MOTION TO STRIKE - Motion To Stay (PKH)

RESERVED FOR
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT – JACKSON DIVISION

VOGEL DENISE NEWSOME PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-00342

PAGE KRUGER & HOLLAND P.A., ET AL. DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT
JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT – JACKSON DIVISION

VOGEL DENISE NEWSOME PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-00342

PAGE KRUGER & HOLLAND P.A., ET AL. DEFENDANTS

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST
DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION)1

COMES NOW Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome (“Newsome” and/or “Plaintiff”) WITHOUT waiving her

OBJECTIONS to Judge Tom S. Lee presiding over this matter in that a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST exist which

requires RECUSAL as well as Newsome’s OBJECTIONS to Magistrate assignment in this matter and files this, her

MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. No. 9) and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 10); Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and

Motion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) (“MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDefault”) in the

preservation of her rights and pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 12(F) governing matters

regarding motion to strike; FRCP Rule 12(G) governing matters regarding consolidation of defenses and objections;

FRCP Rule 11 governing sanctions and/or signing of pleadings, motions, and other documents; FRCP Rule 55

governing default judgments; and the Fourteenth and Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. In support of this

instant MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDEFAULT, Newsome attaches her Affidavit at EXHIBIT “1” – incorporated

herein by reference as if set forth in full herein. Said Affidavit contains PERTINENT and RELEVANT information

that Newsome believes will aid this Court and provide it with an UNDERSTANDING as to what is really taking

place behind the scenes in FURTHERANCE of the Conspiracies addressed in Newsome’s Complaint filed in this

lawsuit. In further support thereof Newsome states:

1. This instant MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDEFAULT is submitted in good faith and is not submitted for
purposes of delay, harassment, hindering proceedings, embarrassment, obstructing the administration of
justice, vexatious litigation, increasing the cost of litigation, etc. and is filed to protect and preserve the
rights of Newsome secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other laws of the United
States.

1
NOTE: Boldface, caps, small-caps, italics, highlights and underline represents “emphasis” added.

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2. Newsome attaches her supporting Affidavit at EXHIBIT “1” which is incorporated herein by reference
as if set forth in full.

3. That a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST presently exists with the assignment of this lawsuit to Judge Tom S.
Lee. The record evidence CLEARLY supports that Newsome has timely, properly and adequately
NOTIFIED this Court of the Conflict-Of-Interest regarding Judge Tom S. Lee. See Doc. No. 2 –
“Motion Conflict-Of-Interest Information. . .” As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply
with the MANDATORY requirements of statutes and laws governing said matters, Newsome has been
irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and
immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other
governing laws. As a direct and proximate result of this Court’s unlawful/illegal practices and failure to
comply with the MANDATORY requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and any and all applicable
statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights
– i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under
the United States Constitution and other governing laws. See EXHIBITS “2” – FRCP Rule 26 and “3”
- 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full
herein.

Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee on Performance and Expenditure Review Of The State of
Mississippi, et al., 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981) - [3] Under statute requiring a judge to disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably questioned, judge need not
accept all the allegations by moving party as true and, in fact, no motion at all is required; the
judge must disqualify himself if the facts cast doubt on his impartiality regardless of how or by
whom they are drawn to his attention. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455.

. . . [3] Congress rewrote the second statute, section 455, in 1974. Subsection (b) of that
section lists a number of specific situations in which a judge must recuse himself. . .Subsection (a),
a more general provision, requires that
Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Section 455, unlike section 144, does not stipulate a formal procedure by which it must
be raised. Like section 144, however, it may be raised by motion. Davis, 517 F.2d at 1051.
Substantively, the two statutes are quite similar, if not identical.[FN6]

FN6. To the extent that there is a difference, section 455 imposes the stricter
standard: a movant under section 144 must allege facts to convince a
reasonable person that bias exists, Parrish, 524 F.2d at 100, while under the
broader language of section 455, he must show only that a reasonable person
“would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality”, Potashnick v. Port City
Constr. Co., 5 Cir. 1980, 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (emphasis added), cert. denied, -
- U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). See Comment, Disqualification of
Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 236, 243-50 (1978). See
also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86
Harv.L.Rev. 736, 745-50 (1973).

On the other hand, section 455, unlike section 144, does not require the judge
to accept all allegations by a moving party as true. Indeed, the section requires
no motion at all; the judge must disqualify himself if the facts cast doubt on his
impartiality regardless of how or by whom they are drawn to his attention. See
Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 5 Cir. 1978, 569 F.2d 251, 254-57,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859, 99 S.Ct. 177, 58 L.Ed.2d 167 (1979). Section 144,
by contrast, requires allegation by affidavit within a stringent time limit and
allows a party only one such affidavit in any case. If a party could bind a judge
by his factual allegations in a section 455 motion, free from the formal
requirements and more demanding standard of proof of section 144, the result
would be a virtual open season for recusal. See 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 250.

[4] The alleged bias of a judge must be personal as distinguished from judicial in nature
in order to require recusal. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144, 455. - - See EXHIBIT “4” – Phillips matter
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

Clearly the INTEGRITY of this Court has been compromised and the appearance of IMPROPRIETY
is inevitable through Judge Tom Stewart Lee’s acts and projects an appearance that this Lawsuit can be
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won through criminal acts – i.e. through bribes, blackmail, extortion, intimidation, threats, etc. - by
Defendants and their counsel. Therefore, Judge Lee’s acts CLEARLY VIOLATE the Mississippi Code of
Judicial Conduct. See EXHIBIT “5” – Code of Judicial Conduct (Mississippi) attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

28 USC § 455 - Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer
concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated
as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an
opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing
in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them,
or the spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and
make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his
spouse and minor children residing in his household. . . .

See EXHIBIT “3” - 28 USC § 455 attached hereto and incorporated by reference as
if set forth in full herein.

MANDATORY DISQUALIFICATION is required when “ONE” of the grounds specifically
enumerated in statute applies – i.e. for instance, as in this instant lawsuit, grounds for Judge Tom
Stewart Lee’s disqualification is required pursuant to 28 USC § 455 and/or the applicable statutes/laws
governing said matters:

Renteria v. Schellpeper, 936 F.Supp. 691 (1996) - [6] If one of grounds specifically enumerated in
statute applies, disqualification of judge is mandatory whether or not reasonable person would
question judge's impartiality. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b).

. . . [6] . . .If one of the provisions of section 455(b) applies then disqualification is mandatory
whether or not a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health
Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2202 n. 8, 100 L.Ed.2d 855
(1988).
CLEARLY Judge Tom S. Lee is adamant and it appears is refusing to RECUSE himself as required by
statutes/laws governing said matters. Therefore, it appears that the proper INVESTIGATION(S) as with
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other CORRUPT Judge(s) as G. Thomas Porteous, may be necessary in having Judge Lee removed from
lawsuits involving Newsome. Furthermore, involving matters of PUBLIC Interest in which Judge Lee is
associated may have to be resolved through IMPEACHMENT proceedings. Clearly it is obvious that
Judge Tom Stewart Lee is placing his JUDICIAL FATE in the “banking” on and/or “placing all of his
eggs” in the basket/relationship of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz. Newsome have
already initiated further legal and proper CONGRESSIONAL actions involving Judge Tom Stewart
Lee. Even if the United States Congress may be dragging its feet and/or attempting to OBSTRUCT such
matters, ALL that is required of Newsome is to PROVE by facts, evidence and legal conclusions that
proper legal recourse for redress has been met. See pleading filed at Doc. No. 2 of this instant Lawsuit
– See EXHIBIT “6” – Docket Sheet for this action attached hereto. Newsome’s burden has been met
and this Court has been timely, properly and adequately notified of same. It matters NOT that there are
attempts by law firms such as Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz and members of such
CONSPIRACIES that may be members of the United States of America Congress, Supreme Court of the
United States of America, etc. OBSTRUCTING the ADMINISTRATION of JUSTICE, Newsome need
only PROVE and SHOW through EVIDENCE that she has initiated legal actions and has done so.
Legal actions which clearly appears may require additional measures permissible under the
statutes/laws governing matters when the United States of America’s Congress, etc. FAILS to act to
protect the INTEREST of the PEOPLE and/or PUBLIC-AT-LARGE!

