This document summarizes a lecture on constructivism and international relations theories. It introduces constructivism and compares it to realism and neoliberalism. Constructivism emphasizes the role of ideas and identity in shaping state interests and behavior, rather than just material factors. It holds that identities give rise to interests and norms of appropriate behavior. The document then discusses structural constructivism and the role of norms, before examining identity and status concerns in international politics.

1. IAFF 6101
Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone
Lecture 4: Construc.vism
September 20, 2016
Today’s Class
• Review Liberalism
• Introduc.on to Construc.vism
• Structural Construc.vism
• Norms and Construc.vism
– Effects of Norms
– Causes of Norms
• Iden.ty and Status Concerns
Neoliberal Ins-tu-onalism
• Primarily a structural theory
– Keohane emphasized that neoliberalism is built on
the same core
assump.ons as structural realism
• Anarchy, states, ra.onal unitary actors
• Different conclusions

2. – Significant coopera.on is possible under anarchy
– Interna.onal ins.tu.ons are the key
• Ins.tu.ons: “persistent and connected sets of rules
(formal and
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain
ac.vity, and shape
expecta.ons” (Keohane 1989, 3)
• Key func.on of ins.tu.ons = informa.on and
monitoring
Economic Interdependence Theories
Interna.onal commerce and tradeè Fewer incen.ves
for conflict and war
• Nosingle theory, but rather a lot of
poten.al causal
mechanisms linking interdependence and peace
– Opportunity costs
– Crea.onof domes.c cons.tuencies opposed to war
– Signaling mechanism
– Globaliza.on of produc.on reduces benefits of
conquest
– Middle ground: expecta.ons about future trade
Democra-c Peace Theories
Stable, mature democracies do not fight wars against

3. each
other
• Again, no single theory, but lots of theories
o Costs
o Norms
• Respect for individual rights/autonomy
• Non-violent conflict resolu.on
o Ins.tu.ons
• Public/group constraint
• Slow mobiliza.on/surprise a_ack
• Democra.c war-figh.ng
Liberal Theories and Levels of
Analysis
1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image
Liberalism Democra.c Peace
Interdependence
Ins.tu.onalism
Interdependence
3 Philosophical Tradi-ons

4. • Construc.vism
– Emphasizes role of ideasand iden.ty – as
opposed to material power and interests
– Norms of appropriate behavior
Ra-onal Choice Theory
• Desire (interest) + Belief (idea) è Ac.on
• Hunger + Belief that hunger can be sa.ated è
Go to 7/11
• Desire/interest = Key driver of behavior
Realism Example
• Anarchy
• States = main actors = like units
• States want to survive
• Interests = fixedand unchanging (exogenous) =
maximize security
• Iden.ty nowhere to be found

5. Neoliberalism Example
• Anarchy
• States = main actors
• States want to survive
• Interests = fixedand unchanging (exogenous) =
maximize absolute gains from coopera.on
• Coopera.on does not change state interests or
iden..es
The Construc-vist Take
• Few interests actually based in material needs;
most are
learned/socialized into us
• Most interests are in fact ideas– ideasabout
how to
meet needs
– Most ideasabout how to meet needs dictated by
iden.ty
• “Rela.vely stable, role-specific understandings and
expecta.ons
about self” (Wendt 1992, 397)
– Iden..es= basisof interests
• Iden.ty è Interests/Desires è Belief/Idea

6. è Ac.on
The Construc-vist Take, Pt. 2
• Iden..es have norms associatedwith them –
prescrip.ons for behavior
– Example: “civilized” states don’t use
weapons that
cause superfluous harm, like Dum Dum bullets
• Iden.ty è Norms è Interests/Desires è
Belief/Idea è Ac.on
The Construc-vist Take, Pt. 2
• Our views of others’ iden..es also affect
our
behavior
– Example: Policeman, President Knapp
Wendt vs. Waltz
• Waltz: Anarchy has a single logic, forces
states
to compete, rely on self-help
• Wendt: Self-help does not flow from anarchy

