An analysis of the security situation in Afghanistan through 2013 and a look forward to the 2014 Presidential and Provincial elections.

1. AFGHANISTAN ON THE EVE
OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS:
A 2014 POLITICAL AND
SECURITY FORECAST

2. PREFACE
Afghanistan is at a pivotal moment. Presidential elections scheduled for 05 April will see the entry of a
new political administration, bringing to an end over twelve years of government led by Hamid Karzai.
Afghanistan’s security landscape will also experience new challenges, with the final withdrawal of NATO
combat troops by December 2014 leading to an additional transition of security responsibility away from
international forces and into the hands of the ANSF.
However, while a Taleban resurgence is likely to bring with it some degree of territorial regression to insurgent control, 2014 will not bring an end to Afghanistan’s post-Taleban political environment. The ANSF remains well funded and has increasingly proved itself capable of operating independently of ISAF oversight.
Development aid funding will also remain in place, though NGOs will face far greater constraints on where
they can operate. Ultimately, new political elites will face the old political challenges, with longer term
security of the country post-2014 remaining dependent upon the signing of a bilateral security agreement
with the United States.
2

3. AFGHANISTAN’S
SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
REMAINS
EXTREMELY
CHALLENGING
FOLLOWING A
YEAR OF
INCREASED
INSURGENT
OPERATIONS
ACROSS
THE COUNTRY.

4. THE STATE OF NATIONAL SECURITY 2013-2014
4
KEY TRENDS OF 2013
Nationwide, southern and
eastern provinces continued
to see the majority of violent
activity in 2013, with notable
deteriorations also reported in
the formerly stable provinces,
Faryab, Farah and Badakhshan.
Such activity was particularly
high during the first six months
of 2013 due to increased numbers of insurgents crossing from
neighbouring Pakistan, utilising
traditional routes along the
eastern border as well as exploiting new routes connecting
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier.
Despite such challenges however, a Taleban offensive planned
for the spring, dubbed Khalid
Ibn Walid (the foremost general
of the early Islamic conquests)
largely fell short of its anticipated aims, with violence falling in
line with seasonal trends during
the autumn and winter periods. Alongside a rise in militant
activity, 2013 also saw a substan-
Extreme
Substantial
Moderate
Low
Provincial Security Threat Level 2013: Source UN, MOI, EI data
tial increase in ANSF casualties
nationwide, as responsibility for
national security was transferred
from international personnel to
Afghanistan’s Army and Police
units.
THE SITUATION IN KABUL
In the capital, a number of
high-profile attacks against GIRoA targets gave way to a largely
stable security environment
from August, with substantial
improvement in security resulting from increased cooperation between the city’s various
security agencies. While militant
groups such as the Haqqani
network and the Taleban remain committed to perpetrating
mass-casualty raids within the
city, increased ANSF capability
has meant that such attacks
have shifted from complex raids
against international and GIRoA
compounds, to moving targets
such as military convoys within
the city’s outlying districts.

5. THE BILATERAL SECURITY AGREEMENT (BSA)
Few issues have attracted the
attention or intrigue of international observers more than the
anticipated signing of a Bilateral
Security Agreement (BSA) between Kabul and Washington.
Constituting the necessary legal
grounding for US forces to extend their troop presence in the
country post-2014, the signing
of a BSA is of critical importance
to the future stability of the
country. Nonetheless, efforts to
broker a deal by US diplomats
have been repeatedly rebuffed
by President Karzai, despite
the approval from among the
GIRoA’s political elite following
consultation in a specially con-
vened Loya Jirga assembly on
27 November 2013.
PROSPECTS FOR A 2014
AGREEMENT
While a “zero option” of full US
withdrawal by the Obama administration remains a possibility,
in practice such a result should
be considered unlikely, due to
strong disadvantages posed to
both parties. Karzai’s decision to
delay the signing of the BSA likely
stems from a desire to extend
the leverage he currently enjoys
with the Obama administration,
as well as to present himself as a
leader resilient to the demands
of the United States. However,
such sentiments are unlikely to be
shared by a successor government
which must face the challenge of
renewed insurgent activity in the
coming year.
Consequently, while the agreement of a residual training and
counter-terrorism force (estimated
at around 10,000 personnel) remains the most likely outcome, dependence on the election of a new
President to sign the bill will mean
that a final written agreement may
not transpire until at least June
2014. In the short term, this delay
will serve to perpetuate a sense
of uncertainty among the Afghan
populace, leading to additional
instability in the coming months.
5

6. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: POTENTIAL SCENARIOS
On 05 April 2014 Afghans will go
the polls to elect a new President, the sixth electoral contest
since the overthrow of the Taleban in 2001. Unlike in previous
contests, President Karzai will
not be among those standing
due to constitutional limitations
which prohibit the President
from exceeding two terms in
office. Standing in his place are
11 men, almost all of whom are
drawn from Afghanistan’s GIRoA
and Mujahedeen-era elite and
are politically close to President
Karzai. The major exception to
this is Dr Abdullah Abdullah, a
seasoned opposition figure who
remains an active critic of the
Karzai government.
6
Pashtun
Uzbek/
Turkoman
Tajik
Mixed
Hazara
Afghanistan’s principal ethnic groupings by province.
CHALLENGES FOR
ELECTION DAY
While last minute deals and
candidate withdrawals are likely
to obscure a clear assessment of
the outcome until March at the
earliest, several wider developments are to be expected. Firstly, corruption and vote rigging,
while potentially lower than
previous contests following the
passage of new legislation will
continue to permeate through
the process, with the sale of
voter cards already underway
within the country’s electoral
black market. Secondly, security
concerns will remain paramount
on Election Day, as militant
forces act to simultaneously
disrupt voting for the Presidential and Provincial council
elections which have historically
witnessed considerable spikes
in violence. Another probable
outcome of the electoral process
will be a runoff vote between
the top two candidates.
At present, neither candidate
appears to possess the requisite
50% share of the popular vote
to avoid a runoff as required
by Afghan law. Consequently,
the announcement of a new
President is unlikely to be made
prior to the conclusion of Hamid
Karzai’s final term in May, adding
further instability to the period
of transition. The final result
itself is likely to be one of three
potential scenarios.
ELECTION OF
PRO-ESTABLISHMENT
CANDIDATE
The most probable outcome is
the victory a pro-Karzai candidate capable of bridging Afghanistan’s disparate Pashtun and
non-Pashtun ethnic voting blocs.
Former Minister of Finance
Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai is at
present the most credible candidate for this position, having
succeeded in appealing to both
his Pashtun constituents as well
as northern voters through the
appointment of Uzbek strongman General Abdul Rashid Dostum as his running mate.

7. 7
VICTORY FOR ABDULLAH
ABDULLAH
Dr Abdullah Abdullah, a seasoned figure of
opposition politics.
While Qayyum Karzai, brother of
the current President could also
conceivably play this role, and is
likely to win key supporters from
the GIRoA administration, his
candidature lacks broad support
among the Afghan electorate.
The Election of Ghani or Karzai
would offer the best of hope of
maintaining national unity within the country, given the support
that both candidates hold within
the restive south and east of
the country and their advocacy
for further reconciliation efforts
with the Taleban.
DECLARATION OF A STATE
OF EMERGENCY
The second most likely scenario
is the victory of popular Tajik
politician Dr Abdullah Abdullah.
Drawing on support from among
his Northern Alliance base, as
well as courting the approval
of Hazara, Youth and Female
voters, Abdullah represents the
best prospect for a move away
from the political status quo.
Despite enjoying a narrow lead
in most nationwide polls, Abdullah’s candidacy has limited
support among much of Afghanistan’s majority Pashtun population and faces the risk that some
pro-Karzai contenders may drop
out of the race in order to unify
their support behind a single
candidate. Should Abdullah win,
already strained divisions between Afghanistan’s north and
south-east would be exacerbated further, with more conservative Pashtun elements unlikely to
accept government by a non-Pashtun President.
While unlikely, there also remains a prospect that President
Karzai may declare a state of
emergency, leading to an indefinite extension of the present
administration’s rule. Low voter
turnout coupled with political
disputes over the outcome of
the election could force the
President to intervene, particularly should the Taleban escalate
violence to a point which effectively prevents large swathes of
the country from participating
in the poll. Such an outcome
would also hand Karzai additional power to secure one of his
supporters in any successor government, likely to be a priority
of the President in the upcoming
elections. An intervention of this
nature would prove extremely
unpopular with both the international community as well as
domestic audiences and would
serve to fundamentally weaken
the already fragile structure of
the GIRoA.
25
Abdullah Abdullah
23.2
Ashraf Karzai
Qayyum Karzai
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf
9.5
6.8
Presidential Election Poll Results 2013; Source: TOLO News, Democracy International, EI data

