Cultural Tastes and Social Class Distinctions

't
First published in 1992
by Routledge
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc.
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O 1992 Richard Jenkins
Typeset in 10 on 11 Times by Intype, London
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A catalogue record for this book is available from the British
Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in publication Data
Jenkins, Richard, 1952-
Pierre Bourdieu/Richard Jenkins.p. cm. -(Key
socioiogists)Includes bibiiographicai references and index.
1. Bourdieu, Pierre. 2. Sociology-
France. 3. Sociology-
Methodology. I. Titie. IL Series.
HM2?.F81461992
301 ' .01 -dc20
ISBN 0-415-05798_1

92-?720
CIP
fil
136 Pierre Bourdieu
projects, and matters of taste and aesthetic judgement, even the
moit individual or personal, contain within them a necessary
reference to 'a common meaning already established'.
Which is where what Bourdieu calls the 'cultural unconscious'
comes in: 'attitudes, aptitudes, knowledge, themes and
problems,
in short the whole system of categories of perception and
thought
acquired by the systematic apprenticeshiq y{ch the school
organizes or makes it possible to organize'.[25] In other words,
the habitus as it is produced by the pedagogic work of the
education system. This expresses itself in a range of effects:
from
'unconscious borrowings and imitations' to the inspiration which
derives from 'the common source of themes and forms which
define the cultural tradition of a society and an age'.1261 But it
is dorle unknowingly, and this masks the importance of society
and culture, allowing the celebration * the misrecognition - of
individual, autonomous creativity and the glorification of Cul-
ture. In the same way, the school can only do its work by
denying
the determinisms of social origins and culture and valorising
ability and Education. In this, both - Culture and Education -
are aiso legitimising the existing social relations of domination.

The canons of legitimacy - shared understandings of the nature
of Art and Culture and of how they are classified - divide the
cultural field and its vassal, the intellectual field, into the
familiar
three zones: universal legitimacy, contested legitimacy (where
genres are in the process of legitimisation, or not) and the non-
legitimacy of arbitrary personal taste. As we have already seen,
thise classificatory caiegories organise cultural consumption.
Bourdieu is insisting that cultural production is thus classified
also. These criteria of legitimacy are the constraints within
which
creativity works.
What he does not do is account for cultural production - and
indeed consumption - which successfully challenges the bound-
aries or contenis of these categories. How is the imperialism of
legitimate Art broken or undermined? In Bourdieu's scheme of
things it is difficult to understand the relatively modest
innovation
of Seurat, let alone the subsequent pace and profundity of
change
represented, say, by C€zanne or Picasso, To shift fields alto-
geiher, Stravinsky's Rite of Spring revolutionised the music of
Ihe concert hall; Elvis Presley's Sun sessions or Dylan's first
electric performances did the same for popular music. But
where
do such impulses come from and how do they happen? There is
something profoundly social going on here - explained by
neither
Culture, Status and Distinction 137
the critical marketplace nor the 'intrinsic' power of individual
'genius' (although in all of my examples there is that, whatever
'that' is, too) - but Bourdieu never quite gets round to broaching
the topic. There is rebellion in his model but, alas, no

revolution.
DISTINCTION
When La Distinction was first published in France in 1979, not
only did it sell in surprisingly large numbers for a densely
written,
technically intimidating and lengthy sociological study, but it
also became the focus of a lively public debate. The clue to
understanding this unusual celebrity may be found in the fact
that the people who bought and argued over the book were
largely those about whom it was written, French bourgeois
intel-
lectuals for whom cultural distinction is not a trivial matter:
French readers either rejected its findings in horror at
the thought that they might be revealed as something
other than the individualists they take pride in consider-
ing themselves to be, or embraced it as a major contri-
bution to understanding modern society.[27]
Something more than individualism was at stake, however.
This is Bourdieu's major assault on the notion of pure or innate
cultural taste, and the whipping boy is, once again, Kant (not
for nothing is the sub-title A Social Critique of the Judgement
of Taste). Bourdieu's project is the 'barbarous reintegration of
aesthetic consumption into the world of ordinary consumption
(against which it endlessly defines itself)'[28]: Culture is
dissolved
into culture. Now at this point, some of you may be asking
whether our hero is not, in fact, tilting at windmills; do people
really believe, these days, in an ahistorical aesthetic sense
which
is independent of its social context? Well, sociologists and
anthro-
pologists may not, but some art historians and critics - and
many

more of their readers ,(not to mention those who do not read,
but know what is art and what isn't) - certainly do. Here, fot
example, is Norman Bryson speaking: 'Painting and viewing are
ultimately self-regulating activities this is a serene
system'.[29] Bourdieu's target here, is not quite a straw man'
He has in his sights the consistent use of notions of 'taste' - as
a sort of naturally occurring phenomenon - to mark and
maintain
(in part by masking the marking) social boundaries, whether
these be between the dominant and dominated classes or within
tl
ffi+.,'
r
H
blrr
138 Pierre Bourdieu
classes. Cultural classiflcation systems, Bourdieu argues, are
rooted in the class system.
The other task which Bourdieu sets himself in Distinction is
the reconceptualisation of Weber's model of social
stratification,
in particular the relationship between class and Srand (status
group). The concepts which he adopts to mediate between these
are the class fractiol and the life-style. Drawing upon two major
surveys, undertaken in 1963 and 1967-8, of 1217 subjects from
Paris, Lille and a small provincial town, supplemented by a
wide
range of data from other surveys concerned with a range of
tcpics, the ernpirical rneat of the book is concerned with the

detailed explication of the life-style differences of differing
class
fractions.
It is a difficult and complex work to summarise. Presentation-
ally, it is an intriguing pastiche of different blocks of text,
photo-
graphs and diagrams, in the best traditions of Acles de la
recher-
che en sciences sociales. L,inguistically, it is at least as dense
and
unforgiving of a moment's lapse in concentration as any of its
predecessors. As with his other studies of aspects of French
society, Bourdieu is explicit that this is not iasr a study of
France.
The model he presents is 'valid beyond the particular French
case and, no doubt, for every stratified society'.[30]
He begins on familiar ground: the link between cultural prac-
tices and social origins, mediated in large part through formal
education. People learn to consume culture and this education
is differentiated by social class. The further away one moves
from the authorised hierarchy of preferences which is governed
by legitimate Culture, the more one is concerned with 'non-
legitimate' cultural domains, the greater becomes - in the
absence of the legislation of orthodoxy - the influence of social
origins upon practices and preferences.
At this point, Bourdieu presents us with a 'three-zone' model
of cultural tastes: 'legitimate' taste, 'middle-brow' taste and
'popular taste'. Although at first sight this also is familiar, it is
a little different to the model presented previously. That was a
map of cultural products according to their legitimacy' This is a
map of tastes and preferences which correspond to education
level
and social class; in short, it is the beginnings of a model of

class
life-styles.
Within this model of life-styles and cultural taste, the working-
class aesthetic is a dominated aesthetic, constantly obliged to
define itself by reference to the dominant aesthetic (the cultural
arbitrary). In fact, the working class is, according to Bourdieu,
less able than the middle or upper classes to adopt a specifically
aesthetic point of view upon objects whose constitution and
defi-
nition involves an aesthetic judgement; such an object might be
anything from a Qar to a compact disc player to a photograph.
The upper classes, distanced from necessity, are allowed a
'play-
ful seriousness';[31] this aesthetic sense is part of an assured
relation to the world, a sense of distinction:
Like every sort of taste, it unites and separates. Being
the product of the conditioning associated with a particu-
lar class of conditions of existence, it unites all those
who are the product of similar conditions while distin-
guishing them from all others. And it distinguishes in an
essential way, since taste is the basis of all that one has
- people and things - and all that one is for others,
whereby one classifies oneself and is classifled by
others.[32]
Apart from reminding us of the general social theory which
underlies his analysis, this nicely gets to the heart of the matter:
taste is one of the key signifiers and elements of social identity.
It is one of the primary interactional determinants of class
endogamy: individuals tend to meet and marry, or so Bourdieu
argues, within rather than between life-styles (and, hence,

within
rather than between social classes).
The petite bourgeoisie fall, as one might imagine, rather badly
between two stools. Condemned to differentiate themselves
sharply from those immediately below them in the class system,
they have essentially two problems concerning those above
them.
First, they may lack the education which is the basis for the
mobilisation of legitimate taste. Second, and perhaps more
important, they lack 'ease or cultivated naturalness', the familial
habitus which enables the upper classes to disguise what they
haye learned as what they are born with. So even with appropri-
ate schooling, the primary school teacher or the clerk is unlikely
to be able to'bring it off': another case of 'manners maketh the
man',
The structure of class life-styles is not, at first sight, obvious;
its unity is 'hidden under the diversity and multiplicity of the
set
of praclices performed in flelds governed by different logics
and
therefore inducing different forms of realization'.[33] First, one
must constitute the 'objective class' of people whose similar
:
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140 Pierre Bourdieu
conditions of existence produce similar habituses and similar
;;;-;&;ds and po*i'' This Bourdieu does by reference to
;""rp";iJ";t "; i"'it"i"t of social
class' Having done this'
prodlcing occupationally defined class fractions' he then exam-
ines national survey .iititti"t for the economic capital (using
indicators such ut f,ornt ownership' luxury car - ownership'
;;;;;,-;ti uno "urt"iuicapital (newspaper
read' frequencv of
il;;;;;:go;i, "nttrrtiutrn toi "tutiical
muiic' etc') possessed bv
thedominantclass.-ft'"-t*oformsofcaoitalareinversely
related: the more of oni itt" t"t' of the otht'' ' general rule
which also holds good in the middle classes' This produces a
rather more comptex model of 'the space of social positiolt' -
as structured by the'Jili"'"'tiut disiribution of two kinds of
caoital - than i, .o*ooniy allowed fo1 ln simple up-down hier-
iiSnil; ;;;h ,i ,ii"tinfrtion.[34] rhis is rhe inreracrion, in
Weberian terms, of class and status'
within this social spa.e thete are more-kinds of mobility possi-
ble than simply up*LiOt and downwarcls' In PTI:Yl1t^'rgl:-
,"tt" -oUifity is, iuggests Bourdieu' of great importance' tnts
is the result of coni"ersion and reconveision strateBjes-, .whgn
il;;t" ;pital is:.;;h;J in, to obtain cultural capital T 11"
;;;;;;t;,ion, and 'i""l"ttu (although the former

