02.security systems

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Fundamentals of Cyber security: Security Systems

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02.security systems

  1. 1. Security Systems: Goals, Definitions,Requirements, and Principles Chulantha Kulasekere Department of Electronic and Computer Engineering Sri Lanka Institute of Information Technology chulantha.k@sliit.lk September 21,2013 ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 1 / 68
  2. 2. Security Systems: Requirements Putting in place an effective security system requires planning, resources and effort from all levels in an organization. Support from the management of an organization is key for a good security system because it is the only entity that can effectively provide: the list of assets and information that need to be protected to ensure the continuity of the organization based on risk analysis risk mitigation the resources to setup and maintain the system based on funding for the equipment required funding for the training + education of the staff the means to enable enforcement of policy compliance and revision auditing policy updating The security program needs to: be driven by the management to have a better chance of being effective. to be developed in terms of the whole of the organization and then refined to fit the specific areas within the organization. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 2 / 68
  3. 3. Security Systems: Requirements .... A key aspect of the development and implementation is communication (between the security development team and the rest of the organization). The security system requires: information ownership to be clearly specified clear definition of staff responsibilities policies to handle asset/information access clear hierarchy and reporting procedure Restrictions to to information/assets is done via: administrative controls technical controls physical controls Example: critical security controls from SANS http://www.sans.org/critical-securitycontrols/guidelines.php ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 3 / 68
  4. 4. Key Concepts Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service Vulnerability Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source Risk a situation involving exposure to danger. Incident: An incident is the result of a successful attack Countermeasure: any organizational action or tool able to mitigate a risk deriving from one or more attack classes intended to exploit one or more classes of vulnerabilities. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 4 / 68
  5. 5. Security System Principles Effective security programs are shaped by the organization’s short and long term objectives. All effective programs are based on the AIC (or CIA) principles triad: Availability Integrity Confidentiality The security measures put in place to attempt to: provide support for the AIC principles address the threats that may compromise or more of the AIC principles ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 5 / 68
  6. 6. Availability Principle What does the principle of Availability entail? All systems should perform in a predictable manner and with the condition that the performance is of an acceptable level. Three causes of availability problems: software denied access to information resulting in software non availability denied access due to strong encryption hardware Denial of services due to DDOS attacks Denial of service due to hardware non availability unexpected circumstances Unexpected circumstances as a result of a natural event Unexpected circumstances as a result of human caused disaster ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 6 / 68
  7. 7. Addressing Availability To address the problem of service denial one can deploy security solutions specifically aimed at DDOS attacks. To address the problem of service provision failure one can employ fault tolerant computer systems. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 7 / 68
  8. 8. Integrity Principle What does the principle of Integrity entail? :– No unauthorized modification is permitted and the information provided both accurate and reliable. Requires a combination of hardware, software and communication methods to ensure that the data is not compromised. Carefully developed controls are key to preventing data integrity problems. The integrity of the data can be compromised either by mistake or with specific intent. From a commercial software development point of view, the integrity principle can be further refined in terms of: a) whether the information is valid b) whether the data has been compromised c) whether the data source can be determined and verified ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 8 / 68
  9. 9. Addressing Integrity The ensure the integrity of information an auditing procedure must be in place in conjunction with a separation of both functions and duties. Separation of duties and functions - why is it important and how does it help with the system security? To compromise the security setup, a concerted effort from multiple staff is required - the larger the number of staff required the smaller the likelihood that the security will be breached Auditing - why is it important and how does it help with the system security? Having a simple and clear procedure to gain access to information/resources reduces the chances that access can be obtained without proper authorization and without detection. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 9 / 68
  10. 10. Confidentiality Principle What does the principle of Confidentiality entail? The secrecy of the data is maintained at all times. The privacy of the data can be protected through a combination of data access control and encryption. The secrecy can be compromised in several ways: malware intruders insecure networks poorly administered systems. packet capture social engineering password attacks ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 10 / 68
