1. ROOTS OF THE CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS
[Note: Most of the following is for Wednesday's class; click here for the section
germane to our final session (Friday)]
Introduction
Most informed observers agree that humanity currently faces serious
environmental problems: resource depletion, extensive air & water pollution
with major public-health consequences, massive deforestation, a huge spike
in species extinctions, global warming (anthropogenic climate change), and so
on
Main disagreements concern 1) causes of these problems, and 2) what
should be done about them
This lecture focuses on the first question, although the second one will be
addressed in the final section
In particular, I want to elaborate on the possible relationships between general
ecological principles surveyed earlier in this course and the causes of the
contemporary environmental crisis (hereafter, "CEC")
Western Cultural Values
First argument I want to consider is that the CEC is best understood as a
consequence of Western cultural values
There are several variants of this argument, differing primarily by which
specific values are charged as guilty, and why:
1) Judeo-Christian religion (Lynn White 1967): for placing humans apart from
(and superior to) nature, giving humans "dominion over nature" and reduced
motivation to take care of the planet given expectation of an eternal afterlife
and coming Armageddon
2) Cartesian dualism (after 17th century philosopher Descartes) and/or
scientific rationalism: for robbing nature of spiritual significance, and
conceiving of humans (or at least human thought or culture) as separate from
nature

2. 3) Patriarchal or phallocentric ideology: for identifying nature with the
feminine, and seeking to subjugate both to a masculine "will to power"
This is of course a very brief and simplistic summary of some rather
complicated arguments
They could each be debated at length (and I expect we'll do some of that in
class), but let me just mention a few critiques of such views
First, it can be argued that most of these "western values" arguments paint
with too broad a brush; thus, Judeo-Christian religion has been around for
several thousand years, so if the CEC is an inevitable product of it, it's sure
been a long time coming
On other hand, it may assign blame too narrowly, since non-Western cultures
do not have perfect environmental records (e.g., extensive deforestation in
China goes back several thousand years, and coexists with refined art, poetry,
and philosophy celebrating transcendent beauty of nature; extensive
deforestation in the circum-Mediterranean preceded the spread of Christianity)
This suggests that these explanations are at best partial; perhaps it takes a
certain set of values (not necessarily Western) plus something else to produce
widespread environmental damage
A deeper or more subtle criticism is that any explanation of CEC in terms of
"values" is inherently incomplete; in particular, it fails to explain where the
values come from: What forces created them and made them so central to
modern culture?
This criticism is an example of the general debate between "mentalist" (or
"culturalist") and "materialist" explanations of social change, with
mentalists/culturalists deriving values from other values, while materialists
derive the values from the influence of material factors (such as resource
scarcity, technology, population growth, natural selection, etc.) and incentives
on human thought and action
Thus, a "materialist" would argue that values promoting destructive behavior
toward nature are merely symptoms (or intermediate links in a causal chain or
causal network), and that a satisfactory analysis should delineate the material
causes favoring the cultural evolution and persistence of these values over
others

3. For example, while an idealist would attribute the decreased sharing and
increased individualism seen in modernizing economies as reflecting a
change in values governing generosity and identity, a materialist analysis
looks for underlying material causes (e.g., increased mobility and decreased
need for localized cooperation in production, leading to declining payoffs to
reciprocity)
(More on materialist views below)
Human Nature
At the other extreme from values-based explanations of CEC are those that
point to one or another fundamental feature of human nature as root causes
In crudest form, this kind of explanation argues that it is "human nature" to be
greedy, to act in self-interest, to convert resources into offspring as rapidly as
possible, and to be short-sighted and selfish enough to ignore long-term or
broader consequences of our actions
Taken at face value, this view suggests there is little hope for reforming our
behavior and avoiding environmental crises
One logical problem with such a view is that it uses a constant (human nature)
to explain a variable (degree of environmental damage)
An empirical critique might point to evidence that many human populations
have persisted in reasonable balance with their environments over long
periods of time
A more sophisticated version of the "human nature" view would thus have to
argue that elements of human nature plus additional variables produce (or
prevent) environmental problems
A logical corollary of this latter view is that environmental problems are a
recurrent possibility in any cultural tradition, not just Western or industrial ones
This is in direct contrast with "values" explanations, as well as widely held
view that non-Western non-urbanized cultures live in harmony with their
environment regardless of the adaptive payoffs for doing so (a topic we have
just been considering in this course)

