1. 0
ANALYSIS OF US AIRPOWER DEPLOYMENT STRATEGY IN THE
WESTERN PACIFIC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON DETERRING
CHINESE AIR SUPERIORITY OVER THE TAIWAN STRAIT
By: Alex Yerukhimov
April 14, 2014

2. 0
Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Figure 1: China’s Anti-Ship missile range 4
Objective Outline 5
Assessing and Categorizing Airfields in the Pacific Theater 6
Table 1: Number of Airfields Usable for Taiwan by Class 8
Calculating Sortie and CAP sizes for US forces 9
Table 2: TAT breakdown 10
Table 3: Statistics of US Aircraft 12
Table 4: Average SR of airfields usable for Taiwan per given class 13
Level of US forces in theater tasked for Taiwan 14
Figure 3: Estimated number of US fighters in theater over time 15
Chinese Airfields used against Taiwan, PRC sortie generation rate and attack strategy 15
Table 5: Chinese Air bases and SR’s 16
Calculating Demand for US CAP size Chinese acceptable loss rate and BVR accuracy 20
Table 6: CAP demands given BVR% and Chinese loss tolerance given Chinese CAP 23
Table 7: CAP demands given BVR% and Chinese loss tolerance given Chinese Surge 23
US fighter distribution scenarios 24
Scenario Summary and Caveat 28
US force levels in theater over time 28
Figure 4: Max CAP Generated over time, full sortie rates 29
Accounting for Chinese Attacks on US air bases 30
Table 8: Modeled overall effects of Chinese attacks on airfields 30
Figure 5: Effects of Chinese attacks on max CAP generated by scenario 31
Figure 6: Changes in max CAP by Scenario given level of damage 31
Figure 7: CAP size by scenario over time with minimal damage 32
Figure 8: CAP size by scenario over time with medium damage 33
Figure 9: CAP size by scenario over time with maximum damage 33
Conclusions 34
Other Considerations: Fighter Losses 37
Other Considerations: Fuel 38
Counter Arguments 40
Consolidated tools for force analysis 43
List of References 47

3. 1
Introduction
Since the turn of the century, many have looked towards Southeast Asia as the next big
stage for world affairs. One of the major flashpoints of Southeast Asian politics is the fate of the
island of Taiwan. Taiwan was founded as the Republic of China in 1912 and was the first
democratic republic in Asia. With the coming of Communism to China, the ruling body fled to
the island in 1949, and declared independence from the Communist mainland. Mainland
Communist China, or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has never acknowledged Taiwan’s
independence and has made several attempts over the course of the 20th century to retake the
island, all of which failed miserably largely due to the Chinese army’s lack of training,
equipment, and leadership matched against a fierce independent spirit in Taiwan.
The United States has historically been Taiwan’s fiercest supporter in Southeast Asia. A
famous incident in 1996 during which the mainland made some aggressive moves against the
island, saw the United States matter-of-factly sailing two aircraft carriers into the strait of
Taiwan to send a strong message to the mainland government as to exactly who had Taiwan’s
interests at heart. Embarrassed, the Chinese government began a massive restructuring and
virtually rebuilding from scratch of the Chinese armed forces. The vigorous military activity
drew the attention of world leaders and military analysts who began to take a more serious
look again at the possibility of the PRC crossing the strait. In 2000, a famous report published by
the Rand Corporation1, a military think tank, modeled what an invasion would look like on the
ground and in the air. The United States was seen as a major player and having the role of
protecting Taiwanese skies and maintaining air superiority to conduct air to ground interdiction
1
(Shlapak, Orletsky &Wilson, 2000)

4. 2
to prevent the Chinese from retaking the island. The main platform of power projection for the
United States? The Nimitz Class nuclear aircraft carrier and her support squadron.
The aircraft carrier has been the symbol of American might since its iconic role in World
War II. A floating city and military airfield, the carrier and its supporting ships, make up a carrier
battle group (CBG). As the world policeman, the US has used the CBG’s to project power
anywhere and protect both its and its allies’ interests anywhere in the globe. The CBG is a
complete war complex replete with surveillance, intelligence, fighters, fighter bombers,
helicopters, and a marine detachment; essentially everything you may need to take over a small
country. Each one also costs 10 to 12 billion dollars. Beginning in the Cold War, the USSR
worked feverishly to develop ways to deny the US carrier access to places from where it could
launch its fighters to impose the will of Uncle Sam.
With the collapse of the USSR, the PRC has taken up the helm of the anti-access
mission2. As both a 1996 and the 2000 Rand report showed, the ability of the US to park its
mobile airbase anywhere with virtual impunity could swing the course of events in instances
such as the repatriation of certain rebellious provinces. It is impossible to get close to a US
aircraft carrier with any sort of conventional weapon. The CBG has an electronic web around it
to several hundred miles. It is protected 24/7 by fighters, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
The Soviets had a lot of success developing missiles; the Chinese have embraced them as the
answers to their prayers.
2
(Kepenevich 2010)

5. 3
Coming in the form of either ballistic (missiles that go up into the atmosphere, then
come down on a target) or cruise (missiles that hug the contour of the terrain), missiles seem
the perfect solution to the anti-access challenge. With modern advents of surveillance,
navigation, and guidance it has become very difficult to hide anything on the surface of the
ocean. As one of the biggest things afloat, the aircraft carrier is especially hard to conceal.
Modern Chinese ballistic missiles, such as the DF-21 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM)
have a range of 1500 miles. Some cruise missiles have even longer ranges. At a cost of about
$500,000 each, they are the perfect weapon to keep the aircraft carrier far away. A couple of
direct hits from ballistic or cruise missiles can send an aircraft carrier to the bottom of the
ocean, or at the very least put it out of commission for the duration of hostilities. Because of
the huge cost differential, a country can afford to launch 100 or more of them at a single
carrier, with the expectation that only a few will make it through the defense systems and hit,
but because the prize is so lucrative the exchange is well worth it.
The past decade has seen an aggressive expansion and development of China’s missile
arsenal and anti-access capabilities3. As a result, areas formerly freely dominated by US CBG’s
are now off limits to them. This poses a major problem for the defense of Taiwan. The effective
unrefueled combat radius of a fighter operating from an aircraft carrier is 575 miles4. If the
carrier cannot get to within that distance of a target, than it cannot play a significant role in that
campaign. Figure 1 shows the various standoff ranges that Chinese missiles can hit from the
mainland. It would not be safe for a carrier to operate anywhere in the missile’s range.
3 (Chapter Six, Asia, 2014)
4
(Kepernevich 2010)

6. 4
Figure 1: China’s Anti-Ship missile range
5
The loss of access to US aircraft carriers has posed a serious problem to getting fighters
to Taiwan. With the removal of carriers from the picture, the US is now back to being forced to
operate from ground based airfields. However, the Chinese have missiles that can also hit land
based airfields. Aircraft sitting in basic shelters or out in the open pose a lucrative target for
missiles and even conventional air strikes. 2 options exist for operating from ground based
airfields. First, you can erect reinforced shelters and harden runways. This greatly reduces the
damage that a missile strike can inflict, however the cost to majorly harden multiple air fields
would cost billions. The other alternative would be to spread out the aircraft such that a single
strike on any given airfield would not cause much damage. This paper looks into the various
ways in which US forces could be distributed among airfields in the pacific to be able to project
fighters over the Taiwan Strait.
5
http://www.chinesedefence.com/forums/chinese-strategic-forces/550-re-enter-df-21d-asbm-4.html

7. 5
Objective outline
This paper sets out to examine the question of the air power balance over the strait of
Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attempt at a hostile takeover of the island. Specifically, this
paper looks at the US strategy of dispersing its fighter force over a number of different airfields
and how this strategy would influence the balance of power by affecting the number of fighters
the US could project over Taiwan in a constant Combat Air Patrol (CAP). Having air supremacy is
universally considered a requirement for any attempt at a crossing is made by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). The question of the balance itself is approached from an angle of
acceptable losses on the part of the PRC. Simply put, if the US is able to project enough power
over the strait to inflict damage above a certain threshold, then the Chinese will not proceed
with aggressive operations, if not, then the Chinese will be willing to tolerate the damage and
proceed with air combat operations for a period of time once the US fighters have run out of
missiles and returned to base. This paper calculates the 2 most probable options for the
number of Chinese aircraft that may be seen over the strait (constant CAP or surge), and the
factors that dictate the number of US fighters needed above Taiwan to achieve this threshold
attrition value given a range of two key variables: acceptable attrition rate by the PRC and kill
probability (Pk) values of US Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles. The manner of distribution of
US aircraft in the theater and the subsequent effects on the size of the CAP over Taiwan is
considered by an analysis of 8 different arrangement scenarios. After a comparative analysis of
each scenario, an analysis is done to enable one to project how long it would have to take
before the US had sufficient aircraft in the pacific theater to achieve the desired deterrent CAP
over Taiwan. Finally, three scenarios are considered, looking in broad terms at the effect of
Chinese strikes on contributing airfields, affecting the airfield’s sortie generation rate and
subsequently, the maximum size of the CAP over Taiwan.