is probablv
more common than the latter)"These strategies can accelerate
iii"'".-p"ii,ion over u.""tt to etite education' for example' lead-
;; ;';[,pi;;; lnflation" It is central to Bourdieu's argument
at this Point that:
Reproduction strategies,-lh:.ttl of outwardly very differ-
""t!iutti""s
whereb"y individuats or families tend' uncon-
sciously unO .o"ttlJusly, to ma.inta.in or increase their
assets and consequintty'to maintain or improve their
oosilion ln tt,e ctasi structure' constitute a system which'
ffi; ;;'p..do"l or a single. unifying' generative prin-
"ipi"]
i"rol to function and.change in a systematic- way'
Through ttre meJiation of the disposition towards the
future, which is itself cletermined by the group's objective
chances of reproduction, these strategies 0tp:lg'-ltl!
on the volume and composition of the capttar to ue
reproArrc"d; and secondly, on.the state of the instruments
ti'r"proO,r"tion (inneritance law and custom' the labour
market,theeducationalsystem,etc.),whichitself
depends on the state of the power relations between the
classes. [35]
This quotation is offered at such length as another reminder
of the consistency of Bourdieu's overall theoretical framework.
Explicitly or implicitly, it is all here: strategies, the habitus

with
its dispositions, subjective expectations of objective
probabilities
and social reproduction. Whether he is talking about the Kabyle
struggle for honour, B6arnais marriage strategies or the
symbolic
violence of French education or cultural consumption, Bourdieu
is concerned with the same issues: the manner in which the
routine practices of individual actors are determined, at least in
large part, by the history and objective structure of their
existing
social world, and how, inasmuch as the nature of that social
world is taken to be axiomatic, those practices contribute -
with-
out this being their intention - to the maintenance of its existing
hierarchical structure. To appropriate a distinction originally
for-
mulated by Raymond Firth, social organisation may change but
social structure remains relatively constant.[36] This is the key
to understanding Bourdieu's notion of 'competitive struggle':
the form of class struggle which the dominated classes
allow to be imposed on them when they accept the stakes
offered by the dominant classes. It is an integrative strug-
gle and, by virtue of the initial handicaps, a reproductive
struggle, since those who enter this chase, in which they
are beaten before they start. . .implicitly recognize the
legitimacy of the goals pursued by those whom they
pursue, by the mere fact of taking part.[37]
Having constituted 'objective classes' by occupation, and
related these to 'constructed classes' which are positioned in
social space by the volume and composition of their mixture of
economic and cultural capital, Bourdieu adds to this the
relation-
ship between class habitus and life-style(s). Here the body and

its hexis are of great importance, particularly in areas such as
cuisine, sport, clothes and non-verbal communication.
Schematic-
ally, the underlying model is as follows: (a) objective
conditions
of existence combine with position in social structure to
produce
(b) the habitus,'a structured and structuring structure', which
consists of (c) a 'system of schemes generating classifiable
prac-
tices and works' and (d) a 'system of schemes of perception and
appreciation' or taste, which between them produce (e) 'classifi-
i
Iilir:i:lir. t,i;;,frr,,i,:i.rt, iiri-":i:i'l,
i'iiiiiiin$ltiiri.nid{{ii;rilid{n'd l
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142 Picrre Ilourdieu
able practices and works', resulting in (f) a life-style, '.a sys191
of clissified and classifying practices, i.e' distinctive signs'.[38]
While there may be quite a distance between the first and last
instances, the determinism of this scheme is unmistakable"
There are as many fields of preferences as there are {ields of
stylistic possibilities. It is taste which mediates the correspon-
dence between classes of products and classes of consumers, in
a relationship of 'elective afflnity'. Each field of possibilities -
be it populai music or gardening - offers a sufficient range of
relationships of similarity and dissimilarity with respect to its
products to constitute a 'system of differences' which allows the
bomprehensive expression of basic social differences (class)

and
'weli-nigh inexhaustible possibilities for the pursuit of distinc-
tion'.[39]
Using-a model of social space such as that constructed by
Bourdieu - a multidimensional arena in which economic and
cultural capital are both the objects and the weapons of a com-
petitive struggle between classes * allows or holds out the
possi-
Lifity of a reconciliation between competing theories of modern
society, between 'theories which describe the social world in the
languige of stratification and those which speak the language of
the-clais struggle'.[40] This attempt at theoretical synthesis, or,
more accuratLly perhaps, the bringing of two theoretical tra-
ditions into creative conflict with each other, may account for
the apparent contradicti on in Distinction between a tight,
circular
model-of social and cultural reproduction, on the one hand, and
the fluidity over time of the system of 'competitive struggle', on
the other.
This fluidity is nowhere more apparent than in the middle
reaches of the system, the petite bourgeoisie' It is, however,
within the dominant class, the bourgeoisie, that symbolic strug-
gles are most apparent and most severe. It is here that the
definition of Culiural legitimacy is fought over' It is also within
the dominant class, according to Bourdieu, that the struggle
occurs'to define the legitimate principles of domination,
between
economic, educational or social capital'.[41] Here the point is
that the dominant class is, in fact, more an uneasy coalition,
from the point of view of its members, or a statistical artifact,
viewed wiih the objective gaze of the social survey, than it is a
homogeneous social group. Each class fraction has a different
combination of economic and cultural capital and a different
life-

style. Within the overall social space of the dominant class - the
t
t:
il
ii;
bourgeoisie - more of one kind of capital tends to mean less of
the other.
The centrepiece of Bourdieu's analysis of the structure of life-
styles of the various class fractions is a correspondence analysis
of the relationship between various survey items relating to
legit
imate Culture, 'middlebrow' culture and ethical diipositions
(views, for example, on the nature of friendship), on bne side
of the calculation, and father's occupation, educational qualifi-
cations, income and age, on the other. For legitimate Cultural
tastes within the dominant class, for example, this yields a con-
tinuum of differentiation with cultural producers and higher
edu-
cation teachers at one end, executives and engineers intermedi-
ately classified, and commercial employers at the other. The
closer together class fractions are, the sharper is likely to be the
boundary between them in terms of its symbolisation. Not least
of all, this reflects the different social trajectories that lie
behind
present social locations:
The classification struggle which is waged initially within
firms, a struggle for supremacy between production and
publicity, between engineering and marketing. . .and all
the similar struggles which are fought out within the

dominant fraction of the dominant class, are inseparable
from conflicts of values which involve the participant's
whole world views and arts of living, because they
oppose not only different sectional interests but different
scholastic and occupational careers and, through them,
different social recruitment areas and therefore ultimate
differences in habitus. [42]
Different class fractions, in addition to their engagement in the
struggles of the moment ('sectional interests'), also have
different
collective histories: their social and historical roots are
different.
The old and the new, the established and the arriviste,
competein the struggle over the possession of, and the
relationihip
between,'temporal and spiritual powers'.[43]
The notion of social trajectories - ideal typical in the case of
collectivities and categories, to some extent empirical for indi-
viduals - is of importance to Bourdieu's understanding of class.
Time and its passage is located at the heart of the analysis, in
the form of individual and collective histories. However,
equally
important is the implication of the past and the present in the
likelihood of a future: an 'objective probability'. The notion of
, rir:rtiiii:,r;,j.riii r i,llrl, iiriiilrti.t;i,tuit_,
i",f 1 il:!.itr,tur, t,i:.rii
144 Pierre Bourdieu
a trajectory involves description and prediction: each might be
thought to determine the other.

ThTs aspect of Bourdieu's model of social class is perhaps at
its clearest in his discussion of the petite bourgeoisie. They are
i" tt " intermediate location reserved
for social categories - class
fractions - which are either rising or falling in the field of class
relations. In this area of unceriainty the key to the game is;"-
oiirrut goodwill' and what is at stake is their knowledge of
Culture rfth"r than their acknowledgement of it. It goes without
*Vrng, for the petit bourgeois, that Culture - however it might
be defined - is a 'good thing':
The whole relationship of the petite bourgeoisie to cul-
ture can in a sense be deduced from the considerable
gap between knowledgg 1nd- recognition, the source of
ihe cultural goodwill which takes different forms depend-
ing on the d'egree of familiarity with legitimate culture,
thit is, on soial origin and the associated mode of cul-
tural acquisition. [44]
This cultural goodwill manifests itself as a 'cultural docility" a
sense of ,unwdrthiness', a 'reverence' for Culture. It is an
'avidity
combined with anxiety', the product of 'undifferentiated rever-
;;;;;, *ni"n teads th'e petit bourgeois to mistake Gilbert and
Sullivan for ,serious, music, or educational television
programmes
ioi ,ci"nc". In their relation to Culture, the petite bourgeoisie
transforms whatever it latches onto into 'middle-brow' culture:
Ggiii*ut" culture is not made for him (and is often made.
against
[i-rij, ro that he is not made for it . ' it ceases to be what it is
u, #on as he appropriates it''[45] If the legitimate gaze of the
Uourgeoisie Uestbws legitimacy,-the middle-brow_ gaze of the
petit

bour[eois imparts a chirmingmediocrity to all that it recognises.
Thi petite bourgeoisie is, however, if anything. even more
internaliy differentiited than the dominant bourgeoisie: there are
tt" u"toaioacts, the anti-intellectual small shopkeepers and the
upwardly mobiie managers who defer their own social and cul-
iriral gritincation in ariinvestment strategy aim.g$- at securing.a
bourgEois future for their children. Each has a different place in
Bouidieu,s social map of the varieties of petit bourgeois taste.
He also offers a solution to the minor p:uzzle, posed in Chapter
fir", uUo"t what happened to those for whom the expansion of
ilgh;. education in fG tg6Os created a disjuncture between their
,rfi""ti* expectations and their objective probabilities. The
answer seems to be that they become social workers. Those who
are unable to find appropriately bourgeois employment, and for
whom family and educational background encourage a view of
themselves as an 'ethical vanguard', move into the occupational
niches between the teaching and medical professions. A range
of 'cultural reconversion' strategies result in a 'profession of
faith'
ending up as a profession. This is allied to a rejection or
inversion
of the 'ascetic morality of the established petite bourgeoisie', an
embracement of alternatives which becomes a celebration of
what it appears to reject:
Classified, d6class6s, aspiring to a higher class, they see
themselves as unclassifiable, 'excluded', 'dropped out',
'marginal', anything rather than categorized, assigned to
a class, a determinate place in social space. And yet all
of their practices . . . speak of classification - but in themode of
denial . . . [They are] thinly disguised

