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Swift-cyber-attacks.pptx
- 1. SWIFT Payment Network Under Attack How to Keep Your System Safe Rached Amine – MSS Director 27/04/2023
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Swift Cyber Attacks: Threats to the Global Financial System • Swift (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) is a global messaging network used by banks and financial institutions to securely transfer money and data across borders. • Swift cyber attacks have become a growing concern in recent years, as hackers have targeted the network to steal funds or sensitive financial information. • The impact of these attacks can be devastating, causing financial losses, reputational damage, and undermining trust in the global financial system. • In this presentation, we will explore the nature of Swift cyber attacks, examine some notable examples, discuss why they are successful, and provide strategies for preventing them.
- 4. What is Swift ? • Swift is a messaging network for financial institutions worldwide • Founded in 1973 to address inefficiencies and risks of international payments • Enables efficient, secure transfer of funds across borders • Provides mechanisms for tracking messages and resolving disputes • Critical for international trade and commerce • Any disruption to Swift can have significant consequences for the global economy
- 5. Types of Swift Cyber Attacks
- 6. Types of Cyber Attacks on SWIFT • Unauthorized Fund Transfers • Data Theft • Malware Infections • DDoS Attacks • Phishing and Social Engineering • Insider Threats • Advanced Persistent.
- 7. Unauthorized fund transfers • Unauthorized Fund Transfers on SWIFT • Account Takeovers • Password Cracking • Keylogging • Exploiting Vulnerabilities • Insider Threats Examples of Major Attacks: • Bangladesh Central Bank heist (2016): $81 million stolen through SWIFT account takeover. • Ecuador Corruption Case (2017): $12 million transferred from Ecuador's accounts under false pretenses. • Thailand Bank of Ayudhya (2016): $135 million stolen over 2 months via SWIFT account takeovers by North Korean hackers. • Mexico Banamex Theft (2019): $25 million stolen through SWIFT network compromise before theft was detected.
- 8. Data Theft on SWIFT Networks • Malicious actors gain unauthorized access to sensitive data stored on or transmitted over SWIFT networks, including: • Customer account information: Account numbers, balances, transaction details, personal info, etc. This data enables identity theft, fraud, scams and targeted attacks. • Internal documents: Strategic plans, risk reports, audit results, security protocols, etc. This data exposes vulnerabilities that can be exploited. • Encryption keys: Compromise of encryption keys used to securely transmit data over SWIFT prevents future protection and detection of threats. • Insider Knowledge: Malicious insiders stealing sensitive details on networks, systems, accounts and communications pose severe risks. This information can facilitate attacks by external threats or be sold on black markets.
- 9. Malware attacks • Ransomware encrypts networks/systems until high ransoms are paid, resulting in permanent loss if unable to pay. • Trojans and keyloggers steal account credentials, encryption keys, network details, enabling fraud and compromise. • Controls restrict damage after infection, but strategic coordination is needed to strengthen perimeters, enhance monitoring, limit access, respond dynamically before trust collapses. • Major incidents included WannaCry, SamSam ransomware attacks, impacting hundreds of banks, governments, critical infrastructure. • Insider threats with network access can deploy malware, with sensitive knowledge exploited by external actors until detected. Early detection is critical.
- 10. Notable Swift Cyber Attacks
- 11. Bangladesh Bank heist • In 2016, hackers stole $81 million from Bangladesh Bank's account at the New York Fed. • Attackers gained access to the bank's SWIFT network and credentials, likely through malware or phishing. They then conducted 35 fraudulent money transfers over several months. • Funds were transferred to accounts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka before detection. $15 million was recovered, but most remains missing. • The heist damaged Bangladesh's economy, finance ministry and international reputation. The bank governor resigned following the attack. • Vulnerabilities in SWIFT, lack of security controls and monitoring enabled the attack. Lessons learned improved defenses but demonstrated threats to connected financial networks. • The hack highlighted risks of cyberattacks siphoning money stealthily from accounts rather than through brute force. Malware, phishing and insider threats endanger networks worldwide. • Coordinated prevention and response strategies across borders are urgently needed to safeguard systems, assets, data and trust critical for global progress. Security must advance rapidly while managing threats that know no boundaries. • Improved monitoring, multi-factor authentication, access management, encryption and staff awareness are required - but determination alone is not enough against adversaries willing to compromise trust for ill gain. Strategic partnerships and information sharing accelerate progress against shared threats to stability and hope.