4. In accordance with the statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome has timely, properly and
adequately PRESERVED said issues such as the CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST and other issues raised in
her Motions to Strike the Defendants’ pleadings filed in this lawsuit. See for instance EXHIBIT “7” –
“Waiver Of Loss Of Right To Disqualify Judge By Participation In Proceedings . . .” attached hereto
and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

5. That Newsome further OBJECTS to the assignment of a Magistrate to this Lawsuit in that she has
timely, properly and adequately NOTIFIED this Court in writing as to her OBJECTIONS.
Furthermore, said OBJECTION is in accordance with Rules governing said matters as well as in
accordance to Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636 and any and all
applicable statutes/laws governing said matters. Furthermore, Newsome states in support thereof:

Rule 73 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

(a) Trial by Consent. When authorized under 28 U.S.C. §636(c), a magistrate judge may, if all parties
consent, conduct a civil action or proceeding, including a jury or nonjury trial. A record must be
made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(5).

(b) Consent Procedure:

(1) In General. When a magistrate judge has been designated to conduct civil actions or
proceedings, the clerk must give the parties written notice of their opportunity to consent under
28 U.S.C. §636(c). To signify their consent, the parties must jointly or separately file a statement
consenting to the referral. A district judge or magistrate judge may be informed of a party's
response to the clerk's notice only if all parties have consented to the referral.

(2) Reminding the Parties About Consenting. A district judge, magistrate judge, or other court
official may remind the parties of the magistrate judge's availability, but must also advise them that
they are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences.

(3) Vacating a Referral. On its own for good cause—or when a party shows extraordinary
circumstances—the district judge may vacate a referral to a magistrate judge under this rule.

See EXHIBIT “8” – Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attached hereto and incorporated
by reference as if set forth in full herein. In fact, this Court has the REQUIRED Form AO 085 that was
to be distributed to parties NOTIFYING of Magistrate Assignment (if any) – See EXHIBIT “9” – Form
AO 085 which has been marked DECLINED attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set
forth in full herein. Nevertheless, this Court failed to comply with the statutes/laws governing said
matters. As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply with the MANDATORY
requirements of said Rule 73 and any and all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome
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has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges
and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other
governing laws.

6. Newsome hereby timely, properly and adequately OBJECTS to this Court’s FAILURE and Defendants
and their Counsel’s FAILURE to provide this Court and Newsome with the REQUIRED information
and/or documentation advising of “CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST” in accordance with the Mississippi
Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”). See EXHIBIT “10” – MRPC attached hereto and

Newsome on or about July 18, 2012, has in good-faith requested that Named Defendants and their
Counsel (Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh) provide her with this MANDATORY
information. Clearly the SHAM/BOGUS/FRIVOLOUS Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A
ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (“Motion to Stay”) and Memorandum In Support Of Motion
To Stay All Proceedings Pending A Ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (“Memorandum in
Support”) of this instant Lawsuit by Named Defendants’ counsel are attempts to EVADE and/or
AVOID having to provide the names of additional members of the CONSPIRACIES and
CRIMINAL/CIVIL wrongs leveled against Newsome who may also be rightful DEFENDANTS to this
lawsuit (i.e. which the required preservations have been made in the COMPLAINT by including “DOES
1 – 100 in their official and individual capacities” should further identities become known during the
litigation of this Lawsuit).

7. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. is a “PRIVATE” company/corporation.
Therefore, subject to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and any and all other statutes/laws governing
said matters.

Plummer vs. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U.A., 452 F.Supp. 1127 (1978)
- . . . plaintiff's action under section pertaining to equal rights under the law would stand. . .
[19] Plaintiffs alleging discrimination in employment could have proceeded by first
bringing action under civil rights section pertaining to equal rights under the law to avoid any
statute of limitations problems. . .or plaintiffs could also have proceeded with separate and
independent action under equal rights under the law section . . .
[25] Section of Civil Rights Act pertaining to equal rights under the law provides federal
remedy against discrimination in PRIVATE employment on the basis of race, whereby
claimant may be entitled to legal and equitable relief, irrespective of whether claimant has pursued
Title VII administrative remedies. . . .
[19] Plaintiffs correctly state that the Supreme Court suggested in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, supra, 421 U.S. at 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716, that plaintiffs file their section 1981 suit to
avoid the tolling of the statute of limitations while the EEOC processes their Title VII charges.
Nonetheless, this suggestion does not support the procedure that plaintiffs followed. They filed
their Title VII suit, while three plaintiffs were still processing their charges through the EEOC, in
order to file in conjunction with their section 1981 action. They then filed two amended complaints
after these plaintiffs received right to sue notices. The Court in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, supra at 466, 95 S.Ct. 1716, stated that section 1981 and Title VII are separate and
independent remedies for discrimination. Plaintiffs could have proceeded by first bringing a section
1981 action to avoid any statute of limitations problem. They could then have petitioned the court
for a stay of the section 1981 action until the Title VII efforts at conciliation and voluntary
compliance had been completed. Id. at 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716. At that point, they could have filed a
supplemental pleading pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d), adding the Title VII claim. Plaintiffs could
also have proceeded with the separate and independent section 1981 action. They could then have
filed their Title VII action after jurisdictional prerequisites had been fulfilled and could have sought
consolidation pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). Plaintiffs' procedure of filing their Title VII claims
before jurisdictional prerequisites had been completed certainly did not provide an orderly
procedure. Their continued updating with respect to the satisfaction of Title VII jurisdictional
prerequisites resulted in two amendments to the complaint and five rounds of complex briefing. –
See EXHIBIT “11” – Plummer matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth
in full herein.

8. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief in
this lawsuit is premised on claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “STATE” and/or
“Government” employers/officials/employees. UNISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s instant lawsuit
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is a premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 – Equal Rights Under The Law which allows for one to “to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . .” Therefore,
NOT even with a MAGNIFYING GLASS will a JURY and Court find any such § 1983 claims as asserted
by the Defendants in this lawsuit.

9. UNDISPUTED is the fact that as with Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum
Brief in this lawsuit their recent filings requesting Staying of action also appears to have been taken
from their Counsel’s FORMS Pleading Manual and or that of its CONSPIRING outside Law Firms with
an interest in this lawsuit (EMPHASIS added). Furthermore, the frivolous allegations asserted by
Defendants and their Counsel clearly are IRRELEVANT and: (i) an insufficient defense to the
Complaint filed by Newsome; (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and
provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness,
commit fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to Defendants and their Counsel.