7. Wendt vs. Waltz
• Waltz: Anarchy has a single logic, forces
states to compete, rely on
self-help
• Wendt: Self-help does not flow from anarchy
• First encounter – Aliens
– Not ra.onal to assume the worst just because
you don’t have 100%
certainty about inten.ons
• Same goes for first encounters in the state of
nature
• “Predators” (i.e., greedy states) can generate self-
help and
compe..on– but this is not an inevitable product of
anarchy
Wendt and Structure
• Waltz’s concep.on of structure = underspecified
• Adds iden.ty and interests: knowledge and ideas
that states have about each other
• Material capabili.es don’t speak for
themselves –
given meaning by ideas
– North Korean (enemy) nukes vs. Bri.sh (friend)

8. nukes
Different Kinds of Anarchies
• Anarchy of “enemies”looks very different from
anarchy of “friends”
• Hobbesian/Compe..ve: Self-help (Realism)
• Lockean/Individualis.c: Self-help (Neoliberal)
• Kan.an/Coopera.ve: NOT Self-help
– Collec.ve security
– A world of all liberal democracies?
Structural Change
• Prospects for change: not easy,but possible
• Big example = Gorbachev
– Transforma.ve prac.ces
• Try to convince West that Soviet iden.ty was
changing
– Try to persuade West to adopt more coopera.ve
stance
• “Altercas.ng”
Structural vs. otherConstruc-visms

9. • Wendt = structural (3rd image) construc.vist
– Interac-on è Iden.ty è Interests è Behavior
• Leaves open the possibility that things inside
states are more important driver of iden..es
and interests than interac.on between states
• Hard to put into prac.ce
Norms
• Shared expecta.ons about behavior
• Standards of right and wrong
• Prescrip.ons or proscrip.ons for behavior, for
actors with certain iden.ty
Norma-ve Effects, 1
• Regula-ve
– Viola.ng norms imposes a cost
– S.ll follows logicof consequences
– Only type of norma.ve effect you can have in
realism or neoliberalism
Norma-ve Effects, 2
• Substan-ve/cons-tu-ve – normhas taken-

10. for-granted character, cons.tutes iden.ty
– “This is just wrong”
– “We don’t do things like this”
– Logic of appropriateness
• Norm è Iden.ty è Interest è Behavior
Norma-ve Effects, 3
• Permissive – normagainst one thingcreates
more permissive environment for another
thing
Effects of Norms: Tannenwald
• “Taboo” against the use of nuclear weapons
• Reasonsfor doubt?
– Wars of choice – low interests engaged
– U.S./NATO first use doctrine in Europe
– Li_le evidence of taboo among public
Origins of Norms
• Power + Principle
– Norm vs. assassina.on (Ward Thomas)
– Convergenceof principle with interests of powerful
states
– Leadersnot appropriate targets
– Norm under stress?

11. • Graoing
– Norm adopted against the wishes of powerful
states (Richard
Price)
– Graoing of effects of weapons onto normagainst
“indiscriminateness”
– Appeal to “civilized” iden..es vs. “barbarism”
• Chemical weapons post-WW1
• Land mines – highlights role of individuals
Status Seeking
• What’s the problem for China and Russia?
– They seek recogni.on as greatpowers
– Goal = “to restore both countries’ greatpower
status” (p. 66)
• In otherwords, they have an “iden.ty crisis”
– Either they used to be GPs and seek to restore
that status…
– …or they self-iden.fy as GPs and seek recogni.on
of that
status
• Iden.ty/status is understood as posi.onal
– There is a hierarchy, and you want to move up
in the world

12. Why Seek Status?
• Individuals (states) desire self-esteem
• Individuals (states) derive self-esteem from group
membership
• Individuals (states) want their group to have a
posi.ve iden.ty
• Posi.ve iden.ty is obtained via comparison to
others
Status-Seeking Strategies
• Social mobility
– Seek acceptance into the elite group by
imita.ng its norms, prac.ces, joining its
ins.tu.ons
– Only possible if boundaries are permeable
• Social compe..on
– Compete with leader(s) in area on which its
superiority rests (e.g., arms race)
– When boundaries are impermeable
• Social crea.vity
– Don’t try to change exis.ng hierarchy, but seek
pres.ge in a different area
altogether
• Turn a nega.ve into a posi.ve