  11. 11. Addressing Confidentiality Encryption and access control RSA DES Diffie–Hellman ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 11 / 68
  12. 12. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Least Privilege Motto: Do not give any more privileges than absolutely necessary to do the required job It applies not only to privileges of users and applications on a computer system, but also to other non- information systems privileges of an organizations staff The principle of least privilege is a preventive control, because it reduces the number of privileges that may be potentially abused and therefore limits the potential damage Some examples of application of this principle include the following: Giving users only read access to shared files if that’s what they need, and making sure write access is disabled Not allowing help desk staff to create or delete user accounts if all that they may have to do is to reset a password Not allowing software developers to move software from development servers to production servers ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 12 / 68
  13. 13. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Defense in Depth The principle of defense in depth is about having more than one layer or different types of defense cascaded. Even if one layer is breached, the next layer will hold out. Hence difficulty of breaching increases. An example application is to use a firewall and IPSEC encryption using a firewall between the Internet and your LAN, plus the IP Security Architecture (IPSEC) to encrypt all sensitive traffic on the LAN. Firewall and the data encryption both have to be compromised. Hard. A suggested method first use preventive controls: second use detective controls to check on preventive control breach third use corrective controls to help you respond effectively to security incidents and contain damage It does not mean indiscriminately application of controls. A balance has to be found between security provided and the financial, human, and organizational resources you are willing to expend following it. (some IT people use a lot to make life easier for them) ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 13 / 68
  14. 14. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Minimization The minimization principle is the cousin of the least privilege principle and mostly applies to system configuration do not run any software, applications, or services that are not strictly required to do the entrusted job a computer whose only function is to serve as an e-mail server should have only e-mail server software installed and enabled. All other services and protocols should either be disabled or not installed at all to eliminate any possibility of compromise or misuse minimization principle not only increases security but usually also improves performance, saves storage space, and is a good system administration practice in general. Examples : See unix security best practices. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 14 / 68
  15. 15. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Keep Things Simple Complexity is the worst enemy of security. Complex systems are inherently more insecure because they are difficult to design, implement, test, and secure complexity of information systems and processes is bound to increase with our increasing expectations of functionality, we should be very careful to draw a line between avoidable and unavoidable complexity and not sacrifice security for bells and whistles One can deliver a simple system via security audits to match the effort with threat. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 15 / 68
  16. 16. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Compartmentalization Use of compartments (also known as zones, jails, sandboxes, and virtual areas), is a principle that limits the damage and protects other compartments when software in one compartment is malfunctioning or compromised Compartmentalization in the information security context means that applications run in different compartments are isolated from each other Examples of this are: Zones in Solaris 10 implement the compartmentalization principle and are powerful security mechanisms. If you have root privileges, you can basically do anything you want. If you don’t have root access, there are restrictions. For example, you can’t bind to ports under 1024 without root access Similarly, you can’t directly access a lot of operating system resources—for example, you have to go through a device driver to write to a disk; you can’t deal with it directly. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 16 / 68
  17. 17. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Use Choke Points Choke points are logical narrow channels that can be easily monitored and controlled An example of a choke point is a firewall Virtual private network (VPN) and dial-in access points The Windows domain controller is an application choke point If every employee is in direct contact with everyone else in the world, then there is a great potential for a social engineering attack to perform. Employees are not allowed to directly contact the outside world during business hours. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 17 / 68
  18. 18. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Fail Securely Failing securely means that if a security measure or control has failed for whatever reason, the system is not rendered to an insecure state. For example, when a firewall fails, it should default to a deny all rule, not a permit all rule. However, fail securely does not mean “close everything” in all cases; if we are talking about a computer-controlled building access control system, for example, in case of a fire the system should default to “open doors” if humans are trapped in the building In this case, human life takes priority over the risk of unauthorized access, which may be dealt with using some other form of control that does not endanger the lives of people during emergency situations. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 18 / 68