- 13. Other attacks • 2016: $12M stolen from Banco Del Austro (Ecuador). Funds remain missing. • 2017: $3M stolen from NMS Bank (Bangladesh). Limited recovery. • 2018: $80M stolen from Banco de Oro (Philippines). Substantial losses. • 2018: $225K stolen from Ukraine city government finances. Details limited, full recovery unlikely. • 2019: $336K stolen from Turkish private bank. Most funds unrecovered.
- 14. How Swift Cyber Attacks Work?
- 15. Attacks vectors
- 16. Case Emotet • Emotet spreads infection through phishing emails. Once installed, establishes foothold then malicious modules. • Modules compromise credentials, keylogging, ransomware and sell sensitive data. 2016-2017 outbreak impacted many, profit gained. Trust threatened. • Evolved faster than solutions. Abused email authentication to spread rapidly before detection. Constant adaptation required. • Damage inflicted, trust damaged. Millions impacted across Ukraine, Turkey, Germany, US, Brazil, Taiwan. • Coordination and security advancing threats essential. No perimeter safe once any remain undefended. No progress secure should trust undermined.
- 21. How to mitigate ?
- 22. • Multi-layered defenses • Threat identification and risk management • Detection and response capabilities • Coordination and information sharing • Governance and regulations • Preparedness through simulation • Public-private partnerships • Determination matching threats • Shared trust and responsibility Protecting your system
- 23. THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION
Editor's Notes
- The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is a global financial messaging network that enables banks and financial institutions to securely transfer money and communicate financial information. The SWIFT network is used by over 11,000 financial institutions in more than 200 countries, and it handles trillions of dollars in transactions every day. The SWIFT network operates by sending messages between banks that contain information about the transfer of funds, such as the amount, the sender and recipient, and any necessary authorization codes. These messages are sent through a series of secure servers and networks to ensure that they are delivered quickly and securely. While the SWIFT network is considered to be very secure, it is still vulnerable to attacks by hackers who may attempt to intercept or alter messages being sent between banks. Banks and financial institutions use a variety of security measures to protect against these attacks, including encryption, two-factor authentication, and regular security audits.
- Welcome to this presentation on Swift cyber attacks, a growing concern that poses a serious threat to the global financial system. The impact of these swift attacks can be devastating, as we have seen in recent high-profile cases. For example, in 2016, hackers stole $81 million from the Bangladesh central bank by exploiting vulnerabilities in the bank's Swift system. Similarly, in 2019, an Ecuadorian bank lost $12 million in a similar attack, and a Ukrainian bank was hit for $10 million in 2020. These attacks not only cause financial losses, but also erode trust in the global financial system, which relies on the security and reliability of Swift to function. Moreover, they can have geopolitical implications, as seen in the case of the Bangladesh heist, which was allegedly carried out by North Korean hackers. So, why are Swift cyber attacks successful? There are several factors that contribute to their effectiveness, including the lack of adequate security measures, human error, and the use of sophisticated hacking techniques.
- Swift stands for Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication. It is a messaging network used by financial institutions worldwide to send and receive financial messages. Swift was founded in 1973 to address the inefficiencies and risks of international payments and trade settlements at the time. Today, Swift has more than 11,000 member institutions in over 200 countries, making it a vital component of the global financial infrastructure. It enables the efficient and secure transfer of funds across borders, helps financial institutions manage risks associated with international payments, reduces settlement times, and promotes transparency and standardization in financial transactions. The Swift network provides mechanisms for tracking messages and resolving disputes related to financial transactions. This makes it critical for international trade and commerce, enabling the movement of goods and services across borders. Any disruption to the Swift network can have significant consequences for the global economy. In summary, Swift plays a crucial role in the global financial system, facilitating the efficient and secure transfer of funds across borders, reducing risks associated with international payments, and promoting transparency and standardization in financial transactions. It is critical for international trade and commerce, and any disruption to its operations can have significant consequences for the global economy.