13. • Find a new dimensionon which you are
superior
– Has to be recognized as validby dominant
group
• If not recognized, compe..onensues
China and Status
• Compe..ve up to mid-1990s
• Social crea.vity
– Responsible greatpower
– Recognized by U.S.:“responsible stakeholder”
• What about now?
Russia and Status
• Social mobility into mid-1990s
• Social compe..on, 1996-1999
– NATO expansion
– But too weakto ma_er – “Zaire with
permafrost”
• Social crea.vity, 1999-
– 9/11: Pu.n cooperates with U.S.
– But not recognized by U.S. as an equal
• Return to social compe..on, mid-2000s

14. IAFF 6101
Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone
Lecture 3: Liberalism
September 13, 2016
Today’s Class
• Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc;on to Liberalism
• Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra;c Peace Theory
Structural (Neo) Realism
• Key assump;ons: anarchy, states, survival,
uncertainty
• Structure of the system induces compe;;ve
behavior,
balancing, imita;on
• Even defensively mo;vated states can end up in
compe;;on

15. • Maximize security, not power, because:
– States balance against power
– Security dilemma
Offensive Realism
• Same basicstar;ng assump;ons
• Different key predic;on: states maximize rela;ve
power
• SD = unavoidable; states have no choice
but to compete
• All GPs bid for regional hegemony
• But isn’t maximizing power irra;onal if you
know the SD
exists?
Defensive Realism
• Same star;ng assump;ons, but portrays a less
compe;;ve
world where coopera;on is not only possible,
but some;mes
a beTer routeto security than compe;ng
• Emphasis on the SD, but SD can vary in
intensity

16. • Offense-defense balance causes the SD to vary
• ODB determined by technology and geography
Mo-va-onal Realism
Builds on defensive realism in two ways:
• Introduces varia;on in state type
– Greedy/revisionist
– Security-seeker/status quo
• Introduces informa;on variables
– Your informa;on about adversary’s type
– Your informa;on about adversary’s beliefs
about your
type
– Informa;on is generated through signaling
Hegemonic Realism
• Preponderance = peace
• Balance = war
• “The growth of the power of Athens, and
the
alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made
war
inevitable.”

17. • Preven;ve war
The Bargaining Model
• Three ra;onal explana;ons for war:
– Private info and incen.ves to
misrepresent
– Credible commitment problems
– Issue indivisibility
1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image
Realism Human nature/
Classical
Mo;va;onal/
Neoclassical
Neorealism
Offensive
Defensive

18. Hegemonic
Bargaining model
Realism and Levels of Analysis
What Unites Realists?
• Emphasis on structure of system, defined in
material
terms
• Emphasis on states as main actors
• Ra;onality
• Security dilemma
• Ins;tu;ons – interna;onal or domes;c – play
liTle role
What Divides Realists?
• What comprises structure
– Power
– Power + ODB
• Interpreta;on of the security dilemma
– Highly constraining
– Not constraining
• System structure most conducive to peace, stability
– Unipolar/hegemonic vs. bipolar vs. mul;polar

19. • Varia;on in state type
– All seek security
– Some seek only security, someseek things beyond
security
Today’s Class
• Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc-on to Liberalism
• Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra;c Peace Theory
The Kan-an Triad
• Republican cons;tu;ons (liberal democracy)
• Interna;onal law and organiza;on
• Cosmopolitan law (free trade)
Wilsonian Liberalism
• Make the world safe for democracy

20. • League of Na;ons
• Removebarriers to trade
The Liberal Tradi-on in America
• U.S. presidents tend to be liberal interna;onalists
– Promote democracy
• More or less forcefully
– Work with mul;lateral ins;tu;ons
• Bush excepted
– Support free trade
• NAFTA, TPP
• Hillary Clinton?
• Donald Trump?
Dueling Anarchies
Realism
• Anarchy: life is nasty,
bru;sh, and short
Liberalism
• Anarchy: individuals have
rights, should not violate

