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Cloud, DevOps and the New Security
Practitioner
15, June 2016
1:30PM
Adrian Sanabria
Senior Security Analyst
451 Research
To get a copy of these slides, send an
email to sawaba@zip.sh with CSW2016
in the subject line or scan this QR code
Slide 2
Why are we here?
 IT changes fast. Attackers change fast. Defenders don’t.
 IT is changing
 Attackers are adapting
 The security discipline is diverging
Slide 3
Understanding security’s role by
understanding IT
Traditional approach to security:
 Security is always a secondary or enabling layer
 Security must have direct knowledge and experience
with the underlying layer in order to be effective at
protecting it or recommending feasible solutions
 Direct experience in core technical disciplines goes a
long way in earning respect and cooperation
Physical
Security
OS
Layer
Network
Layer
Service
Desk
Dev, QA,
Test
Web/App
Layer
Ops
Slide 4
Understanding security’s role by
understanding IT
Issues with the traditional approach:
 Few security teams can ever be ‘well-rounded’ enough
 Security team isn’t qualified to advise much of IT
 Adversarial/dysfunctional relationships common
 IT changes often; attackers adapt quickly
 Defenders and security tools adapt slowly
Physical
Security
OS
Layer
Network
Layer
Service
Desk
Dev, QA,
Test
Web/App
Layer
Ops
Slide 5
Security
Security’s changing role
An example: going ‘cloud-first’
 Lower-level IT layers are outsourced
 Most security practitioner knowledge lies in these layers
 Infrastructure-heavy security skillsets lose value
 Concept of bi-modal IT further confuses things
 As IT changes, so must security
Physical
Security
OS
Layer
Network
Layer
Service
Desk
Dev, QA,
Test
Web/App
Layer
Ops
Slide 6
Security’s changing role
Cloud and DevOps – an opportunity to redesign security:
 Smaller ‘well-rounded’ groups
 Dev, ops, infrastructure and security roles are shared
 Everyone working towards a clear, common goal
 Relationship between security and developers is crucial
 Security can’t impact delivery schedule
Physical
OS
Layer
Network
Layer
Service
Desk
Dev, QA, Test;
Web/App Layer; Ops
Security
Slide 7
Questions
What should security’s future role be?
 Security is redistributed into IT for all operational tasks
 Dedicated security staff performs
 high-level design, design/architectural input
 monitor changes in risk/attackers/landscape
 instruct/consult individual SMEs as needed
Physical
OS
Layer
Network
Layer
Service
Desk
Dev, QA, Test;
Web/App Layer; Ops
Security
SME
Internal Security Team
Security
SME
Security
SME
Security
SME
Slide 8
Increasingly, software resembles these
principles
Yesterday, Chef announced Habitat
https://www.chef.io/blog/2016/06/14/introducing-habitat/
So… what’s up with the yin/yang visual metaphor?
…and where’s security?
Sec
analysts are
too
Slide 9
Chef Habitat, your latest shadow IT problem
Slide 10
New rule: if you own it, own it
“Whomever is responsible for an asset
– be it data, infrastructure, code, or
people, must secure it”
Slide 11
Why make asset owners responsible?
 No one knows and understands the opportunities,
constraints and dependencies of the asset better
 Security becomes a bottleneck for performance,
progress and often, even security
 Little to no time wasted on remediation conflict: what to
fix, how to fix it, when and at what priority level
 Likely that fewer security issues will occur*
 Drives the cost of securing systems down, in terms of
labor, efficiency and efficacy**
* I’ll explain later
** I’ll explain after that
Slide 12
Better Testing, Worse Quality?
Study done in 2000 by Elizabeth Hendrickson
Reads like a short
version of the
Phoenix Project
Slide 13
Better Testing, Worse Quality?
Study done in 2000 by Elizabeth Hendrickson
 Creating an independent testing group can encourage
counterproductive culture
 “Don’t do today what you can push off onto someone else’s
plate”
 Document and address low hanging fruit
 Schedule time for developers to test and fix bugs
 To improve code quality, stop the problem at the source
 Everyone should understand what they’re building and why
 Get testers involved earlier in the process
 Bottleneck testing resources and developers are forced to ship
higher quality code
http://testobsessed.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/btwq.pdf
Slide 14
Better Testing, Worse Quality?
