Studi sejarah dalam filsafat

STUDI SEJARAH DALAM FILSAFAT
A.GAMBARAN UMUM
Rositter (1984)mencatat bahwa NSF meluncurkan ilmu sosialnya untuk program, beserta
subprogram HPS, pada tahun anggaran 1958 (konteks di mana sub-program dioperasikan
dijelaskan dalam Bagian. Pada laporan tahunan baris dari daftar penerima beasiswa individu
NSF hanya sampai tahun 1963,sehingga kami memiliki catatan pendanaan yang relevan hanya
untuk enam tahun pertama tahun sub-program. 3 Tabel 1 memberikan gambaran umum
tentang hibah yang diberikan dalam hal ini program untuk proyek-proyek dalam filsafat
ilmu. Judul dari tiga proyek-proyek (yaitu proyek oleh Edel, Burks dan Beckner) adalah ambig-
uous sehubungan dengan kompatibilitas dengan cita-cita bebas nilai, sebagaimana mereka
termasuk istilah (yaitu, "sosial", "alasan", "psikologi") yang juga kita lihat muncul dalam
karyasarat nilai yang menonjol (misalnya, Feuer, 1963 ; Harris, 1969 ; Shepard, 1956; Shils,
1949 ). Judul dari dua puluh sembilan proyek, bagaimanapun, menunjukkan bahwa proyek-
proyek ini adalah dengan ideal. Melihat konten karya yang diterbitkan oleh penerima
penghargaan juga menunjukkan bahwa sebagian besar proyek penelitian didukung oleh Sub-
program HPS bebas nilai. Dari total 239 publikasi yang dicatat dalam Indeks Filsuf dan
diproduksi oleh penerima beasiswa dalam waktu lima tahun setelah mereka menerima hibah,
48 con- tain (dalam judul, abstrak atau kata kuncinya) istilah yang menonjol dalam karya yang
sarat nilai , dan dengan demikian, itu menunjukkan bahwa mereka mungkin saja melakukannya
melanggar cita-cita bebas nilai. 18 dari 48 publikasi, bagaimanapun, tidak relevan dengan
diskusi saat ini, karena mereka tidak membahas filsafat ilmu. Selain itu, 24 dari 30 publikasi
yang tersisa konsisten dengan cita-cita bebas nilai. Lebih khusus lagi, mereka termasuk 7
makalah logika, 9 publikasi berisi diskusi bebas nilai induksi, justifikasi, konfirmasi,
penjelasan dan / atau prediksi, volume yang diedit tentang konsep, teori, dan pikiran-tubuh
Soal, buku yang membela pandangan bahwa evaluasi ilmiah teori bebas nilai, penyelidikan
konseptual ke dalam ide-ide bawaan, kertas mengkritik pandangan bahwa buah dari
penyelidikan ilmiah harus dievaluasi.
B.DISKUSI
Studi sebelumnya tentang cara filsuf analitik menggunakan kelembagaan kontrol untuk
keuntungan mereka telah difokuskan pada kontrol mereka atas jurnal utama. Sementara studi
kami memungkinkan kami untuk menduga bahwa filsuf analitik juga menggunakan kontrol
pendanaan untuk memarjinalkan fisika non-analitik losophy, kami belum menunjukkan bahwa
NSF hanya mendanai cist, dan dengan demikian analitik, filsafat sains. Judul-judul NSF
didanai proyek, dan pencarian kami untuk publikasi berikutnya yang terkait, hanya
mengizinkan kami mengatakan bahwa proyek-proyek tersebut hampir seluruhnya bebas nilai,
bukan berarti mereka hampir seluruhnya mengandalkan analisis logis atau metodologi lain itu
mungkin bisa diterima oleh filsuf analitik. Tapi, mengingat latar belakang empiris logis dari
para penasihat, tampaknya masuk akal untuk anggaplah mereka hampir secara eksklusif
mendanai pekerjaan di bidang logika semangat piris dan dengan demikian cocok dengan
cetakan filosofi analitik- sophy. Di sini juga, tampaknya, filsafat analitik bekerja untuk
memasarkan memperjelas filsafat non-analitik. Memang, pragmatis dan non- filsuf analitik
menonjol di antara mereka yang tidak menerima dana NSF.
The National Science Foundation and philosophy of science's withdrawal
from social concerns
edisi 78 tahun 2019

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa
The National Science Foundation and philosophy of science's withdrawal
from social concerns
Krist Vaesen a, ∗, 1 , Joel Katzav b
a Eindhoven University of Technology, Department Philosophy & Ethics, Postbox 513, 5600 MB, Eindhoven, the Netherlands
b The University of Queensland, School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, St. Lucia, 4072, Australia
H I G H L I G H T S
• The decline of value-laden philosophy of science during the 1950s-1960s was in part due to the funding policies of the NSF.
• These funding policies were drafted and implemented by philosophers of science who espoused value-free approaches.
• The policies were not the result of the political climate or professionalization.
• Analytic editors’ takeovers of Philosophy of Science and The Journal of Philosophy added to the documented marginalization.
• The marginalization fits a broader pattern of marginalization of non-analytic approaches to philosophy.
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Philosophy of science
History of philosophy
History of philosophy of science
American philosophy
Science funding
A B S T R A C T
At some point during the 1950s, mainstream American philosophy of science began increasingly to avoid
questions about the role of non-cognitive values in science and, accordingly, increasingly to avoid active en-
gagement with social, political and moral concerns. Such questions and engagement eventually ceased to be part
of the mainstream. Here we show that the eventual dominance of ‘value-free’ philosophy of science can be
attributed, at least in part, to the policies of the U.S. National Science Foundation's “History and Philosophy of
Science” sub-program. In turn, the sub-program's policies were set by logical empiricists who espoused value-
free philosophy of science; these philosophers' actions, we also point out, fit a broad pattern, one in which
analytic philosophers used institutional control to marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. We go on to draw
on existing knowledge of this pattern to suggest two further, similar, contributors to the withdrawal from value-
laden philosophy of science, namely decisions by the editors of Philosophy of Science and by the editors of The
Journal of Philosophy. Political climate was, we argue, at most an indirect contributor to the withdrawal and was
neither a factor that decided whether it occurred nor one that was sufficient to bring it about. Moreover, we
argue that the actions at the National Science Foundation went beyond what was required by its senior ad-
ministrators and are better viewed as part of what drove, rather than as what was being driven by, the adoption
of logical empiricism by the philosophy of science community.
1. Introduction