21. rights of others
Liberal Assump-ons
• Anarchy, but state of nature ≠ state of war
• Interstate rela;ons not zero-sum
• Coopera;on is possible
• States differen;ated by internal characteris;cs
• States have aims that go beyond security
è In sum, anarchy does not preclude beneficial
coopera;on
and stable, peaceful rela;ons.
Today’s Class
• Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc;on to Liberalism
• Neoliberal Ins-tu-onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra;c Peace Theory
Neoliberal Ins-tu-onalism

22. • Primarily a structural theory
– Keohane emphasized that neoliberalism is built on
the same core assump;ons as structural realism
• Anarchy, states, ra;onal unitary actors
• Different conclusions
– Significant coopera;on is possible under anarchy
– Interna;onal ins;tu;ons are the key
Defini-ons and Types
• Ins;tu;ons: “persistent and connected sets of rules
(formal
and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles,
constrain
ac;vity, and shape expecta;ons” (Keohane 1989, 3)
– a.k.a., regimes
• Possible forms/types
– Can include a formal organiza;on (NATO,
WTO, IMF), but need not
– Alliances
– Arms control agreements
– Trade deals
– Regimes, which can include broader
understandings, norms,
decision-making procedures
• NPT regime: includes NPT, but also addi;onal
ins;tu;ons, normagainst
prolifera;on

23. Player 2
KeepQuiet
(Cooperate)
Rat
(Defect)
Player 1
KeepQuiet
(Cooperate)
Good, Good Worst, Best
Rat
(Defect)
Best,Worst Bad, Bad
By doing what is individually ra;onal, both players
get a worse outcome than they
could have goTen by coopera;ng
Prisoner’s Dilemma

24. Coopera-on in a Neoliberal World
• Chief obstacle to coopera;on = (fear of)
chea;ng
• How to alleviate this obstacle?
• Itera;on
• Reciprocity
• Monitoring and verifica;on
Providing Informa-on: Chea-ng
• A key func;on played by ins;tu;ons is providing
informa;on
• Ins;tu;ons usually lack enforcement capability
• Anarchy is lem unchanged
• Provide informa;on about state behavior
• Reduces barriers created by collabora;on
problems,
poten;al for chea;ng
• Effec;ve monitoring reduces the risks of being
cheated
• Examples: U.S.-Soviet arms control; NPT—IAEA
inspec;ons; Iran
nuclear agreement
Providing Informa-on: StateType

25. • Ins;tu;ons can also provide informa;on about
state type
• Uncertainty about type = key problem in
realism, helps fuel the SD
• State can gain a reputa;on via coopera;on in an
ins;tu;ons
of being a trustworthy type
• Mechanism: costly signaling
• Forego threatening forces
• Reducing your ability to cheat à security
seeker
• Constrain ability to use forces you have –
seeking UN
authoriza;on
• Enhance credibility of commitments
Establishing a Nego-a-ng Forum
• Reduces costsof beginning nego;a;ons
• Create shared set of understandings, terminology
• Arena to learnabout/resolve others’ concerns
• Help resolve issues that arise later,
unforeseeable
at the ;me ins;tu;on is created

26. IssueLinkages
• Creates linkages across issues that make deals
more feasible
• States may have incompa;ble preferences over a
single issue
• Broadening the issues being bargained over,linking
them, can facilitate agreements
• Side payments: climate change example
Neoliberal-Realist Debate
• There was—and con;nues to be—debate between
realists and neoliberals
• Some debate was unproduc;ve b/c it was based
on
argumentsthat were wrong
• Realismpredicts only compe;;on, not coopera;on
• Some debates ini;ally seemed stark, but evolved
as
both sidesmoderated their posi;ons
• Rela;ve gains
Neoliberal-Realist Debate, 2
• The big debate con;nues to be over establishing
the independent
effect of ins;tu;ons

