RESERVED FOR                                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                               SOUTHERN DIS...
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                                        SOUTHERN DISTRICT – JACKSON DIVISIONVOGEL DENIS...
2.   Newsome attaches her supporting Affidavit at EXHIBIT “1” which is incorporated herein by reference     as if set fort...
won through criminal acts – i.e. through bribes, blackmail, extortion, intimidation, threats, etc. - byDefendants and thei...
other CORRUPT Judge(s) as G. Thomas Porteous, may be necessary in having Judge Lee removed from     lawsuits involving New...
has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges     and immunities...
is a premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 – Equal Rights Under The Law which allows for one to “to make and      enforce contracts...
Excelsior College v. Frye, 233 F.R.D. 583 (2006) - Holdings: The District Court, Papas, United              States Magistr...
Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1145 (D.C.Miss. 1976 ) - (n.1) Since statute                      guaranteei...
contractual nature of claim under Section 1981 dictates application. . . But the statutory right Ms.              Truvilli...
14.   It is well-settled by the court(s) that claims and/or cause of action is the determining factor as to which      sta...
(n.8) A pleading is “frivolous” when it is clearly insufficient on its face and does not                  controvert mater...
[hereinafter, “Phelps Dunbar,” “Siler” and/or “Marsh”)] hereinafter collectively known as “STRICKEN      STATEMENT CLAUSE....
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by        FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CO...
UNDISPUTED is the fact, that Newsome’s instant lawsuit has been filed within the six-year statute oflimitation governing s...
DOCKETING and FILING, this Court was SATISFIED that the Complaint , as in this instant Lawsuit,      was ALSO TIMELY filed...
the substance of the complaint states a cause of action only under section 1983. We therefore treat              Mrs. Gate...
NOTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS” that anyresponsive pleading and/or Answer which did NOT meet the p...
To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N      SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; ...
DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is      supported by FACTS, EVIDENC...
See EXHIBIT “62” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full     herein. From Newsome’s research...
involving CONTACTING her employers and ORCHESTRATING the TERMINATION of                    her employment – as evidenced i...
MOTION TO STRIKE - Motion To Stay (PKH)
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MOTION TO STRIKE - Motion To Stay (PKH)

  1. 1. RESERVED FOR IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT – JACKSON DIVISIONVOGEL DENISE NEWSOME PLAINTIFFV. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-00342PAGE KRUGER & HOLLAND P.A., ET AL. DEFENDANTS PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION)
  2. 2. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT – JACKSON DIVISIONVOGEL DENISE NEWSOME PLAINTIFFV. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-00342PAGE KRUGER & HOLLAND P.A., ET AL. DEFENDANTS PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION)1 COMES NOW Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome (“Newsome” and/or “Plaintiff”) WITHOUT waiving herOBJECTIONS to Judge Tom S. Lee presiding over this matter in that a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST exist whichrequires RECUSAL as well as Newsome’s OBJECTIONS to Magistrate assignment in this matter and files this, herMOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS(Doc. No. 9) and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ONDEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (Doc. No. 10); Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; andMotion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) (“MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDefault”) in thepreservation of her rights and pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 12(F) governing mattersregarding motion to strike; FRCP Rule 12(G) governing matters regarding consolidation of defenses and objections;FRCP Rule 11 governing sanctions and/or signing of pleadings, motions, and other documents; FRCP Rule 55governing default judgments; and the Fourteenth and Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. In support of thisinstant MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDEFAULT, Newsome attaches her Affidavit at EXHIBIT “1” – incorporatedherein by reference as if set forth in full herein. Said Affidavit contains PERTINENT and RELEVANT informationthat Newsome believes will aid this Court and provide it with an UNDERSTANDING as to what is really takingplace behind the scenes in FURTHERANCE of the Conspiracies addressed in Newsome’s Complaint filed in thislawsuit. In further support thereof Newsome states: 1. This instant MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDEFAULT is submitted in good faith and is not submitted for purposes of delay, harassment, hindering proceedings, embarrassment, obstructing the administration of justice, vexatious litigation, increasing the cost of litigation, etc. and is filed to protect and preserve the rights of Newsome secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other laws of the United States. 1 NOTE: Boldface, caps, small-caps, italics, highlights and underline represents “emphasis” added. Page 1 of 39
  3. 3. 2. Newsome attaches her supporting Affidavit at EXHIBIT “1” which is incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full.3. That a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST presently exists with the assignment of this lawsuit to Judge Tom S. Lee. The record evidence CLEARLY supports that Newsome has timely, properly and adequately NOTIFIED this Court of the Conflict-Of-Interest regarding Judge Tom S. Lee. See Doc. No. 2 – “Motion Conflict-Of-Interest Information. . .” As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply with the MANDATORY requirements of statutes and laws governing said matters, Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws. As a direct and proximate result of this Court’s unlawful/illegal practices and failure to comply with the MANDATORY requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and any and all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws. See EXHIBITS “2” – FRCP Rule 26 and “3” - 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee on Performance and Expenditure Review Of The State of Mississippi, et al., 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981) - [3] Under statute requiring a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably questioned, judge need not accept all the allegations by moving party as true and, in fact, no motion at all is required; the judge must disqualify himself if the facts cast doubt on his impartiality regardless of how or by whom they are drawn to his attention. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455. . . . [3] Congress rewrote the second statute, section 455, in 1974. Subsection (b) of that section lists a number of specific situations in which a judge must recuse himself. . .Subsection (a), a more general provision, requires that Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Section 455, unlike section 144, does not stipulate a formal procedure by which it must be raised. Like section 144, however, it may be raised by motion. Davis, 517 F.2d at 1051. Substantively, the two statutes are quite similar, if not identical.[FN6] FN6. To the extent that there is a difference, section 455 imposes the stricter standard: a movant under section 144 must allege facts to convince a reasonable person that bias exists, Parrish, 524 F.2d at 100, while under the broader language of section 455, he must show only that a reasonable person “would harbor doubts about the judges impartiality”, Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 5 Cir. 1980, 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (emphasis added), cert. denied, - - U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). See Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 236, 243-50 (1978). See also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 736, 745-50 (1973). On the other hand, section 455, unlike section 144, does not require the judge to accept all allegations by a moving party as true. Indeed, the section requires no motion at all; the judge must disqualify himself if the facts cast doubt on his impartiality regardless of how or by whom they are drawn to his attention. See Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 5 Cir. 1978, 569 F.2d 251, 254-57, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859, 99 S.Ct. 177, 58 L.Ed.2d 167 (1979). Section 144, by contrast, requires allegation by affidavit within a stringent time limit and allows a party only one such affidavit in any case. If a party could bind a judge by his factual allegations in a section 455 motion, free from the formal requirements and more demanding standard of proof of section 144, the result would be a virtual open season for recusal. See 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 250. [4] The alleged bias of a judge must be personal as distinguished from judicial in nature in order to require recusal. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144, 455. - - See EXHIBIT “4” – Phillips matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Clearly the INTEGRITY of this Court has been compromised and the appearance of IMPROPRIETY is inevitable through Judge Tom Stewart Lee’s acts and projects an appearance that this Lawsuit can be Page 2 of 39
