2. KAEDAH
1. Tafsiran Mahkamah
2. Semakan Kehakiman dan pemberian
remedi di bawah Undang-undang
Pentadbiran yang diberikan oleh s. 25(2)
Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964
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3. PERANAN MAHKAMAH
• Para 161 of the Reid Commission Report,
The guarantee afforded by the Constitution is the
supremacy of the law and the power and duty of
the Courts to annul any attempt to subvert any of
the fundamental rights, whether by legislative or
administrative action or otherwise
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4. TAFSIRAN MAHKAMAH
• Dato’ Menteri Othman Baginda:
In interpreting a constitution two points must be
borne in mind. First, judicial precedent plays a
lesser part than is normal in matters of ordinary
statutory interpretation. Secondly, a constitution,
being a living piece of legislation, its provisions
must be construed broadly and not in a pedantic
way — "with less rigidity and more generosity
than other Acts" (see Minister of Home Affairs v
Fisher [1979] 3 All ER 21. A constitution is sui
generis, calling for its own principles of
interpretation, suitable to its character, but
without necessarily accepting the ordinary rules
and presumptions of statutory interpretation.
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5. TAFSIRAN MAHKAMAH
• Dato’ Menteri Othman Baginda,
As stated in the judgment of Lord Wilberforce in that case: "A
constitution is a legal instrument given rise, amongst other things, to
individual rights capable of enforcement in a court of law. Respect
must be paid to the language which has been used and to the
traditions and usages which have given meaning to that language. It
is quite consistent with this, and with the recognition that rules of
interpretation may apply, to take as a point of departure for the
process of interpretation a recognition of the character and origin of
the instrument, and to be guided by the principle of giving full
recognition and effect to those fundamental rights and freedoms."
The principle of interpreting constitutions "with less rigidity and more
generosity" was again applied by the Privy Council in Attorney-General
of St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla v Reynolds [1979] 3 All ER 129,
136.
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6. TAFSIRAN MAHKAMAH
• Dato’ Menteri Othman Baginda,
It is in the light of this kind of ambulatory approach that we must
construe our Constitution. The Federal Constitution was enacted as a
result of negotiations and discussions between the British Government,
the Malay Rulers and the Alliance Party relating to the terms on which
independence should be granted. One of its main features is the
enumeration and entrenchment of certain rights and freedoms.
Embodied in these rights are the guarantee provisions of Article 71
and the first point to note is that that right does not claim to be new.
It already exists long before Merdeka, and the purpose of the
entrenchment is to protect it against encroachment. In other words
the provisions of Article 71 are a graphic illustration of the depth of our
heritage and the strength of our constitutional law to guarantee and
protect matters of succession of a Ruler (including election of the
Undangs) which already exist against encroachment, abrogation or
infringement.
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7. Pendekatan dalam mentafsirkan
hak asasi
• Terdapat dua bentuk pendekatan:
i. Literalist; jika mahkamah anggap hak adalah sesuatu
yang dianugerahkan (conferred)
ii. Liberal; jika mahkamah anggap sebagai freedom, ‘right
based approach’
• Pentafsiran penting kerana hak asasi disebut dalam
bentuk konsep @ idea dan banyak bergantung kepada
kefahaman pemerintah dan masyarakat mengenainya.
Misalnya: kebebasan asasi tertakluk kepada undang-
undang.
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8. Ujian dalam menentukan status
samada hak dilindungi
1. “Whether the right protected is an integral
part of the constitutionally protected
fundamental rights”. Kekatong Sdn Bhd v
Danaharta Urus (CA) [2003] 3 MLJ 1
2. “Whether the State action directly affected the
fundamental rights such that it made their
exercise ineffective or illusory.” Nordin v
Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan
[1992]1MLJ 697
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9. Penghadan kuasa oleh Mahkamah
• Sivarasa Rasiah (2010)
The other principle of constitutional interpretation that is
relevant to the present appeal is this. Provisos or
restrictions that limit or derogate from a guaranteed right
must be read restrictively. Take art 10(2)(c). It says that
'Parliament may by law impose … (c) on the right conferred
by paragraph (c) of Clause (1), such restrictions as it deems
necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the
Federation or any part thereof, public order or morality'.
Now although the article says 'restrictions', the word
'reasonable' should be read into the provision to qualify the
width of the proviso.