Study done in 2000 by Elizabeth Hendrickson
 Could this apply to InfoSec?
 Surely not.
 In fact, it might be quite worse.
 We’ve convinced everyone not
just that security is our job, but
that we’re the only ones that can
do it properly.
 What if they believed us?
Slide 15
Jobs!
Slide 16
The Enterprise Looked Like This
Slide 17
Then, the Enterprise Looked Like This
Slide 18
Today, the Enterprise Looks Like This
Slide 19
Storage
Database
Networking Enterprise
as a
service
App
Services
Mobile
Dev Tools
Slide 20
This is not now.
Slide 21
So… you want to give away our jobs?
 Traditional InfoSec doesn’t have to worry for a while
 Be aware of the change
 Learn new things now – don’t wait for later
Currently, new security jobs are often NOT going to
security practitioners, and we’ll discuss why…
Slide 22
The Security Practitioner: old versus new
 Monitoring security alerts
 Manage network security
 Manage endpoint security
 IR/Forensics
 Pentesting
 Vulnerability Scanning
 Policies/Standards
 Compliance/Regs
 Log management
 DR/BCP and SecAware
 Influence design,
architecture standards,
processes
 Automate tasks
 Forensics
 Security assessments
 Identify gaps and
recommend fixes
 JSON, REST, XML, SQL
 Routing, load balancing,
nw protocols
Slide 23
How common?
 6 out of the first 10 jobs I looked at required:
 coding skills
 new tech generation experience and/or skills
Slide 24
Like what experience or skills?
 “Ability to automate tasks using scripting or other
programming language”
 “Scripting or general purpose programming languages”
 REST, JSON, XML (API scripting)
 “Experience with DevOps, CI/CD, Chef, Puppet”
 “Experience testing for vulnerabilities in Ruby on Rails
applications”
 “Experience with various scripting and programming
languages”
 “Teach secure coding practices to software engineers”
Slide 25
What should I learn?
 Scripting (automation)
 Get familiar with cloud, agile, devops, containers,
microservices, etc.
 AppSec
 Data protection
 Learn to write code
Slide 26
What should I learn?
 Cloud – focus on AWS, Azure, Digital Ocean (cheap)
 Containers – focus on Docker
 Pick a language - ruby and python are most common
 Jenkins
 Ansible, Chef, Puppet, Salt
 New attack surface  Don’t make security worse!
 Automation  Make security better!
Slide 27
How should I learn it?
 Good starting point: find a security guy that loves to
automate security and plunder his GitHub:
https://github.com/averagesecurityguy
 And more: https://github.com/krmaxwell
 https://github.com/nbrownus  Slack makes cool stuff
 Go after AWS Certs just to learn AWS
 Digital Ocean Tutorials
Slide 28
Resources – efficiency and workflow
Learning to recognize efficiency and workflow issues;
challenging ”because we’ve always done it that way”
 Better Testing, Worse Quality, Elizabeth Hendrickson
 Four Hour Work Week, Tim Ferris
 The Phoenix Project, Kevin Behr, George Spafford,
Gene Kim
 Signal v. Noise 37Signals blogs (on medium) and books
 ReWork by the Basecamp guys
Slide 29
Resources – new ideas
New ideas – challenge assumptions, push thinking
…also, VIDEOS!
 Distributed Security Alerting by Ryan Huber (blog)
 Security Automation by Ryan Huber (video)
 What Got Us Here Won’t Get Us There Black Hat
keynote by Haroon Meer
 Cloud Computing – Why IT Matters by Simon Wardley at
OSCON 09
Slide 30
Conclusion
If you want to understand where security is
going, stop looking at security, and start
following IT innovation, trends and changes
THANK YOU!
