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A New Era in Incident Response and Data Auditing (cont.) The Case for Cyberforensics
[object Object],(CFE/EnCE/GCIA/GSNA/GREM) ,[object Object],Certified: ,[object Object]
Computer Forensic Examiner(Hex Junkie)
Intrusion Analyst (Packet Junkie)
Reverse Engineer (Code Junkie)
Systems and Network Auditor (Audit Junkie)
Superior Court Forensic Expert (Expert Witness Junkie)Experience: ,[object Object], 	- Electronic/Information/Cyber Warfare & SIGINT ,[object Object]
Commercial Intrusion and Forensic Expert to US NAVY HQ [CACI]
6 years in the cyber trenches on dirty networks (All Industries & International)© 2010 Guidance Software, Inc.  All Rights Reserved.  Speaker
Intellectual Property Theft Information Warfare/Cyber Forensics for USSTRATCOM/US NAVY eDiscovery for Federal and State Departments Sabotage of Critical Infrastructure (Oil/Water/Gas) Network Sabotage to secure contracts Malware Analysis & 0-Day Incident Containment  Phishing and PII theft Employee Misuse of assets/access for personal gain Field Experience in IR
Evolution of Threats Timeline
Primary Attack Vectors Digital insider attacks previously compromised systems Client-side applications (applications running on desktop / end-user systems, including email readers, web browsers, media players, instant messengers, productivity tools such as MS Office, etc.) Operating systems Web applications Wireless networks
2009 Trends in Attacks Against .GOV  SQL Injection and Cross-site Scripting Island Hopping-Unisys/DHS Remote User Compromise-VPN Attacks-Client Side Attacks PKI Compromise--Private Key Theft Zero-Day Attacks/Drive By Downloads Automated Attack Tools Digital Insider Attacks
Keeping Up Technical Challenges: High profile attacks – Good vectors need concealment C2 of malware is sophisticated, landscape changes We’re not looking for a single file, many artifacts dropped Designed to evade detection Designed to persist defensive techniques We’re trying to find the needle in the haystack No Magic Pill to take or Silver Bullet to shoot Analysis is considered heavy lifting Malware exists a Tactical level, yet analyzed at Strategic level. But: “k0d3R2 r LA2y” (Coders are Lazy) – They reuse code…    
Evolving Threats Perimeter defense won’t stop it New Technologies bring new Exploits Threats can be Outside-In & Inside-Out A determined hacker will find a way (high end) Hacking has become “Productized” (low end) Nasty stuff is memory resident only Better QA in some malware than COTS Designed to be Resilient and Persistent!
Points to Ponder Incident Response: Actions taken AFTER an event has been detected This is D/BDA (Digital/Battle Damage Assessment) Concentrates on restoral and damage control Intelligence Preparation of the Cyber Battlefield Surveillance & Recon Planning – What you bring… Terrain & Weather – What technology brings… Digital Order of Battle – What the enemy brings… Enemy Capability to impact or influence your operations Cyber Denial & Deception? Cyber Psyops?
“We originally thought of EnCase Enterprise as an e-forensic tool only. However, Guidance Software’s solutionaddresses virtually every aspect of information security and eDiscovery.”Litigation Counsel, Dell EnCase® Enterprise – The Industry Standard Platform for Conducting Network Investigations
How it WorksEnCase Software Components Utilizes exact same 800K endpoint service as EnCase Enterprise and EnCase eDiscovery ,[object Object]
128- bit AES encryption used for secure communication between components,[object Object]
IntroducingEnCase Cybersecurity You’ve been hacked—now what? Your data is leaving the building… Where was the malware? Where is it now? What’s it look like? ,[object Object],How do you stay in a trusted state?  How do you ensure sensitive data is kept in check? Against “gold build” Regular scheduled assessments Anomalies become events Remediate
EnCase Cybersecurity provides… Network-enabled incident response Cyberforensic triage and analysis, attack attribution analysis, and remediation System deviation assessments Expose system integrity issues caused by anomalous or unknown threats Data policy enforcement Identify and wipe PII/IP/Classified data from unauthorized endpoints Why Risk Compromising Your Data?
