275 Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector Paul Seidenstat Abstract September 11, 2001, led to renewed emphasis on airport security in the United States. Before the tragedy, government policy led to a suboptimal level of security. The fundamental problem was not simply the use of private security firms, but rather the reliance on airline financing and poor Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight. After 9/11 a federalized security system was put in place. The current system of tightened security is substantially more costly and should be evaluated in terms of its cost- effectiveness compared to a public–private approach. Introduction In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, 2001, in which hijacked airplanes were crashed into large prominent buildings, renewed emphasis was placed on transportation security in general and airport security in particular. Airport secur- ity had been of great concern in the United States for several decades as sporadic hijackings and bombings occurred. Airport security had been a joint public–private undertaking. However, after 9/11 and the perceived weaknesses of the security system, emphasis shifted to public operations. If weak security was a function of organizational dysfunction and underinvestment, the blame some attributed to the private sector may have been misdirected. Reconsideration of the optimal organization of transportation security may still be an essential exercise if we are to minimize the threat of terrorist attacks. The Airport Security System Before 9/11 The airport security system in place in early September of 2001 was fragmented. Security was the joint responsibility of airport operators, airlines, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The functions of the separate players were as described in the following sections. Commercial Airports The more than 400 airports in the United States were responsible for providing a law enforcement presence. They also were charged with controlling access to the secure areas of the airport and for policing the perimeter of the airport. Some airport authorities contracted with private security firms, whereas others operated their own security or used regular police forces. Commercial Airlines Airlines, numbering more than 100 carriers, were responsible for security of the aircraft. They were responsible for the screening of passengers, baggage, and other cargo for weapons and explosives. Airlines contracted with private security com- panies to do the screening. Review of Policy Research, Volume 21, Number 3 (2004) © 2004 by The Policy Studies Association. All rights reserved. Federal Aviation Administration This federal agency had regulatory responsibility for airport safety. The agency was responsible for establishing security policies and regulations and evaluating the effectiveness of airport and airline security. It provided limited funding for secur- ity activities. It channeled threat information to the.

1. 275
Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector
Paul Seidenstat
Abstract
September 11, 2001, led to renewed emphasis on airport
security in the United States. Before the tragedy,
government policy led to a suboptimal level of security. The
fundamental problem was not simply the
use of private security firms, but rather the reliance on airline
financing and poor Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) oversight. After 9/11 a federalized
security system was put in place. The current
system of tightened security is substantially more costly and
should be evaluated in terms of its cost-
effectiveness compared to a public–private approach.
Introduction
In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, 2001, in which
hijacked airplanes
were crashed into large prominent buildings, renewed emphasis
was placed on
transportation security in general and airport security in
particular. Airport secur-
ity had been of great concern in the United States for several
decades as sporadic
hijackings and bombings occurred.

2. Airport security had been a joint public–private undertaking.
However, after
9/11 and the perceived weaknesses of the security system,
emphasis shifted to public
operations. If weak security was a function of organizational
dysfunction and
underinvestment, the blame some attributed to the private sector
may have been
misdirected. Reconsideration of the optimal organization of
transportation security
may still be an essential exercise if we are to minimize the
threat of terrorist attacks.
The Airport Security System Before 9/11
The airport security system in place in early September of 2001
was fragmented.
Security was the joint responsibility of airport operators,
airlines, and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). The functions of the separate
players were as
described in the following sections.
Commercial Airports
The more than 400 airports in the United States were
responsible for providing a
law enforcement presence. They also were charged with
controlling access to the
secure areas of the airport and for policing the perimeter of the
airport. Some
airport authorities contracted with private security firms,
whereas others operated
their own security or used regular police forces.
Commercial Airlines

3. Airlines, numbering more than 100 carriers, were responsible
for security of the
aircraft. They were responsible for the screening of passengers,
baggage, and other
cargo for weapons and explosives. Airlines contracted with
private security com-
panies to do the screening.
Review of Policy Research, Volume 21, Number 3 (2004)
© 2004 by The Policy Studies Association. All rights reserved.
Federal Aviation Administration
This federal agency had regulatory responsibility for airport
safety. The agency was
responsible for establishing security policies and regulations
and evaluating the
effectiveness of airport and airline security. It provided limited
funding for secur-
ity activities. It channeled threat information to the airports and
airlines (National
Academy of Public Administration, 2000).
Major Components of Security
The various components to the overall security system were as
follows:
• Screening of passengers and carry-on luggage for weapons or
explosives. Passengers
have to pass through a machine, the magnetometer. Carry-on
bags are x-rayed
as well. Screening takes place at the concourse or gate

4. checkpoints. Private
security companies must be certified and require screener
training for their
employees. Two thousand weapons were seized and one
thousand persons
were arrested either for carrying weapons or making false
statements about
weapons in the year 2000.
• Screening of checked baggage and cargo for explosives. The
FAA was slowly requir-
ing new screening equipment. The law in 2000 required the
FAA to establish
minimum standards for bag screener training. Screening was
tied to passen-
ger and cargo profiling. The methods used included explosive
detection
systems (EDS), explosive tract detection systems (ETD),
canines, and baggage
matching with passengers.
• Controlling access to secure air operations areas. The focus of
this function was to
require badges for all personnel. There was a long list of
personnel categories
including baggage handlers, aircraft and facility management
personnel, con-
struction workers, cargo freight employees, fueling operations
personnel,
caterers, and cleaners. Access points had to be controlled and
manned to
check badges.
• Clearing and badging personnel with access to airport areas
and aircraft. This
function required the checking of employment history and

5. criminal records.
• FAA Inspections. To perform its oversight function, the FAA
conducted
announced and unannounced inspections. For violations that
were discov-
ered, the FAA could levy fines that could range per incident to
$4,000 for air-
lines and $1,100 for airports.
• Air marshals. The program to station armed air marshals on
domestic flights
was enacted in 1958. However, very little money was allocated
to this program
and very few air marshals were employed. On 9/11 the federal
government
employed only 33 plainclothes air marshals.
Performance of Security Systems
There were major glitches in the security system that persisted
throughout the last
two decades of the twentieth century. Investigations and reports
by the US General
276 Paul Seidenstat
Accounting Office (GAO), the National Academy of Public
Administration, presi-
dential commissions, the US Department of Transportation’s
Inspector General,
and airline safety advocates outlined serious gaps in security
procedures, but most
of the proposals to tighten security measures were not adopted

6. or rigorously imple-
mented (US General Accounting Office [GAO], 2001a, b, and
National Academy
of Public Administration, 2000).
The security weaknesses included:
• Airport access controls. Gaining access to the tarmac and the
aircraft by unau-
thorized personnel was relatively easy. The GAO ran a test in
the spring of
2000 in which special agents used counterfeit law enforcement
badges to
access secure areas. They were able to bypass security
checkpoints at two air-
ports and to walk unescorted to departure gates. In one series of
tests, the
agents gained access to secure areas 68% of the time and were
able to board
aircraft 117 times. In tests in late 1999 and early 2000, access
to secure areas
was gained more than 30% of the time. (GAO, 2001a, p. 5).
• Screening of passengers and carry-on luggage. The FAA ran
tests in 1987. They
found that screeners missed 20% of the potentially dangerous
objects used by
the FAA in the tests. By 2000, as testing became more realistic,
screener’s per-
formance was even worse. As the GAO report put it: “Test data
for the 1991
to 1999 period show that the declining trend in detection rates
continues.”
(GAO, 2001a, p. 6)
The Poughkeepsie Journal examined FAA records concerning

7. security breaches in
New York state commercial airports from 1990 to August 2000.
John F. Kennedy
Airport had 897 breaches and LaGuardia Airport had 252
breaches. The FAA only
levied fines of $1.1 million during the decade, with Delta
Airlines paying $253,500
as the most heavily fined of air carriers and airports (Pfeiffer,
2001).
Factors Accounting for a Relatively Ineffective Security System
The weaknesses of the security system involving the three
partners, the FAA, the
airlines, and the airports, made for conditions that would have
made it difficult to
prevent the hijackings of September 11. Two broad factors have
been advanced to
explain the existence of a “soft” security system. One
explanation was that the laws
already in place were not managed effectively and the system’s
design was flawed.
The other explanation was that the system was underfunded
consistent with a sub-
optimal investment in airport security.
System Design and Mismanagement
Since there was a tripartite management arrangement, some
observers have argued
that because no single entity was responsible for operational
security activities
at the airport, there were gaps or holes in the security network
(Poole & Butler,
2001). Thus, rigorous screening of passengers may have made it
difficult for

8. Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector 277
weapons to be smuggled on board, but weak control of
contractor and employee
access to the aircraft could allow weapons or explosives to be
planted on board.
Theoretically, the FAA oversaw all components of the system.
However, it can be
argued that the federal agency did not exercise a firm hand and
did not set or
enforce rigorously clear standards of performance. The National
Academy of
Public Administration found in its study of airline security on
behalf of the
American Association of Airport Executives and Airports
Council International—
North America (National Academy of Public Administration,
2000) that there were
a number of weaknesses in oversight and regulatory
management by the FAA.
These shortcomings were in regulatory policy, inspections and
compliance testing,
transmission of intelligence and threat information,
communications, and standard
setting.
The FAA generated much uncertainty among the airports and
carriers as to the
interpretation and enforcement of the security rules. There was
a lack of consul-
tation with the airports and the carriers and their participation
in rule setting was

