LEADERS WHO MAKE A DIFFERENCE_ CRITICAL SKILLS FOR LEADING A DIV.docx

LEADERS WHO MAKE A DIFFERENCE_ CRITICAL SKILLS
FOR LEADING A DIVERSE WORKFORCE - CL.pdf
UV0414
This technical note was prepared by Martin N. Davidson,
Associate Professor of Business Administration. It was
written as a basis for class discussion. Copyright © 2000 by the
University of Virginia Darden School Foundation,
Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. The author thanks
Rachel Bagby, James Clawson, Joseph Harder, C. V.
Harquail, and Heather Wishik for helpful comments. To order
copies, send an e-mail to
[email protected] No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a
spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or
otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School
Foundation. Rev. 12/00.
LEADERS WHO MAKE A DIFFERENCE:
CRITICAL SKILLS FOR LEADING A DIVERSE
WORKFORCE
You can’t excel as a leader in today’s global economy if you
can’t skillfully lead diverse
groups of people, many of whom are different from you in
significant ways. As more traditional
organizations adapt to the demands of global business, the most
successful leaders of these
organizations are adapting as well. Many of the traditional core
competencies of leadership

remain central to the success of these leaders—articulating
vision, inspiring and motivating
subordinates, and maintaining integrity in relationships. But
the increasing diversity of the
people in these organizations is compelling leaders to grapple
with questions they didn’t have to
deal with only a generation ago: How do I make my
organization more diverse? How do I
leverage the benefits that are supposed to be a product of
diverse perspectives? Is there an
“uneven playing field” in my organization? How do I manage
diversity-related governmental
requirements such as affirmative action? How do I manage the
conflicts that arise due to
differences?
Leaders who are effective in organizations that value (or aspire
to value) diversity
possess a distinct set of characteristics and skills. This note
describes some of those
characteristics and skills and culls the best practices of several
leaders who are creating
competitive advantage from diversity.
Key Characteristics of Effective Leaders of Diversity
Ability to articulate the business case for diversity
Effective leaders embody and communicate a vision for the
organization that is
compelling for the members of that organization. In diverse
organizations,1 that vision has as
1 I will use the term “diverse organizations” to mean
organizations comprised of individuals who differ from
one another along a variety of dimensions including but not

limited to race, gender, sexual orientation, national
origin, age, and physical ability.
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part of its foundation an explicit understanding of the business
case for diversity for that
organization. In their classic article on diversity as a
competitive advantage, Cox and Blake
outline several domains in which competitive advantage should
derive from explicitly valuing
the diversity in an organization. These domains include: (1)
enhanced skill in entering untapped
markets; (2) innovation and creativity flowing from new
perspectives; and (3) increased ability
to adapt to changing environments.2
In order for an organization to truly leverage its diversity, that
diversity must position the
organization to manifest its mission and accomplish its goals
more effectively. Effective leaders
in diverse organizations articulate precisely how diversity will
help the organization succeed in
its core businesses. By analyzing their business in this way,
these leaders are prepared to
articulate the long-term benefits and challenges of the diversity
within their organizations.
Honeywell’s vice-president of Corporate Diversity and
Multicultural Business Affairs, Patsy
Randell, summarizes the importance of making a business case
for diversity:
We want to make sure we are thinking and executing from a
multicultural

perspective on all levels—internally, externally, domestically,
and internationally.
Multiculturalism recognizes that diversity is broad; it touches
talent, customers,
suppliers, relationships in general, and the work environment
and company
culture. These components tie this directly to business strategy
and practices.3
Commitment to fairness
Effective leaders in diverse organizations exhibit a strong
ethical commitment to fairness.
In essence, these leaders believe strongly that they want a “level
playing field” in their
organizations. Pragmatically, since they have defined the
business case for diversity, they
believe that a true meritocracy emerges when all people within
the organization have a fair
chance to contribute to the goals of the business. But even
more profound is the notion that if
inequities do exist in the organization, they must be eradicated
as effectively as possible because
it is the right thing to do. Leaders who champion diversity
invariably reveal an ethical
commitment to fairness that does not allow them to tolerate
easily the inequities that often
accompany differences in organizations.4
One successful leader, Henry B. Schacht, CEO of Lucent
Technologies, describes his
experience:
I came from very modest means, a single parent, and was given
the opportunity to
achieve the best, limited only by my ability. I think that a

human being should
2 T. H. Cox, Jr. and S. Blake, “Managing Cultural Diversity:
Implications for Organizational Competitiveness,”
Academy of Management Executive 5 (1991): 45–56.
3 Ibid.
4 J. R. Meindl and K. J. Thompson, “Justice and Leadership: A
Social Co-Constructionist Agenda,” Current
Societal Concerns about Justice: Critical Issues in Social
Justice, (New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1996), 137–153.
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have an equal chance at the starting line independent of their
monetary
circumstances and independent of their package size. What has
to be controlling
is your ability to do whatever the task better than the next
person.5
Commitment to fairness, such as that articulated by Schacht, is
grounded in concrete and
personal experience, not simply in an abstract idea. One
interesting observation about leaders
who manage diverse organizations well is that they often have
profound personal experiences of
injustice. Sometimes that experience comes vicariously as
when someone with whom they are in
a relationship is harmed.6 But an even more powerful
motivator is the personal experience of
being different and being mistreated at some point in life
because of that difference. Whatever

