Yemen; Rival Factions and the Resilience of AQAP

Yemen: Rival Factions and the Resilience of AQAP
By: Alan Kirk
Diplomacy 6520-Politics of Terror in the Middle East
Ambassador Hassan
November 5, 2014

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Introduction
Fighting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen has been a major objective
of the Yemeni government since 2011. Although the president, Abdrahbu Mansour Hadi, has
taken significant steps to ensure an alliance with the United States and to counter AQAP, the
group still operates freely in some regions. The organization has been resilient in maintaining
an environment for the group’s survival in the central, eastern provinces of Shabwa, Abyan, and
other areas as well.1 This raises the question, how has the AQAP remained resilient and
maintained dogmatic power in Yemen despite a joint coordination to eradicate the organization
by Yemeni forces and the U.S. government? Moreover, what role do rival political fractions in
Yemen play in rapport to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Pennisula?
The state politics of the little-known country has major ramifications for the future of
the AQAP in Yemeni politics and for the origins of the organization. Yemen has been in
contention between rival political groups for decades. The unification of Yemen only
temporarily ceased the fighting between rival organizations because the violence erupted soon
thereafter. The political factions in Yemen are crucial to understanding how the organization
has retained political and military power in the highly divisive country.
In order to understand the organization of AQAP, we must understand the politics of the
armed and non-armed political factions in Yemen. The factions in Yemen are important to the
survival of AQAP because the political fragmentation inside the country draws attention away
from the eradication of the organization, to other issues. The Yemeni government has a deluge
1 Winter, Lucas. “The Ansar of Yemen: AQAP and the Huthis.” OE Watch, Foreign Military Studies Office.

of issues it must address and al-Qaeda is well-aware of this political reality. These armed and
non-armed political factions in Yemen undermine the country’s internal security and require
more resources to resolve the tensions; resources and time that could have been spent on
fighting AQAP.
Before an understanding of the political factions in Yemen is conceived, I will provide a
brief background on al-Qaeda in the Arabian Pennisula. Once a background and organizational
structure of the organization are presented, I will provide a contemporary state of affairs on the
organization and the realities regarding political factions in Yemen as they relate to the AQAP
organization. The current situation is constantly changing in Yemen, so this is the reason why I
will be discussing contemporary events and how it relates to the political factions. Once the
background and current state of affairs is addressed, I will develop the rejoinder to my central
question before discussing possible policy prescriptions to resolve the threat which AQAP poses
to Yemen and the world at-large.
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A Brief Background of AQAP
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also known as “Ansar al-Shari’a” to many in
the region. David Patraeus, former Director of the CIA, described the terrorist organization in a
statement to Congress as “the most dangerous regional node in the global jihad.”2 The AQAP
was reinstituted and rebranded by Anwar al-Awlaki and Nasser al-Wahayshi after “its
predecessor group had been decimated by Saudi intelligence, with some help from the United
2 Patraeus, David H. “Statement by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency David H. Petraeus to Congress
on the Terrorist Threat Ten Years After 9/11.” 2011 Speeches and Testimony. Central Intelligence Agency.
September 13, 2011.

States” after the USS Cole bombing in 2000.3 The predecessor group consisted of old
Mujahedeen fighters who had returned from the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.’4 The
death of Abu Ali al-Harithi in 2002 by a U.S. drone missile strike, who was suspected of being
the mastermind behind the attack against the USS Cole, marked the end of the predecessor
group.5
It was not until “January 2009 [when] a union of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-
Qaeda” were formed did a reestablishment of the al-Qaeda affiliate occur.6 The two branches
had united after ‘Saudi Arabia cracked down on al-Qaeda in 2008 and kicked out the members
who fled to Yemen.’7 Before this incident, however, the organization’s leader, Nasser al-
Wahayshi, was one of the “twenty-three convicted terrorists [who] escaped from a high-security
prison in the capital of Sana’a” in 2006 and was not recovered.8 Nasser al-Wahayshi is
still the leader of the organization and, currently, has a reward of ten million U.S. dollars for
information leading to his arrest.9
AQAP ‘rose to power in the summer of 2011 after gaining its current strongholds of
Shabwa and Abyan provinces, which they still hold in Yemen.’10 Before this major offensive, the
3 Jones, Seth G. Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of al-Qaida Since 9/11. New York: W. W. Norton and
Company. 2012. Print. 339.
