SlideShare a Scribd company logo

Auditing Mobile Applications

•
•
Eventos Creativos
Eventos Creativos

Charla impartida por José Selvi en el IV Curso de Verano de Seguridad Informática de la Universidad Europea de Madrid.

Technology
1 of 91
Download to read offline
*[ AUDITING MOBILE APPLICATIONS ] Author: Jose Selvi Date: 30/Jun/2011
$ WHOIS JSELVI Jose Selvi http://twitter.com/JoseSelvi jselvi@s21sec.com jselvi@pentester.es http://www.s21sec.com http://www.pentester.es
INDEX Apps Revolution Divide & Conquer (D&C) Mobile Networking Server Side Client Side What’s Up with WhatsApp
APPS REVOLUTION Pág. 5
“OLD SCHOOL” APPS
“OLD SCHOOL” APPS
WEBSITE FEVER
WEBSITE FEVER
WEBSITE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
MOBILE FEVER
APPLICATIONS EVOLUTION 2010
DIVIDE & CONQUER (D&C) AND MORE Pág. 5
MOBILE LAB
MOBILE LAB CLIENT
MOBILE LAB SERVER CLIENT
MOBILE LAB SERVER CLIENT
MOBILE LAB NETWORK CLIENT SERVER Phone full control Some ways We CAN’T change the server SW full control We’re able to control the We CAN’T have a network look to the We’re able to software change config and software Sometimes hard and expensive Black Box Testing
JAILBREAK / ROOTING Sometimes emulator r00lz! • Android Emulator (SDK) • iOS Simulator (SDK) But sometimes not... We don’t have full built-in control Maybe we should... • iOS Jailbreak • Android Rooting
MOBILE NETWORKING Pág. 5
MULTI-CHANNEL!
MOBILE LAB
MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE msf auxiliary(fakedns) > [*] DNS bypass domain api.facebook.com resolved 66.220.146.36 [*] DNS bypass domain iphone.facebook.com resolved 66.220.153.30 [*] DNS bypass domain m.facebook.com resolved 66.220.158.26
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS ¿whois www.google.com? IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois www.google.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois www.google.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS ¿whois api.facebook.com? IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois api.facebook.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 api.facebook.com = 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS api.facebook.com = 20.20.20.20 IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
“FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 PROXY 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 CERT 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER PUB PRIV CA PUB PRIV CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PUB PRIV INFO CERT CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV DIGEST INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV SIGNED DIGEST INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST SIGNED DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST SIGNED DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 SIGNED DIGEST
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 DIGEST’
PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 DIGEST’
Real Certificate Sample
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 CERT 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 FAKE CA
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
IMPORT CERTIFICATES iPhone / iPad • Export from proxy (Burp, ...) o built (openssl, ...). • iPhone Configuration Utility Android • Only VPN certs, not Web. • Hard... • Still Working...
BINGO!
SERVER SIDE Pág. 5
AS USUAL... Browser Nessus Qualys SQLMap Metasploit Backtrack ... Of course, your brain!
CLIENT SIDE Pág. 5
iOS BINARY FORMAT
iOS BINARY FORMAT
iOS BINARY FORMAT
iOS BINARY FORMAT
iOS BINARY FORMAT
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
PUT ALL TOGETHER!
Man-in-the- CRACKING VERIFYCERT certificados como válidos), algo que evidentemente no podrá hacer un atacante que no tuviera previo control de la máquina pero que nos situa en la posición de un intruso que haya comprometido previamente el NOC de Good. En esta ocasión, dado que no se ha conseguido vulnerar los certificados SSL, NO bastaría con el compromiso de algunos de los routers internmedios, como SI ocurría en el caso anterior. www.s21sec.c
WHAT’S UP WITH WHATSAPP? Pág. 5
WHAT’S UP WITH WHATSAPP? Pág. 5
KNOWN WHATSAPP ISSUES Unencrypted Traffic • But using 443 tcp port... Storing ALL conversation FOREVER Storing GPS position! • WTF!! • Why??!! Much more... Great research from SecurityByDefault guys!
WHATSAPP HIJACKING
ALERT! SPAM! SEC-560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking
THANKS! QUESTIONS? Jose Selvi http://twitter.com/JoseSelvi jselvi@s21sec.com jselvi@pentester.es http://www.s21sec.com http://www.pentester.es
*[ THANKS! SEE YOU! ] Pág. 7