  19. 19. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Leverage Unpredictability You should not publicize the details of your security measures and defenses. This principle should not be seen as contradicting deterrent security controls—controls that basically notify everyone that security mechanisms are in place and that violations will be resisted, detected, and acted upon. In practical terms, this means you can, for example, announce that you are using a firewall that, in particular, logs all traffic to and from your network, and these logs are reviewed by the organization—there is no need to disclose the type, vendor, or version number of the firewall; where it is located; how often logs are reviewed; and whether any backup firewalls or network intrusion detection systems are in place. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 19 / 68
  20. 20. Universal security principles: Commonly used methods Segregation of Duties The purpose of the segregation (or separation) of duties is to avoid the possibility of a single person being responsible for different functions within an organization, which when combined may result in a security violation that may go undetected. No single person should be able to violate security and get away with it Rotation of duties is a similar control that is intended to detect abuse of privileges or fraud and is a practice to help your organization avoid becoming overly dependent on a single member of the staff. By rotating staff, the organization has more chances of discovering violations or fraud. Doors of the Shrine. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 20 / 68
  21. 21. What is access control? It is granting or denying approval to use specific resources; it is controlling access The mechanism used in an information system to allow or restrict access to data or devices Illustrated via an exampled of a FedEx delivery man picking up a parcel from a home ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 21 / 68
  22. 22. Terminology of access control Object. An object is a specific resource, such as a file or a hardware device. Subject. A subject is a user or a process functioning on behalf of the user that attempts to access an object. Operation. The action that is taken by the subject over the object is called an operation. For example, a user (subject) may attempt to delete (operation) a file (object). ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 22 / 68
  23. 23. Roles in access control ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 23 / 68
  24. 24. Roles in access control ... ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 24 / 68
  25. 25. Types of Controls to ensure AIC principles are not compromised Central to information security is the concept of controls, which may be categorized by their functionality (preventive, detective, corrective, deterrent, recovery, and compensating, in this order) and plane of application (physical, administrative, or technical). Physical controls include doors, secure facilities, fire extinguishers, flood protection, and air conditioning. Administrative controls are the organization’spolicies, procedures, and guidelines intended to facilitate information security. Technical controls are the various technical measures, such as firewalls, authentication systems, intrusion detection systems, and file encryption, among others. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 25 / 68
  26. 26. Types of Controls Preventive Control: Preventive controls try to prevent security violations and enforce access control. Like other controls, preventive controls may be physical, administrative, or technical: doors, security procedures, and authentication requirements are examples of physical, administrative, and technical preventive controls, respectively. Detective Controls: Detective controls are in place to detect security violations and alert the defenders. They come into play when preventive controls have failed or have been circumvented and are no less crucial than detective controls. Detective controls include cryptographic checksums, file integrity checkers, audit trails and logs, and similar mechanisms. Compensating Controls Compensating controls are intended to be alternative arrangements for other controls when the original controls have failed or cannot be used. When a second set of controls addresses the same threats that are addressed by another set of controls, the second set of controls are compensating controls. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 26 / 68
  27. 27. Types of Controls .... Corrective Controls: Corrective controls try to correct the situation after a security violation has occurred. Although a violation occurred, not all is lost, so it makes sense to try and fix the situation. Corrective controls vary widely, depending on the area being targeted, and they may be technical or administrative in nature. Deterrent Controls: Deterrent controls are intended to discourage potential attackers and send the message that it is better not to attack, but even if you decide to attack we are able to defend ourselves. Examples of deterrent controls include notices of monitoring and logging as well as the visible practice of sound information security management. Recovery Controls: Recovery controls are somewhat like corrective controls, but they are applied in more serious situations to recover from security violations and restore information and information processing resources. Recovery controls may include disaster recovery and business continuity mechanisms, backup systems and data, emergency key management arrangements, and similar controls. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 27 / 68