9. not encouraged. Confusion was engendered by numerous
revisions to the rules.
The airports frequently complained about “Friday, 5 pm faxes”
(National Academy
of Public Administration, 2000, p. 15).
As to inspections and compliance, the FAA acted as both “cop
and
coach.” However, there was very slow feedback from the
inspections. It frequently
took from eighteen to twenty-four months before incidents in
which rules
were broken or inspections failures were detected to resolve the
situation or levy
fines.
Overall, communication between the FAA and the organizations
that it regulated
was erratic. This situation was especially present in the
dissemination of threat
information. Airport and airline executives were not made privy
to classified infor-
mation, while unclassified information was often too vague or
too general to be of
much use. As Charles M. Barclay, president of the American
Association of Airport
Executives put it, “Very little of this critical data is shared with
the front line airport
and airline personnel responsible for implementing security
procedures” (Barclay,
2001).
Moreover, airline executives saw airport security issues and
FAA actions as
hurting their careers rather than as useful efforts that would
insure safety. Airports

10. and airlines were concerned that more intrusive efforts in the
security area would
escalate costs and antagonize airline customers.
Underinvestment in Security
Although fragmented authority and uneven regulatory
management may have
rendered the security system increasingly vulnerable to breach,
a more funda-
mental underlying problem appears to have been that a
suboptimal level of secur-
ity was being provided. Achieving a greater level of security
inevitably requires
that a higher level of costs be incurred. From the vantage point
of airport and
airline managers operating in a competitive environment, the
benefits flowing to
their organizations from tightened security did not justify the
added costs.
However, from a social point of view a tighter security regime
would have been
desirable.
278 Paul Seidenstat
Using percent successful screening of passenger, baggage, and
airport person-
nel as a proxy, Figure 1 illustrates the dilemma. To achieve a
higher success rate
of intercepting prohibited weapons, explosives, or potential
weapons at screening
stations would require more personnel, better trained or
qualified personnel, or

11. more sophisticated and expensive screening equipment. In
addition, if more inten-
sive screening caused longer waiting time or more
inconvenience to travelers,
airline ticket demand might fall, reducing revenue for airlines.
The marginal cost curve (MC) shows the additional cost of
achieving a higher
success rate. The slope of the curve becomes steeper as the
security rate goes
higher; for example, to move from an 80% rate to a 90% rate
becomes increasingly
difficult as intensive use of resources becomes necessary with
the current technol-
ogy. It may not be possible, in fact, to make the system
completely infallible with
the use of plastic weapons, plastic explosives, and other
techniques that the modern
terrorist can master. Thus, costs would rise very sharply from
beyond a 95% rate
and may become vertical at a level below 100% security.
Those responsible for providing security, then, would have to
assess the poten-
tial benefits of greater security with the costs of achieving it.
The benefits would
include lives saved, the value of the aircraft, and the intangible
benefits associated
with the flying public’s perception of safer flying. The marginal
benefit (MB) curve
shows the additional or marginal benefits of achieving more
security and would
likely decline as the probability of disaster occurring would
recede as security was
enhanced. As airline or airport managers saw it, if screening
stopped 95% of

12. weapons or explosives from entering the aircraft as compared to
90%, there would
be very little difference in the risk of a hijacking or an
explosion.
The equilibrium level of security would be achieved at point A
where MC = MB.
It would not be economically desirable for the airlines to
tighten security beyond
Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector 279
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of illegal items intercepted

13. d
o
ll
a
rs Marginal Cost of Screening
Marginal Private Benefit of Screening
Marginal Social Benefit of Screening
Figure 1. Benefits and Costs Relating to Intensity of Screening.
that point. It appeared that the FAA implicitly understood the
situation and
appeared to be reluctant to aggressively push the airlines or
airports toward a
higher level of security. Fines levied were small and were often
delayed or rene-
gotiated. As disaster occurred, greater emphasis on security
would take place only
to be followed shortly by a more relaxed attitude. For example,
after the crash of
TWA Flight 800 in 1996, President Clinton ordered new
measures to tighten secur-
ity after a period of several years of weak enforcement of the
1990 Airport
Security Act. However, by the late 1990s airline security
enforcement reverted to
a more lenient status.
Since most of the financing for security was required to be
made by airlines and

14. airports, they were pressured by profit considerations or budget
realities to opt for
a level of security that could be achieved at a reasonable cost.
Facing strong com-
petitive pressures, individual airlines did not want to raise
fares. As one travel mag-
azine put it in summarizing an interview with a travel expert in
1986: “Security
costs may compel airlines to raise fares” (Security Costs, 1986,
p. 80). Since few
hijackings or bombings occurred during the two decades before
9/11, there was no
concerted effort to push for a more aggressive security regime.
The benefit–cost calculus of airline executives became more
widely acknowl-
edged. In 1989, writer James Bennet (Bennet, 1989) talked
about the costs of secur-
ity. He argued that since 1976 an annual average of 61 people
died in aircraft
bombings. Given the 1989 costs of security that would be
necessary to have zero
or close to zero deaths, he calculated that the world would be
spending over $6
million for each life saved.
The murder of 270 innocents (Pan American Flight 301) is a
numbing horror, but when
you consider that in 1985, the last previous year of air terror, an
American was 25 times
more likely to choke to death than to die in a terrorist action,
you might wonder why the
world’s governments should spend an amount more than twice
the 1986 gross national
product of Gambia to shave off this particular little bump of
risk. (Bennet, 1989, p. 18)

15. What was missing from the benefit–cost analysis was a
perspective from the
broader society’s viewpoint. Airline and airport decision makers
operated in the
context of their own narrow interests. What they missed were
the benefits accru-
ing to the industry and to society that would flow from tighter
security.
These additional benefits of more security include preventing
the losses to the
families of potential victims, to the industry, to unrelated
individuals, and to prop-
erty owners as well. The disaster of 9/11 vividly makes this
point. In monetary
terms, the losses to the families, to the victims and business
owners of the build-
ings hit, and to related businesses were enormous. In the spoke
and hub system,
a disruption anywhere in the system impacts all parts of the
network as flights are
delayed or cancelled. The 9/11 disasters, in fact, shut down the
entire US com-
mercial airline system. The airline industry suffered huge
additional losses as
demand for flying sharply declined. The losses to the US
economy related to 9/11
were in the billions of dollars (Coughlin, Cohen, & Kahn,
2002).
These external or spillover benefits of preventing aircraft
incidents were signif-
icant even in the case of a hijacking or explosion before 9/11.
Thus, in Figure 1
the overall marginal benefit curve is shown as MBs, and lies

16. above the private MB
curve, MBp. Taking into consideration all the benefits of
various levels of security,
280 Paul Seidenstat
Figure 1 shows that the optimal social level of security is at
point B. Point B rep-
resents a tighter screening regime than at the private optimal
level of point A.
However, this more stringent security level imposes higher
costs on the system.
Since many of the benefits do not flow to the individual airlines
or airports but
rather represent the prevention of collateral damage, some
mechanism is neces-
sary to have those in charge of security implement a more
rigorous inspection struc-
ture. The desired position could be achieved by regulatory
policy, by government
subsidy, or by government operation of the security system.
Those alternatives will
be explored below.
Production of Screening Services by Private Firms
In the mid-1970s, coincident with airline deregulation, the
federal government
charged airlines with the responsibility of passenger and
baggage screening. Along
with the responsibility of providing this service, the airlines
themselves had to pay
for this activity. Not being in the security business, and being

17. more interested in
their core business of transportation, the airlines contracted out
the security func-
tion to privately-owned security companies.
As indicated above, the airlines looked at this security
responsibility from a
cost–benefit overview. In the more competitive deregulated
industry, raising fares
was not good business policy. The individual airline felt that it
had to keep secur-
ity costs at a relatively low level since, if its competitors had
lower costs that could
be reflected in lower fares, it would be at a competitive
disadvantage. Thus, in
selecting a security firm, an airline would place a great deal of
weight upon the
cost of the contract.
The contractor, therefore, had a cost constraint in producing the
service. Since
the major operating costs were labor costs and since available
technology made it
difficult to increase productivity, the contractors hired from the
lower segment of
the labor force that would be willing to work for minimum
wages. The starting
salary at most airports was around $6.00 per hour and few, if
any, fringe benefits
were paid. As a GAO official put it in the year 2000, “It is
common for the start-
ing wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be higher than the
wages the screen-
ers receive” (Martin, 2002, p. 3).
The typical screener’s job performance could often be

18. criticized. However, the
problem was not only low wages but there was also little chance
for improvement,
lack of adequate training, tedious and boring work, and other
job-related factors.
Training was particularly a weak point as the average training
time for
x-ray machine operators was around twelve hours, but experts
maintained that
several hundred hours of training may be necessary for an
operator to be truly
proficient.
With a labor force performing poorly, the quality of screening
of the private
firms was typically poor, as evidenced by the many failures of
screening as men-
tioned above. Maintaining quality was a losing proposition in
the face of very high
employee turnover rates. In the year 2000, turnover averaged
126% annually at
nineteen large airports. In one case it was as high as 416%. That
meant that the
average screener held the job for less than three months
(Martin, 2002). To keep
the jobs filled, the firms often allowed low-performance
screeners to continue to
Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector 281
operate x-ray machines without additional training. As a GAO
official summarized
the job performance situation, “Screeners are being placed on
the job who do not

