We look forward to providing with a copy of the REBUTTAL to Bankruptcy Judge Edward Ellington's 9/30/15 Final Judgment . . . in the Townsend matter. Please be patient and return at a later date. In the meantime, you may want to visit our website at www.vogeldenisenewsome.net

1. RESERVED FOR
REBUTTAL TO 09/30/15 FINAL JUDGMENT. . .
TOWNSEND MATTER:
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT – SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI (JACKSON)
THEN ONE MAY WONDER “HOW” THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BECAME A LAUGHING STOCK TO THE WORLD –
THANK YOU BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ!
U.S.A. SHELLACKING 101
PLEASE RETURN FOR
NEWSOME’S REBUTTAL
IN THE MEANTIME YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN THE AUDIO: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/091815-u-s-
bankruptcy-hearing-recording-townsend-matter
or TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING:
http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/0091815-bankruptcy-hearing-transcribed-townsend-matter-photos-added
THE FOLLOWING IS A COPY OF NEWSOME’S
06/17/15 MOTION THAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT’S 09/30/15 JUDICIAL ABUSE and
EFFORTS TO COVER-UP CRIMINAL ACTS. . .
The 09/30/15 Ruling and Newsome’s REBUTTAL is Forthcoming:

2. IN THE UNITED STATES. BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRlCTi!)?MISSISSIPPI
I S J U H H PH12^2t
IN R E : ^ ,
L A D Y E M. T O W N S E N D DANr^iV^U MjLLb! » C H A P T E R 7
DEBTOR ^^QEPUTY "^^^^ ll-00167-ee
C R E D I T O R ' S ( V O G E L NEWSOME) O B J E C T I O N S T O
JUNE 10, 2015 O R D E R DISMISSING C R E D I T O R ' S ( V O G E L NEWSOME) M O T I O N F O R
R E L I E F F R O M O R D E R / J U D G E M E N T (sic); MOTION F O R R U L E 11 SANCTIONS O F AND
AGAINST R O B E R T R E X M c R A N E Y J R / M c R A N E Y & McRANEY; AND R E Q U E S T TO B E
ADVISED O F C O N F L I C T - O F - I N T E R E S T S - -
M O T I O N F O R R E C U S A L O F J U D G E EDWARD E L L I N G T O N '
COMES NOW Creditor Vogel Newsome ("Newsome'") witlnout waiving her riglnts, without
submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court, without waiving the defenses and claims set forth in her
pleadings tiled with this Court which includes the following:
(a) "Creditor's Opposition/Response to Notice of Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors. & Deadlines and
Motion to be Dismissed from Action " - Docket 10;
(b) "Creditor Vogel Newsome's Opposition/Response to 5/11 •'11
Discharge of Debtor: Request for Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law: and Placating of Discharge of Debtor" -
Docket 20 - and
(c) "Creditor's (Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From
Order/Judgement: Motion For Rule 11 Scmctions Of And Against
Robert Rex McRaney Jr./McRcmey & McRcmey: and Request To
Be Advised Of Conflict-Of-Interests" - Docket 34
and files this her "Creditor's (Vogel Newsome) Objections To June 10. 2015 Order Dismissing Creditor's
(Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From Order/Judgement (sic): Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions Of And
Against Robert Rex McRaney Jr/McRaney & McRaney: And Request To Be Advised Of Conflict-Of
Interests- - Motion For Recusal Of Judge Edward Ellington" ("COT061015ORDER- - MFRECUSAL")
pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), 28 USC § 455; FRCP Rule 12(G)
NOTE: Boldfece, italics and underline, etc. represents "emphasis" added.
Page 1 of26

3. Page 1 of 26
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
IN RE:
LADYE M. TOWNSEND CHAPTER 7
DEBTOR CASE NO. 11-00167-ee
CREDITOR’S (VOGEL NEWSOME) OBJECTIONS TO
JUNE 10, 2015 ORDER DISMISSING CREDITOR’S (VOGEL NEWSOME) MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM ORDER/JUDGEMENT (sic); MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS OF AND
AGAINST ROBERT REX McRANEYJR/McRANEY & McRANEY; AND REQUEST TO BE
ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS - -
MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE EDWARD ELLINGTON1
COMES NOW Creditor Vogel Newsome (“Newsome”) without waiving her rights, without
submitting to the jurisdiction of this Court, without waiving the defenses and claims set forth in her
pleadings filed with this Court which includes the following:
(a) “Creditor’s Opposition/Response to Notice of Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines and
Motion to be Dismissed from Action” – Docket 10;
(b) “Creditor Vogel Newsome’s Opposition/Response to 5/11/11
Discharge of Debtor; Request for Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law; and Vacating of Discharge of Debtor” –
Docket 20 – and
(c) “Creditor's (Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From
Order/Judgement; Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions Of And Against
Robert Rex McRaney Jr./McRaney & McRaney; and Request To
Be Advised Of Conflict-Of-Interests” - Docket 34
and files this her “Creditor’s (Vogel Newsome) Objections To June 10, 2015 Order Dismissing Creditor’s
(Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From Order/Judgement (sic); Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions Of And
Against Robert Rex McRaney Jr/McRaney & McRaney; And Request To Be Advised Of Conflict-Of-
Interests- - Motion For Recusal Of Judge Edward Ellington” (“COT061015ORDER- - MFRECUSAL”)
pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), 28 USC § 455; FRCP Rule 12(G)
1
NOTE: Boldface, italics and underline, etc. represents “emphasis” added.