8. 6
Assessing and Categorizing Airfields in the Pacific for Possible use in Taiwan Operations.
According to Cristopher Bowie, the maximum effective range of operations for a short
range fighter is 1726 miles from its target6. Presumably, beyond that range, even aerial
refueling becomes logistically prohibitive for sustained combat operations. John Stillion writes
that the minimum runway length for operating US fighters is 7200 ft7. (the NATO standard is
8000 ft.).
A list of airports and airfields for every country in the western pacific theater within a
roughly 2000 mile radius of Taiwan was compiled from open source material. Countries in
continental Southeast Asia were excluded because flight trajectories from these countries ran
in close proximity to the PRC and would be susceptible for interception from the mainland and
diverted from Taiwan. Each airfield was categorized according to its country of location, owner,
military or civilian status, its distance from Taiwan, its closest distance from the PRC, airfield
length, and airstrip material. This search yielded 435 airfields.
Airfields within 1726 miles of Taiwan and with airstrips at least 7200 ft. were deemed
usable for Taiwan operations. The total number of usable airfields was 161. These 161 airfields
were categorized into one of 3 basing classes. Class A airfields were US owned airbases (these
did not have to be on US owned soil) Class B airfields were other nations’ military and joint
military/civilian airfields. Class C airfields were other nations’ civilian airfields. The purpose of
this classification for access determination and capacity discrimination. Countries such as South
Korea present a unique access issue that will be addressed later. For the purpose of this
6
(Bowie, 2002)
7
(Stillion 2009)

9. 7
analysis, a maximum 2 air wings (an air wing consisting of 96 fighters) can be stationed at a
class A airbase8, a max 1 air wing can be stationed in a class B air base, and max 2 squadrons (48
aircraft) can be stationed in a class C airbase.
Additionally, each airfield was categorized according to its shortest distance from the
PRC. This classification was done to discriminate airfields according to their vulnerability to
attack by PRC forces, primarily ballistic and cruise missiles. The distance zones are as follows.
Zone “I” Airfields are within 375 miles of the Chinese mainland. This is the range of the CSS-6
Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) as well as the combat range of an unrefueled Mig 21. Zone
“II” airfields are within 1000 miles of China. This is the longest possible range for a strike of
escorted H6D bombers escorted by Su-27 flankers. Zone “III” airfields are within 1500 miles of
China. This is the range of the DF-21 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). Zone “IV” airfields
are greater than 1500 miles from China. The only weapon system that can reach here is the DH-
10 Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM).
While the majority of the attacks on airfields will most likely come from missiles as
discussed thoroughly by published works, it has been brought up that especially for closer
airbases, a more cost-effective approach to attack is to use the missiles only to knock out anti
air installations and temporarily disable the runway to prevent any fighters taking off. This
initial stun attack is followed by a conventional air strike using Precision Guided Munitions
(PGM’s) from bombers to deliver the bulk of the longer lasting damage9 10 11.
8
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)
9
(Bowie, 2002)
10
(Stillion & Orletsky, 1999)

10. 8
A 2009 Rand report detailed the logistics required of using missiles to attack hardened
aircraft shelters and runways12. Its conclusion was that missiles against shelters and runways
are not the most efficient approach to reducing an airfield’s sortie generation. There are
relatively few hardened aircraft shelters in the pacific theater. Most of them are in S. Korea.
Those that do exist, are full of the host nation’s fighters. Creating a hardened shelter
infrastructure would costs billion of dollars13. It is not likely that a major hardening campaign is
forthcoming. What this means is that if the US is forced to fight in China, it will have to store its
fighters outside and unprotected. Aircraft are most vulnerable on the ground. A Chinese attack
on US airfields will probably consist of at least 2 phases. The first, initial stunning blow to
quickly eliminate as many fighters in the region as possible without expending too many
resources, and a second much larger attack later when bases are being saturated with fighter
aircraft tasked for Taiwan. The 2009 Rand study suggested that base hardening would be the
most effective way to reduce damage from Chinese strikes. As this is not likely in the near
future, dispersal to limit damage from overconcentration seems the most logical solution.
Table 1: Number of airfields usable for Taiwan by class and zone
11
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)
12
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)
13
(Stillion, 2009)
Zone A B (S. Korea) B (Japan) B (Taiwan) B (Other) C (S. Korea) C (Japan) C (Taiwan) C (Other)
I 0 0 0 4 4 2 1 8 2
II 5 13 8 0 19 3 14 0 38
III 3 0 8 0 1 0 15 0 9
IV 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
10 13 16 4 25 5 30 8 50

11. 9
S. Korea is unlikely to be a reliable source of airfields for operations in Taiwan. It is
commonly thought that China would put enormous pressure on the S. Korean government that
if the S. Korean allowed the US to operate from their borders, China would activate North Korea
for an attack on Seoul14. This would be a major military operation of its own accord, diverting
valuable US resources to deal with it, taking them away from Taiwan. Because of this threat it is
unlikely that S. Korea would be available to the US. It is important to note that 2 US owned
airbases are in S. Korea. Both are AII class bases and cannot be relied on for sortie generation.
The 2009 Rand report indicates with a good degree of certainty that China would be
able to effectively cripple the airfields of Taiwan15, making them virtually useless for sortie
generation. This (S. Korea and Taiwan) effectively takes 30 airfields off the list of probable
usable airfields, leaving only 131.
Calculating sortie rates and CAP size for US forces.
The number of sorties that can be generated per fighter from a certain airbase over a
certain target is mostly determined by the distance that the airfield is away from the target.
Several reports by the Rand Corporation and John Stillion have discussed this calculation16 17 18
at depth and have led to two very similar equations for this calculation. Sortie rate (SR) is
defined as:
SR = 24 hours / (FT + GT)
14
(Gons, 2011)
15
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)
16
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)
17
(Allan 1993)
18
(Shlapak, Orletsky, & Wilson, 2000)

12. 10
Where FT stands for “flight time” and GT stands for “ground time.” FT and GT are further
broken up into components. GT is comprised of TAT “turnaround time” and MT “maintenance
time” where TAT is a constant set of actions that must take place always, and has a fixed
timespan, and MT is calculated as 3.4 hours + 0.68*FT.
Table 2: TAT components breakdown19 20
Major Action Time (Mins)
Land and taxi 10
Make aircraft safe 5
Shut down systems 2
Post flight inspection/debrief 15
Re-arm 50
Service 20
Refuel 30
Preflight inspection 15
Start engine 5
Final systems check 5
Arm 5
Taxi 10
Wait in queue 5
Take off 3
Total 180
There are two models of breaking up FT. One simply takes the total distance traveled (2 x
distance from airfield to target) and divides it by cruise speed (a constant for all fighters at 500 knots or
575 mph). This however does not accurately represent the situation of a CAP, since a fighter has to
remain on station for a period of time. 1.25 hours is commonly used as a CAP time on station so that is
what will be used here. An element worth mentioning here that will be looked at briefly at the end, but
does not play a major role in the models used in this paper is that of fighter fuel capacity and burn rate.
In the detailed Rand calculations, FT is broken up into CT “cruise time,” CAP time, and RT “refueling
time.”
19
(Stillion &Orletsky, 1999)
20
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)

13. 11
RT is the total time a fighter has to take to refuel (usually multiple times) while in flight, which is
in turn determined by fighter cruise fuel burn rate, fuel capacity and total fuel required for the mission
(again determined by distance). Technically, RT is roughly calculated as total fuel required per mission /
fuel acceptance rate. The total fuel required per mission is calculated by:
Total fuel = CT x cruise fuel burn rate/hour + 1 full internal tank for CAP operations +10% reserve
Number of refuels is calculated by:
Number refueling = (Total fuel required for mission – fighter fuel capacity)/fighter fuel capacity
At each refueling the time spent refueling is given by:
Single refueling time = maneuver to boom + fuel capacity/fuel acceptance rate
Maneuver time to the boom is approx. 2 minutes per refueling and is treated as negligible. Fuel
acceptance rate used is 3000 ibs/minute. Single refueling times are thus simplified to
Single refueling time (mins) = fuel capacity (ibs)/3000 (ibs/min)
Thus, the total RT for a single sortie can be calculated by multiplying the number or refuelings by the
single refueling time.
When SR calculations were run to find comparative rates for different fighters, it was found that
despite varying differences in fuel burn rates and fuel capacities, the SR per fighter did not vary
appreciably at constant distances from airfield to CAP. SR calculations for US fighters do account for RT
its effect is comparable in all of them.
Thus we have the full formula:
SR = 24 hours / (TAT + MT + CT + CAP + RT)

14. 12
Which simplifies to:
SR = 24 hours / (3 + 3.4 + 0.68((2 x distance to target) / 575 + 1.25 + RT) + (2 x distance to target)
/ 575 + 1.25 + RT
Table 3: Statistics on US fighter Aircraft21
Quantity Total Fuel Capacity
(ibs)
Internal Fuel
Capacity (ibs)
Fuel burn at cruise
(ibs/hour)
Exchange Rate
F-15E 219 35,500 28,728 5471.6 5:1
F-16 1018 12,000 7,000 3150 4:1
F-18 765 16,772 10,874 5133 2.6:1
F-22 183 18,000 18,000 8000 27:1
Statistics from US Air force Fact sheets: Fuel burn at cruise estimated by taking the max pounds of thrust
put out by the fighter’s engines x 0.7 ibs fuel burned per hour per pound of thrust at afterburner
“running wet” and estimating 1/6 fuel consumption on cruise “running dry” vs afterburner. Exchange
rates are taken from literature.
Having come up with the number of sorties that could be generated from each airbase
per fighter and having found that the numbers of sorties for any given base across fighters
comparable, I took the average of the SR used it as a representative number for a generic US
fighter launched from that airfield. Combat capabilities were also consolidated to create a
representative US fighter. The attributes of this fighter (weapons load and exchange ratio) were
comprised of the attributes of each of the 4 fighters in the proportion that they comprised the
US fighter fleet. The resultant US fighter had an exchange ratio of roughly 6:1 and a weapons
payload of 6 BVR missiles.
21
Statistics collected from various open source avenues.