the dimension of difference, these leaders learn from their
experience of being different from the
norm.
Willingness to learn about specific dimensions of difference
Effective leaders of diverse organizations are educated about
the dimensions of
difference that are relevant to the people in their organizations.
This education stems from at
least two sources. First, these leaders gather data about the
experiences and perspectives of their
diverse employees. They accomplish this by attending classes
and training programs, conducting
personal research, and discussing critical issues around
differences with knowledgeable
individuals.
Second, these leaders cultivate relationships with people who
are different from them.
This process serves both to offer insight into general
information about the difference (akin to
straightforward educational discussion) and to create an
interpersonal bond that allows the leader
to engage the issues around difference in more depth. These
relationships are often catalysts for
leaders to learn about and understand the inequities in their
organization, as well to understand
the painful impact of these inequities upon the people in the
organization.
Ability to develop diverse members in the organization
Because they are experienced in creating relationships with
people who are different,
effective leaders of diverse organizations are able to develop

individuals who are different from
them with the same skill they use to develop individuals similar
to them. There are three stages
to this developmental technique: identifying promising
individuals, mentoring those individuals,
and actively creating a supportive environment in which those
individuals may thrive.
First, effective leaders find talent. They are able to do so
because they reject attitudes
that prejudge any individual as less or more talented based
solely on identity characteristics like
gender, national origin, or race. Rather, as part of their training
on dimensions of difference,
these leaders have identified some of the fallacies that hinder
fair evaluation of talent (e.g.,
women aren’t assertive enough to lead men), and they can set
them aside.
5 Personal interview with Henry B. Schacht.
This document is authorized for use only by Zachary Van
Rossum in 2017.
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But success in identifying talent does not stem solely from an
attitudinal shift. Effective
leaders also recognize that homogeneous organizations need an
influx of diverse members and
that one must look to diverse sources to find those members.
When an electronics company
sought to increase the number of African American engineers in
its workforce, its leaders tapped

Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs); a source
the company had not paid
attention to previously.
The second way in which these leaders develop talented
individuals is through
mentoring, the dynamic process between two individuals
consisting of activities and interactions
related to work, skill acquisition, and social or emotional
aspects of functioning and thriving in
the organization. Mentoring is an important process of training
and preparation that generates
successful outcomes, including increased salaries, greater
numbers of promotions, greater access
to resources, and higher levels of job satisfaction.6 Mentoring
across difference—choosing to
mentor a junior colleague who is dissimilar to the mentor—is
more difficult than mentoring
someone who is similar. The challenges of negotiating a
professional relationship with someone
who may have very different attitudes, values, and worldviews
are significant and the outcomes
can be disheartening. Protégés who are members of minority
groups in the organization may
leave the organization in spite of the mentor’s support, an
action that may leave the mentor
feeling unappreciated or betrayed. Nevertheless, effective
leaders take this risk because they
understand that when leaders mentor protégés different from
themselves, it increases the
protégé’s chances for success in their socio-political adjustment
in the organization.7 This in
turns furnishes the organization with diverse talent and
perspectives.
Third, effective leaders prepare the way for their protégés by

using their power as a
leader to influence the environment in which the protégé
operates.8 One savvy CEO, wary of the
prospect of his protégée trying to succeed as a single racial
token in his management team,
identified and persuaded another talented individual of the same
race to join the team. This
made the environment more conducive to success for both
individuals as well as for the entire
team.9 Although it could be argued that one more person of
similar racial background is an
inadequate remedy in this case, the example demonstrates the
leader’s awareness that situational
factors like size of the minority group, organizational climate,
and team norms can affect the
likelihood of success for protégés entering organizational
systems where the protégé is
distinctive.
6 G. F. Dreher and R. A. Ash, “A Comparative Study of
Mentoring among Men and Women in Managerial,
Professional, and Technical Positions,” Journal of Applied
Psychology 75 (1990): 539–546.
7 D. A. Thomas, “Racial Dynamics in Cross-Race
Developmental Relationships,” Administrative Science
Quarterly 38 (1993): 169–194.
8 B. R. Ragins, “Diversity, Power, and Mentorship in
Organizations: A Cultural, Structural, and Behavioral
Perspective,” Diversity in Organizations: New Perspectives for
a Changing Workplace (Thousand Oaks, CA.:
SAGE Publications, 1995), 91–132.
9 Personal communication from Richard Orange.