4. Page 2 of 26
– consolidation of matters – and other statutes/laws governing said matters. In support thereof,
Newsome states the following:
I. LACK OF JURISDICTION:
There is authority that dismissal of a bankruptcy case does not
mandate dismissal of all pending adversary proceedings.
However, if an entity joined as a party in an adversary
proceeding raised the defense that the court lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter and that defense is sustained, the court
must dismiss such entity from the adversary proceeding.
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7019(1).
Mississippi Case: Rice v. McMullen, 43 So.2d 195 (Miss. 1949)
- A court must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
person of the parties, to give validity to its final judgments,
orders and decrees, and legislature cannot under the Constitution
dispense with notice, actual or constructive.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission,
135 F.Supp. 304 (S.D.Miss.Jackson.Div.,1955) - “Judicial
power” is the legal right, ability and authority to hear and decide
a justifiable issue or controversy, and such power is ordinarily
vested in a court of justice.
U.S. Supreme Court Case: U.S. v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. 641(1874)
- “Jurisdiction” is the power to hear and determine a cause.
In re N.L.R.B., 58 S.Ct. 1001 (1938) - “Jurisdiction” means, in
one sense, the power to hear and determine the controversy
presented, but a court has “jurisdiction,” in another sense, to
determine whether such power is conferred upon it in the
circumstances disclosed, and if it finds such power is not
granted, it lacks “jurisdiction” of the subject matter and must
refrain from an adjudication of rights in connection therewith.
Other Court Cases: In re Jahelka, 2010 WL 5558990 (Bankr.,
2010) - Subject matter jurisdiction is threshold question in every
case.
In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 435 B.R. 894 (2010) - A motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction challenges the
power of the federal court to hear a claim or case. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
Issue of court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised
in any manner, including on motion of one of the parties or by
the court sua sponte. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 12(b)(1), 28
U.S.C.A.

5. Page 3 of 26
1. Newsome DOES NOT waive her defense to the jurisdictional issue which arises
in this matter. Therefore, Newsome does not submit to the jurisdiction of this
Court. While the laws are clear that Newsome cannot waive jurisdictional rights,
she believes it is necessary to provide information regarding decisions of court(s)
on said issue(s):
In re Kirkland, 600 F.3d 310 (4th
Cir. 2010) - Subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived, and can be raised by
party, or by court sua sponte, at any time prior to final judgment.
2. This instant “COT061015ORDER- - MFRECUSAL” is submitted in good faith
and has not been submitted for purposes of delay, harassment, hindering
proceedings, embarrassment, obstructing the administration of justice, vexatious
litigation, increasing the cost of litigation, etc. and is filed to protect and
preserve the rights of Newsome secured/guaranteed under the United States
Constitution and other laws of the United States.
3. For the purposes of expedition, saving of time and minimize costs associated
with litigation, Newsome consolidate her motions/pleadings herein pursuant to
FRCP Rule 12(G) which states:
FRCP Rule 12(g) Joining Motions.
Right to Join. A motion under this rule may be joined
with any other motion allowed by this rule.
4. Townsend’s Title 11 – Chapter 7 Bankruptcy – proceeding is merely acts in
FURTHERANCE of PATTERN-OF-ABUSE (i.e. for instance, under
CRIMINAL LAWS may be known as “Engaging in a PATTERN of CORRUPT
ACTIVITY”, etc.) to engage in criminal/civil wrongs and efforts to engage/solicit
this Court to cover up such legal injustices. Now it appears from this Court’s
June 27, 2014 Order relying upon a PROPOSED Order provided by Counsel for
Debtor Townsend (Robert Rex McRaney, Jr.) that a Motion to Dismiss –which
has NOT been served on Newsome – was filed with this Court. Service of
process providing Newsome with a copy of the Debtor Townsend’s Motion to
Dismiss has NOT been completed.
In re Spencer, 137 B.R. 506 (1992) - All courts possess inherent
power to protect their jurisdiction and process from abuse. In re
Higginbotham, 111 B.R. 955 (1990).
5. Newsome’s December 3, 2010, filing of the lawsuit – United States District
Court; Southern District of Mississippi (Jackson Division); Civil Action 3:10-cv-
704 - protected her rights and secured District Court with jurisdiction and any
such actions as that brought by Townsend on or about January 18, 2011.
Newsome’s December 3, 2010, lawsuit filed in this action secured District Court
with jurisdiction to hear any such bankruptcy Townsend may attempt to assert in
that Chapter 7 Bankruptcy filing arises out of the relief Newsome seeks through
this instant lawsuit. Therefore, it appears that Townsend has “HIT-A-BRICK-
WALL” in her efforts to try and run and hide from the liability Newsome seeks of
and against her for the legal wrongs addressed in Complaint. As a matter of
law, Newsome is to be dismissed from Townsend’s Bankruptcy action or matter
involving Newsome transferred the United States District Court for purposes of
keeping legal matters combined.