19. have the necessary abilities or adequate knowledge to
effectively perform the work
and who then find the duties tedious and unstimulating”
(Martin, 2000, p. 4).
Security companies may have taken other shortcuts to cut costs.
Of the five major
security companies working at airports in the United States, the
largest with 40%
of the market was Argenbright, a subsidiary of the British firm,
Securicor. Argen-
bright failed to do background checks before hiring screening
staff, failed to train
them to the required standards, and made false submissions to
the FAA. Many hires
were immigrants whose English-speaking abilities were limited.
In spite of these transgressions, the airlines continued to employ
the company
without tightening the contract’s provisions relating to the
quality of service
performed. It was simply placed on probation for three years by
the FAA. Even
after two of the aircraft involved in the 9/11 hijackings took off
from Logan Airport
in Boston, where Argenbright was the screener, the company
was allowed by the
court to continue to operate. Although during 2001, while on
probation, Argen-
bright was fined one million dollars for violations that included
employing con-
victed felons.
It is clear that the effective use of private screening companies
that would
provide high-quality service would require a carefully designed

20. contract that would
clearly specify performance standards. To get companies to bid
on these contracts,
however, would mean, in turn, the willingness of the airlines to
pay significantly
larger contract fees. Moreover, poor performance by the
contractors could have
been possible only if the FAA did not enforce tighter security
standards. The com-
bination of downward pressure on cost by the airlines, by
indifferent regulatory
policy of the FAA, and the cutting of corners in search of
profits by the private
companies would seem to explain the level of security that was
in place at America’s
airport before 9/11.
Airport Security After 9/11
The terrible events of September 11, 2001, galvanized the
executive and legisla-
tive branches of the federal government to move quickly to
develop an airport
security system that would provide a higher level of security.
There were alterna-
tive courses of action available. The nation could upgrade the
present system, shift
the entire responsibility to airport managers, or federalize the
security system.
Upgrade Present System
The simplest course of action was to modify the present system
by upgrading the
quality of the service. The FAA could take the lead and require
the airlines to

21. tighten their contracts with the private security firms to hire
fully qualified screen-
ers, to run strict background checks, to require more training,
and establish a solid
internal audit system. The FAA itself could be required to
establish and vigorously
enforce higher screening standards. Withering fines or dismissal
could be levied
for failure of the private firms to meet the standards that would
be subjected to
continuous testing.
282 Paul Seidenstat
The mood of the Congress, however, was to question the use of
private screen-
ers, especially Argenbright, whose past performance did not
invoke confidence.
Moreover, belief in the oversight capacity of the FAA was
shaken by the GAO’s
and other reports on the agency’s performance. Further, the
precarious financial
situation facing the airlines immediately following 9/11 did not
bode well for
their capacity to sustain the much higher costs that tightened
screening would
entail.
Consequently, this alternative method of increasing the level of
airport security
was rejected. Others would then have to be considered.
Airport Management of the Security System

22. Changing the focal point of control to airport managers, in order
to establish a
fully integrated system, was also a possibility. This alternative
likely would have con-
tinued the regulatory role of the FAA, but it would deal directly
with airports that
would be charged with the entire security function.
Airport managers could contract with private security firms or
they could
develop their own security forces. They would be responsible
for screening and for
controlling all access to the aircraft and to the airport itself.
Airports would have
to finance the security operation, with or without federal aid.
Airports, however, would still be likely to consider only the
benefits to them of
heightened security, rather than the broader social benefits.
Their major concern
would still be the convenience to their customers and the
pleasantness of the airport
environment rather than a tighter, more rigid screening system
that would
inconvenience the traveler. Consequently, airports would likely
underinvest in
security.
Airport managers did not warmly endorse this alternative
method of security.
They were concerned about the financial obligations implicit in
this method, and
with the prospect of even more frequent dealings with the FAA,
which likely would
be the primary regulatory agency. Apparently, without the
strong support of the

23. airports, most of whom are owned by local governments, this
alternative was not
given serious consideration.
Federalization
A widely favored alternative was the takeover by the federal
government of the
entire system of airport security. In this case, a federal
government agency would
be fully responsible for providing security services. There could
be two options:
operate with federal workers, or contract the operation out to
private security
vendors. In either case, the federal government would consider
the entire range
of benefits that were generated from the airport security system.
Thus, there would
be an incentive to choose a higher level of responsible security
than would a system
operated by airlines or by airports.
If staffed with federal workers, the government agency could
directly determine
the quality of the labor force, the level of training, and the
commitment to the pre-
scribed level of security. The federal government would expend
the funds but could
assess the airlines or the airports fees for providing the security
service.
Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector 283
Critics argued that the use of federal employees could raise the

24. cost curve above
what was technically possible. They argued that the federal
operation could become
a top-heavy bureaucracy. Pay and fringe benefit levels for the
federal workers might
exceed the competitive level required. There would be little
incentive to innovate
and to introduce new labor saving technology. However, there
would be a strong
incentive to overinvest in security since the federal managers
would be judged
largely on security lapses and only secondarily on controlling
costs.
The use of contracting out to private security firms to operate
the system,
however, could emphasize cost control at the expense of
security. Contracts would
have to be carefully drawn and monitored to ensure the agreed
upon security level.
Federal overseers would have to exercise care concerning the
background and the
skills of the labor force.
On the other hand, the private security firms would be
interested in minimiz-
ing the discomfort to travelers to avoid complaints, as well as
controlling the cost
of operations. Innovation would be rewarded, especially if it
reduced operating
costs. New technology could be pursued and would spread
quickly because there
would be a variety of firms in the market at various types of
airports with a mixture
of security environments.

25. The Aviation and Transportation Act of 2001
In the wake of the 9/11 disasters and the shock that followed,
Congress hastily
passed transportation security legislation. Signed by President
George W. Bush on
November 19, 2001, the law adopted the federalization
alternative. It established
a new federal agency, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) in the
Department of Transportation (DOT). The TSA was charged
with taking over the
security of the civil aviation system. The agency assumed all
the security functions
of the FAA, the airlines, and the airports.
With the exception of five airports, the TSA will operate with
its own employ-
ees. Not only will TSA screen all passengers and carry-on
luggage, it will also screen
all checked baggage. The law set a deadline of one year for the
complete takeover
of passenger screening and a 2002 year-end deadline for
screening all checked
baggage.
To improve the quality of screening, the law contemplated a
higher-quality labor
force. Compensation levels were set substantially above what
private security com-
panies had been paying. All screeners have to undergo criminal
background checks
and must be US citizens. More extensive training is required.
The workers will not
be offered the same civil service protections as other federal
employees. The TSA

26. had one year to hire and deploy its labor force.
All screening equipment, including large explosive-detection
machines for
baggage screening will be furnished by the TSA. This will
involve large, immedi-
ate capital expenditures.
Other security functions were entrusted to the TSA. The air
marshal program,
to be operated by TSA with the assistance of the Justice
Department, was greatly
expanded with the right to fly on any domestic flight. Under
TSA, federal law
enforcement will secure all airport areas including the perimeter
of the larger air-
ports, and will work with smaller airports to develop security
plans.
284 Paul Seidenstat
The FAA would retain some security-related functions. The law
expanded the
FAA’s research and development function involving all
components of airplane
safety. Airports were to be given reimbursements for the
additional expenses, such
as more law enforcement personnel, access control equipment,
and other operat-
ing costs incurred as a result of new regulations and security
requirements set by
the FAA after 9/11.
Because there was a significant minority in the House of

27. Representatives that
preferred contracting out the screening function by the new
federal agency to
private security companies, a compromise was struck; the law
established a pilot
program in which five airports could contract with qualified
private firms for a
period of three years. In addition, other airports were given the
option to contract
with private vendors after three years in the present program.
TSA Operations Since Passage of Act
As a large, start-up government agency, the TSA had an
enormous task. It had to
organize itself and staff the management group, to hire and train
over forty thou-
sand onsite managers and workers, order and install new
equipment, and oversee
the expansion of the air marshal system. During the interim
period before it was
prepared to take over the screening system, TSA continued to
use private security
firms, assuming contracts worth well over $1.6 billion (Miller,
2002).
During this interim period, there was little criticism of the
private screening con-
tractors who were intercepting very large quantities of
prohibited items. The items
included more than 100,000 knives, 200,000 other cutting
devices, more than 4,000
box cutters, nearly 4,000 incendiary devices, and 227 firearms.
Overall, from
February 2002 to August 2002 more than 2,800,000 prohibited
items were seized

28. (US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Aviation,
2002).
To initiate the test plan of using private contractors, in June of
2002 the
TSA selected five airports. These included San Francisco;
Kansas City, Kansas;
Rochester, New York; Jackson Hole, Wyoming; and Tupelo,
Mississippi.
TSA quickly turned to the private sector to design startup
strategies and
operating plans for the conversion of airport screeners to federal
employees.
Contracts were awarded to three firms. After having received
the plans, TSA
then reviewed the plans and schedules and chose two firms,
Lockheed Martin
and Boeing, to implement the final plan (Federal Airport
Security Update,
2002).
The federalization process included a site survey to determine
the design of the check-
points and what construction may be needed to install explosive
detection devices, check-
point reconfiguration to improve the security and safety of
passengers; and the
deployment of a federal screening workforce by November 19,
2002. (Whitman, 2002,
p. 8)
Despite some early turmoil as the first agency head was quickly
replaced, oper-
ations began to run on schedule. The TSA met the November
deadline to com-

29. pletely federalize screening and 44,000 screeners were either on
the job or in
training. Bomb screening systems were in place in all but thirty
to forty airports
and those airports were given a one-year extension to meet their
goal.
Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector 285
Preliminary Evaluation of the Federalized System
The security model examined above predicts that a decision to
upgrade airport
security will entail:
1. Higher overall costs,
2. A higher labor-to-passenger ratio,
3. More intensive screening of passengers and baggage, and
4. Continued inconvenience of flying.
Higher Costs
It is estimated that for fiscal year (FY) 2002 the total cost of
establishing TSA was
$6.5 billion (McFeatters, 2002). The estimated budget for FY
2003 is $4.8 billion.
This total represents a significant increase over FY 2001 when
security was mainly
paid directly by airlines and airports.
The tremendous increase in costs can be illustrated by looking
at the screening
function. Table 1 compares screening costs before and after
9/11.