10. Named Defendants’ filing of Motion to Stay and
Memorandum In Support it appears are
FRIVOLOUS efforts to keep Newsome out of
their “TREASURE CHEST” and efforts to
deprive her of “INITIAL DISCLOSURE”
information MANDATORILY required to be
released to Newsome pursuant to Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover,
FRIVOLOUS attempts by Named Defendants and
their counsel (Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler,
Jr./Jason T. Marsh) to
UNLAWFULLY/ILLGALLY withhold the
release of Insurance information
MANDATORILY required to be released
pursuant to Rule 26 (a)(1)(A)(iv) of the FRCP.
See EXHIBIT “2” – FRCP Rule 26 attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth
in full herein. Furthermore, according to
information contained in Defendant Page Kruger
& Holland’s Corporate Annual Reports filed with the State of Mississippi – Secretary of State it
provides information regarding “Stocks Shares Authorized, Issued & Outstanding” which reflects, for
instance, from approximately August 2006 through January 2012 the issuance of THEIR Stock Shares
from approximately 7,400 to 9,000. See EXHIBIT “66” – Page Kruger & Holland Corporate Annual
Reports attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/page-kruger-holland-phelps-dunbar-clients

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Hall vs. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 617 F.2d 1108 (5th
Cir. 1980) finding:

Fact that defendant insurer furnished a version of its policy including special endorsements
referring to an exclusion allegedly applicable to plaintiff's claim did not put plaintiff on notice of
the exclusion since insurer's duty was to produce entire contract on pretrial discovery and
although it did so the subject special endorsement by itself was incomprehensible in that it was not
reference to any particular coverage. See EXHIBIT “12” – Hall matter attached hereto and

Other Court Courts finding:

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Excelsior College v. Frye, 233 F.R.D. 583 (2006) - Holdings: The District Court, Papas, United
States Magistrate Judge, held that: (1) discovery rule mandating disclosure of insurance
information merely requires the disclosure of an insurance policy or other agreement that gives
rise to an insurer's obligation to indemnify or hold its insured harmless for a judgment . . .
[1] A plain reading of discovery rule governing mandatory disclosure of insurance
information indicates it is clearly designed for parties to produce documentation of any insurance
policies that give rise to an insurer's obligation to indemnify or hold its insured harmless for a
judgment. See EXHIBIT “12” – Excelsior College matter attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as if set forth in full herein.

Woldum v. Roverud Construction, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 420 (1968) - On defendant's objections to
interrogatories asking whether defendant carried liability insurance at time of accident, name and
address of insurer, name of insured, and amount of coverage, on grounds that they were an attempt
to inquire into privileged matters, and were incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The District
Court, McManus, Chief Judge, held that permitting discovery of existence and amount of
insurance coverage would better further word and spirit of federal discovery rules than to deny it.
Objections overruled.

[1] Interrogatories asking whether defendant carried liability insurance at time of accident,
the name and address of insurer, the name of insured, and amount of coverage were not
improper on grounds that they were an attempt to inquire into privileged matters, and were
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A.

[2] Overriding purpose of federal discovery rules is to promote full disclosure of all facts
to aid in fair, prompt and inexpensive disposition of lawsuits. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 1,
28 U.S.C.A.

[3] Permitting discovery of existence and amount of insurance coverage would better
further word and spirit of federal discovery rules than to deny it. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule
1, 28 U.S.C.A.

[1] In this action damages are sought for . . . injuries allegedly suffered
by plaintiff . . . by an employee of defendant. The interrogatories in
question ask whether defendant carried liability insurance at the time of
the accident, the name and address of the insurer, the name of the
insured, and the amount of coverage. Defendant objects on the grounds
that said interrogatories are ‘an attempt to inquire into privileged
matters, not proper interrogatories, incompetent, irrelevant and
immaterial.’

[2] [3] . . . It is this court's view that the better rule is that taken by
courts allowing discovery. E. g., Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8
(M.D.Pa.1967); Cook v. Welty, 253 F.Supp. 875 (D.D.C.1966); Ash v.
Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D.Kan.1965); 41 A.L.R.2d 968 and
Supplement Service. The overriding purpose of the federal discovery
rules is to promote full disclosure of all facts to aid in the fair, prompt
and inexpensive disposition of lawsuits. Rule 1, F.R.Civ.P., requires
that the federal rules ‘be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.’ It would seem that
permitting discovery of the existence and amount of coverage better
furthers the word and spirit of the rules than to deny it.

It is therefore ordered Defendant's Objections to Interrogatories,
filed December 29, 1967, are overruled. See EXHIBIT “13” –
Woldum matter attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as
if set forth in full herein.

11. For this Court to grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Newsome would be prejudiced and deprived
equal protection of the laws, equal immunities and privileges and due process of laws. Rights
secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws.

A. JURISDICTIONAL/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:

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Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1145 (D.C.Miss. 1976 ) - (n.1) Since statute
guaranteeing equal rights under the law contains no statute of limitations, period of
limitations applicable to action under statute is determined by reference to most analogous statute
of limitations in force in state in which cause of action arises. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.2

See EXHIBIT “14” - Walton v. Utility Products, Inc. attached hereto and incorporated herein by
reference as if set forth in full herein. This citation is not new to the Defendants in this lawsuit in that it
is addressed at Footnote (“Fn.”) 6 at page 7 of the Complaint. Along with other case law provided in:

Heath v. D. H. Baldwin Co., 447 F.Supp. 495 (N.D.Miss.Greenville.Div., 1977) - General six-year
statute of limitations in Mississippi was applicable to suit by . . .employee against employer . . .
claiming racial discrimination. Code Miss. 1972, § 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.

Howard v. Sun Oil Co., 294 F.Supp. 24 (S.D.Miss.Hattiesburg.Div.,1967) - Ordinarily, suit in tort
for damages brought more than six years after commission of tort is barred by Mississippi six-year
statute of limitations. Code Miss.1942, § 722.

See Fn.6 at page 7 of Complaint filed in this instant lawsuit. Moreover, EXHIBITS “15” – Heath and
“16” – Howard respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
Newsome having highlighted information that is PERTINENT and RELEVANT in that it goes to the
relief of SANCTIONS that Newsome seeks of and against Defendants and/or their Counsel – i.e.
supports what facts, evidence and legal conclusions were available at the time of their preparation of
the Motion to Stay [Doc. No. 9] and supporting Memorandum Brief [Doc. No. 10] submitted in this
lawsuit.

12. Newsome believes this Court upon receipt of the Complaint in this lawsuit, may have reviewed the
“CIVIL COVER SHEET” and statements provided under “JURISDICTION” of Complaint and
determined arguments to be well-founded and proceeded to file Newsome’s lawsuit.

Truvillion vs. King's Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. Miss. 1980) - . . .(4) claim against
employer grounded on civil rights statute was governed by Mississippi six-year catchall statute of
limitations rather than three-year statute of limitations governing unwritten contracts. . . .
[6] Job discrimination suit filed under civil rights statute was governed by Mississippi
six-year catchall statute of limitations, rather than three-year statute of limitations governing
unwritten contracts. . .
[6] . . ."(a) person suing under Section 1981 to enforce his right to be free of
discrimination predicates his claim on the right to contract guaranteed in the statute. The

2
[1] The court rejects defendant's contention that the three-year limitations period of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-29 (1972) bars
plaintiff's section 1981 claim. Defendant correctly states that since section 1981 contains no statute of limitations, the applicable period of
limitations is determined by reference to the most analogous statute of limitations in force in the state in which the cause of action arises. Section
15-1-29 pertains to actions founded on implied contracts. . . .

(n. 2) Under law of Mississippi, general six-year period of limitations rather than three-year period of limitations which
applies to action founded on implied contracts and action to recover back pay governs employment discrimination suit charging violation of
federal statute guaranteeing equal rights under the law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Code Miss.1972, §§ 15-1-29, 15-1-49.
(n. 3) Under law of Mississippi, three-year statute of limitations applicable to action seeking recovery of back wages acts as
limitation upon back pay liability of employer charged with racial discrimination but does not operate to bar entire back pay claim or claim for
declaratory or injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Code Miss.1972, § 15-1-29.
(n. 4) Under law of Mississippi, employee's claim against employer charging violation of federal statue guaranteeing equal
rights, filed within six years of alleged racial discrimination, was not time barred. Code Miss.1972, § 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.

