1. The first four months of 2014 will have a decisive
impact on the future of Afghanistan, setting the con-
ditions for the post-ISAF mission and the ‘Decade
of Transformation.’ The peaceful transfer of politi-
cal power as a result of the upcoming election, on 5
April 2014, will provide the necessary
strategic momentum for sustain-
ing the progress made during the
ISAF mission.
The absence of a Bilateral
Security Agreement (BSA) has in-
creased uncertainty among Afghans,
regional neighbors, donor countries
and the international
community. This lack of
certainty has also cre-
ated unhelpful hedging
behavior in the region.
Economic indicators are
apparent, such as reduced
foreign investment, lower
trade and falling gov-
ernment revenues. The
Afghan people continue
to express the need for continued, broader interna-
tional community support, evident in the widespread
Afghan popular sentiment for signing the BSA,
endorsed by the Loya Jirga.
The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
emerged from the 2013 summer fighting season as
a competent and confident force, responsible for
leading the provision of security in Afghanistan; they
also enjoy the support and confidence of the major-
ity of the Afghan people. This winter, we focused
on setting the conditions for 2014 by preparing the
ANSF for the upcoming election and the fighting
season. We continue to strive to ensure that the
progress the ANSF have made thus far is sustainable
in 2014 and beyond.
Overall, surveys suggest security perceptions
remain generally stable across Afghanistan; however,
work remains to be done
and continued ambiguity
regarding the signing of
the BSA may adversely
affect these perceptions.
The signing of the BSA,
followed by the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA), and
the decision on the Reso-
lute Support mission, will strengthen the relationship
between Afghanistan, the United States, NATO and
its partner nations as well as provide the legal frame-
work for our continued commitment to the Afghan
people.
Commander ISAF’s Afghanistan Update
WINTER 2013 -14

2. The ANSF are almost fully-fielded and have shown
improvement in the areas of combined arms operations,uti-
lization of indirect fire systems,and organic casualty evacua-
tion. Progress continues to be demonstrated by the ANSF,
who now execute combat operations across the country,
displaying an ability to plan,support and
sustain complex operations. Furthermore,
ANSF interaction with the Afghan media
and local communities during operations
highlighted to the populace the ability of
Afghan forces to provide security. However,
progress is not evenly distributed across the
force and is not yet fully sustainable.
The Afghan Security Institutions (ASI)
and ANSF still have capability gaps,where
the requisite capability is nascent or non-ex-
istent and also developmental shortfalls
where significant further development is required to achieve
proficiency and requisite effectiveness. ASI Capability gaps
exist in planning,programming,multi-year budgeting and
execution and transparency,accountability and oversight.
ASI developmental shortfalls are apparent in logistics,
acquisition and financial management; strategic plans and
policy and human resource management. Despite the Min-
istry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI)
making progress in both budget execution and account-
ability,critical support functions – particularly the logistics
and facilities departments – still require Coalition assistance
and are expected to continue to require support for the near
future.
ANSF capability gaps include close air support and
intelligence,surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),while
development shortfalls exist in in command
and control,leadership,combined arms inte-
gration,training and sustainment. In partic-
ular,improvements still need to be made in
counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED),
medical,fire support coordination and count-
er-terrorism capabilities. The ASI and ANSF
continue to rely on ISAF support to mitigate
these gaps and shortfalls.
In mid-2013,ISAF completed transition to
a train,advise and assist (TAA) mission as the
ANSF took the lead responsibility for security
across the country. The end of 2013 saw ISAF change em-
phasis from unit level advising to functionally-based Secu-
rity Force Assistance (SFA) at Corps and ministerial levels,
with emphases on problem solving efforts and sustainable
relationships. SFA will remain our primary effort and focus
into Resolute Support,the planned NATO-led mission to
train,advise and assist the ANSF after 2014. These efforts,
designed to make progress sustainable,are fundamental for
security transition and will set the conditions for Resolute
Support.
Afghan Security Institutions and ANSF Development
The Threat
The Taliban-led insurgency failed to achieve its
stated operational objectives for the 2013 summer
fighting season. While ultimately, it has been unable
to exploit the reduced ISAF presence to generate
operational or strategic momentum, the insurgency
draws strength from its belief that NATO will not be
in Afghanistan after 2014. It has used attacks in an
attempt to influence the perceptions of the Afghan
people, international community, its own fighters, sup-
porters and potential donors. Insurgents and criminal
elements are still capable of projecting violence into
urban areas from rural areas, threatening freedom of
movement along major highways, contesting gov-
ernment control in some areas and conducting high
profile attacks and assassinations. Yet the Afghan
population widely rejects the Taliban, whose support
level amongst the populace remains below 15 per cent,
consequently undermining insurgent efforts to expand
influence.
Remnants of Al Qaeda and other foreign mili-
tant groups remain within the border districts, while
sanctuaries outside Afghanistan afford the insurgency
refuge. In an environment where their existence is not
directly threatened, sanctuary allows both the recon-
stitution, training and equipping of enemy forces,
such as the Taliban and Haqqani Network, as well as
freedom for insurgent leaders to plan future attacks.