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10. Penghadan kuasa oleh Mahkamah
• Sivarasa Rasiah (2010)
• The reasons for reading the derogation as 'such reasonable
restrictions' appear in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in
Dr Mohd Nasir bin Hashim v Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia
[2006] 6 MLJ 213; [2007] 1 CLJ 19 which reasons are now
adopted as part of this judgment. The contrary view expressed
by the High Court in Nordin bin Salleh & Anor v Dewan
Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 343; [1992] 1
CLJ 463 is clearly an error and is hereby disapproved.
• The correct position is that when reliance is placed by the state
to justify a statute under one or more of the provisions of art
10(2), the question for determination is whether the restriction
that the particular statute imposes is reasonably necessary
and expedient for one or more of the purposes specified in that
article.
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11. KEDUDUKAN TERKINI
• PP v Azmi Sharom [2015]8 CLJ 921
[35] Learned counsel for the plaintiff urged us to depart from
the reasonableness test as propounded by this court in Sivarasa
Rasiah on two grounds namely:
(i) in Sivarasa Rasiah, this court for some reason did not
consider the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Pung Chen Choon where it was specifically held that
the“reasonableness test” ought not to apply to restrictions
imposed pursuant to art. 10; and
(ii) the framers of the Constitution had deliberately omitted the
word “reasonable” from the final draft of art. 10(2).
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12. KEDUDUKAN TERKINI
[37] For those reasons, we are inclined to agree with the view of
the Supreme Court in Pung Chen Choon, that it is not for the
court to determine whether the restriction imposed by the
Legislature pursuant to art. 10(2) is reasonable or otherwise.
That, in our opinion, is a matter strictly within the discretion of
the Legislature and not within the purview of the court.
Similarly, we are of the view that the reasoning in Ooi Ah Phua
v. Officer in Charge Criminal Investigation Kedah/Perlis [1975]
1 LNS 117; [1975] 2 MLJ 198 does not justify the insertion of the
word “reasonable” before the word “restriction” in art. 10(2). In
Ooi Ah Phua, the Federal Court was concerned with the
interpretation of art. 5(3)…..
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13. KEDUDUKAN TERKINI
[38] Suffian LP construed that provision in the following words:
With respect I agree that the right of an arrested person
to consult his lawyer begins from the moment of arrest,
but I am of the opinion that that right cannot be
exercised immediately after arrest. A balance has to be
struck between the right of the arrested person to
consult his lawyer on the one hand and on the other the
duty of the police to protect the public from
wrongdoers by apprehending them and collecting
whatever evidence exists against them. The interest
of justice is as important as the interest of arrested
persons and it is well-known that criminal elements
are deterred most of all by the certainty of detection,
arrest and punishment.
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14. KEDUDUKAN TERKINI
[39] The learned judge in Dr Mohd Nasir Hashim relying
on the above statement by Suffian LP opined that:
So, although the Constitution did not have any
words postponing the right to counsel, the Federal
Court read those words into the article. So too here.
We can read the word“reasonable” before the word
“restriction” in art. 10(2)(c).
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15. KEDUDUKAN TERKINI
[40] With respect, the reasoning of the learned judge cited in Dr Mohd
Nasir Hashim in our view is flawed since in Ooi Ah Phua the court was
concerned with the interpretation of the words “... as soon as may be
...” which relates to the time within which a person arrested is to be
allowed to consult his lawyer and the court opined that in the
circumstances a balance need to be drawn between the interest of the
accused and the interest of justice. Therefore the words “... as soon as
may be ...” cannot be construed to mean “immediately” upon arrest.
That interpretation arose from the special wordings of art. 5(3). It is, in
our view, fallacious to use the reasoning in Ooi Ah Phua as warranting
us to insert the word “reasonable” before the word “restriction” in art.
10(2). That would be rewriting the provisions of art. 10(2). For those
reasons we depart from the view of the Court of Appeal in Dr Mohd
Nasir Hashim as affirmed by this court in Sivarasa Rasiah.
