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Multilayer Security Architecture for      Internet Protocol (ML-IPSec)                          1 October, 2010           ...
Objectives    • Demonstrate “Security Architecture for      Internet Protocol” (IPSec) protection model.    • Highlight th...
Introduction    • Security Architecture for Internet Protocol      (IPSec) provides security services at IP      layer in ...
Path(s) Security    • Between Pairs of Gateways      – Gateways need to implement IPSec.      – Works in Tunnel Mode (comp...
Path(s) Security    • Between Pair of Hosts      – End nodes need to implement IPSec.      – Works in Transport Mode (Uppe...
Path(s) Security    • Between Host and Gateway      – Both end hosts and gateways implement        IPSec.      – Usually w...
Security Goals    • Access Control      – Prevent unauthorized access to resources.    • Connectionless Integrity      – C...
Security Goals (continued..)    • Partial Sequence Integrity      – Check for duplicate packets (Replay attacks).    • Dat...
Major IPSec Components    • Security Policies      – Provides rules for user access and control level.    • Security Proto...
Major IPSec Components     (continued..)     • Cryptographic Algorithms       – Helps to achieve integrity and confidentia...
Assumptions     • To achieve high quality of security       services, certain assumptions need to be       met:       – Go...
IPSec Components to Help in     Achieving Security Goals     • Security Association (SA)       – SA is a one way traffic s...
IPSec Components to Help in     Achieving Security Goals     (continued..)      • Security Policy Database (SPD)        – ...
IPSec Components to Help in     Achieving Security Goals     (continued..)      • Security Association Database (SAD)     ...
IPSec Working & Role of IKE     • IKE helps in setup of security associations       (SAs).       – The functionality of al...
IPSec Working & Role of ESP     • ESP provides origin authentication,       connectionless and sequence integrity,       d...
IPSec Working & Role of ESP     (continued..)     • Data Confidentiality       – Data confidentiality is provided via encr...
IPSec Working & Role of ESP     (continued..)     • Anti-Replay Service (Partial Sequence       Integrity)       – This is...
Limitations of IPSec     • IPSec follows very strict layering and       protection model works end-to-end.     • With adva...
Limitations of IPSec (continued..)     • Conflicts between IPSec and TCP PEPs       – TCP PEPs work on two pieces of infor...
Limitations of IPSec (continued..)     • Traffic Engineering       – Flow classification is essential in providing rich   ...
Summary of IPSec Limitations and     Conclusion     • All above defined mechanisms, try to       access upper layers infor...
Problem Statement for ML-IPSec     • Develop a security scheme with below       defined features:       – Supports the ser...
Approaches - Transport Layer     Security     • Using a transport-layer security mechanism as an       alternative to IPse...
Approaches –     Tunnelling one security protocol     • This approach tries to use transport layer       security protocol...
Approaches - Using a Transport     Friendly ESP Format     • The transport-friendly ESP (TF-ESP)       protocol format was...
Approaches – Splitting IPsec into     Two Segments     • IPsec protection can be applied twice, once       between sender ...
Approaches – Multi - Layer IP     Security Protocol     • ML-IPsec breaks the IP datagram into       different parts and a...
Standardization & Issues     • Many meetings were attended at IETF to       present the idea of IPSec and internet draft w...
Applications30                  www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
Principle of ML-IPSec Security     Protection     • Multilayer protection model:        • Divides IP datagram into zones  ...
General Model of IPSec Processing• .                                               Multicast                              ...
Composite Security Association     (CSA)• Security Association      • one-way relationship      between sender and      re...
CSA Continued..     • CSA has two elements:       – Zone Map: defines coverage of each zone in         IP datagram.       ...
Zones and Zone Map     • A zone is any portion of IP datagram under same security       protection.        • Entire IP dat...
Composite Security Association     (CSA)     • Zone Map     • Zone List       – In zone list area we show the SAs, their36...