- as with any critical network, SWIFT also faces cyber risks and threats that aim to compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of its systems and services. Cyber criminals seek to exploit vulnerabilities for financial gain, while sophisticated threat groups conduct espionage or sabotage for geopolitical motives. Some of the most serious cyber attacks on SWIFT include: •Massive unauthorized funds transfers: In recent years, malware and phishing attacks have allowed hackers to steal access credentials, crack encryption and conduct unauthorized wire transfers totaling hundreds of millions of dollars from banks. •Theft of sensitive financial data: Data breaches have exposed account information, balances, transactions, and other sensitive records of bank customers, enabling identity theft and fraud. •Targeted ransomware infections: Ransomware strains like NotPetya have been tailored to encrypt systems critical for financial operations and hold them hostage until hefty ransoms are paid. •DDoS attacks: Large-scale DDoS attacks have taken SWIFT networks and servers offline by flooding them with too many internet requests, crippling financial messaging services worldwide. •Advanced persistent threats: APT groups backed by nation states have conducted sophisticated espionage campaigns against SWIFT networks to compromise infrastructure, steal strategic data and ultimately sabotage financial systems.
- In recent years, we have witnessed a disturbing trend of criminals compromising SWIFT networks and accounts to conduct unauthorized money transfers, effectively stealing funds from banks and their customers. Once access is obtained through malware, phishing, password cracking or other attacks, money can be funnelled out of accounts and routed to criminal wallets at will until these thefts are eventually discovered. Some of the most notorious cases of unauthorized SWIFT transfers include: •The Bangladesh Central Bank heist in 2016, where $81 million was stolen through an account takeover. Hackers gained access to the bank's SWIFT network and accounts, then transferred the funds to accounts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka. •The Ecuador corruption case in 2017, where $12 million was transferred from Ecuador's accounts for personal use under false pretenses. The finance minister orchestrated the transfer of public funds into private accounts through SWIFT. • Attacks against the Bank of Ayudhya in Thailand in 2016, where $135 million was stolen over 2 months through SWIFT account compromises by North Korean hackers. •The recent theft of $25 million from Mexico's Banamex bank, which was facilitated through compromise of the SWIFT network before detection.
- As you know, SWIFT enables the secure transfer of trillions in funds each day between banks globally. While these technologies facilitate progress, they also introduce vulnerabilities that malicious actors increasingly seek to exploit through data breaches and theft. Threat groups and hackers gain unauthorized access to customer records, internal documents, encryption keys and insider knowledge on our networks. They then sell, misuse or exploit this information to conduct identity theft, fraud, scams, corporate espionage and targeted attacks dismantling trust. Some cases demonstrate the severity of these assaults, yet the full scale of damage remains unknown due to underreporting. Stolen account numbers, balances, transactions, IDs, addresses, passwords and strategies endanger consumer well-being, financial stability and national security. Malicious insiders aware of network weaknesses pose equal risks, as their sensitive knowledge facilitates exploitation by external threats. Without detection, their infiltration alone can collapse trust, security and progress itself over time.
- Ransomware infections target infrastructure and transactions systems critical for financial progress, encrypting networks until high ransoms are paid to guarantee access once more. Failure to pay results in permanent loss of functionality and data. Trojans and keyloggers steal sensitive account credentials, encryption keys, network details and more - information then exploited for fraud, scams, money laundering and compromise of security.