Network-enabled Incident Response How it Works You’ve Been Compromised!EnCase Cybersecurity collects data from potentially affected machines for analysis… …Which are then compared to the appropriate pre-defined system profiles …And further culled down by comparison to included whitelist database The resulting confirmed malware is used as a basis for exact and near match scans in order to locate and remove the threat network-wide.  This is where Entropy takes charge… The resulting set is analyzed against potentially relevant running processes Leaving a small set of highpriority binaries for deep analysis 100110101
EnCase Enterprise vs. EnCase Cybersecurity – High Level Overview Legend Manual Process Automated Process Not Included Included ü * ** *** ü * No PST/NST Output ** Includes PST/NST Output *** Limited SharePointsearch capabilities ü
EnCase Cybersecurity	How it Works…
EE Command Center Architecture
Sample Deployment Topology WAN Main Office A Main Office B Target Node Target Node SAFE Examiner Target Node Target Node Target Node Target Node Target Node Aggregation Database Target Node Examiner SAFE Target Node Target Node Target Node Target Node Examiner Branch Office Target Node Company Headquarters
How EnCase® Enterprise and EnCase Cybersecurity Integrate With the Network
Current Product Capabilities Proactive Data Security & Compliance Auditing PII, PCI, etc. data leakage and risks Reveal & detect internal threats Identify & validate external threats (including polymorphic malware) Reactive “Cyber forensic endpoint” incident response Responding to & remediating advanced malware & Zero-day attacks Reducing/minimize information security workflow complexity Integration with SIEM tools, IDS/IPS systems, etc. Leverages investment in existing EnCase Infrastructure Built as an application on top of EnCase Enterprise Built using ECC application framework
EnCase Cybersecurity provides… System deviation assessments Expose system integrity issues caused by anomalous or unknown threats Create Profiles of known good machines Static (on disk) Dynamic (in runtime) Integrate with Bit9 database for Application Whitelisting Enables proactive scheduled scans for system deviations Trusted Computing Environments
How do you make the unknown known? Deviation assessments capture running processes Up to 10,000 nodes per hour! Compare against trusted baseline and whitelist Analyze resulting set of unknown processes Identify unapproved process or malware Update baseline(s) Introducing EnCase® CybersecuritySystem Deviation Assessment
System Deviation AssessmentHow It Works System Deviation AssessmentRegularly scheduled, rapid scans for anomalies across a range of endpoints Running processes are gathered at lightning speed – up to 10,000 nodes per hour …And are then compared to the appropriate customer defined profiles …And further culled down by comparison to included whitelisting database Good processes can be added to the trusted profile(s).  Unapproved processes can be remediated. Leaving a small set of processesfor further analysis 100110101
How it WorksStay in a Trusted State Profile: Baseline a “trusted” configuration for each endpoint, using optional Bit9 databases to pinpoint suspicious content Audit: Automatically search out sensitive IP and PII from any system on your network, exposing risk and enabling clean-up Restore: Return drifting or compromised configurations to a trusted state by deleting malware, inappropriate data, and unauthorized software Enforce and collect: Apply policies and remotely retrieve sensitive data capturing its metadata for evidence
System Deviation AssessmentHow do You Expose the Unknown? Assess: Scan endpoints against baselines to expose unknowns Detect: Unknowns become events Secure: Restore systems to baseline through remediation, update baseline(s) Respond: Analyze unknowns, identify malware or unapproved processes
How it Works…Maximize Operational Resources Code Analysis Further analysis of the malicious code to determine the full extent of the threat to the enterprise.  Calculate Entropy value to find polymorphic iterations and remediate the threat Triage After basic analysis confirms the activity of the suspicious code, core functionality is used to further investigate the incident. (What? When? Who? How?) RAM Analysis If code is found to be out of profile, Snapshot and other analysis is done to determine if suspicious code is a threat System Profile and Analysis with Bit9 Alert comes in and first response is to see if any code is out of profile on system(s) -- (RUN THIS DAILY)
MALWARE Detection and Mitigation ,[object Object]
Integration with Bit9 (Whitelist/blacklist)
Disregard known good files and processes from incident investigation
Uncover undiscovered/unknown files and processes
Integration with HBGary                           (Memory Analysis)
Code and behavioral analysis of running RAM or a single process
Provides intelligence on how any given process “does its thing”
Can determine if a piece of Malware is polymorphic, if it can transfer files, etc.