  4. 4. won through criminal acts – i.e. through bribes, blackmail, extortion, intimidation, threats, etc. - byDefendants and their counsel. Therefore, Judge Lee’s acts CLEARLY VIOLATE the Mississippi Code ofJudicial Conduct. See EXHIBIT “5” – Code of Judicial Conduct (Mississippi) attached hereto andincorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. 28 USC § 455 - Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; (2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; (3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household. . . . See EXHIBIT “3” - 28 USC § 455 attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.MANDATORY DISQUALIFICATION is required when “ONE” of the grounds specificallyenumerated in statute applies – i.e. for instance, as in this instant lawsuit, grounds for Judge TomStewart Lee’s disqualification is required pursuant to 28 USC § 455 and/or the applicable statutes/lawsgoverning said matters: Renteria v. Schellpeper, 936 F.Supp. 691 (1996) - [6] If one of grounds specifically enumerated in statute applies, disqualification of judge is mandatory whether or not reasonable person would question judges impartiality. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b). . . . [6] . . .If one of the provisions of section 455(b) applies then disqualification is mandatory whether or not a reasonable person would question the judges impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2202 n. 8, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988).CLEARLY Judge Tom S. Lee is adamant and it appears is refusing to RECUSE himself as required bystatutes/laws governing said matters. Therefore, it appears that the proper INVESTIGATION(S) as with Page 3 of 39
  5. 5. other CORRUPT Judge(s) as G. Thomas Porteous, may be necessary in having Judge Lee removed from lawsuits involving Newsome. Furthermore, involving matters of PUBLIC Interest in which Judge Lee is associated may have to be resolved through IMPEACHMENT proceedings. Clearly it is obvious that Judge Tom Stewart Lee is placing his JUDICIAL FATE in the “banking” on and/or “placing all of his eggs” in the basket/relationship of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz. Newsome have already initiated further legal and proper CONGRESSIONAL actions involving Judge Tom Stewart Lee. Even if the United States Congress may be dragging its feet and/or attempting to OBSTRUCT such matters, ALL that is required of Newsome is to PROVE by facts, evidence and legal conclusions that proper legal recourse for redress has been met. See pleading filed at Doc. No. 2 of this instant Lawsuit – See EXHIBIT “6” – Docket Sheet for this action attached hereto. Newsome’s burden has been met and this Court has been timely, properly and adequately notified of same. It matters NOT that there are attempts by law firms such as Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz and members of such CONSPIRACIES that may be members of the United States of America Congress, Supreme Court of the United States of America, etc. OBSTRUCTING the ADMINISTRATION of JUSTICE, Newsome need only PROVE and SHOW through EVIDENCE that she has initiated legal actions and has done so. Legal actions which clearly appears may require additional measures permissible under the statutes/laws governing matters when the United States of America’s Congress, etc. FAILS to act to protect the INTEREST of the PEOPLE and/or PUBLIC-AT-LARGE!4. In accordance with the statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome has timely, properly and adequately PRESERVED said issues such as the CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST and other issues raised in her Motions to Strike the Defendants’ pleadings filed in this lawsuit. See for instance EXHIBIT “7” – “Waiver Of Loss Of Right To Disqualify Judge By Participation In Proceedings . . .” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.5. That Newsome further OBJECTS to the assignment of a Magistrate to this Lawsuit in that she has timely, properly and adequately NOTIFIED this Court in writing as to her OBJECTIONS. Furthermore, said OBJECTION is in accordance with Rules governing said matters as well as in accordance to Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636 and any and all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters. Furthermore, Newsome states in support thereof: Rule 73 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (a) Trial by Consent. When authorized under 28 U.S.C. §636(c), a magistrate judge may, if all parties consent, conduct a civil action or proceeding, including a jury or nonjury trial. A record must be made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(5). (b) Consent Procedure: (1) In General. When a magistrate judge has been designated to conduct civil actions or proceedings, the clerk must give the parties written notice of their opportunity to consent under 28 U.S.C. §636(c). To signify their consent, the parties must jointly or separately file a statement consenting to the referral. A district judge or magistrate judge may be informed of a partys response to the clerks notice only if all parties have consented to the referral. (2) Reminding the Parties About Consenting. A district judge, magistrate judge, or other court official may remind the parties of the magistrate judges availability, but must also advise them that they are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences. (3) Vacating a Referral. On its own for good cause—or when a party shows extraordinary circumstances—the district judge may vacate a referral to a magistrate judge under this rule. See EXHIBIT “8” – Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. In fact, this Court has the REQUIRED Form AO 085 that was to be distributed to parties NOTIFYING of Magistrate Assignment (if any) – See EXHIBIT “9” – Form AO 085 which has been marked DECLINED attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Nevertheless, this Court failed to comply with the statutes/laws governing said matters. As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply with the MANDATORY requirements of said Rule 73 and any and all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome Page 4 of 39
  6. 6. has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws.6. Newsome hereby timely, properly and adequately OBJECTS to this Court’s FAILURE and Defendants and their Counsel’s FAILURE to provide this Court and Newsome with the REQUIRED information and/or documentation advising of “CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST” in accordance with the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”). See EXHIBIT “10” – MRPC attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Newsome on or about July 18, 2012, has in good-faith requested that Named Defendants and their Counsel (Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh) provide her with this MANDATORY information. Clearly the SHAM/BOGUS/FRIVOLOUS Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (“Motion to Stay”) and Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A Ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (“Memorandum in Support”) of this instant Lawsuit by Named Defendants’ counsel are attempts to EVADE and/or AVOID having to provide the names of additional members of the CONSPIRACIES and CRIMINAL/CIVIL wrongs leveled against Newsome who may also be rightful DEFENDANTS to this lawsuit (i.e. which the required preservations have been made in the COMPLAINT by including “DOES 1 – 100 in their official and individual capacities” should further identities become known during the litigation of this Lawsuit).7. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. is a “PRIVATE” company/corporation. Therefore, subject to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and any and all other statutes/laws governing said matters. Plummer vs. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers Local Union No. 130, U.A., 452 F.Supp. 1127 (1978) - . . . plaintiffs action under section pertaining to equal rights under the law would stand. . . [19] Plaintiffs alleging discrimination in employment could have proceeded by first bringing action under civil rights section pertaining to equal rights under the law to avoid any statute of limitations problems. . .or plaintiffs could also have proceeded with separate and independent action under equal rights under the law section . . . [25] Section of Civil Rights Act pertaining to equal rights under the law provides federal remedy against discrimination in PRIVATE employment on the basis of race, whereby claimant may be entitled to legal and equitable relief, irrespective of whether claimant has pursued Title VII administrative remedies. . . . [19] Plaintiffs correctly state that the Supreme Court suggested in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, 421 U.S. at 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716, that plaintiffs file their section 1981 suit to avoid the tolling of the statute of limitations while the EEOC processes their Title VII charges. Nonetheless, this suggestion does not support the procedure that plaintiffs followed. They filed their Title VII suit, while three plaintiffs were still processing their charges through the EEOC, in order to file in conjunction with their section 1981 action. They then filed two amended complaints after these plaintiffs received right to sue notices. The Court in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra at 466, 95 S.Ct. 1716, stated that section 1981 and Title VII are separate and independent remedies for discrimination. Plaintiffs could have proceeded by first bringing a section 1981 action to avoid any statute of limitations problem. They could then have petitioned the court for a stay of the section 1981 action until the Title VII efforts at conciliation and voluntary compliance had been completed. Id. at 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716. At that point, they could have filed a supplemental pleading pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d), adding the Title VII claim. Plaintiffs could also have proceeded with the separate and independent section 1981 action. They could then have filed their Title VII action after jurisdictional prerequisites had been fulfilled and could have sought consolidation pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). Plaintiffs procedure of filing their Title VII claims before jurisdictional prerequisites had been completed certainly did not provide an orderly procedure. Their continued updating with respect to the satisfaction of Title VII jurisdictional prerequisites resulted in two amendments to the complaint and five rounds of complex briefing. – See EXHIBIT “11” – Plummer matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.8. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief in this lawsuit is premised on claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “STATE” and/or “Government” employers/officials/employees. UNISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s instant lawsuit Page 5 of 39
