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CONFIDENTIAL
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Practical Cryptography, Certificates, and 802.1X
Jon Green
Rich Langston
November 2012
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All rights reserved 2 #airheadsconf
•  Give a basic background in cryptography and
public key infrastructure
–  What is symmetric key crypto?
–  What is asymmetric key crypto?
–  What are certificates and PKI?
•  Show how to use public certs with our controller
•  Show how these two come together to create
802.1x
Today’s Goals
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#airheadsconf
3
Cryptography Primer
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•  Plain text is normal, unencrypted text
•  A Cipher is an encryption technique
•  Cipher Text is the unreadable output on the
Cypher
Terminology
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•  Bob and Alice are traditionally used in examples
of cryptography
Meet Bob and Alice
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Meet The New Bob, Alice, and Eve
Max, aka “Bob” Agent 99, aka “Alice”
Konrad of Kaos, aka “Eve”
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Symmetric Key Cryptography
Watch out!
Kaos is on
the way!
Watch out!
Kaos is on
the way!
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Symmetric Key Cryptography (2)
•  Strength:  
–  Simple  and  very  fast  (order  of  1000  to  10000  faster  than  
asymmetric  mechanisms)  
•  Weakness:  
–  Must  agree  the  key  beforehand  
–  How  to  securely  pass  the  key  to  the  other  party?  
•  Examples:    AES,  3DES,  DES,  RC4  
•  AES  is  the  current  “gold  standard”  for  security  
Agent 99 Max
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Public Key Cryptography (Asymmetric)
Max! You
idiot! Kaos
has our key!
Max! You
idiot! Kaos
has our key!
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Public Key Cryptography (2)
•  Strength  
–  Solves  problem  of  passing  the  key  –  Anyone  can  use  the  public  key  
to  encrypt  a  message,  but  only  recipient  can  decrypt  
–  Allows  establishment  of  trust  context  between  parNes  
•  Weakness:  
–  Slow  (MUCH  slower  than  symmetric)  
–  Problem  of  trusNng  public  key  (what  if  I’ve  never  met  you?)  
•  Examples:  RSA,  DSA,  ECDSA  
Agent 99 Max
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Hybrid Cryptography
•  Randomly  generate  “session”  key  
•  Encrypt  data  with  “session”  key    
(symmetric  key  cryptography)  
•  Encrypt  “session”  key  with  recipient’s  public  key  
(public  key  cryptography)  
Agent 99 Max
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Hash Function
My shoe
phone
battery died
•  Properties
–  it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message
–  it is infeasible to find a message that has a given hash
–  it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash
–  it is infeasible to modify a message without changing its hash
•  Ensures message integrity
•  Also called message digests or fingerprints
•  Examples: MD5, SHA1, SHA2 (256/384/512)
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Digital Signature
•  Combines a hash with an asymmetric crypto algorithm
•  The sender’s private key is used in the digital signature
operation
•  Digital signature calculation:
Agent 99 Max
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•  Encryption provides
–  confidentiality, can provide authentication and integrity protection
•  Checksums/hash algorithms provide
–  integrity protection, can provide authentication
•  Digital signatures provide
–  authentication, integrity protection, and non-repudiation
•  For more info:
Summary: Security Building Blocks
Buy this Book!
CONFIDENTIAL
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#airheadsconf
15
You  have  to  decide  who  you  trust  before  you  decide  what  to  believe  
Cer$ficates,  Trust  &  PKI
CONFIDENTIAL
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What is a Certificate?
•  A  cerNficate  is  a  digitally  signed  statement  
that  binds  a  public  key  to  some  idenNfying  
informaNon  
–  The  signer  of  the  cerNficate  is  called  its  issuer  
–  The  enNty  talked  about  in  the  cerNficate  is  the  
subject  of  the  cerNficate  
•  CerNficates  in  the  real  world  
–  Any  type  of  license,  government-­‐issued  ID’s,  
membership  cards,  ...  
