Course Objective - Assess the importance of Port Management Security. Instructions: Your initial post should be at least 350 words. Lesson Port Facility Operations “The terrorist threat in the early twenty-first century is testing the basic political values and structures of democracy, and in particular, criminal justice roles and processes in controlling deviance in society. Terrorism and the emergence of homeland security are changing the character of local policing, not only in the United States, but around the world”…Kenneth Christopher, Port Security Management Port facility security is not the sole responsibility of only one entity. It is the responsibility of many including international, national, state and local organizations including the private sector (Christopher, 2015). The port authorities often do not have direct control over the following: · Customs and border protection · Police, fire, and emergency medical services · Immigration and agriculture agencies · Coast Guard and harbor authorities · Transportation and utility regulating bodies · Employer groups, stevedores, and labor unions · Cargo terminal operators · Passenger cruise and ferry lines · Vendors, suppliers, and customers Collaborations between Port Security and Enforcement Operations This week the focus will be on the security management aspects of port facility operations. As we learned in week six, the security and safety at U.S. ports is no doubt a shared responsibility to ensure that port authorities develop and apply an operational approach that includes various resources, processes, and systems to establish an interconnected port security program. Intra and interagency cooperation is essential to effectively coordinate security efforts between different stake holders conducting port activities. It is important to understand that port facility security is not the sole responsibility of only one entity. It is the responsibility of many including international, national, state and local organizations including the private sector (Christopher, 2015, p. 268). The changing landscape of criminal activity has forced a change in policing.  Since 9/11, police forces are relied upon, more often than not, to conduct terrorism training, CBRN/WMD training, intelligence gathering (to some extent) and information sharing; along with traditional police roles of crime prevention and follow-on prosecution, public security and assistance.  As with every aspect of our society, this change has encompassed our port security systems as well.  Law enforcement agencies are expected (and needed) to work with port authorities “to integrate the appropriate level of law enforcement service into the Port FSP and security regimen” (Christopher).  Developing mutual Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and/or Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) will help to define each entities' roles, responsibilities and organizational hierarchy. When we take a closer look, we soon realize that collaboration.

1. Course Objective - Assess the importance of Port Management
Security.
Instructions: Your initial post should be at least 350 words.
Lesson
Port Facility Operations
“The terrorist threat in the early twenty-first century is testing
the basic political values and structures of democracy, and in
particular, criminal justice roles and processes in controlling
deviance in society. Terrorism and the emergence of homeland
security are changing the character of local policing, not only in
the United States, but around the world”…Kenneth Christopher,
Port Security Management
Port facility security is not the sole responsibility of only one
entity. It is the responsibility of many including international,
national, state and local organizations including the private
sector (Christopher, 2015).
The port authorities often do not have direct control over the
following:
· Customs and border protection
· Police, fire, and emergency medical services
· Immigration and agriculture agencies
· Coast Guard and harbor authorities
· Transportation and utility regulating bodies
· Employer groups, stevedores, and labor unions
· Cargo terminal operators
· Passenger cruise and ferry lines
· Vendors, suppliers, and customers
Collaborations between Port Security and Enforcement
Operations

2. This week the focus will be on the security management aspects
of port facility operations. As we learned in week six, the
security and safety at U.S. ports is no doubt a shared
responsibility to ensure that port authorities develop and apply
an operational approach that includes various resources,
processes, and systems to establish an interconnected port
security program. Intra and interagency cooperation is essential
to effectively coordinate security efforts between different stake
holders conducting port activities. It is important to understand
that port facility security is not the sole responsibility of only
one entity. It is the responsibility of many including
international, national, state and local organizations including
the private sector (Christopher, 2015, p. 268).
The changing landscape of criminal activity has forced a change
in policing. Since 9/11, police forces are relied upon, more
often than not, to conduct terrorism training, CBRN/WMD
training, intelligence gathering (to some extent) and information
sharing; along with traditional police roles of crime prevention
and follow-on prosecution, public security and assistance. As
with every aspect of our society, this change has encompassed
our port security systems as well. Law enforcement agencies
are expected (and needed) to work with port authorities “to
integrate the appropriate level of law enforcement service into
the Port FSP and security regimen” (Christopher). Developing
mutual Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and/or
Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) will help to define each
entities' roles, responsibilities and organizational hierarchy.
When we take a closer look, we soon realize that collaboration
between port security and law enforcement operations is critical
if both entities want to interact operationally. Although the
jurisdictions still remain the same, the port FSO generally has
jurisdiction over the respective port. Whereas, the law
enforcement authorities have jurisdiction over their prescribed
geographic area. But, seeing as how a port belongs (or is at
least geographically located in) a city or county, then it can
easily get confusing. There is simply no room for more