4 Masters, Jonathan and Zachary Laub. “Backgrounders: Al -Qaeda in the Arabian Pennisula (AQAP).” Council on
Foreign Relations. August 22, 2013.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Office of the Spokesperson. “Rewards for Justice - Reward Offers for Information on Al -Qaeda in the Arabian
Penisula (AQAP) Leaders.” U.S. Department of State. October 14, 2014.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/10/232932.htm
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organization had already gained the attention of the United States, as it was designated as a
foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the State Department on January 19, 2010.11 The
designation of AQAP as a FTO by the United States, explicitly, means that “the organization
must engage in terrorist activity” and “the organization’s terrorist activity must threaten the
security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the
economic interests) of the United States.”12
The U.S. government and Yemeni government have been in alliance with one another to
eradicate the organization which has inflicted terrorist acts on CIA case officers, civilians, and
Yemeni government forces. Some well-known attacks the predeccesor group and AQAP itself
have inflicted include the suicide bombing on the USS Cole on October 12th, 2000, the
attempted underwear bomber on an Northwest flight on Christmas day in 2009, the shipment
of computer printer bombs on cargo planes, and attacks on British tourists who were murdered
by local tribesman that were linked to al-Qaeda. Further attacks the AQAP and its affiliates in
the region have perpetrated include…
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“…the failed August 2009 assassination attempt on Saudi prince Mohammed bin
Nayef; an attack on the U.S. embassy in Sana'a in 2008; attacks on Italian and
British embassies; suicide bombings targeting Belgian tourists in January 2008 and
Korean tourists in March 2009; bombings of oil pipelines and production facilities;
and the bombing of a Japanese oil tanker in April 2008. In May 2012, a suicide
bomber killed more than ninety Yemeni soldiers rehearsing for a military parade in
the capital of Sana'a, the largest attack since Hadi assumed power in early
2012.”13
11 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
12 “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Bureau of Counterterrorism. U.S. Department of State.

The AQAP had originally focused on government officials and soldiers but soon moved to
indiscriminate attacks on civilians, political factions, and government forces. The former
President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and his government were often the target of many al-
Qaeda attacks or plots, however, the civilian population was not excluded from attacks, as
Yemen is a highly divisive country.
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The Structure of AQAP
Nasser al-Wahayshi has been considered the leader of the terrorist organization since its
reestablishment in Yemen with Anwar al-Awlaki pledging “bayat to Nasir al-Wahishi, the
group’s amir.”14 Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-educated citizen, became more radicalized as time
unfolded and was widely considered the “Bin Laden of the Internet” after many YouTube videos
and helping publish the Inspire Magazine, a radical, propaganda tool for al-Qaeda.15 He was
questioned after 9/11, after giving speeches at radical Mosques to three of the hijackers from
the September 11th attacks and dozens of other radical speeches, while at the same time
“presenting himself as a moderate bridge-builder, he gave interviews to the national news
media, preached at the Capitol in Washington and attended a breakfast with Pentagon
officials.”16 He was to assume the position as the regional commander of AQAP but al-
Wahayashi has been considered the top leader of the organization, although, research
15 MacEoin, Denis. “Anwar al -Awlaki: “’I Pray that Allah Destroys America,’ Radical Islam.” The Middle East
Quarterly. Spring 2010, 17:2. 13-19.
16 Mazzetti, Mark, Charlie Savage and Scott Shane. “How a U.S. Citizen Came to be in America’s Cross Hairs.” The
New York Times. March 9th, 2013.