It was, prior to the 1950s, standard for American philosophers of
science to deal with matters ofpolitical ideology and science policy,
and to address, more generally, questions about the role ofnon-cogni-
tive values in science (Cartieri & Potochnik, 2014; Douglas, 2009, 2012;
Howard, 2003). At some point during the 1950s, however, this socie-
tally engaged philosophy ofscience started to lose its prominence;
indeed, it eventually ceased to be part ofthe mainstream. Here we
provide evidence for thinking that this change was, at least in part, due
to decisions at the “History and Philosophy ofScience” (HPS) sub-
program of the U.S. National Science Foundation's (NSF's) Social Sci-
ence program. These decisions were made by philosophers ofscience
who (a) were committed to value-free approaches to the philosophy of
science (i.e., approaches according to which the philosophy ofscience
should not deal with non-cognitive values except in logically analyzing
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.01.001
Received 24 July 2018; Received in revised form 29 November 2018; Accepted 12 January 2019
∗ Corresponding author.
Email addresses: k.vaesen@tue.nl (K. Vaesen), j.katzav@uq.edu.au (J. Katzav).
URL: http://home.ieis.tue.nl/kvaesen/ (K. Vaesen).
1 Krist Vaesen is the main author of this paper.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 78 (2019) 73–82
Available online 19 January 2019
0039-3681/ © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by -nc-nd/4.0/).
T
Page 2
value-laden terms that have a role in the context ofjustification) and (b)
favored value-free approaches at the expense of value-laden ones (i.e.,
at the expense of approaches according to which the philosophy of
science should deal with non-cognitive values in a descriptive and/or
normative way). We also situate our account ofthe impact ofthe HPS
sub-programwithin a broader one about the growing dominance of
analytic philosophy.
We start, in section 2, by clarifying the 1950s and early 1960s
distinction between value-free and value-laden philosophies ofscience,
and by presenting the logical empiricist philosophy behind the dis-
tinction. This material will informour analysis ofNSF projects as well
as of the views ofthe philosophers who influenced NSF funding allo-
cation. We then, in section 3, describe and summarize the funding de-
cisions made in the first six years of the HPS sub-program(1958–1963).

Virtually all the philosophical work that received support fromthe NSF
conformed to the value-free ideal as it was then understood. In section
4, we argue that this ideal, and the logical empiricist philosophy behind
it, was endorsed by the philosophers ofscience who were involved as
advisors in the sub-program. Moreover, these philosophers were, to a
considerable extent, responsible for the pattern observed in the funding
records; philosophers who were committed to value-free approaches
seem to have used institutional control to promote work that fitted their
own standards. This is indicated by the fact that they had the discre-
tionary power to grant funding, probably could have done otherwise
(i.e., direct funds to individuals within the still significant pool of
philosophers who engaged in value-laden philosophy ofscience) and
were affiliated with analytic philosophy, which had (Katzav, 2018;
Katzav and Vaesen 2017a, 2017b) a track record ofusing institutional
control to reduce philosophical diversity. Section 5 suggests that the use
of institutional control at the NSF was, due to the push funding gives to
research careers and due to the NSF's prominence, an important cause
of philosophy ofscience's withdrawal fromsocial concerns. The re-
sulting HPS policies were themselves, ofcourse, also part ofthe with-
drawal. Additional contributing factors that we identify, and that be-
long to analytic philosophy's track record, are the marginalization of
value-laden philosophy ofscience at the journal Philosophy of Science
and of pragmatism at The Journal of Philosophy. Furthermore, we assess
our story in terms of other factors that have been claimed to explain the
withdrawal. While some (Edgar, 2009) have taken it to have been, to a
substantial extent, an effect of the adoption oflogical empiricismby the
philosophy ofscience community in America, we suggest that the
adoption oflogical empiricismand the withdrawal are better thought of
as being driven by the actions and views ofa portion ofthis community.
We acknowledge that McCarthyite pressures (McCumber, 2001, 2016;
Reisch, 2005) and, more broadly, conservative politics, may well have
been factors in encouraging value-free philosophy ofscience, including
in encouraging the HPS sub-program's promotion ofsuch philosophy of
science. We do argue, however, that conservative politics was, at most,
an indirect factor in bringing about the exclusion ofvalue-laden phi-
losophy ofscience from mainstream philosophy ofscience and was
neither a decisive factor in doing so – marginalization would have oc-
curred anyway – nor one that, by itself, sufficed to do so. And we point
out that Solovey's account (2013), according to which NSF adminis-
trators were primarily responsible for promoting the value-free ideal,
overlooks the role played by philosophers in achieving that ideal in the
philosophy ofscience. Section 6 considers how our study furthers the

understanding ofthe use ofinstitutional control in the promotion of
analytic philosophy, as well as points to some unanswered questions
about the development ofphilosophy ofscience.
2. Value-free and value-laden philosophies of science, 1950s to
early 1960s
Our characterization ofthe value-free ideal is taken primarily from
Reichenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951). It provides the
most influential 1950s statement ofthe view that philosophy ofscience
should be value-free (McCumber, 2016, p. 57).
Reichenbach's commitment to value-free philosophy ofscience was
part of his broader logical empiricist philosophy ofscience. On
Reichenbach's version oflogical empiricism, knowledge comes in two
forms (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 276); it is ofanalytic or ofsynthetic
truths. Synthetic truths concern matters offact, and are established by
the empirical sciences. Analytic truths are empty and are not estab-
lished empirically (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 17 & pp. 221–222). Now,
according to Reichenbach, “ philosophy is logical analysis ofall forms of
human thought” (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 308; see also p. 105), where
logical analysis is the clarification ofmeaning by uncovering logical
relations between
expressions (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 123,
Reichenbach, 1949, p. 293), and hence by uncovering analytic truths.
Philosophy ofscience, in turn, should focus on the logical analysis of
science (1951, p. 123). More specifically, philosophy ofscience's ana-
lyses must, according to Reichenbach, pertain to the context ofjustifi-
cation (i.e., to “ the relation between given facts and […] theory”,
Reichenbach, 1951, p. 231); it is not the philosopher's task to account
for the context of discovery, since the act ofdiscovery eludes logical
analysis (Reichenbach, 1951 , p. 231).
The restriction that philosophers be concerned with the establish-
ment of analytic truths means that they should not engage in de-
scriptive ethics. For descriptive ethics informs us (i.e., provides syn-
thetic claims) about social matters offact, e.g., our ethical habits, and is
thus part ofsociology rather than ofphilosophy (Reichenbach, 1951,
pp. 276–277). Furthermore, the restriction also excludes philosophers
from the domain of normative ethics. Ethics can tell us what, for in-
stance, the term “ virtuous man” means, but not whether one ought to
be virtuous (Reichenbach, 1951, p. 277). More generally, a focus solely
on analytic truths means that philosophers ofscience should neither
carry out descriptive research, including descriptive research into non-
cognitive matters, nor be prescriptive.2 Note that Reichenbach ac-
knowledges that scientific reasoning requires volitional decisions that

are not based on cognitive values. However, philosophers ofscience
should not advise the scientist which decisions to take; all they should
do, as philosophers ofscience, is to construct a list ofall possible de-
cisions and to point out, by means oflogical analysis, the logical im-
plications ofeach decision (1951, pp. 321–323).
In sum, what Reichenbach's logical empiricismtells us about phi-
losophers ofscience and non-cognitive values is that philosophers of
science should not, neither in a descriptive nor in a normative manner,
deal with non-cognitive values. Approaches that meet these conditions
will, in the remainder, be referred to as value-free approaches.
Reichenbach's approach to philosophy ofscience (like the ap-
proaches of most of the other players in our further story, see Section 4)
excludes several approaches to philosophy ofscience that explicitly
dealt with non-cognitive values in a descriptive and/or normative way
(value-laden approaches in short). It is, for instance, at odds with ap-
proaches that aimed at the empirical description ofthe normative and
non-normative conditions ofknowledge, including ofscientific knowl-
edge (Lavine, 1950). It is also at odds with approaches that aimto
develop a descriptive, scientific ethics, based on biological knowledge
(Gerard, 1942), and with approaches that attempt to derive normative
moral principles from such knowledge (Bachem, 1958). It is in-
compatible with Deweyan approaches according to which ethical in-
quiry must be scientific, and just like scientific inquiry, results in re-
commendations as to how best to address concrete, problematic
situations ( Mesthene, 1947). In particular, such approaches conflict
with Reichenbach's insistence that the task ofethics is to analyze, not to
provide, moral advice. Further, Reichenbach's value-free ideal excludes
investigation ofvalue-laden topics that belong to the context ofdis-
covery. So it excludes descriptive accounts of, e.g., the social functions
2 In the 1930s, by contrast, Reichenbach thought that epistemology includes a
limited descriptive component (1938. p. 7).
K. Vaesen, J. Katzav
74
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of science (Hartung, 1947) and the effects of publication practices on
the functioning ofscience (Sjoberg, 1956); and it excludes accounts that
offer advice, e.g., regarding the contributions that social scientists
ought to make to social policy (Shils, 1949), and regarding the ways in
which basic research should be supported (Shepard, 1956). Finally, the