Adrian Sanabria
@sawaba
Adrian.Sanabria@451Research.com
To get a copy of these slides, send an email
to sawaba@zip.sh with CSW2016 in the
subject line or scan this QR code

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Cloud, DevOps and the New Security Practitioner

  • 1. Cloud, DevOps and the New Security Practitioner 15, June 2016 1:30PM Adrian Sanabria Senior Security Analyst 451 Research To get a copy of these slides, send an email to sawaba@zip.sh with CSW2016 in the subject line or scan this QR code
  • 2. Slide 2 Why are we here?  IT changes fast. Attackers change fast. Defenders don’t.  IT is changing  Attackers are adapting  The security discipline is diverging
  • 3. Slide 3 Understanding security’s role by understanding IT Traditional approach to security:  Security is always a secondary or enabling layer  Security must have direct knowledge and experience with the underlying layer in order to be effective at protecting it or recommending feasible solutions  Direct experience in core technical disciplines goes a long way in earning respect and cooperation Physical Security OS Layer Network Layer Service Desk Dev, QA, Test Web/App Layer Ops
  • 4. Slide 4 Understanding security’s role by understanding IT Issues with the traditional approach:  Few security teams can ever be ‘well-rounded’ enough  Security team isn’t qualified to advise much of IT  Adversarial/dysfunctional relationships common  IT changes often; attackers adapt quickly  Defenders and security tools adapt slowly Physical Security OS Layer Network Layer Service Desk Dev, QA, Test Web/App Layer Ops
  • 5. Slide 5 Security Security’s changing role An example: going ‘cloud-first’  Lower-level IT layers are outsourced  Most security practitioner knowledge lies in these layers  Infrastructure-heavy security skillsets lose value  Concept of bi-modal IT further confuses things  As IT changes, so must security Physical Security OS Layer Network Layer Service Desk Dev, QA, Test Web/App Layer Ops
  • 6. Slide 6 Security’s changing role Cloud and DevOps – an opportunity to redesign security:  Smaller ‘well-rounded’ groups  Dev, ops, infrastructure and security roles are shared  Everyone working towards a clear, common goal  Relationship between security and developers is crucial  Security can’t impact delivery schedule Physical OS Layer Network Layer Service Desk Dev, QA, Test; Web/App Layer; Ops Security
  • 7. Slide 7 Questions What should security’s future role be?  Security is redistributed into IT for all operational tasks  Dedicated security staff performs  high-level design, design/architectural input  monitor changes in risk/attackers/landscape  instruct/consult individual SMEs as needed Physical OS Layer Network Layer Service Desk Dev, QA, Test; Web/App Layer; Ops Security SME Internal Security Team Security SME Security SME Security SME
  • 8. Slide 8 Increasingly, software resembles these principles Yesterday, Chef announced Habitat https://www.chef.io/blog/2016/06/14/introducing-habitat/ So… what’s up with the yin/yang visual metaphor? …and where’s security? Sec analysts are too
  • 9. Slide 9 Chef Habitat, your latest shadow IT problem
  • 10. Slide 10 New rule: if you own it, own it “Whomever is responsible for an asset – be it data, infrastructure, code, or people, must secure it”
  • 11. Slide 11 Why make asset owners responsible?  No one knows and understands the opportunities, constraints and dependencies of the asset better  Security becomes a bottleneck for performance, progress and often, even security  Little to no time wasted on remediation conflict: what to fix, how to fix it, when and at what priority level  Likely that fewer security issues will occur*  Drives the cost of securing systems down, in terms of labor, efficiency and efficacy** * I’ll explain later ** I’ll explain after that
  • 12. Slide 12 Better Testing, Worse Quality? Study done in 2000 by Elizabeth Hendrickson Reads like a short version of the Phoenix Project
  • 13. Slide 13 Better Testing, Worse Quality? Study done in 2000 by Elizabeth Hendrickson  Creating an independent testing group can encourage counterproductive culture  “Don’t do today what you can push off onto someone else’s plate”  Document and address low hanging fruit  Schedule time for developers to test and fix bugs  To improve code quality, stop the problem at the source  Everyone should understand what they’re building and why  Get testers involved earlier in the process  Bottleneck testing resources and developers are forced to ship higher quality code http://testobsessed.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/btwq.pdf
  • 14. Slide 14 Better Testing, Worse Quality? Study done in 2000 by Elizabeth Hendrickson  Could this apply to InfoSec?  Surely not.  In fact, it might be quite worse.  We’ve convinced everyone not just that security is our job, but that we’re the only ones that can do it properly.  What if they believed us?
  • 16. Slide 16 The Enterprise Looked Like This
  • 17. Slide 17 Then, the Enterprise Looked Like This
  • 18. Slide 18 Today, the Enterprise Looks Like This
  • 19. Slide 19 Storage Database Networking Enterprise as a service App Services Mobile Dev Tools
  • 20. Slide 20 This is not now.