ascertains that the division was not clear.17 The top commander of al-Qaeda, Osama bin
Laden, was not convinced of Anwar al-Awlaki’s commitment because he had not served on the
battlefield, and trusted his former apprentice and former personal secretary in Afghanistan, al-
Wahayshi, more which suggests that Anwar al-Awlaki was overlooked as the regional
commander.18
The structure was very hierarchical because al-Wahayashi based the AQAP on the
structure which Osama bin Laden had designed, which was a top-down approach where a
chain-of-command was to be followed. Approval of major operations and acquisitions was to
be approved by the chain-of-command, and ultimately by Nasser al-Wahayshi. There were also
three other masterminds and top officials in the organization that guided the organization.
Other top AQAP officials included the infamous, Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, Qasim al-
Raymi, and Said al-Shihri. Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri was the Chief Bombmaker and considered
“an evil genius” and “emerged in Western media reports as AQAP’s biggest threat.”19 He was
responsible for constructing the bombs which were used in the attempted assassination of
Muhammad bin Nayif and the attempted underwear bomber of an Northwest Airlines flight,
which also failed in 2009.20 He has helped train many apprentices under his leadership in the
possibility that he is killed or arrested. Qasim al-Raymi is the military commander of the
organization and close confidant to al-Wahayshi. He has ‘spent some time in Afghanistan
17 “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” Mapping Militant Organizations. Stanford University. September 10, 2012.
http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi -bin/groups/view/19
18 Ibid.
19 Johnsen, Gregory D. “A Profile of AQAP’s Upper Echelon.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. July 24,
2012.
20 Ibid.
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training camps during the 1990s, was one of the few who escaped the high-security prison in
2006, and was instrumental in the offensive on the Shabwa and Abyan provinces.’21 Al-Raymi
has been reported as being killed several times, one report saying he was killed in a 2010
airstrike, but he is believed to still be alive.22 Siad al-Shihri was considered the No. 2 official in
the AQAP, who was the organization’s deputy leader.23 Al-Shihri, a former Guantanamo Bay
prisoner, was crucial to the ranks of the AQAP because he was responsible for fundraising and
recruitment activities until his subsequent death in July 2013.24
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Rival Political Factions in Yemen
Besides the AQAP, many factions exist in Yemen which want to guide the country in
different directions or even disintegrate the government. These groups are vying for: power,
religious manifestations, political cohesion, and/or for their own autonomy. Whatever the
reason the political faction is asserting itself, they are important to the dynamic with the AQAP
because some are actively fighting the organization or strongly oppose the group’s ideologies
and tactics, even though they continue to fight the government for their own causes.
Houthi Rebels
The Houthi rebels consist of the Zaydi Shiites in the North who have become more
aggressive and militarized with marginalization. The protagonist role by the Yemeni
21 Johnsen, Gregory D. “A Profi le of AQAP’s Upper Echelon.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. July 24,
2012.
22 Ibid.
23 News Correspondent. “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Confirms Group’s No. 2, Saeed al -Shihri, Killed in U.S.
Stike in Yemen.” CBS News. July 17, 2013.
24 News Correspondent. “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Confirms Group’s No. 2, Saeed al -Shihri, Killed in U.S.

government has also agitated tensions and augmented the Houthi movement. The leader and
founder of the movement, Sheikh Hussein Badr al Din al Houthi, was a prominent religious
scholar from a highly-respected family and activist on the issue of the Yemeni government’s
subversion to the U.S., along with other grievances.25 He was the leader of the Believing Youth
organization, a group of adolescent Yemenis who pursued actions to revive Zaydism through
protests, intimidation, or preachings, and the organizer of anti-government and anti-American
protests during President Saleh’s administration.26 The pro-US Yemen government under
President Saleh, was not going to tolerate any large-scale protests against his rule and
decisions, despite the fact that the former President is also a Zaydi. The Zaydis in the north did
not see him as a legitimate ruler since he did not descend from the bloodline of the Prophet, a
believe they hold. The Houthi leader became more vocal against the Saleh government until
“the government issued a reward for the capture of Hussein… [when] security forces killed him
in September 2004 during an attempt to arrest him.”27 This incident became the catalyst for
the Houthi movement and tensions exploded between the Yemeni government and the en
masse movement.