Identify capabilities of unknown processes,[object Object]
Malware’s Intended Consequence  You are always vulnerable to the unknown… It is impossible to achieve impenetrability If I can get you knocked of the grid, is that a mission kill? We like “Point & Click” & “Idiot Proofed” Automated Solutions that are easy to operate and subsequently, easy to circumvent. (Plug & Pray) Appliance based sensors that you just set and forget…                      (Plug and Prey) Puts you in perpetual catch up mode It is called a “0-Day” for a reason They know you can’t patch against the unknown…
Current Methods for Finding Malware Hashing MD5/SHA Formats  Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing (ie, rolling hash) “Fuzzy Hashing”  Easy to fool Signature based detection Relies on Hashes or other Code fragments  Computationally expensive, takes time Deep Packet Inspection / Stream Analysis Checking it coming in and going out
Traditional Detection Methods Antivirus software has been around since the dawn of the computer virus Traditional methods – signature based ,[object Object]
Antivirus software scans files using these signature(s).
Considered simple “Static Analysis”
In traditional methods signature is mostly “syntactic”, i.e., fixed artifactHow to find signature? ,[object Object]
Binary is scanned structurally and reverse engineered
Code is analyzed to find an unique characteristics to be used as a signature ,[object Object]
Polymorphic Code When creating a new instance, the malware uses code encryption to encrypt its body (Payload) Different keys are used in different instances so body is different sequence of bytes Simple signatures that are just sequences of bytes in the body are fooled Polymorphic Decryption Several algorithms Uses Code obfuscation  Signature changes constantly.
Detection of Polymorphic Code Commercial Antivirus Software is challenged to detect polymorphic malware (viruses and trojans) in real time Signature is created to detect MUTEX code segments (vendors may take days…) Virtualization is used to Command & Control code execution to  find a detectable sequence in the body APT Malware employs anti-reversing techniques to defeat code analysis (Detection of sandbox & virtualization = Morph) Polymorphic worms Cyber speed is expressed in milliseconds
Current Methods for Finding Malware (including polymorphic) Hashing MD5/SHA Formats  Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing (ie, rolling hash) “Fuzzy Hashing”  Easy to fool Signature based detection Relies on Hashes or other Code fragments  Computationally expensive, takes time Deep Packet Inspection Indexing DOESN’T scale to Enterprise Code mutation used to change malware attributes makes identification difficult
Behavioral Detection Behavior based detection is mostly dynamic analysis based Static analysis may be combined (Streams) Sandboxed code execution Some malware exhibit identifiable run-time behavior, for example Spyware that hijack browser Bot programs that access C2 server Adware that may show popups and ads Principle Define “templates” of bad behavior Use run-time monitoring to find match Run-time monitoring is mostly system call, API or an observable behavior
Traditional Hash Algorithms Take an unlimited number of bytes and construct a fixed size digest AB 15 73 2F DE CB 3C 2A 14 7B 34 FF  File Contents FF DE CB 15 73 2F 3C 2A 14 7B DE  2F 3C CB 15 73 2A 14 2F 3C CB 15 73 2A Hash Algorithm Hash Value 2F3CF732F3CFFDECB152A147B2F3CF56
Hash Properties Two files with the same hash will almost certainly have the same contents and size Great for detecting exact file matches If a singe byte changes, the hash value changes completely Actually 50% on average The hash value has no “meaning” One cannot infer information about the file from the value of the hash Good for security Examples CRC32, MD5, SHA1, SHA256
What is entropy? Ordered System Unordered System Low Entropy High Entropy
What about for files? Ordered File Unordered File 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 019283784736284725104816351947164823264583264612864836413743 385713091470450913497583048913408975013876473465132409873443 847251048163519471648232645832648913408975013876473465137103 891340897501387647346513837847368472510481635194716482326454 847251048163519471648232645832648913408975013876473465137103 385713091470450913497583048913408975013876473465132409873443 010101018472510481635194716482326489134089750138764734651363 837847362847251048163519471648232645832646128648364137433857 385713091470450913497583048913408975013876473465132409873443 Low Entropy High Entropy