27. • The standard realist response is that ins;tu;ons
are an effect, not a
cause
• Ins;tu;ons reflect the balance of power
• The same factors that make coopera;on likely
also cause ins;tu;ons
Ins;tu;ons
Structure
Coopera;on
• Ins;tu;ons are “endogenous” to structure – NATO
example
王钊
Neoliberal-Realist Debate, 3
• Defensive/mo;va;onal realist response
– Yes, signaling is important, but ins;tu;ons are
not
especially important for this
• Signaling can some;mes be done unilaterally
• Under somecondi;ons, ins;tu;ons might help, but
are
by no means the only (or most important) method
of
signaling
Neoliberalism and the Rise of China

28. • Mostly op;mists
• China has joined someimportant ins;tu;ons
– WTO
– NPT
– 6-party talks on DPRK nukes
• Westernliberal order open to China and
capable of accommoda;ng it (Ikenberry)
Today’s Class
• Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc;on to Liberalism
• Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism
• Economic Interdependence
• Democra;c Peace Theory
Economic Interdependence
Interna;onal commerce and tradeè Fewer
incen;ves for conflict and war
• Nosingle theory, but rather a lot of
poten;al
causal mechanisms linking interdependence
and peace

29. Opportunity Costs
• High levels of interdependence è High
opportunity costsfor war
– Not only have to pay the costsof figh;ng
– Also lose the benefits you would have gained
from
trade
– Develop a stakein trading partner’s well-being
Domes-c Cons-tuencies
• High levels of interdependence è Crea;on of
domes;c cons;tuencies that oppose war
– Exporters will lobby the government to resolve
disputes peacefully
Costly Signals
• High levels of interdependence è Costly
signal of state’s resolve
– If war is caused by private informa;on,
threatening to hurt your own well-being by

30. cuqng off beneficial tradeis a way to signal
resolve in a dispute
Globaliza-on of Produc-on
• Globaliza;on of produc;on è Great power
peace (Brooks 2005)
– Supply chain is spread around the world
– Aggressors cannot capture and exploit modern
MNCs
– Reduces cumula;vity of resources, discourages
aggression
Realist Responses
• Trade dependence creates vulnerability
– States are inclined to expand to reduce it,
which increases
probability of war
– States are especially concerned to control key
resources, e.g.,
oil
• Security concerns dwarf economic ones
– Even if tradebrings largebenefits, it will not
outweigh benefits
of a war that increases security
• Trade that results in rela;ve losses (even if
absolute gains)

31. is undesirable b/c it reduce state’s rela;ve
power
Synthesis:Trade Expecta-ons Theory
• What maTers is not current levels of trade,
but
expecta;ons about future trade
• States with high levels of tradecan s;ll go to
war – if they
expect tradecut off in future
• Key = costsof adjustment
– Once you specialize, become dependent, costsof
cut off
increase, worse than if you remained autarkic
• For China
– Trade currently high with U.S.—but what if Trump
wins?
– Increasing dependence on imported natural
resources
Today’s Class
• Quick Review of Realism
• Introduc;on to Liberalism
• Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism
• Economic Interdependence

32. • Democra-c Peace Theory
Democra-c Peace
• Democracies fight just as many wars as otherregime
types
• But democracies don’t seemto fight each other
Democra-c Peace?
• Controversial cases
• U.S. CivilWar, 1861-65
• Spanish-American, 1898
• Anglo-Boer, 1899-1902
• U.S.-Filipino, 1899-1902
• World War I – was Germany a democracy?
• Finland in World War II
• Kargil, 1999
• Russo-Georgian, 2008
• Data problems
• Few democracies + few wars, esp. pre-WW2
• Alterna;ve explana;ons for inter-democra;c peace
during Cold War
• Does democracy cause peace, or does peace
cause democracy?