  28. 28. Access Control Models Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Takes a stricter approach to access control. Mandatory access controls specified in a system-wide security policy are enforced by the operating system and applied to all operations on that system. User does not have the discretion. It has two key elements Labels. In a system using MAC, every entity is an object (laptops, files, projects, and so on) and is assigned a classification label. These labels represent the relative importance of the object, such as confidential, secret, and top secret. Subjects (users, processes, and so on) are assigned a privilege label (sometimes called a clearance). Levels. A hierarchy based on the labels is also used, both for objects and subjects. Top secret has a higher level than secret, which has a higher level than confidential. This is compartmentalization. As it is harder to implement MAC-based systems are typically used in government, military, and financial environments, where higher than usual security is required and where the added complexity and costs are tolerated ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 28 / 68
  29. 29. Access Control Models Mandatory Access Control (MAC) .... The implementation strategy of MAC is as follows It grants permissions by matching object labels with subject labels based on their respective levels. To determine if a file can be opened by a user, the object and subject labels are compared. The subject must have an equal or greater level than the object in order to be granted access. For example, if the object label is top secret, yet the subject only has a lower secret clearance, then access is denied. Subjects cannot change the labels of objects or other subjects in order to modify the security settings. Major implementations of MAC are Lattice model: Security levels for objects and subjects are ordered as a lattice. Bell-LaPadula confidentiality model: Advanced version of the lattice model (actually this uses a mix of MAC and DAC) ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 29 / 68
  30. 30. Access Control Models Mandatory Access Control (MAC) .... A limited functional example of MAC is seen in Apple Mac OS X, UNIX, and Microsoft Windows 7/Vista Microsoft Windows implementation has four security levels—low, medium, high, and system Nonadministrative user processes run by default at the medium level Specific actions (such as installing application software) by a subject with a lower classification (such as a standard user) may require a higher level (such as high) of approval This approval invokes the Windows User Account Control (UAC) function A standard user needs to enter the admin password to elevate its privileges to a higher level before installing UAC attempts to match the subject’s privilege level with that of the object ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 30 / 68
  31. 31. Access Control Models Discretionary Access Control (DAC) MAC is the most restrictive model, the DAC model is the least restrictive. However widely used. With the DAC model, every object has an owner, who has total control over that object. The owner (creator) of information (file or directory) has the discretion to decide about and set access control (create and access objects, owner can give permission to others to use them as well) restrictions on the object in question—which may, for example, be a file or a directory. (Unix: chmod) Flexibility of a user deciding the access is an advantage. However its a disadvantage too as users may take wrong decisions. Example: with DAC, User X could access the files EMPLOYEES.XLSX and SALARIES.XLSX as well as paste the contents of EMPLOYEES.XLSX into a newly created document MYDATA.XLSX. User X could also give User Y access to all of these files, but only allow User Z to read EMPLOYEES.XLSX. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 31 / 68
  32. 32. Access Control Models Discretionary Access Control (DAC) ... Two significant drawbacks in this system DAC relies on decisions by the end user to set the proper level of security. As a result, incorrect permissions might be granted to a subject or permissions might be given to an unauthorized subject The subject’s permissions will be inherited by any programs that the subject executes. Attackers can take advantage of this inheritance as end users in the DAC model often have a high level of privileges. Examples: Malware that is downloaded onto a user’s computer would then run in the same context as the user’s high privileges. eg. Trojans are a particular problem with DAC. One method of controlling DAC inheritance is to automatically reduce the user’s permissions. For example, Microsoft Windows 7 uses Internet Explorer Protected Mode which prevents malware from executing code through the use of elevated privileges without the users explicit recommendation. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 32 / 68
  33. 33. Access Control Models Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Rights and permissions are assigned to roles instead of individual users. Sometimes called Non-Discretionary Access Control This added layer of abstraction permits easier and more flexible administration and enforcement of access controls Eg., access to marketing files may be restricted to the marketing manager role only, and users Kamal, and Upul may be assigned the role of marketing manager Later, when Kamal moves from the marketing department elsewhere, it is enough to revoke his role of marketing manager; no other changes would be necessary This is the permissions model used in Microsoft Exchange Server 2013. Additionally there is another variant called Rule Based Access Control (RBAC) ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 33 / 68
  34. 34. Implementing Access Control Inclass independent work Other models: Attribute based access control, Policy based access control, Risk adaptive access control etc. User unix setfacl and getfacl to test access control lists. Identify the use of RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) as a method to provide authentication based access control (method, use and weaknesses) Identify the use of kerberose as a method of access control via identification and verification of network users (method, use and weaknesses) Identify Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) (X.500 Lite) as an access control mechanism (method, use and weaknesses) X.800-191.3 standard services Explain how the access control lists are managed via a matrix ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 34 / 68
