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Workshop on Web Application Security
Overview  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Overview  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Web Application
Evolution of the Internet  ,[object Object]
Evolution of the Internet  ,[object Object],‘ Dynamic’ means different things to different people –  Interactive forms –  Customizing page content based  on client attributes –  Reactive pages
Popularity of web apps ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Typical structure of a Web Application  HTTP allowed through port 80 Firewalls and other simple boundary devices lack some degree of intelligence when it comes to observing, recognizing, and identifying attack signatures that may be present in the traffic they monitor and the log files they collect. Without sounding critical of such other systems’ capabilities, this deficiency brought in Intrusion Detection systems
Today’s threat landscape ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Network Level Attack
Network a mean of breach
Security threats revisit
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
IP Spoofing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
IP Spoofing with Amplification ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Smurf Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Drop inbound broadcasts Drop outbound broadcasts
Denial of Service Attack ,[object Object]
DOS Attack Methods ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Fragmentation Attack ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Fragmentation Basics
Fragmentation Attack,  countermeasures ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Firewalls and Encryption do NOT protect against Web Application Vulnerabilities  Only tool required is a web browser !   HTTP allowed through port 80
Problems  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
A Gartner study indicates that 75% of security breaches are due to flaws in software
Web Application Security Issues ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What makes web apps so vulnerable? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Misconceptions ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Web Application Security
Basic principle behind web app attacks  ,[object Object]
Basic principle behind web app attacks
Basic principle behind web app attacks
Problem: user input ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Root Cause: Client input  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Common vulnerabilities  Cause crashing of a process Buffer Overflow Vulnerability What can an attacker do ? Parameter manipulation  Change values of sensitive information  Cross Site Scripting Impersonate a trusted site and steal user information  SQL Injection Access all data in your database resulting in a total data breach
Buffer Overflows
Buffer Overflows
How to Avoid
Parameter manipulation
Parameter Manipulation ,[object Object],[object Object],Shopping Cart  Product  Details  Order  Details  Check out
Parameter Manipulation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Hidden Fields  ,[object Object],[object Object],<input type=&quot;hidden&quot; id=“price” value=1000>
Hidden-field tampering ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],<input type=&quot;hidden&quot; id=&quot;price“ value=&quot;10000.00&quot;> price=&quot;1.00&quot;
Hidden-field tampering <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=“txtprice1“ value=&quot;1000.00&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=“txtprice2“ value=“500.00&quot;> Sample Shopping Cart
Hidden-field tampering ,[object Object]
 
Hidden-field tampering Change the price ?
Hidden-field tampering ,[object Object]
Cookies  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Cookies  ,[object Object]
Defending against parameter manipulation ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
[object Object],[object Object],Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Welcome back  Taimur  !  Login failed for ‘ Taimur ’  Your search for ‘ Taimur ’ returned 0 results
 
What is cross site scripting? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What is cross site scripting? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],do it
How XSS attack can happen Response.Write(&quot;Welcome &quot; & Request.QueryString(&quot;UserName&quot;)) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
How XSS attack can happen ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
How XSS attack can happen ,[object Object]
Phishing attack via  Cross Site Scripting  1. XSS Attack  2. Website vulnerable to XSS 5. Victim Information stolen 3. Create email with malicious  hyperlink 4. Email Sent to victim
How XSS attack can happen ,[object Object]
XSS Worms ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Comparison of Samy with other worms  First 24 hours of worm propagation
Defending against XSS ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Defense tactics Write an HTMLEncode
HTML Protection ,[object Object],&#45; - &#43; + &#59;   ; &#37;   % &#35; # &#41; ) &#40; ( &apos; or &#39; ' &quot; or &#34; &quot; &amp; or &#38; & &gt; or &#62; > &lt; or &#60; < Encoding Character HTML Entities
Phishing counter-measures ,[object Object]
NoScript ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SQL Injection
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],What is SQL?
UserID:  Test Password :  123  Select * from Users where UserID = ‘Test’ and Password = ‘123’;  ,[object Object],Drop example
 
UserID:  Test;  drop table users ; --  Password :  123  Select * from Users where UserID = ‘Test’;  drop table users ; --  and Password = ‘123’;  ,[object Object]
What is SQL injection? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What is SQL injection? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Defaults  or  Vulnerable
How do attackers know? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
 