8. THE DRAWDOWN OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES
SHIFT TO ANSF CONTROL
Following a process of structured troop reductions beginning in 2011, Afghanistan will
see an increase in both the
scale and speed of ISAF military
drawdowns over the coming
year. At present some 52,000
international military personnel
remain within Afghanistan, with
all front line combat troops to
be removed by the end of the
year in line with NATO plans.
While ANSF troops are likely to
encounter increased rates of
attrition as they fill this security
gap, secured funding and equipment for 2014 will prevent any
major fragmentation in the face
of Taleban advances.
TALEBAN RECOVERY
Nonetheless, in provinces where
Taleban fighters already exert
partial control, a regression of
local government authority to
insurgent fighters, mediated
with the ANSF is to be expected.
Helmand, Zabul, Paktia, Nangahar, Nuristan and Kandahar are
likely to be the worst affected
by this trend given the historic
role ISAF has played in upholding
their security.
8
3000
2012
2013
2500
2000
2767
1870
1500
INTERNAL CHALLENGES
FOR THE ANSF:
Rather than a credible threat
of Taleban advances towards
the capital, the major challenge
to the ANSF in 2014 will be the
maintenance of internal coherence among its tribally organised
battalions, a task traditionally
served by the command and
control structure of ISAF. Beyond
2014, the security of Afghanistan
will depend upon the signing of
some form of bilateral security
agreement between Kabul and
United States, which will provide
a template for both the funding
of Afghanistan’s military institutions, as well as the maintenance
of the ANSF’s offensive capability.
1000
500
394
151
0
ISAF
ANSF
ISAF & ANSF casualties 2012-2013;
Source: ISAF, MOI
SECURITY POST 2014:
With NATO’s pledge to remain
in Afghanistan until 2020, the
long-term survival of the ANSF,
and with it the GIRoA is likely
to persist beyond 2014, though
crucially such stability will
depend on the agreement of a
residual security force under a
formal BSA.

9. THE POLICY OF REGIONAL STATES: 2014 AND BEYOND
PAKISTAN
Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan will remain a mixture of
domestic security concerns
and regional strategic considerations in 2014. Seeking to appease a Pashtun insurgency in its western
provinces, Islamabad’s primary concern is to foster
a peace settlement in Afghanistan which can produce a power-sharing arrangement between the
Taliban and non-Pashtun populations.
However, while Pakistan does not want a return
of an exclusively Taleban government, a full US
withdrawal met with growing Indian military assistance would lead decision-makers to substantially
increase their support of Islamist organisations,
namely the Haqqani network and HiG, seen as the
only firm allies of Pakistan available in the country.
CHINA
INDIA
India’s concerns for the security environment in Afghanistan
have already seen a substantial rise in development assistance and military aid
to the GIRoA, expected to continue throughout
2014. Such policy derives from twin factors of
longstanding enmity towards the Taleban, and
concern that the collapse of the GIRoA administration may result in the country becoming a Pakistani-client state.
Nonetheless, New Delhi is prepared to tolerate a
future pro-Pakistan administration provided that it
is does not institute a new Islamic government.
IRAN
The People’s Republic has invested heavily in Afghanistan’s
mining and energy sector in recent years and will
place as a priority the stabilisation of the security
landscape through the resumption of direct GIRoA-Taleban talks.
Iran’s policy in Afghanistan
will be determined primarily
by security concerns in 2014, as the Islamic Republic prepares to withstand even greater levels of
narcotic smuggling and human migration than in
previous years.
While Beijing is likely to welcome further drawdowns in western military personnel, security concerns for its own restive border areas, will likely
compel China to broaden its own counter-terrorism links with regional states including its historic
rival India.
Historic opposition to any future Taleban administration has the potential to see Tehran renew support to Afghanistan’s Tajik powerbrokers should
insurgent violence increase substantially in the
New Year.
9

10. DEVELOPMENT AID 2014
CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES
2014 will pose a number of new
challenges for the aid industry
in Afghanistan, with violence
against civilian staff likely to
reach particularly high levels during the spring period as insurgent
fighters target international staff
associated with the upcoming
elections.
Over the course of 2013 fatalities
among NGO workers more than
doubled from the previous year.
Northern and western areas saw
a particular increase in this form
of violent incident, a product of
both a more assertive militant
presence in formerly stable rural areas, as well a decline in the
protection traditionally afforded
by NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams. While a number of
10
NGOs may see the ISAF withdrawal as an opportunity to reassert their neutrality to local communities, the reality for many
implementing partners is likely
to be a reduction in of operations
in unprotected rural areas, and a
shift to indirect oversight of projects conducted from key urban
centres such as Kabul, Herat and
Mazar-e Sharif.
AID FUNDING 2014
Despite such challenges however, 2014 will not bring an end to
international development in its
current form. Donor countries
have committed to providing $16
billion in aid though 2015, with
annual US spending expected to
remain around $2 billion until
2017. While failure by the US to
agree a BSA would undoubtedly
undermine support for further
aid pledges in Washington, other
key donors, including Germany
and the Asian Development Bank
are likely to continue spending
over the next two years, irrespective of the future level of direct US military assistance

11. CONCLUSION
Few years in Afghanistan’s recent history have passed without
predictions of dramatic deterioration in the country’s security
environment. Key changes in the
nation’s security and political
situation will undoubtedly bring
significant upheaval, yet at the
same time fundamental continuities of both political elites,
international assistance and aid
funding are unlikely to disappear
within the period of the next 12
months.
The risk for the country remains,
that should Afghan policy makers fail to agree a long term
security pact with the United
States, and with it future plans
on the training and funding of
the ANSF, present conditions of
military uncertainty and chronic
instability will persist into 2015
and beyond.

12. Author:
James Borrelli
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