30. Total screening costs rose five-fold and passenger screening
costs rose to more
than four times the pre-9/11 level. There were three principal
reasons for the rapid
acceleration of costs. They were increased compensation levels
for screeners, con-
siderably more resources allotted to security activities, and the
undertaking of new
functions.
One of the first changes instigated by the TSA was to increase
screener com-
pensation. From an average hourly rate of $7.00 paid by private
security firms
before 9/11, the compensation rate was more than doubled. In
addition, the air
marshal program costs rose by a factor of 6, and other
expenditures for airport
security doubled.
There was a large increase in the number of screeners under
TSA. The pre-9/11
privately employed screener force totaled about 16,200
(Coughlin et al., 2002), but
the TSA has hired over 44,000 screeners, almost triple the
previous number. Of
this total, 33,000 screeners would be used for passenger
screening alone. In fact,
the TSA wanted to hire a total of 54,600, of which 21,600
would handle baggage
screening (Mead, 2002). Congress felt that this number was
excessive and imposed
a ceiling far below it.
A similar situation developed in the air marshal program. There

31. were no more
than 33 air marshals prior to the TSA takeover. By FY 2004,
TSA requires 48,100
Screeners of which 18,300 handle baggage. That number is now
estimated to be
2,800 at a cost of $60 million in FY 2004 (Coughlin et al.,
2000, p. 21).
286 Paul Seidenstat
Table 1. Estimated Airport Operational Screening Costs, FY
2003
Compared to FY 2001 (in Millions of Dollars)
FY 2001 FY 2003
Passenger Screening 600 2,532
Checked Bag Screening 0 800
Total Screening 600 3,302
Source: Based on data from De Lollis (2002) and Coughlin et al.
(2002).
Checked bag screening for explosives is a massive new task that
the Congress
mandated. This function requires the use of very expensive
explosive-detection
machines that cost from $750,000 to $1 million each. Yearly
operating and main-
tenance costs are also considerable. Approximately 1,100
machines were in oper-
ation by early 2003. The TSA also took over security in the
airports, requiring over
8,000 federal law enforcement officers and payed for major

32. capital projects asso-
ciated with airport security.
More Screeners per Passenger
Thus, one of the major reasons for higher screening costs is the
increased size of
the labor force. If the number of screeners is tripled, while the
passenger load
remains the same, it follows that there will be many more
screeners per passenger.
There is anecdotal evidence of overabundant federal screening
personnel at
some airports. For example, the Richmond, Virginia, airport had
80 screeners
before TSA. It now employs 140 ( Jones, 2002). At some
smaller airports there were
several screeners for every passenger. As the chairman of the
House Appropria-
tions Transportation Subcommittee put it: “It’s wasteful.
Anybody that travels
knows that we have excessive screeners out there” (Deadline
Met on Airport
Screeners, 2002).
Tighter Security
With more resources devoted to screening, there is more
intensive scrutiny of indi-
vidual passengers and their baggage. Since the TSA took over,
there are often three
screening positions: at the counter, upon entry into gate area,
and at the flight gate.
Overcoming the trauma of 9/11, the tighter security regime has

33. reduced the
level of fear among travelers. In a survey taken by the online
booking site, Travel-
ocity, 78% of the respondents were “somewhat” or “not at all”
concerned. Eighty
percent agree that airport security has improved and that most
security measures
are “reasonable.” However, 72% say that security is not entirely
consistent from
airport to airport (Edelstan, 2002).
Inconvenience of Flying
Closer scrutinizing of passengers and checked baggage
screening can be irritating
to the traveler, especially if it is done in an autocratic,
insensitive way. Having to
arrive at the airport well before takeoff time is another irritant.
Some observers
argue that the “security hassle factor” is adversely affecting the
demand for airline
tickets. In fact, airlines have argued that they have lost billions
of dollars in ticket
revenue as business travelers have reduced their flying
(Sharkey, 2002).
Current Issues
There are several factors at work that will shape the near-term
future of airport
security. These include checked bag screening, the financing
mechanism, and the
privatization experiment.
Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector 287

34. Bag Screening
There is growing concern about the newly required system of
checked bag screen-
ing that began in early 2003. Not only are the machines for
explosive detection
very expensive, but some estimates are that nearly 5,000 more
will be needed. To
fit these eight-ton machines has also meant expensive
remodeling of airports.
The worry is that the system of screening means more delays for
the travelers
and the potential threat of theft. The current machine
technology, at best, can
process only 150 to 200 bags per hour. However, for every 100
bags screened, there
are 25 to 30 false positives; these bags have to be screened by
hand, involving inher-
ent theft problems. Supplementing the big machines are 6,000
smaller, hand-held
trace detection devices that may take 47 seconds to screen a
bag. At large airports,
within a given hour there may be several flights preparing to
leave and, with several
thousand bags to be screened, delays can be forecast (Sharkey,
2002).
There is a serious research effort funded by the TSA to improve
the screening
equipment in sensitivity, speed, and size. These efforts may pay
off in the future
to reduce the “wait factor.”

35. Financing Security
Before 9/11 the airlines and the airports directly financed most
of the security appa-
ratus. To help finance the new TSA operation, Congress placed
a heavy burden on
the airlines as well. Congress enacted a new tax, called the
security service tax. This
is an excise tax on the passenger ticket of $2.50 for each
enplanement on flights
originating at airports in the United States. There is a $5.00
limit each way, or
$10.00 per round trip. Air carriers are required to collect the tax
and remit the
proceeds monthly to the TSA.
This unit excise tax is likely to be absorbed, in whole or in part,
by the airline.
Facing a relatively elastic demand, sellers locked into a
competitive market have
difficulty raising ticket prices to cover the tax. In addition, the
airlines are assessed
a monthly fee based upon what they paid in 2000 for passenger
screening.
The result of current annual expected tax collections and fees at
$2.2 billion
(Transportation Security Agency, 2002), most of which
represents additional costs
to the airlines, is an expected worsening of the tenuous financial
situation of many
US airlines. In fact, the airline industry argues that the tax,
coupled with other ele-
ments of airport security, has increased airline costs and
deprived them of signifi-
cant revenues. The president of the Air Transport Association

36. puts the industry’s
pretax loss at $9 billion in 2002; and $6.3 billion of that loss
was a result of the
aftermath of 9/11 (Lewandowski, 2002).
In addition to absorbing security taxes and fees, it is argued that
free seats
provided to air marshals, additional screening of airline
workers, and the
“hassle factor” of travel have escalated losses. The airlines have
requested that the
Congress end the aviation security tax and airline fees. The
government’s aviation
security efforts were also questioned by suggesting that they
were reactive rather
than preemptive and not directed at what might happen in the
future.
The topic of who should bear the brunt of airport security is
likely to become a
key issue. Since many of the airlines are either in bankruptcy or
on the brink of
288 Paul Seidenstat
bankruptcy, it does not seem sensible for the TSA to place a
heavy financial burden
on the airlines while the Congress debates the issue of assisting
the industry to
survive.
Privatization Experiment
The current experiment involving five airports that will use

37. private screening com-
panies operating under contract to the TSA should allow a
comparison between a
government-supervised security program and a government-
operated program.
After the three-year experiment, we should be able to compare
the efficiency and
effectiveness of both approaches to security. It is unfortunate
that Congress only
included five airports in the program, as a larger sample size
would add confidence
as to the validity of the results.
To maximize the value of the experiment, it is essential that
careful data collec-
tion be undertaken. Such performance indicators as screeners
per passenger,
average passenger waiting time, and cost per bag screened
should be examined.
The “hassle factor” and the perception of an acceptable level of
security could be
ascertained by surveys of passengers, airport and airline
personnel, and screening
personnel.
Conclusions: Airport Security and the Evolving Role of the
Private Sector
Two fundamental problems were inherent in the airport security
system before
9/11. By placing the responsibility and financial burden on the
airlines and the air-
ports, government policy led to a socially suboptimal level of
security. Whether by
indifference or poor performance, weak government and airline
oversight of the

38. private security firms that operated the system led to the
potential for serious secur-
ity system breaches. Even though the 9/11 disaster itself did not
involve an extreme
breach of the existing lax security protocol, the possibility of a
major breach was
omnipresent.
It could be argued that the public–private partnership approach
was not
the fundamental problem. Nevertheless, the performance of
some of the
private screening firms, even having to operate under a difficult
budget con-
straint, left a lot to be desired. However, the performance of the
FAA regulators
appeared to have been even more deficient in requiring and
enforcing security
standards.
Under the pressures resulting from 9/11, Congress changed
security policy.
There was a broad consensus that the level of security must be
raised in light of
the broader social calculus. To ensure that the new policy
direction would be
advanced, Congress created a new federal agency to directly
administer the secur-
ity program. A choice then had to be made as to the mechanism
to operate the
system.
Congress weighed whether the potential performance benefits
stemming from
reliance upon private security contractors, who often are more
cost-effective, par-

39. ticularly since contracts would be awarded through competitive
bidding, would
outweigh the loss of direct federal control. The federal
operations path was
selected. However, the option of using private screening
companies was preserved
Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector 289
by running a small experimental program and by allowing
airports to shift to a
public–private arrangement after three years.
The federalized system became operational as required by the
Congress. The
preliminary results include: much higher costs, an apparent
higher level of secur-
ity, and a continuation of some traveler discomfort. Eventually,
policymakers might
reexamine the operational system and choose to use more
private screeners.
However, once established as a federal agency function,
government operations of
the security program may be entrenched as political inertia
takes hold.
It seems clear, however, that the public commitment to a high
level of airport
security will be sustained. In the face of terrorism,
consideration of efficiency will
play a secondary role to security and safety. Unless Congress
can be convinced that
the public–private approach will yield the same level of security
and safety at a

40. lower cost, the status quo will persist.
About the Author
Paul Seidenstat specializes in public finance, public
management, and water resources. He
is a coeditor of Reinventing Water and Wastewater Systems:
Global Lessons for Improving Manage-
ment (Wiley, 2002), and America’s Water and Wastewater
Industries: Competition and Privatization
(Public Utilities Reports, 2000). Professor Seidenstat has also
coedited or written six other
books and several journal articles on the use of economic
incentives to improve the provi-
sion of public services. He has conducted several research
projects for federal government
agencies and served in local government as a finance director
and financial advisor. Dr.
Seidenstat is an associate professor of Economics at Temple
University.
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Deadline met on airport screeners. (2002, November 18).