15. 13
The SR generation formula was calculated for every single airfield usable for Taiwan.
When the airfields were grouped into a table, a companion table showing the average sortie
generation rate of an airfield in that group was also calculated.
Table 1: Number of airfields usable for Taiwan by class
Table 4: Average SR of airfields usable for Taiwan per given class
CAP is calculated by multiplying the fraction of the 24 hours that each sortie in the CAP
comprises and multiplies it by the number of aircraft at the base and the SR of
the base.
CAP contribution/base = 1.25/24 x base SR x number of aircraft at the base
CAP contribution/class = 1.25/24 x class SR x number of aircraft in that class of airfield
The total CAP that is able to be maintained thus is the sum of all the contributions of all of the
airfield classes that have aircraft stationed at them. You would multiply the total number of
aircraft in any given class by that class’s average SR and multiply by 1.25/24, combine with all
Zone A B (S. Korea) B (Japan) B (Taiwan) B (Other) C (S. Korea) C (Japan) C (Taiwan) C (Other)
I 0 0 0 4 4 2 1 8 2
II 5 13 8 0 19 3 14 0 38
III 3 0 8 0 1 0 15 0 9
IV 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Total 10 13 16 4 25 5 30 8 50
Zone A B (S. Korea) B (Japan) B (Taiwan) B (Other) C (S. Korea) C (Japan) C (Taiwan) C (Other)
I 0 0 0 3.0 2.5 2.2 2.6 3.0 2.6
II 2.1 2.0 2.0 0 1.8 2.0 1.8 0 1.8
III 1.5 0 1.5 0 1.6 0 1.5 0 1.6
IV 1.3 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 0 1.5

16. 14
other airfield classes for a total CAP. Care needs to be taken such that the number of aircraft in
a given class does not exceed the total capacity of the bases in that class (from Table 1). These
calculations will be used to derive the max CAP in the 8 illustrative scenarios found later in this
paper.
Level of US forces in theater tasked for Taiwan
There may not be any warning to the commencement of hostilities. The US would need
to shift air assets from around the world on a scale never before seen in modern war. It can be
estimates that there are approximately 274 aircraft stationed in the pacific between Japan and
Guam that can be readily tasked for Taiwan (the 15th F-16 fighter air wing in Osan AB, S. Korea
would not count for example). 2009 Rand postulates that in the opening volley of missile
attacks against US airfields, the US would lose approximately 49 aircraft, leaving it with 225 in
theater tasked for Taiwan22. How soon can the US get more fighters in theater? How many?
The largest and fastest mobilization of US air power in recent history occurred in the
events leading up to the first gulf war23, as chronicled in the Rand book “The League of Airmen”
In this book, Rand provides a graphic of fighters on station from the day of the deployment
order. To summarize, the first 5 days saw virtually zero fighters arriving on station. On day 5,
the first group of fighters, 100 total were on station. Then from day 5 through day 20, fighters
arrived at approximately a rate of 10/day. From day 20 onward, fighters arrived on theater at a
rate of 30/day until peak levels were reached. In the Gulf, approximately 420 fighters were
deployed. For Taiwan, it may not be unreasonable to expect the US to devote up to 1/3 of the
22
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)
23
(Winneford, Preston & Dana, 1994)

17. 15
available USAF to the mission. Approximately 728 fighters. Applying the same trends seen in
the gulf to a deployment of US fighters in the pacific theater, we could expect to see the
following force levels by day, accounting for the 49 lost initially, while not crediting them
against the 728 total. If one wanted to account for the 49 lost, one would simply cap the graph
at 679 aircraft and reduce the overall availability of fighters for sorties. The sortie and CAP
potential would change but the trends and relationships would not.
Figure 3: Estimated number of fighters in theater if deployment is ordered on day 0
Chinese airfields used against Taiwan, PRC attack strategy and Sortie Generation.
The 2009 Rand report provides an excellent foundation for analysis of the Chinese
airbases most likely used for sorties over Taiwan24. Using Google Earth and a helpful article by
the think tank Air Power Australia25, I estimated the total capacity of the air bases identified in
the Rand report. Underground bunker capacity was taken from Air Power Australia, total
capacity calculated by counting shelters, parking spaces and open tarmac (non-runway) and
24
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)
25
(O’connor & Kopp, 20110
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
number of
fighters
Day

18. 16
underground shelter capacity. The USAF parking layout, suggests that an air wing (96 aircraft) is
able to fit in an 810,000 square ft.26 space. All these elements combined to make the total
capacity of each airbase. In the 2000 Rand Report, the PLAAF commitment to the Taiwan
Mission was 864 aircraft27. I will use this as my assumed Red Force
Table 5: Chinese Air bases, capacities and SR’s28
Airfield Name Total Capacity SR CAP Contribution
PLA Fuzhou 131 3 11.3
PLA Zhangzhou 68 2.9 10.9
Plan Luquiao 64 2.6 9.8
PLA Quzhou 170 2.6 9.8
PLA Nanchang Xiantang 69 2.4 9.0
PLA changxing 63 2.4 9.0
PLA Wuhu 108 2.3 8.6
PLA Changsha Huanghua 57 2.3 8.6
PLA Feidong 103 2.2 8.3
PLA Suixi 96 2.1 7.9
PLA Foluo 84 2 7.5
PLA Hainan Do 190 2 7.5
Given a maximum total force of 864, I will roughly distribute 72 fighters per airbase,
which could generate the CAP contributions seen in the last column. Using the same rationale,
if the Chinese wanted to hold a CAP over Taiwan, they could support one of 108 fighters. We
could compare this steady state CAP against the various US steady state CAP scenarios,
however this would not likely describe the situation that will be seen over the strait.
Unlike US fighters, Chinese fighters over the strait can chose when and where to attack.
With extended flight times to the CAP, the US does not have the ability to alter its fighter
strength with enough timing to make a difference. The PRC on the other hand would opt not for
26
(Stillion &Orletsky 1999)
27
(Shlapak, Orletsky &Wilson, 2000)
28
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)

19. 17
a CAP, but to surge at as strategic moments to overwhelm the US deterrent capability, and
maximize the number of surviving Chinese fighters for interdiction missions over Taiwan. This
surge ability forces the US to have a greater CAP size to maintain the ability to inflict attrition
rates at the deterrent threshold.
To calculate this surge capability, we need to look at what is the absolute greatest
number of aircraft that a single airfield can put up into the air in an hour. To envision this, we
imagine that all of the fighters are sitting in queue waiting for takeoff, armed, fueled and ready
to go. When the order is given, how fast and how many do they get up into the air? If we look
at Table 2, we see that the only exclusive amount of time that a single aircraft has use of the
runway is when it is actually taking off. This is a process of 3 minutes per aircraft. This is the
only time that more than one aircraft cannot be doing the same thing. Using this logic, we can
surmise that in the span of an hour, a single airfield can launch 20 aircraft. Most likely, the first
hour of the launch is spent in a holding and assembling pattern for most of the aircraft, then as
a critical mass is reached, all the aircraft would fly together towards the front. This assembly
would be detected by US forces, but due to the delayed response times, they would not be able
to adjust force levels accordingly.
Using this approach, the 12 Chinese airfields being used against Taiwan can in the span
of an hour generate 240 sorties, or planes actively in the sky. An hour after the order for launch
is given, a force of 240 arrives over Taiwan. How often can this be done? Each airfield has a
sortie rate of 2 per aircraft, so the 24 hour time slot can be broken into 2 “windows” during
which the Chinese can chose how to disperse 864 aircraft over the strait. Technically, since

20. 18
China has a force of 864 fighters devoted to the Taiwan scenario, they could be able to surge 3
times per 12 hours (3 x 240). However, this would not be logistically possible except for the first
12 hour cycle. Each sortie takes approximately 3 hours to fly at most (1 hour loiter time + 1.25
hours on station + return to base). This means that if each aircraft would need to be able to fly
2 full sorties at surge levels per 24 hours, then each aircraft would need 9 hours to recover and
refuel. For a sortie duration of 3 hours, the on-the-ground time for each aircraft would be 180
minutes TAT + MT. MT for an aircraft flying for 3 hours is 3.4 + 0.68(3) = 367.2 total minutes
(8.32 hours) to recover. Each aircraft would need to be being serviced for the entire down time.
With 20 aircraft flying off of each airbase, and 9 hours needed for each to be turned around, in
order to maintain the ability to surge 3 times per 12 hours, the Chinese would have to be able
to service 2/3 of the strike force on the ground simultaneously. In a given 12 hours, after the
initial 12, 20 planes will be in the air, but 40 will have to be being serviced simultaneously,
around the clock such that the next wave of 20 planes is done being serviced every three hours
when the combat sortie returns such that a new sortie can take off. This is logistically
prohibitive even for the most highly trained and equipped air forces and is the reason why
surge levels are not sustainable at quantity.
If 40 is not possible to be serviced at the same time, then how many? If only a single
surge per 12 hours is used, then the time available to service a given aircraft before it is needed
to be operational again is greatly increased since one can go through 36 hours without needing
to reuse an aircraft. Instead of 9 hours available per aircraft, the aircraft needs to be turned
around in 33 (36 hours – 3 hours mission). If we have a returning flight of 20 aircraft with 8.32
hours of maintenance needed for each, that is a total of 166.2 maintenance hours needed per

21. 19
sortie. 166.2 hours per sortie / 33 hours allowed per aircraft means that now we can sustain a
surge every 12 hours as long as the airfield is able to service a little more than 5 aircraft at a
time29. From this I would conclude that it would be unrealistic to see 3 surges in any given 12
hour segment except for possibly the first 12 hours, after which there would have to be a
significant delay. A surge every 12 hours is however well within the realm of reasonable
expectations.
What does all this tell us? It tells us that the US could expect to see 11 of 12 hours with
minimal activity over the strait with a one-time surge of 240 aircraft. 2 surges can be possible
but rare, three surges would be unrealistic outside of the opening hours of the campaign. For
sustained operations such as supporting an amphibious assault, the Chinese would probably
switch to more of a CAP style of deployment at which the sortie strength drops to around 108.
Because the US will not know when the surges will be coming, it needs to keep a
sufficient CAP in place over Taiwan such that if the surge does come, there would be sufficient
firepower to inflict the deterring level of attrition on the 240 Chinese fighters. Additionally,
whether the PLAAF is able to maintain command and control to coordinate 240 fighters
simultaneously is unknown.
29
(Stillion & Orletsky, 1999)

22. 20
Calculating the demand for US CAP size: Acceptable Chinese Attrition rate and accuracy of US
BVR missiles.
Having calculated the maximum number of aircraft that the Chinese are able to both
sustainably keep and surge over Taiwan let us turn to the question of deterrence, The
framework that we are using to evaluate balance over the strait. Given a Chinese sortie size of
108 or 240, what determines how many aircraft the US needs to put up to deter that?
Modern air-to-air combat with extensive BVR use is limited at best. The statistics that
we do have are not encouraging, leading to some, like Air Power Australia to suggest that the
effectiveness of BVR missiles does not justify their cost30. While proponents of BVR missiles
claim 70%-90% Pk per missile31, historical data from the best trained air force in the world, the
USAF operating in the gulf, suggests the Pk per missile is actually an abysmal 5.2%32. Air Power
Australia is a bit more generous, calculating a theoretical Pk of 17.1%33, although qualifying that
this number is likely to decrease as time goes on. Why such discrepancy? The simple answer is
that it is hard to hit a moving target, especially when that target is a modern highly
maneuverable fighter jet. Put simply, an air to air missile achieves its kill by getting near its
target and exploding using its kinetic energy from speed and the blast to disable or destroy the
aircraft. It flies very fast (Mach 4) in order to chase down its target. However at this speed,
inertia makes it is very difficult to maneuver drastically. Any sharp turns results in the missile
losing an incredible amount of kinetic energy which it then has to burn more fuel to regain. The
30
(Mills, 2009)
31
(Allan, 1993)
32
(Picard578, 2013)
33
(Mills, 2009)