3. confusion in an already extremely complex port environment.
To properly combat this problem, once again the key is
communication. Communication between the heads of each
agency and having a collaborative working relationship is
crucial to smooth and effective port operations. The Chief of
Police of the local law enforcement agency must be able to
speak freely and frequently with the Port FSO. It is easy to
contemplate the need for having both agencies, but, it’s not the
pure simplicity of having more personnel to protect the port.
There are legalities as well that impact how both agencies work
and collaborate. For instance, not all violations fall into the
realm of the port FSO. In many cases, the situation must be
handled by local law enforcement authorities. Yes, the port
security personnel can initially apprehend, but, the specific
violations may require the handling of the situation by local,
state, or federal law enforcement personnel. This is yet another
reason why the two departments should be able to work together
in unison as opposed to working against each other. For
instance, the local police should always be included in any
facility security plan that addresses matters related to
administration, legal authority to act, training, joint training and
exercise functions and activities, and response and recovery
from a natural or manmade disaster or terrorist attack. Together,
both parties can work in harmony and establish a secure and
safe port (Christopher, 2015).
The threat of terrorism continues to evolve and so does
homeland security. It is imperative that all federal, state and
local (in some cases tribal) agencies and authorities are
operating on the same page. Collaboration between all security
and law enforcement entities is the key to deter terrorism and
criminal activities. Port security collaboration with law
enforcement operations is vital, as port facilities have a major
economic impact on towns and the surrounding cities. It is in
the best interest of the law enforcement agency to ensure not
only the port is safe and protected, but the community
surrounding the port is protected as well. Just as important, and

4. in the best interest of both parties, is to understand one
another’s management and organizational structure. This
understanding can provide and enhance utilization of both
organizations resources when an event or incident occurs.
Trying to train, equip, and organize the port security and law
enforcement elements post event will lead to failure and
potentially result in increased death and destruction within the
port and the surrounding local community.
Challenges of Collaboration in Managing Port Security
Overall, there are three key challenges when working with
numerous agencies for one common goal: “resource allocation”,
“lack of big-picture” (strategic thinking), and “improving risk
communication” (Christopher, 2015). Communication will
always be a big piece when we assess the challenges associated
with collaboration. As with any working relationship between
differing agencies, there will be challenges to overcome. The
challenges in managing port security operations, as identified
by a forum held by the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) in 2007 are; “improving risk communications, political
obstacles to risk-based resources allocations, and as already
mentioned, a lack of strategic thinking about managing
homeland security risk” (Christopher, 2015). What is
interesting about the three challenges identified is that they
appear to be very similar to the findings of the 9/11
Commission Report on the hijacking of commercial aircraft.
The Commission cited a lack of interagency collaboration in the
sharing of information and communications, political issues
surrounding command and control, and finally a “lack of
imagination” on the part of the government. However, it
appears that the lessons learned from those events have taken
root. Progress has been made in the working relationships to
counter the terrorist threat and impede criminal activities within
the seaport environment.
Port Security and the Dirty Bomb Threat
No discussion on port security challenges is complete without a
brief discussion on the so called dirty bomb. The dirty bomb is