Zone List continued     • SA (designated)       –   Sequence Number Counter (64 bit)       –   Sequence Counter Overflow  ...
Outbound Processing (zone by     zone)                       Outbound: IP datagram                              Zone map  ...
Inbound Processing (zone by zone)                         Outbound: IP datagram                                Zone map   ...
ESP Header     • Security Parameter Index:       Identifies Security Association       (SA).     • Sequence Number: Counts...
Implementation and Evaluation     • Two different evaluations of ML-IPSec       shall be performed.       – Simulations ba...
Testbed Experiment     Requirements     • Use Cases       – IP Only: running standard IP with no security.       – IPSec: ...
Testbed Experiment     Requirements     Processing Delay                           – Network speed will be fixed.     • Th...
ML-IPSec Testbed     • Current Status        – Fedora 13 Installed        – Computers are          configured as shown    ...
Simulations & Standalone     Implementation Plans     • NIST has performed IPSec simulations as part       of project “NII...
Simulations & Standalone     Implementation Plans46                              www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
Conclusion     • Intermediate gateways can have access to       partial IP datagram (e.g. TCP header) by partial       key...
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Multilayer Security Architecture for Internet Protocols

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A New Security Architecture build on IPsec for IP based networks.

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Transcript of "Multilayer Security Architecture for Internet Protocols"

  1. 1. Multilayer Security Architecture for Internet Protocol (ML-IPSec) 1 October, 2010 Muhammad Nasir Mumtaz Bhutta Centre for Communication Systems Research University of Surrey Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH Email: m.bhutta@surrey.ac.uk, Tel: 01483 68 3036 www.surrey.ac.uk
  2. 2. Objectives • Demonstrate “Security Architecture for Internet Protocol” (IPSec) protection model. • Highlight the limitations of IPSec. • Demonstrate the working or ML-IPSec. • Demonstrate the detailed experiment plans.2 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  3. 3. Introduction • Security Architecture for Internet Protocol (IPSec) provides security services at IP layer in protocol stack. • All upper layers than IP layer can get security services without reengineering the applications. • IPSec operates in two modes, tunnel and transport, to secure path(s) between communicating nodes.3 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  4. 4. Path(s) Security • Between Pairs of Gateways – Gateways need to implement IPSec. – Works in Tunnel Mode (complete IP packet is protected & new IP header is appended). – Different source and destination addresses in dual IP headers. Un Protected Subnet Protected Subnet Protected Subnet IPSec Tunnel Tunnel Endpoint Tunnel Endpoint Gateway Gateway4 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  5. 5. Path(s) Security • Between Pair of Hosts – End nodes need to implement IPSec. – Works in Transport Mode (Upper layers headers and IP data are protected). – IP addresses are unchanged. Un Protected Subnet IPSec Tunnel OR Transport mode Protected Endpoint Protected Endpoint5 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  6. 6. Path(s) Security • Between Host and Gateway – Both end hosts and gateways implement IPSec. – Usually works in tunnel mode to take benefits of hiding external characteristics of communication. Protected Subnet Un Protected Subnet AND/OR IPSec Tunnel Internet Protected Endpoint Protected Endpoint6 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  7. 7. Security Goals • Access Control – Prevent unauthorized access to resources. • Connectionless Integrity – Check any modifications in IP datagram without caring about the arrival order of IP datagrams. • Origin Authentication – Identify claimed source of data.7 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  8. 8. Security Goals (continued..) • Partial Sequence Integrity – Check for duplicate packets (Replay attacks). • Data Confidentiality – Protect against disclosure of data to unauthorized entities. • Limited Traffic Flow Confidentiality – Protect external characteristics of communications (e.g. source and destination addresses etc.).8 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  9. 9. Major IPSec Components • Security Policies – Provides rules for user access and control level. • Security Protocols – Authentication Header (AH) • Provides origin authentication, connectionless integrity and optional partial sequence integrity. – Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) • Provides all services provided by AH, data confidentiality and limited traffic flow confidentiality as well.9 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  10. 