value-free ideal considers illegitimate approaches that are explicitly
political, e.g., approaches engaging with Marxism(Ballard, 1955;
Fire, 1949 ; Riepe, 1958).
3. The NSF's support for value-free philosophies of science,
1958–1963
Rossiter (1984) notes that the NSF launched its social science pro-
gram, along with the HPS sub-program, in fiscal year 1958 (the context
in which the sub-programoperated is described in Section 4). The on-
line annual reports ofthe NSF list individual awardees only until 1963,
so that we have relevant funding records for just the first six years ofthe
sub-program.3 Table 1 gives an overview ofthe grants awarded in this
program to projects in the philosophy ofscience. The titles ofthree of
the projects (viz. the projects by Edel, Burks and Beckner) are ambig-
uous with respect to compatibility with the value-free ideal, as they
include terms (viz., “ social”, “reason”, “psychology”) that we also see
appearing in prominent value-laden work (e.g., Feuer, 1963; Harris,
1969; Shepard, 1956; Shils, 1949).4 The titles ofthe remaining twenty-
nine projects, however, indicate that these projects are legitimate ac-
cording to the ideal.
Looking at the content ofthe work published by the awardees also
suggests that the vast majority ofthe research projects supported by the
HPS sub-programwere value-free. From a total of239 publications
which are recorded in the Philosopher's Index and were produced by
the awardees within five years after they received their grant, 48 con-
tain (in their title, abstract or keywords) terms that feature prominently
in value-laden work (see footnote 3), and thus, that suggest they might
violate the value-free ideal. 18 ofthe 48 publications are, however,
irrelevant to the present discussion, since they do not concern the
philosophy ofscience.5 Moreover, 24 ofthe remaining 30 publications
are consistent with the value-free ideal. More specifically, they include
7 papers in logic,6 9 publications containing value-free discussions of
induction, justification, confirmation, explanation and/or prediction,7
an edited volume concerning concepts, theories and the mind-body
problem,8 a book defending the view that the evaluation ofscientific
theories is value-free,9 a conceptual inquiry into innate ideas,10 a paper
criticizing the view that the fruits ofscientific inquiry are to be eval-
uated by taking into account practical concerns,11a satirical piece by
Feigl regarding on-going discussions about the nature ofvalue judg-
ment,12 another paper by Feigl in which he criticizes modernized
theology,13 a paper on the measurability ofeconomic terms,14 and a
favorable review ofHerbert Simon's mathematical essays on rational
human behavior.15 Only 6 (froma total of239) publications pursue an

approach that violates the value-free ideal. One ofthese is an empirical
study ofvalue change by Rescher.16 The rest are authored by Edel, and
deal with the development ofa scientifically informed descriptive and
normative ethics.17
A closer examination of the publications by awardees who, apart
from Edel, were hard to classify based on the titles oftheir projects,
suggests that only Arthur W. Burks, in his engagement with the work of
Peirce, wrote on topics that belie the value-free ideal (e.g., Burks, 1943,
1958). However, the book that Burks devotes to the research for which
he was awarded an NSF grant is a technical and value-free inquiry into
the nature of scientific evidence (Burks, 1977).
A similar pattern emerges when we consider the work published by
scholars who were awarded a graduate or postdoctoral fellowship by
the NSF. The Philosopher's Index documents 43 publications written by
graduate students in the ten years after they obtained their award, and
Table 1
Research grants awarded by the NSF's History and Philosophy of Science Sub-
Program to projects in the philosophy of science (1958–1963).
Project title
Date
Awardee
Philosophical Foundations of Physics
1958
Herbert Feigl
Foundations of measurement
1959
Ernest W. Adams
Theory of Inductive Probability
1959
Rudolf Carnap
Social Science Variables in Philosophy
1959
Abraham Edel
Philosophy of Fundamental Physical
Theory
1959
Adolf Grünbaum
Applications of Symbolic Logic
1959
Richard M. Martin
Foundations of measurement
1960
Ernest W. Adams
Arabic contributions to Logic
1960

Nicholas Rescher
The Logic of Measurement
1960
Paul K. Feyerabend
Applications of Symbolic Logic
1960
Richard M. Martin
A Deductive Physical Theory
1961
Saul A. Basri
Completeness in Physical Science
1961
Richard Schlegel
Foundations of Logic and Mathematics
1962
Max Black
Bibliography of the Philosophy of Geology
1962
Claude C. Albritton
Theory of Inductive Probability
1962
Rudolf Carnap
Theory of Scientific Structure
1962
Israel Scheffler
Philosophical Foundations of Atomic
Physics
1962
Henryk Mehlberg
The Foundations of Probability
1962
Herbert Feigl
Cause, Chance, and Reason
1962
Arthur W. Burks
Arabic Contributions to Logic
1962
Nicholas Rescher
Meaning, Belief, Behavior
1962
Richard M. Martin
Probability and Potential Surprise
1963
Isaac Levi
The Concept of Causal Necessity
1963
Clark L. Romane and

Robert W. Binkley
Probability, Frequency and Induction
1963
Wesley Salmon
Scientific theories: Explanation, Theoretical
Terms and Models
1963
Peter Achinstein
Computer Models of Human Behavior
1963
Keith Gunderson
Zeno's Criticisms of Plurality and Motion
1963
Gregory Vlastos
Philosophy of Psychology
1963
Morton O. Beckner
Inductive Consistency
1963
Frederic Schick
Logical Systems and Quantum Mechanics
1963
Mary B. Miller
Simulation of Mental Processes
1963
Kenneth M. Sayre
Mathematical Logic
1963
Alan R. Anderson
3 The annual reports can be consulted at: https://www.nsf.gov/about/
history/annual-reports.jsp.
4 In addition to “social”, “reason” and “psychology”, the following terms
figure prominently in the value-laden publications discussed at the end of the
previous section and in the workof the value-laden philosophers of science
discussed in the next section: value, ideological, ideology, Marxism, Marxist,
dialectic, dialectical, pragmatism, pragmatist, Dewey, sociological, sociology,
social, society, societal, moral, morality, ethics, ethical, public, action, nor-
mative, democratic, democracy, government, politics, political, policy, plan-
ning, welfare, freedom, responsibility, and psychological.
5 I.e., Martin, 1964; Rescher, 1966a, 1967a, 1967b; Rescher & Shehadi, 1964;
Black, 1962; Edel, 1959a, 1959b, 1961a , 1962 , 1963a; Adams, 1964, 1965;
Vlastos, 1968; Sayre, 1963; Maxwell & Feigl, 1961; Binkley, 1965; Feyerabend,
1963.
6 I.e., Rescher, 1966b, 1966c; Rescher & Robison, 1964; Schick, 1966 ; Martin,
1963; Anderson, 1967; Black, 1964.
7 I.e., Feigl & Maxwell, 1961, 1962; Feigl, 1958; Grünbaum, 1963; Rescher,