expressions of a sort of dream of social flying, a desper-
ate attempt to defy the gravity of the social field . . .
these new intellectuals are inventing an art of living
which provides them with the gratifications and prestige
of the intellectual at the least cost . . .[46]
And there is much more in this delightful vein. It may simply
be that Bourdieu is appealing to my own prejudices in this case,
but his analysis of the new 'caring' professions is a timely
reminder of his undoubted capacity, despite the serious
problems
which exist with respect to his general theory, to hit the nail on
the head as an empirical sociologist. The more enthusiasm with
which an alternative way is espoused, the more securely is the
mainstream deflned and signposted, and the principles upon
which it is founded reproduced.
From the resentment of the displaced intellectuals of the stran-
ded, counter-cultural petite bourgeoisie, Bourdieu moves on to
the 'choice of the necessary' which he characterises as the work-
ing-class relation to culture. His argument here can be briefly
put. Economic constraints and the dispositions of the working-
class habitus produce an adaptive response which is
distinguished
by the relatiye absence of aesthetic choice-making: 'nothing is
more alien to working-class women than the typically bourgeois
idea of making each object in the home the occasion for an
aesthetic choice.'[47] This is not just because they cannot afford
aesthetic sensitivites. Bourdieu is emphatic that income only
pro-
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146 Pierre Bourdieu
duces choices - or their refusal - in conjunction with a habitus
that is already in harmony with the economic limitations within
which it functions (and of which, historically, it is a product).
The last refuge of working-class cultural autonomy, he goes on
to argue, lies in the 'values of virility', the 'decisive point of
relation to the body' which is rooted in a history of manual
labour and is under threat from social and economic change,
The dominated class, in danger of coming to see themselves
completely through the mediation of the dominant definition of
the body, are in a poor position to resist inasmuch as hexis, 'the
most fundamental principle of class unity and identity', is

located
in the unconscious and, hence, not easily available for mobilis-
ation in organised and knowing resistance.[48]
Within the working class there is, of course, also differen-
tiation. Bourdieu calls the cultural and political differences
between skilled workers and foremen, who remain typical of
their class, and office workers, already in the race for mobility,
a 'real frontier'. Where the former watch sports and the circus
on television, the latter view educational programmes. More
generally, however, it is in culture - a way of life that is charac-
terised by a 'realistic (but not resigned) hedonism' and 'sceptical
(but not cynical) materialism' - rather than politics that
whatever
working-class unity and solidarity ls to be found can be found.
The working-class habitus is both an adaptation to the realities
of working-class life and a defence against them.[49]
The cultural dispossession which Bourdieu attributes to the
working class is also manifest in their attitude towards politics.
In an argument which harks back to his earliest days in Algeria
(see Chapter Two), he argues that abstentionism and the large
number of people who answer 'don't know' in political opinion
polls are to be found disproportionately among the working
class.
As such they are vital to the reproduction of the established
order
and the maintenance of the illusion of liberal democracy (which
is,
of course, the political equivalent of meritocracy and equal
oppor-
tunity). The possession of a 'personal opinion' on matters
political
is related to class and is constructed by class relations.
'Indiffer-
ence', says Bourdieu, 'is only a manifestation of impotence.'[50]

The readiness to speak or act politically - even only to the
limited extent of casting a vote - reflects the sense of having the
right to speak or act. This sense of right - an analogue, no doubt
of the sense of distinction - is related to a sense of competence:
The authorized speech of status-generated competence,a
powerful_speech which helps to create what'it says,is answered
by the silence o1 an equally statusJinked
lncompetence, which is experienced as technical inca-
pacity and leaves no choice but delegation . . .[51]
Political competence - self-defined - is related to class
positionand the trajectory of probabilities attached to it. This
,status
competence' both entitles and requires the bearer to engage
inpolitical action, however modest. It only exists, fr"*eu?r] foi
those wlose trajectories permit its perception as 'realistic,. For
the working class, realism dictates a-drawing back from
p".ronui
opinion, a polite.equivocation or concessioir to what
is'thoughtto be expected in response to the pollster,s questions:
it" is'nothing to do with me' or .won,t mak-e any diffeience
anyway,.
Thus do the middle and upper reaches of the class system'ooml-
nate the production of 'general opinion, (which, in its turn,
feeds
back into the discoursg and opinion of actors, the working class
being disproportionately vulnerable to such influence).
Bourdieu's central. argument in Distinctiorz is that struggres
about the meaning of things, and specifically the meaning oi"tt
"social world, are an aspect of class struggle. In this respict it is
essentially the same a-rgument as Reprodiaion: the sociil repro-
duction of the established order is largely secured by symbolic

violence,. a process of cultural reproduition. Although ii is less
deterministic in its depiction of ihe workings of thi system
_fluidity and .change are documented - the -underlying
generaltheory remains the same and so do the problems. S6clal
andcultural reproduction models.of society se-em, of necessity
per-
haps, to involve the importation of deierminism
, M.ore. speciflcally, the analysis remains weak, for example,
atthe institutional level. The discussion of the rise of the
.iuring,
professions, while incisive and thoughtful, says nothing
aboritthe manner in which this has occuried within an
instiiutional
framework of state welfare provision, nor about the relationship
of many.such professions to institutional social control.
Similarly,
as Garnham has pointed out, the institutions of cultural pro-
duction - the 'culture industry,-- are more or less compleiely
neglected by Bourdieu.[52] And so on: all of the criticai com_
ments rvhich may have wearied the reader bv their reiteration
could be made here,, albeit perhaps less forcefully.
There are also, however, particular problems with Disrinction.
I
lr
t:
ijl
tl
tl
"i1

148 Pierre Bourdieu
In terms of method, the analysis of the relationship between
life-
styles and class fractions is flawed - and it is a flaw which lies
at the heart of the study. Class fractions are defined in terms of
occupation and employment status, Life-styles, however, are not
immediately self-evident. Their constituent practices are scat-
tered across a variety of different fields. As a consequence,
their
coherence, the 'reality' of their existence, is concealed. How
then
is their hidden unity to be discovered? Some sort of extraneous
classificatory device is needed to sort out the population in
order
that the clusters of practices and tastes which cohere as the life-
styles of categories of the population may reveal themselves.
Simply using class fraction - occupation - to sort out the sample
would be likely to render the argument somewhat circular.
Bour-
dieu appears to be aware of this problem; instead of class
fraction
he uses a combination of father's occupation, education, income
and age. However, the first three of these, in particular, are
likely to be related to occupation (class fraction) in a systematic
and positive fashion. It is, therefore, not surprising that
different
class fractions exhibit distinct life-styles inasmuch as the basis
for
the analytical classiflcation of research subjects as members of
either life-styles or class fractions is similar.[53]
The problem could perhaps have been avoided by allocating
life-style identities to subjects on the basis of either patterns of
social interaction[S4] or self-identification.[55] The reader is

left
uncertain about the social meaning of the bundles of practices
and attributes identified as 'life-styles', and the relationships
they
have with each other. The question of the relationship between
class and life-style (status group) also remains unresolved. Is it
'real' or an artifact of the analysis?
On a different tack, I am less convinced than Bourdieu - andI
am similarly sceptical about Homo Academicus - that the use
of French data does not undermine the general relevance of the
argument. It may be that there is, for example, something highly
specific about the relationship of the French metropolitan elite
to Culture. America or Britain may be very different,
Next, the superficiality of his treatment of the working class
is matched only by its condescension. Does Bourdieu really
believe that it is alien to working-class women to furnish and
decorate their homes on the basis of aesthetic choices? As Mary
Douglas has pointed out, his own evidence suggests that
working-
class people seem no less concerned to make distinctions than
anyone else.[56] Perhaps it is time he dusted off his anthropol-
ogist's hat and went out and spent some time among the people
about whom he writes. In this, as in many other aspects of the
book, he betrays his membership of French bourgeois cultural
networks. Despite his good intentions, this elevated point of
view
taints the entire discussion with the sub-text of the author's own
distinction (and that of its intended audience).
Finally, and it is also an issue which has been raised by other
commentators,[57] although Bourdieu is obviously correct in his

rejection of a Kantian transcendent aesthetic, it may be less
obvious that his own approach is, in its own way, no less
reductionist. Culture and taste are, for Bourdieu, wholly arbi-
trary: history and social construction are all. Leaving aside the
matter of whether aesthetic response may in some way be
innate,
the question of the role of individual psychology in the creation
of taste and aesthetic preference has some significance, if only
insofar as it may help to account for the non-conformist
aesthetic
impulse. So too does the sense of history as the longue durde:
how in Bourdieu's scheme are we to understand, for example,
the rise of modernism? As in the rest of Bourdieu's work, con-
formism is of the essence. There is little room for innovation or
deviance except insofar as they represent limited manoeuvres
within an overall framework of stability.
Despite the generally critical tone of the discussion so far, and
despite the difficulty of the language Bourdieu employs and the
complexity of the presentation, Distinction is a truly impressive
piece of sociology. As an exploration of the place of Culture
(and culture) in modern industrial society, what it has to say is
indispensable. The pursuit of distinction is also one of the
themes
of Homo Academicus, particularly the role of language use in
the status-seeking strategies of academics. We shall examine
this
theme further in the next chapter.
NOTES AND RBFERENCES
[1] P. Bourdien, Distinction: A Social Critique of the ludgement
o.f Taste, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul (1984), p. 5.
[2] P. Bourdieu, In Other Words, Cambridge, Polity (1990),
p.22.