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3. ISAF personnel continue to maintain positive day-to-day relationships with
their peers within the ASIs and remain committed to working together in pursuit
of shared strategic objectives. The true strength of the relationship is demonstrated
by the lively discussions conducted between ISAF and the MoD over budgets, in-
frastructure, civilianization and maintenance; robust debate now takes place with-
out the relationship being adversely affected and positive outcomes are achieved.
Despite a strained relationship between the Coalition and GIRoA at the political
level, ISAF’s relationship with the security ministries remains strong.
Amongst the Afghan populace, three quarters of survey respondents support hav-
ing an ISAF presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014, with a plurality believing that
ISAF is helping, rather than hindering, Afghanistan’s development.
Ultimately, the ability of the Afghan government and security ministries to con-
duct a transparent, inclusive and credible election, acceptable to the Afghan people
in April 2014, remains crucial.
Partnership with Afghanistan
The election is scheduled to occur on 5 April and
ISAF is prepared to support the ANSF, including during
a run-off if necessary. With the ANSF having assumed
nationwide lead for security in June 2013, the Afghans
already have a solid foundation for electoral preparations,
which are now well advanced, relative to the 2009 presi-
dential election.
Technical aspects of the political process are already
in place with the establishment of the Independent
Election Commission (IEC), Independent Electoral
Complaints Commission (IECC) and Election Media
Commission (EMC). While stating the aim of inclu-
sive, credible and transparent elections, we should also
expect that there will be violence and other challenges on
election day.
Assessments regarding the ability of the ANSF to
successfully secure the election remain encouraging.The
Election
MoI-led planning demonstrates the vital importance
and scrutiny that election security has at all levels. Total
security forces will number approximately 425,000,
including Afghan and Coalition forces – well above
the 250,000 forces that were present during the 2009
elections.
The ANSF continue to demonstrate vastly improved
capabilities, as displayed by the security provision for
the Loya Jirga. Additionally, both ANA and ANP have
demonstrated their ability to secure election polling sites
toward the end of the period, securing multiple such sites
in Nangahar Province; these operations highlighted the
benefits of layered security, which will be used during
the election period. Although much remains to be done,
the ANSF have the confidence, capability and intent
to secure the vast majority of polling sites in the weeks
leading up to and on election day.
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4. Redeployment is fundamental to ISAF’s efforts to
posture the force for Resolute Support and is a visual
manifestation of Afghanistan’s growing capability as a
sovereign nation,displaying that responsibility for security
is increasingly in the hands of our Afghan partners. The
gradual reduction of forces and capabilities still allow for
the necessary support to the ANSF during the election
period and the remainder of the ISAF mission. Force
protection remains a critical priority,requiring the contin-
ued dedication of ISAF resources,reducing the number of
troops available to perform SFA specific roles.
Today’s force posture is designed to support yesterday’s
TAA mission and does not fully support our current needs
for functionally-based SFA,which has seen the focus shift
Force Posture
from developing ANSF combat capability at the unit
level to ensuring that end-to-end processes are established
across at both ministerial and Corps level; in doing so we
will sustain the ANSF and deliver transparency,account-
ability and oversight. This requires different advising skill
sets,to ensure that the force is optimized for the remain-
der of 2014 and the follow-on mission. It is imperative
that,along with alterations to the current command
and control construct,nations carefully screen and select
advisors who understand the environment,ensuring the
candidates have the requisite experience,knowledge and
temperament to operate effectively in this environment.
Fully resourcing and training these forces and individuals
remains critical to continued ANSF development.
Afghanistan’s neighbors share common concerns about
the post-2014 security environment and have vested
interests in regional stability.This winter,GIRoA has
conducted a range of relationship-building activities with
many of its neighbors,including Pakistan,India,Iran and
Russia.
Our objective remains to establish a constructive and
effective relationship between the militaries of Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. During the fall,we saw some positive
political developments which provided space for the mil-
itary-to-military relationship to grow. President Karzai’s
Regional Relationships
visit to Pakistan in August was followed with a visit by
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif to Kabul in November.
Leaders on both sides appear committed to developing a
military-to-military relationship.
India continues to improve its relationship with Af-
ghanistan and remains willing to provide funds and
material support for non-lethal equipment and to train the
ANSF in India.
Afghanistan’s relations with Iran continue to develop
and Russia has provided economic aid and training for
select members of the ANA.
With our Coalition presence,the ANSF will continue to improve.
As the ANSF demonstrate their enhanced capabilities during the
upcoming election and beyond,insurgents will see the contradiction
between their propaganda and reality.
Ultimately,military actions provide the necessary time and space for
renewed diplomatic and economic initiatives to take hold. The 2014
election provides an opportunity for the first democratic transition of
power in Afghanistan. The Coalition presence provides a measure of
confidence and certainty for political transition to occur and reduces
hedging behaviors that may limit or reduce participation in the election
process.
Whilst a delay in signing the BSA is causing uncertainty,once signed the BSA and the NATO SOFA will provide
the necessary certainty by setting the framework for our continued commitment to Afghanistan. Additionally,as the
international community demonstrates its continued engagement with the region,regional actors will be encouraged to
commit to real progress in relations with Afghanistan.
Looking Forward
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