1964; Scheffler, 1963 ; Levi, 1967; Salmon, 1968; and the papers concerning the
philosophy of science in Black's edited volume (Black, 1965).
8 Feigl et al., 1958.
9 Scheffler, 1967 .
10 Rescher, 1966d.
11 Ie, Levi, 1964 .
12 Ie, Feigl, 1964 .
13 Ie, Feigl, 1963 .
14 I.e., Rescher, 1966e.
15 Ie, Adams, 1962 .
16 I.e., Rescher, 1967c.
17 Ie, Edel, 1959c, 1960, 1961b , 1963b , 1963c .
75
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12 publications written by postdoctoral fellows in the five years after
they obtained their award.18 Fromthese 55 publications, only 7 pass
the search filter detailed above. None ofthe 7, however, conflicts with
the value-free ideal. One paper is a contribution to political philosophy
rather than to the philosophy ofscience,19 and five papers are con-
cerned with logic.20 The seventh contribution is a textbook, authored
by Richard Rudner, concerning the philosophy ofsocial science (1966 ).
According to Rudner, the philosophy ofscience is concerned with
methodological issues (1966, p. 3) and methodological issues are a
matter of the logic ofjustification (1966, p. 5). The philosophy ofthe
social sciences is distinguished by its focus on methodological issues in
the social sciences (1966, p. 4). Rudner was thus a proponent ofa value-
free ideal and his work on the social sciences aimed to fulfill that ideal.
Nor was value-laden philosophical work relegated to the sub-pro-
gram “ Sociology” (see below). Froma total of219 research grants that
were awarded in the sociological sciences over the period 1958–1963, 7
pertain to a project the title ofwhich suggests an engagement with
science, broadly conceived, as a social activity: “The Acceptance of
Innovation” (Russell L. Langworthy, 1960), “Factors in scientific per-
formance” (Donald C Pelz, 1961, 1962, 1963), “Automation and the
Community” (WilliamA. Faunce, 1962), “ The impact oftechnological
change” (Fred Cottrell, 1963), and “ Patterns ofscientific collaboration”
(Robert K. Merton, 1963). However, the awardees of these projects
were sociologists and psychologists, whose work, with the exception of
the work ofRobert K. Merton, does not appear in the Philosopher's

Index. Apparently, although the NSF supported some work in the so-
ciology ofscience, it neglected philosophical approaches to this field of
study.
In sum, the NSF's funding records and the publication records ofthe
scholars that obtained NSF funding suggest that HPS, from its inception
until at least 1963, almost exclusively supported value-free philosophy
of science.
4. An explanation of the NSF's support for value-free philosophies
of science
Why did NSF funds, during the period 1958–1963, go almost ex-
clusively to value-free philosophy ofscience? The present section sug-
gests that this was, to a considerable extent, the immediate result ofthe
promotion ofsuch philosophy by philosophers ofscience who were
committed to it and served as advisors in the HPS sub-program.
The main reason for thinking that philosophers ofscience were, to
no small extent, responsible for promoting value-free philosophy is that,
since its founding in 1950, the NSF awarded research money primarily
through competitive peer review, a process in which grant applications
were, per program, assessed by advisory panels and/or external referees
(England, 1982, p. 173; Mazuzan, 1992, p. 67). Members on the ad-
visory panels reviewed applications themselves, or helped to coordinate
the out-house review process (England, 1982, pp. 262, 358) (and may
also have provided suggestions about who should sit on future advisory
panels). Subsequently, programdirectors asked for final approval ofthe
decisions made within their program.
The role of advisors might have been particularly large at the HPS
sub-program(at least in the period we are concerned with). In the first
four years, there was one director for the entire Social Science program,
which comprised, in addition to the HPS sub-program, the sub-
programs “ Anthropology”, “Economy” and “Sociology”. The respective
directors, Henry W. Riecken (1958–1959) and Albert Spaulding
(1960–1961), did not have a background in philosophy (Riecken ob-
tained a PhD in the behavioral sciences, Spaulding in archaeology);
they thus may have had to rely in an especially heavy way on the advice
of the philosophers in the advisory panel ofthe program. In 1962,
Roger C. Buck became the first director who was solely responsible for
the HPS sub-program. Although Buck had training in philosophy, his
publication record in the Philosopher's Index (one publication before
1962, which contained a value-free analysis ofclinical insight in psy-
chology) suggests that he was not yet a prominent philosopher ofsci-
ence.21 Since the philosophers in the advisory panels were much more
established than he was (see below), Buck too might have had to rely in

a particularly heavy way on their advice.
Let us now look at the metaphilosophical commitments of these
philosopher-advisors. Ernest Nagel (panel member in 1958 and 1959)
acknowledges that understanding science requires investigating its in-
stitutions. However, he adds that ifscience is to be understood, “the
types and the articulation ofscientific statements, as well as the logic by
which scientific conclusions are established, also require careful ana-
lysis. This is a task – a major if not exclusive task – that the philosophy
of science undertakes to execute” (Nagel, 1961, p. 15). Thus, Nagel
inclines towards the view that all there is to the philosophy ofscience is
logical analysis, even ifhe does not firmly state a commitment to this
view. When he goes on to examine science, his focus is on the logic of
science. While he does consider whether non-epistemic values have a
role in science, he does so only in examining whether they necessarily
make objective conclusions in the social sciences impossible (1961, pp.
485–502).
Max Black (panel member in 1960 and 1961) is also committed to
value-free philosophy ofscience. Black's focus throughout his career is
on conceptual clarification or, as he called it, “the articulation ofcon-
cepts ”( Schrader, 2005). In particular, his work in the philosophy of
science does not engage with political, moral or societal issues, but
rather centers on conceptual issues in the philosophy ofmathematics
(see, e.g., Black, 1942) and on problems relating to induction (see, e.g.,
the exchange between Black and Wesley Salmon; see Salmon, 1957 and
Black, 1959). And Black's response to the worry that there is more to
philosophy than clarity is that “it will be time enough to worry about
that when clarity is generally valued more highly than mystification”
(1950, p. v). Black's metaphilosophy is thus clearly at odds with value-
laden approaches to the philosophy ofscience.
Sidney Morgenbesser (panel member in 1962 and 1963) tells us that
what constitutes a philosophy ofscience is, in addition to the provision
of an understanding ofthe aims ofscience, an analysis ofits key terms,
an analysis ofthe key terms used to discuss its theories and the eluci-
dation ofspecific scientific theories (Morgenbesser, 1967, p. xi).
A volume entitled Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science (1961),
that was co-edited by Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, tells us what
Maxwell (panel member in 1963) thought were the outstanding issues
in the philosophy ofscience. The topics covered in the volume include
the logic ofdiscovery, explanation, probability, induction, natural laws,
conventionalism, and the interpretation ofquantumtheory. Many of
these topics re-appear, a year later, in another volume that Maxwell co-
edited with Feigl (Feigl & Maxwell, 1962). Feigl and Maxwell do not, in