4. Materialist Causes
Intermediate between "cultural value" and "human nature" explanations of
CEC lie analyses that point to materialist determinants -- i.e., aspects of
demography, economics, and environment that appear to be causally related
to environmental problems
Main material causes relevant to CEC = population growth, technology, and
economic growth
Population growth if unchecked must lead eventually to some forms of
resource depletion and environmental degradation -- that much seems certain
in a finite world
But asserting what must eventually happen is not same as showing what has
in fact happened (just as saying that anyone who lives long enough must die
of old age is not same as showing that people mostly die of old age rather
than malaria, cancer, or AIDS)
More specific criticisms of population-growth paradigm are:
1) It is not sufficient in itself (e.g., much of Asia has been densely populated
for centuries without destroying ecosystem; U.S. = major contributor to CEC,
but not densely populated nor growing all that fast)
2) Malthusian account blames society in aggregate, rather than looking at how
environmental problems may be due to some subset of society which benefits
from the activities causing an environmental problem, and imposes its costs
on less powerful segments
While I agree (up to a point) with the anti-Malthusians, I think they are
sometimes as one-sided as Malthusians; they're right in pointing to
sociopolitical inequalities as important contributors to environmental problems
(e.g., famine), but incorrect in presuming or implying that things would be no
different if population were stable or declining
To the contrary, if inequalities exist, then population growth can only
exacerbate their effects in face of competition over increasingly scarce
resources, even if this scarcity is (at least in part) a product of unequal access

5. On the other hand, blaming population alone while ignoring other causes is
obviously incorrect, and morally and politically suspect
Technology is another prime nominee for chief environmental villain
It is clear that certain kinds of industrial technology are major causes of CEC,
particularly for such impacts as chemical pollution, ozone depletion, and
global warming
We can also hold technology (in the form of fossil fuel extraction and industrial
processes of various sorts) responsible for producing tremendous impacts on
soils, fisheries, and other environmental factors
As Rappaport (1971, "The flow of energy in an agricultural society," Scientific
American 225(3):132) notes,
When such energy sources are available, the pressures that can be brought
to bear on specific ecosystems are no longer limited to the energy that the
ecosystem itself can generate, and alterations become feasible that were
formerly out of reach.
On the other hand, it is not technology per se that is directly to blame for
deforestation in Nepal or Amazonia, since the technology being used there is
often no more complicated than fire and axes -- thousands of years old
Economic Growth is another factor that many people hold responsible (in
whole or part) for CEC
Some see this as specifically a problem of capitalism, because of its
competitive dynamic and resultant tendency for continual economic expansion
But economic logic based on competition, on extracting surplus from one
locale or class to benefit those in another locale or class, and on economic
growth, is characteristic of other economic systems besides capitalist ones,
including mercantilism, tributary empires, as well as industrial "socialism"
(e.g., USSR, PRC)
In any intensely competitive socioeconomic system, long-term sustainability is
likely to be sacrificed to short-term gains in an attempt to best one's opponent

6. Thus, perhaps the root problem here is not economic growth per se, but the
fact that competition rewards short-term gains (even if this leads to resource
depletion and political collapse in the long run)
Among economic systems, capitalism pre-eminently rewards quick profits,
and the elites who make the major economic decisions are often able to
escape the negative consequences of environmental degradation by pulling
up stakes ("take the money and run"), by sucking one area dry and moving on
to the next, squeezing the goose who lays golden eggs dry and using one of
the golden eggs to buy another goose (e.g., cattle ranch, copper mine,
factory) in another region, country, or continent ("reinvesting profits")
Quoting again from Rappaport (1971: 132)
As man forces the ecosystems he dominates to be increasingly simple,
however, their already limited autonomy is further diminished. They are
subject not only to local environmental stress, but also to extraneous
economic and political vicissitudes. They come to rely more and more on
imported materials; the men who manipulate them become more and more
subject to distant events, interests and processes they may not even grasp
and certainly do not control. National and international concerns replace local
considerations, and with the regulation of the local ecosystems coming from
outside, the system's normal self-corrective capacity is diminished and
eventually destroyed.
The roots of this system lie in the origins of stratified societies several
thousand years ago (just yesterday in terms of the full span of human
existence, but long before the rise of capitalism), and have been unleashed in
full force by colonial expansion of European mercantilism (and then
capitalism) over the whole globe in last 500 years
Where Do We Go From Here?
Given the massive historical inertia at work here, and the ever-expanding
power and worldwide spread of capitalist production, is there any obvious way
out of the CEC?
Our assigned readings provide some contrasting views on these issues