- Gaining access likely through malware infections or phishing attacks targeting employees, the attackers were then able to conduct 35 fraudulent money transfers repeatedly from April to August before detection. Funds were moved to casino accounts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka, damaging Bangladesh's economy, finance ministry reputation and international trust in the process. $15 million has since been recovered, yet over $60 million remains missing, costing the governor his post following a breach highlighting vulnerabilities in global networks and lack of security controls enabling catastrophic threat realization. The Bangladesh Bank heist demonstrated how financial networks and accounts may be infiltrated and plundered through stealth rather than force. Malware, phishing scams, and insider threats exploiting trust for gain pose perils as dangerous as any brute hack or leak. Such schemes may siphon money slowly from the system over time until balance sheets lie in ruin. While investments work to bolster defenses after damage has already come to pass, determination alone cannot shield progress against adversaries dedicating years to compromise. Only through strategic adaptation, enhanced monitoring, restricted access, and information sharing do we gain even footing - yet even then, the battle is never truly won. We must secure trust at pace with its perils now as global dependencies deepen daily.
- The hackers used a custom version of malware to hack software called SWIFT Alliance Access to both make the transactions and hide the evidence. The hackers used a version of the malware that removed integrity checks within the Alliance software and then monitored the transaction files sent through the system, searching the payment orders and confirmations for specific terms. These terms and the responses to them were specified by a Command and Control server in Egypt. When a message with one of the search terms was found, the malware would do different things depending on the kind of message. Payment orders were modified to increase the amounts being moved, updating the Alliance database with new values. Confirmation messages from the SWIFT network were also modified. Confirmations are printed and stored in the database. Before being printed, the malware would alter the confirmations to show the original, correct transaction value; it also deleted confirmations from the Alliance database entirely. It's still not clear how the initial transactions were entered into the system to trigger the malware in the first place. Again, the SWIFT network key components haven't been compromised, the malware was targeting the Bangladesh Central Bank's own bride to the SWIFT infrastructure running the SWIFT Alliance Access Software. If an organization can't keep its endpoint secure, it leaves itself very vulnerable to being electronically robbed. That was the case here. The bank lacked any firewalls and was using second-hand $10 switches on its network. These switches did not allow for the regular LAN to be segmented or otherwise isolated from the SWIFT systems. The lack of network security infrastructure has hindered the investigation. It's still not known how the hackers penetrated the network, but it looks like the bank didn't make it difficult for them to do so. How the attackers obtained administration credentials is still unclear. They might have obtained these credentials by using another malware or by exploiting a remotely available vulnerability (not impossible considering the weak security practices in place in the Bangladesh Central Bank) or it might also have been an insider job. So far there are only speculations in this regards. Forging fraudulent SWIFT messages Simplifying a bit the reality, we can picture the malware as forging fraudulent SWIFT messages as follows: The view above is a simplification of the reality. Actually, the worm was brilliantly implemented since forging from scratch consistent SWIFT announces (MT103) and Money Transfer Orders (MT202) messages would have been more difficult. Instead, the worm was tampering with genuine messages issued by the Banking Information System and changing the amounts and recipient. This is a lot easier than blank forging. It is still unclear for now if the initial untampered messages were simply authentic and relevant messages, perhaps duplicated by the worm, or forged through other malwares on different systems. I couldn't find clear information in this regards in all that has been published (if a reader has additional information in this regards, I would be happy to learn about it). Just as a sidenote, whenever an institution such as the Bengladesh central bank sends a SWIFT funds transfer order, it's always in behalf of one of its customer. The SWIFT message(s) indicates the customer for which the bank requests a funds transfer. Now of course the target correspondent bank cannot know if such customer exist, it doesn't have access to the list of customers of the sending bank. The SWIFT messages tampered by the worm could have been related to any random customer of the Bengladesh bank, this doesn't matter. The only important aspect was that the beneficiary account and banking institution were the ones intended by the attackers. Intercepting SWIFT confirmations Here as well, by simplifying a little the reality, we can picture the malware as intercepting SWIFT confirmations as follows: The malware was also developed in such a way that it was intercepting confirmation messages (MT950) back from the Fed (from the SWIFT network in fact). Confirmation of genuine orders were supposed to be allowed to pass through untampered while confirmation of fraudulent messages were supposed to be intercepted and hidden. But the worm was buggy and while tampering with confirmations sent to the printer, it corrupted them somehow which caused the printer to crash. We'll get back to that later. Interestingly, going as far as trying to tamper with confirmations was pure genius (even though it didn't work as