6. Page 4 of 26
Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th
Cir. Miss. 1987) - If
proceeding involves right created by federal bankruptcy law, or
is one which would only arise in bankruptcy, it is core
proceeding, but if proceeding does not invoke substantive right
created by federal bankruptcy law and is one that could exist
outside of bankruptcy, it is noncore proceeding, though it may be
related to bankruptcy because of its potential effect on debtor's
estate. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157.
In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359 (5th
Cir. 2008) - Bankruptcy
court's adjudicative authority is constrained if the adversary
proceeding is non-core.
6. As a matter of law, the United States District Court – Southern District of
Mississippi (Jackson Division) on December 3, 2010, FIRST retained
jurisdiction over this matter.
Jurisdiction is the power to decide; it must be conferred,
not assumed. Matter of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R.
Co., 794 F.2d 1182 (7th
Cir. 1986). All bankruptcy jurisdiction is
given in the first instance to the United States district courts.
Acolyte Elec. Corp. v. City of New York, 69 B.R. 155 (Bankr.
E.D. N.Y. 1986), ordered aff’d, 1987 1987 WL 47763 (E.D.
N.Y. 1987); In re Double TRL, Inc., 65 B.R. 993 (Bankr. E.D.
N.Y. 1986).
The district courts are granted jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases, that is cases under the Bankruptcy Code and
over three categories of bankruptcy proceedings: (1) civil
proceedings arising under Title 11; (2) civil proceedings arising
in a case under Title 11; and (3) civil proceedings related to
cases under Title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). As used in this
statute, the phrase “arising under Title 11” is meant, not to
distinguish between different matters, but to identify collectively
a broad range of matters subject to the bankruptcy jurisdiction of
federal courts. Matter of Wood, 825 F.2d 90 (5th
Cir. 1987).
On or about December 16, 2010, Newsome served Debtor (Ladye M. Townsend
[“Townsend”]) with the required: (a) “Notice of Lawsuit and Request to Waive
Service of Summons;” and (b) “Waiver of the Service of Summons” which was
accompanied by Notification Accompanying Waiver of Service of Summons.
According to United States Postal Service information, Townsend received these
documents on or about December 27, 2010.
7. PLEASE BE ADVISED: There are FOREIGN/INTERNATIONAL Interest in
the Legal proceedings involving Vogel Newsome because it EXPOSES the
CORRUPTION in the United States of America’s JUDICIAL System and
SUPPORTS the RACIST/DISCRIMINATORY handling of lawsuits and
SPECIAL FAVORS given to Terrorist/White Supremacist Regimes as the Law
Firm of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz. You see
Foreign/International Nations have LAWYERS/ATTORNEYS as well and they
can see for themselves THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS and EVIDENCE that
Newsome is presenting in Legal matters involving her and HOW the JUDICIAL

7. Page 5 of 26
SYSTEM is TAINTED and DETERMINED to COVER-UP Criminal/Civil
wrongs made known to it – i.e. for instance look at the interest in one document
regarding Judge Tom S. Lee (United States District Court – Southern District of
Mississippi (Jackson))
NOTE: Information taken from Newsome’s SLIDESHARE Social Forum -
www.SlideShare.net/VogelDenise
8. PLEASE BE ADVISED: Under the statutes/laws governing said matters that the
Southern District Court of Mississippi (Jackson) action (Civil Action 3:10-cv-
704) is STILL very VIABLE and ACTIVE regardless of the APPEARANCE said
Court may want the Public/World to think in displaying it as being
CLOSED/DISMISSED – i.e. it is NOT.
In fact, during the MAY 14, 2014 hearing held by this Court before Judge
Edward Ellington, this REPEATEDLY seem to be an issue that was
CLEARIFIED by Newsome that “DUE TO THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST”
present, any/all RULINGS by the District Court in that Lawsuit is NULL/VOID
and Newsome is in the process of having it addressed and seeing that the proper
actions –i.e. PROSECUTIONS, IMPEACHMENTS, etc. are initiated.
During said May 14, 2014 hearing, this Court attempted to convince/persuade
Newsome that the Southern District Court of Mississippi (Jackson) action (Civil
Action 3:10-cv-704) was a CLOSED/DISMISSED/RESOLVED matter.
However, Newsome NOTIFIED the Court of the statutes/laws governing said
matters which PRECLUDES the acts of Judge Louis Guirola in that lawsuit.

8. Page 6 of 26
FACTS and EVIDENCE of the CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS that precludes
Judge Guirola from acting and NEITHER is Newsome required to ENGAGE in
the CRIMINAL Acts of said Court/Judge in which the PROPER pleading(s) have
been submitted and will be UPDATED to support the INVESTIGATION(S)
requested. It is PLEASANT to state that said issues are
PROPERLY/ADEQUATELY and TIMELY PRESERVED. Thus, allowing
Newsome to CONTINUE in her QUESTS to EXPOSE what former United
States of America’s President John Fitzgerald Kennedy announced:
“There’s a PLOT in this country to ENSLAVE
every man, woman and child. BEFORE I leave
this HIGH and NOBLE office, I INTEND to
EXPOSE the PLOT!”
Then approximately seven (7) days later, President Kennedy is assassinated to
SILENCE him!
President Kennedy was nice in using the term “PLOT;” however, Newsome is
going to call it what it is “CONSPIRACY(S)!” So let us move on!