[2] [3] [4] This court is of the opinion that the reasoning . . . is equally applicable to a section 1981 employment discrimination
action. As there is no Mississippi statute of limitations for civil rights actions, or a specific Mississippi statue of limitations for actions analogous
to actions based on racial discrimination in employment, the general six-year period of limitations provided by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49,
rather than the three-year period provided by section 15-1-29, determines the time within which a section 1981 employment discrimination suit
must be filed. As noted previously, section 15-1-29 does act as a limitation upon an employer's back pay liability, but it does not operate to bar
the entire back pay claim, or a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief.FN1 Since plaintiff filed his section 1981 claim well within the six-year
period, defendant's motion to dismiss this portion of the complaint must be denied.

[5] The court also does not agree with defendant's contention that Title VII relief is precluded because of plaintiff's failure to file this
action within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC failure of conciliation notice. . . . Defendant's motion to dismiss the Title VII aspects of plaintiff's
complaint is accordingly denied.

Page 8 of 39

contractual nature of claim under Section 1981 dictates application. . . But the statutory right Ms.
Truvillion asserts is not the right to enforce an unwritten contract as the district court assumed . . .
Because Mississippi has no statute of limitations designed to cover actions seeking redress for the
tort of employment discrimination, the State's catch-all statute is applicable. [FN16] See Heath v.
D.H. Baldwin Co., N.D. Miss. 1979, 447 F.Supp. 495, 504; Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., N.D.
Miss. 1976, 424 F.Supp. 1145, 1147. The statute runs for six years, and does not bar Ms.
Truvillion's claim.

FN16. The statute provides:
All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be
commenced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not
after.

See EXHIBIT “17” – Truvillion matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set
forth in full herein.

13. The filing of this lawsuit should come as no surprise to Defendants Page Kruger & Holland, P.A.
(“PKH”), Thomas Y. Page (“TPage”), Louis G. Baine III (“LBaine”), and Linda Thomas. (“LThomas”)
[collectively known as “Named Defendants”] because the record evidence will support that as early as
May 16, 2006, Named Defendants were timely, properly and adequately notified of Newsome’s intent to
bring a lawsuit. See EXHIBIT “18” – Newsome’s May 16, 2006 Email to Named Defendants attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Said email which states in part:

In that I believe that I have been unlawfully terminated, I am requesting that PKH PRESERVE
my employment records, any other documents, audio, etc. regarding my employment and
reasons for termination.

In that PKH was given an opportunity to provide me with written documentation as to their
reasons for my termination, I will only conclude that any other reasons which may be offered
AFTER the fact/termination will be PRETEXT in nature - provided in an effort to COVER-
UP/SHIELD PKH's unlawful employment action taken against me.

Said email was also provided with the Complaint in this lawsuit at Exhibit VI. It is an UNDISPUTED
fact that Named Defendants ACKNOWLEDGE referenced statement as sufficient NOTIFICATION
on Newsome’s intent to bring suit and/or legal action regarding her termination. The U.S. Supreme
Court finding:

Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 85 S.Ct. 1050 (1965) - Statutes of limitations are designed
primarily to assure fairness to defendants; they promote justice by preventing surprises through
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.
Policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed where
interests of justice require vindication of plaintiff's rights.

Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 118 S.Ct. 1408 (1998) - The object of a statute of limitation in
keeping stale litigation out of the courts would be distorted if statute were applied to bar otherwise
legitimate defense to timely lawsuit, for limitation statutes are aimed at lawsuits, not at
consideration of particular issues in lawsuits. [EMPHASIS ADDED].

Named Defendants CANNOT say that evidence was lost and/or assert memories have faded, etc.
because they were timely, properly and adequately requested to PRESERVE the record. Named
Defendants and their counsel’s FRIVOLOUS assertion alleging § 1983 claims NOT provided in
Newsome’s Complaint clearly supports their KNOWLEDGE that any attacks against Newsome’s claims
as being TIME BARRED is (i) an insufficient defense to the Complaint filed by Newsome; (ii)
redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for purposes of delay,
harassment, obstructing justice, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, commit fraud upon this Court, and
other reasons known to Defendants and their Counsel. Furthermore, the record evidence will support
that Named Defendants and their counsel have been WELL ENGAGED in CONTINUED and
ONGOING conspiracies and criminal/civil wrongs leveled against Newsome since her unlawful/illegal
termination of employment and TO DATE have NOT ceased from engaging in such unlawful/illegal
practices.

Page 9 of 39

14. It is well-settled by the court(s) that claims and/or cause of action is the determining factor as to which
statute-of-limitation is applicable:

King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.Miss.,1988) - When suit alleges several distinct causes
of action, even if they arise from single event, applicable limitations period must be determined by
analyzing each cause of action separately, rather than by determining “essence” of plaintiff's
claims considered as a whole.
Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to obtain trials for intentional tort claims after statute of
limitations has barred them merely by engaging in artful pleading; if however, claim can plausibly
withstand motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, it cannot be treated as mere rewording of
barred claim, and thus, instead of probing for essence of suit, district court should analyze each
claim on its own merits.

Alexander v. Taylor, 928 So.2d 992 (Miss.App.,2006) - What limitations statute or statutes apply is
determined from an examination of the claims that are made.

Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir.Miss.,1976) - In choosing applicable state statute of
limitations to apply to action brought under civil rights statute, court must ground its decision on
the basis of which statute will best effectuate the congressional policies underlying the civil rights
statute.

In this instant lawsuit Newsome brings the following Counts and claims, facts, evidence and legal
conclusions to sustain them will support that Newsome’s claims are subject to the six-year statute of
limitation and are not barred – while some of the Counts may be misnumbered, it has NO bearing on
the claims, facts and legal conclusions provided by Newsome to support her Complaint. Moreover,
misnumbering is a MINOR issue which can be corrected through an Amended Complaint should it be
deemed necessary. The supporting statements of claims are set forth in PARAGRAPHS in the
Complaint and are DISTINCTLY numbered as required by the Rules/Statutes governing said matters.
The Counts being as follows: Count I - 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendants; Count II - 42 USC § 1985: Conspiracy To Interfere With Civil Rights and 42 USC § 1981:
Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count III - 42 USC § 1986: Action For Neglect To
Prevent and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count IV - Negligent
Interference with Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s);
Count V - Discrimination in Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s); Count II [Sic] – Retaliation and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s); Count IIIII [Sic] - Breach Of Express Employment Agreement 42 USC § 1981: Equal
Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count VIII – Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith
And Fair Dealing 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count IX –
Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s); Count X – Fraud Against [sic] and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s); Count XI – Negligent Interference With Employment – Malicious Conspiracy To Cause
Discharge From Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s);
Count IVII – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution – Due Process and 42
USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law; and Count VII – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution – Equal Protection and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against
Defendant(s)

I. MOTION TO STRIKE/
CONSOLIDATION OF DEFENSES
Pendleton County v. Amy, 80 U.S. 297 (1871) - Defendant's pleas which were inartistically framed
and were argumentative and set up nothing which could not have been taken advantage of for what
it was worth under the general issue might have been stricken from the record on motion.

Brown v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 171 N.E.2d 191 (1960) - (n.4) Motions to strike pleadings and
papers from the files are ordinarily employed to strike pleadings for failure to comply with previous
orders . . . or to test its form with respect to certification, and the office of such motions is not to
inquire into the merits of the case.

Page 10 of 39

(n.8) A pleading is “frivolous” when it is clearly insufficient on its face and does not
controvert material points of the opposite pleading and is presumably interposed for mere
purposes of delay or to embarrass the opponent.

Sherrill v. Stewart, 21 So.2d 11 (Miss.,1945) - A “frivolous pleading” is one so clearly untenable
or the insufficiency of which is so manifest upon bare inspection of pleading that court is able to
determine its character without argument or research.

McDowell v. Minor, 131 So. 278 (Miss.,1930) - Where pleading is manifestly sham and frivolous,
motion to strike is available.