–  Binds  an  idenNty  to  certain  rights,  privileges,  or  
other  idenNfiers  
CONFIDENTIAL
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What is a Certificate? (2)
CONFIDENTIAL
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Trust Model
•  Agent  99  will  believe  Max’s  public  key  belongs  to  
Max  if  Agent  99  trusts  the  issuer  of  Max’s  
cerNficate  to  make  key-­‐name  binding  statements  
•  How  can  we  convince  Agent  99  to  trust  the  issuer  
of  Max’s  cerNficate?  
•  SoluNon:  Agent  99  must  implicitly  trust  some  set  
of  public  keys  
–  Once  she  does  that,  those  public  keys  can  introduce  
other  public  keys  to  her  (hierarchical  model)  
CONFIDENTIAL
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Public Key Infrastructure
•  A  CerNficate  Authority  (CA)  guarantees  the  
binding  between  a  public  key  and  another  CA  or  
an  “End  EnNty”  (EE)  
•  CA  Hierarchies  
CONFIDENTIAL
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•  Normally, self-signed root CAs are created, then
these create subordinate CAs
•  Once subordinate CAs have been created, the
root is taken offline
–  If the root is compromised, the trust model is broken and the
bad guys can fool you into trusting a cert that is bogus
Certificate Authority Best Practice
CONFIDENTIAL
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Certificate Authority Best Practices
Symantec/VeriSign Data Center
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Who do you trust?
Windows: Start->Run->certmgr.msc
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•  Windows Server includes a domain-aware CA –
why not just use it?
•  Disadvantages:
–  PKI is complex. Might be easier to let Verisign/Thawte/etc.
do it for you.
–  Nobody outside your Windows domain will trust your
certificates
•  Advantages:
–  Less costly
–  Better security possible. Low chances of someone outside
organization getting a certificate from your internal PKI
Public CA versus Private CA
CONFIDENTIAL
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•  Only intended for BYOD – not a general-purpose
CA
–  No Web enrollment interface
–  No manual enrollment interface
–  Limited (BYOD-focused) policy controls
•  Recommendation: Use for deploying BYOD
certs which have limited applicability
–  Valid for WLAN access to a limited access zone
–  Not valid for other enterprise services (email, VPN, app sign-
on, etc.)
ClearPass as a CA
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Public Key Infrastructure (3)
•  Agent  Agent  99  trusts  Max’s  public  key  if  there  is  a  
valid  chain  of  cerNficates  from  Max’s  public  key  to  a  
root  CA  that  Agent  99  implicitly  trusts  
•  Web  browsers  also  check  DNS  hostname  ==  
cerNficate  Common  Name  (CN)  
•  Chain  Building  &  ValidaNon  
CONFIDENTIAL
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Certificate Validity
CONFIDENTIAL
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•  With the latest version of Apple TV iOS, WPA2
Enterprise can be used
•  However, the Apple TV does not have a clock
•  So when it is rebooted, it thinks it is January,
1970, aka the “epoch”
•  It will not authenticate successfully because it
will not trust the network’s cert is valid
•  NTP must complete first to fix the time
Good to Know: Apple TV
CONFIDENTIAL
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•  Can be used by the client (e.g. web browser) to
verify server’s certificate validity
–  OCSP URL is read from server certificate’s AIA field
•  Can be used by the server (e.g. mobility
controller) to verify client’s certificate validity
–  OCSP URL is most often configured on the server to point to
specific OCSP responders
•  OCSP transactions use HTTP for transport
protocol
•  Important: Nonce Extension required for replay
prevention
–  Some public CAs don’t like this…
OCSP
CONFIDENTIAL
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•  OCSP Direct Trust Model
–  Each OCSP responder has an OCSP Responder certificate
–  Each Responder cert must be installed on relying party
(controller)
–  ArubaOS only supports a single Responder cert – problem
for redundancy
•  OCSP Delegated Trust Model
–  OCSP responder has an OCSP Responder cert issued by
each issuing CA for which it can respond
–  Relying party checks to see that OCSP response is signed
by a known cert
–  Requires each issuing CA cert to be installed on relying party
(controller) because chaining is not supported
–  Requires ArubaOS 6.1.4.1-FIPS or ArubaOS 6.3+
OCSP – Two Variants
CONFIDENTIAL
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For More Info
Buy this Book!