Recommended

ConnectJS 2015: Video Killed the Telephone Star
ConnectJS 2015: Video Killed the Telephone StarConnectJS 2015: Video Killed the Telephone Star
ConnectJS 2015: Video Killed the Telephone StarMojo Lingo
 
AstriCon 2015: WebRTC: How it Works, and How it Breaks
AstriCon 2015: WebRTC: How it Works, and How it BreaksAstriCon 2015: WebRTC: How it Works, and How it Breaks
AstriCon 2015: WebRTC: How it Works, and How it BreaksMojo Lingo
 
WebRTC Overview by Dan Burnett
WebRTC Overview by Dan BurnettWebRTC Overview by Dan Burnett
WebRTC Overview by Dan BurnettMojo Lingo
 
La informática se creó en las calles: Microhistorias de Apple y Microsoft
La informática se creó en las calles: Microhistorias de Apple y MicrosoftLa informática se creó en las calles: Microhistorias de Apple y Microsoft
La informática se creó en las calles: Microhistorias de Apple y MicrosoftEventos Creativos
 
The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting Class
The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting Class The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting Class
The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting Class Chris Gates
 
Pentesting
PentestingPentesting
PentestingEventos Creativos
 
Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...
Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...
Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...Chris Gates
 
Home Arcade setup (NoVA Hackers)
Home Arcade setup (NoVA Hackers)Home Arcade setup (NoVA Hackers)
Home Arcade setup (NoVA Hackers)Chris Gates
 

Recommended

ConnectJS 2015: Video Killed the Telephone Star
ConnectJS 2015: Video Killed the Telephone StarConnectJS 2015: Video Killed the Telephone Star
ConnectJS 2015: Video Killed the Telephone StarMojo Lingo
 
AstriCon 2015: WebRTC: How it Works, and How it Breaks
AstriCon 2015: WebRTC: How it Works, and How it BreaksAstriCon 2015: WebRTC: How it Works, and How it Breaks
AstriCon 2015: WebRTC: How it Works, and How it BreaksMojo Lingo
 
WebRTC Overview by Dan Burnett
WebRTC Overview by Dan BurnettWebRTC Overview by Dan Burnett
WebRTC Overview by Dan BurnettMojo Lingo
 
La informática se creó en las calles: Microhistorias de Apple y Microsoft
La informática se creó en las calles: Microhistorias de Apple y MicrosoftLa informática se creó en las calles: Microhistorias de Apple y Microsoft
La informática se creó en las calles: Microhistorias de Apple y MicrosoftEventos Creativos
 
The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting Class
The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting Class The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting Class
The Dirty Little Secrets They Didn’t Teach You In Pentesting Class Chris Gates
 
Pentesting
PentestingPentesting
PentestingEventos Creativos
 
Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...
Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...
Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...Chris Gates
 
Home Arcade setup (NoVA Hackers)
Home Arcade setup (NoVA Hackers)Home Arcade setup (NoVA Hackers)
Home Arcade setup (NoVA Hackers)Chris Gates
 
From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...
From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...
From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...Amazon Web Services
 
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014Amazon Web Services
 
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Software
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant SoftwareCloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Software
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Softwarecornelia davis
 
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt Netflix
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt NetflixStranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt Netflix
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt NetflixC4Media
 
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy services
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy servicesFunctional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy services
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy servicesNatan Silnitsky
 
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey Fedorov
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey FedorovNetworking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey Fedorov
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey FedorovSergey Fedorov
 
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)Andreas Taudte
 
Kubernetes Networking
Kubernetes NetworkingKubernetes Networking
Kubernetes NetworkingCJ Cullen
 
Networking in Kubernetes
Networking in KubernetesNetworking in Kubernetes
Networking in KubernetesMinhan Xia
 
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protection
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protectionBest practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protection
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protectionWestermo Network Technologies
 
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018Peter Souter
 
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...Daniel Oh
 
VPC and DX PoP @ HKG
VPC and DX PoP @ HKGVPC and DX PoP @ HKG
VPC and DX PoP @ HKGAmazon Web Services
 
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018Amazon Web Services Korea
 
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWSAmazon Web Services
 
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路利用AWS建立企業全球化網路
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路Amazon Web Services
 