The government’s moves ignited a war in 2004 between the Zaydi community (Houthis)
and the Yemeni government forces under President Saleh. The results of the war were
catastrophic. “Starting in 2004, the war between Yemen's central government and the rebels,
called ‘Houthis’ after their assassinated leader, has displaced upwards of 300,000 people,
destroyed Zaidi religious sites, and disrupted age-old systems of tribal conflict mediation,” due
25 Zimmerman, Katherine and Chris Harnisch. “Profile: al Houthi Movement.” Critical Threats Project. American
Entreprise Institute. January 28, 2010.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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to the killing of Hussien al Houthi and the reactionary response.28 Some 20,000-30,000
casualties, both combatants and noncombatants, were reported and another 3,000 detained in
Yemeni prisons for fighting the government in the 2004 rebellion.29
After the 2004 war, Hussein al Houthi’s father Badr al din al Houthi took the reigns of
the al Houthi movement to continue the fight. He guided the group as the spiritual leader but
was instrumental as a backer of the two fighting episodes that took place the following year in
2005 into 2006.30 Hussein’s al Houthi’s brother, Abdul Malik al Houthi, assumed leadership of
the group or political faction in 2006 from his father and is the current leader. He participated
in several cease-fires and settlements, such as the June 2007, Qatari-mediated peace
agreement but none have been withstanding.31
The Houthi movement has aspired to obtain several objectives, some of which have
been hazy or conflictual. One of the objectives, which most followers would not be conflicted
on, is to simply defend Islam’s values under their Zaydi, religious views. They also wish to gain
more autonomy in the north under Zaydi control. Some objectives which are more conflictual
include intentions to establish a Zaydi imamate, as Hussein’s father advocated, and the
expulsion of the Saleh regime, which became a reality in the 2011 Arab Spring uprising.32
28 Wells, Madeline. “Yemen’s Houthi Movement and the Revolution.” Foreign Policy. February 27, 2012.
29 Salmoni, Barak. “Yemen’s Forever War: The Houthi Rebellion.” Policywatch 1681. The Washington Institute. July
20, 2010.
30 Zimmerman, Katherine and Chris Harnisch. “Profile: al Houthi Movement.” Critical Threats Project. American
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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The Harak Movement
The Harak movement, or al-Harak al-Janoubi, are the southern
secessionists/autonomous protestors who want either a complete return to the pre-1990
borders when the Republic of Yemen was two countries or who want more autonomy,
depending on the member. The Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) of the north peacefully united with
the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) during 1990. The southern PDRY
was a “centralized pro-Soviet regime in the South” that pursued radical Marxist-Leninst style,
government control of the country and wanted minimal external interference from their
northern neighbor at the time, while north Yemen was more capitalistic and decreasingly less
pan-Arabism.33
The YAR and PDRY both pursued anti-colonialism policies, as they were both under
Ottoman and British control, respectively, at differing points, but that was one of the few
similarities that existed between the two countries. Both had conceived very different
alliances, ideologies, and nationalisms. While Yemen as a whole started out supporting Arab
nationalism, by 1965, there had become two camps of Arab nationalism.34 The “Arab
nationalism, of both Nasserist and Ba’thist variants,” which had once engulfed many Arab
states, splitered into differing groups across the Middle East.35 The old movement, Movement
of Arab Nationalists (MAN), broke into two major camps in Yemen; the Front for the Liberation
of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF) in North Yemen
33 Hinnebusch, Raymond and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Print. 259.
34 Ibid, 265.
35 Ibid, 265.
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which quickly died out.36 The FLOSY helped unite South Yemen to fight against British
colonialism and win their independence in 1967 with the withdrawal of British forces, but the
YAR had already gained their independence forty-nine years before South Yemen.37 South
Yemen’s foreign policy-making was uneasy with the strict Marxist-Leninist ideology, decreasing
support from the Soviet Union, and unintended isolation which South Yemen faced. Just 23
years after their independence, the PDRY agreed to unify under one Yemen.
Since the 1990 conglomeration of South Yemen (PDRY) into North Yemen (YAR),
tensions have been tumultuous, despite the Unification Agreement of 1990 being accepted by
both the two countries and “with almost universal support in North and South.”38 The two
sides thought it would be better, economically and nationally, for unication of Yemen to occur.