  7. 7. is a premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 – Equal Rights Under The Law which allows for one to “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . .” Therefore, NOT even with a MAGNIFYING GLASS will a JURY and Court find any such § 1983 claims as asserted by the Defendants in this lawsuit.9. UNDISPUTED is the fact that as with Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief in this lawsuit their recent filings requesting Staying of action also appears to have been taken from their Counsel’s FORMS Pleading Manual and or that of its CONSPIRING outside Law Firms with an interest in this lawsuit (EMPHASIS added). Furthermore, the frivolous allegations asserted by Defendants and their Counsel clearly are IRRELEVANT and: (i) an insufficient defense to the Complaint filed by Newsome; (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, commit fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to Defendants and their Counsel.10. Named Defendants’ filing of Motion to Stay and Memorandum In Support it appears are FRIVOLOUS efforts to keep Newsome out of their “TREASURE CHEST” and efforts to deprive her of “INITIAL DISCLOSURE” information MANDATORILY required to be released to Newsome pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, FRIVOLOUS attempts by Named Defendants and their counsel (Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh) to UNLAWFULLY/ILLGALLY withhold the release of Insurance information MANDATORILY required to be released pursuant to Rule 26 (a)(1)(A)(iv) of the FRCP. See EXHIBIT “2” – FRCP Rule 26 attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Furthermore, according to information contained in Defendant Page Kruger & Holland’s Corporate Annual Reports filed with the State of Mississippi – Secretary of State it provides information regarding “Stocks Shares Authorized, Issued & Outstanding” which reflects, for instance, from approximately August 2006 through January 2012 the issuance of THEIR Stock Shares from approximately 7,400 to 9,000. See EXHIBIT “66” – Page Kruger & Holland Corporate Annual Reports attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/page-kruger-holland-phelps-dunbar-clients The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Hall vs. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 617 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1980) finding: Fact that defendant insurer furnished a version of its policy including special endorsements referring to an exclusion allegedly applicable to plaintiffs claim did not put plaintiff on notice of the exclusion since insurers duty was to produce entire contract on pretrial discovery and although it did so the subject special endorsement by itself was incomprehensible in that it was not reference to any particular coverage. See EXHIBIT “12” – Hall matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Other Court Courts finding: Page 6 of 39
  8. 8. Excelsior College v. Frye, 233 F.R.D. 583 (2006) - Holdings: The District Court, Papas, United States Magistrate Judge, held that: (1) discovery rule mandating disclosure of insurance information merely requires the disclosure of an insurance policy or other agreement that gives rise to an insurers obligation to indemnify or hold its insured harmless for a judgment . . . [1] A plain reading of discovery rule governing mandatory disclosure of insurance information indicates it is clearly designed for parties to produce documentation of any insurance policies that give rise to an insurers obligation to indemnify or hold its insured harmless for a judgment. See EXHIBIT “12” – Excelsior College matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Woldum v. Roverud Construction, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 420 (1968) - On defendants objections to interrogatories asking whether defendant carried liability insurance at time of accident, name and address of insurer, name of insured, and amount of coverage, on grounds that they were an attempt to inquire into privileged matters, and were incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The District Court, McManus, Chief Judge, held that permitting discovery of existence and amount of insurance coverage would better further word and spirit of federal discovery rules than to deny it. Objections overruled. [1] Interrogatories asking whether defendant carried liability insurance at time of accident, the name and address of insurer, the name of insured, and amount of coverage were not improper on grounds that they were an attempt to inquire into privileged matters, and were incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A. [2] Overriding purpose of federal discovery rules is to promote full disclosure of all facts to aid in fair, prompt and inexpensive disposition of lawsuits. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A. [3] Permitting discovery of existence and amount of insurance coverage would better further word and spirit of federal discovery rules than to deny it. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A. [1] In this action damages are sought for . . . injuries allegedly suffered by plaintiff . . . by an employee of defendant. The interrogatories in question ask whether defendant carried liability insurance at the time of the accident, the name and address of the insurer, the name of the insured, and the amount of coverage. Defendant objects on the grounds that said interrogatories are ‘an attempt to inquire into privileged matters, not proper interrogatories, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.’ [2] [3] . . . It is this courts view that the better rule is that taken by courts allowing discovery. E. g., Slomberg v. Pennabaker, 42 F.R.D. 8 (M.D.Pa.1967); Cook v. Welty, 253 F.Supp. 875 (D.D.C.1966); Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D.Kan.1965); 41 A.L.R.2d 968 and Supplement Service. The overriding purpose of the federal discovery rules is to promote full disclosure of all facts to aid in the fair, prompt and inexpensive disposition of lawsuits. Rule 1, F.R.Civ.P., requires that the federal rules ‘be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ It would seem that permitting discovery of the existence and amount of coverage better furthers the word and spirit of the rules than to deny it. It is therefore ordered Defendants Objections to Interrogatories, filed December 29, 1967, are overruled. See EXHIBIT “13” – Woldum matter attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein. 11. For this Court to grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Newsome would be prejudiced and deprived equal protection of the laws, equal immunities and privileges and due process of laws. Rights secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws.A. JURISDICTIONAL/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Page 7 of 39
  9. 9. Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1145 (D.C.Miss. 1976 ) - (n.1) Since statute guaranteeing equal rights under the law contains no statute of limitations, period of limitations applicable to action under statute is determined by reference to most analogous statute of limitations in force in state in which cause of action arises. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.2 See EXHIBIT “14” - Walton v. Utility Products, Inc. attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein. This citation is not new to the Defendants in this lawsuit in that it is addressed at Footnote (“Fn.”) 6 at page 7 of the Complaint. Along with other case law provided in: Heath v. D. H. Baldwin Co., 447 F.Supp. 495 (N.D.Miss.Greenville.Div., 1977) - General six-year statute of limitations in Mississippi was applicable to suit by . . .employee against employer . . . claiming racial discrimination. Code Miss. 1972, § 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. Howard v. Sun Oil Co., 294 F.Supp. 24 (S.D.Miss.Hattiesburg.Div.,1967) - Ordinarily, suit in tort for damages brought more than six years after commission of tort is barred by Mississippi six-year statute of limitations. Code Miss.1942, § 722. See Fn.6 at page 7 of Complaint filed in this instant lawsuit. Moreover, EXHIBITS “15” – Heath and “16” – Howard respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Newsome having highlighted information that is PERTINENT and RELEVANT in that it goes to the relief of SANCTIONS that Newsome seeks of and against Defendants and/or their Counsel – i.e. supports what facts, evidence and legal conclusions were available at the time of their preparation of the Motion to Stay [Doc. No. 9] and supporting Memorandum Brief [Doc. No. 10] submitted in this lawsuit. 