Entropy value range (bits per byte) Blank 0.0 Text EXE Picture Compressed Encrypted Random 8.0
Commanding MALWARE remotely
Using Entropy to find Polymorphism
Network-enabled Incident ResponseUsing Entropy to Detect Advanced Threats ,[object Object],[object Object]
Data is the Lifeblood of Government Intellectual  Property ClassifiedInformation Government Data Epicenter of Risk Personnel Data Schematics Human Resources Budgetary Defense Contracts
Cyber Criminals are after Your Data ,[object Object]
$600 Billion IP Theft a Year Globally
Across all industries, data loss is a growing challenge,[object Object]
Its not always on purpose
There is no shortage either…
This network had just undergone a survey… Some of the spill data was over 5 years old… Network had undergone a “technology refresh” 3 yrs previously How do you transfer files from one server to the next? Drag & Drop Backup tapes Copy to removable drives So, classified data was migrated…   However, in the interest of full disclosure… #1 - No TS on UNCLAS #2 - Only 2 real scary leaks #3 - Unit tool swift action to contain & report Real Life Example #1 (cont.)
Performing large enterprise sweep during Intrusion Find malicious code on machines Look at naming convention of machine Indicates machine is(was) on class network Was machine improperly connected to domain? Was machine wiped and never renamed? Good news… IT personnel reapportioned asset, removed HDD Renaming was done via sticker on top of computer… Real Life Example #2
containing leakage Exfiltration techniques Store to USB Thumb drive Email it to the “other” account XOR the data (Bit Shifting) Encrypt it Collect and compress (ZIP/RAR)  Covert Tunnel it using proprietary packers On a network share, how do you know who accessed a compromised file? Link file analysis Matching files search If you clean a shared repository, have you adequately contained? Can a user save a file to their own desktop?
Creating your expressions ,[object Object]
Formatted message traffic
Typical Office type documents
Video of classified operations
Email communications
Photos and imagery
Reference material

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Incident Response and Data Auditing Evolution

  • 1. A New Era in Incident Response and Data Auditing (cont.) The Case for Cyberforensics
  • 2.
  • 6. Systems and Network Auditor (Audit Junkie)
  • 7.
  • 8. Commercial Intrusion and Forensic Expert to US NAVY HQ [CACI]
  • 9. 6 years in the cyber trenches on dirty networks (All Industries & International)© 2010 Guidance Software, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Speaker
  • 10. Intellectual Property Theft Information Warfare/Cyber Forensics for USSTRATCOM/US NAVY eDiscovery for Federal and State Departments Sabotage of Critical Infrastructure (Oil/Water/Gas) Network Sabotage to secure contracts Malware Analysis & 0-Day Incident Containment Phishing and PII theft Employee Misuse of assets/access for personal gain Field Experience in IR
  • 12. Primary Attack Vectors Digital insider attacks previously compromised systems Client-side applications (applications running on desktop / end-user systems, including email readers, web browsers, media players, instant messengers, productivity tools such as MS Office, etc.) Operating systems Web applications Wireless networks
  • 13. 2009 Trends in Attacks Against .GOV SQL Injection and Cross-site Scripting Island Hopping-Unisys/DHS Remote User Compromise-VPN Attacks-Client Side Attacks PKI Compromise--Private Key Theft Zero-Day Attacks/Drive By Downloads Automated Attack Tools Digital Insider Attacks
  • 14. Keeping Up Technical Challenges: High profile attacks – Good vectors need concealment C2 of malware is sophisticated, landscape changes We’re not looking for a single file, many artifacts dropped Designed to evade detection Designed to persist defensive techniques We’re trying to find the needle in the haystack No Magic Pill to take or Silver Bullet to shoot Analysis is considered heavy lifting Malware exists a Tactical level, yet analyzed at Strategic level. But: “k0d3R2 r LA2y” (Coders are Lazy) – They reuse code… 
  • 15. Evolving Threats Perimeter defense won’t stop it New Technologies bring new Exploits Threats can be Outside-In & Inside-Out A determined hacker will find a way (high end) Hacking has become “Productized” (low end) Nasty stuff is memory resident only Better QA in some malware than COTS Designed to be Resilient and Persistent!