CONFIDENTIAL
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All rights reserved 31 #airheadsconf
#airheadsconf
31
Aruba Certificate Operations
CONFIDENTIAL
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• Server Certificate
– Used by controller to authenticate to the
client (EAP-TLS, PEAP, Web)
• CA Certificate
– Used by controller to validate client
certificate (EAP-TLS only)
• Client Certificate
– Used by client to authenticate to the
network (EAP-TLS only)
Relevant Certificate Types
CONFIDENTIAL
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• PEM / PKCS#7
– Contains a certificate in base64 encoding (open in
a text editor)
• DER
– Contains a certificate in binary encoding
• PFX / PKCS#12
– Contains a certificate AND private key, protected
by a password
Certificate Formats
CONFIDENTIAL
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• Private key stays on controller
• CSR is sent to CA
– How this works depends on the CA type
• CA issues certificate in PEM/CER or
DER format
• Certificate is uploaded to controller
• Controller puts certificate back
together with private key
automatically
Using Certificate Signing Request
CONFIDENTIAL
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Generating Certificate Signing Request
CONFIDENTIAL
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Send CSR to your CA of choice
CONFIDENTIAL
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All rights reserved 37 #airheadsconf
Uploading Certificates
CONFIDENTIAL
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Uploading Certificate
Certificate only
(PEM format)
Certificate and
private key in PFX
format
CONFIDENTIAL
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All rights reserved 39 #airheadsconf
#airheadsconf
39
Putting it all together: 802.1X
CONFIDENTIAL
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Authentication with 802.1X
•  Authenticates users
before granting access
to L2 media
•  Makes use of EAP
(Extensible
Authentication Protocol)
•  802.1X authentication
happens at L2 – users
will be authenticated
before an IP address is
assigned
CONFIDENTIAL
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Sample EAP Transaction
2-stage process
– Outer tunnel establishment
– Credential exchange happens inside the encrypted
tunnel
Client
Authentication
Server
Request Identity
Response Identity (anonymous) Response Identity
TLS Start
Certificate
Client Key exchange
Cert. verification
Request credentials
Response credentials
Success
EAPOL RADIUS
Authenticator
EAPOL Start
CONFIDENTIAL
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802.1X Acronym Soup
PEAP (Protected EAP)
–  Uses a digital certificate on the network side
–  Password or certificate on the client side
EAP-TLS (EAP with Transport Level Security)
–  Uses a certificate on network side
–  Uses a certificate on client side
TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security)
–  Uses a certificate on the network side
–  Password, token, or certificate on the client side
EAP-FAST
–  Cisco proprietary
–  Do not use – known security weaknesses
CONFIDENTIAL
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EAP to RADIUS Server
EAPOL (EAP over LAN) RADIUS
EAP Session
RADIUS
Server
AP/Controller
STA
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Local EAP Termination
EAPOL (EAP over LAN) RADIUS/LDAP (optional)
EAP Session
Authentication
Server
AP/Controller
STA
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CONFIDENTIAL
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All rights reserved 46 #airheadsconf
Configure Supplicant Properly
•  Configure the Common
Name of your RADIUS
server (matches CN in
server certificate)
•  Configure trusted CAs
(an in-house CA is
better than a public CA)
•  ALWAYS validate the
server certificate
•  Do not allow users to
add new CAs or trust
new servers
•  Enforce with group
policy
CONFIDENTIAL
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•  PEAP Termination
–  Authentication against whatever AAA server has been
configured (RADIUS, internal DB, LDAP)
–  If LDAP is used, use GTC as the inner EAP method
•  EAP-TLS Termination
–  If client certificate is valid and not revoked, client will be
authenticated
–  Optional: Look up certificate name in RADIUS/LDAP
(configure ‘aaa authentication dot1x cert-cn-lookup)
Authentication Sources
CONFIDENTIAL
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•  Sequenced authentication
–  Machine credential followed by user credential
–  Sequencing must be tracked by auth server (CPPM)
–  Supported in Windows domain environment…. but nowhere else
–  Timing / user behavior dependencies
•  Hardware tokens
–  Viable option, but users don’t like them…
–  Use EAP-GTC, EAP-POTP
–  RSA supplicant available
•  Stacked authentication
–  Machine and user credential in same EAP transaction
–  Theoretically possible, but not supported by any known
supplicant
Multi-Factor 802.1X Authentication?