9. Page 7 of 26
9. Newsome believes given the facts, evidence and legal conclusions not only in
this Bankruptcy matter, but that in the United States District Court, that
Townsend’s Title 7 Bankruptcy proceeding naming Newsome under “Creditors
Holding Unsecured Nonpriority Claims” has been submitted: in bad faith, for
purposes of harassment, for delay, for vexatious litigation, for purposes of
increasing the costs of litigation, for embarrassment, for false and frivolous
reasons in attempts to provide her with a defense to Newsome’s Civil lawsuit
filed in the United States District Court – Southern District of Mississippi
(Jackson Division) [“USDC-MS proceeding”]on or about December 3, 2010;
and other willful, malicious and wanton reasons known to Townsend for the
filing of this Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, supporting the
dismissal of Newsome from Townsend’s Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding:
A district court may transfer a bankruptcy case or
proceeding to a district court . . .in the interest of justice or for
the convenience of the parties. 28 § 1412. In contrast with the
general venue transfer statutes, this provision allows transfer to
any district, not only to districts in which venue would have been
proper had the case been brought in that district.
In determining whether to transfer a bankruptcy case, the
court should consider the following factors: (1) the proximity of
creditors to the court; (2) the proximity of the debtor to the court;
(3) the proximity of the witnesses necessary to the administration
of the estate; (4) the location of the assets; (5) economic
administration of the estate; (6) the necessity of ancillary
administration if liquidation should result. See In re
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 596 F.2d 1239, 1247 (5th
Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980) (construing former 28
U.S.C. § 1475, substantially similar to present § 1412O.
Newsome does not believe that based upon the willful, malicious and wanton
acts of Townsend and the filing of this FRIVOLOUS Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
proceeding as a defense to Newsome’s “USDC-MS proceeding,” that a transfer
of this case is warranted or even qualifies for transfer. Therefore, in the
interest of justice and expedition of this case, Newsome timely, properly and
adequately requested to be dismissed as a “Creditor” from Townsend’s Chapter 7
Bankruptcy action in that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Newsome to proceed;
furthermore, that this Court(if it insist on entertaining Townsend’s Bankruptcy
action), in the interest of justice and convenience of parties transfer matter
regarding Newsome to the United States District Court – Southern District of
Mississippi (Jackson Division) for consolidation of cases and convenience to
parties. Townsend’s filing of the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy action clearly supports
that she would not be prejudiced by the transfer of this matter in that it will
remain in SAME venue; however, JURISDICTION of the United States District
Court – i.e. NOT Bankruptcy Court.
Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th
Cir. 1966) - Both
jurisdiction and venue are designed to test fairness to defendant
and degree of inconvenience caused him by requiring him to
litigate in a particular court, but jurisdiction is relatively more
concerned with fairness and venue more with inconvenience.

10. Page 8 of 26
10. It appears that Townsend and her counsel are attempting to get this Court to
usurp jurisdiction over this matter, the laws clearly prohibits such practices.
Brown v. Pyle, 310 F.2d 95 (5th
Cir. Miss. 1962) - “Jurisdiction”
is the power to hear and determine a cause-the power to
adjudicate; it is not to be confused with venue.
11. While Newsome does not claim to have knowledge of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
laws, it is clear that Townsend did not bring this instant Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
proceeding as an “ENTITY,” “BUSINESS” for “ESTATE ADMINISTRATOR.”
Therefore, Newsome believes the laws support her concerns as to the motives for
the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy filing and this Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction over
this matter.
12. Newsome further believes that Townsend’s Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding
filed with this Court in her INDIVIDUAL capacity was filed as a DEFENSE to
Newsome’s “USDC-MS proceeding” and therefore, may be precluded by law
given the facts, evidence and laws governing said matters.
In re SemCrude, L.P., 428 B.R. 82 (2010) - As general rule,
subject matter jurisdiction of court is based on state of facts that
existed at time cause of action was filed.
13. Newsome further believes that a “FEDERAL” court judgment on her “USDC-
MS proceeding” may preclude Townsend from bringing Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
proceeding naming Newsome in efforts to avoid the liability owed for damages
Newsome sustained and is addressed in the “USDC-MS proceeding.” Under the
statutes/laws governing issues regarding CONFLICT OF INTERESTS,
Newsome’s Lawsuit in Southern District Court of Mississippi (Jackson) action
(Civil Action 3:10-cv-704) is still LEGALLY/LAWFULLY active despite the
CRIMINAL acts of said court to make it appear that the case is closed (when it is
NOT)!
14. Newsome is NOT a business entity, but a private citizen (individual) of the
United States and is seeking relief of and against Townsend and others in the
“USDC-MS proceeding.”
II. MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUNE 10, 2015 CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY ORDER
Vogel Newsome (“Newsome) further moves this Court for “Relief From the June 10, 2015
Order” pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) entered in that it appears
that this Court’s Judge Edward Ellington, Clerk Of Court, and Counsel for Debtor – Robert Rex
McRaney, Jr./McRaney & McRaney – obtained said ruling as a direct and proximate result of engaging
in “FRAUD UPON THE COURT!” Moreover, that said Order is to be VACATED in that it was
INDUCED and/or PROCURED through FRAUDULENT and CRIMINAL Acts. Furthermore, said June