  35. 35. Lets look at how the label based access control works MLS or Multilevel security is an implementation of the label based access control The following example is based on confidentiality (unauthorized eyes cannot see) and disregards integrity and availability First step is categorize data Objects are an ordered list with labels: Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, Top-Secret Subjects (these express a membership in an interest group) are an unordered set with labels: Crypto, Nuclear, Janitorial, Personnel Example of two documents with associated labels (Secret: {Nuclear, Crypto})– contains somewhat sensitive information related to the categories Nuclear and Crypto (Top Secret: {Crypto})–contains very sensitive information in category Crypto. A question we suggested for confidentiality policies is: How do I characterize who is authorized to see what? ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 35 / 68
  36. 36. Lets look at how the label based access control works ... Then each individual desirous of accessing this information will have a hierarchical security level indicating the degree of trustworthiness to which he or she has been vetted; a set of “need-to-know categories” indicating domains of interest in which he or she is authorized to operate. The labels on documents indicate the sensitivity of the contained information; “labels” on humans indicate classes of information that person is authorized to access. The need-to-know-categories is an implementation of the Principle of Lease Privilege Now lets look at how the access is controlled Clarence (Subject) Sensitivity (Object) (Secret:{Crypto}) (Confidential:{Crypto}) (Secret:{Crypto,Nuclear}) Top-Secret:{Crypto}) (Secret:{Nuclear}) (Unclassified:{}) ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS Access Yes No Yes September 21, 2013 36 / 68
  37. 37. Lets look at how the label based access control works ... To control access by Subjects to Objects, we need “labels” for both. For Objects the labels indicate the sensitivity of the information contained. For Subjects, the labels indicate the authorization (clearance) to view certain classes of information. A Subject should be given the minimal authorization to perform the job assigned. (Least Privilege) Whether an Subject should be able to view a specific Object depends on a relationship between the label of the Object and the clearance of the Subject. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 37 / 68
  38. 38. Lets look at how the label based access control works ... Mathematically, it uses the dominate rules: Given a set of security labels (L, S), comprising hierarchical levels and categories, we can define an ordering relation among labels. (L1 , S1 ) dominates (L2 , S2 ) iff L1 ≥ L2 in the ordering on levels, and S2 ⊆ S1 We usually write (L1 , S1 ) ≥ (L2 , S2 ). Note that this is a partial order, not a total order. I.e., there are security labels A and B such that neither A ≥ B nor B ≥ A. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 38 / 68
  39. 39. Implementations Access Control Models Bell-LaPadula model Biba model Clark-Wilson model Chinese wall model ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 39 / 68
  40. 40. Bell-LaPadula Model (BLP) The BLP is a state machine model used for enforcing access control in government and military applications It was developed by David Elliott Bell and Leonard J. LaPadula The Bell-LaPadula model focuses on data confidentiality and controlled access to classified information It defines two MAC rules and one DAC rule: The Simple Security Property (ss-property)- a subject at a given security level may not read an object at a higher security level (no read-up). The ∗-property - a subject at a given security level must not write to any object at a lower security level (no write-down). The ∗-property is also known as the Confinement property. The Discretionary Security Property (ds-property) - An individual (or role) may grant to another individual (or role) access to a document based on the owner’s discretion, constrained by the MAC rules. Using an ACL. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 40 / 68
  41. 41. Bell-LaPadula Model (BLP) .... Breach of confidentiality: Read from high and write to low ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 41 / 68
  42. 42. Bell-LaPadula Model (BLP) .... Scenario: Consider a restrictive classification which has label ordering Regular < Secret < Top-secret < Double-Z Top Secret. The first rule says that you can’t read documents if you don’t have a high enough classification level. Hence if you have a ”Secret” clearance, then you can read ”Secret” and ”Regular” documents, but you can’t read ”Top Secret” or ”Double-Z Top Secret” documents. The simple description of this rule is ”no read-up.” The second rule says that you can’t write documents lower than your classification level. But you can write documents higher than your classification level, you still can’t read them. So again if you have a ”Secret” classification level, you can write to ”Secret,” ”Top Secret,” and ”Double-Z Top Secret”, but you can’t write to ”Regular”. The simple description of this rule is ”no write-down.” The third rule just allows for much more fine-grained access, within an access level, the system uses an access control matrix to limit. For eg. a Top-Secret label may not be allowed to access all documents associated with Top-Secret label. According to the matrix can the user delete the file? Write to the file? Read from the file? Is the user the owner of the file? ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 42 / 68