Pursuant to Rule 12 (F) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Newsome through this MTS-

MTSTAY&MFR11SDEFAULT moves this Court to strike the statements, contents and any supporting exhibits of

Defendants’ Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum

In Support Of Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A Ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss. Under said

Rule it states:

Rule 12(F) Motion to Strike. The Court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:

(1) on its own; or

(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a
response is not allowed, within 20 days after being served with the pleading.

Therefore, in an effort to provide specificity Newsome moves for the striking of contents/statements in Defendants’

Motion to Stay and the supporting Memorandum In Support in that the asserted Rule 12 (b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and

its Memorandum Brief are IRRELEVANT and IMMATERIAL to this instant lawsuit. In further support of this

instant MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDEFAULT, Newsome moves this Court to strike the contents/statements for the

following reasons:

A. MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS (“MOTION TO STAY”)

The entire contents of “Motion to Stay” which include; however, is not limited to the Style and Headings of

said pleading in that it is: (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for

purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness,

unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to

Defendants and their Counsel and the following:

15. Opening paragraph on Page 1 which begins with “COME NOW, Defendants, Page Kruger & Holland,
P.A. (“PKH”), Thomas Y. Page, Louis G. Baine, III, and Linda Thomas” in that it is - (ii) redundant;
(iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for purposes of delay, harassment,
obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, unduly
burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to
Defendants and their counsel (Phelps Dunbar LLP, W. Thomas Siler, Jr. and Jason T. Marsh

Page 11 of 39

[hereinafter, “Phelps Dunbar,” “Siler” and/or “Marsh”)] hereinafter collectively known as “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.”

16. ¶1 on Page 1 which begins with, “Because Plaintiff filed her claims against Defendants six years after
they accrued” and the referenced Footnote 1 in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”

Heath vs. D. H. Baldwin Company, 447 F.Supp. 495 (N.D. Miss. 1977) - . . . (4) Mississippi six-
year statute of limitations was applicable to action under Civil Rights Act of 1870 . . .
[5] General six-year statute of limitations in Mississippi was applicable to suit by laid off
employee aganst employer and union claiming racial discrimination. Code Miss. 1972, § 15-1-49;
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. . . .
For the reasons set forth by Chief Judge Keady in Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., 424
F.Supp. 1145, 1147, (N.D. Miss. 1976) the court finds that the 6-year limitation period of Miss.
Code Ann. s 15-1-49 (1972) is applicable and therefore Heath's s 1981 claim was timely filed.
Defendants' motion to dismiss the s 1981 claim is not well taken and will be denied.

To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by
FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!

17. ¶2 on Page 2 which begins with, “For the reasons fully set forth in corresponding Memorandum in
Support” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”


18. ¶3 on Page 2 which begins with, “In further support of this Motion, Defendants submit the following
exhibit” and the supporting “Exhibit ‘A’ – Email from Vogel Newsome” in that it is - “STRICKEN
STATEMENT CLAUSE.”

UNDISPUTED is the fact that Named Defendants and their counsel resort to EXTRAJUDICIAL
matters and rely upon an UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL Order in another lawsuit in which the Magistrate
Judge CLEARLY LACKED Jurisdiction to enter and CANNOT be upheld in that it appears from
review of Docket Sheet in Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, at Doc. No. 2 that OBJECTION to
Magistrate assignment was timely, properly and adequately made known to that court. See EXHIBIT
“19” – Docket Sheet Mitchell McNutt & Sams matter attached hereto.

UNDISPUTED is the fact that while Named Defendants and their counsel rely upon an ORDER which
it appears from the record evidence may have been obtained through CRIMINAL acts – i.e. BRIBES,
EXTORTION, COERCION, BLACKMAIL, SPECIAL FAVORS, etc. – and DELIBERATELY
FAILS to make KNOWN Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball’s EMPLOYMENT history with counsel in this
lawsuit (Phelps Dunbar) as well as his TIES/ROOTS/CONNECTIONS with Phelps Dunbar’s
CONSPIRING Law Firm (Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz). Moreover, the FACT of
how Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (“Baker Donelson”) relies upon “FRONTING
FIRMS” as Phelps Dunbar - who SHARE clients (i.e. such as Entergy – see for instance Phelps
Dunbar’s Client Listing at EXHIBIT “20” and the Docket Sheet in Newsome vs. Entergy at EXHIBIT
“21” respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein) - to enter
Lawsuits involving Newsome for purposes of SHIELDING an ILLEGAL ANIMUS and HIDING their
IDENTITY and their and their clients’ INTERESTS from the PUBLIC/WORLD!

19. On Page 2, paragraph which begins with, “WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants,
Page Kruger & Holland, P.A.” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”

Page 12 of 39


20. On Page 2, the remaining contents of the Motion to Dismiss in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”

21. On Page 3, the Certificate of Service and the contents therein in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”

22. “Exhibit A” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” See also ¶ 18 above of this instant
pleading.

Now that the statutes/laws governing said matters require the STRIKING of the entire contents, statements,

exhibits, etc. as noted above, there remains NO legal/lawful pleading of record. Therefore, Newsome is entitled to

the relief (Rule 11 Sanctions and DEFAULT Judgment, etc.) sought herein.

B. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY (“MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT”)

The Striking of entire contents in “Memorandum In Support” which include; however, is not limited to the

Style and Headings of said pleading in that it is: (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous

and provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment,

sham/frivolousness, unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other

reasons known to Named Defendants and their counsel (Phelps Dunbar LLP, W. Thomas Siler, Jr. and Jason T.

Marsh [hereinafter, “Phelps Dunbar,” “Siler” and/or “Marsh”)] hereinafter collectively known as “STRICKEN

STATEMENT CLAUSE.” In support thereof, Newsome states the following:

23. On the first unnumbered page, the opening paragraph which begins with, “COME NOW, Defendants,
Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. (“PKH”)” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”


24. On first unnumbered page, “I. INTRODUCTION” and paragraph which begins with, “Because Plaintiff
filed her claims against Defendants six years after they accrued” along with the referenced Footnote 1
and the contents therein which begins with, “In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a litany of federal
constitutional claims” in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”

UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s Complaint has been filed within six-years. UNDISPUTED
is the fact that Named Defendants are PRIVATE actors. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s
Complaint is premised upon 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 claims and NOT 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claims.
Therefore, § 1981 implicitly creates an independent cause of action AGAINST PRIVATE actors
because no other statute created such a remedy; moreover, the acts of Named Defendants are
“CONTINUING” acts to date in which the statute of limitations CONTINUES to run and/or restarts
with EACH overt act.

Page 13 of 39

UNDISPUTED is the fact, that Newsome’s instant lawsuit has been filed within the six-year statute of
limitation governing said matters but also within the six-year statute of limitation period in that, as
evidenced in this instant lawsuit, Named Defendants and their counsel CONTINUE to engage in
conspiracies that affect Newsome’s “EQUAL Rights Under the Laws!” Therefore, with EACH overt
act by Named Defendants, Newsome’s claims become subject to “TOLLING” doctrine requirements.
This is PERTINENT and RELEVANT information KNOWN to Named Defendants and/or their counsel
(Phelps Dunbar/Siler/Marsh). For instance, see one of PHELPS DUNBAR’S cases – Walker vs. Epps,
550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008):

Under Mississippi law, “continuing tort,” for which limitations period resets at each wrongful act,
is one inflicted over period of time; it involves wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted. See
EXHIBIT “22” – Walker matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference.