23. 21
basic plan for a fighter engaged by an air to air missile is to let the missile get to a fairly close
distance on a straight trajectory and then pull a very sharp turn in the aircraft, simultaneously
deploy decoys to throw off the targeting on the missile, hopefully cause it to lock onto the hot
flak instead of the fighter, and hit full afterburners and put as much distance between the jet
and the missile as possible such as to be able to pull off the maneuver again. The fighter
survives if either the missile hits the deployed flairs, is unable to re-acquire the fighter after the
fighter’s evasive maneuvers or simply runs out of fuel. Ironically, the safety and “standoff
range” offered by BVR missiles to the attacker greatly increases the survivability of the one
being attacked as well since he is now given precious seconds warning and has some time to
react. Recall, that inertia is proportional to the velocity of the object squared. As jets become
more maneuverable, able to take tighter turns faster, (or actually fly slower to take even tighter
turns and then accelerate faster) their survivability against BVR missiles increases, because the
inertia needed to be overcome by a fighter traveling at cruise (575 mph) or even Mach is
dwarfed by energy needed to overcome the inertia of a Mach 4 missile to change directions.34
The US has traditionally embraced accuracy and speed for its missiles, hoping to win the
fight with physics by making the missile harder to avoid. This has come at a design cost
however, US fighters like the F-16 and F-22 are not designed to carry more than 6 air-to-air
missiles, while the F-15 was originally designed for just 4. Russia has embraced a different
approach to the BVR problem. Instead of focusing on accuracy, it aimed to create highly
maneuverable platforms that can carry up to 12 air to air missiles that are fired in salvos35,
34
(Pikard578, 2013)
35
(Kopp, 2008)

24. 22
greatly increasing the Pk of any given engagement. The Chinese have adopted this strategy in
their Su-27 and Su-30 flankers.
The other messy variable is calculating just how much attrition the Chinese air force is
willing to tolerate. The historical data on fairly evenly matched air forces and the largest
attrition rates they have tolerated in air to air combat seems to hover between 6.8% during the
India-Pakistan War and 10% for Israel in 197336. For reference, the US has not seen attrition
rates above 0.76%. In WWII, US fighter attrition in air combat was 0.76%, and 0.65% over
Vietnam. China has no historical records to base their tolerance for attrition, however attrition
rates higher than 10% are operationally prohibitive in any extended conflict.
The other variables in the calculation are straight forward, the level of US CAP needed is:
US CAP demand = PRC sortie size x % acceptable combat attrition / (US BVR pk x BVR
missiles per fighter)
For this simulation, the US fighter is given 6 missiles. PRC sortie size is either 108 or 240, and
Chinese attrition tolerances as well as US BVR Pk’s are given as a range. The calculated US CAP
demands are given in Tables 6,7.
36
(Singh, 2013)

25. 23
Table 6: US CAP needed to inflict max tolerated level of damage (found down the first column) given a certain BVR accuracy (across the top
row), given a Chinese CAP of 108 fighters, and 6 BVR missiles per US fighter.
Table 7: US CAP needed to inflict max tolerated level of damage (found down the first column) given a certain BVR accuracy (across the top
row), given a Chinese surge of 240 fighters, and 6 BVR missiles per US fighter.
PRC acceptable loss rate5.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 8.2% 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 12.2% 12.7% 13.2% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 15.2% 15.7% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2%
6% 20.8 18.9 17.4 16.1 15.0 14.0 13.2 12.4 11.7 11.1 10.6 10.1 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.3
6.2% 21.5 19.6 18.0 16.7 15.5 14.5 13.6 12.8 12.1 11.5 10.9 10.4 10.0 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.1 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5
6.4% 22.2 20.2 18.6 17.2 16.0 15.0 14.0 13.2 12.5 11.9 11.3 10.8 10.3 9.8 9.4 9.1 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7
6.6% 22.8 20.8 19.2 17.7 16.5 15.4 14.5 13.7 12.9 12.2 11.6 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.7 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9
6.8% 23.5 21.5 19.7 18.3 17.0 15.9 14.9 14.1 13.3 12.6 12.0 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.0 9.6 9.3 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1
7.0% 24.2 22.1 20.3 18.8 17.5 16.4 15.4 14.5 13.7 13.0 12.4 11.8 11.3 10.8 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.3
7.2% 24.9 22.7 20.9 19.3 18.0 16.8 15.8 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.7 12.1 11.6 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5
7.4% 25.6 23.4 21.5 19.9 18.5 17.3 16.2 15.3 14.5 13.7 13.1 12.4 11.9 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.1 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 8.0 7.7
7.6% 26.3 24.0 22.1 20.4 19.0 17.8 16.7 15.7 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.8 12.2 11.7 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.0
7.8% 27.0 24.6 22.6 21.0 19.5 18.2 17.1 16.1 15.3 14.5 13.8 13.1 12.5 12.0 11.5 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.7 8.4 8.2
8.0% 27.7 25.3 23.2 21.5 20.0 18.7 17.6 16.6 15.7 14.8 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.8 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.4
8.2% 28.4 25.9 23.8 22.0 20.5 19.2 18.0 17.0 16.0 15.2 14.5 13.8 13.2 12.6 12.1 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.6
8.4% 29.1 26.5 24.4 22.6 21.0 19.6 18.4 17.4 16.4 15.6 14.8 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.0 10.6 10.3 9.9 9.6 9.3 9.1 8.8
8.6% 29.8 27.2 25.0 23.1 21.5 20.1 18.9 17.8 16.8 16.0 15.2 14.5 13.8 13.2 12.7 12.2 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9.0
8.8% 30.5 27.8 25.5 23.6 22.0 20.6 19.3 18.2 17.2 16.3 15.5 14.8 14.1 13.5 13.0 12.5 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2
9.0% 31.2 28.4 26.1 24.2 22.5 21.0 19.8 18.6 17.6 16.7 15.9 15.1 14.5 13.8 13.3 12.8 12.3 11.8 11.4 11.0 10.7 10.3 10.0 9.7 9.4
9.2% 31.8 29.1 26.7 24.7 23.0 21.5 20.2 19.0 18.0 17.1 16.2 15.5 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.0 12.5 12.1 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6
9.4% 32.5 29.7 27.3 25.3 23.5 22.0 20.6 19.4 18.4 17.4 16.6 15.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.3 12.8 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8
9.6% 33.2 30.3 27.9 25.8 24.0 22.4 21.1 19.9 18.8 17.8 16.9 16.1 15.4 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.1 12.6 12.2 11.8 11.4 11.0 10.7 10.3 10.0
9.8% 33.9 30.9 28.5 26.3 24.5 22.9 21.5 20.3 19.2 18.2 17.3 16.5 15.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.4 12.9 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.3
10.0% 34.6 31.6 29.0 26.9 25.0 23.4 22.0 20.7 19.6 18.6 17.6 16.8 16.1 15.4 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.1 12.7 12.2 11.8 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.5
PRC acceptable loss rate5.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 8.2% 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 12.2% 12.7% 13.2% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 15.2% 15.7% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2%
6% 46.2 42.1 38.7 35.8 33.3 31.2 29.3 27.6 26.1 24.7 23.5 22.4 21.4 20.5 19.7 18.9 18.2 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.8 14.4 14.0
6.2% 47.7 43.5 40.0 37.0 34.4 32.2 30.2 28.5 27.0 25.6 24.3 23.2 22.1 21.2 20.3 19.5 18.8 18.1 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.9 14.4
6.4% 49.2 44.9 41.3 38.2 35.6 33.2 31.2 29.4 27.8 26.4 25.1 23.9 22.9 21.9 21.0 20.2 19.4 18.7 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.9
6.6% 50.8 46.3 42.6 39.4 36.7 34.3 32.2 30.3 28.7 27.2 25.9 24.7 23.6 22.6 21.6 20.8 20.0 19.3 18.6 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.3
6.8% 52.3 47.7 43.9 40.6 37.8 35.3 33.2 31.3 29.6 28.0 26.7 25.4 24.3 23.2 22.3 21.4 20.6 19.9 19.2 18.5 17.9 17.3 16.8 16.3 15.8
7.0% 53.8 49.1 45.2 41.8 38.9 36.4 34.1 32.2 30.4 28.9 27.5 26.2 25.0 23.9 23.0 22.0 21.2 20.4 19.7 19.0 18.4 17.8 17.3 16.8 16.3
7.2% 55.4 50.5 46.5 43.0 40.0 37.4 35.1 33.1 31.3 29.7 28.2 26.9 25.7 24.6 23.6 22.7 21.8 21.0 20.3 19.6 18.9 18.3 17.8 17.2 16.7
7.4% 56.9 51.9 47.7 44.2 41.1 38.4 36.1 34.0 32.2 30.5 29.0 27.7 26.4 25.3 24.3 23.3 22.4 21.6 20.8 20.1 19.5 18.9 18.3 17.7 17.2
7.6% 58.5 53.3 49.0 45.4 42.2 39.5 37.1 34.9 33.0 31.3 29.8 28.4 27.1 26.0 24.9 23.9 23.0 22.2 21.4 20.7 20.0 19.4 18.8 18.2 17.7
7.8% 60.0 54.7 50.3 46.6 43.3 40.5 38.0 35.9 33.9 32.2 30.6 29.2 27.9 26.7 25.6 24.6 23.6 22.8 22.0 21.2 20.5 19.9 19.3 18.7 18.1
8.0% 61.5 56.1 51.6 47.8 44.4 41.6 39.0 36.8 34.8 33.0 31.4 29.9 28.6 27.4 26.2 25.2 24.2 23.4 22.5 21.8 21.1 20.4 19.8 19.2 18.6
8.2% 63.1 57.5 52.9 49.0 45.6 42.6 40.0 37.7 35.7 33.8 32.2 30.7 29.3 28.0 26.9 25.8 24.8 23.9 23.1 22.3 21.6 20.9 20.2 19.6 19.1
8.4% 64.6 58.9 54.2 50.1 46.7 43.6 41.0 38.6 36.5 34.6 32.9 31.4 30.0 28.7 27.5 26.5 25.5 24.5 23.7 22.9 22.1 21.4 20.7 20.1 19.5
8.6% 66.2 60.4 55.5 51.3 47.8 44.7 42.0 39.5 37.4 35.5 33.7 32.1 30.7 29.4 28.2 27.1 26.1 25.1 24.2 23.4 22.6 21.9 21.2 20.6 20.0
8.8% 67.7 61.8 56.8 52.5 48.9 45.7 42.9 40.5 38.3 36.3 34.5 32.9 31.4 30.1 28.9 27.7 26.7 25.7 24.8 23.9 23.2 22.4 21.7 21.1 20.5
9.0% 69.2 63.2 58.1 53.7 50.0 46.8 43.9 41.4 39.1 37.1 35.3 33.6 32.1 30.8 29.5 28.3 27.3 26.3 25.4 24.5 23.7 22.9 22.2 21.6 20.9
9.2% 70.8 64.6 59.4 54.9 51.1 47.8 44.9 42.3 40.0 37.9 36.1 34.4 32.9 31.5 30.2 29.0 27.9 26.9 25.9 25.0 24.2 23.4 22.7 22.0 21.4
9.4% 72.3 66.0 60.6 56.1 52.2 48.8 45.9 43.2 40.9 38.8 36.9 35.1 33.6 32.1 30.8 29.6 28.5 27.4 26.5 25.6 24.7 23.9 23.2 22.5 21.9
9.6% 73.8 67.4 61.9 57.3 53.3 49.9 46.8 44.1 41.7 39.6 37.6 35.9 34.3 32.8 31.5 30.2 29.1 28.0 27.0 26.1 25.3 24.5 23.7 23.0 22.3
9.8% 75.4 68.8 63.2 58.5 54.4 50.9 47.8 45.1 42.6 40.4 38.4 36.6 35.0 33.5 32.1 30.9 29.7 28.6 27.6 26.7 25.8 25.0 24.2 23.5 22.8
10.0% 76.9 70.2 64.5 59.7 55.6 51.9 48.8 46.0 43.5 41.2 39.2 37.4 35.7 34.2 32.8 31.5 30.3 29.2 28.2 27.2 26.3 25.5 24.7 24.0 23.3