12. Newsome believes this Court upon receipt of the Complaint in this lawsuit, may have reviewed the “CIVIL COVER SHEET” and statements provided under “JURISDICTION” of Complaint and determined arguments to be well-founded and proceeded to file Newsome’s lawsuit. Truvillion vs. Kings Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. Miss. 1980) - . . .(4) claim against employer grounded on civil rights statute was governed by Mississippi six-year catchall statute of limitations rather than three-year statute of limitations governing unwritten contracts. . . . [6] Job discrimination suit filed under civil rights statute was governed by Mississippi six-year catchall statute of limitations, rather than three-year statute of limitations governing unwritten contracts. . . [6] . . ."(a) person suing under Section 1981 to enforce his right to be free of discrimination predicates his claim on the right to contract guaranteed in the statute. The 2 [1] The court rejects defendants contention that the three-year limitations period of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-29 (1972) barsplaintiffs section 1981 claim. Defendant correctly states that since section 1981 contains no statute of limitations, the applicable period oflimitations is determined by reference to the most analogous statute of limitations in force in the state in which the cause of action arises. Section15-1-29 pertains to actions founded on implied contracts. . . . (n. 2) Under law of Mississippi, general six-year period of limitations rather than three-year period of limitations whichapplies to action founded on implied contracts and action to recover back pay governs employment discrimination suit charging violation offederal statute guaranteeing equal rights under the law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Code Miss.1972, §§ 15-1-29, 15-1-49. (n. 3) Under law of Mississippi, three-year statute of limitations applicable to action seeking recovery of back wages acts aslimitation upon back pay liability of employer charged with racial discrimination but does not operate to bar entire back pay claim or claim fordeclaratory or injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Code Miss.1972, § 15-1-29. (n. 4) Under law of Mississippi, employees claim against employer charging violation of federal statue guaranteeing equalrights, filed within six years of alleged racial discrimination, was not time barred. Code Miss.1972, § 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. [2] [3] [4] This court is of the opinion that the reasoning . . . is equally applicable to a section 1981 employment discriminationaction. As there is no Mississippi statute of limitations for civil rights actions, or a specific Mississippi statue of limitations for actions analogousto actions based on racial discrimination in employment, the general six-year period of limitations provided by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49,rather than the three-year period provided by section 15-1-29, determines the time within which a section 1981 employment discrimination suitmust be filed. As noted previously, section 15-1-29 does act as a limitation upon an employers back pay liability, but it does not operate to barthe entire back pay claim, or a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief.FN1 Since plaintiff filed his section 1981 claim well within the six-yearperiod, defendants motion to dismiss this portion of the complaint must be denied. [5] The court also does not agree with defendants contention that Title VII relief is precluded because of plaintiffs failure to file thisaction within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC failure of conciliation notice. . . . Defendants motion to dismiss the Title VII aspects of plaintiffscomplaint is accordingly denied. Page 8 of 39
  10. 10. contractual nature of claim under Section 1981 dictates application. . . But the statutory right Ms. Truvillion asserts is not the right to enforce an unwritten contract as the district court assumed . . . Because Mississippi has no statute of limitations designed to cover actions seeking redress for the tort of employment discrimination, the States catch-all statute is applicable. [FN16] See Heath v. D.H. Baldwin Co., N.D. Miss. 1979, 447 F.Supp. 495, 504; Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., N.D. Miss. 1976, 424 F.Supp. 1145, 1147. The statute runs for six years, and does not bar Ms. Truvillions claim. FN16. The statute provides: All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. See EXHIBIT “17” – Truvillion matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.13. The filing of this lawsuit should come as no surprise to Defendants Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. (“PKH”), Thomas Y. Page (“TPage”), Louis G. Baine III (“LBaine”), and Linda Thomas. (“LThomas”) [collectively known as “Named Defendants”] because the record evidence will support that as early as May 16, 2006, Named Defendants were timely, properly and adequately notified of Newsome’s intent to bring a lawsuit. See EXHIBIT “18” – Newsome’s May 16, 2006 Email to Named Defendants attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Said email which states in part: In that I believe that I have been unlawfully terminated, I am requesting that PKH PRESERVE my employment records, any other documents, audio, etc. regarding my employment and reasons for termination. In that PKH was given an opportunity to provide me with written documentation as to their reasons for my termination, I will only conclude that any other reasons which may be offered AFTER the fact/termination will be PRETEXT in nature - provided in an effort to COVER- UP/SHIELD PKHs unlawful employment action taken against me. Said email was also provided with the Complaint in this lawsuit at Exhibit VI. It is an UNDISPUTED fact that Named Defendants ACKNOWLEDGE referenced statement as sufficient NOTIFICATION on Newsome’s intent to bring suit and/or legal action regarding her termination. The U.S. Supreme Court finding: Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 85 S.Ct. 1050 (1965) - Statutes of limitations are designed primarily to assure fairness to defendants; they promote justice by preventing surprises through revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. Policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed where interests of justice require vindication of plaintiffs rights. Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 118 S.Ct. 1408 (1998) - The object of a statute of limitation in keeping stale litigation out of the courts would be distorted if statute were applied to bar otherwise legitimate defense to timely lawsuit, for limitation statutes are aimed at lawsuits, not at consideration of particular issues in lawsuits. [EMPHASIS ADDED]. Named Defendants CANNOT say that evidence was lost and/or assert memories have faded, etc. because they were timely, properly and adequately requested to PRESERVE the record. Named Defendants and their counsel’s FRIVOLOUS assertion alleging § 1983 claims NOT provided in Newsome’s Complaint clearly supports their KNOWLEDGE that any attacks against Newsome’s claims as being TIME BARRED is (i) an insufficient defense to the Complaint filed by Newsome; (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, commit fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to Defendants and their Counsel. Furthermore, the record evidence will support that Named Defendants and their counsel have been WELL ENGAGED in CONTINUED and ONGOING conspiracies and criminal/civil wrongs leveled against Newsome since her unlawful/illegal termination of employment and TO DATE have NOT ceased from engaging in such unlawful/illegal practices. Page 9 of 39
  11. 11. 14. It is well-settled by the court(s) that claims and/or cause of action is the determining factor as to which statute-of-limitation is applicable: King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.Miss.,1988) - When suit alleges several distinct causes of action, even if they arise from single event, applicable limitations period must be determined by analyzing each cause of action separately, rather than by determining “essence” of plaintiffs claims considered as a whole. Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to obtain trials for intentional tort claims after statute of limitations has barred them merely by engaging in artful pleading; if however, claim can plausibly withstand motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, it cannot be treated as mere rewording of barred claim, and thus, instead of probing for essence of suit, district court should analyze each claim on its own merits. Alexander v. Taylor, 928 So.2d 992 (Miss.App.,2006) - What limitations statute or statutes apply is determined from an examination of the claims that are made. Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir.Miss.,1976) - In choosing applicable state statute of limitations to apply to action brought under civil rights statute, court must ground its decision on the basis of which statute will best effectuate the congressional policies underlying the civil rights statute. In this instant lawsuit Newsome brings the following Counts and claims, facts, evidence and legal conclusions to sustain them will support that Newsome’s claims are subject to the six-year statute of limitation and are not barred – while some of the Counts may be misnumbered, it has NO bearing on the claims, facts and legal conclusions provided by Newsome to support her Complaint. Moreover, misnumbering is a MINOR issue which can be corrected through an Amended Complaint should it be deemed necessary. The supporting statements of claims are set forth in PARAGRAPHS in the Complaint and are DISTINCTLY numbered as required by the Rules/Statutes governing said matters. The Counts being as follows: Count I - 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendants; Count II - 42 USC § 1985: Conspiracy To Interfere With Civil Rights and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count III - 42 USC § 1986: Action For Neglect To Prevent and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count IV - Negligent Interference with Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count V - Discrimination in Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count II [Sic] – Retaliation and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count IIIII [Sic] - Breach Of Express Employment Agreement 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count VIII – Breach Of The Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count IX – Negligent Infliction Of Emotional Distress and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count X – Fraud Against [sic] and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count XI – Negligent Interference With Employment – Malicious Conspiracy To Cause Discharge From Employment and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s); Count IVII – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution – Due Process and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law; and Count VII – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution – Equal Protection and 42 USC § 1981: Equal Rights Under The Law Against Defendant(s) I. MOTION TO STRIKE/ CONSOLIDATION OF DEFENSES Pendleton County v. Amy, 80 U.S. 297 (1871) - Defendants pleas which were inartistically framed and were argumentative and set up nothing which could not have been taken advantage of for what it was worth under the general issue might have been stricken from the record on motion. Brown v. Lamb, 112 Ohio App. 116, 171 N.E.2d 191 (1960) - (n.4) Motions to strike pleadings and papers from the files are ordinarily employed to strike pleadings for failure to comply with previous orders . . . or to test its form with respect to certification, and the office of such motions is not to inquire into the merits of the case. Page 10 of 39
  12. 12. (n.8) A pleading is “frivolous” when it is clearly insufficient on its face and does not controvert material points of the opposite pleading and is presumably interposed for mere purposes of delay or to embarrass the opponent. Sherrill v. Stewart, 21 So.2d 11 (Miss.,1945) - A “frivolous pleading” is one so clearly untenable or the insufficiency of which is so manifest upon bare inspection of pleading that court is able to determine its character without argument or research. McDowell v. Minor, 131 So. 278 (Miss.,1930) - Where pleading is manifestly sham and frivolous, motion to strike is available. Pursuant to Rule 12 (F) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Newsome through this MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDEFAULT moves this Court to strike the statements, contents and any supporting exhibits ofDefendants’ Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss and MemorandumIn Support Of Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A Ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss. Under saidRule it states: Rule 12(F) Motion to Strike. The Court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 20 days after being served with the pleading.Therefore, in an effort to provide specificity Newsome moves for the striking of contents/statements in Defendants’Motion to Stay and the supporting Memorandum In Support in that the asserted Rule 12 (b)(6) Motion to Dismiss andits Memorandum Brief are IRRELEVANT and IMMATERIAL to this instant lawsuit. In further support of thisinstant MTS-MTSTAY&MFR11SDEFAULT, Newsome moves this Court to strike the contents/statements for thefollowing reasons: A. MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (“MOTION TO STAY”) The entire contents of “Motion to Stay” which include; however, is not limited to the Style and Headings ofsaid pleading in that it is: (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided forpurposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness,unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known toDefendants and their Counsel and the following: 15. Opening paragraph on Page 1 which begins with “COME NOW, Defendants, Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. (“PKH”), Thomas Y. Page, Louis G. Baine, III, and Linda Thomas” in that it is - (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalous and provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to Defendants and their counsel (Phelps Dunbar LLP, W. Thomas Siler, Jr. and Jason T. Marsh Page 11 of 39
  13. 13. [hereinafter, “Phelps Dunbar,” “Siler” and/or “Marsh”)] hereinafter collectively known as “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.”16. ¶1 on Page 1 which begins with, “Because Plaintiff filed her claims against Defendants six years after they accrued” and the referenced Footnote 1 in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” Heath vs. D. H. Baldwin Company, 447 F.Supp. 495 (N.D. Miss. 1977) - . . . (4) Mississippi six- year statute of limitations was applicable to action under Civil Rights Act of 1870 . . . [5] General six-year statute of limitations in Mississippi was applicable to suit by laid off employee aganst employer and union claiming racial discrimination. Code Miss. 1972, § 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. . . . For the reasons set forth by Chief Judge Keady in Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1145, 1147, (N.D. Miss. 1976) the court finds that the 6-year limitation period of Miss. Code Ann. s 15-1-49 (1972) is applicable and therefore Heaths s 1981 claim was timely filed. Defendants motion to dismiss the s 1981 claim is not well taken and will be denied. To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!17. ¶2 on Page 2 which begins with, “For the reasons fully set forth in corresponding Memorandum in Support” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!18. ¶3 on Page 2 which begins with, “In further support of this Motion, Defendants submit the following exhibit” and the supporting “Exhibit ‘A’ – Email from Vogel Newsome” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” UNDISPUTED is the fact that Named Defendants and their counsel resort to EXTRAJUDICIAL matters and rely upon an UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL Order in another lawsuit in which the Magistrate Judge CLEARLY LACKED Jurisdiction to enter and CANNOT be upheld in that it appears from review of Docket Sheet in Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams, at Doc. No. 2 that OBJECTION to Magistrate assignment was timely, properly and adequately made known to that court. See EXHIBIT “19” – Docket Sheet Mitchell McNutt & Sams matter attached hereto. UNDISPUTED is the fact that while Named Defendants and their counsel rely upon an ORDER which it appears from the record evidence may have been obtained through CRIMINAL acts – i.e. BRIBES, EXTORTION, COERCION, BLACKMAIL, SPECIAL FAVORS, etc. – and DELIBERATELY FAILS to make KNOWN Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball’s EMPLOYMENT history with counsel in this lawsuit (Phelps Dunbar) as well as his TIES/ROOTS/CONNECTIONS with Phelps Dunbar’s CONSPIRING Law Firm (Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz). Moreover, the FACT of how Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (“Baker Donelson”) relies upon “FRONTING FIRMS” as Phelps Dunbar - who SHARE clients (i.e. such as Entergy – see for instance Phelps Dunbar’s Client Listing at EXHIBIT “20” and the Docket Sheet in Newsome vs. Entergy at EXHIBIT “21” respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein) - to enter Lawsuits involving Newsome for purposes of SHIELDING an ILLEGAL ANIMUS and HIDING their IDENTITY and their and their clients’ INTERESTS from the PUBLIC/WORLD!19. On Page 2, paragraph which begins with, “WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants, Page Kruger & Holland, P.A.” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND Page 12 of 39
  14. 14. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED! 20. On Page 2, the remaining contents of the Motion to Dismiss in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” 21. On Page 3, the Certificate of Service and the contents therein in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” 22. “Exhibit A” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” See also ¶ 18 above of this instant pleading. Now that the statutes/laws governing said matters require the STRIKING of the entire contents, statements,exhibits, etc. as noted above, there remains NO legal/lawful pleading of record. Therefore, Newsome is entitled tothe relief (Rule 11 Sanctions and DEFAULT Judgment, etc.) sought herein. B. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STAY ALL PROCEEDINGS PENDING A RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY (“MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT”) The Striking of entire contents in “Memorandum In Support” which include; however, is not limited to theStyle and Headings of said pleading in that it is: (ii) redundant; (iii) immaterial; (iv) impertinent and/or (v) scandalousand provided for purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment,sham/frivolousness, unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and otherreasons known to Named Defendants and their counsel (Phelps Dunbar LLP, W. Thomas Siler, Jr. and Jason T.Marsh [hereinafter, “Phelps Dunbar,” “Siler” and/or “Marsh”)] hereinafter collectively known as “STRICKENSTATEMENT CLAUSE.” In support thereof, Newsome states the following: 23. On the first unnumbered page, the opening paragraph which begins with, “COME NOW, Defendants, Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. (“PKH”)” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED! 24. On first unnumbered page, “I. INTRODUCTION” and paragraph which begins with, “Because Plaintiff filed her claims against Defendants six years after they accrued” along with the referenced Footnote 1 and the contents therein which begins with, “In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a litany of federal constitutional claims” in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s Complaint has been filed within six-years. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Named Defendants are PRIVATE actors. UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s Complaint is premised upon 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 claims and NOT 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claims. Therefore, § 1981 implicitly creates an independent cause of action AGAINST PRIVATE actors because no other statute created such a remedy; moreover, the acts of Named Defendants are “CONTINUING” acts to date in which the statute of limitations CONTINUES to run and/or restarts with EACH overt act. Page 13 of 39