[3] B.S. Turner, Status, Milton Keynes, Open University Press
(1988), p. 66.
Interest Group
Chapter 10
Dr. Kula A. Francis
*
What is an Interest Group?People trying to cover just about any
collection of people trying to influence governmentNot Publicly
Accountable OrganizationsAttempts to promote shared private
interests by influencing public-policy outcomes
*
Interest Groups and PoliticsInterest Groups cannot influence a
government if there is no government…Bureaucracy has become
a BIG interest group…Civil servants do more than implement
laws.They have much input in the making and application of

laws.The more government, the more interest groups
*
Factors Affecting Interest GroupsAll important to an effective
interest groupMoney Intensity of the issues involvedSize and
MembershipAccess
Effective Interest GroupsMONEY – Single most important
factor in interest group success…Can lead to corruption “a step
away from influence buying”…
Especially important for elections, and groups help candidate
who favor their cause…“Best Congress Money Can
Buy”!“Money is the mother’s milk of politics”
*
The Rise in Single Issue GroupsThe second greatest factor in
the influence of interest groups is the intensity of the issue
involved…The right ISSUE can mobilize millionsOrganized
groups on Social Security, medical insurance, education,
unemployment, etc.Abortion (1973 – Supreme Court ruling
“could not restrict a woman’s right to an abortion”Religious
groups – called it murderPro-life – would like to amend the
Constitution to outlaw it.Pro-choice – (linked to the women’s
movement) – a matter for the individual woman to decide.

*
Size and Membership
The biggest and fastest growing U.S. interest group is
AARP…AARP – formally known as American Association of
Retired Persons
40 Million members“When AARP speaks, Congress Trembles”
AIPAC – American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (well
funded)
NRA – National Riffle Association – “America’s defendant of
the 2nd amendment.
Groups such as NAACP…Represent large groups, small
membership
*
Access, Effective Interest GroupsAlthough money, issue and
size are important… an interest group must have access to
government …
---
How Does it Happen?Approach Lawmakers (Lobby)Approach
the Administration (president, governor, etc.)Approach the
Judiciary (Judges have power.. Hear cases)Appeals to the Public
– use the media and public to gain additional
constituentsViolent Protest – As seen in Riots, as well as
Abortion clinics.

*
Introduction to Political Science
POL 120
Constitutions
Dr. Kula A. Francis
*
Constitutions
What is it? --- (commonly defined as a written document…)
Could be written or unwritten
The case of Britain and Israel
Rules and customs
Government follows to conduct its affairs
Almost all nations have a constitution…
Countries
The United States Constitution (very short)
Seven Articles (Define the powers of each branch of
government)

Twenty-seven Amendments (Define civil rights –leaving much
for interpretation)
*
U.S. ConstitutionAmending the U.S. Constitution is difficult…
Requires approval of two-thirds of both the Senate and the
House of Representative, followed by ratification by three-
fourths of state legislatures.
Has occurred only 17 times in the U.S. since 1791.
*
General Nature of Constitutional LawRegardless of how
detailed a Constitution is written, it will always require
interpretation.
Requires Judicial Interpretation
Congress cannot make laws concerning religion)
Is left for interpretation when it comes to items like Prayer in
school or religions who use illegal drugs as a religious practice.
So who does the interpreting?
Generally requires the interpretation of the highest court of the
land.
In the U.S., the Supreme Court

The British Parliament determines what is constitutional
*
Purpose of a ConstitutionA Statement of National Ideals
Formalizes the Structure of Government
Establishes the legitimacy of Government (government’s right
to govern)
*
A Statement of National IdealsThe Preamble of the US
Constitution states six goals:
To form a more perfect union
To establish justice
To ensure domestic tranquility
To provide for the common defense
To promote the general welfare
To secure the blessings of liberty
Indicates the values, ideals, and goals of those who drafted the
document.
*

Formalizes the Structure of GovernmentThe Constitution…
Serves as a “blueprint”
A “who does what” in government
Divides authority and responsibilities as well as limits powers
between branches
Separation of Powers
Keeps government branches distinct
Keeps checks and balances among government branches
Limits the power of each branch
*
Establishes the Legitimacy of GovernmentMany nations do not
recognize a state until it establishes a written constitution, since
having one acts as a sign of permanence and responsibility…
Ouch to the VI ???
*
Freedom of ExpressionFreedom of Speech
Right to Spread “Dangerous or Malicious Falsehoods”
Justice Holmes argument on screaming FIRE!
First Amendment Case – 2001 Cell Phone Conversation
Supreme Court ruled a radio station could air an illegally

recorded phone conversation…
“the public has a right to know public information…”
Shelley Moorhead – Reparations from Denmark (p. 87)
*
POL 120
Regimes
Dr. Kula A. Francis
*
DemocracyAccording to Roskin et al, there is probably no
single word with more definitions…
Soviet Union – claimed to be one of the most democratic
systems in the world.
China – called the “People’s Republic”

*
DemocracyThe word DEMOCRACY comes from Greek…
Demos – people
Kratia – government
*
Types of DemocraciesILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Election produces a regime over rights and freedom of citizens
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
Found in the U.S., U.K.
*
Representative Democracy
Popular Accountability of Government
Political Competition
Alternation in Power

Popular Representation
Majority Decision
Rights of Dissent and Disobedience
Political Equality
Popular Consultation
Free Press
*
Representative DemocracyPopular Accountability of
Government
Leaders are accountable to citizens
“Bad” politicians can be voted outPolitical Competition
Voters have a choice (minimum of two distinct alternatives)
Parties have time and freedom to organize and present their case
before electionsAlternation in Power
Power occasionally changes hands
*
Representative DemocracyPopular Representation
Voters elect representatives to act as legislators (to voice and
protect their general interest)Majority Decision
The Majority decides… (but with respect to minority) – Racial
Make-up of the U.S.Right of Dissent and Disobedience
People must have the right to resist the commands of
government they deem wrong or unreasonable.

*
Representative DemocracyPolitical Equality
All adults (regardless of gender are equally able to participate
in politics) – One Person – One Vote!Popular Consultation
Need to know what the people want…(usually turning to public
opinion)
Letters to the editor
Opinion Polls
Press Conference/ Interviews with elected officialsFree Press
Free and Critical Mass Media
Mass media provides citizens with facts, raise public
awareness…
*
TOTALITARIANISMTotalitarian system –
Elites are almost completely unaccountable
Roskins et al, 2007- state only Cuba and North Korea remain
examples of this form of government…State controls
communication and economic life.
*

Six Features of a Totalitarian StateAn All-Encompassing
IdeologyA Single PartyOrganized TerrorMonopoly of
CommunicationsMonopoly of WeaponsControlled Economy
*
Totalitarian GovernmentAll-Encompassing Ideology
Portrays the world in black-and-white terms…
“Claims” to be building a perfect, happy society
Anyone against it is the “enemy of the state”A Single Party
Only one party exists
Party membership is controlled (usually less than 10% of the
population)Organized Terror
Uses physical and psychological methods to keep citizens
‘cowed’
Constitutional guarantees either do not exist or were ignored
*
Totalitarian GovernmentMonopoly of Communications
Indoctrinates the people with the official ideology and promotes
and feeling that the system is working well…Monopoly of
Weapons
Governments have complete monopoly on weapons (eliminating
armed resistance)Controlled Economy
State becomes powerful

Resources are allocated to heavy industry, weapon production,
etc.
*
Authoritarianism Governed by a small group (a party, dictator,
or the army)Does not attempt to control everything
Economic, social, religious, cultural, and familial matter are left
up to the individuals…
Individual freedoms come second to command, obedience, and
order…
*
Democratization of Authoritarian RegimesSince 1974, the
majority of Authoritarian or totalitarian countries have become
or adopted a democratic system.
Example: Chile, South Korea, and Taiwan Education – no
longer fall for extremists ideas…
*

POL 120
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
Dr. Kula Francis
1
What is Ideology?
Begins with a belief that things can be better…
Commitments to change political systems
Roskin et al, (2010) claim that political ideologies never work
precisely the way the advocates claim… when ideologies are
measured against actual performance, are more or less
defective, and should be taken as a grain of salt.
2
Major Ideologies
Classic Liberalism
Classic Conservatism
Modern Liberalism
Modern Conservatism
Marxist Socialism
Social Democracy
Communism
Nationalism
Fascism
3

Classic Liberalism
Adam Smith – 1776 “The Wealth of Nations”
Mercantilism – nation’s treasury determines if it was a rich
country…
Smith disagreed… based on goods and services the people
produce.
Laissez-faire – government keeps out of the economy…
The term Liberalism comes from “liber”, to be free…
Government should not regulate:
Economy
Religion
The press
Free speech
4
Classic Conservatism
Edmund Burke – 1792 “Reflexions on the Revolution in France”
Agreed with Smith that Free market was the best economic
system
Opposed revolutions
Conserve the best parts of society [Traditions, Institutions and
Morality]
Change should come gradually
5
Modern Liberalism
Change from the Classic Liberalism…

Free market was not as self-regulating as Smith had thought.
Competition was imperfect…
Manufacturers rigged the market
The system produced large underclass
Class position was heredity
Richer got richer… poorer got poorer
6
Modern Liberalism (cont.)
Thomas Hill Green – rethought liberalism in the 1880’s…
Government needed to get involved sometimes… to protect
citizens.
Need for labor laws, etc…
Started modern liberalism… holding on to freedom of speech
and press from the classical liberalism…
7
Modern Conservatism
Milton Friedman – economist…
Blends between the economic ideas of Adam Smith and
traditionalist ideas of Edmund Burke.

Known as conservatives in the United States and liberals or
neo-liberalists in Europe.
8
Marxist Socialism
Karl Marx – “The Communist Manifesto”
A perfect society without private property, police, class
domination, distinct classes, government, etc….
9
Social Democracy
Marxism became the biggest party in Germany until…
The idea of using Ballot instead of the Bullet
No need for revolutions by the working class
Eventually transformed themselves into center left parties with
no trace of revolution…
Instead of state ownership of industry, social democrats became
welfare states.
Denmark and Sweden
Taxes are extremely high
Argument – right to do whatever?