How do attackers know?
How do attackers know?
SQL Injection attack on U.N.
Worst case scenario ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Find it
Some valid arguments by web-app owners  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
[object Object]
Malware Infection via SQL Injection
The new landscape ,[object Object],[object Object]
Malware : Changing threat landscape  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Malware : Changing threat landscape  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
What’s for sale ?
Malware spreading techniques  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SQL injection as a way to spread malware ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Check if website is vulnerable to SQL injection  Insert malicious <Script> tags in database
Before Injection  After  Injection
User visits compromised website  Malicious script embedded in the database is executed  Malware is downloaded onto the user’s PC
U.S. Sony Playstation website incident  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Automated Mass SQL Injections ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Automated Mass SQL Injections ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Mass SQL injections
Mass SQL injections
Automated Mass SQL Injections
Automated Mass SQL Injections ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Automated Mass SQL Injections http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/954462.mspx
SQL Injection Defense ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SQL Injection Defense ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Set rs = cn. Execute(“Select * from Users where UserID = ‘” & request.form(“txtuserid”) & “’ and password = ‘” & request.form(“txtpassword”)”’”
Follow the Least Privilege principle ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SQL Injection Defense ,[object Object],“ The application experienced an error and could not continue. The error has been logged for administrative purposes. Please click  here  to try again”
Implementing Web Application Security in your organization
Implementing Web App. Security ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
The Web Developer
Role of the Web Developer  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Role of the Web Developer  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
25 most dangerous programming errors  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],http://www.sans.org/top25errors/
25 most dangerous programming errors  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
25 most dangerous programming errors  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],And so on …
IT Management
Role of IT Management  ,[object Object],[object Object]
Hacme Bank  (www.foundstone.com)  ,[object Object],[object Object]
The IT Auditor / IT Security Officer
Role of IT Security / IT Auditor  ,[object Object]
Role of IT Security / IT Auditor  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Security Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Commercial Scanners  No. Security Scanner URL 1. Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner http://www.acunetix.com 2. Watchfire Appscan http://www.watchfire.com/products/appscan/default.aspx 3. Milescan Web Security Auditor  http://www.milescan.com/hk/ 4. HP WebInspect software  https://h10078.www1.hp.com/cda/hpms/display/main/hpms_content.jsp?zn=bto&cp=1-11-201-200%5E9570_4000_100__
Security Testing  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Security Testing  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Security Testing ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Freely available tools  No. Security Scanner URL 1. Free Cross Site Scripting Scanner http://www.acunetix.com/cross-site-scripting/scanner.htm 2. Security Compass Tools http://www.securitycompass.com/exploitme.shtml 3. Microsoft Source Code Analyzer for SQL Injection http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=58A7C46E-A599-4FCB-9AB4-A4334146B6BA&displaylang=en 4. HP Scrawlr  (free  tool for SQL injection) https://h30406.www3.hp.com/campaigns/2008/wwcampaign/1-57C4K/index.php?mcc=DNXA&jumpid=in_r11374_us/en/large/tsg/w1_0908_scrawlr_redirect/mcc_DNXA
Exploit-Me by Security Compass ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],http:// www.securitycompass.com/exploitme.shtml
Exploit-Me by Security Compass
Exploit-Me by Security Compass
Source Code Reviews ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Global Information Security Survey – 2008
Review ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Eliminate backdoors
Source Code Reviews  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Cost of fixing a security flaw increases as software goes into Production
Sample Case Study ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Sample Case Study ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Sample Case Study ,[object Object],[object Object],Set rs = cn. Execute(“Select * from Users where UserID = ‘” & request.form(“txtuserid”) & “’ and password = ‘” & request.form(“txtpassword”)”’”
Microsoft Threat Modeling via STRIDE and DREAD
Threat Risk Modeling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],© Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7
