the Presidents’ efforts, instead it came from what
was being shown by the media. Night after night, Americans would tune in only to see coverage
of young American soldiers being flown home in body bags; the public was growing impatient,
and thus began to harshly criticize U.S involvement in Vietnam at all (ushistory.org, 2014).
Public support for the military and military operations in general fluctuates, some
conflicts seem worth engaging more so than others. While the Vietnam War remains one of
the most highly criticized wars, a more recent conflict in United States History garnered
surprising support among the U.S general public. The Persian Gulf War, a U.S effort to remove
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from power would amass a 63% to 31% approval rating (Moore,
2001). However, U.S involvement was not always this highly favored among the public.
Although Americans unanimously agreed that action should be taken against Iraq, reluctance to
engage in war was still extraordinary. According to David W. Moore (2001), Americans wanted
to avoid war by a 55% to 42% margin. As tensions among Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia began
to rise, President George H.W. Bush began to take action, ordering the deployment of U.S troops
to Saudi Arabia; the American consensus on engaging in war was generally split (Moore, 2001).
When the President issued air strikes however, the U.S public rallied around the President
causing public support to surge. Moore (2001) cites that 80% to 15% of Americans expressed
support for “the U.S decision to go to war with Iraq in order to drive the Iraqi’s out of Kuwait.”
Favor for continued fighting until Hussein was removed from power would continue to be the
majority until the end of the war in 1991 (Moore, 2001).
Despite overwhelming support for war against Iraq during the first Bush Administration,
another war in Iraq initiated by George W. Bush (former President George H.W. Bush’s son),

would not resonate quite the same among the American people. In September of 2001, the
United States terrorist attacks left the people of the U.S both stunned, and fearful. President
George W. Bush responded to the attacks accusing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein for the deadly
attacks. In 2003, when it was speculated that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,
Bush ordered the deployment of U.S troops. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the
fear of foreign threat still very prominent in the minds of Americans, the public supported the
President’s decision to enter Iraq; 72% to 25% (Newport, 2003). In March of 2003, the majority
of American’s felt that the war had been going well. Over the years, Americans began to grow
tired and impatient as the war raged on overseas. In 2008, Pew Research Center conducted a
survey; the results showed that a 54% majority thought that using military force in Iraq was the
wrong thing to do. A slight majority also agreed that it was time to bring the troops home (Pew
Research Center, 2008).
Americans’ skepticism would continue to grow. In 2011, when current President Barrack
Obama ordered the withdrawal of the majority of troops in Iraq, 75% of Americans rallied
around the President in support (Pew Research Center, 2011). Despite the efforts made by both
the Bush and the Obama Administrations, 31% of Americans felt that the U.S involvement in
Iraq would increase the chances of another terrorist attack, although 39% felt the efforts made no
difference (Pew Research Center, 2011).
September 11 era Veterans also felt the effects of post war. Although an alarming
majority (96%) of veterans felt proud of their service, and received an overwhelming
appreciation among Americans, despite the loosened connection between civilians and the
Armed Forces, nine in ten Americans expressed pride in the troops, and three-quarters reported
thanking a veteran for their service; still 44% of post 9/11 era veterans reported having difficulty

adjusting to civilian life (Pew Research Center, 2011). Despite the overwhelming support, eight
in ten post 9/11 era veterans feel that the general public possesses little to no understanding of
the problems that those in the military face (Pew Research Center, 2011).
In 2005, Gallup polls released a study that attempted to gauge Americans’ sense of
patriotism. The study found that about one in five Americans, in polls conducted in 1994 and
1999, said they were ‘extremely patriotic’ while in 2002 and 2005, surveys showed that roughly
on in four Americans said they were extremely patriotic (Carroll, 2005). The September 11,
attacks caused a spike in Americans’ sense of patriotism as are displayed not only in the Gallup
poll (2005) study that shows no less than 61% and as many as 70% of Americans are extremely
proud to be American, or extremely patriotic, but also in the literature published by Linda Skitka
(2005) that stated that more Americans displayed the American flag in their homes, on their cars,
or even on their person.
Although the above research have supported many claims, and are thorough and precise
in their data collection, the studies are outdated. This research will focus on a more
psychological approach and will focus primarily on public support for the military in general and
also public support for military action, taking into specific consideration senses of patriotism and
nationalism, and the effects those senses may or may not have on public support for the military.
Hypotheses:
H1: In times where there is apparent fear of threat, senses of patriotism and nationalism will
increase.
H2: When senses of patriotism increase, public support for the military in general will also
increase.
H3: When senses of nationalism increase, public support for military action (war) will also
increase.
H4: When overall public support for the military increase, satisfaction among military personnel
(both active and inactive) will also increase.