26. 24
Using these tables, one can determine the necessary size of the CAP to deter Chinese
operations. These conditions are calculated assuming the US to have access to an infinite
number of fighters. What is the actual number of fighters that can be generated over Taiwan?
US Fighter distribution scenarios, maximum CAPs possible and likelihood of each with no
reduction in sortie generation rates from Chinese attack.
Using Table 1, 728 aircraft were distributed according to airfield capacity by type and
objective of the model. Table 4 was then used in conjunction with the CAP contribution by SR
formula (SR x number of aircraft in class x 1.25 / 24) to come up with the total CAP generated
out of each of the following scenarios.
Scenario 1: Max Scatter Sortie Generation Model
The first scenario looks at simply the greatest size of CAP possible to generate if 728 US
fighters are evenly spread out over every single one of the 161 airfields in the western pacific.
This is the model that would be most resilient to Chinese attacks because there are only 4
aircraft at most airfields and 15 at US airbases. This model would utilize airbases in S Korea, and
Taiwan and thus is not likely to be highly realistic. Additionally, with only 4 fighters per base,
the amount of repair and maintenance equipment that would be required for the fighters
would be cost prohibitive. The max CAP generated this way would be 71.1 fighters
Scenario 2: Max Scatter, No Civilian Airfields Sortie Generation Model
It is not considered professional to put the lives of civilians at risk to attack by staging
military assets next to civilian targets. Additionally, while civilian airfields have plenty of tarmac

27. 25
space, they may not be equipped for servicing military aircraft and securely storing munitions.
These would be highly vulnerable to high levels of damage from very few Chinese munitions.
The total number of usable airfields here is 68, with an average of 10 US aircraft at each. The
max CAP generated using only military bases in the theater is 73. Not only is it more pragmatic
not to use civilian airfields, but the generated CAP is also greater. However, this model would
also utilize airbases in Taiwan and S. Korea and would not be highly realistic.
Scenario 3: Max Scatter, No Civilian Airfields, No Taiwan, No S. Korea
Addressing the issues raised in the two scenarios above, this model utilizes only US and
foreign military bases excluding Taiwan and S. Korea. With 51 bases to work with, and between
14 and 15 fighters at each base, the max Cap would be 69 aircraft. This is probably the most
likely scenario if the objective is to most realistically maximize spread.
Scenario 4: Max Sortie, No S. Korea, No Taiwan
Eliminating S. Korea and Taiwan issue off the bat, this scenario looks at the CAP
generated by filling the non-excluded airbases with the highest SR’s to capacity as much as
possible before filling the next one. Within a class of airfield, fighters are distributed evenly
throughout the airfields. This strategy would use 10 airbases total, 4 foreign military, 3 foreign
civilian and 3 US airbases. The total CAP that would be generated from this would be 92. This is
a very respectable number, the only considerations being the aforementioned hazards of
civilian airbases along with the very high vulnerability from the close to PRC main land. The
entire force would be within 1000 miles of the PRC and more than 500 of those fighters are
within 375 miles. Any attack on bases here would result in high numbers of aircraft destroyed.

28. 26
The high potential loss rate for aircraft on the ground would most likely yield this strategy
unpopular.
Scenario 5: Max Sortie, No S. Korea, No Taiwan, No Civilian
While nothing can be done about the proximity to the PRC in this scenario, the CAP is re-
evaluated without the use of any civilian airbases. Using 4 foreign military bases and 3 US
airbases only, the max CAP generated becomes 88. While this is a very high number, and
generates the most sorties when accounting for political and practical access issues, the entire
force is again within 1000 miles of PRC with about half of them within 375 miles. Just as in
scenario 4, the high potential loss rate on the ground will likely yield this strategy prohibitive.
Scenario 6: Max Sortie, only US airbases (excluding in S. Korea)
There are no US owned airbases within 375 miles of the PRC. In an attempt to offset
slightly the risks of scenario 5, a scenario filling the three US airbases (excluding S. Korea) in
Zone “II” to capacity and putting the rest in zone “III” was assessed. Using these 6 airbases, the
max CAP generated was 75 aircraft. This model offers a 6 aircraft per CAP advantage over
Scenario 3, but condenses the aircraft onto 6 bases instead of 51. These 6 bases would most
likely prove very attractive targets for the PRC. What advantage gained initially by a greater
possible CAP, may never be realized due to attacks on the airfields.
Scenario 7: Safest Distribution
There is greater safety in distance. To compare against the other scenarios, two basing
arrangements assessed to be “safe” are evaluated. Not restricting access to civilian airfields, all

29. 27
of the fighters were distributed among all available Zone “IV” airfields to capacity, and the rest
were put into US airbases in Zone “III.” This operation would involve using one foreign military,
one foreign civilian airbase as well as 5 US airbases. The max CAP from this scenario was only
52. Because only 2 airbases that were not US owned, It may be more hassle than it is worth to
base aircraft from them. Especially when given the max 2 squadrons at a foreign civilian base.
96 aircraft at a foreign military base may be worth it. An additional airbase provides a level of
protection for the aircraft, while the 1.4 SR is higher than the average US SR in Zone “IV” and
only .1 SR below the average US SR in Zone “III.” The ultimate use or non-use of this airbase
would most likely come down to the US relationship with the host country. No S. Korean or
Taiwanese airbases fit the criteria for this scenario so would not be considered even if not
excluded.
Scenario 8: Safest distribution, USAB only
One way to assess if the foreign airbase in Scenario 7 is a benefit, it is helpful to
compare to the alternative: the farthest “safest” distribution given only US airbases. This
arrangement uses the 5 US airbases in zones “III” and ”IV,” filling “IV” to capacity. The max CAP
generated in this scenario is 53. The greater CAP size compared to Scenario 8 in conjunction
with the much greater ease of operations makes scenario 8 favorable. Possible Chinese attacks
on US bases given the high concentration of fighters in only 5 bases needs to be considered
here. The logistical efficiency from operating only from US airbases comes at a price of
concentration of targets.

30. 28
Scenario Summary and Caveat
At cursory glance, it seems that just a few scenarios seem most plausible Scenario 3 is
very appealing on several levels. The high level of scatter greatly reduces the vulnerability of US
aircraft, while the max CAP size of 69 is a very formidable number for the PRC. Being able to
deter the PRC for virtually any attrition tolerated and BVR Pk, but the logistical effort to enable
operating from so many bases is astronomical however. Maximizing sortie generation seems
unwise because of the vulnerability to Chinese attack. Scenario 8 is a plausible alternative to
scenario 3. Operating from fewer bases greatly eases the logistical burden of the mission; a CAP
of 53 is still formidable effectively dealing with most tolerated attritions and BVR Pk’s.
However all of the scenarios above ignore any reduction to sortie rates due to Chinese
aggression and also assume the availability of all 728 aircraft. There is nowhere near that supply
of fighters in the pacific at a given point in time. Comparing the max CAPs generated in the
scenarios above to the static force balance requirements outlined in table 6, the question needs
to be revised from “can” to “how soon.” If China’s goal is to invade Taiwan, it does not need to
hold air dominance indefinitely, just long enough for the amphibious assault to take place.
Analyzing CAP size over time
Using the forces available in theater from Figure 3, the average sortie rates and aircraft
distributions in Tables 1 and 4, the max CAP for each of the 8 scenarios has been estimated
over time as aircraft arrive on theater.

