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The contribution of forestry in maintaining and expanding forest-based carbon sinks

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    • 1. CLIMATE 2050 Montréal, 24-26 October, 2007 The contribution of forestry in maintaining and expanding forestbased carbon sinks Markku Kanninen, Robert Nasi, CIFOR Alain Karsenty, CIRAD 1
    • 2. 2
    • 3. Why conserve tropical forests? 3
    • 4. Changes, threats, risks 4
    • 5. Forests and carbon sinks ► Contribution to carbon sinks  Planting ‘new’ forests (A/R CDM)  Avoiding deforestation (conserving forests) ► Contribution to GHG emissions  Deforestation is responsible for 18 to 25% of GHG annual emissions  Bio-energy 5
    • 6. Trends ► During the last 40 years  Deforestation: 500 M Ha  Consumption of forest products: 50% increase ► During the next 40 years    ► Over 100 M Ha of new agricultural land needed Consumption of forest products: 50% increase 40-50% of industrial wood from plantations does not consider the issues related to biofuels 6
    • 7. 7
    • 8. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) ► ► A PES scheme for reducing emissions through project activities in developing countries General rules of CDM: boundaries, baseline, additionality and leakage ► Additionality: demonstrate that the project would not have been undertaken without the incentive of carbon credits  industrial plantation projects systematically rejected by CDM Executive Board ► Leakage: demonstrate the project will nor result in displacement of the emissions elsewhere ► Afforestation/Reforestation (A/R) projects    Addressing non permanence (temporary credits) Human-induced activities only: no project in degraded forest Ineligible if the land was covered by forest after 31/12/1989 8
    • 9. Forestry CDM: a failure? One registered project and a few more in the pipe 9
    • 10. The difficulties faced by forestry CDM  No real demand for temporary credits in a context of relative oversupply of permanent credits;  EC do not allow European companies to use A/R credits to fulfill their objectives of emission reductions  In most tropical countries, difficulties to secure land for plantations due to:  land tenure issues,  the bureaucratic process and low efficiency of the administration,  the poor governance and ill-functioning justice institutions  Transaction costs are high, too high for small and community-based projects 10
    • 11. from Azevedo 2007 11
    • 12. Avoided Deforestation (RED, REDD) ► Generic expression for RED (Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation) or REDD (the 2nd D initially for Developing countries but used now for Degradation) ► To curb down deforestation – and biodiversity loss- by rewarding good land use and forestry practices (e.g. promotion of sustainable forestry…) ► Reward will be through carbon credits (Kyoto assets) or money equivalent (special fund?) 12
    • 13. RED/REDD ► A mechanism proposed by PNG, Brazil and others (e.g. Congo Basin’s countries), but with different features ► The bottom line: financial rewards for countries reducing their deforestation rates ► Major difficulties:    How to choose and set up baselines? How to take into account degradation? As a Kyoto (fungible credits, second commitment period 2013-2017) or independent (special credits or money) instrument? 13
    • 14. Assessing deforestation ► Monitoring deforestation is difficult, but not impossible ► The crux is about agreeing on the reference baseline  Most proposals suggest deriving the baseline from an average of past trends of deforestation  Others (e.g. Congo Basin countries) claim for an adjustment factor allowing them to increase their future deforestation while keeping a possibility to be rewarded  Others (researchers) would prefer predictive baselines based on anticipated rates of deforestation by country 14
    • 15. Historical reference: winners and losers ► Indonesia or Malaysia had high rates of deforestation in the 80 and 90’s; forest tends now to concentrate on less accessible lands: deforestation expected slow down for ‘mechanical’ reasons  Future reductions likely to be non additional  Would it be ‘fair’ to reward Indonesia and Malaysia with regard to their policies vis-à-vis the forest in the past decades? ► Peru, Bolivia, Congo Basin are likely to be the losers under such baseline reference and claim for adjusting the reference to anticipated trends of deforestation 15
    • 16. Can we predict deforestation rates? ► ► A possible solution would be to forecast a likely “business as usual” deforestation rate Chomitz et al. (2007) suggest modeling land-use dynamics to calculate the baseline scenario.  also pointing out correlations between deforestation rate in the Amazon and beef price at farm gate or with rainfall… ► (quite) predictable variables (e.g. population growth) and (best educated) guesses:  Speculative prices of major agriculture commodities, such as soy, oil palm, beef…?  Evolution of rainfall and the risk of forest fires in the context of growing climate disorders? 16
    • 17. Can governments do something? ► Most factors influencing deforestation rates are beyond the reach of governments (cash crop commodities price changes, currency exchange rates…) ► In complex systems, finding a direct plausible causality link between public action and a number hectares (not) deforested is very difficult (or impossible?)  Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1999) have shown the non consistent effects of single variables (such as agricultural progress) on deforestation  If deforestation slows down, how to disentangle the effect of public policies to the other factors insensitive of government action? 17
    • 18. Exogenous factors Type of measures Non intentional Endogenous factors Change in Agricultural commodity prices Changes in interest rates Extended climate disorders Cut in fertilizer subsidies Intentional Endogenous factors Stringent enforcement of land-use change laws Possibility to impute the deforestation reduction to the public action No yes yes Possibility to quantify the net impact on deforestation No Very difficult Possible 18
    • 19. Carbon credits or what else? ► Fears that AD would generate huge quantities of “hot air” and a reduction of price of emission permits ► Recent report from CDM executive board suggests 20% of carbon credits are “non additional”… ► A possible alternative:  De-coupling from Kyoto: money instead of carbon credits through an international fund against deforestation  Targeting, in priority, field actors instead of governments  Using a range of PES to favor changes in farmers’ productive practices and rewarding true conservation efforts (case by case assessment)  Working with governments to remove perverse incentives (inappropriate subsidies, fiscal system…) and overcome structural threats, such as land tenure insecurity, corruption, justice… 19
    • 20. Combining economic instruments and law enforcement ► ► Detecting forest infractions (by satellite) is less difficult than enforcing law and effective sanctions… How to avoid designing a scheme in which law compliers will be at a disadvantage compared to violators?  What conditions of eligibility?  Setting differential regimes for compliers and non-compliers? ► The minimum condition of success is strong signals of political will to enforce the law: do we want to pay for that?  With the risk to be said : “ if you don’t pay I let my forests being destroyed ” ► The ultimate condition is (still) about choices and behavior: forest are converted because it ‘pays’ to do so (for cultivation, feeding beef, biofuels, paper…) 20
    • 21. Conclusions – a way forward ► Synergies of C sequestration with other PES schemes ► Diversified rural economies and improved livelihoods ► CDM projects for biodiversity corridors ► Landscape level planning in watersheds ► Combine mitigation (C sequestration) measures with adaptation to climate change ► CDM projects to reduce vulnerability, minimize risks (forest fires, flooding, etc.) or increase resilience of ecosystems ► Joint CDM / AD projects ► Promoting sustainable forestry 21
    • 22. Promoting sustainable forestry ► CDM for afforestation and reforestation    Gain experience in good management Develop forest-based rural enterprises Role of planted forests will increase in the future in timber supply ► Avoided deforestation    High potential post 2012 Reduce emission and conserve biodiversity Improve forestry practices and management 22
    • 23. Thank you 23

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