  • 21. Slide 21 So… you want to give away our jobs?  Traditional InfoSec doesn’t have to worry for a while  Be aware of the change  Learn new things now – don’t wait for later Currently, new security jobs are often NOT going to security practitioners, and we’ll discuss why…
  • 22. Slide 22 The Security Practitioner: old versus new  Monitoring security alerts  Manage network security  Manage endpoint security  IR/Forensics  Pentesting  Vulnerability Scanning  Policies/Standards  Compliance/Regs  Log management  DR/BCP and SecAware  Influence design, architecture standards, processes  Automate tasks  Forensics  Security assessments  Identify gaps and recommend fixes  JSON, REST, XML, SQL  Routing, load balancing, nw protocols
  • 23. Slide 23 How common?  6 out of the first 10 jobs I looked at required:  coding skills  new tech generation experience and/or skills
  • 24. Slide 24 Like what experience or skills?  “Ability to automate tasks using scripting or other programming language”  “Scripting or general purpose programming languages”  REST, JSON, XML (API scripting)  “Experience with DevOps, CI/CD, Chef, Puppet”  “Experience testing for vulnerabilities in Ruby on Rails applications”  “Experience with various scripting and programming languages”  “Teach secure coding practices to software engineers”
  • 25. Slide 25 What should I learn?  Scripting (automation)  Get familiar with cloud, agile, devops, containers, microservices, etc.  AppSec  Data protection  Learn to write code
  • 26. Slide 26 What should I learn?  Cloud – focus on AWS, Azure, Digital Ocean (cheap)  Containers – focus on Docker  Pick a language - ruby and python are most common  Jenkins  Ansible, Chef, Puppet, Salt  New attack surface  Don’t make security worse!  Automation  Make security better!
  • 27. Slide 27 How should I learn it?  Good starting point: find a security guy that loves to automate security and plunder his GitHub: https://github.com/averagesecurityguy  And more: https://github.com/krmaxwell  https://github.com/nbrownus  Slack makes cool stuff  Go after AWS Certs just to learn AWS  Digital Ocean Tutorials
  • 28. Slide 28 Resources – efficiency and workflow Learning to recognize efficiency and workflow issues; challenging ”because we’ve always done it that way”  Better Testing, Worse Quality, Elizabeth Hendrickson  Four Hour Work Week, Tim Ferris  The Phoenix Project, Kevin Behr, George Spafford, Gene Kim  Signal v. Noise 37Signals blogs (on medium) and books  ReWork by the Basecamp guys
  • 29. Slide 29 Resources – new ideas New ideas – challenge assumptions, push thinking …also, VIDEOS!  Distributed Security Alerting by Ryan Huber (blog)  Security Automation by Ryan Huber (video)  What Got Us Here Won’t Get Us There Black Hat keynote by Haroon Meer  Cloud Computing – Why IT Matters by Simon Wardley at OSCON 09
  • 30. Slide 30 Conclusion If you want to understand where security is going, stop looking at security, and start following IT innovation, trends and changes
  • 31. THANK YOU! Adrian Sanabria @sawaba Adrian.Sanabria@451Research.com To get a copy of these slides, send an email to sawaba@zip.sh with CSW2016 in the subject line or scan this QR code

Editor's Notes

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  2. We could also throw some other things in here as well. People (security awareness training) HR Data Supply Chain/Third party partners Compliance/regulation Design/Architecture Identity
  3. We could also throw some other things in here as well. People (security awareness training) HR Data Supply Chain/Third party partners Compliance/regulation Design/Architecture Identity
  4. We could also throw some other things in here as well. People (security awareness training) HR Data Supply Chain/Third party partners Compliance/regulation Design/Architecture Identity
  5. We could also throw some other things in here as well. People (security awareness training) HR Data Supply Chain/Third party partners Compliance/regulation Design/Architecture Identity
  6. Just an idea – doesn’t have to be precisely like this. Depends on the business, the culture, trial/error and a hundred other factors. The general idea though, is to get security responsibility and expertise closer to where the work is done.
  7. Do you have any DevOps-excitable people back at the office? They’ll have this running by the time you get back there. You’re welcome for the heads up ;) But look at that! Security! Built-in, not bolted on! Well, in theory – we still need to dig into this.