  15. 15. UNDISPUTED is the fact, that Newsome’s instant lawsuit has been filed within the six-year statute oflimitation governing said matters but also within the six-year statute of limitation period in that, asevidenced in this instant lawsuit, Named Defendants and their counsel CONTINUE to engage inconspiracies that affect Newsome’s “EQUAL Rights Under the Laws!” Therefore, with EACH overtact by Named Defendants, Newsome’s claims become subject to “TOLLING” doctrine requirements.This is PERTINENT and RELEVANT information KNOWN to Named Defendants and/or their counsel(Phelps Dunbar/Siler/Marsh). For instance, see one of PHELPS DUNBAR’S cases – Walker vs. Epps,550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008): Under Mississippi law, “continuing tort,” for which limitations period resets at each wrongful act, is one inflicted over period of time; it involves wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted. See EXHIBIT “22” – Walker matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference.UNDISPUTED is the fact that PKH is involved in the Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartment matter.Which as recent as July 2008 (i.e. approximately FOUR [4] years ago] Newsome had to have removedfrom that court and is a matter that Newsome is presently working on through the continued MASSIVEConspiracies leveled to obstruct said matter. Continued tort claims are timely, properly and adequatelyasserted in Newsome’s Complaint filed in this instant lawsuit: ¶5 Pg. 21 ¶(xii) Pg. 63 ¶214-216 Pg. 94 ¶278 Pg. 121 ¶(xii) Pg. 22 ¶165 Pg. 70 ¶217 Pg. 95 ¶1 Pg. 122 ¶105 Pg. 41 ¶170 Pg. 71 ¶l Pg. 96 ¶292 Pg. 127 ¶¶106, 107 Pg. 43 ¶175 Pg. 73 ¶ 233-235 Pg. 108 ¶296 Pg. 127 ¶110 Pg. 47 ¶176 Pg. 74 ¶237, 238 Pg. 109 ¶297 Pg. 130 ¶117 Pg. 48 ¶177 Pg. 75 ¶m Pg. 111 ¶298 Pg. 130 ¶119 Pg. 49 ¶(xii), (xvii) Pg. 77 ¶245 Pg. 112 ¶1 Pg. 131 ¶ (xii) Pg. 51 ¶188 Pg. 82 ¶253, 259 Pg. 114 ¶136 Pg. 60 ¶197 Pg. 85 ¶260 Pg. 115 ¶138-139 Pg. 61 ¶198-199 Pg. 87 ¶261 Pg. 116 ¶140 Pg. 62 ¶l Pg. 89 ¶l Pg. 117To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I NSUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; ANDMOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported byFACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!Furthermore, it is UNDISPUTED that Named Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (i.e. in that it appears intheir TRICKERY in the use of the pen/computer, it appears that the relief sought may be that ofsummary judgment) and Motion to Stay are NOT supported by Affidavits because they have FULLKNOWLEDGE that their Motions have been submitted in bad faith and/or for purposes of delay,harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness,unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasonsknown to Named Defendants and their counsel. Myers v. Mississippi Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel, 720 F.Supp.2d 773 (S.D. Miss. Jackson 2010) - Section 1981 implicitly creates an independent cause of action against private actors because no other statute created such a remedy, but does not create any right of action against state actors separate from § 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1983. Tramble v. Converters Ink Co., 43 F.Supp. 1350 (1972) - [2] Civil rights statute generally guaranteeing equal rights under the law applies to private job discrimination based on race and is not limited to acts under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.Moreover, it appears that Named Defendants are eyeing cases outside this lawsuit involving Newsome;therefore, a reasonable mind/person may conclude that from the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Samsmatter [USDC Southern District of Mississippi/Jackson, 3:10-cv-704], filed approximately SIX-YEARSfrom the date of her termination with Mitchell McNutt & Sams (“MMS”) – i.e. termination date beingapproximately December 3, 2004, and Newsome’s lawsuit was received and filed by this Court on orabout December 3, 2010. As with the “MMS” matter, upon reviewing of pleading PRIOR to Page 14 of 39
  16. 16. DOCKETING and FILING, this Court was SATISFIED that the Complaint , as in this instant Lawsuit, was ALSO TIMELY filed, the FILING FEE PAID and therefore, DOCKETED the matter.25. On Page 2, continuance of paragraph from first unnumbered page which states, “this matter, as well as preserve important judicial resources” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!26. On Page 2, “II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND” and paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff began working for PKH as a temporary legal secretary” along with the referenced Footnotes 2, 3, and 4 as well as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” UNDISPUTED is the NEXUS/CAUSAL Link between Newsome’s March 15, 2006, lawsuit (i.e. in Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartments LLC, et al. - a protected activity which alleges discriminatory practices, etc.) and PKH’s May 15, 2006 termination (approximately two (2) months later) of Newsome’s employment based on being contacted and notified of her engagement in this lawsuit and/or other protected activities. See EXHIBIT “18” – Newsome’s May 16, 2006 Email attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein. PKH’s termination of Newsome’s employment coming approximately three (3) days prior to hearing/proceedings on or about May 18, 2006, in Newsome vs. Spring Lake Apartments LLC, et al. [EMPHASIS added]. See EXHIBIT “23” – Motion Docket Sheet attached hereto and incorporated by reference. Note: Also provided at Exhibit VII of Complaint filed in this lawsuit. To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED! The prohibited retaliatory practices of PKH were KNOWN at the time Named Defendants counsel (Phelps Dunbar/Siler/Marsh) executed the Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief. For instance see one of PHELP DUNBAR’S cases - Callahan v. Bancorpsouth Ins. Services of Mississippi, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 678 (S.D. Miss. S.Div. 2002): [3] Title VII prohibits retaliation in either of two instances: ( 1) where the employee has opposed any unlawful employment practice; or (2) where the employee has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–3(a). – EXHIBIT “24” Callahan matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. UNDISPUTED is that Actions brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1981 are governed by the SAME standards applicable to claims raised under Title VII.27. On Page 2, paragraph which begins with, “Plaintiff’s employment with PKH ended on May 15, 2006” along with the referenced Footnotes 5 and 6 as well as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” UNDISPUTED is the fact that this instant lawsuit premised on 42 USC § 1981 claims, etc. was filed within six years of the alleged violations and CONTINUING violations [EMPHASIS added] addressed in this lawsuit. Furthermore, UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s claims premised on 42 USC § 1981 fall under “all actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within six years;” therefore, the six-year statute of limitation under Mississippi’s CATCHALL statute is applicable pursuant to Mississippi Code Ann. § 15-1-49: Gates vs. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. S.D. Miss. 1985) - FN1. Although Mrs. Gates formally denominated her complaint as being brought pursuant to “Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1981, et seq.”, Page 15 of 39