10. Major IPSec Components (continued..) • Cryptographic Algorithms – Helps to achieve integrity and confidentiality. • Key Management – All security operations are provided by cryptographic means, so keys are required. – Internet Key Exchange (IKE v2) is used to provide key management.10 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  11. 11. Assumptions • To achieve high quality of security services, certain assumptions need to be met: – Good implementation of IPSec. – Security is dependent on many things in over all system (e.g. personnel & physical procedures, security policies etc.), so IPSec just play its role as a part. – Good Implementation of Operating System (OS) security services.11 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  12. 12. IPSec Components to Help in Achieving Security Goals • Security Association (SA) – SA is a one way traffic secure connection between communicating parties. – For Bidirectional communication, two SAs are established. – SA, providing actually all security services, is setup by IKE. – Functionality is dependent upon security protocols, mode of IPSec working, endpoints of SA and chosen security services.12 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  13. 13. IPSec Components to Help in Achieving Security Goals (continued..) • Security Policy Database (SPD) – Stores security policies. – Provides information about security policy rules to be applied. – At least one SPD implementation must be supported in IPSec. – Three logical components • SPD-Secure (S) contains rules for all IPSec protected traffic. • SPD-Outbound (O) contains rules for all outbound traffic • SPD-Inbound (I) contains rules for all inbound traffic or bypassed.13 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  14. 14. IPSec Components to Help in Achieving Security Goals (continued..) • Security Association Database (SAD) – Stores SAs. – Provides information about security associations. – For outbound processing SAD is pointed by SPD-S part. – For inbound processing SAD is pointed by SPD-I part. • Peer Authorization Database (PAD) – Stores information about links between SPD and SAD. – Helps IPSec components in security services practice.14 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  15. 15. IPSec Working & Role of IKE • IKE helps in setup of security associations (SAs). – The functionality of all cryptographic protocols is dependent on these SAs. – Control information exchange also requires SA setup. • IKE provides this setup by message exchanges. – IKE_SA_INIT, IKE_AUTH – IKE_CHILD_SA – Informational Exchanges15 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  16. 16. IPSec Working & Role of ESP • ESP provides origin authentication, connectionless and sequence integrity, data and limited traffic flow confidentiality. • Security services are offered in three modes by ESP. – Confidentiality Only (may be supported) – Integrity Only (must be supported) – Confidentiality and Integrity (must be supported)16 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  17. 17. IPSec Working & Role of ESP (continued..) • Data Confidentiality – Data confidentiality is provided via encryption. – Encryption scheme selection is dependent upon SA out of various encryption algorithms. • Origin Authentication and Connectionless Integrity – Integrity of IP datagram is validated via Message Authentication Code (MAC). – Origin authentication is provided indirectly by binding of the key with the holding entity (origin).17 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  18. 18. IPSec Working & Role of ESP (continued..) • Anti-Replay Service (Partial Sequence Integrity) – This is service to detect arrival of duplicate packets. – Provides sequential integrity and may be supported in ESP. • Limited Traffic Flow Confidentiality – This service hides source and destination addresses and usually employed in Tunnel Mode.18 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  19. 19. Limitations of IPSec • IPSec follows very strict layering and protection model works end-to-end. • With advancement in wireless technology according to characteristics of networks, certain cross-layer optimizations are performed. • Some examples of wireless technology highlights the functionality of new network applications.19 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  20. 20. Limitations of IPSec (continued..) • Conflicts between IPSec and TCP PEPs – TCP PEPs work on two pieces of information, TCP flow identification and sequence numbers. – IPSec encapsulate whole TCP packet. • Traffic Analysis – For functioning of upper layers, some information from headers is required at intermediate nodes. – IPSec hides all upper layer headers.20 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  21. 