  43. 43. Issues with Bell-LaPadula Model The transfer of information from a high-sensitivity document to a lower-sensitivity document may happen in the Bell-LaPadula model via the concept of trusted subjects. Trusted Subjects are not restricted by the *-property. Untrusted subjects are. Suppose someone with access to a Top Secret document copies the information onto a piece of paper and sticks it into an Unclassified folder Only addresses confidentiality, control of writing (one form of integrity), ∗-property and discretionary access control Covert channels such as Trojan horses and Requesting system resources to learn about other users are mentioned but are not addressed comprehensively The tranquility principle (The tranquility principle of the Bell–LaPadula model states that the classification of a subject or object does not change while it is being referenced) limits its applicability to systems where security levels do not change dynamically. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 43 / 68
  44. 44. Issues with Bell-LaPadula Model ... Assume you could somehow change an object’s label from (Top Secret: { Crypto }) to (Unclassified: {}) independent of the object’s contents. This would clearly violate confidentiality. The Tranquility principle has two flavors The Strong Tranquility Property: Subjects and objects do not change labels during the lifetime of the system. The Weak Tranquility Property: Subjects and objects do not change labels in a way that violates the “spirit” of the security policy. Suppose your system includes a command to lower the level of a object in an unconstrained way. Does that violate the goals of simple security or the ∗-property? Suppose your system includes a command to raise the level of a object in an unconstrained way. Does that violate the goals of simple security or the ∗-property? ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 44 / 68
  45. 45. Bell-LaPadula Model in Mathematics The Simple Security Property: Subject S with clearance (LS , CS ) may be granted read access to object O with classification (LO , CO ) only if (LS , CS ) ≥ (LO , CO ). The ∗-Property: Subject S with clearance (LS , CS ) may be granted write access to object O with classification (LO , CO ) only if (LS , CS ) ≤ (LO , CO ). ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 45 / 68
  46. 46. Bell-LaPadula Model Example Consider a BLP system with three subjects and three objects together with the ordering H > L Subjects Level Objects Level Sub1 (H:{A,B,C}) Obj1 (L:{A,B,C}) Sub2 (L:{}) Obj2 (L:{}) Sub3 (L:{A,B}) Obj3 (L:{B,C}) The corresponding access control matrix is Obj1 Obj2 Obj3 Sub1 R R R Sub2 W R,W W Sub3 W R - ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 46 / 68
  47. 47. Lattice Based Models The labels when they are organized in a structure is called a lattice. It is a partial ordering which satisfies the transitive property (if a ≤ b, and b ≤ c then a ≤ c) and antisymmetric property (if a ≤ b and b ≤ a, then a = b) A simple lattice example for factors of 60 ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 47 / 68
  48. 48. Lattice Based Models... ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 48 / 68
  49. 49. The Biba Model Similar to BLP but focus is on integrity, not confidentiality On analogy with BLP, bad (low integrity) information can flow into a good (high integrity) object if: a low integrity subject writes bad information into a high integrity object; or a high integrity subject reads bad information from a low integrity object. Reviews distinction between military and commercial policy Military policy focus on confidentiality Commercial policy focus on integrity For modeling purposes, as we did with the confidentiality, we assign integrity labels An object’s label characterizes the degree of “trustworthiness” of the information contained in that object: Eg. Gossip overheard on the roadside should have lower credibility than a report from a panel of experts. A subject’s label measures the confidence one places in its ability to produce / handle information: Eg. A certified application may have more integrity than freeware downloaded from the Internet. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 49 / 68
  50. 50. The Biba Model... Intuitively, integrity relates to how much you trust an entity to produce, protect, or modify data. It uses the following principles: Separation of duty and functions, Auditing. Integrity labels look like BLP confidentiality labels. A hierarchical component gives the level of trustworthiness. A set of categories provides a list of domains of relevant competence. Example: A lecturer might have integrity label: (Expert: Management) meaning that he has a very high degree of credibility in Management expertise. But there’s no particular reason to trust his opinion on a matter of Politics or Drama. This suggests, by analogy with the BLP rules, a subject shouldn’t be allowed to “write up” in integrity or to “read down” in integrity. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 50 / 68
  51. 51. The Biba Model... Ken Biba (1977) proposed three different integrity access control policies. The Low Water Mark Integrity Policy (for objects and subjects and integrity audit) The Ring Policy Strict Integrity (this is the one which is called the Biba Integrity Model) Mathematically the Biba model can be given as Simple Integrity Property: Subject S can read object O only if I (S) ≤ I (O)—subject can only read objects at its own integrity level or above. Integrity ∗-Property: Subject S can write to object O only if I (O) ≤ I (S)—a subject can only write objects at its own integrity level or below. This means that a subject’s integrity cannot be tainted by reading bad (lower integrity) information; a subject cannot taint more reliable (higher integrity) information by writing into it. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 51 / 68