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)Yan Cui
 
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network Attack
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network AttackBest Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network Attack
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network AttackAmazon Web Services
 
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: Networking
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: NetworkingAWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: Networking
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: NetworkingCobus Bernard
 
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - Meetup
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - MeetupManaging microservices with istio on OpenShift - Meetup
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - MeetupJosé Román Martín Gil
 
Windows server 2012 para it
Windows server 2012 para itWindows server 2012 para it
Windows server 2012 para itEventos Creativos
 
Pentesting con metasploit framework
Pentesting con metasploit frameworkPentesting con metasploit framework
Pentesting con metasploit frameworkEventos Creativos
 

More Related Content

Similar to Auditing Mobile Applications

From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...
From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...
From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...Amazon Web Services
 
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014Amazon Web Services
 
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Software
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant SoftwareCloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Software
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Softwarecornelia davis
 
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt Netflix
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt NetflixStranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt Netflix
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt NetflixC4Media
 
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy services
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy servicesFunctional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy services
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy servicesNatan Silnitsky
 
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey Fedorov
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey FedorovNetworking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey Fedorov
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey FedorovSergey Fedorov
 
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)Andreas Taudte
 
Kubernetes Networking
Kubernetes NetworkingKubernetes Networking
Kubernetes NetworkingCJ Cullen
 
Networking in Kubernetes
Networking in KubernetesNetworking in Kubernetes
Networking in KubernetesMinhan Xia
 
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protection
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protectionBest practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protection
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protectionWestermo Network Technologies
 
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018Peter Souter
 
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...Daniel Oh
 
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018Amazon Web Services Korea
 
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWSAmazon Web Services
 
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路利用AWS建立企業全球化網路
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路Amazon Web Services
 
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)Yan Cui
 
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network Attack
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network AttackBest Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network Attack
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network AttackAmazon Web Services
 
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: Networking
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: NetworkingAWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: Networking
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: NetworkingCobus Bernard
 
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - Meetup
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - MeetupManaging microservices with istio on OpenShift - Meetup
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - MeetupJosé Román Martín Gil
 

Similar to Auditing Mobile Applications (20)

From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...
From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...
From One to Many: Diving Deeper into Evolving VPC Design (ARC310-R2) - AWS re...
 
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014
(GAM304) How Riot Games re:Invented Their AWS Model | AWS re:Invent 2014
 
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Software
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant SoftwareCloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Software
Cloud Native: Designing Change-tolerant Software
 
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt Netflix
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt NetflixStranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt Netflix
Stranger Things: The Forces that Disrupt Netflix
 
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy services
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy servicesFunctional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy services
Functional legacy - how to incorporate ZIO in your legacy services
 
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey Fedorov
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey FedorovNetworking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey Fedorov
Networking @Scale'19 - Getting a Taste of Your Network - Sergey Fedorov
 
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)
 
Kubernetes Networking
Kubernetes NetworkingKubernetes Networking
Kubernetes Networking
 
Networking in Kubernetes
Networking in KubernetesNetworking in Kubernetes
Networking in Kubernetes
 
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protection
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protectionBest practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protection
Best practices for using VPNs for easy network-to-network protection
 
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018
Consul Connect - EPAM SEC - 22nd september 2018
 
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...
Microservice 4.0 Journey - From Spring NetFlix OSS to Istio Service Mesh and ...
 
VPC and DX PoP @ HKG
VPC and DX PoP @ HKGVPC and DX PoP @ HKG
VPC and DX PoP @ HKG
 
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018
AWS Serverless 활용 네트워크 보안 아키텍처::함인용 실장, 이성현 매니저, 솔트웨어::AWS Summit Seoul 2018
 
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS
(NET405) Build a Remote Access VPN Solution on AWS
 
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路利用AWS建立企業全球化網路
利用AWS建立企業全球化網路
 
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)
Serverless Design Patterns (London Dev Community)
 
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network Attack
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network AttackBest Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network Attack
Best Practices to Mitigate from the Emerging Vectors of Network Attack
 
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: Networking
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: NetworkingAWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: Networking
AWS SSA Webinar 10 - Getting Started on AWS: Networking
 
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - Meetup
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - MeetupManaging microservices with istio on OpenShift - Meetup
Managing microservices with istio on OpenShift - Meetup
 