  • 16. Points to Ponder Incident Response: Actions taken AFTER an event has been detected This is D/BDA (Digital/Battle Damage Assessment) Concentrates on restoral and damage control Intelligence Preparation of the Cyber Battlefield Surveillance & Recon Planning – What you bring… Terrain & Weather – What technology brings… Digital Order of Battle – What the enemy brings… Enemy Capability to impact or influence your operations Cyber Denial & Deception? Cyber Psyops?
  • 17. “We originally thought of EnCase Enterprise as an e-forensic tool only. However, Guidance Software’s solutionaddresses virtually every aspect of information security and eDiscovery.”Litigation Counsel, Dell EnCase® Enterprise – The Industry Standard Platform for Conducting Network Investigations
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.
  • 21. EnCase Cybersecurity provides… Network-enabled incident response Cyberforensic triage and analysis, attack attribution analysis, and remediation System deviation assessments Expose system integrity issues caused by anomalous or unknown threats Data policy enforcement Identify and wipe PII/IP/Classified data from unauthorized endpoints Why Risk Compromising Your Data?
  • 22. Network-enabled Incident Response How it Works You’ve Been Compromised!EnCase Cybersecurity collects data from potentially affected machines for analysis… …Which are then compared to the appropriate pre-defined system profiles …And further culled down by comparison to included whitelist database The resulting confirmed malware is used as a basis for exact and near match scans in order to locate and remove the threat network-wide. This is where Entropy takes charge… The resulting set is analyzed against potentially relevant running processes Leaving a small set of highpriority binaries for deep analysis 100110101
  • 23. EnCase Enterprise vs. EnCase Cybersecurity – High Level Overview Legend Manual Process Automated Process Not Included Included ü * ** *** ü * No PST/NST Output ** Includes PST/NST Output *** Limited SharePointsearch capabilities ü
  • 25. EE Command Center Architecture
  • 26. Sample Deployment Topology WAN Main Office A Main Office B Target Node Target Node SAFE Examiner Target Node Target Node Target Node Target Node Target Node Aggregation Database Target Node Examiner SAFE Target Node Target Node Target Node Target Node Examiner Branch Office Target Node Company Headquarters
  • 27. How EnCase® Enterprise and EnCase Cybersecurity Integrate With the Network
  • 28. Current Product Capabilities Proactive Data Security & Compliance Auditing PII, PCI, etc. data leakage and risks Reveal & detect internal threats Identify & validate external threats (including polymorphic malware) Reactive “Cyber forensic endpoint” incident response Responding to & remediating advanced malware & Zero-day attacks Reducing/minimize information security workflow complexity Integration with SIEM tools, IDS/IPS systems, etc. Leverages investment in existing EnCase Infrastructure Built as an application on top of EnCase Enterprise Built using ECC application framework
  • 29. EnCase Cybersecurity provides… System deviation assessments Expose system integrity issues caused by anomalous or unknown threats Create Profiles of known good machines Static (on disk) Dynamic (in runtime) Integrate with Bit9 database for Application Whitelisting Enables proactive scheduled scans for system deviations Trusted Computing Environments
  • 30. How do you make the unknown known? Deviation assessments capture running processes Up to 10,000 nodes per hour! Compare against trusted baseline and whitelist Analyze resulting set of unknown processes Identify unapproved process or malware Update baseline(s) Introducing EnCase® CybersecuritySystem Deviation Assessment