  17. 17. the substance of the complaint states a cause of action only under section 1983. We therefore treat Mrs. Gates claim as one brought pursuant to § 1983. FN2. Section 15-1-49. Limitations applicable to actions not otherwise specifically provided for - All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. . . . The six-year statute (section 15-1-49) is more general in the sense that it is a general residual statute that applies to a broad class of actions-tort, contract or statutory-not otherwise provided for. A reasonable person/mind may conclude that Named Defendants’ counsel’s KNOWLEDGE that Newsome’s Complaint premised on 42 USC § 1981 claims are subject to the six-year statute of limitations. Therefore, Named Defendants’ counsel has FRIVOLOUSLY attempted to assert 42 USC § 1983 claims – i.e. as evidenced in the “CLUMP” of trashed Opinions dumped on this Court - when no such § 1983 claims are made by Newsome through her Complaint filed in this lawsuit. To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!28. On Page 2, paragraph which begins with, “Because Plaintiff’s claims are time barred” along with the referenced Footnote 7 as well as the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!29. On Page 2, “III. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES” and paragraph which begins with, “It has long been recognized that “[a] trial court has broad discretion” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” UNDISPUTED is the fact that Named Defendants and their counsel are attempting to “put the cart before the horse.” As a matter of law, NO Responsive Pleading and/or Answer (in accordance to the statutes/laws governing said matters) have been made to Newsome’s Complaint. Therefore, there are NO facts, evidence, NOR legal conclusions to sustain a staying of this action for DISCOVERY purposes. Named Defendants and their counsel have not even gotten off of the home plate to assert first-base privileges and/or defenses regarding DISCOVERY matters. The Discovery process may begin AFTER the filing of a legal/lawful responsive pleading and/or Answer – which in this Lawsuit has NOT been filed. Moreover, the record evidence supports Newsome timely, properly, and adequately NOTIFIED Named Defendants’ through “Waiver of the Service of Summons and Page 16 of 39
  18. 18. NOTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS” that anyresponsive pleading and/or Answer which did NOT meet the pleading REQUIREMENTS would be metwith a MOTION TO STRIKE! See EXHIBITS “25,” “26,” “27,” and “28” respectively attached heretoand incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Furthermore, the “Notice Of A Lawsuit AndRequest To Waive Service Of A Summons” served on EACH of the Named Defendants NOTIFIEDthem of the PUBLIC/SOCIAL Forums – i.e. such as www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise andhttps://secure.filesanywhere.com/fs/v.aspx?v=8a706b8f58666ebeac6b to be used for theposting/sharing of documents in this Lawsuit [EMPHASIS ADDED]. See EXHIBITS “29,” “30,”“31,” and “32” - “Notice of Lawsuit. . .” ONLY respectively, attached hereto and incorporated byreference as if set forth in full herein.UNDISPUTED is the fact, that it appears that Named Defendants counsel may have had a SNEAKPEEK at Newsome’s July 14, 2012 Motion to Strike posted at: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/071412-motion-to-strike-page-kruger-holland-matterand then MOVED swiftly TWO (2) days later in efforts of BLINDSIDING the Court and Newsomefiled their SHAM/FRIVOLOUS/BOGUS “Motion to Stay” and supporting “Memorandum in Support”PRIOR to its receipt of Newsome’s Motion to Strike Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum In SupportOf Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for DefaultJudgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) in hopes of obtaining and UNLAWFUL/ILLEGALOrder Staying of this Lawsuit by Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker who LACKS JURISDICTIONto act in that Newsome has timely, properly and adequately “IN WRITING” notified of herOBJECTIONS to Magistrate Referral as well as OBJECTION to Judge Tom S. Lee.Furthermore, that Named Defendants counsel AGAIN, it appears, resorting to their “Folder of FORMPleadings” and pulled out one addressing DISCOVERY matters – i.e. which IS NOT applicable to thisinstant lawsuit – in efforts of trying to OBSTRUCT the administration of justice and their having tofulfill their MANDATORY OBLIGATIONS to notify parties and/or this Court notifying parties to thisaction of any/all CONFLICTS-OF-INTERESTS pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct(See EXHIBIT “10” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein) andother statutes/laws governing said matters. Mississippi Comn on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155 (Miss.,2004) - “Moral turpitude,” in the context of judicial misconduct, includes, but is not limited to, actions which involve interference with the administration of justice, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, or other such actions which bring the judiciary into disrepute.UNDISPUTED is the fact, that on or about July 14, 2012, Newsome posted in a PUBLIC/SOCIALForum at http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/071412-motion-to-strike-page-kruger-holland-matter her pleadings entitled, PLAINTIFF’ S MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS ANDMEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF ANDAGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THISACTION). See EXHIBIT “33” – ScreenShot of pleading reflecting “POSTING Date.” [EMPHASISADDED].UNDISPUTED is the fact, that on or about July 18, 2012, Newsome submitted Facsimile toNamed Defendants’ counsel entitled, “REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION FOR PHELPSDUNBAR’S/COUNSELS’ KNOWLEDGE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DELIBERATEFAILURE TO NOTIFY PARTY(S) OF SAME and GOOD FAITH DEMAND THAT PHELPSDUNBAR WITHDRAW PLEADINGS.” See EXHIBIT “34” – July 18, 2012 Facsimile attachedhereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. At the time of this instant filing,Named Defendants’ counsel has FAILED to provide Newsome with information MANDATORILYrequired pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct and other statutes/laws governing saidmatters. Page 17 of 39
  19. 19. To date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM I N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!30. On Page 3, continuance of paragraph from page 2 which states, “Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583” and the referenced “Exhibit ‘1’” and the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” UNDISPUTED is the fact that NO Responsive Pleading and/or Answer to Newsome’s Complaint, in accordance with the statutes/laws governing said matters, has been filed in this Lawsuit. Furthermore, to date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED! UNDISPUTED is the fact that pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – for instance Rule 26(a)(1)(A), it clearly states in part: RULE 26 - Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery (1) Initial Disclosure. (A) In General. Except as exempted by Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or as otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties: (i) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information—along with the subjects of that information—that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; (ii) a copy—or a description by category and location—of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; (iii) a computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party— who must also make available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, unless privileged or protected from disclosure, on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and (iv) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34, any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. See EXHIBIT “2” – Rule 26 of FRCP attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. So now with have Named Defendants and their counsel attempting to OBSTRUCT justice in the release of MANDATORY “DISCLOSURE” information as well as their DELIBERATE failure to release such information because of KNOWLEDGE of the EXPOSURE of “Conflict-Of-Interest” that is inevitable and may further EXPOSE their CRIMINAL/CIVIL violations; moreover, ROLE in CONTINUING and ONGOING Conspiracies leveled against Newsome.31. On Page 3, paragraph which begins with, “A stay of discovery is warranted” and the “. . .” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” Furthermore, to date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST Page 18 of 39
  20. 20. DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!32. On Page 3, paragraph which begins with, “Courts within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit” in that it is - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” Furthermore, to date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!33. On page 4, continuance of paragraph from page 3 which states, “dispositive motion. The Magistrate Judge in that case, Honorable F. Keith Ball, granted the stay until the District Court Judge, Honorable Henry T. Wingate,” along with the referenced Footnotes 8 and 9 and the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” UNDISPUTED are the following facts that are PERTINENT and RELEVENT to understanding the ONGOING Conspiracies and BLATANT Criminal/Civil violations being carried out by Judges/Magistrate Judges of this Court and opposing counsel in Lawsuits involving Newsome that are matters of SOCIAL/PUBLIC/GLOBAL importance in that it supports the PATTERN-OF- PRACTICE as well as supports NOT only the appearance of IMPROPRIETY but actual IMPROPRIETY by Officers of this Court. A reasonable mind may conclude that this is a “CULTURE” of criminal/civil wrongs ENGRAINED and DEEPLY-ROOTED” in the United States of America’s CORRUPT Judicial System that involve matters that are RACIALLY motivated and matters of PUBLIC Policy/Interests. It is important to note that Named Defendants and their counsel (Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh) DELIBERATELY and with CRIMINAL/CRIMINAL intent fail to advise Newsome of the following PERTINENT and RELEVANT facts: a) Honorable Henry T. Wingate was nominated by former President Ronald Reagan on or about September 11, 1985. See EXHIBIT “58” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. b) Baker Donelson’s employee Howard Henry Baker, Jr. served as CHIEF OF STAFF to United States of America President Ronald Reagan. Served as Senior Majority Leader of the United States Senate. Is currently SENIOR Counsel at Baker Donelson. Descendant of Baker Donelson founder. Founder of Baker Donelson in WASHINGTON, D.C. and London. See EXHIBIT “59” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. c) Honorable Henry T. Wingate confirmed the Honorable F. Keith Ball. See EXHIBIT “60” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Judge Wingate appointed the Magistrate Selection Panel responsible. See EXHIBIT “61” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. DIRTY-HANDS DEALS: It appears from information found regarding the selection of Magistrate Ball that he may have been PRE-SELECTED. If so, it appears MORE qualified candidates may have been deprived EQUAL employment opportunities as a direct and proximate result of CRIMINAL/CIVIL violations by Judge Wingate, Phelps Dunbar and Baker Donelson to get another one of their judges on the bench for purposes of STACKING the Court. It appears the LEAKING of Magistrate Ball’s selection coming from a source NOT on the Magistrate Selection Panel. Last Monday I reported that Keith Ball has been selected as the new Magistrate Judge for the Southern District. I had heard the news the previous Friday from someone who was not on the Magistrate Selection Panel. Then last Wednesday I heard that one of the Southern District Judges was telling lawyers that no announcement had been made on the selection yet. Page 19 of 39