21. Limitations of IPSec (continued..) • Traffic Engineering – Flow classification is essential in providing rich classes of service and QoS (RED, RSVP). – The flow information present in upper layers such ac TCP is hidden by IPSec. • Application Layer Agents/Proxies – Some modern routers can serve the HTTP requests from their local cache in order to improve performance. – They need information from upper layers like HTTP but, that is hidden by IPSec.21 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  22. 22. Summary of IPSec Limitations and Conclusion • All above defined mechanisms, try to access upper layers information for their working. • IPSec works on end-to-end basis and encrypts all the upper layer information. • So IPSec has basic functioning conflict with many intermediate devices. • Need to resolve these issues for optimal performance.22 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  23. 23. Problem Statement for ML-IPSec • Develop a security scheme with below defined features: – Supports the services and applications which have conflict with IPsec working. – Should grant trusted intermediate nodes a secure, controlled and limited access to a selected portion of IP datagram. – Should preserve the end-to-end security protection for user data.23 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  24. 24. Approaches - Transport Layer Security • Using a transport-layer security mechanism as an alternative to IPsec to provide security services. • The transport-layer mechanism, such as secure sockets layer (SSL) or transport layer security (TLS) operates above TCP and works well with TCP PEP: – it encrypts the TCP data while leaving the TCP header in unencrypted and unauthenticated form • Limitations: – Vulnerable to traffic analysis attack – SSL/TLS only works on TCP but not on UDP so the range of applications is limited24 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  25. 25. Approaches – Tunnelling one security protocol • This approach tries to use transport layer security protocols, SSL/TLS, inside IPsec. • SSL/TLS will protect the TCP data and IPSec will protect TCP header information • Limitations: – wastage of resources because TCP data will be encrypted twice by SSL/TLS and IPsec, – IPsec still encrypts the whole TCP information including header and data part25 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  26. 26. Approaches - Using a Transport Friendly ESP Format • The transport-friendly ESP (TF-ESP) protocol format was proposed: – The TCP state information (such as flow identifications and sequence numbers) are in a disclosure header outside the encryption scope, bbut authenticated. • Limitations: – Vulnerable to traffic analysis attack – it does not work well with TCP spoofing when a write access is needed26 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  27. 27. Approaches – Splitting IPsec into Two Segments • IPsec protection can be applied twice, once between sender and security gateway and second time between security gateway and destination. • Limitations: – It exposes the information to intermediate nodes while confidentiality is only meant for end-to-end27 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  28. 28. Approaches – Multi - Layer IP Security Protocol • ML-IPsec breaks the IP datagram into different parts and apply different security mechanisms on different parts: – one security mechanism for transport header – different security mechanism for application data • This approach allows the intermediate nodes to co-exist with end-to-end IPsec • Limitations: – More complex than IPsec28 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  29. 29. Standardization & Issues • Many meetings were attended at IETF to present the idea of IPSec and internet draft was written. • IETF Concerns: – Application domains is limited (Satellite Networks only). – Implementation complexity is increased. (shown feasible via implementation in IPSec). – Two more implementations required to prove the points. • Key Management Complexity is major issue.29 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  30. 30. Applications30 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  31. 31. Principle of ML-IPSec Security Protection • Multilayer protection model: • Divides IP datagram into zones • Different protection schemes for different zones (e.g. SA, public/private keys, access control rules etc.)31 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  32. 32. General Model of IPSec Processing• . Multicast Key Exchange32 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  33. 33. Composite Security Association (CSA)• Security Association • one-way relationship between sender and receiver. • defines set of parameters (e.g. sequence number, anti- replay window, lifetime of SA, Path MTU etc). • Controls outbound, inbound processing.33 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  34. 34. CSA Continued.. • CSA has two elements: – Zone Map: defines coverage of each zone in IP datagram. – Zone List: is a list of all SAs for all zones. (all stored in “Security Association Database (SAD)”).34 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  35. 