  • 31. System Deviation AssessmentHow It Works System Deviation AssessmentRegularly scheduled, rapid scans for anomalies across a range of endpoints Running processes are gathered at lightning speed – up to 10,000 nodes per hour …And are then compared to the appropriate customer defined profiles …And further culled down by comparison to included whitelisting database Good processes can be added to the trusted profile(s). Unapproved processes can be remediated. Leaving a small set of processesfor further analysis 100110101
  • 32. How it WorksStay in a Trusted State Profile: Baseline a “trusted” configuration for each endpoint, using optional Bit9 databases to pinpoint suspicious content Audit: Automatically search out sensitive IP and PII from any system on your network, exposing risk and enabling clean-up Restore: Return drifting or compromised configurations to a trusted state by deleting malware, inappropriate data, and unauthorized software Enforce and collect: Apply policies and remotely retrieve sensitive data capturing its metadata for evidence
  • 33. System Deviation AssessmentHow do You Expose the Unknown? Assess: Scan endpoints against baselines to expose unknowns Detect: Unknowns become events Secure: Restore systems to baseline through remediation, update baseline(s) Respond: Analyze unknowns, identify malware or unapproved processes
  • 34. How it Works…Maximize Operational Resources Code Analysis Further analysis of the malicious code to determine the full extent of the threat to the enterprise. Calculate Entropy value to find polymorphic iterations and remediate the threat Triage After basic analysis confirms the activity of the suspicious code, core functionality is used to further investigate the incident. (What? When? Who? How?) RAM Analysis If code is found to be out of profile, Snapshot and other analysis is done to determine if suspicious code is a threat System Profile and Analysis with Bit9 Alert comes in and first response is to see if any code is out of profile on system(s) -- (RUN THIS DAILY)
  • 35.
  • 36. Integration with Bit9 (Whitelist/blacklist)
  • 37. Disregard known good files and processes from incident investigation
  • 39. Integration with HBGary (Memory Analysis)
  • 40. Code and behavioral analysis of running RAM or a single process
  • 41. Provides intelligence on how any given process “does its thing”
  • 42. Can determine if a piece of Malware is polymorphic, if it can transfer files, etc.
  • 43.
  • 44. Malware’s Intended Consequence You are always vulnerable to the unknown… It is impossible to achieve impenetrability If I can get you knocked of the grid, is that a mission kill? We like “Point & Click” & “Idiot Proofed” Automated Solutions that are easy to operate and subsequently, easy to circumvent. (Plug & Pray) Appliance based sensors that you just set and forget… (Plug and Prey) Puts you in perpetual catch up mode It is called a “0-Day” for a reason They know you can’t patch against the unknown…
  • 45. Current Methods for Finding Malware Hashing MD5/SHA Formats Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing (ie, rolling hash) “Fuzzy Hashing” Easy to fool Signature based detection Relies on Hashes or other Code fragments Computationally expensive, takes time Deep Packet Inspection / Stream Analysis Checking it coming in and going out
  • 46.
  • 47. Antivirus software scans files using these signature(s).
  • 49.
  • 50. Binary is scanned structurally and reverse engineered
  • 51.
  • 52. Polymorphic Code When creating a new instance, the malware uses code encryption to encrypt its body (Payload) Different keys are used in different instances so body is different sequence of bytes Simple signatures that are just sequences of bytes in the body are fooled Polymorphic Decryption Several algorithms Uses Code obfuscation Signature changes constantly.