  21. 21. See EXHIBIT “62” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. From Newsome’s research, she found that Judge Wingate is a BLACK-American (i.e. NOT African-American). However, one should NOT be deceived by the fact that Newsome is AFRICAN-American that Judge Wingate would not be engaged in the CRIMINAL practices and CONSPIRACIES, etc. leveled against Newsome. From information that has been found, clearly it appears that the United States District Court – Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson) JUDICIAL panel may be STACKED with CORRUPT/TAINTED/BRIBED, etc. Judges purchased by such firms as Phelps Dunbar, Baker Donelson, Page Kruger & Holland, and others that CONSPIRE with them. Furthermore, the mere fact that Judge Wingate is a BLACK-American does NOT insulate him from RECUSAL. Judge Wingate KNOWS and/or should of KNOWN of his DUTY to RECUSE himself; moreover, the role he is playing in the ONGOING Criminal/Civil violations and CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome. Clearly the unlawful/illegal attacks leveled against Newsome are RACIALLY motivated. In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 1997) - Judge is not insulated from recusal, in racially charged case, merely because he or she is black. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455. It appears Judge Wingate may be known as what is called a “HOUSE NEGRO:” One who has NO sense of his heritage and roots and is ASHAMED to be associated with African Heritage or roots because of what has been depicted in the MEDIA teaching them to hate themselves (i.e. the color of their skin, hair, etc.) and to be ashamed of their looks: http://youtu.be/YtOslGWp13A They are HIGHLY employed by the United States of America Government to serve as HOUSE Negroes/GATEKEEPERS and/or to meet QUOTAS for DECEPTIVE purposes - i.e. to DECEIVE and HIDE from the PUBLIC/WORLD the United States of Americas WHITE Supremacist and RACIST Agenda. HIGHLY employed by Government Agencies to COVER-UP Discriminatory practices in the Government and PRIVATE Sector by WHITE Racist Employers/Supremacists. They are also used to COVER-UP the Corruption and Criminal/Civil wrongs of SYSTEMATIC Discriminatory Practices leveled against AFRICAN-Americans and People of Color that are seen as a THREAT because they are EDUCATED and are STRONG Civil Rights Activists fighting for the cause of their people and EXPOSING the United States of America’s CRIMINAL HERITAGE. http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/criminals-in-our-past HOUSE Negroes/BLACK-Americans are usually individuals NOT qualified to perform jobs they are hired for and are merely put into their positions as “GATE KEEPERS” and a direct and proximate result of SPECIAL FAVORS - i.e. them having to COMPROMISE and DENY morals, values and beliefs. One who will do EVERYTHING possible to FIT IN and be ACCEPTED by White Society. They live in FEAR and have become VERY DEPENDENT on a WHITE-RUN Government DETERMINED to erase and change their IDENTITY and LOOKS. But NO matter how HARD he/she TRIES, they are STILL seen as "BLACK!" It is BLACK- Americans that a White Reporter is SCOFFING at and PRAISING the TERRORISTS Acts (i.e. RAPES, MURDERS, LYNCHING, etc.) of his White Supremacist Counterparts in this interview with "Muslim Civil Rights Activist Malcolm X" and that Malcolm X prophesied whose REIGN will come to an END! http://youtu.be/o7f5NTLgtEA Just keeping it real and laying down the FACTS! So one can see why Judge Wingate was selected and why his MASTERS LOVE him so!d) Honorable F. Keith Ball has employment history with Named Defendant’s counsel Phelps Dunbar. See EXHIBIT “63” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Furthermore, research yielding information regarding Magistrate Ball’s presiding over a COPYRIGHT case [EMPHASIS added] involving Baker Donelson. See EXHIBIT “64” – As recent as JUNE 2012, information regarding Baker Donelson serving as counsel in Copyright matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Why is this information PERTINENT and RELEVANT, because as recent as February 3, 2012, it appears that Baker Donelson, their Client (United States of America President Barack Obama) and others with whom they conspire with in ONGOING Conspiracies leveled against Newsome, had a FRIVOLOUS Copyright Lawsuit brought against Newsome for purposes of CRIMINAL intent and to keep the PUBLIC/WORLD from seeing the role they have played in the pattern-of-practices leveled against Newsome Page 20 of 39
  22. 22. involving CONTACTING her employers and ORCHESTRATING the TERMINATION of her employment – as evidenced in this instant Lawsuit and the 05/16/06 Email through the use of: STALKING, HARASSMENT, THREATS, BRIBES, COERCION, BLACKMAIL, INTIMIDATION, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, etc. in attempts of silencing her and depriving her equal protection of the laws, equal immunities and privileges under the laws, due process of laws and other rights secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws of the United States of America governing said matters – See EXHIBIT “65” – Docket Sheet in The Garretson Firm Resolution Group matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. This case was SEALED once Newsome went PUBLIC/GLOBAL in sharing this information. Acts taken to keep this information out of the PUBLIC/WORLD eyes as they STRUGGLE to get United States of America President Barack Obama RE-ELECTED! It appears United States of America President Barack Obama, Baker Donelson and those with whom they conspire going as far as contacting companies providing Newsome with PUBLIC/SOCIAL forum services (i.e. as the Internet) for purposes of sharing information that is of PUBLIC/GLOBAL interests. However, as Named Defendants, their counsel, and those with whom they CONSPIRE can see, they have failed and Newsome continues to exercise rights secured to her under the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws and release information regarding the CRIMINAL/CIVIL wrongs and CONSPIRACIES leveled against her: www.vogeldenisenewsome.net and www.slideshare.net/vogeldenise, etc. e) On or about July 18, 2012, Newsome timely, properly and adequately requested an explanation from Named Defendants counsel (Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh) via Facsimile entitled, “REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION FOR PHELPS DUNBAR’S/COUNSELS’ KNOWLEDGE OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND DELIBERATE FAILURE TO NOTIFY PARTY(S) OF SAME and GOOD FAITH DEMAND THAT PHELPS DUNBAR WITHDRAW PLEADINGS.” See EXHIBIT “34” attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Newsome’s request being in compliance with the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct and other statutes/laws governing said matters. See EXHIBIT “10” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Mississippi Comn on Judicial Performance vs Agin, 17 So.3d 578 (Miss.,2009) - Judges conduct in failing to issue a timely ruling in case violated the code of judicial conduct canons that required a judge to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary, to respect and comply with the law and to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and to dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly. Code of Jud.Conduct, Canons 1, 2A, 3B(8), 3C(1). See EXHIBIT “5” – Code of Judicial Conduct attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Mississippi Comn on Judicial Performance vs Bustin, 2011 WL 4634995 (Miss., 2011) - “Moral turpitude,” in the context of judicial misconduct, includes, but is not limited to, actions which involve interference with the administration of justice, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, or other such actions which bring the judiciary into disrepute. Furthermore, to date, Newsome’s July 14, 2012 MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION TO DISMISS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS; MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS; AND MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS ACTION) which is supported by FACTS, EVIDENCE and LEGAL CONCLUSIONS remains UNCONTESTED!34. On Page 4, paragraph which begins with, “If Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, the need for discovery,” along with the referenced Footnote 10 and the contents therein, in that they are - “STRICKEN STATEMENT CLAUSE.” UNDISPUTED is the FACT that Named Defendants and their counsel AGREE that Newsome’s 143-Page Complaint distinctly set forth VALID Claims! Furthermore, because there has been NO Page 21 of 39

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