This has not been the case, however, because four years after the Unification Agreement was
signed, a civil war broke out between the two factions in 1994. The war broke out due to
grievances by what became known as the Harak protests and later the Harak movement of
southerners. They were dismayed by the state taking power of the whole of the state and
controlling the few natural resources of the country.39 The “grievances are mostly political and
economic in nature, but cultural and religious concerns have also come to the fore” by the
young activists.40 The Harak movement advocates peaceful protests and means while
36 Ibid, 265
37 Hinnebusch, Raymond and Anoushiravan Ehteshami. The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. Print. 266.
38 Ibid, 272.
39 Dahlgren, Susanne. “The Snake with a Thousand Heads: The Southern Cause in Yemen.” Middle East Report, 256.
Fall 2010. 28.
40 Ibid, 32.
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disavowing any violent acts by a select few individuals, however, the military is increasingly
using violent means to purge the protests which is causing a reactionary course of action.
The Abdrahbu Mansour Hadi Government
President Hadi served as Minister of Defense to Yemen during the 1994 civil war with
the southern secessionists and was appointed Vice President by the ousted President Ali
Abdullah Saleh.41 President Hadi has served as the transitional president since February 2012
and will finish his term in 2015 when open elections will be held.42 Much is expected of the
transitional presidency under Mansour Hadi. He is suppose to be paving the way for a unified
Yemen but faces troubles such as soaring poverty, armed political factions from across Yemen,
and corruption from within his own government. Even worse, President Hadi’s own military
“remained divided between rival military factions aligned to the former president and to
General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, commander of the First Armoured Brigade who had defected to
the opposition”, making security threats to the government or to the civilians very difficult to
resolve. This is in part because President Saleh, who often criticizes President Hadi, feels he
was slighted when he was ousted and his appointed Vice President took his spot.
The relationship which the U.S. and the Yemeni government holds is important to
Yemeni politics and the political factions within Yemen. While political maneauvering by the
Yemeni government tries to deny the closeness of the military relationship between the U.S.
and their government, it is a political reality on the ground, and has been since 2002. Under US
41 “Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi.” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. Georgetown University.
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/abd-rabbuh-mansour-hadi
42 Ibid.
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President George W. Bush and Yemeni President Abdullah Saleh, a “predator drone that killed
six suspected Al Qaeda terrorists travelling in a vehicle in Yemen on Sunday [November 6th
2002] was carried out with the cooperation and approval of that country’s leadership, U.S.
sources said yesterday.”43 This was the start of the “secretive” military relationship between
the US government and Saleh’s government, which was advanced and expanded in Hadi’s
government.
Known drone/airstrikes on al-Qaeda and other militants by an average estimate
of thos e killed.
–Courtesy of CFR, originally published by New America Foundation.
http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369
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President Hadi has
significantly expanded the
military operations, via drones,
which the US government
carries out under the
authorization of Yemeni officials.
According to conservative
estimates recorded by the Public Broadcasting Service via Frontline, “124 suspected U.S. drone,
missile or other airstrikes [have been] carried out since 2002” and 17 drone/airstrikes have
been carried out this year alone.44 All but a select few of the strikes occurred after 2008, during
the Obama administration. Since the AQAP is fairly new and was not designated a FTO until
2010, it is logical that the organization would be targeted more during the Obama
administration. However, they would not be able to target AQAP targets in the sovereign state
of Yemen unless they had authorization to do so.
43 Pincus, Walter. “Missile Strike Carried Out With Yemeni Cooperation: Official Says Operation Authorized Under
Bush Finding.” Washington Posts Article in Journal of Military Ethics, 2:3. 2003. 227-229.
44 Khan, Azmat, Sam Bailey, and Jason Breslow. “Interactive Map: America’s War in Yemen.” Frontline interactive
map on Public Broadcasting Service. October 30, 2014.