  • 53. Detection of Polymorphic Code Commercial Antivirus Software is challenged to detect polymorphic malware (viruses and trojans) in real time Signature is created to detect MUTEX code segments (vendors may take days…) Virtualization is used to Command & Control code execution to find a detectable sequence in the body APT Malware employs anti-reversing techniques to defeat code analysis (Detection of sandbox & virtualization = Morph) Polymorphic worms Cyber speed is expressed in milliseconds
  • 54. Current Methods for Finding Malware (including polymorphic) Hashing MD5/SHA Formats Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing (ie, rolling hash) “Fuzzy Hashing” Easy to fool Signature based detection Relies on Hashes or other Code fragments Computationally expensive, takes time Deep Packet Inspection Indexing DOESN’T scale to Enterprise Code mutation used to change malware attributes makes identification difficult
  • 55. Behavioral Detection Behavior based detection is mostly dynamic analysis based Static analysis may be combined (Streams) Sandboxed code execution Some malware exhibit identifiable run-time behavior, for example Spyware that hijack browser Bot programs that access C2 server Adware that may show popups and ads Principle Define “templates” of bad behavior Use run-time monitoring to find match Run-time monitoring is mostly system call, API or an observable behavior
  • 56. Traditional Hash Algorithms Take an unlimited number of bytes and construct a fixed size digest AB 15 73 2F DE CB 3C 2A 14 7B 34 FF File Contents FF DE CB 15 73 2F 3C 2A 14 7B DE 2F 3C CB 15 73 2A 14 2F 3C CB 15 73 2A Hash Algorithm Hash Value 2F3CF732F3CFFDECB152A147B2F3CF56
  • 57. Hash Properties Two files with the same hash will almost certainly have the same contents and size Great for detecting exact file matches If a singe byte changes, the hash value changes completely Actually 50% on average The hash value has no “meaning” One cannot infer information about the file from the value of the hash Good for security Examples CRC32, MD5, SHA1, SHA256
  • 58. What is entropy? Ordered System Unordered System Low Entropy High Entropy
  • 59. What about for files? Ordered File Unordered File 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101 019283784736284725104816351947164823264583264612864836413743 385713091470450913497583048913408975013876473465132409873443 847251048163519471648232645832648913408975013876473465137103 891340897501387647346513837847368472510481635194716482326454 847251048163519471648232645832648913408975013876473465137103 385713091470450913497583048913408975013876473465132409873443 010101018472510481635194716482326489134089750138764734651363 837847362847251048163519471648232645832646128648364137433857 385713091470450913497583048913408975013876473465132409873443 Low Entropy High Entropy
  • 60. Entropy value range (bits per byte) Blank 0.0 Text EXE Picture Compressed Encrypted Random 8.0
  • 62. Using Entropy to find Polymorphism
  • 63.
  • 64. Data is the Lifeblood of Government Intellectual Property ClassifiedInformation Government Data Epicenter of Risk Personnel Data Schematics Human Resources Budgetary Defense Contracts
  • 65.
  • 66. $600 Billion IP Theft a Year Globally
  • 67.
  • 68. Its not always on purpose
  • 69. There is no shortage either…
  • 70. This network had just undergone a survey… Some of the spill data was over 5 years old… Network had undergone a “technology refresh” 3 yrs previously How do you transfer files from one server to the next? Drag & Drop Backup tapes Copy to removable drives So, classified data was migrated… However, in the interest of full disclosure… #1 - No TS on UNCLAS #2 - Only 2 real scary leaks #3 - Unit tool swift action to contain & report Real Life Example #1 (cont.)
  • 71. Performing large enterprise sweep during Intrusion Find malicious code on machines Look at naming convention of machine Indicates machine is(was) on class network Was machine improperly connected to domain? Was machine wiped and never renamed? Good news… IT personnel reapportioned asset, removed HDD Renaming was done via sticker on top of computer… Real Life Example #2
  • 72. containing leakage Exfiltration techniques Store to USB Thumb drive Email it to the “other” account XOR the data (Bit Shifting) Encrypt it Collect and compress (ZIP/RAR) Covert Tunnel it using proprietary packers On a network share, how do you know who accessed a compromised file? Link file analysis Matching files search If you clean a shared repository, have you adequately contained? Can a user save a file to their own desktop?
  • 73.
  • 76. Video of classified operations
  • 80.
  • 83. File flagged as deleted. Data wiped with zeros
  • 84. Data-B-Gone As a side note, no entry was created in the INFO2 file and the Recycler was untouched.