UNDISPUTED is the fact that PKH is involved in the Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartment matter.
Which as recent as July 2008 (i.e. approximately FOUR [4] years ago] Newsome had to have removed
from that court and is a matter that Newsome is presently working on through the continued MASSIVE
Conspiracies leveled to obstruct said matter. Continued tort claims are timely, properly and adequately
asserted in Newsome’s Complaint filed in this instant lawsuit:

¶5 Pg. 21 ¶(xii) Pg. 63 ¶214-216 Pg. 94 ¶278 Pg. 121
¶(xii) Pg. 22 ¶165 Pg. 70 ¶217 Pg. 95 ¶1 Pg. 122
¶105 Pg. 41 ¶170 Pg. 71 ¶l Pg. 96 ¶292 Pg. 127
¶¶106, 107 Pg. 43 ¶175 Pg. 73 ¶ 233-235 Pg. 108 ¶296 Pg. 127
¶110 Pg. 47 ¶176 Pg. 74 ¶237, 238 Pg. 109 ¶297 Pg. 130
¶117 Pg. 48 ¶177 Pg. 75 ¶m Pg. 111 ¶298 Pg. 130
¶119 Pg. 49 ¶(xii), (xvii) Pg. 77 ¶245 Pg. 112 ¶1 Pg. 131
¶ (xii) Pg. 51 ¶188 Pg. 82 ¶253, 259 Pg. 114
¶136 Pg. 60 ¶197 Pg. 85 ¶260 Pg. 115
¶138-139 Pg. 61 ¶198-199 Pg. 87 ¶261 Pg. 116
¶140 Pg. 62 ¶l Pg. 89 ¶l Pg. 117


Furthermore, it is UNDISPUTED that Named Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (i.e. in that it appears in
their TRICKERY in the use of the pen/computer, it appears that the relief sought may be that of
summary judgment) and Motion to Stay are NOT supported by Affidavits because they have FULL
KNOWLEDGE that their Motions have been submitted in bad faith and/or for purposes of delay,
harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness,
unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasons
known to Named Defendants and their counsel.

Myers v. Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel, 720 F.Supp.2d 773 (S.D. Miss.
Jackson 2010) - Section 1981 implicitly creates an independent cause of action against private
actors because no other statute created such a remedy, but does not create any right of action
against state actors separate from § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983.

Tramble v. Converters Ink Co., 43 F.Supp. 1350 (1972) - [2] Civil rights statute generally
guaranteeing equal rights under the law applies to private job discrimination based on race and is
not limited to acts under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.

Moreover, it appears that Named Defendants are eyeing cases outside this lawsuit involving Newsome;
therefore, a reasonable mind/person may conclude that from the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams
matter [USDC Southern District of Mississippi/Jackson, 3:10-cv-704], filed approximately SIX-YEARS
from the date of her termination with Mitchell McNutt & Sams (“MMS”) – i.e. termination date being
approximately December 3, 2004, and Newsome’s lawsuit was received and filed by this Court on or
about December 3, 2010. As with the “MMS” matter, upon reviewing of pleading PRIOR to
Page 14 of 39

DOCKETING and FILING, this Court was SATISFIED that the Complaint , as in this instant Lawsuit,
was ALSO TIMELY filed, the FILING FEE PAID and therefore, DOCKETED the matter.

25. On Page 2, continuance of paragraph from first unnumbered page which states, “this matter, as well as
preserve important judicial resources” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”


26. On Page 2, “II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND” and paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff began
working for PKH as a temporary legal secretary” along with the referenced Footnotes 2, 3, and 4 as well
as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”

UNDISPUTED is the NEXUS/CAUSAL Link between Newsome’s March 15, 2006, lawsuit (i.e. in
Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartments LLC, et al. - a protected activity which alleges discriminatory
practices, etc.) and PKH’s May 15, 2006 termination (approximately two (2) months later) of
Newsome’s employment based on being contacted and notified of her engagement in this lawsuit and/or
other protected activities. See EXHIBIT “18” – Newsome’s May 16, 2006 Email attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein. PKH’s termination of Newsome’s
employment coming approximately three (3) days prior to hearing/proceedings on or about May 18,
2006, in Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartments LLC, et al. [EMPHASIS added]. See EXHIBIT “23” –
Motion Docket Sheet attached hereto and incorporated by reference. Note: Also provided at Exhibit VII
of Complaint filed in this lawsuit.


The prohibited retaliatory practices of PKH were KNOWN at the time Named Defendants counsel
(Phelps Dunbar/Siler/Marsh) executed the Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief. For
instance see one of PHELP DUNBAR’S cases - Callahan v. Bancorpsouth Ins. Services of Mississippi,
Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 678 (S.D. Miss. S.Div. 2002):

[3] Title VII prohibits retaliation in either of two instances: ( 1) where the employee has opposed
any unlawful employment practice; or (2) where the employee has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–3(a). – EXHIBIT “24” Callahan matter attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

UNDISPUTED is that Actions brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1981 are governed by the SAME
standards applicable to claims raised under Title VII.

27. On Page 2, paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff’s employment with PKH ended on May 15, 2006”
along with the referenced Footnotes 5 and 6 as well as the contents therein, in that they are -
“STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”

UNDISPUTED is the fact that this instant lawsuit premised on 42 USC § 1981 claims, etc. was filed
within six years of the alleged violations and CONTINUING violations [EMPHASIS added]
addressed in this lawsuit. Furthermore, UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s claims premised
on 42 USC § 1981 fall under “all actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall
be commenced within six years;” therefore, the six-year statute of limitation under Mississippi’s
CATCHALL statute is applicable pursuant to Mississippi Code Ann. § 15-1-49:

Gates vs. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. S.D. Miss. 1985) - FN1. Although Mrs. Gates formally
denominated her complaint as being brought pursuant to “Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1981, et seq.”,
Page 15 of 39

the substance of the complaint states a cause of action only under section 1983. We therefore treat
Mrs. Gates' claim as one brought pursuant to § 1983.
FN2. Section 15-1-49. Limitations applicable to actions not otherwise specifically
provided for - All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced
within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.
. . . The six-year statute (section 15-1-49) is more general in the sense that it is a general
residual statute that applies to a broad class of actions-tort, contract or statutory-not otherwise
provided for.

A reasonable person/mind may conclude that Named Defendants’ counsel’s KNOWLEDGE that
Newsome’s Complaint premised on 42 USC § 1981 claims are subject to the six-year statute of
limitations. Therefore, Named Defendants’ counsel has FRIVOLOUSLY attempted to assert 42 USC §
1983 claims – i.e. as evidenced in the “CLUMP” of trashed Opinions dumped on this Court - when no
such § 1983 claims are made by Newsome through her Complaint filed in this lawsuit.


28. On Page 2, paragraph which begins with, “Because Plaintiff’s claims are time barred” along with the
referenced Footnote 7 as well as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”


29. On Page 2, “III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES” and paragraph which begins with, “It has long
been recognized that “[a] trial court has broad discretion” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”

UNDISPUTED is the fact that Named Defendants and their counsel are attempting to “put the cart
before the horse.” As a matter of law, NO Responsive Pleading and/or Answer (in accordance to the
statutes/laws governing said
matters) have been made to
Newsome’s Complaint.
Therefore, there are NO facts,
evidence, NOR legal
conclusions to sustain a
staying of this action for
DISCOVERY purposes.
Named Defendants and their
counsel have not even gotten
off of the home plate to assert
first-base privileges and/or
defenses regarding
DISCOVERY matters. The
Discovery process may begin
AFTER the filing of a
legal/lawful responsive
pleading and/or Answer –
which in this Lawsuit has
NOT been filed. Moreover,
the record evidence supports
Newsome timely, properly,
and adequately NOTIFIED Named Defendants’ through “Waiver of the Service of Summons and
Page 16 of 39

NOTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS” that any
responsive pleading and/or Answer which did NOT meet the pleading REQUIREMENTS would be met
with a MOTION TO STRIKE! See EXHIBITS “25,” “26,” “27,” and “28” respectively attached hereto
and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Furthermore, the “Notice Of A Lawsuit And
Request To Waive Service Of A Summons” served on EACH of the Named Defendants NOTIFIED
them of the PUBLIC/SOCIAL Forums – i.e. such as www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise and
https://secure.filesanywhere.com/fs/v.aspx?v=8a706b8f58666ebeac6b to be used for the
posting/sharing of documents in this Lawsuit [EMPHASIS ADDED]. See EXHIBITS “29,” “30,”
“31,” and “32” - “Notice of Lawsuit. . .” ONLY respectively, attached hereto and incorporated by

UNDISPUTED is the fact, that it appears that Named Defendants counsel may have had a SNEAK
PEEK at Newsome’s July 14, 2012 Motion to Strike posted at:

http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/071412-motion-to-strike-page-kruger-holland-matter

and then MOVED swiftly TWO (2) days later in efforts of BLINDSIDING the Court and Newsome
filed their SHAM/FRIVOLOUS/BOGUS “Motion to Stay” and supporting “Memorandum in Support”
PRIOR to its receipt of Newsome’s Motion to Strike Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum In Support
Of Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default
Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) in hopes of obtaining and UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL
Order Staying of this Lawsuit by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker who LACKS JURISDICTION
to act in that Newsome has timely, properly and adequately “IN WRITING” notified of her
OBJECTIONS to Magistrate Referral as well as OBJECTION to Judge Tom S. Lee.

Furthermore, that Named Defendants counsel AGAIN, it appears, resorting to their “Folder of FORM
Pleadings” and pulled out one addressing DISCOVERY matters – i.e. which IS NOT applicable to this
instant lawsuit – in efforts of trying to OBSTRUCT the administration of justice and their having to
fulfill their MANDATORY OBLIGATIONS to notify parties and/or this Court notifying parties to this
action of any/all CONFLICTS-OF-INTERESTS pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct
(See EXHIBIT “10” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein) and
other statutes/laws governing said matters.

Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155 (Miss.,2004) - “Moral
turpitude,” in the context of judicial misconduct, includes, but is not limited to, actions which
involve interference with the administration of justice, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
bribery, extortion, or other such actions which bring the judiciary into disrepute.

UNDISPUTED is the fact, that on or about July 14, 2012, Newsome posted in a PUBLIC/SOCIAL
Forum at http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/071412-motion-to-strike-page-kruger-holland-
matter her pleadings entitled, PLAINTIFF’ S MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND
AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS
ACTION). See EXHIBIT “33” – ScreenShot of pleading reflecting “POSTING Date.” [EMPHASIS
ADDED].

UNDISPUTED is the fact, that on or about July 18, 2012, Newsome submitted Facsimile to
Named Defendants’ counsel entitled, “REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION FOR PHELPS
DUNBAR’S/COUNSELS’ KNOWLEDGE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DELIBERATE
FAILURE TO NOTIFY PARTY(S) OF SAME and GOOD FAITH DEMAND THAT PHELPS
DUNBAR WITHDRAW PLEADINGS.” See EXHIBIT “34” – July 18, 2012 Facsimile attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. At the time of this instant filing,
Named Defendants’ counsel has FAILED to provide Newsome with information MANDATORILY
required pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct and other statutes/laws governing said
matters.

Page 17 of 39


30. On Page 3, continuance of paragraph from page 2 which states, “Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583”
and the referenced “Exhibit ‘1’” and the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT
CLAUSE.”

UNDISPUTED is the fact that NO Responsive Pleading and/or Answer to Newsome’s Complaint, in
accordance with the statutes/laws governing said matters, has been filed in this Lawsuit. Furthermore, to
date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION
FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS,
EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!

UNDISPUTED is the fact that pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – for
instance Rule 26(a)(1)(A), it clearly states in part:

RULE 26 - Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery

(1) Initial Disclosure.

(A) In General. Except as exempted by Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or as otherwise stipulated or
ordered by the court, a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the
other parties:

(i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
likely to have discoverable information—along with the subjects of that
information—that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses,
unless the use would be solely for impeachment;

(ii) a copy—or a description by category and location—of all documents,
electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in
its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses,
unless the use would be solely for impeachment;

(iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—
who must also make available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the
documents or other evidentiary material, unless privileged or protected from
disclosure, on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the
nature and extent of injuries suffered; and

(iv) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance agreement under which
an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the
action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment.

See EXHIBIT “2” – Rule 26 of FRCP attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in
full herein. So now with have Named Defendants and their counsel attempting to OBSTRUCT justice
in the release of MANDATORY “DISCLOSURE” information as well as their DELIBERATE failure
to release such information because of KNOWLEDGE of the EXPOSURE of “Conflict-Of-Interest”
that is inevitable and may further EXPOSE their CRIMINAL/CIVIL violations; moreover, ROLE in
CONTINUING and ONGOING Conspiracies leveled against Newsome.

31. On Page 3, paragraph which begins with, “A stay of discovery is warranted” and the “. . .” in that it is -

Furthermore, to date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST
Page 18 of 39

DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is
supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!

32. On Page 3, paragraph which begins with, “Courts within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit” in that it is
- “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”


33. On page 4, continuance of paragraph from page 3 which states, “dispositive motion. The Magistrate
Judge in that case, Honorable F. Keith Ball, granted the stay until the District Court Judge,
Honorable Henry T. Wingate,” along with the referenced Footnotes 8 and 9 and the contents
therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”

UNDISPUTED are the following facts that are PERTINENT and RELEVENT to understanding the
ONGOING Conspiracies and BLATANT Criminal/Civil violations being carried out by
Judges/Magistrate Judges of this Court and opposing counsel in Lawsuits involving Newsome that
are matters of SOCIAL/PUBLIC/GLOBAL importance in that it supports the PATTERN-OF-
PRACTICE as well as supports NOT only the appearance of IMPROPRIETY but actual
IMPROPRIETY by Officers of this Court. A reasonable mind may conclude that this is a
“CULTURE” of criminal/civil wrongs ENGRAINED and DEEPLY-ROOTED” in the United States
of America’s CORRUPT Judicial System that involve matters that are RACIALLY motivated and
matters of PUBLIC Policy/Interests. It is important to note that Named Defendants and their
counsel (Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh) DELIBERATELY and with
CRIMINAL/CRIMINAL intent fail to advise Newsome of the following PERTINENT and
RELEVANT facts:

a) Honorable Henry T. Wingate was nominated by former President Ronald Reagan on or
about September 11, 1985. See EXHIBIT “58” attached hereto and incorporated by

b) Baker Donelson’s employee Howard Henry Baker, Jr. served as CHIEF OF STAFF to
United States of America President Ronald Reagan. Served as Senior Majority Leader of
the United States Senate. Is currently SENIOR Counsel at Baker Donelson. Descendant of
Baker Donelson founder. Founder of Baker Donelson in WASHINGTON, D.C. and
London. See EXHIBIT “59” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in
full herein.

c) Honorable Henry T. Wingate confirmed the Honorable F. Keith Ball. See EXHIBIT “60”
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Judge Wingate
appointed the Magistrate Selection Panel responsible. See EXHIBIT “61” attached hereto
and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. DIRTY-HANDS DEALS: It
appears from information found regarding the selection of Magistrate Ball that he may
have been PRE-SELECTED. If so, it appears MORE qualified candidates may have been
deprived EQUAL employment opportunities as a direct and proximate result of
CRIMINAL/CIVIL violations by Judge Wingate, Phelps Dunbar and Baker Donelson to get
another one of their judges on the bench for purposes of STACKING the Court. It appears
the LEAKING of Magistrate Ball’s selection coming from a source NOT on the Magistrate
Selection Panel.

Last Monday I reported that Keith Ball has been selected as the new
Magistrate Judge for the Southern District. I had heard the news the
previous Friday from someone who was not on the Magistrate
Selection Panel.