either of these volumes, include contributions by authors pursuing a
value-laden approach.
Finally, Reichenbach's student Wesley Salmon (panel member in
1963) primarily worked on probability, induction, and explanation
(Salmon, 2005 and references therein) around the time that he was
appointed as an HPS sub-programadvisor. Neither the title ofthe
project Salmon received a grant for in 1963 (the year he also served on
18 The graduate students include David Kaplan, Thomas Scanlon, John
Corcoran Jr., Marshall Spector, Alfred E Miller, Jane Shelby, Ronald N Giere,
Joseph D Sneed, Robert J Morris, Nino B Cocchiarella, Lee A Forstrom,
Theodore M Brown, John P Kimball and Richard E Grandy. The postdoctoral
fellows include Abner E Shimony, Frederic Schick, Richard Rudner and Robert
E Butts.
19 I.e., Scanlon, 1972.
20 Ie, Schick, 1966; Cocchiarella, 1969a, 1969b, Corcoran, 1972; Corcoran &
Herring, 1971.
21 Buck's later publications concerned the logical analysis of the sciences, and
thus fitted Reichenbach's value-free ideal.
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Page 5
the advisory panel), nor his scholarly work, suggests an interest in
value-laden philosophies ofscience. All ofthis fits well with how
Salmon later characterized his own work, as he considered himself,
together with AdolfGrünbaum, to be “the two people who have de-
voted the largest amount ofeffort to carrying on the work ofReich-
enbach” (Salmon, 1979, p. 39).
All ofthe philosophers who, during the period 1958–1963, served as
advisors to the HPS sub-programthus had a clear bias against value-
laden approaches and, as suggested above, had an important say in the
sub-program.
What adds to the suspicion that the philosophy advisors were the
immediate causes of the pattern described in the previous section is that
there were alternatives to value-free philosophy ofscience. Howard
(2003, pp. 66–70) shows that the journal Philosophy of Science gave
substantial space to value-laden philosophy ofscience during the
1950s; indeed, the examples provided above ofvalue-laden philosophy
of science are mostly drawn from this journal. So too, Deweyan prag-
matism was an important source ofvalue-laden philosophy ofscience
and still had, contrary to Giere (1996) and Howard (2003), a sub-

stantial presence in American philosophy. This presence is made clear
by the many Deweyan papers that appeared in The Journal of Philosophy
and other journals in the 1950s and early 1960s.22 Philosophers, in-
cluding pragmatists, publishing work on value-laden philosophy of
science in the 1950s and early 1960s, but who were neither awarded a
grant (1958–1963) nor sat on the HPS advisory panel (1958–1966),
include, among others, Sidney Axinn, Cornelius Benjamin, Lewis Feuer,
Rollo Handy, Errol Harris, Sidney Hook, Jack Kaminsky, Gail Kennedy,
Paul W. Kurtz, Thelma Lavine, David Miller, Charles Morris, Dale Riepe,
Ralph Ross, Paul W. Schmidt, R. W. Sleeper, Horace S. Thayer and
Philip P. Wiener.23 Likewise, AbrahamEdel, whose work we have dis-
cussed above, did not serve as an advisor (1958–1966). Noteworthy too
is Irving Horowitz. Horowitz was a prominent sociologist ofscience
with many publications (in, e.g., Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search, Philosophy of Science, and British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science) that are recorded in the Philosopher's Index. Horowitz neither
sat on the advisory panel ofthe HPS sub-program(1958–1966) nor
received a research grant (1958–1963).
Further, the advisors clearly not only shared Reichenbach's com-
mitment to the idea that philosophy ofscience should be value-free, but
had broader commitments that are akin to his logical empiricist ones.
They were thus part ofthe broader community of mid-century analytic
philosophy. This, by itself, suggests that their decisions were causes of
the pattern ofNSF awards. Journals run by analytic philosophers had,
during the middle decades ofthe twentieth century, a track record of
marginalizing those who did not share their metaphilosophical com-
mitments. The track record included founding analytic philosophy only
journals (Analysis in 1933, Philosophical Studies in 1950, American
Philosophical Quarterly in 1964, and Noûs in 1967 (Katzav, 2018)) and
taking over journals that were open to diverse philosophical approaches
and then quickly turning theminto analytic only philosophy journals
(Philosophy of Science in 1959, when Rudner, who we have seen was a
proponent ofthe value-free ideal, became its editor (Howard, 2003),
Mind roughly in 1926, The Philosophical Review in about 1948, The
Philosophical Quarterly in 1957 and The Journal of Philosophy in the early
1960s (Katzav, 2018; Katzav and Vaesen 2017a, 2017b)). In each of
these cases, the speed ofthe change in journal contents strongly sug-
gests that the immediate cause of the change was editorial policy. Two
of the NSF advisors, namely Black and Morgenbesser, were involved in
these other cases ofmarginalization (Black in what occurred at The
Philosophical Review (Katzav & Vaesen, 2017b) and Morgenbesser in
what occurred at The Journal of Philosophy (Katzav, 2018)), giving us

further reason to suspect that they played a part in what occurred at the
NSF.
There are two complications for our story. First, the NSF's annual
reports do not list rejected applications. So perhaps, one might think,
socially engaged philosophers ofscience did not suffer from dis-
crimination, simply because they did not apply for NSF funding.
However, the incentives to apply were there: publication, and thus the
incentive to free up time for research, became important to getting and
keeping an academic job after the Second World War (Nee & Ingram,
1998), and university administrations appeared not to be insensitive to
grantsmanship when it came to hiring faculty (Veatch, 1997, pp. 74,
94). In light ofsuch incentives, and in light ofthe fact that the NSF was,
in the 1950s, by far the biggest source ofexternal support for work in
the philosophy ofscience, it would have made sense for socially en-
gaged philosophers to try acquiring NSF research money.24 Admittedly,
socially engaged philosophers might have considered applying point-
less, because they knew who panel members were and which ap-
proaches they favored. In that case, the marginalization ofvalue-laden
approaches would still be an effect, albeit an indirect one, ofHPS sub-
program policies.
A second complication concerns our suggestion that Nagel, Black,
Morgenbesser, Maxwell and Salmon could have done otherwise.
Possibly, the NSF administration put pressure on themnot to support
socially engaged philosophers ofscience. Indeed, Solovey (2013, p.
149–163) writes that Harry Alpert, the NSF administrator who started
preparing the Social Science programin 1954, envisaged a program
that was to fund approaches to the social sciences that met universal
scientific standards, such as generalizability, verifiability and objec-
tivity, and that thereby stayed clear ofsocial and political action. Such a
focus, Alpert thought, was needed to counter attacks fromnatural sci-
entists who had their doubts about the scientific status ofthe social
sciences and attacks from conservative politicians who complained that
the social sciences tended to serve left-wing ideologies. The NSF's
22 A search on JSTOR uncovered 54 articles which appeared in the English-
language journals it archives, had ‘Dewey’ in their title and were published
during the period 1950–1962; as a reference point, a similar search for ‘Quine’
yielded 13 articles. Authors publishing Deweyan workin The Journal of
Philosophy during the period 1950–1962 include, among others, Corey, D.
47 (5), Fingarette, H. 48 (21), Hook, S. 50 (24), S. Fen 52 (1), Kennedy, G. 52 (4),
Coolidge, M. L. 52(18), George, F. H. 52(19), Handy, R. 53(26), Robischon, T.
55(26), Sleeper, R. W. 57(3), Blau, J. L. 57(3), Parson, H. L. 58(5), Eames, S. M.
55(4) and Suits, B. 58(7). Examples of non-analytic, non-pragmatist workthat is
sympathetic to Deweyan pragmatism is by, among others, E. A. Burtt, 57(13), A.