31. 29
Figure 4: Max CAP generated by Scenario over Time given full sortie production rates.
Now, given the added element of time, the models become much more powerful. Using Tables
6, 7 to determine the needed US CAP size, it is possible to estimate how many days it will take
the US to reach sufficient force levels given each of the different deployment strategies. If it
takes longer for the US to achieve sufficient force levels than it takes to land on Taiwan, then
the US cannot project sufficient force over the strait to meaningfully deter the invasion. At the
same time, Figure 3 gives an idea of how much advance warning the US would need of an
imminent invasion to have enough time to mobilize the forces necessary to deter the attack.
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAP
Day
CAP size over time by distribution, full sortie rates
Max sortie, no S. Korea, no
Taiwan
Max sortie, no civilian, no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter
Max scatter, No civilian
Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)
Max scatter, no Civilian no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Safest, only USAB
Safest

32. 30
Accounting for Chinese attacks on Air Bases and subsequent effects on CAP size generation.
Hitherto, all accounts and scenarios have not taken into account the action of the
Chinese to inhibit sortie generation by the US. Obviously in this situation the PRC would carry
out attacks through a variety of methods, including air strikes, ballistic and cruise missile attacks
and even possibly Special Forces operations to reduce sortie generation and destroy fighters on
the ground. This paper does not focus on the actual attacks on airfields, and is only concerned
in so much that these attacks will have some effect of reducing sortie generation rates. In
Rand’s 2009 report, acknowledging the difficulty of tying attack analysis to effects on sortie
generation, used a three scenario approach looking at a worst, middle and best case for
reduction in sortie generation. Rand stated that the SR’s on Taiwan and Kadena could be
reduced by a half at worst, a quarter at best and a third on average. I will use the same general
approach to model the effects of Chinese attacks. An additional assumption was made that the
Chinese would not attack civilian targets.
Table 8: modeled effects of Chinese attacks on SR. Values are % reduction in SR
Best Middle Worst
A B C A B C A B C
I 25 25 0 33 33 0 50 50 0
II 25 25 0 33 33 0 50 50 0
III 10 10 0 25 25 0 33 33 0
IV 0 0 0 10 10 0 25 25 0
The values chosen above are intended simply to be demonstrative and are not reflective of in
depth analysis and calculation.

33. 31
Figure 5: Effects of Chinese attacks on Max Cap Generated by Scenario
Figure 6: Changes in CAP by Scenario, given level of damage
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
No
Damage
Min
Damage
Medium
Damage
Max
Damage
CAP
Max CAP by Distribution and Damage
Max sortie, no S. Korea, no
Taiwan
Max sortie, no civilian, no
S. Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter
Max scatter, No civilian
Max sorti only USAB (no S.
Korea)
Max scatter, no Civilian no
S. Korea, no Taiwan
35
45
55
65
75
85
95
No
Damage
Min
Damage
Medium
Damage
Max
Damage
CAP
Max CAP by Distribution and Damage
Max sortie, no S. Korea,
no Taiwan
Max sortie, no civilian,
no S. Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter
Max scatter, No civilian
Max sorti only USAB (no
S. Korea)
Max scatter, no Civilian
no S. Korea, no Taiwan
Safest, only USAB

34. 32
Figures 5, 6 show us the resilience of the various scenarios to reduction in sortie generation
potential, revealing some key weaknesses. Where previously, Scenario 3, the max scatter over
military bases seemed like a very strong strategy, it turns out to be one of the most susceptible
to Chinese attacks according to this model. The strategy to simply maximize the sorties, utilizing
both military and civilian bases may have redeeming qualities in resilience to Chinese
aggression. The safest strategies of basing far away, while looking pathetic in comparison when
there is no damage, are virtually as viable as any other in terms of sorties generated with
increasing damage.
Ultimately, the most effective approach is to re-evaluate Figure 4, with respect to the various
levels of damage sustained.
Figure 7: Max CAP generated by Scenario over Time given Minimum Damage
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAP
Days
CAP size by distribution with minimal damage
Max sortie, no S. Korea, no
Taiwan
Max scatter
Max sortie, no civilian, no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter, No civilian
Max scatter, no Civilian no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max sorti only USAB (no S.
Korea)
Safest
Safest, only USAB

35. 33
Figure 8: Max CAP generated by Scenario over Time given Medium Damage
Figure 9: Max CAP generated by Scenario over Time given Maximum Damage
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAP
Days
Cap size by distribution with medium
damage
Max sortie, no S. Korea, no
Taiwan
Max scatter
Max sortie, no civilian, no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter, No civilian
Max scatter, no Civilian no
S. Korea, no Taiwan
Safest
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAP
Days
CAP size over time given maximum damage
to sortie rate Max sortie, no S. Korea, no
Taiwan
Max scatter
Max sortie, no civilian, no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Safest
Max scatter, No civilian
Max scatter, no Civilian no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max sorti only USAB (no S.
Korea)
Safest, only USAB

36. 34
While Figures 5, 6 give a much better job comparing the different strategies against
each other, Figures 7, 8, 9 give a rather harsh assessment of overall US capabilities when SR’s
are even slightly disrupted, especially when compared to the unhindered CAP generating
potential shown in Figure 4. For example, a CAP size of 30, according to Table 7 would put one
squarely in the middle of the BVR Pk and attrition variable spreads as far as size of a CAP to
deter PRC sorties. With unmolested sortie generation at the 100 aircraft surge on day 5; 6 of
the 8 scenarios were able to comfortably field such a CAP. Even with only minimal damage to
sortie generation rates, only 3 of the 5 scenarios were able to field a CAP size of 30. Of those
three, two of them relied on all of their aircraft being dangerously close to the PRC and the
third relied on unrealistic access to every airfield in the theater. Even with minimal damage, it
takes 10 days for the first truly viable distribution strategies to generate enough sorties. The
picture becomes even grimmer with increasing damage. With medium damage, it takes 15 days
before the first viable plan reaches a CAP generating potential of 30. At the highest damage
level, the US cannot generate CAP of size 30 for 20 days.
Conclusions
In analyzing the invasion of Taiwan, it is conceivable that the opening 12 hours of the
engagement can see up to 3 surges of 240 aircraft. This is unlikely to be seen otherwise during
any point in time in the engagement. It can be expected that the Chinese would be able to field
a CAP over the strait of Taiwan of 108 aircraft. This would most likely be done during
amphibious operations to provide air support. Other than that mission, there is no reason for

37. 35
the PRC to do this. The advantage held by the PRC is their ability to surge a flight of 240 fighters
over the strait at short notice in the event that air cover is needed.
The actual accuracy of a BVR missile is poorly understood, most likely it lies somewhere
between 5.2% and 17.1%. The willingness to tolerate attrition by the PLA is also not well
understood. Most likely it lies somewhere between the historical 6.8% and 10%. The number of
US aircraft theoretically needed to inflict such an attrition rate can be calculated. Because the
US does not have the ability to surge due to long flight times, there must be a CAP in place large
enough to inflict this attrition rate at all times.
The US’s ability to generate such a CAP is dependent on how the US chooses to
distribute its fighters. In assessing raw CAP generating potential, the participation of S. Korea in
allowing the US to base fighters there is not consequential. Similarly, the access to civilian
airfields does not seem to add a significant factor to the size of the CAP that is able to be
projected over Taiwan. The integration of civilian airfields into US basing structures seems to
have some merit only when military airfields are not allowed to generate sorties at their
maximum rate.
The chief question is not whether the US can project sufficient air power over Taiwan to
deter a crossing of the strait, but in how long it would take the US to assemble the force
necessary to do so. If we are to use the gulf war deployment as an example, from the beginning
of the deployment, there would not be expected to see any forces in theater for the first four or
5 days. It can be expected that the first wave of fighters approximately 100 in total would arrive
on day 5, after which the fighter influx rate would be approximately 10 fighters into the theater

38. 36
per day for the next 15 days. Then, 30 fighters per day until peak levels are reached. The peak
levels of deployment during the Gulf War were 420 aircraft. If the US choses to devote 1/3 of
the air force for a Taiwan contingent, it would take at least 25 days to do so and incorporate
between 679 and 728 fighter aircraft. Depending on the distribution and access available to US
forces in the theater, CAP sizes of largely varying sizes could be seen even though the same
number of aircraft would be being used.
Some models of distribution are much more susceptible to enemy aggression than
others. Even low amounts of enemy aggression can prohibit the US from establishing a
deterrent CAP for at least 10 days according to the most likely basing strategies. Medium and
high levels of aggression can push this timeline back to at least 20 days, possibly even more if
the US BVR accuracy is less than 10% per missile and/or the Chinese are willing to tolerate
losses greater than 7.8%. Some basing scenarios, such as the ones that base US aircraft as far
away as possible, while not seeming very impressive for sortie generation from unmolested
airfields, become very attractive options when the enemy is able to significantly hamper sortie
generation from closer air bases.
A maximum dispersion model of US fighter basing is a very effective method of
countering the efforts of the PRC at anti access in terms of being a valid means to project a
sufficient amount of air power over Taiwan. It is highly attractive because in the absence of
hardened aircraft shelters and airfields, dispersal is the most cost effective way of protecting
fighters on the ground. Servicing these dispersed aircraft would be a logistically momentous

39. 37
task. Additionally, protecting these aircraft scattered around the pacific theater will be a large
operation by itself.
The most effective way that the US would be able to deter Chinese aggression would be
to mobilize early. If the US can receive 5 or 10 days warning before the strike, that would be
enough to have sufficient aircraft to be flown into the theater to form a deterrent force.
Other Considerations: US Fighter losses.
Some of the must unreliable and inconsistent and speculative data that exists today is
on the exchange ratio’s for US fighters. Partly because they have never encountered fight,
exchange rates vary wildly. For the F-22, for example, rates vary from 6:1 to 27:1. Regardless of
what the data is, a simple set of calculations based on the possible exchange ratios of the US
fighter were done to get an idea of what sort of attrition the US may expect to see in this
conflict. The aggregate exchange rate that I got from the weighted average of the numbers in
Table 3 gave an aggregate exchange ratio of 6:1. A ratio of 10:1 and 24:1 were also used to
generate more possible casualty rates. If China’s willingness to tolerate losses is anywhere
above 8%, then the US could expect to lose between 1 and 4 fighters per surge. If one surge
happens every 12 hours, then the US could be losing between 2 and 8 aircraft per 24 hours.
This astronomically high loss rate for the US would significantly impair the US’s ability to build
up forces in the area (8 aircraft per day is almost cancel’s the arrival rate of aircraft in theater
from day 5 to 20). It may suggest that in the event of outbreaks of hostilities, instead of sending
our fighters to fight outnumbered and outgunned, it may make sense to wait until we have
sufficient forces built up before we try attacking. In fact, such loss rates would strongly call into