41. MSNBC. Retrieved from http://
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Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector 291
http://www.tsa.gov
Informative Speech Template
Remember [detailed sentences] means I want you to clearly
write your ideas, but you are not writing your whole speech.
Introduction
Attention Getter: (type detailed sentences)
Give the audience a reason to listen: (Why it affects them
directly?)
Introduce the subject (Your Thesis statement): (Should be
extremely specific and clear)
Credibility (What makes you credible on this topic): (type
detailed sentences)
Preview your main ideas

44. Transition (ex. Let’s start by doing the most important thing,
which is…)
Main Body
List the organization type (ex. Topically, cause and effect,
compare and contrast, problem & solution, problem-cause-
solution, chronological, biographical):
Main Point #1: (type detailed sentences)
Support
Main Point #2: (type detailed sentences)
Support
Main Point #3: (type detailed sentences)
Support
Transition (ex. now that you know how to pick up a hot date,
let’s go over what I have explained to you today)
Conclusion
Summary (thesis +main points in a memorable way, follow the
order you have listed in the body): (type detailed sentences)
Closure (tie it back to the attention getter/ ex. started with a
joke-give the punch line, started with a question-answer it):
(type detailed sentences)
B
Border Security

45. Keith Cozine
College of Professional Studies, St. John’s
University, New York, USA
Definition
Border security is the step that nations take to
prevent people or items from entering and
departing into their country that may pose a threat
or other adverse consequences or otherwise vio-
late that nation’s laws.
Introduction
One could argue that borders have been around
since humans first began to settle in fixed loca-
tions, claiming that location as their own. As
humans moved from hunter-gathers to agrarian
society, they began to mark land over which they
believe to have exclusivity over its use. These
lines of ownership or borders could exist only in
one’s mind, meaning that this is what this person
or group of people believed to be theirs, accepted
by others outside their borders, based on physical
features of the earth, or barrier such as primitive
fences or walls to mark their land. Today, borders
most commonly thought of as the divide between
political entities, usually between countries. Just
like in early times, these borders could be
imaginary, existing only in the mind of certain
individuals, borders that are agreed upon, and
demonstrated by lines on a map based on con-
quest, threat, agreements with others, natural
physical feature, or walls and other means of

46. marking territory. Just like early man marking
their territory, borders have become a symbol of
national sovereignty where that nation exerts
exclusive control. Borders represent national sov-
ereignty that need to be protected and controlled
to maintain that country’s sovereignty; therefore,
border security is an important component of any
country’s national or homeland security (Phelps
et al. 2014).
Throughout much of history, the primary threat
to border security was military incursion from
hostile neighbors or other foreign forces. In fact,
just a quarter of a century ago, what Winston
Churchill famously referred to as an “Iron Cur-
tain” divided Europe between East and West. The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
founded at least in part in response to the threat
posed by the Soviet Union and Soviet expansion-
ism. As a result, in many parts of the world, much
of what would be considered border security was
handled by countries’ military organizations
(Cozine 2016). However, the use of military
power against another state may no longer be the
practical option if these two opponents are both
militarily and economically powerful. The cost of
war can become a high one, not just in the cost of
lives but also the harm done to both nations’
economy, as well as the global economy.
# Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018
L. R. Shapiro, M-H. Maras (eds.), Encyclopedia of Security and
Emergency Management,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69891-5_11-1
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/978-3-319-

47. 69891-5_11-1&domain=pdf
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69891-5_11-1
Today’s globalized world seems to continually
shrink to a point where time and space are less and
less important. Advancement and innovation in
shipping allow for goods to be loaded onto
ships, cross vast oceans, and then be unloaded
and delivered to markets in days. Air travel,
which not long ago was available only to the
elite, is now affordable to all but the world’s
poorest. This current era of globalization has
been decades in the making. However, few argue
with the notion that the end of the Cold War and
East-West divide was a catalyst, speeding up the
process and bringing its benefits to the world as a
whole. Advancements in technology and trans-
portation that facilitate more efficient and faster
trade and travel have not exclusively benefited
legitimate transnational actors but have has also
benefited international criminals, terrorist, and
their organizations (Rees 2006). With globaliza-
tion and the barriers lifted by the end of the Cold
War, the security threat has shifted somewhat
from state-centric threats to transborder issues
such as financial collapse and global warming,
pandemics, and threats from a variety of non-
state actors. The openness that globalization has
created engenders an environment in which the
illegal trade of drugs, arms, intellectual property
rights, and money is booming and has allowed for
terrorist organizations to operate globally as well
(Cozine 2010).
Threat

48. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
the way that those responsible were able to gain
entry to the United States quickly focused the
spotlight on border security as a major national
security concern. Advancements in technology
and transportation that facilitate faster and more
efficient trade and travel have not exclusively
benefited legitimate transnational actors; they
have also benefited international criminals, terror-
ists, and their organizations (Rees 2006). The
September 11th hijackers were able to take advan-
tages of flaws in the US border security and visa
system to pass through ports of entry, in some
cases, several times, to train, plan, and carry out
the attacks.
The attacks and the way that those responsible
were able to gain entry to the United States
quickly focused the spotlight on border security
as a major national security concern. In order to
better understand how the September 11th attacks
occurred, the US Congress passed legislation that
created the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, more commonly
known as the 9/11 Commission. The Commission
was tasked with preparing a full and complete
account of the circumstances surrounding the
September 11th terrorist attacks. It quickly
became apparent to the Commission that the ter-
rorists’ ability to successfully gain entry to the
United States was a key element in their ability
to carry out the attacks. The topic of terrorist travel
was deemed so important that it was covered in
much greater detail in the form of a staff mono-
graph separate from the Commission’s final report

49. (Cozine 2010).
The profile of those individuals who pose the
greatest threat, at least in terms of terrorism, has
evolved over the past decade and now focuses on
homegrown violent extremism – a threat that
arises from within a domestic population where
citizens or residents embrace an extremist ideol-
ogy and take violent action in furtherance of that
ideology (Southers 2014). Much has been made of
the concept of the lone wolves, inspired to carry
out terrorist attacks on their own, without any
specific direction from a terrorist organization. In
reality, the most catastrophic attacks and sophisti-
cated plots were carried out in some part by mem-
bers of the domestic population that traveled to
other areas of the world to receive training and
direction from terrorist organizations. This is a
phenomenon that first came to light in the after-
math of the July 7 bombings in London and most
recently played out in Paris and Brussels (Cozine
2016). This threat environment has created a situ-
ation where border security and those organiza-
tions charged with securing a nation’s borders
now face the dual challenge of dealing with both
homegrown and external threats. Traditional bor-
der security was focused on outsiders seeking to
do harm – a concern that still exists today as
highlighted by the June 2016 attacks at the Istan-
bul Airport that were carried out by attackers from
Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan who entered
2 Border Security

50. Turkey a month before the attack by illegally
crossing its border with Syria carrying the suicide
vests and bombs used in the attack (Karimi et al.
2016). However, there is also an internal threat of
one’s own citizens traveling overseas to Iraq or
Syria to join terrorist organizations and possibly
return home to carry out attacks. Since 2011,
nearly 40,000 fighters, including at least 6,900
from Western countries, have traveled to Syria.
Around 250 of the Westerners traveled from the
United States and 5,000 traveled from European
Union countries. It is suspected that one third of
the European fighters have returned home from
Syria (House Homeland Security Committee
2016 June).
The reality is that terrorism is only one of the
many man-made and natural transnational threats
and challenges that face those tasked with secur-
ing a nation’s borders. Today, illegal migration,
human smuggling, drug trafficking, counterfeit
goods, and mass migration are just a few of the
man-made threats the border security officials
must combat. Add to this mix a variety of natural
threats such as pandemics or invasive species and
the threat picture becomes even more complex.
Adding to this complexity is the question of how
border security agencies and organizations pro-
vide security while still facilitating legitimate
trade and travel across international borders, a
process vital to the health of the global economy.
Nearly 1 million people and 67,000 cargo con-
tainers enter the United States each day (Custom
and Border Protection 2016). Finding those indi-
viduals or items that pose a security threat among
this avalanche of people and goods that cross the