CONFIDENTIAL
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•  Short answer: Yes – because of things like
rainbow tables, distributed cracking, fast GPUs,
etc.
•  This is why we use MSCHAPv2 inside a TLS
tunnel for Wi-Fi
•  Still using PPTP for VPN? Watch out…
Isn’t MSCHAPv2 broken?
CONFIDENTIAL
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All rights reserved 50 #airheadsconf
•  The problem: Today’s password-based auth
exposes password hashes to a possibly
unknown entity
•  Goal of PWD: Mutual authentication using a
password
•  Both sides prove they possess the password
without actually exposing the password or a
password derivative
•  Developed by Dan Harkins of Aruba Networks –
standardized in RFC xxx
Future directions: EAP-PWD
CONFIDENTIAL
© Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc.
All rights reserved 51 #airheadsconf
•  Some slides stolen from:
http://cevi-users.cevi.be/Portals/ceviusers/
images/default/Userdag-20101125-Certs.pptx
•  Some others stolen from:
http://acs.lbl.gov/~mrt/talks/secPrimer.ppt
•  Get Smart images used without permission
Credits
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#airheadsconf
The Airheads Challenge
Use Unlock Code “CRYPTO”
To get the quiz for this session
Login to play at
community.arubanetworks.com
CONFIDENTIAL
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53

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Security intermediate practical cryptography_certs_and 802.1_x_rich langston_jon green

  • 1. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 1 #airheadsconf #airheadsconf Practical Cryptography, Certificates, and 802.1X Jon Green Rich Langston November 2012
  • 2. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 2 #airheadsconf •  Give a basic background in cryptography and public key infrastructure –  What is symmetric key crypto? –  What is asymmetric key crypto? –  What are certificates and PKI? •  Show how to use public certs with our controller •  Show how these two come together to create 802.1x Today’s Goals
  • 3. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 3 #airheadsconf #airheadsconf 3 Cryptography Primer
  • 4. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 4 #airheadsconf •  Plain text is normal, unencrypted text •  A Cipher is an encryption technique •  Cipher Text is the unreadable output on the Cypher Terminology
  • 5. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 5 #airheadsconf •  Bob and Alice are traditionally used in examples of cryptography Meet Bob and Alice
  • 6. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 6 #airheadsconf Meet The New Bob, Alice, and Eve Max, aka “Bob” Agent 99, aka “Alice” Konrad of Kaos, aka “Eve”
  • 7. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 7 #airheadsconf Symmetric Key Cryptography Watch out! Kaos is on the way! Watch out! Kaos is on the way!
  • 8. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 8 #airheadsconf Symmetric Key Cryptography (2) •  Strength:   –  Simple  and  very  fast  (order  of  1000  to  10000  faster  than   asymmetric  mechanisms)   •  Weakness:   –  Must  agree  the  key  beforehand   –  How  to  securely  pass  the  key  to  the  other  party?   •  Examples:    AES,  3DES,  DES,  RC4   •  AES  is  the  current  “gold  standard”  for  security   Agent 99 Max
  • 9. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 9 #airheadsconf Public Key Cryptography (Asymmetric) Max! You idiot! Kaos has our key! Max! You idiot! Kaos has our key!