11. Page 9 of 26
10, 2015 Order is NULL/VOID and is UNENFORCEABLE! In support of this instant Motion,
Newsome states the following:
Rule 60. Relief from a Judgment or Order
(b) GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR
PROCEEDING. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . .
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; . . .
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
(c) TIMING AND EFFECT OF THE MOTION.
(1) Timing. A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a
year after the entry of the . . . order or the date of the
proceeding.
(d) OTHER POWERS TO GRANT RELIEF. This rule does not limit a court's
power to:
(1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order, or proceeding;
(3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court. . . .
Fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party are express grounds for relief by
motion under amended subdivision (b). There is no sound reason
for their exclusion. The incorporation of fraud and the like
within the scope of the rule also removes confusion as to the
proper procedure. It has been held that relief from a judgment
obtained by extrinsic fraud could be secured by motion within a
“reasonable time,” which might be after the time stated in the
rule had run. Fiske v. Buder (C.C.A.8th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 841;
see also inferentially Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co.
(C.C.A.9th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 213.. . .. The amendment settles
this problem by making fraud an express ground for relief by
motion; and under the saving clause, fraud may be urged as a
basis for relief by independent action insofar as established
doctrine permits. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from
Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623, 653–659; 3 Moore's
Federal Practice (1938) 3267 et seq. And the rule expressly does
not limit the power of the court, when fraud has been

12. Page 10 of 26
perpetrated upon it, to give relief under the saving clause. As an
illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford Empire Co. (1944) 322 U.S. 238.
However the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of
Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th
Cir. 1995) held that a lawyer’s failure to disclose . . . constituted
fraud upon the court.
In further support of said motion,
15. Creditor, Vogel Denise Newsome, was NOT served with Notification/Notice of
the June 10, 2015 Hearing and, therefore, UNLAWFUL/ILLEGALLY deprived
of PROTECTED Rights secured under the United States Constitution and other
statutes/laws governing said matters.
16. On or about June 10, 2015, this Court’s Judge Edward Ellington COMMITTED
FRAUD UPON THE COURT in his execution of the “Order Dismissing
Creditor’s (Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From Order/Judgement (sic);
Motion For Rule 11 Sanctions Of And Against Robert Rex McRaney Jr/McRaney
& McRaney; And Request To Be Advised Of Conflict-Of-Interests” - - see below:

13. Page 11 of 26

14. Page 12 of 26

15. Page 13 of 26
17. This Court’s June 10, 2015 Order, asserts that:
“After being duly noticed at her address of record on file with
the Court (P.O. Box 14731, Cincinnati, OH 45250), Ms.
Newsome failed to appear.”
Said statement by this Court’s Judge Ellington is FALSE and CANNOT be
supported. Furthermore, said statement appears has been asserted for purposes of
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, DEPRIVING Newsome of PROTECTED
Rights – in this Court’s FAILURE to NOTIFY her of the June 10, 2015 Hearing,
CRIMINAL INTENT – in this Court’s WILLFUL PARTICIPATION in the
CONSPIRACIES that have been leveled against Newsome for purposes of
depriving her EQUAL Protection of the Laws, privileges and immunities, and
due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other
governing laws; as well as other reasons KNOWN to Judge Ellington and those
with whom he CONSPIRES and ENGAGES in criminal/civil violations with in
efforts of providing OPPOSING Counsel Robert Rex McCraney Jr., his Client
Ladye Margaret Townsend and other CONSPIRATORS with an
UNDUE/UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL advantage in this Bankruptcy action!
18. UNDISPUTED BY EVIDENCE: On or about April 17, 2014, this Court served
Newsome with “NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE” at P.O. Box 14731,
Cincinnati, OH 45250.
IMPORTANT TO NOTE: Due to the CHANGE OF ADDRESS on record
with the United States Postal Service, this Court’s April 17, 2014, Notice to
Newsome was forwarded to an Address in Mississippi at P.O. Box 415, Utica,
MS 39175 - - See Below:

16. Page 14 of 26

17. Page 15 of 26
19. UNDISPUTED BY EVIDENCE: This Court being DULY NOTIFIED of
Newsome’s LOCAL Mailing Address in Jackson, Mississippi, on or about June
27, 2014, served Newsome with a PROPOSED Order from OPPOSING Counsel
Robert Rex McRaney, Jr./McRaney & McRaney to Newsome’s LOCAL
MAILING ADDRESS at P.O. Box 31265, Jackson, MS 39286 - - See Below:

18. Page 16 of 26
20. SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE: On record with the United States Postal
Service, Newsome CONTINUES to have a CHANGE OF ADDRESS on record
which REFLECTS a Mailing Address of P.O. Box 31265, Jackson, MS 39286 -
- See Below:
Therefore, the BURDEN of PROOF OF SERVICE of
the alleged Notice asserted by this Court to have been
served of Creditor Newsome to notify her of the June
10, 2015 Hearing is on this Court to provide
EVIDENCE of service and MERE MANIPULATION
of this Court’s ELECTRONIC Filing System IS NOT
sufficient and further SUSTAINS Newsome’s
allegations of FRAUD UPON THE COURT by this
Court’s Clerk Of Court and Judge Edward Ellington.

19. Page 17 of 26
21. SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE: The United States Postal Service records will
SUPPORT that a CHANGE OF ADDRESS to Newsome at P.O. Box 31265
being EFFECTIVE PRIOR to as well as AFTER (as well as to date) to said
P.O. Box - - See Below 02/2015 FORWARDED MAIL as well as 05/2015
FORWARDED MAIL. Thus, a reasonable mind MAY CONCLUDE any such
assertion by this Court to have NOTIFIED Newsome of the June 10, 2015, is
FALSE, MALICIOUS and CANNOT be SUBSTANTIATED by evidence.