More from Eventos Creativos

Pentesting con metasploit framework
Pentesting con metasploit frameworkPentesting con metasploit framework
Pentesting con metasploit frameworkEventos Creativos
 
Despliegue empresarial de smartphones mdm
Despliegue empresarial de smartphones mdmDespliegue empresarial de smartphones mdm
Despliegue empresarial de smartphones mdmEventos Creativos
 
Atacando iphone a través de wireless y javascript botnet
Atacando iphone a través de wireless y javascript botnetAtacando iphone a través de wireless y javascript botnet
Atacando iphone a través de wireless y javascript botnetEventos Creativos
 
Ataque a redes de datos IPv6 con Evil Foca
Ataque a redes de datos IPv6 con Evil FocaAtaque a redes de datos IPv6 con Evil Foca
Ataque a redes de datos IPv6 con Evil FocaEventos Creativos
 
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 03
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 03Análisis forense de dispositivos android 03
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 03Eventos Creativos
 
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 02
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 02Análisis forense de dispositivos android 02
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 02Eventos Creativos
 
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 01
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 01Análisis forense de dispositivos android 01
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 01Eventos Creativos
 
Análisis forense de dispositivos ios
Análisis forense de dispositivos iosAnálisis forense de dispositivos ios
Análisis forense de dispositivos iosEventos Creativos
 
Arquitectura, aplicaciones y seguridad en ios
Arquitectura, aplicaciones y seguridad en iosArquitectura, aplicaciones y seguridad en ios
Arquitectura, aplicaciones y seguridad en iosEventos Creativos
 
Jailbreak y rooting más allá de los límites del dispositivo
Jailbreak y rooting más allá de los límites del dispositivoJailbreak y rooting más allá de los límites del dispositivo
Jailbreak y rooting más allá de los límites del dispositivoEventos Creativos
 
I os en el entorno corporativo
I os en el entorno corporativoI os en el entorno corporativo
I os en el entorno corporativoEventos Creativos
 
Análisis forense de tarjetas sim, smartcards, etc
Análisis forense de tarjetas sim, smartcards, etcAnálisis forense de tarjetas sim, smartcards, etc
Análisis forense de tarjetas sim, smartcards, etcEventos Creativos
 
Firma digital y biométrica en dispositivos móviles
Firma digital y biométrica en dispositivos móvilesFirma digital y biométrica en dispositivos móviles
Firma digital y biométrica en dispositivos móvilesEventos Creativos
 
Fraude en tecnológias móviles
Fraude en tecnológias móvilesFraude en tecnológias móviles
Fraude en tecnológias móvilesEventos Creativos
 
Malware en dispositivos móviles
Malware en dispositivos móvilesMalware en dispositivos móviles
Malware en dispositivos móvilesEventos Creativos
 

More from Eventos Creativos (20)

Windows server 2012 para it
Windows server 2012 para itWindows server 2012 para it
Windows server 2012 para it
 
Pentesting con metasploit framework
Pentesting con metasploit frameworkPentesting con metasploit framework
Pentesting con metasploit framework
 
Malware en android
Malware en androidMalware en android
Malware en android
 
Despliegue empresarial de smartphones mdm
Despliegue empresarial de smartphones mdmDespliegue empresarial de smartphones mdm
Despliegue empresarial de smartphones mdm
 
Atacando iphone a través de wireless y javascript botnet
Atacando iphone a través de wireless y javascript botnetAtacando iphone a través de wireless y javascript botnet
Atacando iphone a través de wireless y javascript botnet
 
Ataque a redes de datos IPv6 con Evil Foca
Ataque a redes de datos IPv6 con Evil FocaAtaque a redes de datos IPv6 con Evil Foca
Ataque a redes de datos IPv6 con Evil Foca
 
Windows 8
Windows 8Windows 8
Windows 8
 
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 03
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 03Análisis forense de dispositivos android 03
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 03
 
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 02
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 02Análisis forense de dispositivos android 02
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 02
 
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 01
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 01Análisis forense de dispositivos android 01
Análisis forense de dispositivos android 01
 
Análisis forense de dispositivos ios
Análisis forense de dispositivos iosAnálisis forense de dispositivos ios
Análisis forense de dispositivos ios
 