  • 10. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 10 #airheadsconf Public Key Cryptography (2) •  Strength   –  Solves  problem  of  passing  the  key  –  Anyone  can  use  the  public  key   to  encrypt  a  message,  but  only  recipient  can  decrypt   –  Allows  establishment  of  trust  context  between  parNes   •  Weakness:   –  Slow  (MUCH  slower  than  symmetric)   –  Problem  of  trusNng  public  key  (what  if  I’ve  never  met  you?)   •  Examples:  RSA,  DSA,  ECDSA   Agent 99 Max
  • 11. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 11 #airheadsconf Hybrid Cryptography •  Randomly  generate  “session”  key   •  Encrypt  data  with  “session”  key     (symmetric  key  cryptography)   •  Encrypt  “session”  key  with  recipient’s  public  key   (public  key  cryptography)   Agent 99 Max
  • 12. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 12 #airheadsconf Hash Function My shoe phone battery died •  Properties –  it is easy to compute the hash value for any given message –  it is infeasible to find a message that has a given hash –  it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash –  it is infeasible to modify a message without changing its hash •  Ensures message integrity •  Also called message digests or fingerprints •  Examples: MD5, SHA1, SHA2 (256/384/512)
  • 13. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 13 #airheadsconf Digital Signature •  Combines a hash with an asymmetric crypto algorithm •  The sender’s private key is used in the digital signature operation •  Digital signature calculation: Agent 99 Max
  • 14. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 14 #airheadsconf •  Encryption provides –  confidentiality, can provide authentication and integrity protection •  Checksums/hash algorithms provide –  integrity protection, can provide authentication •  Digital signatures provide –  authentication, integrity protection, and non-repudiation •  For more info: Summary: Security Building Blocks Buy this Book!
  • 15. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 15 #airheadsconf #airheadsconf 15 You  have  to  decide  who  you  trust  before  you  decide  what  to  believe   Cer$ficates,  Trust  &  PKI
  • 16. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 16 #airheadsconf What is a Certificate? •  A  cerNficate  is  a  digitally  signed  statement   that  binds  a  public  key  to  some  idenNfying   informaNon   –  The  signer  of  the  cerNficate  is  called  its  issuer   –  The  enNty  talked  about  in  the  cerNficate  is  the   subject  of  the  cerNficate   •  CerNficates  in  the  real  world   –  Any  type  of  license,  government-­‐issued  ID’s,   membership  cards,  ...   –  Binds  an  idenNty  to  certain  rights,  privileges,  or   other  idenNfiers  
  • 17. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 17 #airheadsconf What is a Certificate? (2)
  • 18. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 18 #airheadsconf Trust Model •  Agent  99  will  believe  Max’s  public  key  belongs  to   Max  if  Agent  99  trusts  the  issuer  of  Max’s   cerNficate  to  make  key-­‐name  binding  statements   •  How  can  we  convince  Agent  99  to  trust  the  issuer   of  Max’s  cerNficate?   •  SoluNon:  Agent  99  must  implicitly  trust  some  set   of  public  keys   –  Once  she  does  that,  those  public  keys  can  introduce   other  public  keys  to  her  (hierarchical  model)  
  • 19. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 19 #airheadsconf Public Key Infrastructure •  A  CerNficate  Authority  (CA)  guarantees  the   binding  between  a  public  key  and  another  CA  or   an  “End  EnNty”  (EE)   •  CA  Hierarchies  
  • 20. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 20 #airheadsconf •  Normally, self-signed root CAs are created, then these create subordinate CAs •  Once subordinate CAs have been created, the root is taken offline –  If the root is compromised, the trust model is broken and the bad guys can fool you into trusting a cert that is bogus Certificate Authority Best Practice
  • 21. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 21 #airheadsconf Certificate Authority Best Practices Symantec/VeriSign Data Center
  • 22. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 22 #airheadsconf Who do you trust? Windows: Start->Run->certmgr.msc
  • 23. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 23 #airheadsconf •  Windows Server includes a domain-aware CA – why not just use it? •  Disadvantages: –  PKI is complex. Might be easier to let Verisign/Thawte/etc. do it for you. –  Nobody outside your Windows domain will trust your certificates •  Advantages: –  Less costly –  Better security possible. Low chances of someone outside organization getting a certificate from your internal PKI Public CA versus Private CA