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16. Elemen Undang-undang Hak Asasi
Manusia Antarabangsa
• Dualist v Monist
• Pendekatan dualist oleh mahkamah:
i) Merdeka University Berhad v Govt of Msia [1981]2
MLJ 356
Pihak universiti menghujahkan bahawa keengganan untuk
membenarkan mereka beroperasi menggunakan bahasa
Mandarin adalah bertentangan dengan Art 26 UDHR
ii) Beatrice Fernandez v Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia
[2005]3 MLJ 681
CEDAW tidak relevan dalam menentukan sama ada
‘perjanjian kolektif’terjumlah sebagai diskriminasi atas
sebab mengandung yang bertentangan dengan PP &
CEDAW
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17. Elemen Undang-undang Hak Asasi
Manusia Antarabangsa
• Hujah-hujah memasukkan undang-undang hak
asasi manusia antarabangsa ke dalam
mahkamah tempatan:
i) UDHR telah dinyatakan dalam s.4(4) Akta
SUHAKAM 1999 – SUHAKAM boleh mengambil
kira UDHR dalam pelaksanaan fungsi dan
kuasanya
ii) Doctrine of legitimate expectation
iii) Undang-undang hak asasi manusia
antarabangsa sebagai sumber pentafsiran
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18. Elemen Undang-undang Hak Asasi
Manusia Antarabangsa
ii) Doctrine of legitimate expectation
- SIS Forum (Malaysia) v Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid
(Menteri Dalam Negeri) [2010]2 MLJ 378 -
ditolak
- Sepakat Efektif Sdn Bhd v Menteri Dalam
Negeri Msia [2012]9 MLJ 550 – ditolak
- Indira Gandhi v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam
Perak [2013]5 MLJ 552 - diterima
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19. Elemen Undang-undang Hak Asasi
Manusia Antarabangsa
iii) Undang-undang hak asasi manusia
antarabangsa sebagai sumber pentafsiran
- Nor Anak Nyawai v Borneo Pulp Plantation
[2001]6 MLJ 241 - diterima
- Mohamad Ezam Mohd Noor v Ketua Polis
Negara [2002]4 MLJ 449 – ditolak
- Abdul Malek Hussin v Borhan Hj Daud [2008]1
MLJ 368 - diterima
- Noorfadilla Ahmad Saikin v Chayed Basirun
[2012]1 MLJ 832 - diterima
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20. PENDEKATAN BERBEZA
• Suzana Md Aris v DSP Ishak Hussain [2011]1 CLJ 226
“UDHR is part and parcel of [Msia’s] jurisprudence as the
international norms in the UDHR are binding on all
member countries”
- There was a need to ground the court’s decision to grant
exemplary damages in international law because s.
8(2)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956 prohibits recovery of
exemplary damages where a cause of action is brought
by the estate of a deceased person
- The court has to show that the police’s actions were
egregious in the eyes of law and this is where Art.3 & 5
of the UDHR comes in
- International human rights law overruling domestic law
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21. KUASA TAMBAHAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI–
AKTA MAHKAMAH KEHAKIMAN
Powers of the High Court
25. (1) Without prejudice to the generality of Article 121 of
the Constitution, the High Court shall in the exercise of its
jurisdiction have all the powers which were vested in it
immediately prior to Malaysia Day and such other powers
as may be vested in it by any written law in force within its
local jurisdiction.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1)
the High Court shall have the additional powers set out in
the Schedule:
Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in
accordance with any written law or rules of court relating
to the same
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22. KUASA TAMBAHAN MAHKAMAH
TINGGI
• Section 25(2) of Courts of Judicature of Act 1964:
Prerogative writs
1. Power to issue to any person or authority directions,
orders or writs, including writs of the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, or any others, for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Part II of the Constitution, or any of them, or
for any purpose
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23. KAEDAH PERMOHONAN
SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN
Rules of Court 2012:
Application for judicial review (O. 53, r. 1)
1. (1) This Order shall govern all applications seeking the
relief specified in paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and for the purposes therein
specified.
(2) This Order is subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII of
Part 2 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 [Act 137].
Applications (O. 53, r. 2)
(4) Any person who is adversely affected by the decision of
any public authority shall be entitled to make the
application.
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25. UNDANG-UNDANG PENTADBIRAN
• salah satu cabang undang-undang awam (public law)
• memperkatakan tentang fungsi, kuasa dan tanggungan:-
i. Pihak eksekutif, termasuklah pentadbiran
ii. Badan-badan berkuasa awam
• menegaskan mengenai kuasa kajian semula kehakiman
oleh mahkamah
• Walau bagaimanapun terdapat juga kawalan dari badan
bukan kehakiman, seperti badan perundangan.