51. border each day is truly a daunting task. But the
nature of borders and the strategies for securing
them are as varied as the threats that are faced.
Nature of Borders and Border Security
Borders can take many forms: natural, such as
rivers and other bodies of water; physical, such
as walls and fences; agreed upon lines on a map;
or any combination of these. How well border
security and integrity are maintained directly
affects those living within those borders and
those who wish to profit from violating interna-
tionally accepted rules of national sovereignty.
The characteristics of borders are often dictated
by societal and political institutions within a par-
ticular country as well as their relationships with
their neighbors and potential threats that lie just on
the other side of that border (Cozine 2016).
Natural borders will often dictate a country’s
border security strategy. Geography has long been
a barrier that has separated people into separate
groups, and even today these mountains remain as
a physical and political border separating China
from Pakistan, India, and several other countries.
The Alps have long served as an impressive phys-
ical border in Europe. The Alps have allowed for
Switzerland to maintain independence political
neutrality since 1291 and has not been in a state
of war since 1812. This, despite the fact that
during this time there has been a state of near
constant hostility all around them, including two
world wars. Bodies of water have also served an
import physical barrier that separated people and

52. established political borders. The English Chan-
nel has separated Great Britain from the European
continent, thus allowing Britain to implement
many policies separate from those of the
European Union including maintaining border
control between itself and the rest of the continent.
The oceans, seas, and other large bodies of water
remain formidable barriers. For proof, one needs
to look farther than Australia and New Zealand,
two large island nations that have never been
invaded.
When natural barriers do not exist between
countries and one country sees its neighbors or
things within its neighbor’s borders as threats,
many countries feel the need to fortify borders
with artificial barriers to prevent or limit unwanted
incursions across the border. The most common
artificial barrier between nations are walls. Walls
are erected to prevent or deter an individual,
groups of people, even foreign forces from cross-
ing a nation’s border or designed to funnel legal
border crossings through checkpoints or ports of
entry setup at specific locations. Walls are not the
only type of artificial barriers used to fortify bor-
ders. Other types of barriers include fences, armed
patrols, and air and marine patrols. Increasingly,
Border Security 3
technology is being implemented either in lieu of
artificial barriers or to augment both artificial and
natural barriers. These include measures such as
motion sensors, thermal image cameras, and even

53. unmanned aerial vehicles, all of which can be
monitored remotely by user who can dispatch a
response team to deal with unwanted border
incursions (Phelps et al. 2014).
Border security is not exclusive to the geo-
graphic location where one country meets another.
Individuals and goods entering a country legally
need to enter that country through a port of entry.
Ports of entry are specific locations where indi-
viduals and goods can enter a country legally by
land, sea, or air. They typically have a staff of
people who check passports and visas and inspect
luggage to assure that contraband is not imported
and that individuals who are not eligible to enter a
country or pose security risk are refused access.
Ports of entry at international airports are usually
divided up into two screening areas: passport con-
trol and baggage control. At passport control, it is
individual people who are screened in terms of
their eligibility to enter the country. Individuals
are screened for things such as their citizenship,
whether they have the required papers such as
passport and visas if required, and whether there
is something in the individual’s background that
would make them ineligible to enter the county
such as previous immigration violations, criminal
record, or a danger to the security of that country.
When an individual is ineligible to enter a country,
they might try to sneak past passport control and
border security officials by presenting fraudulent
travel documents to change their identity or other
characteristics about them such as their citizen-
ship. There are a variety of types of fraudulent
documents that an individual can use to try and
gain entry to the country that they would other-

54. wise not be allowed to enter. These include coun-
terfeit documents; documents that have been
altered in some way, such as switching the photo-
graph or name; using a document that belongs to
an individual who looks similar to the traveler, a
technique known as impostoring; or using a gen-
uine document that is real but has been obtained
by identity theft or some other illegal means. This
means that officials at passport control must very
quickly determine an individual’s citizenship,
whether they have the required documents,
whether those documents are genuine, and
whether the individual has anything in their back-
ground that would make them ineligible to enter
the country. In recent years, many technological
advances were introduced into the passenger
screening process, including a variety of security
features within the passport itself to aid in
detecting counterfeits, radio-frequency chips that
transmit information to border screening com-
puter systems automatically, and increased use
of biometrics such as fingerprint and facial recog-
nition technology.
At baggage control, travelers’ belongings are
screened for prohibited items, such as drugs,
counterfeit merchandise, agricultural and food
products as well as insects which may pose a
risk to a country’s ecosystem, currency that
needs to be reported, and items that require that
a duty or other tax be paid. Screening at baggage
control includes examining both the traveler and
their baggage for prohibited items. Some common
examples of how people try and sneak prohibited
items through baggage control include hiding

55. items in the lining or secret compartments of
their luggage, making it look like other items
such as prepackaged items and food products,
sewing it into their clothing, simply strapping it
on their body, or swallowing the drugs so that it
passes through their digestive system after they
have successfully entered through the port of
entry. The only way for border officials to detect
this type of smuggling is by the use of an X-ray
machine. The reality is the way in which an indi-
vidual can try and sneak prohibited items through
baggage control is limited only by their
imagination.
In addition to passengers and their baggage,
many international airports also have large
amounts of cargo pass through that all need to
screen for prohibited items as well as cargo
where duty needs to be collected. The same is
true of seaports and ports of entry at land borders.
At seaports, passengers and crew are screened for
eligibility to enter the country, and cargo is
inspected. What makes seaports somewhat differ-
ent is the amount of cargo that comes in and out of
4 Border Security
seaports. One needs only to look at the enormous
size of a modern container ship to have an idea of
how much cargo passes through a seaport in a
given day. For example, the Triple E container
ship has a capacity equivalent to 18,000 20-foot
containers that would fill more than 30 trains, each
a mile long and stacked two containers high

56. (Kremer 2013). Many ports of entry at land bor-
ders have to deal with a high volume of both
individuals seeking admission (i.e., pedestrians
or individuals in vehicles) and large amounts of
cargo carried by tractor trailers or freight trains.
Adding to the challenges is the fact that these
conveyances themselves can be used to smuggle
both people and prohibited items through a port of
entry. The number of places to conceal both items
and people on a large container ship is near limit-
less. Hidden compartments in cars, trucks, and
trains have all been used to smuggle people and
goods across the border in the past. This sheer
volume of cargo and people coming through a
port of entry on any given day makes providing
for effective border security while at the same
time facilitating efficient trade and travel a
daunting task.
When nature does not serve as a mechanism for
border security, the characteristics of border secu-
rity are often dictated not just by societal and
political institutions within a particular country
but also the relationships they have with their
neighbors as well as potential threats that lie just
on the other side of that border. For an example of
how internal politics and a volatile relationship
with one’s neighbors impacts a country’s border
security strategy, one needs to look no further than
the Korean Peninsula and the demilitarized zone
(DMZ) that is between North and South Korea.
The DMZ is a 2.5-mile-wide and 160-mile-long
barrier created by both countries surrounding the
military demarcation zone that serves as the bor-
der separating the two countries since the end of
the Korean War in 1953 (Phelps et al. 2014). With

57. both countries’ militaries constantly patrolling
their respective side of the DMZ while on alert
for acts of aggression by the other side, the DMZ
is the most heavily militarized border in the world
with one side in a constant state of readiness to
respond to threats from the other side (Phelps
et al. 2014).
The nature of border security is not static and
often changes over time. Perhaps no place in the
world illustrates this better than Europe. Just a
quarter of a century ago, what Winston Churchill
famously referred to as an “Iron Curtain” divided
Europe between East and West. Much like the
border between North and South Korea, the Iron
Curtain separated members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) on one side and
Warsaw Pact members on the other. With the fall
of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, it is now
possible to drive from Spain to Finland without
passing through a single border check. In reality,
even before the fall of communism, the elimina-
tion of internal borders between democracies in
Western Europe while at the same time strength-
ening their common external borders has been a
goal in many European countries.
Since the 1970s, countries in Europe have
worked together on an intergovernmental basis
to combat cross-border threats such as terrorism,
drug trafficking, and illegal migration. By 1980,
the frequency of this cooperation was a growing
recognition that the freedom of movement
throughout the continent was a key element to
establishing a common internal market; it became
clear that this type of informal cooperation was no

58. longer adequate to address cross-border issues
faced on the continent (Direction Générale des
Douanes et Droits Indirects 2015). Since EU
member states could not reach an agreement on
how to formally deal with these issues, France,
Germany, and the Benelux nations agreed that the
territory among their states would be without
internal borders. This border-free zone became
known as the Schengen Area, which was named
after the town in Luxemburg where the agreement
was signed on June 14, 1985. On June 19, 1990,
the Schengen member states (Adopted by the
Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy
of Luxembourg, and the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands.) signed the Schengen Implementation Con-
vention (SIC) to formalize their agreement on
how the rules of the agreement’s framework
would be put into place. The convention called
for the removal of checks at internal borders,
common rules for crossing external borders, har-
monization of entry and visa conditions,
Border Security 5
enhancement of police and judicial cooperation,
and the establishment of a common information
technology system for border security. By
September 1, 1993, all Schengen members had
ratified the convention and the agreement offi-
cially entered into force. The Schengen Area
became a reality in the spring of 1995 when,
with only a few exceptions, border checks were
eliminated between signatory nations and a single

59. external border was created where members car-
ried border inspections with identical procedures
based on common rules for visa and entry require-
ments as well as asylum rights (European Union
2009).
During the 1990s, several other EU member
states signed on to Schengen Agreement, and the
Treaty of Amsterdam brought the Schengen
Agreement and subsequent acquis (Schengen
Convention; agreement accession to the Schengen
Convention by Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece,
Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden; the deci-
sions of the Executive Committee and the Central
Group; and Union acts adopted by the European
Parliament and/or the Council after the Schengen
acquis was integrated into Union law.) into the
framework of the EU. When the treaty entered
into force on May 1, 1999, every EU member
state was within the Schengen Area with the
exception of the United Kingdom, which includes
England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and
Ireland. Schengen, along with the establishment
of the euro as a common currency, became shining
symbols of the reality of European integration.
Ironically, today because of threats of terrorism,
transnational crime, and mass migration stem-
ming from conflicts in the Middle East and other
regions, some Schengen members have
reinstituted border checks on their borders, and
there are political movements in some countries
calling for withdrawal from the Schengen zone.
Border Security in the United States
For the latter half of the twentieth century, the