  • 24. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 24 #airheadsconf •  Only intended for BYOD – not a general-purpose CA –  No Web enrollment interface –  No manual enrollment interface –  Limited (BYOD-focused) policy controls •  Recommendation: Use for deploying BYOD certs which have limited applicability –  Valid for WLAN access to a limited access zone –  Not valid for other enterprise services (email, VPN, app sign- on, etc.) ClearPass as a CA
  • 25. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 25 #airheadsconf Public Key Infrastructure (3) •  Agent  Agent  99  trusts  Max’s  public  key  if  there  is  a   valid  chain  of  cerNficates  from  Max’s  public  key  to  a   root  CA  that  Agent  99  implicitly  trusts   •  Web  browsers  also  check  DNS  hostname  ==   cerNficate  Common  Name  (CN)   •  Chain  Building  &  ValidaNon  
  • 26. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 26 #airheadsconf Certificate Validity
  • 27. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 27 #airheadsconf •  With the latest version of Apple TV iOS, WPA2 Enterprise can be used •  However, the Apple TV does not have a clock •  So when it is rebooted, it thinks it is January, 1970, aka the “epoch” •  It will not authenticate successfully because it will not trust the network’s cert is valid •  NTP must complete first to fix the time Good to Know: Apple TV
  • 28. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 28 #airheadsconf •  Can be used by the client (e.g. web browser) to verify server’s certificate validity –  OCSP URL is read from server certificate’s AIA field •  Can be used by the server (e.g. mobility controller) to verify client’s certificate validity –  OCSP URL is most often configured on the server to point to specific OCSP responders •  OCSP transactions use HTTP for transport protocol •  Important: Nonce Extension required for replay prevention –  Some public CAs don’t like this… OCSP
  • 29. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 29 #airheadsconf •  OCSP Direct Trust Model –  Each OCSP responder has an OCSP Responder certificate –  Each Responder cert must be installed on relying party (controller) –  ArubaOS only supports a single Responder cert – problem for redundancy •  OCSP Delegated Trust Model –  OCSP responder has an OCSP Responder cert issued by each issuing CA for which it can respond –  Relying party checks to see that OCSP response is signed by a known cert –  Requires each issuing CA cert to be installed on relying party (controller) because chaining is not supported –  Requires ArubaOS 6.1.4.1-FIPS or ArubaOS 6.3+ OCSP – Two Variants
  • 30. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 30 #airheadsconf For More Info Buy this Book!
  • 31. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 31 #airheadsconf #airheadsconf 31 Aruba Certificate Operations
  • 32. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 32 #airheadsconf • Server Certificate – Used by controller to authenticate to the client (EAP-TLS, PEAP, Web) • CA Certificate – Used by controller to validate client certificate (EAP-TLS only) • Client Certificate – Used by client to authenticate to the network (EAP-TLS only) Relevant Certificate Types
  • 33. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 33 #airheadsconf • PEM / PKCS#7 – Contains a certificate in base64 encoding (open in a text editor) • DER – Contains a certificate in binary encoding • PFX / PKCS#12 – Contains a certificate AND private key, protected by a password Certificate Formats
  • 34. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 34 #airheadsconf • Private key stays on controller • CSR is sent to CA – How this works depends on the CA type • CA issues certificate in PEM/CER or DER format • Certificate is uploaded to controller • Controller puts certificate back together with private key automatically Using Certificate Signing Request
  • 35. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 35 #airheadsconf Generating Certificate Signing Request
  • 36. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 36 #airheadsconf Send CSR to your CA of choice
  • 37. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 37 #airheadsconf Uploading Certificates
  • 38. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 38 #airheadsconf Uploading Certificate Certificate only (PEM format) Certificate and private key in PFX format
  • 39. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 39 #airheadsconf #airheadsconf 39 Putting it all together: 802.1X