20. Page 18 of 26
EVIDENCE WHICH SUSTAINS that Newsome in GOOD FAITH not ONLY
Notified this Court and provided during the LAST hearing she attended, the
Court with her MAILING ADDRESS, also NOTIFIED the United States Postal
Service of CHANGE OF ADDRESS!
Therefore, PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That as a MATTER OF LAW, this Court
is being REQUESTED to PRODUCE evidence – PROOF OF MAILING – of the
alleged NOTIFICATION providing Newsome with information regarding the
June 10, 2015 Hearing.
RECORD EVIDENCE REFLECTS mailings of this Court’s June 10, 2015 Order
to BOTH Addresses – Cincinnati, OH and Jackson, MS. Therefore, a reasonable
mind may CONCLUDE that IF indeed a NOTIFICATION of the June 10, 2015
Hearing was served on Newsome, then WHY has she NOT received said
Notification at either address IF since it appears this Court is USING BOTH
Addresses for mailings - - as that shown below on its June 10, 2015 Order:

21. Page 19 of 26
22. FACT: This Court has before it UNCONTESTED pleadings:
(a) “Creditor’s Opposition/Response to Notice of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines and Motion to be
Dismissed from Action” – Docket 10 – and
(b) “Creditor Vogel Newsome’s Opposition/Response to 5/11/11
Discharge of Debtor; Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law; and Vacating of Discharge of Debtor” – Docket 20 -
of Vogel Newsome.
23. At the end of the May 14, 2014 Bankruptcy Hearing in this instant Bankruptcy
action, this Court, Counsel for Townsend (McRaney) and Newsome UPDATED
Address information for Newsome:
Post Office Box 31265
Jackson, MS 39286
and evidence in this instant pleading supports that it is a GOOD THING that
Newsome RETAINS as well as UPDATES Address information with the United
States Postal Service!
24. TO DATE (July 14, 2014), Newsome has NOT been served with the Motion to
Dismiss that this Court’s June 27, 2014 addresses. The EVIDENCE supports that
Newsome provided this Court and Counsel for Debtor (McRaney) with
UPDATED mailing address and RECEIVED this Court’s June 27, 2014
PROPOSED Order created by Counsel for Debtor Robert Rex McRaney, Jr.
25. Creditor Vogel Newsome is PRO SE and is NOT an attorney and DOES NOT
receive NOTICE(s) of filing(s) with this Court ELECTRONICALLY as Counsel
for Debtor Townsend – McRaney. Furthermore, Newsome DOES NOT have
available to her – because of PRO SE/NON-Attorney Status – the ability to

22. Page 20 of 26
submit filings ELECTRONICALLY through this Court’s Electronic Filing
System.
26. With that being said, the BURDEN OF PROOF is on THIS COURT to PROVE
by EVIDENCE that he SERVED Newsome with the NOTIFICATION of the
June 10, 2015 Hearing pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and or other statutes/laws governing said matters:
Rule 5. Serving and Filing Pleadings and Other Papers
(b) Service: How Made.
(1) Serving an Attorney. If a party is represented by an attorney,
service under this rule must be made on the attorney unless the
court orders service on the party.
(2) Service in General. A paper is served under this rule by: . . .
(C) mailing it to the person's last known address—in
which event service is complete upon mailing; . .
(d) Filing.
(1) Required Filings; Certificate of Service. Any paper after the complaint that
is required to be served—together with a certificate of service—must be filed
within a reasonable time after service. . . .
27. With TWO VALID addresses provided to this Court and Creditor Newsome
NOT receiving NOTIFICATION of the June 10, 2015 Hearing, it warrants
further INVESTIGATION(S) as well as PROOF from this Court that Service
was completed PRIOR to this Court’s proceeding with KNOWLEDGE that
Newsome was NOT present.
FURTHER WARRANTING an INVESTIGATION because during the May 14,
2014 Hearing, when Opposing Counsel was NOT present, Judge Edward
Ellington REQUESTED that the Clerk CONTACT Robert Rex McRaney to
determine if he would be attending the hearing. However, IN A
DISCRIMINATORY and PREJUDICIAL move during the alleged June 10,
2015, Hearing before Judge Ellington, he did NOT request his Clerk to contact
Creditor Vogel Newsome to determine whether she would be attending the
Hearing.
28. Such FRAUDULENT and CRIMINAL Acts by this Court’s Judge Edward
Ellington and Clerk Of The Court are PREJUDICIAL and caused Creditor
Newsome rights SECURED under the Constitution –i.e. providing her with
information so that she can CONTEST (if desired – Newsome would have
contested had she been served). This Court Bankruptcy Rules as well as the
Constitution MANDATORILY requires that Creditor Newsome be provided with
NOTIFICATION of Hearings as that alleged to have been provided her regarding
the June 10, 2015 Hearing in this Bankruptcy action.