35. Zones and Zone Map • A zone is any portion of IP datagram under same security protection. • Entire IP datagram can be broken into zones. • Zones can not overlap. • A zone can be split into multiple sub zones (continuous part of IP datagram). • A zone map is a mapping relationship between IP octets and zones. • Remains Constant for a security relationship. • zones that covers last part of IP datagram (data) should35 be variable according to size. www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  36. 36. Composite Security Association (CSA) • Zone Map • Zone List – In zone list area we show the SAs, their36 parameters and access control. www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  37. 37. Zone List continued • SA (designated) – Sequence Number Counter (64 bit) – Sequence Counter Overflow – Anti-Replay Window (64 bit) – Protocol mode (Transport or Tunnel) – Path MTU – Lifetime – Encryption algorithm (DES-CBC) – Encryption Key – Authentication algorithm (HMAC-MD5-32) – Authentication Key37 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  38. 38. Outbound Processing (zone by zone) Outbound: IP datagram Zone map Plain Text (masked and concatenated) Encryption (using ESP) AH SA Cipher Text (ESP) Authentication ICV AH or ESP authentication data ESP paylod data38 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  39. 39. Inbound Processing (zone by zone) Outbound: IP datagram Zone map Plain Text (masked and concatenated) Decryption (using ESP) AH SA Cipher Text (ESP) Authentication ICV AH or ESP authentication data ESP paylod data39 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  40. 40. ESP Header • Security Parameter Index: Identifies Security Association (SA). • Sequence Number: Counts the packet sent. • Encrypted Payload Data for Zone: contains the encrypted payload data (IP payload data, padding, pad length, Next Header). • Authentication Data for Zone: Contains the Integrity Check Values (ICV) for each zone.40 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  41. 41. Implementation and Evaluation • Two different evaluations of ML-IPSec shall be performed. – Simulations based, to see the scalability and reliability behaviour. • Impact of network bandwidth on Performance ( SA establishment latency, TCP throughput and delay). • Impact of different data packet size on performance and security protocol behaviour. – Reference Implementation of ML-IPSec to see the overhead on real network.41 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  42. 42. Testbed Experiment Requirements • Use Cases – IP Only: running standard IP with no security. – IPSec: running IPSec using ESP with authentication mode enabled. – ML-IPSec (1 Zone) = IPSec – ML-IPSec (2 Zone) – ML-IPSec (3 Zones) • The ML-IPSec experiment will be evaluated for processing delays, CPU overload and bandwidth overhead42 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  43. 43. Testbed Experiment Requirements Processing Delay – Network speed will be fixed. • The processing delay will be – Throughput and protocol measured by taking following overhead relationship will be studied parameters into consideration: – One Host pinging other Comparing CPU Overload – Packet size will be fixed. • For evaluation of CPU – Processing Time will be overhead environment will be evaluated. configured as given below: Bandwidth Overhead – One host generate and send packets as fast as it can and – One host generate and send other counting after receiving. packets as fast as it can and other counting after receiving. – CPU speed will be fixed. – Network speed will be fixed. . – CPU speed will be fixed. – Throughput and CPU load relationship will be studied.43 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  44. 44. ML-IPSec Testbed • Current Status – Fedora 13 Installed – Computers are configured as shown in diagram. • Future Plans – Need to configure network’s speed. – Need to configure NIST Net according to requirements.44 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  45. 45. Simulations & Standalone Implementation Plans • NIST has performed IPSec simulations as part of project “NIIST(NIST IPSec and IKE Simulation Tool”. •SPD: Security Policy Database •SAD: Security Association Database •PF_Key: Generic Socket Key Management API45 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  46. 46. Simulations & Standalone Implementation Plans46 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
  47. 47. Conclusion • Intermediate gateways can have access to partial IP datagram (e.g. TCP header) by partial keys. • Can solve the conflict between IPSec and TCP PEPs being used in satellite networks. • The current new and future networks can improve quality of service using fair queuing, differential services etc. • IPSec problems are solved.47 www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/CCSR
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