  52. 52. Biba Model Example Since this is an access control policy, it can be represented as an access control matrix. Suppose H > L are hierarchical integrity levels. Level Objects Level Subjects Sub1 (H:{A,B,C}) Obj1 (L:{A,B,C}) Sub2 (L:{}) Obj2 (L:{}) Sub3 (L:{A,B}) Obj3 (L:{B,C}) The corresponding access control matrix is Obj1 Obj2 Obj3 Sub1 W W W Sub2 R R,W R Sub3 R W To protect confidentiality and integrity, one could use both BLP and Biba’s Strict Integrity policy: That is, need confidentiality labels and integrity labels for all subjects and objects. Access is allowed only if allowed by both the BLP rules and the Biba rules. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 52 / 68
  53. 53. BLP versus Biba Model The Bell-LaPadula model is used to provide confidentiality. The Biba model is used to provide integrity. The Bell-LaPadula and Biba models are informational flow models because they are most concerned about data flowing from one level to another. Bell-LaPadula uses security levels and Biba uses integrity levels. A tip to remember: if the word “simple” is used, the rule is talking about reading. If the rule uses a “star”, it is talking about writing. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 53 / 68
  54. 54. Independent Work on Security Models Biba’s Low Water Mark Integrity Policy Bibas Ring Policy Take-Grant Model (this is a DAC model) Lipner’s Integrity Matrix Models (which combines the Bell model and the Biba model) Graham Denning Model Note that most of the above policies are commercially applicable policies so they are more DAC than MAC. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 54 / 68
  55. 55. Biba Model Mandatory Policies Low-Watermark Policy for Subjects Its a relaxed “no-read-down” It does not restrict a subject from reading objects however it dynamically lowers the integrity level of a subject based on what objects are observed. One short coming of the policy: If a subject observes a less trusted object, it will drop the subjects integrity level to that of the object. Later for any reason the subject cannot observe a higher integrity level object even though one legitimately needs too. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 55 / 68
  56. 56. Biba Model Mandatory Policies Low-Watermark Policy for Objects Its a relaxed “no write-down” Any subject may modify any object, regardless of integrity levels and its not prevented In reality policy is not very practical. If a subject modifies an object at higher integrity level (a more trusted object), it results in the transaction being recorded in an audit log. The object integrity level is lowered. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 56 / 68
  57. 57. Biba Model Mandatory Policies Ring policy The Ring Policy allows any subject to observe any object. This policy is only concerned with direct modification. The drawback to this policy is it allows improper modifications to indirectly take place. A subject can read a less trusted object. Then the subject could modify the data it observed at its own integrity level. An example of this would be a user reading a less trusted object, then remember the data that they read and then at a later time writing that data to an object at their own integrity level. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 57 / 68
  58. 58. Clark and Wilson Model David Clark and David Wilson (1987) argued that commercial security has its own unique concerns and merits a model crafted for that domain. Clark and Wilson claimed that the following are four fundamental concerns of any reasonable commercial integrity model: Authentication: identity of all users must be properly authenticated. Audit: modifications should be logged to record every program executed and by whom, in a way that cannot be subverted. Well-formed transactions: users manipulate data only in constrained ways. Only legitimate accesses are allowed. Separation of duty: the system associates with each user a valid set of programs they can run and prevents unauthorized modifications, thus preserving integrity and consistency with the real world. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 58 / 68
  59. 59. Clark and Wilson Model..... The policy is constructed in terms of the following categories: Constrained Data Items: CDIs are the objects whose integrity is protected Unconstrained Data Items: UDIs are objects not covered by the integrity policy Transformation Procedures: TPs are the only procedures allowed to modify CDIs, or take arbitrary user input and create new CDIs. Designed to take the system from one valid state to another. Integrity Verification Procedures: IVPs are procedures meant to verify maintenance of integrity of CDIs. It uses two kinds of rules, viz certification and enforcement, to control access. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 59 / 68
  60. 60. Clark and Wilson Model Policy Rules C1: IVP Certification – The system will have an IVP for validating the integrity of any CDI. i.e. All IVPs must ensure that CDIs are in a valid state when the IVP is run. C2: Validity – The application of a TP to any CDI must maintain the integrity of that CDI. CDIs must be certified to ensure that they result in a valid CDI. i.e. All TPs must be certified as integrity-preserving. C3: Modification – A CDI can only be changed by a TP. TPs must be certified to ensure they implement the principles of separation of duties and least privilege. i.e. Assignment of TPs to users must satisfy separation of duty. C4: Journal Certification – TPs must be certified to ensure that their actions are logged. i.e. The operation of TPs must be logged. C5: TPs which act on UDIs must be certified to ensure that they result in a valid CDI E1: Enforcement of Validity – Only certified TPs can operate on CDIs E2: Enforcement of Separation of Duty – Users must only access CDIs through TPs for which they are authorized E3: User Identity – The system must authenticate the identity of each user attempting to execute a TP E4: Initiation – Only administrator can specify TP authorizations ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 60 / 68