33. Costs
• Becausethe people pay the costsof wars, they
are reluctant to fight them
– Problem: democracies have fought lots of wars!
– Problem: some;mes the people are gung-ho for
war!
Norms
• Leaders socialized to norms of peaceful
conflict resolu;on in domes;c society;
externalize those norms in foreign rela;ons
– Individual rights, non-interven;on
– Non-violent conflict resolu;on – compromise,
nego;a;on, media;on
– “Con;ngent consent”
Norms, 2
• Leaders socialized to norms of peaceful
conflict resolu;on in domes;c society;
externalize those norms in foreign rela;ons
• Other democracies warrant trust and respect,

34. non-interven;on; autocracies do not
– In permanent state of aggression against own
people
– Aggressive internally, aggressive externally
Norms: Problems?
• Other democracies warrant trust and respect, non-
interven;on; autocracies do not
– Problem: Covert Ac;on
– Problem: Imperialism
Ins-tu-ons
• Leaders are accountable to the public via
elec;ons, must heed their wishes to get
reelected
– Public/group constraint
• Problem: predicts fewer wars in general
– Slow mobiliza;on/surpriseaTack
• Problem: democracies have launched surprise aTacks
– Democracies fight harder
• Problem: why do autocracies aTack
democracies?

35. Liberal Theories and Levels of
Analysis
1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image
Liberalism Democra;c Peace
Interdependence
Ins;tu;onalism
Interdependence
IAFF 6101
Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone
Lecture 2: Realism
September 6, 2016
Today’s Class
• Classical (Human Nature) Realism
• Structural (Neo) Realism
– Offensive
– Defensive
• MoBvaBonal & Neoclassical Realism
– DisBnguishing thesefrom non-realist theories
• Hegemonic Realism (a.k.a. power transiBon theory)

36. • The Bargaining Model
Classical (Human Nature) Realism
• Cause of conflict is the lust for power rooted
in human
nature
– Animus dominandi, the will for power
• PoliBcs = the compeBBon for power
• Acknowledged that internaBonal system =
anarchic,
but emphasized individual human nature
• Problem: conflict varies, but human nature
doesn’t
– Hard to explain variaBon with a constant
Structural (Neo) Realism: Assump-ons
• About the System
– System = Anarchic
• About Units
– States = main actors
– States = like units
– States = unitary raBonal actors
– States want to survive …
– …but are uncertain about others’ intenBons

37. A NeorealistWorld
• CompeBBon for power
• Self-help
• Fear and mistrust
• PotenBal for cheaBng makes cooperaBon
dangerous
• RelaBve gains concerns further inhibit
cooperaBon
• CooperaBon = temporary
– No enduring friends, only enduring interests
A NeorealistWorld, cont.
• Security Dilemma
– Increase in your security decreases security of
others
• Maximize Security, not power – because states
balance, maximizing power
triggers SD
– Balancing is dominant tendency in the system
– States balance against power, don’t bandwagon
with it
� Seek an “appropriate” amount of power
• States balance in two ways:
– Internal(arms build-ups)

38. – External (alliances)
• Balance = good; imbalance = bad
• Bipolarity > MulBpolarity
Neorealism: Rise of China
• Growth in Chinese capabiliBes induces fears in
others – U.S.,regional powers
• PotenBal for SD
• Return to bipolarity
• Peace preserved by nuclear weapons, but plenty
of compeBBon – a new Cold War
Offensive Realism
• Similar starBng assumpBons
– Anarchy
– Offensive capability
– Uncertainty
– Survival
– RaBonality
• Predicted behaviors
– Fear
– Self-help
– Maximize rela:ve power

39. • Hard to determine what an “appropriate” amount of
power is
• Best way to survive is to acquire as much
power as possible
• Power accumulaBon only stopswhen states become
hegemons – global or regional?
– Work to prevent others from becoming regional
hegemons
Offensive Realism, cont.
• SD = unavoidable; states have no choice
but to
compete
• States don’t always balance – opens the
door to try
to max. rel. power
– Want to get others to pay the priceof
containing rising
powers
– Buckpassing common in mulBpolar systems
• How powerful the rising power is
• Geographic proximity of balancers
Offensive Realism: Rising China
• CompeBBon is unavoidable