Threat Risk Modeling ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],© Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7
Steps in Threat Modeling Identify Assets  1 Create an architecture overview 2 Decompose the application 3 Identify the threats  (STRIDE) 4 Document the threats 5 Rate the threats  (DREAD)  6
Threat Risk Modeling ,[object Object],© Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7 System  Threat # 1 Threat # 2 Threat # 3 Threat # n
Step 1: Identify Assets ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Step 2: Create An Architecture Overview ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],NTFS Permissions (Authentication) File Authorization URL Authorization .NET Roles (Authentication) User-Defined Role (Authentication) SSL (Privacy/Integrity) Trust Boundary Alice Mary Bob IIS Anonymous Authentication Forms Authentication IPSec (Private/Integrity) Trust Boundary ASPNET (Process Identity) Microsoft  ASP.NET Microsoft Windows r Authentication Microsoft SQL Server™
Step 3: Decompose the Application ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Step 4: Identify the threats ,[object Object],[object Object]
STRIDE Methodology for Threat Identification ,[object Object],[object Object],© Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7
Threat Identif./Categorization via STRIDE  © Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7 Types of threats Examples S poofing ,[object Object],[object Object],T ampering ,[object Object],[object Object],R epudiation ,[object Object],[object Object],I nformation disclosure ,[object Object],[object Object],D enial of service ,[object Object],[object Object],E levation of privilege ,[object Object],[object Object]
Step 5: Document the Threats ,[object Object],[object Object],Threat Description Injection of SQL Commands Threat target SQL Server Backend database Risk Attack techniques Attacker appends SQL commands to user name, which is used to form a SQL query Countermeasures Filter all browser input for malicious characters, and use a stored procedure with parameters to access the database
Step 6: Rate the Threats  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Risk Ratings using DREAD Methodology ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],© Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7
Risk Ratings using DREAD Methodology © Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7 High (3) Medium (2) Low (1) D Damage Potential Attacker can completely compromise the system gaining full access  Sensitive information might be leaked Leakage of trivial information R Reproducibility Attack can be reproduced every time and does not require some condition Attack can be reproduced only within a specific condition Attack is very difficult to reproduce E Exploitability Novice attacker can use this threat Skills required In-depth knowledge of system required A Affected Users All Users  Some users Only specific users D Discoverability Information about this threat is available on the Internet  It would take some time before attacker becomes aware of this vulnerability Highly unlikely that users will come across this security flaw
Risk Ratings using DREAD Methodology Sample DREAD Risk Rating  Threat D R E A D Total Rating Injection of SQL commands 3 3 2 2 2 12 High Leakage of passwords through network monitoring  2 2 2 3 2 11 Medium Stealing of passwords through key loggers 2 3 3 2 3 14 High DREAD Risk Rating 5-7 Low Risk 8-11 Medium Risk 12-15  High Risk
Step 6: Rate the threats ,[object Object],Threat Description Injection of SQL Commands Threat target SQL Server Backend database Risk High Attack techniques Attacker appends SQL commands to user name, which is used to form a SQL query Countermeasures Filter all browser input for malicious characters, and use a stored procedure with parameters to access the database
Threat Risk Modeling ,[object Object],© Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7
Resources
Open Web Application Security Project  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
OWASP Top 10 No. Vulnerability  A1 Cross  Site Scripting (XSS) A2  Injection Flaws A3 Malicious File Execution A4 Insecure Direct Object Reference A5 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) A6 Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling A7 Broken Authentication and Session Management A8 Insecure Cryptographic Storage A9 Insecure Communications A10 Failure to restrict URL access
Hacking
Google  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object],[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object],[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object],[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object],[object Object]
Google Hacking ,[object Object]
How to protect yourself  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Google Hacking Database ,[object Object],The  Google Hacking Database  (GHDB) is a complete collection of all known Google hacks contributed by the Google hacking community to the public. GHDB is one of the best resources available on the Internet for search engine hacking.
FoundStone's SiteDigger Tool ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Conclusion
Conclusion ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Conclusion ,[object Object]
Conclusion ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Don’t become this guy !
Thanks for listening !