  • 40. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 40 #airheadsconf Authentication with 802.1X •  Authenticates users before granting access to L2 media •  Makes use of EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) •  802.1X authentication happens at L2 – users will be authenticated before an IP address is assigned
  • 41. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 41 #airheadsconf Sample EAP Transaction 2-stage process – Outer tunnel establishment – Credential exchange happens inside the encrypted tunnel Client Authentication Server Request Identity Response Identity (anonymous) Response Identity TLS Start Certificate Client Key exchange Cert. verification Request credentials Response credentials Success EAPOL RADIUS Authenticator EAPOL Start
  • 42. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 42 #airheadsconf 802.1X Acronym Soup PEAP (Protected EAP) –  Uses a digital certificate on the network side –  Password or certificate on the client side EAP-TLS (EAP with Transport Level Security) –  Uses a certificate on network side –  Uses a certificate on client side TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security) –  Uses a certificate on the network side –  Password, token, or certificate on the client side EAP-FAST –  Cisco proprietary –  Do not use – known security weaknesses
  • 43. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 43 #airheadsconf EAP to RADIUS Server EAPOL (EAP over LAN) RADIUS EAP Session RADIUS Server AP/Controller STA
  • 44. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 44 #airheadsconf Local EAP Termination EAPOL (EAP over LAN) RADIUS/LDAP (optional) EAP Session Authentication Server AP/Controller STA
  • 45. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 45 #airheadsconf
  • 46. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 46 #airheadsconf Configure Supplicant Properly •  Configure the Common Name of your RADIUS server (matches CN in server certificate) •  Configure trusted CAs (an in-house CA is better than a public CA) •  ALWAYS validate the server certificate •  Do not allow users to add new CAs or trust new servers •  Enforce with group policy
  • 47. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 47 #airheadsconf •  PEAP Termination –  Authentication against whatever AAA server has been configured (RADIUS, internal DB, LDAP) –  If LDAP is used, use GTC as the inner EAP method •  EAP-TLS Termination –  If client certificate is valid and not revoked, client will be authenticated –  Optional: Look up certificate name in RADIUS/LDAP (configure ‘aaa authentication dot1x cert-cn-lookup) Authentication Sources
  • 48. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 48 #airheadsconf •  Sequenced authentication –  Machine credential followed by user credential –  Sequencing must be tracked by auth server (CPPM) –  Supported in Windows domain environment…. but nowhere else –  Timing / user behavior dependencies •  Hardware tokens –  Viable option, but users don’t like them… –  Use EAP-GTC, EAP-POTP –  RSA supplicant available •  Stacked authentication –  Machine and user credential in same EAP transaction –  Theoretically possible, but not supported by any known supplicant Multi-Factor 802.1X Authentication?
  • 49. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 49 #airheadsconf •  Short answer: Yes – because of things like rainbow tables, distributed cracking, fast GPUs, etc. •  This is why we use MSCHAPv2 inside a TLS tunnel for Wi-Fi •  Still using PPTP for VPN? Watch out… Isn’t MSCHAPv2 broken?
  • 50. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 50 #airheadsconf •  The problem: Today’s password-based auth exposes password hashes to a possibly unknown entity •  Goal of PWD: Mutual authentication using a password •  Both sides prove they possess the password without actually exposing the password or a password derivative •  Developed by Dan Harkins of Aruba Networks – standardized in RFC xxx Future directions: EAP-PWD
  • 51. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 51 #airheadsconf •  Some slides stolen from: http://cevi-users.cevi.be/Portals/ceviusers/ images/default/Userdag-20101125-Certs.pptx •  Some others stolen from: http://acs.lbl.gov/~mrt/talks/secPrimer.ppt •  Get Smart images used without permission Credits
  • 52. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 52 #airheadsconf #airheadsconf The Airheads Challenge Use Unlock Code “CRYPTO” To get the quiz for this session Login to play at community.arubanetworks.com
  • 53. CONFIDENTIAL © Copyright 2013. Aruba Networks, Inc. All rights reserved 53 #airheadsconf #airheadsconf 53