Then last Wednesday I heard that one of the Southern District Judges
was telling lawyers that no announcement had been made on the
selection yet.

Page 19 of 39

See EXHIBIT “62” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full
herein. From Newsome’s research, she found that Judge Wingate is a BLACK-American
(i.e. NOT African-American). However, one should NOT be deceived by the fact that
Newsome is AFRICAN-American that Judge Wingate would not be engaged in the
CRIMINAL practices and CONSPIRACIES, etc. leveled against Newsome. From
information that has been found, clearly it appears that the United States District Court –
Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) JUDICIAL panel may be STACKED with
CORRUPT/TAINTED/BRIBED, etc. Judges purchased by such firms as Phelps Dunbar,
Baker Donelson, Page Kruger & Holland, and others that CONSPIRE with them.
Furthermore, the mere fact that Judge Wingate is a BLACK-American does NOT insulate
him from RECUSAL. Judge Wingate KNOWS and/or should of KNOWN of his DUTY to
RECUSE himself; moreover, the role he is playing in the ONGOING Criminal/Civil
violations and CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome. Clearly the unlawful/illegal
attacks leveled against Newsome are RACIALLY motivated.

In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1997) - Judge is not
insulated from recusal, in racially charged case, merely because he or
she is black. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455.

It appears Judge Wingate may be known as what is called a “HOUSE NEGRO:”

One who has NO sense of his heritage and roots and is ASHAMED to be associated
with African Heritage or roots because of what has been depicted in the MEDIA
teaching them to hate themselves (i.e. the color of their skin, hair, etc.) and to be
ashamed of their looks: http://youtu.be/YtOslGWp13A They are HIGHLY
employed by the United States of America Government to serve as HOUSE
Negroes/GATEKEEPERS and/or to meet QUOTAS for DECEPTIVE purposes - i.e.
to DECEIVE and HIDE from the PUBLIC/WORLD the United States of
America's WHITE Supremacist and RACIST Agenda. HIGHLY employed by
Government Agencies to COVER-UP Discriminatory practices in the Government and
PRIVATE Sector by WHITE Racist Employers/Supremacists. They are also used to
COVER-UP the Corruption and Criminal/Civil wrongs of SYSTEMATIC
Discriminatory Practices leveled against AFRICAN-Americans and People of
Color that are seen as a THREAT because they are EDUCATED and are
STRONG Civil Rights Activists fighting for the cause of their people and
EXPOSING the United States of America’s CRIMINAL HERITAGE.
http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/criminals-in-our-past HOUSE
Negroes/BLACK-Americans are usually individuals NOT qualified to perform
jobs they are hired for and are merely put into their positions as “GATE
KEEPERS” and a direct and proximate result of SPECIAL FAVORS - i.e. them
having to COMPROMISE and DENY morals, values and beliefs. One who will do
EVERYTHING possible to FIT IN and be ACCEPTED by White Society. They live
in FEAR and have become VERY DEPENDENT on a WHITE-RUN Government
DETERMINED to erase and change their IDENTITY and LOOKS. But NO matter
how HARD he/she TRIES, they are STILL seen as "BLACK!" It is BLACK-
Americans that a White Reporter is SCOFFING at and PRAISING the
TERRORISTS Acts (i.e. RAPES, MURDERS, LYNCHING, etc.) of his White
Supremacist Counterparts in this interview with "Muslim Civil Rights Activist
Malcolm X" and that Malcolm X prophesied whose REIGN will come to an END!
http://youtu.be/o7f5NTLgtEA

Just keeping it real and laying down the FACTS! So one can see why Judge Wingate was
selected and why his MASTERS LOVE him so!

d) Honorable F. Keith Ball has employment history with Named Defendant’s counsel Phelps
Dunbar. See EXHIBIT “63” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth
in full herein. Furthermore, research yielding information regarding Magistrate Ball’s
presiding over a COPYRIGHT case [EMPHASIS added] involving Baker Donelson. See
EXHIBIT “64” – As recent as JUNE 2012, information regarding Baker Donelson serving
as counsel in Copyright matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth
in full herein. Why is this information PERTINENT and RELEVANT, because as recent as
February 3, 2012, it appears that Baker Donelson, their Client (United States of America
President Barack Obama) and others with whom they conspire with in ONGOING
Conspiracies leveled against Newsome, had a FRIVOLOUS Copyright Lawsuit brought
against Newsome for purposes of CRIMINAL intent and to keep the PUBLIC/WORLD
from seeing the role they have played in the pattern-of-practices leveled against Newsome

Page 20 of 39

involving CONTACTING her employers and ORCHESTRATING the TERMINATION of
her employment – as evidenced in this instant Lawsuit and the 05/16/06 Email through the
use of: STALKING, HARASSMENT, THREATS, BRIBES, COERCION,
BLACKMAIL, INTIMIDATION, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, etc. in attempts of
silencing her and depriving her equal protection of the laws, equal immunities and
privileges under the laws, due process of laws and other rights secured/guaranteed under
the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws of the United States of America
governing said matters – See EXHIBIT “65” – Docket Sheet in The Garretson Firm
Resolution Group matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full
herein. This case was SEALED once Newsome went PUBLIC/GLOBAL in sharing this
information. Acts taken to keep this information out of the PUBLIC/WORLD eyes as they
STRUGGLE to get United States of America President Barack Obama RE-ELECTED! It
appears United States of America President Barack Obama, Baker Donelson and those with
whom they conspire going as far as contacting companies providing Newsome with
PUBLIC/SOCIAL forum services (i.e. as the Internet) for purposes of sharing information
that is of PUBLIC/GLOBAL interests. However, as Named Defendants, their counsel, and
those with whom they CONSPIRE can see, they have failed and Newsome continues to
exercise rights secured to her under the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws
and release information regarding the CRIMINAL/CIVIL wrongs and CONSPIRACIES
leveled against her: www.vogeldenisenewsome.net and www.slideshare.net/vogeldenise,
etc.

e) On or about July 18, 2012, Newsome timely, properly and adequately requested an
explanation from Named Defendants counsel (Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T.
Marsh) via Facsimile entitled, “REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION FOR PHELPS
DUNBAR’S/COUNSELS’ KNOWLEDGE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND
DELIBERATE FAILURE TO NOTIFY PARTY(S) OF SAME and GOOD FAITH
DEMAND THAT PHELPS DUNBAR WITHDRAW PLEADINGS.” See EXHIBIT
“34” attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Newsome’s request being in
compliance with the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct and other statutes/laws
governing said matters. See EXHIBIT “10” attached hereto and incorporated by reference
as if set forth in full herein.

Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance vs Agin, 17 So.3d 578
(Miss.,2009) - Judge's conduct in failing to issue a timely ruling in
case violated the code of judicial conduct canons that required a
judge to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary, to
respect and comply with the law and to act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, and to dispose of all judicial matters promptly,
efficiently and fairly. Code of Jud.Conduct, Canons 1, 2A, 3B(8),
3C(1).

See EXHIBIT “5” – Code of Judicial Conduct attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if
set forth in full herein.

Mississippi Com'n on Judicial Performance vs Bustin, 2011 WL
4634995 (Miss., 2011) - “Moral turpitude,” in the context of
judicial misconduct, includes, but is not limited to, actions which
involve interference with the administration of justice,
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, or other such
actions which bring the judiciary into disrepute.


34. On Page 4, paragraph which begins with, “If Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, the need for
discovery,” along with the referenced Footnote 10 and the contents therein, in that they are -

UNDISPUTED is the FACT that Named Defendants and their counsel AGREE that Newsome’s
143-Page Complaint distinctly set forth VALID Claims! Furthermore, because there has been NO
Page 21 of 39

MOTION TO STRIKE - Motion To Stay (PKH)

MOTION TO STRIKE - Motion To Stay (PKH)

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