Both governments have similar interests and concerns regarding the political factions
within Yemen, principally that of AQAP. The eradication of the extremist organization is one
which has support from most in the government, however, some differ in the methods and
military partners (drones and the US government) used. The military relationship seems posed
to withstand, however. The continuing US-Yemeni relationship and recent developments in
Yemen could offer some insight into the resilience of AQAP too.
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Recent Developments & the Current State of Affairs
The recent Houthi rebellion, which is a major concern to security in Yemen as the
military has failed to hold the rebels from overtaking the capital city, is only one such incident
where state politics allows the AQAP to operate with semi-impunity in the region because of
their focus on the developing rebellions occuring in the north. The Houthis “seized control of
Sanaa” and they refrained from taking the presidential palace in a coup d’ètat.45 They instead
sat down at the table and asked for an agreement with the government that they would retreat
if a new prime minister was appointed, new advisors to the president would be instituted from
both the Southern Movement and from the Houthis, while also reestablishing the fuel
subsidy.46 The Houthis refused to leave the capital, probably because they were suspicious that
their demands would not be followed. Fighting continued until the political factions signed
another agreement which is suppose to form a “competent national government” with the
selection of new ministers who are representative of the population (factions).47
45 Harb, Khalil. “Houthis take Sanaa but Refrain from Coup.” Al-Monitor. September 22, 2014.
46 Ibid.
47 Correspondent. “Yemeni Factions Agree to Form a New Government.” Al-Jazeera. November 2, 2014.

This ongoing insurgency and the subsequent peace agreements, while urgent and
aspiring, has focused all attention away from AQAP in the last few months. If these agreements
don’t spring real results, AQAP will be the only beneficiaries to the recent events.
With that being said, the government forces and the Houthis recently entered into a de
facto alliance against the AQAP when “Houthi rebels backed by government forces entered into
an al Qaeda stronghold in central Yemen on Sunday [October 26, 2014].”48 Despite fighting
each other, the two factions are able to put aside differences mid-battle to fight against the
terrorist organization, AQAP, which they find to be the biggest threat to their own security and
to Yemen’s security. They are willing put aside differences and to form a de facto alliance to
fight AQAP, temporarily. This shows that AQAP’s resilience is not permanent, no matter how
entrenched they currently are in the country.
Many similarities can be seen between the Harak movement and the Houthi movement,
in as far as they both lack participation in the political process and remain committed to
dissolving corruption in the government, which are major concerns for good governance. Both
groups find al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to be repulsive, but the Houthis have a true
hatred towards their radical Sunni counterpart, and vice versa. The Harak and Houthi
movements also differ in many ways too, such as the means to bring about change, where the
Harak movement believes in peaceful protests and the Houthi movement believes in armed
conflict in changing the political environment. This is why the Houthi rebels were not afraid to
bear arms “in early 2011 [when] AQAP’s deputy leader Said al-Shihri declared jihad against the
48 Ghobari, Mohammed. “It Is Now Houthi Rebels And Government Forces Against Al Qaeda In Yemen.” Reuters
article in Busniss Insider. October 26, 2014.
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Huthis.”49 In this case, the AQAP decided to inflict violence on its periphery political rival which
only distracted the terrorist organization from their objectives; fighting the government forces,
banishing the US presence, and imposing strict Shari’a law. If the government fights opposing
political factions, it is beneficial to AQAP but if the AQAP begins to fight the political factions,
besides the Hadi government forces, it is just a hindrance to their goals.
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AQAP’s Enduring Survival
The recent happenings with the Houthi rebels in the north, continued tussles with the
Harak movement, and the militarization towards AQAP results in a troubled landscape. There is
no doubt that “Yemen faces ongoing political and economic challenges that will shape the
threat posed by AQAP in the coming years” which is the reason AQAP picked Yemen to
reinstate the al-Qaeda affiliate.50 The landscape is perfect in Yemen for the al-Qaeda affiliate
because the pressure is not solely on the organization but on a host of problems which the
country currently holds. A worm picks the best apples to fed from because they are ripe for the
taking; the same goes for the AQAP organization in Yemen.