expected). Had it worked, the bank might well have noticed the attack weeks after the facts since on both sides of the world (the Fed view and the Bengladesh Central bank view), positions would have been very different but yet consistent, the Fed knowing about the orders, taking them as genuine and the Bangladesh bank would have known nothing about them. Also, one should note that transfer orders (MT202) are executed immediately. So trying to tamper with confirmations was not intended to give more chance to the transfer to succeed, it was really intended as a way to hide the theft until hopefully after the money is laundered. The Malware The malware, codenamed Dridex (Addendum 2020-Sep-03 - see note at the end of the article), filenamed evtdiag.exe, was designed to hide the hacker's tracks by changing information on a SWIFT database within Alliance Access and contained the IP address of a server in Egypt the attackers used to monitor the use of the SWIFT system by Bangladesh Bank staff. It was likely part of a broader attack toolkit that was installed after the attackers obtained administrator credentials. The malware was compiled close to the date of the heist, contained detailed information about the bank's operations and was uploaded from Bangladesh. While that malware was specifically written to attack the Bangladesh Bank, the general tools, techniques and procedures used in the attack may allow the gang to strike again and as a matter of fact there have been attempts discussed by Reuters. The malware was designed to make a slight change to the code of the Access Alliance software installed at the Bangladesh Central Bank, giving attackers the ability to modify a database that logged the bank's activity over the SWIFT network. Once it had established a foothold, the malware could delete records of outgoing transfer requests altogether from the database and also intercept incoming messages confirming transfers ordered by the hackers. It was also able to manipulate account balances on logs to prevent the heist from being discovered until after the funds had been laundered. Additionnaly, it manipulated the stream of confirmations sent to a printer that produced hard copies of transfer requests so that the bank would not identify the attack through those printouts. This part went wrong and led the printer to crash.
- In 2016, $12 million was stolen from Banco Del Austro in Ecuador, and the funds remain missing to this day. In 2017, $3 million was stolen from NMS Bank in Bangladesh, and while there was some limited recovery, the damage had already been done. In 2018, $80 million was stolen from Banco de Oro in the Philippines, and the losses were substantial. And in the same year, $225,000 was stolen from the Ukraine city government finances, with full recovery unlikely. The trend continued in 2019, with $336,000 stolen from a Turkish private bank, and most of the funds still unrecovered. These attacks are not only financially damaging, but they also erode trust in financial institutions and the wider economy. We must take swift action to prevent them from happening in the first place.
- Now we will talk about swift attacks vectors, which are the various ways in which cybercriminals can exploit weaknesses in a financial institution's systems to carry out swift attacks. As we all know, swift attacks are a significant threat to financial institutions worldwide, and understanding these vectors is crucial in developing effective strategies to prevent them from happening. Firstly, let's talk about back-office swift attacks. These attacks target the back-end systems of financial institutions, including their databases, servers, and applications. Cybercriminals can exploit vulnerabilities in these systems to gain unauthorized access, extract sensitive information or initiate unauthorized transactions. To prevent back-office swift attacks, financial institutions need to ensure that their systems are secure, updated regularly, and that access is limited to authorized personnel only. Another vector for swift attacks is through middleware. Middleware is a software layer that acts as a bridge between different systems, allowing them to communicate with each other. Cybercriminals can exploit vulnerabilities in this software to gain access to sensitive information or initiate fraudulent transactions. To prevent these attacks, financial institutions need to ensure that their middleware is secure and updated regularly. End-user swift attacks are another vector that cybercriminals can exploit. This involves targeting the end-users, such as customers or employees of the financial institution, and tricking them into revealing sensitive information or clicking on malicious links. Financial institutions must educate their customers and employees about the importance of cybersecurity, and how to recognize and avoid phishing scams or other fraudulent activities. The administrator's account is also a vector for swift attacks. Cybercriminals can gain access to an administrator's account, which gives them privileged access to the financial institution's systems and data. To prevent this, financial institutions must ensure that their administrator accounts are secure, have strong passwords, and are only accessible to authorized personnel. Finally, VPN connections are also a vector for swift attacks. Cybercriminals can exploit vulnerabilities in VPN connections to gain unauthorized access to a financial institution's systems and data. Financial institutions must ensure that their VPN connections are secure, have strong encryption, and are regularly updated to prevent cybercriminals from exploiting any known vulnerabilities. In conclusion, swift attacks vectors are a