Arquitectura, aplicaciones y seguridad en ios
Arquitectura, aplicaciones y seguridad en iosArquitectura, aplicaciones y seguridad en ios
Arquitectura, aplicaciones y seguridad en ios
 
Jailbreak y rooting más allá de los límites del dispositivo
Jailbreak y rooting más allá de los límites del dispositivoJailbreak y rooting más allá de los límites del dispositivo
Jailbreak y rooting más allá de los límites del dispositivo
 
I os en el entorno corporativo
I os en el entorno corporativoI os en el entorno corporativo
I os en el entorno corporativo
 
Análisis forense de tarjetas sim, smartcards, etc
Análisis forense de tarjetas sim, smartcards, etcAnálisis forense de tarjetas sim, smartcards, etc
Análisis forense de tarjetas sim, smartcards, etc
 
Lo que las apps esconden
Lo que las apps escondenLo que las apps esconden
Lo que las apps esconden
 
Firma digital y biométrica en dispositivos móviles
Firma digital y biométrica en dispositivos móvilesFirma digital y biométrica en dispositivos móviles
Firma digital y biométrica en dispositivos móviles
 
Nfc en móviles
Nfc en móvilesNfc en móviles
Nfc en móviles
 
Fraude en tecnológias móviles
Fraude en tecnológias móvilesFraude en tecnológias móviles
Fraude en tecnológias móviles
 
Malware en dispositivos móviles
Malware en dispositivos móvilesMalware en dispositivos móviles
Malware en dispositivos móviles
 

Recently uploaded

Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersEnhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersThousandEyes
 
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksBenefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksSoftradix Technologies
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):comworks
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Enterprise Knowledge
 
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power SystemsUnlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power SystemsPrecisely
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubKalema Edgar
 
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)Wonjun Hwang
 
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsAI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsMemoori
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Mattias Andersson
 
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machineInstall Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machinePadma Pradeep
 
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationBeyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationSafe Software
 
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...Alan Dix
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticsKotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticscarlostorres15106
 
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationMy Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationRidwan Fadjar
 
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024BookNet Canada
 
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project SetupStreamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project SetupFlorian Wilhelm
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for PartnersEnhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
Enhancing Worker Digital Experience: A Hands-on Workshop for Partners
 
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other FrameworksBenefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
Benefits Of Flutter Compared To Other Frameworks
 
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
CloudStudio User manual (basic edition):
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
 
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power SystemsUnlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
Unlocking the Potential of the Cloud for IBM Power Systems
 
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding ClubUnleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
Unleash Your Potential - Namagunga Girls Coding Club
 
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
 
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial BuildingsAI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
AI as an Interface for Commercial Buildings
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
 
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machineInstall Stable Diffusion in windows machine
Install Stable Diffusion in windows machine
 
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationBeyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
 
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
Swan(sea) Song – personal research during my six years at Swansea ... and bey...
 
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food ManufacturingPigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
Pigging Solutions in Pet Food Manufacturing
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmaticsKotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
Kotlin Multiplatform & Compose Multiplatform - Starter kit for pragmatics
 
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 PresentationMy Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
My Hashitalk Indonesia April 2024 Presentation
 
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptxVulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
Vulnerability_Management_GRC_by Sohang Sengupta.pptx
 
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
Transcript: #StandardsGoals for 2024: What’s new for BISAC - Tech Forum 2024
 
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project SetupStreamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
 