23. Page 21 of 26
29. Creditor Newsome is CONFIDENT neither Judge Edward Ellington NOR the
Clerk of this Court will be able to provide any PROOF/EVIDENCE of mailing(s)
of the NOTIFICATION of Hearing that may have been ELECTRONICALLY
filed.
Moreover, NEITHER will Judge Edward Ellington NOR the Clerk of this Court
be able to PROVIDE EVIDENCE to rebut the ABUSE and MANIPULATION
of the United States Bankruptcy Court’s ELECTRONIC SYSTEM to ENGAGE
in CRIMINAL/CIVIL VIOLATIONS for purposes of DEPRIVING Newsome
Rights secured under the Constitution, Bankruptcy Rules and other statutes/laws
governing said matters.
WHEREFORE, it appears that this Court’s Judge Edward Ellington and the Clerk of The Court,
in COLLUSION with Opposing Counsel Robert Rex McRaney, Jr./McRaney & McRaney and other
CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS did KNOWINGLY and WILLINGLY commit FRAUD
UPON THE COURT in the handling the alleged June 10, 2015 Hearing in this Bankruptcy Action.
Moreover, said Public Officials appears to be ENGAGING in a PATTERN-OF-CRIMINAL Acts
through the use of this Court’s Electronic Filing System which WARRANTS the proper
INVESTIGATIONS and PROSECUTION(S) for criminal/civil wrongs these Officers of the Court have
are ENGAGING IN! It appears that Officers of the Court involved in this Bankruptcy action are
PRETTY DESPERATE and WILLING to engage in CRIMINAL Acts to obtain UNDESERVING
Ruling(s) in favor of Debtor Ladye M. Townsend - - SURELY a reasonable mind may conclude that
Townsend’s Bankruptcy action is FRIVOLOUS because the COST of LITIGATION and PAYING for
CRIMINAL Acts of her counsel may be sustained from BLATANT criminal/civil wrongs she, her legal
counsel, this Court and those with whom they CONSPIRE are engaging in!

24. Page 22 of 26
III. MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF JUDGE EDWARD ELLINGTON:
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(G) and 28 USC § 455, Creditor Vogel
Newsome (“Newsome”) moves this Court, for the above foregoing reasons and those known to this Court
for the RECUSAL of and against Judge Edward Ellington. Furthermore, it appears that CONFLICT-OF-
INTEREST presently exist and REPEATED EFFORTS by Judge Ellington to provide opposing Counsel
Robert Rex McRaney/McRaney & McRaney with an UNDUE/UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL advantage in this
lawsuit. Moreover, that Judge Edward Ellington is exhibiting and reflecting BIAS, PREJUDICE and
RACIST BEHAVIOR towards Newsome in his handling of this Bankruptcy Action.
30. That a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST presently exists with the assignment of this
lawsuit to Judge Edward Ellington. The record evidence CLEARLY supports
that Newsome has timely, properly and adequately NOTIFIED this Court of the
Conflict-Of-Interest regarding the Law Firm of Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz – i.e. who appears is Legal Counsel for Judge Edward
Ellington. As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply with the
MANDATORY requirements of statutes and laws governing said matters,
Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal
protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws
guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws. As a
direct and proximate result of this Court’s unlawful/illegal practices and failure
to comply with the MANDATORY requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and any
and all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome has been
irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the
laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the
United States Constitution and other governing laws.
Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee on Performance and
Expenditure Review Of The State of Mississippi, et al., 637 F.2d
1014 (5th
Cir. 1981) - [3] Under statute requiring a judge to
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might be reasonably questioned, judge need not accept all the
allegations by moving party as true and, in fact, no motion at all
is required; the judge must disqualify himself if the facts cast
doubt on his impartiality regardless of how or by whom they are
drawn to his attention. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455.
. . . [3] Congress rewrote the second statute, section 455,
in 1974. Subsection (b) of that section lists a number of specific
situations in which a judge must recuse himself. . .Subsection (a),
a more general provision, requires that
Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.

25. Page 23 of 26
Section 455, unlike section 144, does not stipulate a
formal procedure by which it must be raised. Like section 144,
however, it may be raised by motion. Davis, 517 F.2d at 1051.
Substantively, the two statutes are quite similar, if not
identical.[FN6]
FN6. To the extent that there is a difference, section 455
imposes the stricter standard: a movant under section 144
must allege facts to convince a reasonable person that bias
exists, Parrish, 524 F.2d at 100, while under the broader
language of section 455, he must show only that a
reasonable person “would harbor doubts about the judge's
impartiality”, Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 5 Cir.
1980, 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (emphasis added), cert. denied,
-- U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). See
Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or
Prejudice, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 236, 243-50 (1978). See also
Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the
Federal Courts, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 736, 745-50 (1973).
On the other hand, section 455, unlike section
144, does not require the judge to accept all
allegations by a moving party as true. Indeed, the
section requires no motion at all; the judge must
disqualify himself if the facts cast doubt on his
impartiality regardless of how or by whom they
are drawn to his attention. See Fredonia
Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 5 Cir. 1978,
569 F.2d 251, 254-57, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859,
99 S.Ct. 177, 58 L.Ed.2d 167 (1979). Section 144,
by contrast, requires allegation by affidavit within
a stringent time limit and allows a party only one
such affidavit in any case. If a party could bind a
judge by his factual allegations in a section 455
motion, free from the formal requirements and
more demanding standard of proof of section 144,
the result would be a virtual open season for
recusal. See 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 250.
[4] The alleged bias of a judge must be personal as distinguished
from judicial in nature in order to require recusal. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144,
455.
Clearly the INTEGRITY of this Court has been compromised and the appearance of
IMPROPRIETY is inevitable through Judge Edward Ellington’s acts and projects an
appearance that this Lawsuit can be won through criminal acts – i.e. through bribes,
blackmail, extortion, intimidation, threats, etc. - by Debtor and her counsel. Therefore,
Judge Ellington’s acts CLEARLY VIOLATE the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct.