- Emotet has been causing significant damage to individuals, businesses, and organizations worldwide Emotet malware is a Trojan virus that primarily spreads through spam emails. These emails often contain a seemingly harmless attachment or link, which, once opened, activates the malware and infects the victim's computer. Once infected, Emotet can steal sensitive information, such as passwords, credit card numbers, and other personal data. It can also spread to other computers on the same network, making it particularly dangerous for businesses and organizations. What makes Emotet particularly concerning is its ability to morph and evolve. Its creators continually update the malware with new techniques, making it difficult for antivirus software to detect and remove it. Emotet can also download other malicious software onto the infected computer, such as ransomware, which can lock the victim's files and demand payment for their release. Emotet has caused significant damage worldwide, affecting businesses, organizations, and individuals in various sectors, including healthcare, finance, and government. Its impact can be devastating, resulting in data breaches, financial losses, and damage to an organization's reputation.
- One of the most common ways that Emotet spreads is through phishing emails. These emails are carefully crafted to appear legitimate, and often contain a weaponized Word document that contains a macro. When the user opens the document, the macro launches PowerShell, which then downloads Emotet malware onto the system. Once installed, Emotet can be incredibly difficult to detect and remove. It repeatedly spawns and injects itself into other processes, establishing persistence through scheduled tasks, register keys, and shortcuts in the startup folder. This allows Emotet to continue operating even after a system reboot, making it a formidable threat to organizations and individuals alike. Each spawned process has modules that perform different functions. For example, NetPass.exe is used to recover network passwords, while webbrowserpassview is used to steal saved credentials in a user's browser. Emotet can also spread through SMB and download new payloads from its command and control server, making it even more dangerous and difficult to contain.
- We can here observe some phishing email used to spread emotet
- Here you can see the office document and they add a simple how to to non aware users to place the file under sensitive directory
- On September 16, XMRig, the most common Monero (XMR) miner, was installed by Emotet using command 2 which is just for loading modules. This sample was packed in the same way that other Emotet modules are packed. Therefore, it effectively worked just like the other Emotet modules but dropped and executed XMRig. Generally, this is only done when the development team commits to delivering the module long term (like the credit card stealer). XMRig contains a configuration that specifies the mining pool and the wallet address. From the botnet there were two specific wallet IDs that were used. Here the first payloads that was delivered to the Emotet bots was a new variant of the IcedID loader. This variant is brand new or still in development as it contains a legitimate PDB path.(PDB stands for Program Database, and it is a file format used by Microsoft Visual Studio to store debugging information for an executable program or a DLL) From analysis done on the Conti Leaks from February 2022 in which a researcher with access to Conti's internal operations began leaking data from the cybercriminal organization, researchers have learned that Anubis is the internal name for IcedID and this new variant of the IcedID loader which is used with this emotet variant IcedID is a two-stage malware. The first stage is the loader which makes a request to download the second stage (the bot). Standard IcedID that is delivered via malspam exfiltrates system information through cookies in the request to the loader C2. The C2 then uses that information to determine whether the loader will receive the IcedID bot payload. With the system information generated, the C2 server can easily identify sandboxes which is the reason most sandboxes don’t see the second stage of IcedID. This new loader forgoes all of that system information exfiltration. We believe this is because the loader is being delivered to already infected machines and therefore there is no need to do a check on the system profile. The loader starts by resolving the APIs needed to execute properly then it makes up to two HTTP requests to download the encrypted next stage. The decrypted data needs to start with a 2, which most likely is a version. Next there is a boolean value which determines if the loader is invoked via the export name or just the ordinal value #1. Following that are two sizes which relate to the cleartext custom bot loader, and the encrypted bot. The bot itself is encrypted so needs to be decrypted Code wise, the IcedID bot here is the exact same as the standard bot delivered to IcedID malspam campaigns but there is a slight difference in how the bot is initialized. When standard IcedID gets commands from the C2, it comes in a list. These commands differ when looking at the IcedID being delivered to Emotet infected hosts. The integers in the response correspond to commands within the bot. So, for the above response the bot would execute the following commands in this specific order. 54897577 – update C2 list 36609609 – start beaconing 61593029 – get desktop info 46731293 – get running processes 24258075 – get system information 45055027 – get browser cookies 95350285 – get stored browser credentials The bot sent to the Emotet infected machines get the above commands as well as the following: 58139018 – send internal IcedID log 13707473 – read a file and send contents to C2 72842329 – search for file and send contents to C2 This could indicate that more priority is being placed on the IcedID bots running on Emotet machines or that the group managing IcedID bots from malspam is different than the group managing the bots sourced from Emotet malware. With this kind of malware hackers can get into bank system and then find a way to manipulate the control in place and get a direct access to swift plateform or the backoffice solution and then forge there own swift messages.