Auditing Mobile Applications

  • 1. *[ AUDITING MOBILE APPLICATIONS ] Author: Jose Selvi Date: 30/Jun/2011
  • 2. $ WHOIS JSELVI Jose Selvi http://twitter.com/JoseSelvi jselvi@s21sec.com jselvi@pentester.es http://www.s21sec.com http://www.pentester.es
  • 3. INDEX Apps Revolution Divide & Conquer (D&C) Mobile Networking Server Side Client Side What’s Up with WhatsApp
  • 4. APPS REVOLUTION Pág. 5
  • 16. DIVIDE & CONQUER (D&C) AND MORE Pág. 5
  • 18. MOBILE LAB CLIENT
  • 19. MOBILE LAB SERVER CLIENT
  • 20. MOBILE LAB SERVER CLIENT
  • 21. MOBILE LAB NETWORK CLIENT SERVER Phone full control Some ways We CAN’T change the server SW full control We’re able to control the We CAN’T have a network look to the We’re able to software change config and software Sometimes hard and expensive Black Box Testing
  • 22. JAILBREAK / ROOTING Sometimes emulator r00lz! • Android Emulator (SDK) • iOS Simulator (SDK) But sometimes not... We don’t have full built-in control Maybe we should... • iOS Jailbreak • Android Rooting
  • 23. MOBILE NETWORKING Pág. 5
  • 26. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE msf auxiliary(fakedns) > [*] DNS bypass domain api.facebook.com resolved 66.220.146.36 [*] DNS bypass domain iphone.facebook.com resolved 66.220.153.30 [*] DNS bypass domain m.facebook.com resolved 66.220.158.26
  • 27. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 28. “FAKE” DNS ¿whois www.google.com? IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 29. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois www.google.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 30. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois www.google.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 31. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 32. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 33. “FAKE” DNS www.google.com = 74.125.39.104 IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 34. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 35. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 36. “FAKE” DNS ¿whois api.facebook.com? IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 37. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 ¿whois api.facebook.com? 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 38. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 api.facebook.com = 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 39. “FAKE” DNS api.facebook.com = 20.20.20.20 IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 40. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 41. “FAKE” DNS IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 GW: 20.20.20.1 DNS: 20.20.20.20 PROXY 20.20.20.20 DNS SERVER
  • 42. REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
  • 43. REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
  • 44. REDIRECT TRICK IP: 20.20.20.10 10.10.10.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 20.20.20.20 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 PROXY
  • 45. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 46. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 CERT 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 47. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER PUB PRIV CA PUB PRIV CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 48. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PUB PRIV INFO CERT CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 49. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 50. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 51. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 52. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV DIGEST INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 53. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV SIGNED DIGEST INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 54. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST SIGNED DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 55. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT DIGEST SIGNED DIGEST PUB PUB PUB PUB CA1
  • 56. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 SIGNED DIGEST
  • 57. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 DIGEST’
  • 58. PKI: Public Key Infraestructure SERVER CA PUB PRIV PRIV INFO CERT PUB CLIENT PUB PUB PUB PUB DIGEST CA1 DIGEST’
  • 60. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 61. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 CERT 10.10.10.10 GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 62. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8 FAKE CA
  • 63. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 64. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 65. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 66. SSL/HTTPS PROXY IP: 20.20.20.10 MASK: 255.255.255.0 FAKE CERT 10.10.10.10 CERT GW: 20.20.20.20 DNS: 8.8.8.8
  • 67. IMPORT CERTIFICATES iPhone / iPad • Export from proxy (Burp, ...) o built (openssl, ...). • iPhone Configuration Utility Android • Only VPN certs, not Web. • Hard... • Still Working...
  • 69. SERVER SIDE Pág. 5
  • 70. AS USUAL... Browser Nessus Qualys SQLMap Metasploit Backtrack ... Of course, your brain!
  • 71. CLIENT SIDE Pág. 5
  • 80. ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
  • 81. ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
  • 82. ANDROID BINARY FORMAT App.java App.class App.dex
  • 84. Man-in-the- CRACKING VERIFYCERT certificados como válidos), algo que evidentemente no podrá hacer un atacante que no tuviera previo control de la máquina pero que nos situa en la posición de un intruso que haya comprometido previamente el NOC de Good. En esta ocasión, dado que no se ha conseguido vulnerar los certificados SSL, NO bastaría con el compromiso de algunos de los routers internmedios, como SI ocurría en el caso anterior. www.s21sec.c
  • 85. WHAT’S UP WITH WHATSAPP? Pág. 5
  • 86. WHAT’S UP WITH WHATSAPP? Pág. 5
  • 87. KNOWN WHATSAPP ISSUES Unencrypted Traffic • But using 443 tcp port... Storing ALL conversation FOREVER Storing GPS position! • WTF!! • Why??!! Much more... Great research from SecurityByDefault guys!
  • 89. ALERT! SPAM! SEC-560: Network Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking
  • 90. THANKS! QUESTIONS? Jose Selvi http://twitter.com/JoseSelvi jselvi@s21sec.com jselvi@pentester.es http://www.s21sec.com http://www.pentester.es
  • 91. *[ THANKS! SEE YOU! ] Pág. 7