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Web Application Security

  • 1. Workshop on Web Application Security
  • 2.
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  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8. Typical structure of a Web Application HTTP allowed through port 80 Firewalls and other simple boundary devices lack some degree of intelligence when it comes to observing, recognizing, and identifying attack signatures that may be present in the traffic they monitor and the log files they collect. Without sounding critical of such other systems’ capabilities, this deficiency brought in Intrusion Detection systems
  • 9.
  • 11. Network a mean of breach
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.
  • 21. Firewalls and Encryption do NOT protect against Web Application Vulnerabilities Only tool required is a web browser ! HTTP allowed through port 80
  • 22.
  • 23. A Gartner study indicates that 75% of security breaches are due to flaws in software
  • 24.
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 27.
  • 29.
  • 30. Basic principle behind web app attacks
  • 31. Basic principle behind web app attacks
  • 32.
  • 33.
  • 34. Common vulnerabilities Cause crashing of a process Buffer Overflow Vulnerability What can an attacker do ? Parameter manipulation Change values of sensitive information Cross Site Scripting Impersonate a trusted site and steal user information SQL Injection Access all data in your database resulting in a total data breach
  • 39.
  • 40.
  • 41.
  • 42.
  • 43. Hidden-field tampering <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=“txtprice1“ value=&quot;1000.00&quot;> <input type=&quot;hidden&quot; name=“txtprice2“ value=“500.00&quot;> Sample Shopping Cart
  • 44.
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  • 52.
  • 53.  
  • 54.
  • 55.
  • 56.
  • 57.
  • 58.
  • 59. Phishing attack via Cross Site Scripting 1. XSS Attack 2. Website vulnerable to XSS 5. Victim Information stolen 3. Create email with malicious hyperlink 4. Email Sent to victim
  • 60.
  • 61.
  • 62. Comparison of Samy with other worms First 24 hours of worm propagation
  • 63.
  • 64. Defense tactics Write an HTMLEncode
  • 65.
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  • 70.
  • 71.  
  • 72.
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  • 74.
  • 75. Defaults or Vulnerable
  • 76.
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  • 78.  
  • 82.
  • 83.
  • 84.
  • 85. Malware Infection via SQL Injection
  • 86.
  • 87.
  • 88.
  • 90.
  • 91.
  • 92. Check if website is vulnerable to SQL injection Insert malicious <Script> tags in database
  • 93. Before Injection After Injection
  • 94. User visits compromised website Malicious script embedded in the database is executed Malware is downloaded onto the user’s PC
  • 95.
  • 96.
  • 97.
  • 100. Automated Mass SQL Injections
  • 101.
  • 102.
  • 103.
  • 104. Automated Mass SQL Injections http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/954462.mspx
  • 105.
  • 106.
  • 107.
  • 108.
  • 109. Implementing Web Application Security in your organization
  • 110.
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  • 115.
  • 116.
  • 118.
  • 119.
  • 120. The IT Auditor / IT Security Officer
  • 121.
  • 122.
  • 123.
  • 124. Commercial Scanners No. Security Scanner URL 1. Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner http://www.acunetix.com 2. Watchfire Appscan http://www.watchfire.com/products/appscan/default.aspx 3. Milescan Web Security Auditor http://www.milescan.com/hk/ 4. HP WebInspect software https://h10078.www1.hp.com/cda/hpms/display/main/hpms_content.jsp?zn=bto&cp=1-11-201-200%5E9570_4000_100__
  • 125.
  • 126.
  • 127.
  • 128. Freely available tools No. Security Scanner URL 1. Free Cross Site Scripting Scanner http://www.acunetix.com/cross-site-scripting/scanner.htm 2. Security Compass Tools http://www.securitycompass.com/exploitme.shtml 3. Microsoft Source Code Analyzer for SQL Injection http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=58A7C46E-A599-4FCB-9AB4-A4334146B6BA&displaylang=en 4. HP Scrawlr (free tool for SQL injection) https://h30406.www3.hp.com/campaigns/2008/wwcampaign/1-57C4K/index.php?mcc=DNXA&jumpid=in_r11374_us/en/large/tsg/w1_0908_scrawlr_redirect/mcc_DNXA
  • 129.
  • 132.
  • 133. Global Information Security Survey – 2008
  • 134.
  • 135.
  • 136. Cost of fixing a security flaw increases as software goes into Production
  • 137.
  • 138.
  • 139.
  • 140. Microsoft Threat Modeling via STRIDE and DREAD
  • 141.
  • 142.
  • 143. Steps in Threat Modeling Identify Assets 1 Create an architecture overview 2 Decompose the application 3 Identify the threats (STRIDE) 4 Document the threats 5 Rate the threats (DREAD) 6
  • 144.
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  • 148.
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  • 150.
  • 151.
  • 152.
  • 153.
  • 154. Risk Ratings using DREAD Methodology © Toronto Area Security Klatch 200 7 High (3) Medium (2) Low (1) D Damage Potential Attacker can completely compromise the system gaining full access Sensitive information might be leaked Leakage of trivial information R Reproducibility Attack can be reproduced every time and does not require some condition Attack can be reproduced only within a specific condition Attack is very difficult to reproduce E Exploitability Novice attacker can use this threat Skills required In-depth knowledge of system required A Affected Users All Users Some users Only specific users D Discoverability Information about this threat is available on the Internet It would take some time before attacker becomes aware of this vulnerability Highly unlikely that users will come across this security flaw
  • 155. Risk Ratings using DREAD Methodology Sample DREAD Risk Rating Threat D R E A D Total Rating Injection of SQL commands 3 3 2 2 2 12 High Leakage of passwords through network monitoring 2 2 2 3 2 11 Medium Stealing of passwords through key loggers 2 3 3 2 3 14 High DREAD Risk Rating 5-7 Low Risk 8-11 Medium Risk 12-15 High Risk
  • 156.
  • 157.
  • 159.
  • 160. OWASP Top 10 No. Vulnerability A1 Cross Site Scripting (XSS) A2 Injection Flaws A3 Malicious File Execution A4 Insecure Direct Object Reference A5 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) A6 Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling A7 Broken Authentication and Session Management A8 Insecure Cryptographic Storage A9 Insecure Communications A10 Failure to restrict URL access
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Editor's Notes

  1. 09-06-09 class-a SQLRecon