60. continental United States was long thought to be
insulated from a massive attack other than a
Soviet nuclear barrage. These all changed on
September 11, 2001, when its vulnerability was
revealed. While September 11 brought this vul-
nerability to the forefront, a variety of non-state
actors have long benefited from the ever-
increasing openness and interconnectivity of the
world to operate across national borders in viola-
tion of law and evading law enforcement to
achieve their goals (Andreas 2003). However,
the September 11 attacks did result in a dramatic
restructuring of the United States’ approach to
both border security and intelligence. The Home-
land Security Act of 2002 created the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and, within it, Cus-
toms and Border Protection (CBP), which is the
agency primarily responsible for border security
in the United States at and between ports of entry.
Border security enforcement is the responsibil-
ity of three operational components within CBP:
the Office of Field Operation, US Border Patrol,
and Air and Marine Operations. The Office of
Field Operations is primarily responsible for
screening individuals and goods at air, sea, and
land ports of entry. The US Border Patrol is the
component whose main mission is to detect, inter-
dict, and prevent individuals entering the United
States illegally or smuggling people or contraband
between official ports of entry. The Air and
Marine Operations provides an air and maritime
force to support the other two operational compo-
nents by detecting, interdicting, and preventing
the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs,

61. and other contraband toward or across the borders
of the United States.
In addition to CBP, other agencies within DHS
play an important role in border security: Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (CIS), and the US
Coast Guard (USCG). Like CBP, ICE was created
as part of DHS with the passage of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and is the largest investiga-
tive organization within DHS by incorporating
and consolidating the investigative elements of
the former US Customs Service (USCS) and
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
into one agency. ICE has two main operational
components that carry out the daily enforcement
and investigation activities—Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO) and Homeland
6 Border Security
Security Investigations (HSI). ERO is primarily
tasked with interior enforcement of immigration
laws including identifying, apprehending,
detaining, and removing aliens residing illegally
within the United States or other aliens deemed
removable by an immigration judge. HSI is
responsible for investigating a wide range of
domestic and international activities arising from
the illegal movement of people and goods into,
within, and out of the United States. CIS is
responsible for overseeing lawful immigration to
the United States while also maintaining the integ-
rity of the country’s immigration system. The

62. USCG is unique in a number of ways including
that it is the only component of the US Armed
Forces that is not housed within the Department of
Defense, but rather it is part of DHS; it simulta-
neously acts as a military service, a law enforce-
ment organization, and a regulatory agency.
Included among the USCG’s many missions are
defending the United States’ maritime borders by
disrupting and deterring the flow of illegal drugs
and undocumented migrants at sea, and pre-
venting their entry via maritime routes to the
United States.
There are also a variety of law enforcement
agencies outside of the DHS that play a role in
border security intelligence. Within the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ), there are two such
organizations – the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA). The FBI is involved in investigating a wide
variety of issues directly related to border security,
including international terrorism, human traffick-
ing, and organized crime. The DEA’s primary mis-
sion is to investigate and prepare for the
prosecution of major violators of controlled sub-
stance laws operating at interstate and international
levels. The Department of State’s (DOS) Diplo-
matic Security Service (DSS) is another law
enforcement agency that is directly involved with
border security. In addition to its protective mis-
sion, DSS also investigates passport and visa fraud.
Conclusion
A country’s border security strategy varies greatly
depending on that country’s geographic location,

63. political institutions, and social and cultural heri-
tage. For example, the border the United States
shares with the Canada is the world’s longest
undefended border, stretching nearly 9,000 kilo-
meters across land and water, yet there are still
ports of entry and other security measures along
(Phelps et al. 2014). This is in stark contrast to the
borders of countries in the European Union where
there are no border checks when crossing between
many member states. On the other side of the
spectrum is the heavily militarized border
between North and South Korea. Complicating
the matter further is the fact that borders and
approach to border security are not static and
will often change as one country’s relationship
with their neighbors change and events occur in
that neighboring country that directly impact the
security of one’s own border security.
The fact is that no country can effectively go it
alone when it comes to border security. In an ever
more globalized world, what happens inside your
neighbors’ borders impacts your own. Today, the
threat to security does not just come from citizens
of some far-off country that follow a particular
violent ideology or make a profit by exploiting a
country’s laws and weaknesses in border security
measures to engage in illicit trade but one’s own
citizens traveling overseas to carry out similar
activities. Another major challenge is how a coun-
try, or groups of countries, provides border secu-
rity while facilitating the efficient movement of
legitimate trade and travel. For border security to
be effective in confronting the diverse cross-
border threats faced today, cooperation is needed
not just with domestic partners with border secu-

64. rity responsibilities but also with international
partners to ensure the integrity and security of
their borders and the safety of their people.
Border Security 7
Cross-References
▶ Big Data
▶ Biometrics
▶ Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
▶ Maritime Security: Cargo and Ports
▶ Maritime Security: Contraband (Drugs, Arms,
Trafficking, Smuggling, Counterfeit Goods)
▶ Terrorism: International
▶ Terrorism: Weapons of Mass Destruction/
WMD (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological,
Chemical, IED)
References
Andreas, P. (2003). Redrawing the line: Borders and secu-
rity in the twenty-first century. International Security,
28(2), 78–111. https://doi.org/10.1162/
016228803322761973.
Cozine, K. (2010). Transgovernmental networks as a tool
to combat terrorism: How ICE attachés operate over-
seas to combat terrorist travel. Doctoral dissertation,
Rutgers The State University of New Jersey-Newark.
Cozine, K. (2016). Fragmentation and interdependency:
Border security intelligence in North America and

65. Europe. The International Journal of Intelligence,
Security, and Public Affairs, 18(3), 175–197.
Custom and Border Protection. (2016). On a typical day,
About CBP. Retrieved from https://www.cbp.gov/
about
Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects.
(2015). La direction nationale du renseignement et
des enquêtes douanières. Retrieved from http://www.
douane.gouv.fr/articles/a12574-la-direction-nationale-
du-renseignement-et-des-enquetes-douanieres
European Union. (2009). The Schengen area and coopera-
tion. European Union. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_
movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_
en.htm
House Homeland Security Committee. (2016, June). The
ISIS terror threat in America. Terror Threat
Snapshot. Retrieved from https://homeland.house.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Terror-Threat-Snaps
hot-June.pdf
Karimi, F., Almasy, S., & Tuysuz, G. (2016 July 1). ISIS
leadership involved in Istanbul attack planning, Turk-
ish source says. CNN. Retrieved from http://edition.
cnn.com/2016/06/30/europe/turkey-istanbul-ataturk-ai
rport-attack/
Kremer, W. (2013, February 19) How much bigger can
container ships get? BBC News. Retrieved from https://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21432226

66. Phelps, J., Dailey, J., & Koenigsberg, M. (2014). Border
security. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.
Rees, W. (2006). Transatlantic-counterterrorism coopera-
tion: The new imperative. London: Routledge.
Southers, E. (2014). Homegrown violent extremism.
New York: Routledge.
Further Readings
Andreas, P., & Biersteker, T. J. (2014). The rebordering of
North America: Integration and exclusion in a new
security context. New York: Routledge.
Koslowski, R. (Ed.). (2011). Global mobility regimes.
New York: Palgrave MacMiollan.
8 Border Security
http://link.springer.com/Big Data
http://link.springer.com/Biometrics
http://link.springer.com/Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)
http://link.springer.com/Maritime Security: Cargo and Ports
http://link.springer.com/Maritime Security: Contraband (Drugs,
Arms, Trafficking, Smuggling, Counterfeit Goods)
http://link.springer.com/Maritime Security: Contraband (Drugs,
Arms, Trafficking, Smuggling, Counterfeit Goods)
http://link.springer.com/Terrorism: International
http://link.springer.com/Terrorism: Weapons of Mass
Destruction/ WMD (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological,
Chemical, IED)
http://link.springer.com/Terrorism: Weapons of Mass
Destruction/ WMD (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological,
Chemical, IED)

67. http://link.springer.com/Terrorism: Weapons of Mass
Destruction/ WMD (Nuclear, Radiological, Biological,
Chemical, IED)
https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803322761973
https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803322761973
https://www.cbp.gov/about
https://www.cbp.gov/about
http://www.douane.gouv.fr/articles/a12574-la-direction-
nationale-du-renseignement-et-des-enquetes-douanieres
http://www.douane.gouv.fr/articles/a12574-la-direction-
nationale-du-renseignement-et-des-enquetes-douanieres
http://www.douane.gouv.fr/articles/a12574-la-direction-
nationale-du-renseignement-et-des-enquetes-douanieres
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_securit
y/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.h
tm
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_securit
y/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.h
tm
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_securit
y/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.h
tm
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_securit
y/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.h
tm
https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Terror-
Threat-Snapshot-June.pdf
https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Terror-
Threat-Snapshot-June.pdf
https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Terror-
Threat-Snapshot-June.pdf
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/30/europe/turkey-istanbul-
ataturk-airport-attack/
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/30/europe/turkey-istanbul-
ataturk-airport-attack/
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/30/europe/turkey-istanbul-

68. ataturk-airport-attack/
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21432226
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-2143222611-1: Border
SecurityDefinitionIntroductionThreatNature of Borders and
Border SecurityBorder Security in the United
StatesConclusionCross-ReferencesReferencesFurther Readings
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces (DCAF)
Policy Paper – №21
Security Sector Responses to Trafficking
in Human Beings
Megan Bastick and Karin Grimm

69. GENEVA CENTRE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF
ARMED FORCES (DCAF)
POLICY PAPER – №21
Security Sector Responses to Trafficking
in Human Beings
Megan Bastick and Karin Grimm

70. About the Authors
Megan Bastick is coordinator of the Special Programmes
division at DCAF, working
principally on the gender and security programme.
Karin Grimm is a project officer in DCAF’s Special
Programmes division.