  61. 61. Clark and Wilson Model Implementation Permissions are encoded as a set of triples of the form: (user, TP, {CDI set}), where user is authorized to perform a transaction procedure TP, on the given set of constrained data items (CDIs). Each triple in the policy must comply with all applicable certification and enforcement rules. Handling of untrusted inputs: Any TP that takes as input a UDI may perform only valid transformations, or no transformations, for all possible values of the UDI. The transformation either rejects the UDI or transforms it into a CDI For example, in a bank ATM, numbers entered at the the keyboard are UDIs so cannot be input to TPs as such. TPs must validate numbers (to make them a CDI) before using them; if validation fails, TP rejects UDI ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 61 / 68
  62. 62. Clark and Wilson Model Implementation ... Separation of duties: Only the certifier of a TP may change the list of entities associated with that TP. No certifier of a TP, or of an entity associated with that TP, may ever have execute permission with respect to that entity Enforces separation of duty with respect to certified and allowed relations. Ensuring integrity: Provides an assurance that CDIs can be modified only in constrained ways (Ensured by rules C1, C2, C5, and E1 and E4) Provides an ability to control access to resources (Ensured by rules C3 and E2 and E3) Provides an ability to ascertain after the fact that changes to CDIs are valid and the system is in a valid state (Provided by rules C1 and C4) Provides an ability to uniquely associate an user to her/his action (Enforced by rule E3) ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 62 / 68
  63. 63. Chinese Wall Model Brewer and Nash (1989) proposed the policy which addresses a conflicts of interest problem. Strictly speaking, this is not an integrity policy, but an access control confidentiality policy. The Chinese Wall Model is an idea that stems from the ability to read or write information. The main idea is that you are able to access any information you want from any company but once you access that information, you are no longer allowed to access information from another company within that class of companies. The security policy builds on three levels of abstraction. Objects such as files. Objects contain information about only one company. Company groups collect all objects concerning a particular company. Conflict classes cluster the groups of objects for competing companies. For example, consider the following conflict classes: { Dialog, Mobitel, Airtel } { Central Bank, HNB, HSBC } { Microsoft } ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 63 / 68
  64. 64. Chinese Wall Model.... We have a simple access control policy: A subject may access information from any company as long as that subject has never accessed information from a different company in the same conflict class. For example, if you access a file from Dialog, you subsequently will be blocked from accessing any files from Mobitel or Airtel. You are free to access files from companies in any other conflict class. Notice that permissions change dynamically. The access rights that any subject enjoys depends on the history of past accesses. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 64 / 68
  65. 65. Policy Rules for Chinese Wall Model (Chinese Wall) Simple Security Rule: A subject s can be granted access to an object o only if the object: is in the same company datasets as the objects already accessed by s, that is, “within the Wall,” or belongs to an entirely different conflict of interest class. (Chinese Wall) ∗-property: Write access is only permitted if: access is permitted by the simple security rule, and no object can be read which is: in a different company dataset than the one for which write access is requested, and contains unsanitized information. The Chinese Wall is an access control policy in which accesses are sensitive to the history of past accesses. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 65 / 68
  66. 66. The concept of a Trusted System The models described above are all aimed at enhancing the trust that users and administrators have in the security of a computer system. Some definitions Trust: The extent to which someone who relies on a system can have confidence that the system meets its specifications (i.e., that the system does what it claims to do and does not perform unwanted functions). Trusted system: A system believed to enforce a given set of attributes to a stated degree of assurance. Trusted computing base (TCB): A portion of a system that enforces a particular policy. The TCB must be resistant to tampering and circumvention. The TCB should be small enough to be analyzed systematically. The trust domain security rules specify the conditions: for generating information for maintaining information privacy for maintaining information integrity ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 66 / 68
  67. 67. The reference monitor Initial implementations used something called a Reference Monitor to implement a TCS. The reference monitor enforces the security rules (no read up, no write down) and has the following properties: Complete mediation: The security rules are enforced on every access, not just, for example, when a file is opened. Isolation: The reference monitor and database are protected from unauthorized modification. Verifiability: The reference monitor’s correctness must be provable. That is, it must be possible to demonstrate mathematically that the reference monitor enforces the security rules and provides complete mediation and isolation. It is noted that these are very restrictive and the solution may be partly hardware based. ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 67 / 68
  68. 68. The reference monitor .... ECK/2013 (SLIIT) FCCS September 21, 2013 68 / 68

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