E. Murphy 57(17) and Randall Jr., J. H. 56(23). Other JSTOR journals which
published pragmatist workduring the 1950s include The Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, The Review of
Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science.
23 See e.g., Axinn, 1954; Benjamin, 1965 ; Fire, 1963 ; Handy, 1956, 1958;
Harris, 1969; Hook1950, 1959; Kaminsky, 1957; Kaminsky & Nelson, 1958;
Kennedy, 1954; Kurtz, 1955, 1956; Avalanche, 1950 , 1953; Miller, 1947, 1959;
Morris, 1956, 1970; Riepe, 1958; Ross, 1963,1965; Schmidt, 1959; Sleeper,
1960; Thayer, 1951, 1968; Wiener, 1949; Wiener & Noland, 1957. The philo-
sophers on the HPS advisory panel during the period 1964–1966 included, in
addition to some of the advisors discussed in the main text, Ernan McMullin,
Richard Rudner, Carl Hempel, Romane L. Clarkand Dudley Shapere. Of these
philosophers, only Rudner published, during the period 1958–1966, a paper
concerning the role of non-cognitive values in science and this paper focused on
the logical role of non-cognitive values in justification (Rudner, 1953). As noted
in the main text, Rudner was committed to value-free philosophy of science.
24 Our claim about available sources of funding is taken from Solovey (2013,
p. 169), but is also supported by an examination of alternatives to NSF funding.
Philosophers of science did receive Guggenheim Fellowships, but only 8 did so
during the period 1958–1963 and, of these, only 2 (Arthur Child in 1958 and
Milton K. Munitz 1960) were not analytic philosophers (the names of fellowship
awardees can be found at https://www.gf.org/fellows/). The Rockefeller
Foundation also funded philosophy, but primarily legal and political philo-
sophy; two notable exceptions were projects by Blackand Nagel (the names of
The Foundation's awardees can be found in its annual reports, retrievable from
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/about-us/governance-reports/annual-
reports/).
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president, Alan T. Waterman, and the first director of the Social Science
Program, Henry W. Riecken, consented to this plan. In practice, prior to
the establishment ofthe Social Science program, the NSF only sup-
ported social science research that was thought to meet universal sci-
entific standards and that was convergent, that is, that bridged the gap
between natural and social sciences in terms ofmethodology and sub-
ject matter (Solovey, 2013, p. 157). After the establishment ofthe So-
cial Science program, support for social science broadened to include
non-convergent research, but the emphasis on universal scientific
standards remained in place (Solovey, 2013, p. 166).
Note, however, that it is hard to see why criteria such as general-

izability, verifiability and objectivity would have been thought, by non-
philosophers, to favor the approaches supported by the NSF over some
of the alternatives it did not support (even ifexplicitly normative work
did not sit well with NSF administrators' policies). For one thing, non-
philosophers (programdirectors, such as, Riecken and Spaulding, or
NSF's central administrators, such as, Waterman) probably would not
have been sufficiently familiar with philosophy to be able to determine
for themselves which, if any, of the approaches on behalfofwhich
scientific objectivity was being claimed, including, e.g., empirical,
pragmatist approaches and Reichenbachian analysis, were indeed ob-
jective. For another thing, criteria such as generalizability and verifia-
bility meaningfully apply to empirical studies but not to logical analysis
(viz., the establishment ofanalytic truths). So, in some ways, philoso-
phers who took themselves to be partly engaged in empirical research,
e.g., those aiming at a descriptive, scientific ethics or those studying
sociological aspects ofthe context ofdiscovery, would at least appear to
be better candidates for funding than the logical analysts.25 Further,
while the philosophy actually funded by the NSF by and large seems to
have had to meet the narrower pre-1958 requirements ofconvergent
research, research in other social sciences did not have to do so. In
1960, for example, NSF funded anthropology projects had titles such as
“ Acculturation among the Chippewa”, “Culture Change in the Masai”
and “ Social Change in a Plural Society” (see also the titles given above
for funded work in the sociology sub-program). All ofthis suggests that
HPS sub-programpanelists were more restrictive in what they deemed
worthy offunding than NSF policies demanded ofthem, and thus that
they could have done otherwise.
Interestingly, philosophers were also involved in the design phase of
the HPS sub-program. In 1954, Alpert financed a meeting under the
auspices ofthe American Philosophical Society, America's first learned
society, which was founded (Conklin, 1937) in 1743 by Benjamin
Franklin for the purpose ofpromoting useful knowledge. The steering
committee of the symposium, which aimed to identify the status and
needs of the social sciences, included two physicist-philosophers, Henry
Margenau (former colleague at Yale ofWaterman; see Lindsay, 1964),
and Philipp Frank. The closed meeting was further attended by the
philosophers Percy Bridgman, RudolfCarnap (awardee in 1959 and
1962), Herbert Feigl (awardee in 1958 and 1962), Herbert Dingle, and
Ernest Nagel (panel member 1958 and 1959). Three philosophers (viz.,
Margenau, Dingle and Frank) presented papers, each ofwhich argued
that the value ofthe philosophy ofscience lies primarily in its con-
tributions to science rather than to broader societal issues and none of

which linked such contributions to normative issues (Margenau, 1955;
Dingle, 1955; Frank, 1955; see also; Shryock, 1955). So ifNSF admin-
istrators were in need of(additional) arguments for the promotion of
value-free philosophies ofscience, the presentations by Margenau,
Dingle and Frank might have provided these.26
5. Explanations of the triumph of the value-free ideal
There are a variety of explanations for the loss ofinfluence ofvalue-
laden approaches. In what follows, we review these explanations and
discuss how they relate to the observations made above.
Reisch (2005) suggests that logical empiricismin the U.S. depoliti-
cized in response to the pressures, exerted by the FBI and fellow phi-
losophers, ofMcCarthyism. In a similar vein, McCumber (2001, 2016)
takes socially engaged philosophy, including pragmatism, to have been
a victim of McCarthyite pressures on philosophy. He (2016) emphasizes
the influence of the “ Allen Formula” (named after its originator Ray-
mond B. Allen), a formula that, among other things, was designed to
fire communist faculty members and that was implemented throughout
the U.S. Solovey (2013, pp. 150–163) points to another potential po-
litical influence on the start ofthe development ofthe HPS in the first
half of the 1950s, namely the already mentioned attacks on the social
sciences by conservative politicians who thought that these sciences
were tainted by left-wing ideology.
Edgar (2009) suggests that the transformations during the 1950s
and 1960s must in part be explained by the professionalization ofthe
discipline. He here follows suggestions by Howard (2003), but makes
more explicit what professionalization entails. Edgar links professio-
nalization, in one ofthe senses of“ professionalization”, to a profession's
getting “monopolistic control”, that is, to the emergence ofclear stan-
dards for deciding who is allowed into the profession and for judging
which members are competent. Members have considerable autonomy
in setting their professional standards, but must ensure that their work
is valued by the institutions which support it. Edgar doubts, though,
that this sense ofprofessionalization helps to explain the depoliticiza-
tion ofwork in the philosophy ofscience. According to Edgar, philo-
sophies ofscience that promoted liberalism, ofthe kind endorsed for
instance by the pragmatist, anti-communist Sidney Hook, did not re-
main mainstream despite the fact that they were valued. We agree that
some stakeholders valued some ofthe normative work produced by
Hook, as well as some of the related work ofLewis S. Feuer, who
transitioned to anti-communismafter the Second World War (Fire,
1988, pp. 28–29). But, as Solovey emphasizes, some NSF administrators
aimed to maintain a sharp boundary between science and politics