10
Communism
Original socialists…
The transformation was a Russian intellectual Vladimir Lenin.
Made several changes to Marxism to produce Marxism-
Leninism
Became known as communism
11
Nationalism
Belief in the greatness of one’s country!
Arises when a population, led by intellectuals, perceive an
enemy to despise and struggle against.
Believes it is terribly wrong to be ruled by others…
Depends on emotional appeal…
Feeling of belonging
12

Fascism
In Italy and Germany – Fascism grew from Nationalism…
Benito Mussolini was a socialist, who was molded by the
military to love his country…
Hitler copied Mussolini’s fascism and added racism…
13
Introduction to Political Science (POL120)
Roskin, et al (2012)
Chapter 2
THEORIES
Dr. Kula A. Francis
*
Why are Theories important?Gathering of facts without a
principle to lead:Meteorologists – “its going to rain” (is based

on something/ more than a hunch)Theories are needed to know
what questions to ask…
*
Models of PoliticsPercolation upConcerned about the bottom
part upward…Interest groups’ formationHow citizens vote
Percolation downConcerned about the top part downward…How
legislatures and executives react to …Public opinionInterest
groupsPolitical parties
Turn to page 22 (Roskin, et al, 2012)
Which seems most correct?
*
Major TheoristsPlato – … most recognized as the founder of
political science.
Aristotle – … first empirical political scientist.Completed the
first “Census”.
Aristotle (student of Plato, believed that democracies required a
large group of middle class citizens. Without it, the state will
end.)

*
Major Theorists (Cont.)Machiavelli – the focus on power…(The
Prince, tells us that there is a need to get, and use political
power)Was a realist…Considered by some the first modern
philosopher
Morgenthau – “all politics is a struggle for power”German
Refugee; scholarMade Americans aware of “political power”
*
Major Theorists (Cont.)The Contractualists (p. 24)Why do we
need political systems at all?They all agreed that humans need a
social contract…Hobbes – Need of a society Compared life in
the state of nature to civil society… State of Nature – Constant
enemies with every other man“No art, no letters, no society”To
END this, people would form Societies (only out of fear)Locke
– “Life, liberty and property”Also compared life in the state of
nature to civil society…The original state of nature was Good
(living equally and tolerably)No money, land ownership, courts,
thus needed civil societyCivil Society secures their “Life,
Liberty and Property”.
*

Major Theorists (Cont.)
Rousseau (French) – is said to have laid the groundwork for the
French RevolutionAccepted the theories of Hobbes and Locke
(but made his own)Life in the state of nature was good… Living
as “Noble Savages”… society corrupting man!Societies make
people, not the other way around…
U.S. founding fathers studied Hobbes and LockeMaking the
Constitution a Social Contract
*
Major Theorists (Cont.)Marx – German – living in London…
Focused on three interrelated areas… economics, social class
and history.Things NEVER happen by accident…Economics –
Workers produce things (but are paid small fragments of what
they produced)The capitalists skim off the rest (surplus value)..
Without the hard work The workers (Proletariats) make too
little money to afford the things they make… Leads to repeated
overproduction… Leading to DepressionsMarx believed that
eventually causing capital systems to collapse.Social Class –
Every society is divided into two groups:Those who own the
means of production (small group; sets the laws)Those who
work for the small class.The proletariats have no true country
(Just suffer under Capitalists)History – Based on economic and
social factors, history will (has) tell (told) us everything we
need to understand. Is Karl Marx correct?

*
Stable DemocraciesAccording to Lipset (1960) [by combining
Marx and Aristotle]
Devised…Countries with a GDP below $5000 not likely to be a
democracy
Countries with a GDP above $8000 likely to be democracy Had
the industry, radios, education, cars, doctors, Large middle
classes
*What about China?
*
Rational-Choice TheoryPredicting Political BehaviorBased on
InterestsBased on Public OpinionBased on culture, religion,
language, ethnicity, etc.
Consummate Opportunists!!!
*
KEY TERMS
Behavioralism – the empirical study of actual human behavior
rather than abstract or speculative theories
Bourgeois – Adjective, originally French for city dweller; later
and current, middle class in general.

Civil Society – Humans after becoming civilized, Modern
Usage: Associations between family and government.
*
KEY TERMSDescriptive - Explaining what is…
General Will – Rousseau’s Theory of what everybody in the
community wants.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – Sum Total of goods and
services produced in a given country in one year, often
expressed per capita (GDPpc) by dividing population into GDP.
*
KEY TERMS
Institution – The formal structures of government, such as the
U.S. Congress.
Leftist – Favors social and economic change to uplift poor.
Normative – Explaining what ought to be…
*

KEY TERMSParadigm – A model or way of doing research
accepted by a discipline.
Positivism - Theory that society can be studied scientifically
and incrementally improved with the knowledge gained.
Postbehavioral – A synthesis of traditional, behavioral, and
other techniques in the study of politics.
Proletariat – Marx’s name for the industrial working class.
*
KEY TERMSRealism – Working with the world as it is and not
as we wish it to be; usually focused on power.
Social Contract – theory that individuals join and stay in civil
society as if they had signed a contract.
State of Nature – humans before civilization.
*
Key TermsSuperstructure – Marx’s term for everything that is
built on top of the economy (laws, arts, politics, etc.).
Thesis - A main idea or claim, to be proved by evidence.
Zeitgeist – German for “spirit of the times”: Hegel’s theory that
each epoch has a distinctive spirit, which moves history along.

*
Introduction to Political Science (POL120)
Roskin, et al (2012)
Chapter One
Politics and Political Science
Dr. Kula A. Francis
*
What is Politics?
Power
Government
Behavior
Political Animals (Biological) – Aristotle (Not just politicians –
all of us)Similar to elephants or deer (p.8) – lived in herdsNeed
guidance… leadership from each other
The Study of Who Gets What – Harold Lasswell
“Studying Politics mean studying nearly everything” - -
Examples on next slide
*

Politics Political ScienceNegatively viewed by most (even
those who study it)Compare to a biologist (p. 4) Study to
understandStudy to improveDetermines what is
importantHurricane (Who gets help?)AIDS vs. Breast Cancer
Research? Who should get the funds?UVI vs. Correction
Bureau Funding? Who should get the funds?WHO DECIDES???
*
The Social SciencesInter-related
- (SSC100)History – Closely aligned with Political
Science *What’s the difference? Historians need to pinpoint
(evidence) on specific itemsPolitical scientists generalize
without the need to pinpoint or get facts Human Geography –
Where you are determine how politics/ government will affect
you.Economics - $$$$ (Roskin, et al claims sufficient finances
helps to form democracy… without it, there is an absence of
democracy (p. 6)Sociology - lets us see political science from
social class, region, religion, gender, age, etc. (p.
6)Anthropology – determines why specific groups of people act
(perhaps vote) certain ways.Psychology – Helps determine why
you act or decide to behave in certain ways.
*

Political PowerFindings from the social sciences are generally
used…Political Power – hated conceptReads coercion,
inequality, occasionally brutality (p. 7)No clear explanation of
political powerExplanations still suggested by the fields of
biology, psychology, culture, rational, irrational, etc. (p. 7)
Legitimacy (Respect for the Government) Originally meant that
the King or Queen had the right for his or her position based on
legitimate birth right…The term later was broadened to mean
“legal right to govern”Today, legitimacy means ‘the attitudes in
people’s (citizen’s) minds’What does this mean? Do the people
“do” what they are supposed to do without one’s enforcements?
Do Americans pay taxes before being forced? A great test is the
amount of police officers in an area (p. 8)Countries that have
lots of police officers have little legitimacy; Countries that have
little police officers have high legitimacy – such as Sweden
(people follow rules without coercion necessary)
*
Sovereignty (Respect for a Country)From old French word
meaning “to rule over”Later, the term became broadened to
mean national control over the country’s territory… Ruler of
one’s turf (p. 9)Is the reason countries have military, homeland
security, border patrol, visas, passports (control who, what
enters home) Sometimes loss of legitimacy can cause loss of
sovereignty.

*
Authority (Respect for a Leader)The psychological ability of
leaders to get others to obey them (p. 9).Generally, a private has
to obey a captainA driver obeys the police (who can give a
ticket for seatbelt, cell phone, speeding, etc)A student endures
reading assignment passed on by the professor, still some
students don’t read their assignments.Still – those with
authority will have some control over others…
*
Legitimacy, Sovereignty, & Authority
Not Guaranteed!Must be earned!With the collapse of one, others
follow…
WHAT IS THE LEVEL OF THESE ITEMS WHERE YOU ARE
FROM?
*
Political CultureReligion
Child Rearing
Land Tenure
Economic Development

*
Power (revisited)Lord Action – “Power tends to corrupt,
absolute power corrupts absolutely”Power v. PoliticsAn
enabling device
*
Key WordsDiscipline – A field of study, often represented by an
academic department or major.
Methodology – The Techniques for studying questions
objectively.
Political Power – Ability of one person to get another to do
something.
*
Key Words
Legitimacy – Mass feeling that the government’s rule is rightful
and should be obeyed.

Sovereignty – A national government’s being boss on its own
turf, the last word in law in that country.
Authority – Political leaders’ ability to command respect and
exercise power.
*
Key WordsCulture – human behavior that is learned as opposed
to inherited.
Rational – Based on the ability to reason
Irrational – Based on the power of fears and myth to cloud
reason.
Quantify – To measure with numbers.
Hypothesis – An initial theory a researcher starts with to be
proved by evidence.
*
Key WordsEmpirical – Based on observable evidence
Scholarship – Intellectual arguments supported by reason and
evidence.
*

Chapter 1
WHY PEOPLE
WANT GOODS
Silence in Utility Theory
It is extraordinary to discover that no one knows why people
want goods. Demand theory is at the very center, even at the
origin of economics as a discipline. Yet 200 years of thought on
the subject has little to show on the question. It is important to
know why demand is sometimes stable, sometimes careers along
with inflating speed, and sometimes goes slack while people
save rather than spend. But economists carefully shun the ques-
tion of why people want goods. They even count it a virtue not
to offer suggestions. In the past, too many illicit intrusions from
psychology have damaged their theoretical apparatus' It has
now been painstakingly cleansed. lt can answer questions about
consumers' responses to changes in prices and incomes, so long
as the period is short term and so long as "tastes" can be treated
as given, as the ultimate unexplainable factor of demand that is
used to explain everything else. On this academically restricted
basis the machine can grind powerfully and exceedingly flne'
But when it comes to policy problems, the theoretical gears
75
Gooos As AN INToRMATToN SYSTEM
mesh badly with social reality. The cool consensus that econo-
mists display on questions of economic method dissolves into a
heated wrangle when a major economic crisis appears.
lf theoretical economists try not to know about what makes
the consumer tick, there are others who will not let him alone.