40. 38
question the value of our relationship with Taiwan. Is it really worth losing billions of dollars-
worth of aircraft?
Other Considerations: Fuel
Like a racecar, a US fighter jet requires a lot of help getting along even though it looks so
fast and sleek on the track. Not designed for long range missions, US fighters rely on extensive
aerial refueling to commute from base to the combat area. For instance, an F-22 flying on a
mission from Guam to Taiwan has to refuel 4 times in the course of the mission. Rand says that
usually, a fighter will consume a full fuel load while on a CAP. This means that fighters regularly
have to refuel right before entering the combat area and refuel right after leaving it. What this
means, especially for a major operation such as Taiwan would be, that there would have to be
enormous formations of refueling KC 135s on station just outside the combat area. To maintain
a CAP of 30 or more planes, the area right outside of the combat zone would have to resemble
an aerial parking lot as fighters arrived, got refueled, came off CAP to again be refueled, to the
head home (maybe even with another refueling stop on the way). These tankers are the life line
of the CAP, without them, the fighters would arrive on station just in time to run out of fuel and
drop like a very expensive paperweight out of the sky. Naturally, both sides appreciate the
vitality of these tankers. They have their own CAP to protect them. Speaking of which, where
does the US get the fighters for that mission? Another 1/3 of the air force? And where do they
base? Luckily for this paper, these are not questions that need to be answered.
While it is nice and all to be contending with a US CAP over Taiwan, most likely one of
the first and most vigorous missions of the PRC will be to wipe out or at least scare away this

41. 39
last US stepping stone that is single handedly enabling the US to project power into China’s
back yard. Recall that even if a Chinese surge of 240 aircraft eats 10% casualties before the US
fighters have to turn home because they have no more ordinance, there are still 216 fighters
that are now uncontested in the airspace just a short way from the refueling tankers. The
protective CAP around them is most likely not as large as the combat CAP over Taiwan. Even if
the Chinese fighters don’t manage to find and or shoot down the tankers, just scaring them
away puts the state of the CAP in jeopardy. The fighters on station in the CAP rely on the
tankers to stay up in the air, and enable them to go home; so do the incoming fighters of the
next element of the CAP who are running low because they have used up most of their fuel just
getting almost to where they need to go. In any way or form, disrupting, destroying or even
slowing down the US ability to refuel its fighters on the last leg of the journey could prove fatal
for the CAP. If the first surge is able to disrupt the tankers, then parts of the next element of the
CAP won’t be able to join the CAP since those parts cannot refuel and have to divert away from
the combat zone before they run out of fuel. This will make the remaining CAP weaker. What’s
more as much as new elements can’t join the CAP, the old elements have to bug out early since
their next refueling point suddenly became much farther away than they would have liked,
requiring more fuel to get there and thus less time that can be spent on CAP.
So vital is this objective that one can easily imagine an air war over the Taiwan strait to
turn into a cat and mouse game between large formations of slow, fuel laden tankers along
with their fighter escorts, and “seek and destroy” formations of Chinese fighters guided by their
own AWACS). The scariest element is that the more effective the Chinese are at putting
pressure on the last refueling point, the less CAP they have to contend with, the more

42. 40
resources that can be thrown at that objective. Tragically for the US, this will be especially true
in the early stages of the conflict when the US won’t have a significant presence there. If the
Chinese are able to knock out a tanker early, the setbacks to establishing, let alone maintaining
a CAP would be severe.
On a slightly different fuel related topic is the raw consumption of fuel that establishing
and maintaining a cap over Taiwan would require. In 2009 RAND report, it was said that
Anderson AFB supporting a wing of 96 F22’s in a 6 fighter CAP over Taiwan would run out of
fuel in 20 days with the fuel demands.37 The scenarios described above would represent keeping
probably the largest number of fighters in history in continuous action over an extended period of time.
All fuel would have to be shipped from CONUS or borrowed from our allies. While it is nice projecting
force levels in theater using spreadsheets and math formulas, it would be reasonable to conclude that
the limiting factor of US involvement in a conflict over Taiwan in duration at least, if not in scope as well
would be the limits of the logistics infrastructure that has to support all of it, chief among them, how
many planes can we keep fueled for how long.
Counter Arguments
This paper takes a novel approach at an issue that is inherently difficult to grasp, chiefly the
question of assessing air to air combat in the 21st
century. With very little to no data available in the
performance of any given fighter against any other given fighter in a modern day “dog fight” using
primarily beyond visual range weapons. From this uncertainty, has emerged two main schools of
thought, both of which have some glaring weaknesses. The first looks at “historical” data, tallies sorties
flown, enemies “engaged” and killed for the various fighters. While this is based on perfectly real and
37
(Shlapak, Orletsky, Teid, Tanner &Wilson 2009)

43. 41
undoubtedly accurate data, it overlooks the fact that no air force has given the US anything resembling a
fight in the last 20 years. There have been many enemy aircraft taken out on the ground or others
downed although no real “engagement” had taken place. This data looks really good and awards fighters
like the F-22 spectacular exchange rates like 27:1. Using this logic, some argue that in a confrontation
against China, the US could take on surreal odds and come out victorious. This seems extraordinarily
hubristic.
The other theory that has emerged to create a framework of groups of fighters encountering
one another tries to basically use the Lancaster Square law and apply it to ordinance (missiles) and use
weapons and weapon proficiency combined with their quantity to create a comparable playing field. By
this logic, the F-22 gets a drastically lower exchange rate of 6:1. This approach, while being the more
logical and rational does not account at all for the human element, and especially not for any kind of
networked combat element, where fighters working together can create synergistic effects that
individually would have been impossible.
I will not argue the merits of either of these as I believe they make up the two extremes of the
spectrum, somewhere in the middle of which lies the true way to model these exchanges. Some may
argue that one, the other or a third method that aims to compare performances of fighters head to head
is better than my approach of casualty tolerance vs capacity to inflict. I would argue that I have come up
with a more objective approach that does not rely so heavily on suppositions, but works instead in a
bigger picture.
I have chosen here to work with facts of war that are universal whether you are fighting with
sticks or stealth fighters. There is an aggressor who is willing to pay a price to achieve an objective.
There is a defender whose goal is to make the price too steep for the aggressor to pay. The one who

44. 42
best succeeds at his goal wins. Additionally, my approach acknowledges variability and has the flexibility
to account and react to the ambiguity of the factors without fundamentally changing the model.
Coincidentally, the roles of aggressor and defender can be changed using my model with
different parameters to yield different results, while holding the model constant. The key would be in
defining parameters, specifically what the cost willing to be paid is, how it is defined and what elements
can the defender bring to bear to raise that cost. In this case, if we were to switch roles, we could assign
the price willing to be paid by the US as the aggressor for victory in Taiwan is a certain number of
aircraft shot down (same as the Chinese price as it turns out, but with a different scale). We could then
use a similar model using Chinese BVR missile Pk’s and capacity per aircraft. If we were to do this, then
we could actually determine the willingness to tolerate attrition for the US. The conflict would then be
an analysis of how can one side raise the price of the other without exceeding its own limit to tolerate
loss. A conflict on any scale could thus be weighed and results determined without ever looking at direct
force on force comparisons.
By individually defining parameters and acceptable prices, we are able using my model to
actually compare two combatants who have completely different parameters of cost and acceptable
cost to achieve a goal, as long as there is some common element that ties the two together. For
example, if the US’s acceptable loss was not fighters shot down, but raw cost, the same kinds of
analyses (although more complicated) could be run to determine each side’s stakes in the conflict,
willingness to fight and tolerance threshold, compare them using the different parameters and still
determine what the balance will be.

45. 43
Consolidated Tools for Force Analysis
The following is a collection of all the resources developed by this paper that can be used
together to answer many force balance, and force deployment questions. These materials are found
scattered throughout the paper, here they have been assembled in one place for convenience of use.
The questions can be approached from either direction. If the question is something along the
lines of how long will it take the US to be able to generate sufficient air power over Taiwan, then the
first step is to select the parameters (or rough range of parameters) from a reproduction of tables 5 and
6 below, dependent on the state of the Chinese presence over the strait (CAP or surge). Then, having
acquired an idea of necessary US CAP size, select the appropriate level of inhibition on US sortie
generation rates (or compare different rates) from Figures 4, 7, 8, or 9 reproduced below, hold your US
CAP size constant on the Y axis and see where different kinds of deployment strategies cross that level.
At the point of intersection, you will have your day of deployment.
On the other hand, if the question is what kind of casualty tolerance must the PRC have, given
that my BVR missiles some value of accuracy (or flip which parameter to hold constant) in order to
balance a Chinese surge (or CAP) on the 14th
day of a full scale deployment using a certain deployment
strategy, under some level of SR reduction, then you would work backwards. Start with what CAP can be
generated given your chosen level of Chinese aggression and deployment strategy, given that CAP size,
you can then go to Table 7 (or 6), find your chosen level of BVR accuracy, find what your CAP is and from
that, deduce what level of attrition the PRC needs to be willing to accept for the situation to be
balanced.