5. commonly associated with the technical name, Radiation
Dispersal Device or RDD. The initial idea is that radioactive
material would be dispersed (through IED or aerial application)
into a target area by the use of explosives with the intent to
contaminate the area. The radioactive material most associated
with such an attack would be medical grade material or
industrial radioactive waste, not fissile or weapons grade
material. Generally, the RDD would be constructed with various
radioactive elements such as strontium 90, iodine 131, or
cesium 137. These elements are the most likely candidates for
such an attack as they could contaminate large areas with
radioactive material. However, these elements are beta
emitters, and beta particles can be stopped by normal clothing.
However, they can present a major hazard if inhaled or
ingested, resulting in radiation sickness and likely death.
Now the author will opine that this threat is more of a political
hype than reality. Yes, in theory the potential exists. However,
in probability the threat would be low for many reasons.
Obtaining enough radioactive material to construct an RDD
would be problematic. Then there is the transportation issue of
delivering the RDD to target. To date, as confirmed by the
additional reading for week 6, the Council on Foreign Relations
report (2006) on “Dirty Bombs,” there has not been a successful
attack utilizing an RDD. True, there is a lot of talk about
testing and threating the use of a dirty bomb…Iraq in 1987 and
the Chechen rebels in Moscow in 1995, who planted a device
that failed to function (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006).
The RDD threat - the real truth and nothing but the truth
We are exposed to radiation on a daily basis through many
means. However the threat of an RDD accomplishes one of its
major goals, fear. And it is due to this fear that a lot of time
and money has been spent to detect, deter and defeat (the
objective of any security program) such a threat. In the last
few years a lot of money has been spent not only at our ports
but in our local communities as well. Stabilization teams have
been organized and equipped to counter this threat in the local

6. community. In the political world fear sells, regardless of the
reality. The author is not suggesting that this is not a threat,
but is suggesting that it has obtained more attention than it
should have, thereby propagating the idea that an RDD is a huge
threat within the port environment.
As far as ports and the general public is concerned there are
more realistic threats with a higher probability of success. For
example, all the trucks that transport hazardous materials daily
from and to the port while traversing through our local city
streets. Loads such as ammonium nitrate (fertilizer), chlorine,
or strong acids is a common occurrence. Looking ahead to next
week’s lesson 8, we will see what happened to Texas City,
Texas when a vessel caught fire and exploded at a dock carrying
bulk fertilizer. Spoiler alert – it flattened the town. A similar
event occurred just a few years back at a processing plant
outside of Waco, Texas, when it caught fire and exploded.
Click on the photo below to see the massive power from the
fertilizer plant explosion.
Measuring Risk
Michael German, a fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice’s
Liberty and National Security Programs, wrote an article
entitled: Is Flawed Terrorism Research driving Flawed
Counterterrorism Policies?, which was dated April 7, 2015, and
published by The Daily Threat Brief . The article discusses
how the government is continuing to fund research that supports
desecrated theories rather than using objective empirical
analyses to form policy decisions on counterterrorism defenses.
German uses historical events and the hysteria that led to the
internment of Japanese citizens during WWII and the current
“modern radicalization theory” to justify the tactics used by the
FBI against the American Muslim communities. “The theory
that terrorists incubate through predictable steps from adopting
a radical ideology to committing an act of violence has been
soundly discredited by empirical studies of terrorists” (German,
2015, p.2). Radicalization does occur, which can lead to
violence, such as the Boston Marathon Bombers…this cannot be

7. denied. But at what cost?
Now what does this have to do with the threat of an RDD in a
seaport? A parallel can be drawn between the governments
polices on Islamic extremist radicalization theory and the RDD
threat. It is simple to assume the worst, and formulate all kinds
of potential threats without looking at the real probability of the
threat occurring or evolving. The problem is that it is not cost
effective to do so. Limited resources are expended attempting
to counter a threat that although is possible, may not be
probable. An effective risk assessment utilizing factual data,
capability, availability, intent in conjunction with empirical
data could form a low probability of risk. This is not saying to
ignore the risk, but placing it where it belongs with all the other
many possibilities that may have a higher probability of causing
harm or damage. But again, in the political world of foreign
policy and money spending, “fear” sells, especially to the
uninformed public.
References
Christopher, K. (2015). Port Security Management, 2nd Ed.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group, ISBN #
13: 978-1-4200- 6893-1 e-book.