They inveigh against the destructive greed of the consumer
society, environmentalists and moralists, and economists, too,
when wearing their "applied" hat. The consumer himself may
well feel puzzled. With barely a twinge of guilt when he catches
himself reaching for more furnishings or food, he partly sup-
ports the formal economist's view that his behavior is based on
rational choice. He does not usually believe that he himself is
a mindless moron, an easy victim for the advertiser's wiles,
though he admits that others may be. He would agree that
once he decides to get something, he chooses between brands
and takes price and income level into account, much as the text-
books say. But the economist's view leaves much unexplained.
Often it is not so much a sense of having made a decision but
of having been overtaken by events. The new thing-the better
lawn mower or bigger freezer-has somehow become, of its
own accord, a necessity. It exerts its own imperative to be ac-
quired and threatens that the household, without it, will regress
to the chaos of a more primitive era. Far from exercising a
sovereign choice, the wretched consumer, as often as not, feels
like the passive holder of a wallet whose contents are pre-
empted by such strong forces that moral reproaches seem
impertinent.
Any vacuum sucks in its own filling. In the absence of an
explicit account, implicit ideas about human needs creep into
economic analysis unseen. The two main assumptions use each
other for support, yet the cornbination is still dubious. On the
one hand is the hygienic or materialist theory; on the other, the
envy theory of needs. According to the first our real needs, most
basic and universal, are our physical needs, those we have in
common with livestock. Probably to avoid a too grossly veter-
t6
Why People Want Goods

inary approach, a curious moral split appears under the surface
of most economists' thoughts on human needs; they do recog-
nize two kinds of needs, spiritual and physical, but they accord
priority to the physical. They allow it the dignity of a necessity,
while they downgrade all the other demands to a class of arti-
ficial wants, false, luxurious, even immoral. Luc Boltanski
calls this bias "biological Manicheeism." 1 That famous heresy
divided the universe between evil, the low biological side of
man's nature, and good, the spiritual side. But the economists
who make the same split unofficially change the heretical signs,
so that the biological becomes the good and the spiritual is
unjustified.
The hygiene approach seems to promise an objective defini-
tion of poverty since it can generally show that the poor in any
country have worse morbidity rates than the rich. But the prom-
ise is illusory, for it cannot deliver a way of defining poverty
cross-culturally that is not counterintuitive. True, this tribe or
that is poor in material things, its housing has to be remade
every year, its children run naked, its food is deficient in nu-
trients, its death rate is high-but are these sufficient to capture
the notion of poverty? If the hygiene standard is used alone,
improved death rates over the last 200 years would imply that
there are no poor left in England. In fact, however, poverty
studies never risk going out of business even in rich, industrial
societies, but they do face an awkward problem of definition.
Material standards have been indubitably raised: "Obviously
even those at the very foot of society in contemporary Britain
enjoy a standard of living that is somewhat higher than that of
the poorest in Victorian society a hundred years ago and much
higher than in many underdeveloped countries." z "People
who in this country are reckoned-or who reckon themselves-
poor today are not necessarily so by the standards of twenty-
five years ago or by the standards of other countries." :i What
other countries? The hygienic criterion suggests those which
are malaria-ridden and lack public sanitation- Many of the

t7
Goons As AN INronMArroN SysrEM
countries that anthropologists study are poor on such mate-
rial criteria-no wall-to-wall carpets, no air conditioning-but
they do not regard themselves as poor. The Nuer of the Sudan
in the 1930s would do no trade with the Arabs because the
only things they had to sell were their herds of cattle, and the
only things they could possibly want from trade were more
cattle.4 Since the materialist approach cannot stand by itself,
the economist is led to buttress it with a relativist view that
invokes an envy theory to supplement materialism. "Poverty
is a relative concept. Saying who is in poverty is to make a
relative statement rather like saying who is short or heavy." 5
To explain the discontent in that relative condition, they are led
to impute to the objects of their study feelings of covetousness
and envy. For example, Albert Hirschmann believes in a uni-
versal feeling of envy which can be suspended by what he
calls the "tunnel effect" at the beginning of a process of eco-
nomic development.
"The tunnel effect operates because advances of others supply
information about a more benign external environment; receipt
of
this information produces gratification; and this gratification
over-
comes, or at least suspends, envy. Though long noted as the
most
uninviting of the scven deadly sins because, unlike gluttony,
pride,
etc., it does not provide any initial fun to its practitioners, envy
is
nevertheless a powerful human emotion. This is attested to by

the
writings of anthropologists, sociologists, and economists, who
all
have proclaimed, in general quite independently of one another,
that
if you advance in income or status whilc I remain where I was, I
will actually feel worse off than beforc because my ielative
position
has declined." 6
This is a very weak argument, however.
Anthropologists have written tomes on the subject of envy.
Their fieldwork has forced it on their attention. Whatever they
write about, whether about gifts, about witchcraft, demons,
zombies, ancestors, or parish pump politics, their frequent point
of reference is fear of envy, individual envy-deflecting tech-
niques, and community envy-controlling edicts. If economists
r8
think that the demand for goods is influenced by envy, then
anthropology is one place to turn for understanding it'? As we
shall see, difierent types of social organization can be distin-
guished according to the envy-controlling techniques they
deploy'
The psychological state, unqualified by institutional
differences,
cannot do service for a subjective definition of poverty' Anyone
can be envious, rich, or poor. But if we reject envy and keep
materialism we are left with a mild wonder about the irrational
human wish for fine carpets and new kitchens, much as one
might question why dogs should want jeweled collars as well as
food and exercise.

Fortunately a shift in emphasis is in the air- Titmuss wrote
". we have sought too diligently to find the causes of pov-
erty among the poor and not in ourselves. our frame of
reference in the past has been too narrow. Thought, research,
and action have been focused too heavily on the poor; poverty
engineering has thus been abstracted from society." 8
Self-criticism of Economists
There is no justification in traditional utility theory for assum-
ing anything about physical or spiritual needs, still less about
envy. The theory merely assumes the individual to be acting
rationally, in that his choices are consistent with each other and
stable over the short time that is relevant. lt says that his tastes
should be taken as given, that he responds to a fall in prices
by readiness to buy a larger quantity and to a rise by buying
less, and that he responds in consistent fashion to changes in his
income. As he gets more of a particular good his desire for
additional units of it weakens. For the anthropologist this mini-
mum watertight rationality leaves the individual impossibly
isolated. His rational objectives are tidied out of sight and
r9
Gooos As AN INpoRMATIoN SysrEM
trivialized under the term "tastes." It is hard to know where
to begin to think about his social problems. But no rebuke that
the anthropologist can deliver will be as severe as the self-
criticism of the economists themselves on this very score.
Economists are their own harshest critics when it comes to
the limitations of consumption theory, but naturally the strong-
est criticism comes from those who have some improvement to
propose. Accordingly, Kelvin Lancaster said in a well-turned

passage:
The theory of consumer behaviour in deterministic situations as
set
out by, say, Debreu (1959, 1960) or Uzama (1960) is a thing of
great aesthetic beauty, a jewel set in a glass case. The product
of a
long process of refinement from the nineteenth century Utility
theo-
rists through Slutsky and Hicks-Allen to the economists of the
last
twenty-five years, it has been shorn of all irrelevant postulates
so
that it now stands as an example of how to extract the minimum
of
results from the minimum of assumptions.e
The criticisms are old, widespread, and still fashionable.
"Hardly more than a collection of isolated, arbitrary defini-
tions," Leontieff said, describing the theory of consumer be-
havior.lo "One may wonder why such a theory has survived as
a fundamental part of standard economics," said Michael and
Becker. The defense usually falls back on the plea that de-
mand theory, for all its weaknesses, still provides the most
powerful method of analyzing choice. Indeed, it is probably
true that there is no field of choice in which it cannot be used.
But Michael and Becker will have none of this:
To whatever extent income and prices do not explain observed
be-
haviour the explanation rests with variations in tastes, since
they are
the portmanteau in the demand curve. . . For economists to rest
a
large part of their theory of choice on dilferences in tastes is
disturb-

ing, since they admittedly have no usel'ul theory of the
formation of
tastes, nor can they rely on a well-developed theory of tastes
from
any other discipline in the social sciences, since none exists. Of
coursc, by incorporating an intuitivcly appealing explanation in
each
case economists usually interpret these observations in
reasonable
20
ways. The important point, however. is that thc received theory
of
choice itself is of modest use in that undertaking.ll
To the inquiring anthropologist, the econclmists certainly
seem to be unsatisfied consumers of their own product, and very
self-critical of their own narrowness.
The early masters of cconomic thcory were. in fact, intensely
in-
terested in the general deternlinants of economic progress and
the
broacl conclitions of wealth or poverty. l-he titte An Enquiry
ittto the
Nature antl Cturses ol thc ll'eulth ol Nulit.tn.r could nol have
been
chosen by one wl.to thought that thc price nrechanism in a
short-run
commodity market was the esscnce of economics. Adam Smith
reached down to the fundamental factors that spell riches or
poverty
for a particular nation.12