Data and Methods:
The data for this research will be obtained by means of two experiments. In attempt to
support all four hypotheses, two different experiments will need to be conducted, but will also
require a correlations coefficient test. The correlations coefficient test results will be further
examined using a significance test. The means to discover whether H1, H2, and H3 are supported
will all be through one experiment, which will be referred to as experiment one. The means to
determine whether H4 is supported will be through another experiment, which will be referred to
as experiment two.
Experiment one should be comprised of a simple random sample of fifty consenting, non
military personnel participants, in which there should be an even number of males and females of
all races, all at least over the age of eighteen. These fifty participants will then be split randomly
into a control group and an experimental group each with twenty-five participants. Both the
experimental and control groups will be asked to complete anonymous surveys. The
experimental group will be taken to a room with a television, desks and chairs. Participants’ will
be asked to sit at every other desk, and will be expected to complete a pre-survey, comprised of
only two questions, which are presented below:
1. In general, how supportive are you of the U.S military?
1. Extremely supportive, 2. supportive, 3.moderately supportive,
4. not at all supportive
2. Do you own/fly/display an American flag?
1. Yes, 2. no
The pre-survey will attempt to gauge the participants’ senses of patriotism and
nationalism before the fear of foreign threat is imposed. Participants will then be shown fake
news stories in which the U.S. is under attack. The news stories will be shown to the twenty-five
experimental group individuals on three different news stations: Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC,

to account for potential ideological biases on the part of the news stations that could potentially
sway an individuals initial reaction. The News coverage will show images of burning buildings,
along with other graphic images in attempt to raise the participants’ fear of foreign threat. The
News story will state that government officials have reason to believe that known terrorist group,
ISIS was directly involved in the attacks, and that the U.S is prepared to take action against the
terrorist group. After the news stories have been shown on the three news networks, a survey will
be distributed to each of the twenty-five individuals. The survey will consist of four questions
that are outlined below:
1. After watching the news stories, would you say you feel?
1. Very threatened, 2. Threatened, 3. Somewhat threatened,
4. Not threatened at all
2. If the U.S were to take military action against ISIS, would you support that decision?
1.Yes, 2. No
3. In general, how supportive are you of the United States Military?
1. Strongly supportive, 2. Supportive, 3. Moderately supportive,
4. Not at all supportive
4a. Do you own/fly/display an American flag?
1. Yes, 2. No
4b. If not, will you now, after watching the News?
1. Yes, 2. No
Question two will gauge the respondents’ sense of nationalism after foreign threat is imposed, if
the respondent answers yes; it will be assumed that the respondents’ sense of nationalism is high.
Question three will gauge the respondents’ overall feelings about the military by means of how
supportive they consider themselves to be. Question four will gauge the respondents’ feelings of
patriotism, again after foreign threat is manipulated, if the respondent answers yes to the
question, it will be assumed that their feelings of patriotism are high. The numbers associated
with the survey responses, will serve as a means for coding.
The control group will be taken to a room with desks and chairs, they will not be shown
the news stories, as the experimental group was, but will be asked to complete a three question

survey. The twenty-five participants will be asked to sit at every other desk, to dissuade
participants from looking at another’s survey responses. The survey will be similar to that of the
experimental group, although will contain a few minor differences. This survey will ask
explicitly: How patriotic would you say you are, extremely patriotic, somewhat patriotic, and not
at all patriotic? Question two will be the same as question four in the experimental group’s post-
survey, and question three will be the same as question three in the experimental group’s post-
survey. The last question will be different, and is cited below:
4a. If the U.S were to declare war on any radical Islamic terrorist group, would you be in
support of that decision?
1. Yes, 2.No.
4b. How likely are you to be in support of that decision?
1. Extremely likely, 2. Likely, 3. Moderately likely, 4. Unlikely,
5. Extremely unlikely.
The responses will be coded the same.
The results from the experimental group pre and post-surveys will be tested using the
correlations coefficient test to determine whether or not the fear of foreign threat to which
participants were exposed had any effect on the participants’ support for the military, or their
senses of patriotism and nationalism. The correlations coefficient test will determine whether or
not the fear of threat had a positive, negative, or no relationship at all with the participants’
feelings of nationalism, patriotism, and support for the military. A correlation coefficient test
should also be run between the post-survey responses and the control group survey responses in
attempt to further support hypotheses one, two, and three. The results from the correlation
coefficient test will be further examined using a significance test, which will determine how
significant the relationships really are.
Experiment two should also be a simple random sample of one hundred military
personnel, fifty active duty, and fifty veterans. There should be twenty members from each of