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26. Tafsiran MP Jain
• Administrative Law deals with the
structure, powers and functions of organs
of administration; the limits of their
powers and functions; the methods by
which their powers are controlled
including the legal remedies available to a
person against them when his rights are
infringed by their operation.
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27. PERKEMBANGAN
• Prinsip RULE OF LAW Dicey menggugat peranan undang-
undang Pentadbiran.
• “The words ‘administrative law’ … are unknown to the
English judge and counsel, and are in themselves hardly
intelligible without further explanation.” (Dicey,
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution)
• Ridge v Baldwin (1964) Lord Reid,
“we do not have a developed system of administrative
law perhaps because until fairly recently we did not need
it.”
• Moorgate Ltd v Twitchings (1975) Lord Denning,
‘as Parliament has done nothing, it is time the courts did
something.’
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28. Pembentukan Undang-undang
Pentadbiran dalam Common Law
• 2 cabang:
a) kreativiti kehakiman;
b) perundangan
• sehingga awal abad ke 20 : Mahkamah tidak
menunjukkan minat untuk mengekang kuasa
pentadbiran.
• Pertengahan abad ke 20, kes Ridge v Baldwin (1964) dan
Breen AEU (1971) – ‘It may now truly be said that that
we have a developed system of Administrative law.’ (Lord
Denning)
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29. Pembentukan Undang-undang
Pentadbiran dalam Common Law
• Disokong oleh perundangan dan perubahan sikap
eksekutif. 1947 penggubalan Crown Proceedings Act,
Freedom of Information Act 2000, Pembaharuan kepada
prosedur kajian semula kehakiman (1988),
• Berbeza dengan UK perkembangan di Malaysia
terutamanya dari aspek perundangan agak lembab
kerana bergantung kepada mahkamah
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30. Perkembangan Undang-undang
Pentadbiran di Malaysia
• 1980an – Mahkamah dipengaruhi oleh perkembangan di
UK
• Terencat 1988 – asas locus standi diperketatkan, kuasa
kawalan mahkamah disempitkan – pelebaran ouster
clause pindaan kepada ISA dan Akta Mesin Cetak.
• Tahun 2000 – Mahkamah kembali aktif, meluaskan kuasa
mahkamah dalam memberi remedi, pemantapan prinsip
keadilan tatacara.
• Sekarang, undang-undang baru mempengaruhi Personal
Data Protection 2010, Whistleblower Protection Act,
peranan Public Account Committee, Suruhanjaya
Siasatan. Oleh itu mahkamah tidak bersendirian dalam
mengenakan kawalan.
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31. PenggabunganUndang-undangPentadbirandan
Perlembagaan
• Pada era tahun 200 ke atas, Mahkamah Malaysia
cenderung untuk melihat kes-kes undang-
undang pentadbiran dari sudut pandang
Perlembagaan Malaysia, terutamanya jika
melibatkan persoalan mengenai kebebasan asasi
dalam Per 5 dan 8.
• Lihat kes TAN TEK SENG V SURUHANJAYA
PERKHIDMATAN PENDIDIKAN & ANOR [1996] 1
MLJ 261
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32. Prinsip kes Tan Teck Seng
• Mahkamah mengambililkira Per 5 dan Per 8 dalam menilai
kesesuaian hukuman yang dikenakan.
“In undertaking these two separate and distinct tasks, it need
not afford the public servant an opportunity to be heard: for,
as the learned judge in the present case correctly concluded,
that right is lost to the servant by the operation of para (a) of
the proviso to art 135(2). But it must, when deciding what
punishment it ought to impose on the particular public
servant, act reasonably and fairly.
If it acts arbitrarily or unfairly or imposes a punishment that is
disproportionate to the misconduct, then its decision, to this
extent, becomes liable to be quashed or set aside. As to
whether our courts must, in all such cases, direct
reinstatement or may grant some other appropriate relief in
an action for declaratory relief by, for example, imposing a
lesser punishment, is a question that I shall return to later.
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33. Prinsip kes Tan Teck Seng
It follows from what I have said, that the doctrine of
procedural fairness, which is a product of the combined
effect of arts 8(1) and 5(1), does not require that a public
servant be afforded the right to make representations upon
the issue of punishment in a case to which proviso (a) of art
135(2) applies. I therefore unhesitatingly reject the
argument of counsel on this point.” (Gopal Sri Ram JCA)
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