- To protect the Swift platform, a multi-layered defense strategy is required. This strategy includes a range of technical, procedural, and organizational controls that work together to prevent, detect, and respond to threats. Threat identification and risk management are critical components of any effective defense strategy. This involves conducting regular assessments of the threat landscape, identifying potential risks and vulnerabilities, and implementing controls to mitigate them. Risk management must be an ongoing process that is integrated into the overall security strategy of the organization. Detection and response capabilities are also critical to protecting the Swift platform. This involves implementing advanced monitoring and threat detection systems that can identify and respond to threats in real-time. Response capabilities must be well-defined and include incident response plans, procedures for communication and escalation, and a clear chain of command. Coordination and information sharing are essential for effective threat response. Swift has established partnerships with law enforcement agencies and other financial institutions to facilitate information sharing and coordination in the event of a cyberattack or other security incident. Governance and regulations are also critical components of any effective defense strategy. This involves establishing clear policies and procedures for security management, ensuring compliance with relevant regulations and standards, and implementing internal controls to ensure the integrity of the system. Preparedness through simulation is also an important element of a multi-layered defense strategy. This involves conducting regular security drills and simulations to test the effectiveness of response plans and procedures and identify areas for improvement. Public-private partnerships are also essential for protecting the Swift platform. Swift has established partnerships with government agencies and other organizations to facilitate information sharing and collaboration in the fight against cybercrime. In addition, determination matching threats must be a priority for organizations using the Swift platform. This involves understanding the nature of the threats facing the organization and implementing appropriate controls to mitigate those risks. Finally, shared trust and responsibility are essential for effective security management. All stakeholders must work together to ensure the security and integrity of the Swift platform, and everyone must be aware of their role and responsibilities in protecting the system. Also Swift developed a CSP program to guide their client on how securing their system; Certainly. The Customer Security Program (CSP) is a crucial aspect of SWIFT's commitment to ensuring the security and integrity of its network and its users' financial transactions. The program was established in response to the growing threat of cyber attacks and fraudulent activities that pose a significant risk to the global financial system. The CSP includes a range of security controls that are designed to provide a multi-layered defense against cyber threats. These controls include measures to secure customer environments, limit access to critical systems and data, educate and raise awareness among employees, and detect and respond to security incidents in a timely and effective manner. One of the key components of the CSP is the requirement for customers to implement a set of security controls, known as the Customer Security Controls Framework (CSCF). The CSCF is a set of mandatory and advisory controls that customers must implement to help protect their SWIFT environment from cyber attacks. In addition to implementing the CSCF, customers are also required to conduct regular security assessments and share information about any security incidents or threats with SWIFT and other members of the financial community. This information-sharing is a critical aspect of the CSP, as it enables the community to work together to identify and respond to emerging threats and vulnerabilities. Overall, the CSP represents a significant step forward in the fight against cybercrime in the financial sector. By implementing a range of security controls and fostering a culture of collaboration and information-sharing,