7. Low & Heinen propose that people will only avoid environmental destruction if
it is in their short-term self-interest to do so, implying that this is nothing new in
human history (though perhaps intensified)
Alcorn takes a more conventional environmentalist position, arguing that
major env. destruction is a novel problem which must be corrected by
changing our environmental values or ethics
Norgaard takes a middle ground of sorts, locating the primary source of our
contemporary envir. crisis in an economic system (market capitalism) that
profits disproportionately from overconsumption, and fosters it worldwide;
hence he implies that effective change must be socioeconomic in form (and
will be difficult to achieve), but also argues that we need to "derive a viable
image of the future, to change the vocabulary of our political discourse" (p
180), and abandon a worldview based on progress--a rather mentalist
prescription of how to combat the CEC
Clay provides summaries of various cases which could be used to support
each of the above positions to varying degrees, though his views seem closer
to Low & Heinen than to the others
Where the various views perhaps converge is in viewing communal
management by indigenous or local communities as often better at conserving
resources than are market forces or bureaucracies
Alcorn argues that "traditional conservation systems maintain biodiversity for
subsistence and survival purposes" (323) but also that "the subsistence needs
of the burgeoning global human population" is undermining conservation (324)
There is some tension between Alcorn's statement that traditional subsistence
cultures conserved resources via rules limiting exploitation (p. 326) and her
statement that "Biodiversity has persisted up to present time partly because of
limited human population size and limited human technological abilities" (p.
325)
In any case, the era in which small, localized, communally-organized peoples
with long-term familiarity with their homelands held sole control over a
significant portion of the inhabited biosphere has ended, and everywhere we
find nation states, multinational corporations, and NGOs vying for the upper
hand in setting and enforcing land-use policy

8. This does not mean that locally-adapted populations are doomed or irrelevant,
just that they are no longer masters of the political or environmental arena in
their homelands, and must work out some sort of partnership with the more
powerful actors just listed if they hope to survive and retain any measure of
control
Towards Sustainability
So what can we do about the accelerating crises of habitat degradation and
biodiversity loss that appear to be driven both by "the subsistence needs of
the burgeoning global human population" (Alcorn) and by "the rise of the
global exchange economy" (Norgaard)?
One possible resolution to the CEC is a catastrophic one: the global industrial
economy implodes, human population plummets, and subsistence once again
becomes local affair for the survivors, with the result that decision-makers
once more have to live with the local or regional consequences of their
resource utilization and environmental use decisions
But is there a less apocalyptic way out? In particular, given the great material
attractions of economic growth, and the poverty in which most people in the
world live, is it possible to pursue so-called "sustainable development"?
From the materialist perspective, this would require three things:
1) zero or negative population growth: maybe possible, given the tendency
for more developed economies to undergo "demographic transition" to low
(even zero or negative) population growth
2) thorough substitution of non-destructive technology: arguably technically
possible, though counter to some strong special interests in current system
3) steady-state economy: not just recycling, but zero net growth in material
cycles and energy flows
My feeling is that this last goal would be the hardest to achieve, not only
because it would reverse some 5,000 (or perhaps 50,000) years of cultural
evolution, but because it is so unstable in the face of free-riders who seek
competitive sociopolitical advantage (no matter how temporary) through short-
term economic growth

9. It also flies in the face of the aspirations of the "developing" (less-
industrialized) world to achieve the levels of material prosperity characteristic
of the "north" and seems to unfairly say "Well, it was a great party while it
lasted, but it's over now and you can't have your own party"
So though I would rather not be, I am at least partly convinced by those who
argue that "sustainable development" on a large scale is an oxymoron, a
utopian delusion
I would be pleased to hear cogent arguments to the contrary, however; see
you in class....
References cited
Alcorn, Janis B. (1991) Epilogue: Ethics, economies, and conservation. In Biodiversity:
Culture, Conservation, and Ecodevelopment, ed. M. L. Oldfield and J. B. Alcorn, pp 317-
349. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Brooks, Jeremy S., et al. (2006) Testing hypotheses for the success of different conservation
strategies. Conservation Biology 20(5):1528-1538.
Cashdan, Elizabeth (1992) Spatial organization and habitat use. In Evolutionary Ecology and
Human Behavior, ed. E. A. Smith and B. Winterhalder, pp 237-266. Hawthorne, NY:
Aldine de Gruyter.
Clay, Jason (2004) Borrowed from the future: Challenges and guidelines for community-based
natural resource management. NY: Ford Foundation [Environment and Development
Affinity Group].
Low, Bobbi S. and Joel T. Heinen (1993) Population, resources, and environment: Implications
of human behavioral ecology for conservation. Population and Environment 15:7-41.
Norgaard, Richard B. (1994) Development Betrayed: The End Of Progress And A Co-
Evolutionary Revisioning Of The Future, pp. 173-190. NY: Routledge.