That economics is still supposed to be reaching down into those
factors, but has tied its own hands, is E. J. Mishan's plair.rt. Be-
cause of admitted ignorance about real conditions of exis-
tence, the economists, he says, have busily ferreted
out of welfare analysis all those tacit assumptions that appear to
say
sorncthing about thc economic universc. tsut this purging of
tacit
enrpiricisr-n has gone too far. Any generalisation but the most
trivial
is sure to collapse when all bounds to tcchnical and behaviour
possi-
bilities are removed-whcn allowance is made for any and every
imaginable situation. . . . What thc subject badly needs is a
strong
infusion of empiricism to end its unchecked wandcrings in the
empyrean and to bring it down to earth fcet first'1:r
If it were even agreed whether consumption was an end in itself
or a means to an end, that would be a starting Point. But some-
times consumption is treated as if it were a cost in keeping up
the
supply of healthy labor to the market, as if the consumer were
a glorified carthorse to be fed, watered, and kept fit. Kuznets
is not happy with this view; he remarks that over the long his-
torical period of modern economic growth the
rise in food supply and improved health conditions should . ' .
have
made for a better quality of the body of workers' But if the
addi-
tional lood, health and recrcation outlays are trcated as so many
27

Goorls AS AN INnonMATrotr SysrEM
economic costs (rather than as final consumption), the
implication
would be that living is for work; and thc distinction between
final
consumption, or product, and intermediate consumption, or
costs,
so basic in the ideological framework of modern society as well
as
in economic analysis and measurement, would be obliterated.la
On the other hand the more traditional view, treating consump-
tion as the end or objective of all work 15 is equally objec-
tionable. It demeans labor and disallows its right to be taken as
an end in itself, always treating work as an input into some-
thing else.
As Frank Knight put it so wisely:
When we consider that productive activity takes up the larger
part
of the waking lives of the great mass of mankind, it is surely
not to
be assumed without investigation or inquiry that production is a
means only, a necessary evil, a sacrifice made for the sake of
some
good entirely outside the production process. We are impelled
to
look for ends in the economic process itself, and to give
thoughtful
consideration to the possibilities of participation in economic
activity
as a sphere of self-expression and creative achievement.lG
But Knight knew that he was working in a humane tradition.

As Jevons insisted: "Economics does not rest upon the laws
of human enjoyment; if these laws are developed by no other
sciences they must be developed by economists." 17 And what
about the challenge to Benlham's own account of utility? "By
utility is meant that property in any object whereby it tends to
produce benefit, advance, pleasure, good or happiness or
. . . to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappi-
ness." 18 No one argues that human enjoyment should be
separated off from work, but something in the construction of
utility theory often makes it seem so.
Is there any reason why consumption should be found at the
end or the beginning of a one-way avenue? Piero Sraffa iden-
tifies the tendency to focus on costs of production and outputs
with the advent of the marginal method and deplores the loss
of the earlier view of the economy as a seamless garment. His
own Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities le
22
l{hy People Want Goods
is an attempt to restore something akin to .,the original picture
of the system of production and consumption as a circular pro-
cess," . . which "stands in striking contrast to the view pre-
sented by modern theory, of a one-way avenue that leads from
'Factors of Production' to 'Consumption Goods,.',:0 His in-
vestigation "is concerned exclusively with such properties of an
economic system as do not depend on changes in the scale of
production or in the proportions of .factors.' ',
This standpoint, which is that of the old classical economists
from Adam Smith to Ricardo, has been submerged and for-
gotten since the advent of the "marginal,, method. The reason
is obvious. The calculation of marginal differences requires
attention to be focused on change, for without change either in

the scale of an industry or in the proportions of the factors of
production, "there can be neither marginal product nor marginal
cost. In a system in which, day after day, production continued
unchanged in those respects, the marginal product of a factor
(or alternatively the marginal cost of a product) would not be
merely hard to find-it just would not be there to be found.,, :1
The work that follows these prefatory remarks ought to be of
great value to anthropology because of our tradition of work-
ing in the "ethnographic present." This is a special tense that
aims to concentrate past, present, and future into a continuous
present. Perhaps not always used honestly, the ethnographic
present has more merit than a reconstructed and misconstrued
time dimension. It synthesizes into one temporal point the
events of many periods, the value of the synthesis lying in the
strength of the analysis of the perceived present. Whatever is
important about the past is assumed to be making itself
known and felt here and now. Current ideas about the future
likewise draw present judgments down certain paths and block
off others. It assumes a two-way perspective in which the in-
dividual treats his past selectively as a source of validating
myths and the future as the locus of dreams. The tense refers
to a two-way filter being used in the present to sort out from
Goops As AN INrtoRMATroN SvsrEM
the myths and dreams some sets that plausibly interlock as
guides to action.
The ethnographic present assumes an unchanging economic
system. Given the short time in which he has to do his research,
the main problem to which a functional anthropologist of the
1950s and 1960s addressed himself was the understanding of
an economy found in the here and now, a snapshot view, so
implicitly deemed to be unchanging. The economic analysis
explained how resources are channeled to the political and re-

ligious systems and the religious and political analyses ex-
plained how the economic system is sustained and credibly
clothed in the raiment of distributive justice. Sraffa's book is
too
specialized and idiosyncratic to be directly useful to the an-
thropologist seeking to join issue with economists, but it is en-
couraging to realize that we have been speaking good prose
without knowing it; we have been analyzing a circular process,
so much so that the ethnographic picture could often be called
production of ancestors by means of ancestors or production of
cattle by means of,cattle.
This is admittedly only a small qualification, not much to
boast of, for entering a debate about the consumer society. One
source of encouragement is that no one else seems to have
much idea of why people want goods. When it comes to the
other side of the same question, the reasons for not spending,
there are also some intriguing misconceptions to straighten out.
Chapter 2
WHY THEY SAVE
According to Keynes
Saving is investment. It is also consumption postponed. As the
level of future income depends on the amount of saving, the
decision to consume now or to consume in the future is im-
portant in macroeconomics. In a famous passage Keynes de-
clared that a psychological rule causes men to be disposed to
increase their consumption as their income increases, but not
by as much as by the increase in income.
These considerations will lead, as a rulc, to a greater proportion
of
income being saved as real income rises. . . . We take it as a
funda-

mental psychological rule of any modern community that, when
its
real income is increased it will not increase its consumption by
an
absolute equal amount, so that a greater amount must be saved.l
This "rule" relates the propensity to consume to a capacity to
be satisfied at a particular level of real income. It relates it
thereby implicitly to a capacity of goods themselves to satisfy
"real" wants. It might be assumed, therefore, that in the past
century, when real income has increased steadily and impres-
sively, the proportion saved out of income should have
increased
accordingly. But the long historical rise in real income has not
been accompanied by a proportionate rise in savings. To the
anthropologist it would be very surprising if it had. That
savings
2524
Chapter 3
THE USES OF
GOODS
Redefining Consumption
To make a fresh start on the subject, an anthropological defini-
tion of consumption would help. To speak sensibly of consump-
tion here, in industrial society, in terms that also apply without
strain to distant tribal societies that have barely seen commerce,
still less capitalism, is indeed a challenge. But unless we make
the attempt there can be no anthropology of consumption. We
need somehow to extract the essence of the term, while ignor-
ing the potentially misleading local effects. One boundary may

be drawn by an idea essential to economic theory: that is, that
consumption is not compelled; the consumer's choice is his free
choice. He can be irrational, superstitious, traditionalist, or
experimental: the essence of the economist's concept of the
individual consumer is that he exerts a sovereign choice. An-
other boundary may be drawn by the idea central to national
bookkeeping that consumption starts where market ends. What
happens to material objects once they have left the retail outlet
and reached the hands of the final purchasers is part of the
56
The Uses of Goods
consumption process. These two boundaries raise various prob-
lems and borderline cases for economics and do not make a
completely satisfactory definition. Together they assume that
consumption is a private matter. Consumption that is provided
by government as part of its functioning is not properly part of
consumption. Central heating or cups of tea drunk in bureau-
cratic offices count as part of the cost of administration, in the
same way as cups of tea or central heating provided by busi-
nesses count as costs of production, not as output, when they
make their income tax returns. As to consumption being un-
coerced, this is not a straightforward matter either. When a city
is proclaimed a smokeless zone by law, householders are not
free to burn log fires if they choose; nor are car purchasers free
to ignore government regulations as to safety, noise, and so on.
But by and large the two boundaries capture the essence of
the idea and the detailed tidying-up is a matter of convention.
So if we define consumption as a use of material possessions
that is beyond commerce and free within the law, we have a
concept that travels extremely well, since it fits parallel usages
in all those tribes that have no commerce.
Seen under this aspect, consumption decisions become the

vital source of the culture of the moment. People who are
reared in a particular culture see it change in their lifetime:
new words, new ideas, new ways. It evolves and they play a
part in the change. Consumption is the very arena in which
culture is fought over and licked into shape. The housewife
with her shopping basket arrives home: some things in it she
reserves for her household, some for the father, some for the
children; others are destined for the special delectation of
guests.
Whom she invites into her house, what parts of the house she
makes available to outsiders, how often, what she offers them
for
music, food, drink, and conversation, these choices express and
generate culture in its general sense. Likewise, her husband's
judgments as to how much of his wages he allots to her, how
much he keeps to spend with his friends, etc., result in the
57
Gooos AS AN INroRMATtow SysrEM
channeling of resources. They vitalize one activity or another.
They will be unconstrained if the culture is alive and evolving.
Ultimately, they are moral judgments about what a man is,
what a woman is, how a man ought to treat his aged parents,
how much of a start in life he ought to give his sons and
daughters; how he himself should grow old, gracefully or dis-
gracefully, and so on. How many of his aunts and uncles and
orphaned nephews is he expected to support? Do family obli-
gations stop him from migrating? Should he contribute to his
union? Insure against sickness? Insure for his own funeral?
These are consumption choices which may well involve heavy
costs, and which, when made, may determine the evolution of
culture.