the branches (Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy). Participants will be divided into an
experimental group and a control group, with fifty members in each group. There should be an
even number of members from each branch, both the experimental and control groups (five from
each of the four branches).
The experimental group will be told about the findings of experiment one. They will be
given the survey responses, and the results from the correlations coefficient test. Participants will
then be asked to complete a survey of the questions. The questions will include:
1. How satisfied are you with the military?
1. Extremely satisfied, 2. Satisfied, 3.Moderately satisfied, 4. Dissatisfied,
5. Extremely dissatisfied
2. For Veterans: Given the opportunity, would you choose to enlist in the military again?
1.Yes, 2.No
3a. For active Duty members: Are you considering re-enlistment?
1.Yes, 2. No
3b. How certain are you in that decision?
1. Extremely certain, 2. Fairly certain, 3. Not certain at all.
The control group will be taken into a separate room from the experimental group and
will not be told about the findings of experiment one, instead, they will only be asked to
complete an anonymous survey. The survey will be the same as it was for the experimental
group. As in experiment one; the numbers associated with the responses will serve as a means
for coding.
The results from the surveys completed by the experimental and control groups
associated with experiment two, will also be tested using a correlations coefficient test. The
results from the correlations coefficient test will determine whether public support for the
military increases satisfaction among those who have served and those currently serving in the
Armed Forces, has a positive, negative, or no relationship, again, the results yielded from the
correlation coefficient test will be further examined using a significance test.

Expected Results
Through carrying out these experiments, and using the correlations coefficient test, it can
be expected that each of the four hypotheses will be supported. First, it is important to note that a
correlation implies that a change in one variable will normally be accompanied by a change in
the other. The change that is determined through this test can be positive, negative, or it can be
found that the two variables have no relationship at all.
A positive correlation suggests that as one variable increases, the other variable will also
increase. A negative correlation suggests that as one variable increases, the other variable will
decrease, thus no correlation suggests that the two variables are completely independent of each
other.
To validate the determined relationship, correlations tests are typically complemented by
a significance test, which determines how significant or how certain one can be that the proposed
relationship is, by using a value referred to as Pearson’s R. The closer the Pearson’s R-value is to
one, the stronger, and thus, more significant the relationship. A negative value for Pearson’s R,
suggests that the relationship is negative; therefore, a positive Pearson’s R-value suggests that
the relationship is positive.
The pre-survey given to the experimental group before the imposed fear of threat, will
help to determine whether or not the fear of threat had any impact on their responses in the post-
survey. The responses from the control group on their survey will attempt to further support the
claim that fear of foreign threat does in fact cause increases in senses of nationalism and
patriotism. Through conducting experiment one, it is expected that before the participants are
exposed to the news stories, their senses of patriotism and nationalism will be fairly moderate, if
not low. Therefore, after they are exposed to the news stories, their senses of nationalism and

patriotism will be higher. This finding would support hypothesis one given that it was
hypothesized that after participants are exposed to fear of foreign threat, their senses of
nationalism and patriotism, will increase. A strong positive relationship between fear of foreign
threat and senses of nationalism and patriotism can be expected.
Also in conducting experiment one, after fear is imposed by the news stories,
participants’ feelings towards to the military will be higher; therefore, general support will
increase. A strong positive correlation between general support for the military would support
hypothesis two, as it states as senses of patriotism increase, general support for the military will
also increase. The same can be said for senses of nationalism. It was hypothesized that as senses
of nationalism increase, support for military action will also increase, as nationalism is often
associated with support for war. Again, a strong positive correlation can be expected.
The responses from the experimental group surveys in experiment two compared with the
responses from the control group surveys in experiment two, will attempt to further support the
claim that as overall support for the military increases, satisfaction among active and inactive
members of the Armed Forces will also increase, as such a strong positive correlation is
expected.
Summary and Conclusions
Public support for both the military in general and military action fluctuates in times of
war. The same can be said about senses of patriotism and nationalism. After the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001, patriotism increased as many more Americans started to fly and/or
display the American flag (Skitika, 2005). Nationalism also increased, as most were in support of
former President Bush’s decision to send U.S troops to Iraq (Newport, 2003). Given recent
economic turmoil, spending on the military has steadily decreased, and is set to decrease even

more. As support for the military increases in time of war, military spending also increases in
time of war, despite policies to combat that phenomenon. Both active duty members as well as
veterans, along will the support given by the general public suffer when these cutbacks are
executed.
This research attempts to explain what drives support for the military. However, the
means by which this research is conducted may contain biases that skew the results. For
example, although a simple random sample is the means by which participants will be chosen,
that will not account for biases in personal views. Some individuals may be extremely patriotic
even without being exposed to the fear of foreign threat. The same can be said for the veterans
and active duty members. For active duty military members, satisfaction may differ among
different branches. As for veterans, satisfaction may differ depending on during what time period
they were actively serving in the military.
This research is merely a design, and its primary purpose should not be to prove or
support the stated hypotheses, but should rather serve as a way to raise awareness to the
presenting problem: low public support for the United States Armed Forces, and thus low
satisfaction among veterans and active duty members.

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