40. • China will pursue regional hegemony
• China will compete intensely with the U.S.
• U.S. will compete to retain its posiBon
• War is not unlikely
Defensive Realism
• Same basicstarBng assumpBons, but portrays a
less compeBBve
world where more cooperaBon is possible
– Anarchy
– States
– Unitary actors
– RaBonality
– Survival/security-seeking
� Bofom-line: The internaBonal system can drivestates
into
compeBBon and conflict, BUT it doesn’t always
• Puzzle: How does the internaBonal system generate
this result?
Defensive Realism: Security Dilemma
• Emphasis on the security dilemma
– Policies a state pursues to increase its
security can reduce its adversary’s

41. security
– The adversary has the ability to respond in
ways that could then reduce
the state’s own security
• SD is logically necessary to generate compeBBon
between
security seekers
• RaBonal security seekers facing an SD can,
under some
condiBons, choose compeBBon or war
• BUT, under othercondiBons, cooperaBon can be
best opBon
The Compe--on Bias in Neorealism
• States seek security
• One way to pursue that is to compete
– But, compeBng can potenBally reduce your
security if the otherside reacts
– So, compeBBon is not necessarily smart
(or raBonal)
• Anotherway to is make the adversary more secure
– If the adversary is more secure, you are more secure!

42. • Strategy should be designed to reduce the
adversary’s insecurity, as well as
to deter
– The need to strike this balance is another
way to understand the SD
• CooperaBon can bring benefits
– Arms control to reduce military risks
– Restraint to send “costly” signals, reducing
poliBcal risks
• Arms control
• Unilateral restraint
Varia-on in the Security Dilemma
• The SD can vary in intensity
– When SD is mild, internaBonal system does
not generate strong
incenBvesto compete
• What causes the SD to vary?
• Offense-defense balance
– The relaBve ease of afack or defense in
war
– RelaBve cost of offense vs. defense
• ODB determined by:
– Technology
– Geography

43. Offense-Defense Advantage
• Military technology
– Mobility favors offense
– Firepower favors defense
Offense-Defense Advantage
• Geography
– Flat, open terrain favors offense
– Obstacles (rivers, mountains, forests) favor
defense
Offense-Defense Predic-ons
• Offensive Advantage è SD more intense è
War morelikely
• Defensive Advantage è SD less intense è
War
less likely
Defensive Realism: 4 Worlds
OFFENSE
DEFENSE

44. NOT
DISTINGUISHABLE
DISTINGUISHABLE
Offense &
Defense
DisBnguish-
able?
Offensive or Defensive Advantage
Nuclear Weapons and the SD
• Nuclear weapons favor defense
– Deterrence is funcBonalequivalent of defense
– Secure retaliatory capability is the key requirement
for deterrence
• Nuclear weapons make offense and defense
disBnguishable, at least with largearsenals
• Nukes therefore significantly diminish the SD
Defensive Realism and Rising China

45. • Peaceful rise is possible and intense compeBBon
can be
avoided
• Nuclear weapons provide core security
• Geography reduces potenBal for invasion
– But U.S. could be pulled into conflict in
otherways – allies…
• Restraint can be reinforcing
– OrcompeBBve policies by either side risk
damaging poliBcal
relaBons
Mo-va-onal Realism: StateType
• InternaBonal system = benign, offers few
incenBvesfor aggression
– States balance
– ODB typically favors the defense
• Yet aggression someBmes occurs under
structural condiBons when it
“shouldn’t”
• Offensive realist answer = all states are
revisionist!
• MoBvaBonal realist answer = states vary in
type
– Greedy
– Security-seeker/status quo

46. • State type explains aggression, more than structure
Mo-va-onal Realism: StateType,
cont.
• Divides states into greedy states and security-
seekers
• Doesn’t try to explain where those moBves
come
from
• Example: Schweller, Deadly Imbalances
– Puzzle: Why do somestates bandwagon (ally with
the
stronger side)?
– Answer: Revisionist states bandwagon, status
quo
states balance
Mo-va-onal Realism: Informa-on
• Recall that SD reflects uncertainty about moBves
• But uncertainty itselfis a variable
• High esBmates that the adversary is a security
seeker
reduce the SD
– CooperaBon = less risky