  • 85. Data Risk and Spillage AssessmentHow do You Ensure Sensitive Data is Kept in Check? Define: Create search criteria for relevant sensitive data Identify: Automatically search systems for sensitive data Enforce: Collect and/or wipe sensitive data from unauthorized locations Assess: Map data found to data policies
  • 86. In addition to malware and suspicious activity, EnCase Cybersecurity can expose and remediate errant sensitive data Ongoing risk assessments for PII/IP and Classified Spillage Configurable for your specific data formats (e.g., contract numbers) Light passive driver as opposed to a heavy and active agent Forensic-grade disk level visibility and validation Risk mitigation and policy enforcement through remediation Data Risk and Spillage AssessmentData Remediation & Policy Enforcement
  • 87. EnCase Cybersecurity provides… An open, web-services API to enable third-party applications to trigger investigative/forensic functions, so that automated incident response can be performed. It is optimized when triggered by a SIM/SIEM wherein threshold, prioritization and coverage are all weighted within the requesting sensor. Automated Incident Response
  • 89. Feature Roadmap Job Scheduling Job Recurrence Examiner Affinity Security Centric User Interface Web UI Process Automation API Based integration with SIEM, IDS, IPS tools Initial integration with ArcSight Services based offering with other IDS vendors Enhanced Reporting
  • 91. EnCaseCybersecurity AIRS module will functionally provide: An API to allow data flow between AIRS and 3rd Party security applications. The ability to automate routine job cueing and execution based on both internal (manual) and external (Semi-Automatic) triggered events. The ability to schedule job execution at a user selectable frequency and reoccurrence. Extension of pre-configured job modules that are to run based upon class of event trigger received into the cue, or as defined by the operator upon manual entry.
  • 92. 3rd Party Application Programming Interface (API) Full API Will accept inbound event Queuing Will provide outbound job results Open API ensures open framework User writes own connectors User uses Professional Services to write connector ArcSight out of the box Partnered
  • 93. Triggered job creation and execution Templates jobs that will ingest target data Conduct Snapshot Preserve data Image Drive Image Memory Perform System Profile Collection & Subsequent Analysis Perform Configuration Assessment (DISA STIG/FDCC) Perform PII/IP Audit Perform Entropy Remediation
  • 94. Triggered job creation and execution Automatically Queue Run the job Automatic Semi-Automatic Manual Override Alert Threshold Asset Prioritization Event Severity Distributed Command Center Infrastructure Remote Examiner Service Jobs assigned by region/AD Forest/segment, etc…
  • 95. Job scheduling Minimize bandwidth impact of intensive operations Ie, Full Disk Imaging Assign jobs based upon network infrastructure Keep jobs within segments Creation of reoccurring jobs Set up periodicity and intervals
  • 96. Job status Which jobs are running Which jobs have completed Which jobs remain in the Queue
  • 97. Job Results Viewable via Web Interface within Cybersecurity Open API pushes results to requesting sensor Optional write results to Database
  • 98. User Interface and Report Generator Results delivered to “non experts” via web interface Consolidate and Simplify Results Provide Report Generation of items of interest Export significant items for archive
  • 99. Saturation Safeguards / “Run Now” Operator Override Set Job Queue to auto run Run continuously as licensing permits Preconfigured batch limit Spool like jobs and run concurrently Operator will be able to select and override Immediately trigger jobs.
  • 100. Job Refresh / Export XML to 3rd Party Refresh Job Status Alert 3rd Party Solution that jobs have completed Export XML to: Database 3rd Party Solution Ready to review
  • 101. Major Defense Contractor US Military Federal and State Departments Critical Infrastructure (Oil/Water/Gas) UK Office of Govt Commerce NATO Financial Industry Bio Research Real World Use Cases
  • 102.
  • 103.
  • 105.
  • 106. McAfee
  • 107.
  • 109.
  • 110. McAfee
  • 111.
  • 113.
  • 115.
  • 118.
  • 119. Snort
  • 120.
  • 122.
  • 123. RSA
  • 124.
  • 126.