(2013, p. 154); at least at the NSF, normative philosophy ofscience
might not have been welcomed.27 Nevertheless, it is at least unclear
25 The heavy use of formal techniques, on the other hand, would have favored
the workof some of the analysts.
26 Some of Frank's workclearly goes against the value-free ideal (see Frank,
1937). Moreover, the support his presentation gives to this ideal is less
straightforward than what is found in the presentations by Margenau and
Dingle. Nevertheless, Frank's presentation is consistent with, and plausibly
(footnote continued)
taken to support, the ideal. What he explicitly says about the role of philosophy
of science is that it investigates the rules about how concepts and facts interact
and that its business is “to present and analyze the changing conceptual system
of science” (1955, p. 350). He does go on to state that science should be studied
not only from a logical and empirical perspective but also with an eye towards
the extra-scientific factors in the formation of concepts. But he does this in the
context of discussing the functions of history, philosophy and the sociology of
science; he does not state that philosophy itself studies extra-scientific factors
(1955, p. 351). Moreover, some of what he says regarding extra-scientific fac-
tors suggests that their study belongs to history, psychology and sociology. He
writes that, if a student is to understand the formula, f = ma, its logical and
empirical aspects will have to be explained as well as “the historical psycho-
logical and sociological background from which the formula has emerged”
(1955 p. 351).
27 Capps (2003) provides another criticism of Edgar, one that might be
thought to undermine the use of Hook's workas an example of pragmatist
philosophy of science. Hook(1952) argues for the exclusion of communists
from academia. His argument, according to Capps (2003, p. 73), is in the style
of analytic philosophy because it emphasizes definitions, generality and logical
deduction, as opposed to earlier pragmatists' emphasis on the context sensitivity
of arguments. As a result, Capps claims, it is not clear what practical difference
Hook's pragmatism makes to his argument. Capps, however, provides no evi-
dence for thinking that pragmatists were ever committed to the view that their
pragmatism had to manifest itself directly in each of their arguments. Moreover,
Hook provides clear statements of his commitment to pragmatism as well as of
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Page 7
why value-free philosophy ofscience would be more valued by in-
stitutional supporters than descriptive, value-laden philosophy ofsci-
ence. In the case of the NSF, for example, we have seen that it was far
from obvious that descriptive value-laden philosophy ofscience was

less likely to meet its standards (viz. generalizability, verifiability and
objectivity).
Additionally, Edgar discusses a second sense ofprofessionalization,
one that he thinks actually did contribute to depoliticization.
Professionalization is accompanied by specialization and is defined by
the abstract theory which informs it. Accordingly, philosophy ofscience
underwent a wave ofprofessionalization during the 1950s, in the sense
that its framework became consolidated around what one could broadly
conceive of as logical analysis (e.g., analysis ofterms such as, ex-
planation, probable inference, causality, measurement). Logical ana-
lysis determined the boundaries ofwhat was and what was not philo-
sophy ofscience, and, more particularly, set philosophy ofscience apart
from investigations which previously would fall under its heading, such
as historical, sociological, psychological and moral investigations of
science.
Our study points to another factor behind the loss ofground by
value-laden philosophy ofscience: value-free philosophers probably
used institutional control ofthe HPS sub-programto promote value-free
approaches at the expense of value-laden ones. They did so in the
period we have been concerned with (1958–1963); and, given who sat
on later advisory panels, it is not unreasonable to think that they did so
throughout the 1960s.28 In all likelihood, this would have boosted the
publication numbers ofthose producing value-free philosophy ofsci-
ence and, partly as a result and partly because ofthe prestige ofthe
NSF, enhanced their prestige. Overall, these philosophers would have
had a substantial advantage on the job market at a time (Katzav, 2018;
Katzav & Vaesen, 2017b) when philosophy was growing rapidly. Thus,
the continued marginalization ofvalue-laden approaches at the NSF
likely was one ofthe factors that contributed to philosophy ofscience's
withdrawal from social concerns. Rudner's roughly simultaneous deci-
sion to close Philosophy of Science to value-laden work, and the closure
of The Journal of Philosophy to pragmatism, are likely to have further
reduced the prospects ofvalue-laden philosophy and philosophers. The
sub-program's policies and journal policies are likely to have enhanced
each other's effects. A further adverse effect on pragmatism might have
been generated by the takeover ofkey Ph.D. programs by analytic
philosophers, e.g., by the takeover ofthe Sage School ofPhilosophy at
Cornell immediately after the Second World War (Katzav & Vaesen,
2017b). Finally, note that the policies that resulted fromphilosophers'
decisions at the NSF, Philosophy of Science and The Journal of Philosophy
were themselves, apart from their effects on American philosophy of
science, important steps in the exclusion ofvalue-laden philosophy of

science from the mainstream.
The mid-1950s saw the waning ofMcCarthyismas well as the easing
off of the conservative pressures specifically targeting the social sci-
ences (Solovey, 2013, p. 163). It is in 1958, recall, that the Social Sci-
ence program is founded. It then starts expanding, with an important
milestone being reached in 1961, when it acquires the status ofa di-
vision within the NSF (Solovey, 2013, pp. 167–169). So the actions at
the HPS sub-programoccurred after the influence of McCarthyite
pressures ofthe kind described by Reisch and McCumber, and after the
influence of the political attacks on the social sciences described by
Solovey. It, accordingly, seems that McCarthyite pressure, as well as the
conservative political attacks on the social sciences, did not have an
immediate effect on the HPS sub-program. More broadly, political fac-
tors' immediate effects did not include the exclusion ofvalue-laden
philosophy ofscience frommainstream philosophy ofscience. As we
have seen, value-laden philosophy ofscience and pragmatismcon-
tinued to play a substantial role in mainstreamphilosophy ofscience
throughout the 1950s.
McCarthyism and the attacks on the social sciences might never-
theless have had an indirect impact on the trajectory ofphilosophy of
science in the 1950s, including by playing an indirect role in en-
couraging the policies ofthe sub-program(e.g. by changing the atti-
tudes ofsome of the advisors during the early 1950s). External political
factors, however, were probably not decisive in bringing about the
marginalization ofvalue-laden philosophy ofscience; this margin-
alization would probably have occurred even without external political
influences.29
The philosophers involved in the HPS sub-program,
Rudner and the editors ofthe Journal of Philosophy do not appear to
have needed external political pressure to enforce their metaphiloso-
phical commitments. This is suggested by our observation that behavior
similar to theirs at institutions controlled by analytic philosophers was
found in Britain, outside ofthe sphere oflikely influence ofMcCar-
thyismand the conservative attacks on the social sciences (recall the
cases of Mind, Analysis and The Philosophical Quarterly), and in America,
even before McCarthyism and the attacks really start to bite (recall the
case of The Philosophical Review in 1948). That external political pres-
sure was not necessary is also suggested by the work ofHPS advisors
and of Rudner, and by the fact that they marginalized work that was
never politically sensitive. Insofar as politics had an adverse effect, it
was on what were perceived to be left-wing views. As we have seen,
value-laden philosophy ofscience was sometimes not perceived to be