26. Page 24 of 26
28 USC § 455 - Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter,
or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning
it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness
concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the
merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse
or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or
any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest
that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding.
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself
about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor
children residing in his household. . . .

27. Page 25 of 26
MANDATORY DISQUALIFICATION is required when “ONE” of the grounds specifically
enumerated in statute applies – i.e. for instance, as in this instant lawsuit, grounds for Judge
Edward Ellington’s disqualification is required pursuant to 28 USC § 455 and/or the
applicable statutes/laws governing said matters:
Renteria v. Schellpeper, 936 F.Supp. 691 (1996) - [6] If one of grounds
specifically enumerated in statute applies, disqualification of judge is
mandatory whether or not reasonable person would question judge's
impartiality. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b).
. . . [6] . . .If one of the provisions of section 455(b) applies then
disqualification is mandatory whether or not a reasonable person would
question the judge's impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2202 n. 8, 100 L.Ed.2d 855
(1988).
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That Creditor Vogel Newsome IS CONFIDENT that
INVESTIGATIONS in to Judge Edward Ellington’s handling of this Bankruptcy matter WILL SUSTAIN
that CONFLICT-OF-INTERESTS exist, thus, making him UNFIT/UNJUST and UNQUALIFIED to
proceed as the Judge in this Bankruptcy Action. Furthermore, SUPPORTING WILLFUL, MALICIOUS
and WANTON behavior by Judge Edward Ellington in his ZEALOUS efforts to fulfill his roles in the
CONSPIRACIES leveled against Vogel Denise Newsome on behalf of his LEGAL COUNSEL Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz and said Law Firms other PARTIES/CLIENTS with an
interest in the outcome of this Bankruptcy Action.
The record evidence will support that this Court as well as Judge Edward Ellington has been
TIMELY, PROPERLY and ADEQUATELY notified and requested to address the CONFLICT-OF-
INTEREST PRESENT; however, has BLATANTLY refused in his QUEST and ZEAL to fulfill his
ROLES in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome by him, his Legal Counsel and opposing
counsel and their CLIENTS having in INTEREST in the outcome of this Bankruptcy Action.
REQUEST TO BE ADVISED OF CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST:
Creditor Vogel Denise REITERATES her “Request TO BE ADVISED of
Conflict-Of-Interest” in this Court’s handling of this Bankruptcy Action.

28. Page 26 of 26
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED Newsome prays that his Court GRANT the relief set
forth in this instant “Creditor’s (Vogel Newsome) Objections To June 10, 2015 Order Dismissing
Creditor’s (Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From Order/Judgement (sic); Motion For Rule 11
Sanctions Of And Against Robert Rex McRaney Jr/McRaney & McRaney; And Request To Be Advised Of
Conflict-Of-Interests- - Motion For Recusal Of Judge Edward Ellington” and Newsome’s supporting
Motions individually raised in this instant Bankruptcy pleading. While Newsome believes that this
instant filing provides the facts and evidence to support the relief sought herein and saves of additional
costs, she reserves the right to submit to this Court her Memorandum Brief in support of
“COT061015ORDER- - MFRECUSAL” if said Court deems the motion alone is insufficient and an
additional memorandum brief may be beneficial.
Respectfully submitted this 17th
day of June, 2015.
By:
__________________________________________
Vogel Newsome
Post Office Box 31265
Jackson, Mississippi 39286
Phone: (601) 885-9536 or (513) 680-2922
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the forgoing pleading was
MAILED via U.S. Mail first-class to:
Robert Rex McRaney, Jr.
Post Office Box 1397
Clinton, Mississippi 39060
COUNSEL FOR DEBTOR (LADYE M. TOWNSEND)
Dated this 17th
day of June, 2015.
_____________________________________
Vogel Newsome

29. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED Newsome prays that his Court GRANT the relief set
forth in this instant "Creditor's (Vogel Newsomej Objections To June 10. 2015 Order Dismissing
Creditor's (Vogel Newsome) Motion For Relief From Order/Judgement (sic): Motion For Ride 11
Scmctions Of And Against Robert Rex McRaney Jr/McRo.ney & McRcmey: And Request To Be Advised Of
Conflict-Of-Interests- - Motion For Recusal Of .Judge Edward Ellington" and Newsome's supporting
Motions individually raised in this instant Bankruptcy pleading. While Newsome believes that this
instant filing provides the facts and evidence to support the relief sought herein and saves of additional
costs, she reserves the right to submit to this Court her Memorandum Brief in support of
"COT061015ORDER- - MFRECUSAL" if said Court deems the motion alone is insufficient and an
additional memorandum brief may be beneficial.
Respectfully submitted this l?"" day of June, 2015.
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the forgoing pleading was
MAILED via U.S. Mail first-class to:
Robert Rex McRaney, Jr.
Post Office Bo.x 1397
Clinton. Mississippi 39060
C O U N S E L FOR D E B T O R ( L A D Y E M . TOVV^'SEMD)
Dated this 17"^ day of June, 2015.
By: Vogel Newsome
Post Office Box 31265
Jackson, Mississippi 39286
Phone: (601) 885-9536 or(513) 680-2922
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Voaei Newsome
Page 26 of 26