71. Copyright © 2007 by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces
ISBN 978-92-9222-066-2
DCAF Policy Papers offer a practical, policy-oriented view of
Security Sector Governance issues. Policy Papers can
be downloaded for free from the DCAF website at
www.dcaf.ch/publications. Printed and bound copies can also
be purchased.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
....................................................................... 1
2. The Nature and Scope of Trafficking in Human Beings
................... 2
2.1. Key concepts .................................................................
2
2.2. Overview of Global Patterns in Human Trafficking

72. .................... 4
2.3. Overview of Patterns in Human Trafficking in Europe
................ 5
2.4. Both Organised Crime and Violation of Human Rights
................ 7
3. A Security Governance Analysis of Responses to
Trafficking in Human Beings
.................................................... 8
4. Improving Security Sector Responses to Trafficking
in Human Beings..................................................................
10
4.1. Legal measures .............................................................
10
4.2. Prosecution..................................................................
12
4.3. Protection ...................................................................
16
4.4. Prevention in Countries of
Origin........................................ 18
4.5. Prevention in Countries of Destination
................................. 19
5. Conclusions ........................................................................
23
Appendix ...............................................................................
24

73. Abstract
In recent years trafficking in human beings has become an issue
of increasing
concern to European states. Trafficking in human beings is
understood as a
human rights issue, a violation of labour and migration laws,
and as undermining
national and international security through its links to organised
crime and
corruption.
United Nations agencies, the European Union, the Council of
Europe and the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, amongst
others, make
important contributions to coordinating the fight against human
trafficking.
However, there remain significant deficits in concrete
information sharing and
cooperation between the security agencies of different states
necessary to achieve
success. In many countries, cooperation among local security
sector actors, other
state agencies and non governmental organisations has

74. improved. However,
ensuring that the human rights of trafficking victims are
protected requires more
substantial training and specialised operational procedures
within the security
sector.
This paper brings a governance analysis to security sector
responses to human
trafficking. It focuses on security governance approaches
concerning
criminalisation and harmonisation of laws, prosecution of
traffickers, protection
of trafficked persons, prevention in countries of origin and
prevention in
countries of destination. The authors identify key shortcomings
in current security
responses to human trafficking, and make recommendations to
states with a
particular focus on national and international coordination and
the prevention of
human trafficking.
1
Security Sector Responses to Trafficking
in Human Beings1
Megan Bastick and Karin Grimm

75. 1. Introduction
Human trafficking violates human rights and undermines
national and
international security through its links to organised crime and
corruption. The
Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF) highlighted the
scourge of human trafficking in its book, Women in an Insecure
World: Violence against
women – facts, figures and analysis.2 The related issue of anti-
trafficking measures in
post-conflict peace-building was addressed in DCAF’s 2005
Year Book.3 DCAF
also collaborates in the important work of the Global Coalition
‘Women
Defending Peace’, initiators of the campaign ‘End Human
Trafficking Now!’4
The security sector plays a central role in preventing human
trafficking, and has
important responsibilities in responding to trafficking in such a
manner as to
respect and promote the human rights of trafficked persons.
This policy paper
discusses a number of ways to strengthen responses of the
security sector to
human trafficking. It employs a security governance analysis of
anti-trafficking
initiatives, identifying priorities with regard to laws concerning
trafficking; law
enforcement; support for trafficked persons; and prevention of
trafficking in
origin, transit and destination countries. It is important to note

76. here that while the
security sector is the focus of this paper, given the complex
causes and
consequences of trafficking in persons, it can never be more
than a vital element
of a much larger anti-trafficking strategy.
This paper has a particular focus on anti-trafficking policies and
activities in and
around the European Union (EU). Europe has long constituted a
key site of
source, transit and, most especially, destination for trafficked
persons. Europe has
been host to a great number of anti-trafficking programmes,
from which
important lessons can be distilled. The recent Finnish EU
Presidency (1 July 2006
– 31 December 2006) had a strong focus on implementation of
the EU Plan on
Best Practices, Standards and Procedures for Combating and
Preventing Trafficking in Human
1 Thanks for revisions and comments go to: Benjamin
Buckland, Research Assistant, DCAF; Anja H. Ebnöther,
Assistant Director, DCAF; Dr. Cornelius Friesendorf, ISN; and
Stephan Libiszewski, of the Swiss Federal
Police’s Coordination Unit against the Trafficking in Persons
and Smuggling of Migrants.
2 Vlachová, M. and Biason, L. eds. (2005) Women in an
Insecure World: Violence against women – facts, figures
and analysis, DCAF, Geneva.
3 V.-Y. Ghebali, “Designing Effective Measures Against

77. Trafficking in Human Beings” in Security Governance in
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, ed. A. Bryden and H. Hänggi
(Geneva: DCAF, 2005), 233-250.
4 The ‘End Human Trafficking Now!’ campaign engages the
private sector in initiatives to prevent human
trafficking. Initiated at the Athens roundtable in January 2006,
the campaign brings together the business
community with the IOM, ILO, INTERPOL, governments,
legislative bodies, international organisations, NGOs
and others involved in combating human trafficking.
2
Beings (the EU Action Plan).5 The German EU Presidency (1
January 2007 –
30 June 2007) continued implementation of this Action Plan,
emphasising closer
cooperation with Europe’s eastern neighbours and discussing
proposals to expand
the powers and mandate of EUROPOL and other cross-border
policing
mechanisms. Many EU Member States are also involved in
implementing the
2003 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Action Plan to
Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.
The paper is divided into two sections. The first section gives
an overview of the
nature and scope of human trafficking. The second section
identifies particular
inadequacies of the security sector in preventing and responding
to trafficking, and

78. makes recommendations to address these inadequacies. The
analysis includes the
following dimensions of anti-trafficking action:
• regulation and harmonisation of human trafficking laws;
• criminal justice and law enforcement;
• support for trafficked persons;
• prevention in countries of origin;
• prevention in countries of destination.
It is intended that this paper form the initial basis for future
work by DCAF on
the issue of trafficking in human beings, including a manual
containing both
geographical and thematic approaches to the issue as well as a
comprehensive set
of tools for policy makers and high-level security sector actors.
2. The Nature and Scope of Trafficking in Human Beings
2.1. Key concepts
Trafficking in persons is defined by the 2000 Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children
(Palermo Protocol) as:
(a) [T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of

79. power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or
receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced
5 European Council, “EU Plan on Best Practices, Standards and
Procedures for Combating and Preventing
Trafficking in Human Beings. Regulation No OJ C 311,
9.12.2005” Official Journal of the European Union 311,
no.1 (9 December 2004),
http://www.osce.org/documents/cthb/2005/12/18676_en.pdf
(accessed 7 August
2007).
3
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude
or the removal of organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the
intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) have been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt
of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered

80. “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve any of the
means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.6
From this definition we can draw out a key distinction between
trafficked and
smuggled persons. Trafficking always involves an element of
coercion and
exploitation. Trafficked persons have not consented or, if they
initially consented,
that consent has been rendered meaningless by the coercive,
deceptive or abusive
actions of the traffickers. Smuggling of illegal migrants, on the
other hand, while
often dangerous and degrading, almost always involves an
element of consent on
the part of the smuggled person. Furthermore, smuggling
involves movement
across internal or international borders while, as the United
States Government’s
2007 Trafficking in Persons Report points out: “Movement to
the new location is
incidental. The force, fraud, or coercion exercised on that
person to perform or
remain in service to another is the defining element of human
trafficking…”.7
In practice, the distinction between persons being trafficked and
persons being
smuggled is often hazy or even non-existent. Many people may
end up beginning
their journey in one category and ending it in another.
Smuggled persons are often
forced into slavery or servitude as they struggle to repay the

81. “debts” that they have
incurred to smugglers/traffickers.8 Similarly, many trafficked
persons may be
refugees and vice-versa.9
6 Adopted by GA resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November
2000; entered into force 25 December 2003. As of
September 2007, 117 states have signed the protocol with 115
ratifications. The grave consequences of
human trafficking have also been recognized in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Under
the Statute, trafficking may constitute the crime against
humanity of ‘enslavement’ or be a war crime in
certain circumstances.
7 United States of America, Department of State, Trafficking in
Persons Report, Condoleezza Rice, introduction
(Washington: Department of State, 2007).
8 Claire Brolan. “An Analysis of the Human Smuggling Trade
and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants
by Land, Air and Sea (2000) From a Refugee Protection
Perspective.” International Journal of Refugee Law
14, no.4 (2003): 579.
9 Anne Gallagher. “Human Rights and the New UN Protocols
on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A
Preliminary Analysis.” Human Rights Quarterly 23, (2001):
1001; Andrew Brouwer, and Judith Kumin.
“Interception and Asylum: Where Migration Control and Human
Rights Collide.” Refuge 21, no.4 (December
2003): 9.