47. • InformaBon can offset dangerous material condiBons
– Power alone does not determine how threatening
others
are
Mo-va-onal Realism: Variables
• End up with 6 variables
– Materialvariables
• RelaBve power
• ODB
• O-D disBnguishability
– InformaBon variables
• Info about adversary’s moBves
• Info about the adversary’s info about your
moBves
– State’s moBves
• Security seeker vs. greedy
Mo-va-onal Realism: Rise of China
• ImplicaBons of China’s rise depends on China’s
type, moBves
– Peace is possible if China is security-seeking
state
– Intense compeBBon and possibly war are much
more
likely if China is a greedy/expansionist state

48. • Name of the game is discerning China’s
type
– Greedy vs. status quo/security seeker
– If greedy, limited aims vs. unlimited aims
– If limited aims, what does China want?
Non-Realist Theories
• Some theories are called “realist” when they
probably aren’t
• Theories that explain raBonal behavior given
structural constraints and/or state type = realist
• Theories that explain subopBmal (i.e., non-
raBonal) behavior – ojen with resort to theories
of domesBc poliBcs – are not realist
Non-Realist Theories: Examples
• Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire
– Puzzle: Why do somestates over-expand when
thereare
no structural incenBvesto do so?
– Answer: DomesBc coaliBonal logrolling and
naBonalist
mythmaking
• “Cult of the offensive”
– Puzzle: ObjecBve condiBons in 1914 favored
defense, yet

49. states nevertheless adopted offensive strategies
– Answer: European militaries favored offense for
organizaBonal reasons + poor civilian control of
the
military
Hegemonic Realism
• Preponderance = peace
– System is stable if thereis a clear hierarchy of
power
• Balance = war
– Shij awayfrom preponderance towards equality
between the leading two powers foreshadows
(hegemonic) war
• “The growth of the power of Athens, and
the
alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made
war
inevitable.”
The Case For Hegemony/Unipolarity
• Huge gap in power = no uncertainty
• Nopower transiBons
• Unipole can intervene to nip potenBal challenges in
the bud

50. • Hard for potenBal opponents to coordinate
• Bids for regional hegemony likely to be
opposed by
those in the region
Hegemonic Realism: Assump-ons
• Law of uneven growth
– States growat different rates over Bme
– Moves them up (and down) the hierarchy of
power
• In modern Bmes, industrializaBon = key factor
– Triggersconflict between declining hegemon and
rising challenger
– Outcome of war re-orders system
Hegemonic Realism:
Causal Mechanisms for War
• Disequilibrium in distribuBon of benefits,
presBge, territory, etc., in the system – sBll
favors the hegemon
• Nolonger reflects actual balance of power,
which increasingly favors the challenger

51. Hegemonic Realism:
Causal Mechanisms for War
• PrevenBve moBve
• Declining power wages war now to prevent
challenger
from rising and to head off its own decline
• Fight war now to avoid possibility of having
to fight a
war later under worse circumstances
• Similarity to commitment problem
• Example = Germany vs. Russia, 1914
The Bargaining Model
• Key insight: war is costly
– States have to pay a cost for fighBng whether
they win,
lose, or draw
• Costs of fighBng = big incenBve to negoBate a
seflement
• Why not simply skip the fighBng part and go
straight to a deal that reflects their relaBve
strength? Why does war nevertheless happen?

52. Ra-onal Explana-on for War #1
• States have private informa-on about their
capabiliBes…
• … and incen-ves to misrepresent it
Ra-onal Explana-on for War #2
• States cannot credibly commit to abide by
bargains agreed to now if condiBons change in
future
Ra-onal Explana-on for War #3
• States cannot reach a bargain because the
issueunder dispute is indivisible
The Bargaining Model and China
• Private informaBon
– China’s moBves
– Willingness to fight for territorial expansion
– U.S. ability to hit Chinese mobile ICBMs
• Commitment
– China’s conBnued rise undermines credibility of
any deal struck today

53. • Indivisibility
– “One China”
– “Nine dash line”
– Status concerns
1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image
Realism Human nature/
Classical
MoBvaBonal/
Neoclassical
Neorealism
Offensive
Defensive
Realism and Levels of Analysis