If one wants to know why AQAP has been resilient in staying power, all one must do is
look at Yemeni politics and factions to answer that question. The resiliency of the AQAP is due
to the multitude of issues and political factions who each have their own grievances which
brings attention and resources away from the terrorist organization. There have been small
victories against AQAP by Hadi’s government, for example, when “in June [2013] the Yemeni

army finally forced a retreat of Al-Qaeda affilitated militants occupying Zinjibar, a provincial
capital of Abyan, toppling the short-lived ‘Islamic Emirate of Abyan.’”51 These small victories
are usually temporary or cause revenge attacks by the AQAP on government officials, military
and police members, or on innocent civilians who blame the government for not providing
security after an attack is executed.
Some of the perfect conditions are present in Yemen for the AQAP’s survival. These
conditions include extreme poverty, a highly divisive country, multiple political factions, poor
governance and their inability to provide basic services, poor education, influence from foreign
actors, an alliance between the Yemeni government and US government (which many Yemenis
see as colonialism), poor development, and an uncertainty of the future. With a 54.5 percent
poverty rate in 2012, and a large unemployment rate, Yemenis are stuck in the cross hairs
between political factions and can be easily persuaded by AQAP members with bribes or
intimidation.52 Due to the extreme poverty, dwindling natural resources & government capital,
and lack of participation in the political process, Yemenis distrust the government, whether it is
President Saleh or President Hadi in power. With a distrust of government, comes a higher
possibility for support of al-Qaeda because “according to Andrew Garfield, Glevum’s founder,
approval of AQAP is highest where citizens are most dissatisfied with the Yemeni
government.”53 Al-Qaeda often gets sympathy from Sunni tribesmen but if civilians, who
normally would not support the group, give their sympathies to al-Qaeda then they can become
51 Northedge, Leonie. “Is the US Shadow War Helping Yemen?” The World Today, Royal Institute of International
Affairs. February 1, 2013.
53 West, Eleanor T. “Yemen: Hearts, Minds and Al -Qaeda.” World Policy Journal, 28:2. Summer 2011. 122.
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entrenched in Yemen. This would make for harder tactics and more resources to eradicate the
group.
Furthermore, “Yemen’s recent transition and fragmentation has provided an ideal
opportunity for AQAP to create these spaces from within which to operate” without a major
fear of government forces disrupting their activities because their eyes are fixated on other
issues.54 The multitude of factions allows al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to not be
constantly monitored or targeted. Movements and whereabouts of leaders is tougher when
two other political factions are fighting or protesting the government at the exact same time.
These other political complexes cause time and resources to be exhausted elsewhere and not
on the AQAP.
“International concern in Yemen is primarily driven by fear that a failed state would
allow it to become the ‘next Afghanistan’, a base from where Al-Qaeda terrorists could launch
attacks on the West”, but international onlookers or foreign third parties involved in the feared
failed state often disregard political factions and state politics.55 They get tunnel vision on the
terrorist organization, instead of looking at the conditions which harvest these organizations.
The factors can be numerous and it often takes multiply factors for the survival of an
organization such as the AQAP, but understanding the political context of the host country is
essential to understanding the resilience of the AQAP.
54 Sharp, Robert. “Why Yemen’s Fight Against Al -Qaeda is about Survival.” International Policy Digest. May 10,
2014.
55 Northedge, Leonie. “Is the US Shadow War Helping Yemen?” The World Today, Royal Institute of International
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Policy Prescriptions
Policy Prescription I
The first prescription would be to increase military funds and allow more U.S. drone
strikes to be advanced upon AQAP to root out the resilient organization by force. This policy
would draw attention away from other political factions and focus all time and resources on the
AQAP. The U.S. would be allowed to bomb al-Qaeda during a several month operation while
Yemeni ground troops would root out the organization from urban environments. This policy
prescription would be a purely military option.
The benefits would be the heavy losses to top and mid-level AQAP officials and even to
lower ground troops. This move would make it tough for the organization to carry on with
operations, however, if in the process of the military operations children were hurt or Yemenis
found sympathy from innocent civilian casualties, then a backlash could occur. A new fortified
organization with grudges could be resurrected. Furthermore, this option does nothing to
address the reasons for why the AQAP is finding it so easy to set up camps in Yemen in the first
place.