left wing and was often descriptive rather than normative. Ofcourse,
that the HPS sub-program, as well as Philosophy of Science, excluded
much more than what might have been thought to be required by
politics also indicates that politics was not sufficient to bring about
either the HPS policies or the broader marginalization ofvalue-laden
philosophy ofscience.
Similarly, given that many philosophers ofscience were still
working on value-laden philosophy ofscience in the 1950s, and that
key institutions such as Philosophy of Science and The Journal of
Philosophy, were run by those who considered value-laden philosophy
of science legitimate, it seems that marginalization is better thought of
as driving, rather than as being driven by, the adoption ofthe logical
empiricist framework by American philosophy ofscience. This is just to
say that, contrary to Edgar, marginalization is a cause of, rather than is
caused by, what counts as professionalization in the second ofthe
senses of“ professionalization” that he introduces - that is, professio-
nalization conceived ofas the adoption ofa theoretical framework by a
field of research.30
Further, our account suggests that analytic philosophers were
simply more successful than pragmatists in acquiring important posi-
tions at the NSF. Once they had acquired these positions, they treated
their own standards as standards for the entire profession, and saw to it
that work fitting these standards was promoted. Several factors, none of
them having to do with professionalization (in the second ofthe senses
used by Edgar), may have contributed to the success ofanalytic
(footnote continued)
how it informs his anti-communist stance (see, e.g., Hook, 1956). In any case,
what matters most in the present context is just that Hookwas engaged in
value-laden philosophy of science and, in this respect, provides an alternative to
value-free philosophy of science.
28 In addition to the advisors listed in the body of our paper and in footnote
16, the following philosophers served as panel members during the period
1964–1969: Donald Davidson, Richard C. Jeffrey, Wilfrid S. Sellars and Peter
Achinstein.
29 We do not here imply that McCumber or Reisch claim that the impacts
were decisive.
30 We have our reservations about this characterization of professionalization.
It makes professionalization dependent on the emergence of a dominant para-
digm within a discipline, and thus implies, in our opinion infelicitously, that
methodological pluralism reduces a discipline's degree of professionalization.
We do not want to pursue this any further, though, given that it is tangential to
the main point we want to make here.

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philosophers at gaining a foothold at the HPS sub-program. Analytic
philosophers, for example, might have been better at selling their work
as scientific. Additionally, the philosophers in the steering committee of
the meeting in which HPS was prepared (viz. Margenau and Frank)
were also physicists; that perhaps made themless suspect in the eyes of
the many NSF natural scientists who had their doubts about the sci-
entific standing ofthe social sciences.
In keeping with NSF administrators' plans for the Social Science
Program, it was, Solovey (2013, pp. 170–171) suggests, primarily sci-
entific research that appeared to meet universal scientific standards
that received funding during the relevant period. With regard to the
philosophy ofscience, Solovey concludes, albeit on the basis ofjust a
couple ofexamples, that funding primarily went to studies concerning
the natural sciences. This conclusion is thus consistent with the one
argued for here. At the same time, ours is inferred from a much more
systematic analysis ofNSF's funding records and is broader in scope:
funded projects did not just concern the natural sciences, they ap-
proached the natural sciences in a way that avoided addressing non-
cognitive value questions. We also noted a contrast between the narrow
focus of philosophy projects on convergent research and the broader
focus of some of the other areas of research funded by the Social Science
program. Finally, whereas Solovey identifies NSF administrators as the
primary force in promoting the value-free ideal, our study suggests that
philosophers, as it comes to the philosophy ofscience, also had a sig-
nificant role in promoting that ideal.
6. Discussion
The evidence provided above suggests that philosophers sympa-
thetic to logical empiricismused the NSF's HPS sub-programin order to
marginalize value-laden philosophy ofscience during the period
1958–1963; plausibly, marginalization continued after 1963. This use
of institutional control by logical empiricists fits a broader pattern in
which analytic philosophers used such control to marginalize other
approaches to philosophy. Indeed, the broader pattern, especially as it
manifested itselfat Philosophy of Science and The Journal of Philosophy,
seems further to have helped to marginalize value-laden philosophy of
science. While McCarthyismand conservative pressure on the social
sciences might have also contributed to this marginalization, they do

not appear to have been decisive factors in bringing it about. Finally,
the restrictions that the HPS programimposed on funding allocation
went well beyond NSF administrators' worries about funding explicitly
normative research and appear to have driven, rather than to have been
driven by, the adoption oflogical empiricismby the philosophy of
science community. Of course, other factors, such as control ofkey
Ph.D. training programs and the arguments developed in favor ofvalue-
free philosophy, may also have contributed to the increasingly value-
free trajectory ofphilosophy ofscience.
Previous studies ofthe way analytic philosophers used institutional
control to their advantage have focused on their control ofkey journals.
While our study allows us to surmise that analytic philosophers also
used the control offunding in order to marginalize non-analytic phi-
losophy, we have not shown that the NSF only funded logical empiri-
cist, and thus analytic, philosophy ofscience. The titles ofNSF funded
projects, and our search ofrelated subsequent publications, only allow
us to say that the projects were almost entirely value-free not that they
almost entirely relied on logical analysis or other methodologies that
might have been acceptable to analytic philosophers. But, given the
logical empiricist background ofthe advisors, it seems plausible to
suppose that they almost exclusively funded work in the logical em-
piricist spirit and thus that fit neatly into the mold ofanalytic philo-
sophy. Here too, it seems, analytic philosophy was operating to mar-
ginalize non-analytic philosophy. Indeed, pragmatists and other non-
analytic philosophers do feature prominently among those who did not
receive NSF funding.
An interesting question which our study leaves open is why virtually
none of the philosophy ofscience projects funded by the NSF during the
period 1958–1963 appears to have had an historical dimension; pos-
sibly, logical empiricist metaphilosophy is also relevant here. So too, we
do not address the question ofwhat happened to HPS funding in the
1970s. Did funding continue to go to value-free approaches when, for
example, Thomas Kuhn, who had received wide recognition fromphi-
losophers for his normative and descriptive work on the sociology of
science, became an advisor in 1970? No less significant is the question
of how much damage might have been done to the philosophy ofsci-
ence given NSF funding practices and the associated exclusion ofvalue-
laden philosophy ofscience from the journal Philosophy of Science and
of pragmatism from The Journal of Philosophy. Still, that the NSF helped
limiting the range ofanalysis and discussion in the field is suggested by
the fact that the voices ofsome philosophers ofscience who were
concerned with value-laden issues were not heard as loudly as they

might have been heard. These issues are now once again perceived as
being important issues within the philosophy ofscience.
Acknowledgements
Research by KV was supported by the Netherlands Organisation for
Scientific Research, under VIDI grant number 276-20-021.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2019.01.001.
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