In most cultures reported over the world, there are certain
things that cannot be sold or bought. One obvious case with us
is political advance (which should not be bought); as to selling,
a man who is capable of selling his honor, or even of selling
his grandmother, is condemned by clich6. Everywhere there is
at least a notion of some area of untrammeled individual
choice. If any local tyrant could march into your home, turn
out your friends or force you to add unchosen names to your
visiting list, tell you whom you can see and speak to and whom
to ignore, then personal freedom and dignity would be lost. If
he
did it by passing laws, by threat of guns, by threat of lost liveli-
hood, he would probably be judged more immoral even than
the rich man who might seek to buy your support. We have in
fact succeeded in defining consumption as an area of behavior
hedged by rules which explicitly demonstrate that neither com-
merce nor force are being applied to a free relationship.
This is why, no doubt, in our society the line between cash
and gift is so carefully drawn. It is all right to send flowers to
your aunt in the hospital, but never right to send the cash they
are worth with a message to "get yourself some flowers"; all
right to offer lunch or drinks, but not to offer the price of a
lunch
or a drink. Hosts may go to extravagant lengths to attract and
58
The Uses of Goods
please guests-short of offering them money to come to the
party.
Social sanctions protect the boundary. Apparently, some fabled
New York hostess in the 1890s, worrying how to surpass her
rival who habitually gave each guest a rich jewel, was worried
even more by their derision when, her turn having come, she

folded a crisp $100 bill in each napkin. The right to give cash
is reserved for family intimacy. Here again there are details
that could be tidied up. But in general it is true to say that
around the field of consumption we have a spontaneous, opera-
tive boundary between two kinds of services: professional, paid
with money and to be classed with commerce, and personal,
recompensed in kind and in no other way. Within the field of
personal services, freely given and returned, moral judgment
of the worth of people and things is exercised. This establishes
the first step in a cultural theory of consumption.
A Universe Constructed from Commodities
Instead of supposing that goods are primarily needed for sub-
sistence plus competitive display, let us assume that they are
needed for making visible and stable the categories of culture.
It is standard ethnographic practice to assume that all material
possessions carry social meanings and to concentrate a main
part of cultural analysis upon their use as communicators.
In every tribal study an account is given of the material parts
of the culture. Like us, the members of a tribe have fixed
equipment, houses, gardens, barns, and like us, they have
durable and nondurable things. The anthropologist usually
devotes some space to marshaling the evidence for deciding'
from the vantage point of our technology, whether, for ex-
ample, the cattle husbandry is efficient, the farmer's knowl-
edge of his soils and seasons accurate, the hygienic precautions
and the amount of food taken adequate, etc- The material
59
Gooos As AN INr,oRMATtoN Sysrnrvr
possessions provide food and covering, and this has to be un-

derstood. But at the same time it is apparent that the goods
have another important use: they also make and maintain so-
cial relationships. This is a long-tried and fruitful approach to
the material side of existence which yields a much richer idea
of social meanings than mere individual competitiveness.
A well-known case is Evans-Pritchard's account of the place
of cattle in Nuer lives:
The network of kinship ties which links members of local
commu-
nities is brought about by the operation of exogamous rules,
often
stated in terms of cattle. The union of marriage is brought about
by
the payment of cattle and every phase of the ritual is marked by
their transference or slaughter. The legal status of the partners
is
defined by cattle rights and obligations.
Cattle are owned by families. When the head of the household is
alive he has full rights of disposal over the herd, though his
wives
have rights of use in the cows and-his sons own some of the
oxen.
As each son, in order of seniority, reaches the age of marriage
he
marries with cows from the herd. The next son will have to wait
till
the herd has reached its earlier strcngth before'he can marry in
his
turn. . . . The bond of cattle between brothers is continued long
after
each has a home and children of his own, for when a daughter of
any one of them is married the others rcceive a large portion of
her
bride-wealth. Her grandparents, maternal uncles, paternal and

ma-
ternal aunts, and even more distant relatives also receive a
portion.
Kinship is customarily defined by reference to these payments,
being
most clearly pointed at marriage, when movements of cattle
from
kraal to kraal are equivalent to lines in a genealogical chart. It
is
also emphasized by division of sacrificial meat among agnatic
and
cognatic relatives. . . Nuer tend to define all social processes
and
relationships in terms of cattle. Their social idiom is a bovine
idiom.l
This approach to goods, emphasizing their double role in
providing subsistence and in drawing the lines of social rela-
tionships, is agreed upon, practically axiomatic among anthro-
pologists, as the way to a proper understanding of why people
need goqds. But there are some problems about transferring
the insight to our own ethnograPhy of ourselves.
Each branch of the social sciences has been bogged down
6o
The Uses ol Goods
until it has drawn a distinctive line between the level of human
behavior that its techniques are adapted to analyze and all other
levels. Durkheim, for example, required the identihcation of
"social facts" by his rules of method.2 Each such isolation of a
part or layer of the social process is a self-denying ordinance,
an austerity, practiced for the sake of learning not to pose
unanswerable questions. Of course there is always a loss of

richness, which the gains in clarity have to justify. Long before
Durkheim, economists had carved out a sphere of "economic
facts" by disregarding the ends of hunran activity and con-
centrating on problems of choice. The history of anthropology
has been 6ne of continual disengagement of theoretical fields
from the intrusive assumptions from common sense. In each
case enlightenment has followed a decision to ignore the phys-
iological levels of existence which sustain the behavior in ques-
tion. For interpreting bizarre kinship terminologies it was at
first
assumed that the clue to the uses of the terms "Father" and
"Mother" would lie in some long-abandoned arrangements for
marriage and procreation. No advance was made until kinship
terms were cut free from their obvious biological meanings
and seen as constituting a system for organizing social relations
-a system based on the metaphors of engendering and rear-
ing. In turn, L6vi-Strauss made a similar stand when he ridi-
culed the idea that the origin of totemism was some gastronomic
criterion that reserved the most delicious foods to privileged
persons. Animals which are tabooed are chosen, he said, be-
cause they are good to think, not because they are good to eat.
So he was able to reveal a systematic relation between natural
and human species as the typical basis of primitive thought.s
Again, as another example, in nineteenth-century comparative
religion, medical materialism blocked the interpretation of ideas
about the contagiousness of magic. Scholars were sidetracked
by occasional signs of medical benefit following rites of purifi-
cation. But it can be argued that these rites are better under-
stood as being concerned with rnaking visible the boundaries
I rll.
il
6t

Goons AS AN INpoRMATToN SvsrEM
between cognitive categories than with pathogenicity in the
strict
medical sense.a Now we are trying the same exercise with
consumption goods, bracketing away for the moment their prac-
tical uses. If it is said that the essential function of language is
its capacity for poetry, we shall assume that the essential func-
tion of consumption is its capacity to make sense. Forget the
idea of consumer irrationality. Forget that commodities are
good for eating, clothing, and shelter; forget their usefulness
and try instead the idea that commodities are good for thinking;
treat them as a nonverbal medium for the human creative
faculty.
Theoretical Individualism
The time is ripe for this new approach. Individualist theories
of knowledge and behavior have had their day and run their
course. Here and there the outposts are still manned. Perhaps
Peter Blau is one of the most forceful exponents of the
eighteenth-century tradition (to which economics as a whole is
heir). The Benthamite view of human psychology starts and
ends with the individual agent. Other people appear only in-
sofar as they may help or hinder his life project. He can use
or be used by them, but they lurk always in a shadow cast by his
egocentric awareness. Blau's theory of social structure tried to
build up society from the simplest relations between individ-
uals. He concedes that most pleasures have their roots in social
life: "There is something pathetic about the person who de-
rives his major gratifications from food and drink as such, since
it reveals either excessive need or excessive greed, the pauper'
. . . the glutton." 5 Anyway, there are no simple processes in the
relations between individuals. They can only be postulated arbi-
trarily, and so Blau's focus upon power is itself an arbitrary and
biased restriction: "The satisfaction a man derives from exer-

cising power over others requires that they endure the depriva-
6z
The Uses ol Goods
tion of being subject to his power; . . . individuals associate
with
one another because they all profit from the association. But
they do not necessarily all proflt equally, nor do they share the
cost of providing the benefits equally. . . ." And so onward to a
theory of individualistic social exchange. Blau stands in a low
grid/low group position, where the view of a world organized
as a competitive, power-seeking game between individuals has
a priori rightness. His work is a rescue job, salvaging an ap-
proach whose reverberations will appeal automatically to other
thinkers who also share the same standpoint. But the anthro-
pologist can recognize this approach itself as an example of a
cultural bias rooted in a certain kind of social experience.
Other cultural biases derive from other social forms. Our ulti-
mate task is to find interpretative procedures that will uncover
each bias and discredit its claims to universality. When this is
done the eighteenth century can be formally closed, and a new
era that has been here a long time can be officially recognized.
The individual human being, stripped of his humanity, is of
no use as a conceptual base from which to make a picture of
human society. No human exists except steeped in the culture
of his time and place. The falsely abstracted individual has
been sadly misleading to Western political thought.G But now
we can start again at a point where major streams of thought
converge, at the other end, at the making of culture. Cultural
analysis sees the whole tapestry as a whole, the picture and the
weaving process, before attending to the individual threads.
At least three intellectual positions being developed today

encourage such an approach. One, the philosophical movement
styled Phenomenology started by taking seriously the question
of our knowledge of other persons. It sets the individual
squarely in a social context, treating knowledge as a joint con-
structive enterprise. Knowledge is never a matter of the lone
individual learning about an external reality. Individuals inter-
acting together impose their constructions upon reality: the
world is socially constructed.T
Structuralism is a convergent movement whose implicit the-
69
lir
'ill,"ii
Goons AS AN INponMATIoN SYSTEM
ory of knowledge transcends the efforts of the individual
thinker, and focuses upon social processes in knowledge. ln its
many forms, modern structural analysis, the offspring of the
electronic computer, affords possibilities of interpreting culture
and of relating cultural to social forms, possibilities that
outpace
any approaches that doggedly start with the individual.s
Ancl finally, closest to the present task, is the Californian
movement in sociology called "social accounting" or ethno-
methodology. This takes it for granted that reality is socially
constructed and also takes it for granted that reality can be
analyzed as logical structures in use. It focuses on interpreta-
tive procedures-on the methods of verification used by lis-
teners, methods of proving credibility used by speakers, on the
whole system of accountability which operates in everyday

Cultural Tastes and Social Class Distinctions

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