Policy Prescription II
The second policy prescription would be to offer high currency rewards for information
leading to the arrests of mid to high-level AQAP leaders, and smaller rewards for lower level
runners in the organization. On top of this reward system, the Yemeni government would allow
economic development and poverty reduction NGOs into the country to advance the average

Yemeni civilian out of poverty and provide them with a way to earn a salary. The problem is
these NGOs would be targets for AQAP and many Sunni tribesmen hold strong to their
agreements or values over a reward for an AQAP leader. The AQAP may target the Sunni
tribesmen or civilian who turned in the reward, causing unintended consequences.
Policy Prescription III
The third prescription is a multi-faceted solution to the malleability of the organization
which I believe would best serve Yemen over Policy I or Policy II. This plan calls for increased
political participation for the Harak and Houthis which is in progress now, but needs to be
followed through. I also propose a new constitution where new and old political parties can be
institutionalized so armed rebellions would not have to take place in the future to obtain
political participation. The next step would be a phasing out of drone and missile strikes by the
U.S., a move which I feel will be very popular in Yemen as a whole and would play on the
colonialism card to unite Yemenis. Instead, I propose more direct military operations by
Yemeni forces, with the possibility of U.S. counterterrorism intelligence on AQAP being
provided. Furthermore, the fuel subsidy would be reestablished, genuine purges of corruption
in the government would be advanced, and calls for foreign aid to be increased would be called
upon, given the drastic steps being undertaken to further the nation’s interests.
The rebuffs to this policy prescription include increased military deaths with direct
fighting of the AQAP, the U.S. as still a foreign player in Yemen, and the daunting task of
purging corruption in the Yemeni government. All our valid rejections to the policy but the
positive aspects would most likely outweigh the costs. A more accountable and service-
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oriented government like the northern and southern movements had wished for would be
achieved. Also, this could help alleviate Yemen’s debt, inspire investment, and allow more
services to be provided. As stated earlier, the more services provided and the more the people
trust their government in Yemen, the less likely they will be sympathetic to the AQAP group.
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Conclusion
AQAP is resilient for many reasons including high poverty, sympathy from Sunni
tribesmen, political fragmentation and internal strife in the country between political factions,
high unemployment, weak institutions, and so on. The structure of the organization and
merger between the Saudi and Yemeni branches of AQAP after it had been decimated by Saudi
intelligence in the early 2000s, marked a new and improved organization that was able to
exploit the situation in Yemen for its own gain. While AQAP has suffered some setbacks
including government forces retaking Zinjibar, a key AQAP stronghold, the assassination of
Anwar al-Awlaki, fighting Houthi rebels in their strongholds in recent weeks, and an increasingly
young, secular population in general, they have remained resilient.
I have provided three policy presciptions to root out al-Qaeda and to stabilize the
political situation in Yemen. The first was a militarized policy prescription where increased
targeting was the only change, the second was offering to allow NGOs into the country and
offer high rewards for information leading to the capture of AQAP members, and the third
prescription was an amalgamation of factors in a multifaceted approach. I advocated for the
third policy prescription which called for an increaseed political participation for the Harak and
Houthi movements, institutionalizing of a new constitution, less U.S. drone strikes, more

ground operations to root out AQAP, reinstating the fuel subsidy, ending government
corruption, and calling for more foreign aid. This is the policy prescription I believe would best
serve Yemenis and would be able to eradicate AQAP as a political faction in the country.
AQAP can no longer be the worm which eats the ripe apple in Yemen. The fruits of
labor come to those who fight for the good of their country and for the good of its civilians. The
terrorist organization has preyed on Yemeni civilians and the government forces who wish to
see their country become unified and decorous. Al-Wahayshi and his al-Qaeda counterparts
have exploited the situation in Yemen for their own religious fanaticism but will come to realize
the Yemeni spirit is much stronger than the Kalashnikov assault rifles which AQAP brandishes.
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