  8. Introduced an independent test unit, which made the number of bugs go up and software quality go down.
  9. Findings More QA = more bugs and longer cycles Created the psychological impact of telling developers that quality is someone else’s problem Insulting; percieved lack of empathy and respect for the developer Solution Tight relationships necessary between QA and Dev QA remains, but with an artificial bottleneck Developers still responsible for deadlines and therefore have to ‘budget’ time for QA Devs write better code to ensure it goes through QA quickly Devs need to be given 10% extra time to ensure better quality code.
  10. Also, remember – the two are inseparably linked. When we talk about code quality, we’re also often talking about security - issues with quality is where vulnerabilities come from, right?
  11. I’m using AWS as an example here, because it represents one extreme. There are 55 products on this page, but only one of them is for running virtual servers. Can we even call this cloud? It is probably better to think of large public clouds like AWS instead, as a development framework. You could just forklift most of your datacenter and applications into AWS, but you wouldn’t be getting a lot of value out of it.
  12. If we’re not well equipped to handle them? Yes. Otherwise… my research shows that they’re already being given away to non-security folks. Turns out, it is easier to take someone with a dev background and skills and teach them security than to take security folks and teach them dev & low tolerance for inefficiency.  Again, this aligns with the mainframe/Windows admin analogy
  13. SR DevSecOps Engineer "we are a cloud first, mobile first company" "capable of working in a multi-platform environment" Scripting: PowerShell, Python, Perl, Ruby Ability to automate tasks using scripting or other programming language. Demonstrated expertise in web services, virtualization, cloud concepts, REST, JSON, XML, SQL, PHP, LDAP, & object oriented methodologies. Senior InfoSec Analyst (SecOps role) Scripting or general purpose programming languages (Javascript, Perl, PHP, Powershell, Python, etc.) Representational state transfer (REST) APIs Software Security Analyst Lots of software stuff Technical Manager, AppSec Experience deploying systems and applications using cloud solutions (e.g. Amazon AWS, Azure) Experience with DevOps, CI/CD, Chef, Puppet Application security – secure SDLC practices, secure coding, application vulnerabilities, DAST, SAST, RASP, WAF Security Engineer Teach secure coding practices to software engineers through regular code reviews Validate and triage vulnerabilities submitted by researchers from our bug bounty program Design automated tests to ensure secure coding practices are followed Experience testing for vulnerabilities in Ruby on Rails applications Solid understanding of web security fundamentals Information Security Analyst/Engineer Experience with various scripting and programming languages such as Python, Perl, Java, etc. Experience with C and/or C++ would be awesome. Experience with both RDBMS (MySQL) and NoSQL (Cassandra, Couchbase, Mongo). Experience with and proven methods for analyzing and interpreting information from Security Operations Centers (SOCs), Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), or SecOps systems. Experience deploying, monitoring, and managing the information security risk posture with open source tools, to include: Moloch, ElasticSearch + Logstash + Kibana (The ELK stack), SIEMonster, Bro, Snort, Suricata, Syslog, Cuckoo, etc. Proficiency with using and securing popular cloud services (SAAS, IAAS, etc.). Security Ops Engineer at Slack Responsibilities Create and develop solutions to improve Slack’s Security stack Build and maintain the state of the art systems that help make Slack more secure Automate tooling and process to eliminate as much manual work as possible Collaborate with Slack’s operations team and advise on best practices Help improve signal detection and alerting capabilities Participate in the on-call rotation supporting the security team’s infrastructure Requirements You have a background in development or operations with a strong interest in security You are proficient in at least one programming language, such as Python, Go, Node, PHP, Ruby, *sh, etc. You have strong written and verbal communication skills You have a solid understanding of web application architecture You write readable, maintainable code You have a solid background using Linux and *nix operating systems You have experience working with git for source code management You have used configuration management tools (Ansible, Chef, Puppet, etc) You have experience with administration of cloud services, such as AWS
  14. “Learn to write code”, what does that mean? Doesn’t mean you have to learn to write UI, mobile apps, create database schemas and all that. It means you should be able to recognize opportunities to make a task more efficient and write the code to implement that change Learn to do it for ordinary, boring things. ESPECIALLY that. Automate the boring.
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