46. 44
Table 6: US CAP needed to inflict max tolerated level of damage (found down the first column) given a certain BVR accuracy (across the top
row), given a Chinese CAP of 108 fighters, and 6 BVR missiles per US fighter.
Table 7: US CAP needed to inflict max tolerated level of damage (found down the first column) given a certain BVR accuracy (across the top
row), given a Chinese surge of 240 fighters, and 6 BVR missiles per US fighter.
PRC acceptable loss rate5.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 8.2% 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 12.2% 12.7% 13.2% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 15.2% 15.7% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2%
6% 20.8 18.9 17.4 16.1 15.0 14.0 13.2 12.4 11.7 11.1 10.6 10.1 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.3
6.2% 21.5 19.6 18.0 16.7 15.5 14.5 13.6 12.8 12.1 11.5 10.9 10.4 10.0 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.1 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5
6.4% 22.2 20.2 18.6 17.2 16.0 15.0 14.0 13.2 12.5 11.9 11.3 10.8 10.3 9.8 9.4 9.1 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7
6.6% 22.8 20.8 19.2 17.7 16.5 15.4 14.5 13.7 12.9 12.2 11.6 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.7 9.4 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1 6.9
6.8% 23.5 21.5 19.7 18.3 17.0 15.9 14.9 14.1 13.3 12.6 12.0 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.0 9.6 9.3 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.3 7.1
7.0% 24.2 22.1 20.3 18.8 17.5 16.4 15.4 14.5 13.7 13.0 12.4 11.8 11.3 10.8 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.3
7.2% 24.9 22.7 20.9 19.3 18.0 16.8 15.8 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.7 12.1 11.6 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.8 9.5 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5
7.4% 25.6 23.4 21.5 19.9 18.5 17.3 16.2 15.3 14.5 13.7 13.1 12.4 11.9 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.1 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.2 8.0 7.7
7.6% 26.3 24.0 22.1 20.4 19.0 17.8 16.7 15.7 14.9 14.1 13.4 12.8 12.2 11.7 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.6 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.0
7.8% 27.0 24.6 22.6 21.0 19.5 18.2 17.1 16.1 15.3 14.5 13.8 13.1 12.5 12.0 11.5 11.1 10.6 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.2 8.9 8.7 8.4 8.2
8.0% 27.7 25.3 23.2 21.5 20.0 18.7 17.6 16.6 15.7 14.8 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.3 11.8 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.4
8.2% 28.4 25.9 23.8 22.0 20.5 19.2 18.0 17.0 16.0 15.2 14.5 13.8 13.2 12.6 12.1 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.0 9.7 9.4 9.1 8.8 8.6
8.4% 29.1 26.5 24.4 22.6 21.0 19.6 18.4 17.4 16.4 15.6 14.8 14.1 13.5 12.9 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.0 10.6 10.3 9.9 9.6 9.3 9.1 8.8
8.6% 29.8 27.2 25.0 23.1 21.5 20.1 18.9 17.8 16.8 16.0 15.2 14.5 13.8 13.2 12.7 12.2 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.3 9.0
8.8% 30.5 27.8 25.5 23.6 22.0 20.6 19.3 18.2 17.2 16.3 15.5 14.8 14.1 13.5 13.0 12.5 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2
9.0% 31.2 28.4 26.1 24.2 22.5 21.0 19.8 18.6 17.6 16.7 15.9 15.1 14.5 13.8 13.3 12.8 12.3 11.8 11.4 11.0 10.7 10.3 10.0 9.7 9.4
9.2% 31.8 29.1 26.7 24.7 23.0 21.5 20.2 19.0 18.0 17.1 16.2 15.5 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.0 12.5 12.1 11.7 11.3 10.9 10.5 10.2 9.9 9.6
9.4% 32.5 29.7 27.3 25.3 23.5 22.0 20.6 19.4 18.4 17.4 16.6 15.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.3 12.8 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8
9.6% 33.2 30.3 27.9 25.8 24.0 22.4 21.1 19.9 18.8 17.8 16.9 16.1 15.4 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.1 12.6 12.2 11.8 11.4 11.0 10.7 10.3 10.0
9.8% 33.9 30.9 28.5 26.3 24.5 22.9 21.5 20.3 19.2 18.2 17.3 16.5 15.8 15.1 14.5 13.9 13.4 12.9 12.4 12.0 11.6 11.2 10.9 10.6 10.3
10.0% 34.6 31.6 29.0 26.9 25.0 23.4 22.0 20.7 19.6 18.6 17.6 16.8 16.1 15.4 14.8 14.2 13.6 13.1 12.7 12.2 11.8 11.5 11.1 10.8 10.5
PRC acceptable loss rate5.2% 5.7% 6.2% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 8.2% 8.7% 9.2% 9.7% 10.2% 10.7% 11.2% 11.7% 12.2% 12.7% 13.2% 13.7% 14.2% 14.7% 15.2% 15.7% 16.2% 16.7% 17.2%
6% 46.2 42.1 38.7 35.8 33.3 31.2 29.3 27.6 26.1 24.7 23.5 22.4 21.4 20.5 19.7 18.9 18.2 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.8 14.4 14.0
6.2% 47.7 43.5 40.0 37.0 34.4 32.2 30.2 28.5 27.0 25.6 24.3 23.2 22.1 21.2 20.3 19.5 18.8 18.1 17.5 16.9 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.9 14.4
6.4% 49.2 44.9 41.3 38.2 35.6 33.2 31.2 29.4 27.8 26.4 25.1 23.9 22.9 21.9 21.0 20.2 19.4 18.7 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.3 14.9
6.6% 50.8 46.3 42.6 39.4 36.7 34.3 32.2 30.3 28.7 27.2 25.9 24.7 23.6 22.6 21.6 20.8 20.0 19.3 18.6 18.0 17.4 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.3
6.8% 52.3 47.7 43.9 40.6 37.8 35.3 33.2 31.3 29.6 28.0 26.7 25.4 24.3 23.2 22.3 21.4 20.6 19.9 19.2 18.5 17.9 17.3 16.8 16.3 15.8
7.0% 53.8 49.1 45.2 41.8 38.9 36.4 34.1 32.2 30.4 28.9 27.5 26.2 25.0 23.9 23.0 22.0 21.2 20.4 19.7 19.0 18.4 17.8 17.3 16.8 16.3
7.2% 55.4 50.5 46.5 43.0 40.0 37.4 35.1 33.1 31.3 29.7 28.2 26.9 25.7 24.6 23.6 22.7 21.8 21.0 20.3 19.6 18.9 18.3 17.8 17.2 16.7
7.4% 56.9 51.9 47.7 44.2 41.1 38.4 36.1 34.0 32.2 30.5 29.0 27.7 26.4 25.3 24.3 23.3 22.4 21.6 20.8 20.1 19.5 18.9 18.3 17.7 17.2
7.6% 58.5 53.3 49.0 45.4 42.2 39.5 37.1 34.9 33.0 31.3 29.8 28.4 27.1 26.0 24.9 23.9 23.0 22.2 21.4 20.7 20.0 19.4 18.8 18.2 17.7
7.8% 60.0 54.7 50.3 46.6 43.3 40.5 38.0 35.9 33.9 32.2 30.6 29.2 27.9 26.7 25.6 24.6 23.6 22.8 22.0 21.2 20.5 19.9 19.3 18.7 18.1
8.0% 61.5 56.1 51.6 47.8 44.4 41.6 39.0 36.8 34.8 33.0 31.4 29.9 28.6 27.4 26.2 25.2 24.2 23.4 22.5 21.8 21.1 20.4 19.8 19.2 18.6
8.2% 63.1 57.5 52.9 49.0 45.6 42.6 40.0 37.7 35.7 33.8 32.2 30.7 29.3 28.0 26.9 25.8 24.8 23.9 23.1 22.3 21.6 20.9 20.2 19.6 19.1
8.4% 64.6 58.9 54.2 50.1 46.7 43.6 41.0 38.6 36.5 34.6 32.9 31.4 30.0 28.7 27.5 26.5 25.5 24.5 23.7 22.9 22.1 21.4 20.7 20.1 19.5
8.6% 66.2 60.4 55.5 51.3 47.8 44.7 42.0 39.5 37.4 35.5 33.7 32.1 30.7 29.4 28.2 27.1 26.1 25.1 24.2 23.4 22.6 21.9 21.2 20.6 20.0
8.8% 67.7 61.8 56.8 52.5 48.9 45.7 42.9 40.5 38.3 36.3 34.5 32.9 31.4 30.1 28.9 27.7 26.7 25.7 24.8 23.9 23.2 22.4 21.7 21.1 20.5
9.0% 69.2 63.2 58.1 53.7 50.0 46.8 43.9 41.4 39.1 37.1 35.3 33.6 32.1 30.8 29.5 28.3 27.3 26.3 25.4 24.5 23.7 22.9 22.2 21.6 20.9
9.2% 70.8 64.6 59.4 54.9 51.1 47.8 44.9 42.3 40.0 37.9 36.1 34.4 32.9 31.5 30.2 29.0 27.9 26.9 25.9 25.0 24.2 23.4 22.7 22.0 21.4
9.4% 72.3 66.0 60.6 56.1 52.2 48.8 45.9 43.2 40.9 38.8 36.9 35.1 33.6 32.1 30.8 29.6 28.5 27.4 26.5 25.6 24.7 23.9 23.2 22.5 21.9
9.6% 73.8 67.4 61.9 57.3 53.3 49.9 46.8 44.1 41.7 39.6 37.6 35.9 34.3 32.8 31.5 30.2 29.1 28.0 27.0 26.1 25.3 24.5 23.7 23.0 22.3
9.8% 75.4 68.8 63.2 58.5 54.4 50.9 47.8 45.1 42.6 40.4 38.4 36.6 35.0 33.5 32.1 30.9 29.7 28.6 27.6 26.7 25.8 25.0 24.2 23.5 22.8
10.0% 76.9 70.2 64.5 59.7 55.6 51.9 48.8 46.0 43.5 41.2 39.2 37.4 35.7 34.2 32.8 31.5 30.3 29.2 28.2 27.2 26.3 25.5 24.7 24.0 23.3

47. 45
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAP
Day
CAP size over time by distribution, full sortie rates
Max sortie, no S. Korea, no
Taiwan
Max sortie, no civilian, no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter
Max scatter, No civilian
Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)
Max scatter, no Civilian no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Safest, only USAB
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAP
Days
CAP size by distribution with minimum SR reduction
Max sortie, no S. Korea, no
Taiwan
Max scatter
Max sortie, no civilian, no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter, No civilian
Max scatter, no Civilian no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)
Safest
Safest, only USAB

48. 46
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAP
Days
Cap size by distribution with medium SR reduction
Max sortie, no S. Korea, no
Taiwan
Max scatter
Max sortie, no civilian, no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter, No civilian
Max scatter, no Civilian no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Safest
Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)
Safest, only USAB
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
CAP
Days
CAP size over time given maximum SR reduction
Max sortie, no S. Korea, no Taiwan
Max scatter
Max sortie, no civilian, no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Safest
Max scatter, No civilian
Max scatter, no Civilian no S.
Korea, no Taiwan
Max sorti only USAB (no S. Korea)
Safest, only USAB

49. 47
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50. 48
Stillion, J. (2009). Fighting under missile attack. Air Force Magazine, 34-37.
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Mills, C. (2009). Breaking the kill chain. Air Power Australia. (Mills, 2009)
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