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Critical Skills for the Leaders of Diverse Organizations10
Effective leaders in diverse organizations have cultivated a core
set of managerial skills
that aid them in managing the diversity of their employees’
experiences well. If we were to
extrapolate from the examples discussed, six skills stand out as
critical to success in leading
diverse organizations.
Shifting frame of reference
Effective leaders of diverse organizations are empathic, and, as
was noted in the
discussion of learning about differences, they are skilled at
putting themselves in another
person’s position or shifting frames of reference. As a starting
point for building this
competence, you can attend events and engage in activities
where the culture and customs are
different from your normal ones. Some people experience this
when they travel to countries
outside of the United States, but you can accomplish such
immersion simply by attending a
religious service that is different from your own or look for
local events where the themes
emphasize the differences in which you are interested.
Listening effectively
The best leaders have outstanding listening skills. While there
are many ways to improve

listening skills, one approach is especially useful in cultivating
relationships across differences.
First, adopt an attitude of humility and openness in listening to
someone who is different. Try to
suspend the common habit of listening in preparation to respond
or argue. Rather, assume you
are about to be treated to a story. Second, when listening,
restrain from interjecting comments,
questions, or other responses until you have listened for a
period of time (an imperfect heuristic
is about 20 seconds, but each person must make the
determination based on the situation). When
you do ask questions, be patient and listen for a complete
response before you ask another
question. Sometimes, it is so exciting to learn about differences
that we openly display our
enthusiasm and curiosity. But, for those who differ from us,
those expressions of enthusiasm can
be overwhelming or off-putting.
Telling one’s personal story
All of the leaders described are skilled in talking about
themselves in a personal way that
reveals aspects of who they are along specific dimensions of
difference. A number of leaders
have spoken with passion about their lower-class upbringing
and how their class experience has
shaped their leadership style. Others have taken the opportunity
to talk about what it means to
them to be white, or to be male and to lead.
10 This list of skills is distilled from the set of core
competencies articulated by a consortium of consultants and
scholars, including Barbara Berry, Janice Eddy, Ann Akiko
Kusumoto, Richard Orange, Bill Page, Anita Sanchez,

Kit Tennis, and Heather Wishik.
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Effective leaders in diverse organizations are able to tell these
stories because they are
willing to be introspective about what the dimensions of
difference mean. Every aspect of
difference has social, psychological, and political implications
regardless of where we reside
along that dimension. There is a “race story” for blacks,
Asians, whites, and Latinos; a “gender
story” for men and women; a “sexual orientation story” for
gays, lesbians, heterosexuals, and
bisexuals. These leaders have taken the effort to discover and
elaborate upon their own stories
so they can talk about them with those they lead.
You can discover aspects of your story by researching your
place on a specific dimension
of difference in the same way you would research another’s
place along the dimension—using
books, articles, or the Internet. For example, if you are a white
U.S. citizen, you can examine the
scholarly work on whiteness in the United States as a means of
gaining insight into your own
whiteness.11 In addition, you can engage in personal research
by talking with family members
about your family history. Interestingly, people who have
embarked upon this personal research
often find family and friends are quite interested in talking
about these issues, and they want to
hear what you have learned.

Finally, you can explore how you learned about difference from
past experiences—from
family, friends, and institutions. For example, you can reflect
upon what messages were
received early in life about people whose religion differs from
your own. What did your parents
say? Your siblings? Your clergy? Identifying these messages
as they pertain to any given
dimension of difference is one way to discover your own sense
of identity along these
dimensions. This technique is especially helpful when you are
trying to understand your identity
as a member of the majority or dominant part of any given
identity group (e.g., you are a man
learning about gender, a white learning about race, a
heterosexual learning about sexual
orientation).
Separating intent from impact
Leaders in diverse organizations cultivate the recognition that
actions and behaviors in
which they engage may negatively impact individuals who are
different from them, even if the
leader had no intention of harming the individual. The leader is
able to reconcile the fact that his
or her comment or action may have had a negative effect upon
the recipient without experiencing
the recipient’s negative reaction as an indictment of the leader’s
sense of social awareness and
self esteem.
For example, one leader jokingly referred to his friend and
colleague as “girl,” a
terminology for him that was meant to convey collegial
closeness and platonic affection. He

meant it as a compliment. However, his female colleague
experienced the term as demeaning to
her professionalism and was insulted. The leader was able to
acknowledge the insulting
experience his colleague had, without feeling insulted or hurt
that his intended expression of
11 R. Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social
Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), x+289.
This document is authorized for use only by Zachary Van
Rossum in 2017.
UV0414 -7-
colleagueship was met with anger. He was clear that he
intended a positive message and was
open to apologizing for the unintended impact of his comment.
Moreover, he remained
committed to finding other ways to express his high regard for
his colleague.
Accepting feedback
Effective leaders are able to accept feedback about their own
behavior and modify that
behavior appropriately. Everyone, regardless of position,
improves his or her individual
competence by receiving and acting on valid feedback. Rarely
does anyone completely master
the intricacies and subtleties of intergroup and intercultural
differences, so the ability to change a
behavior that is dysfunctional in diverse settings is essential.

Practice enhances this skill. Ask trusted others for feedback on
your behaviors in the
presence of people who are different. It is best to have two
sources of feedback—one person
who is similar to you, and one who is different from you. This
structure can provide the requisite
amount of help you need to consider the feedback without
becoming too defensive to act on it.
Demonstrating courage
Finally, leaders in diverse organizations are courageous. This
courage manifests in two
ways. Invariably, negotiating difference in organizations means
various constituents in the
organization will dislike you. Each of the leaders described
above was willing to alter the status
quo.12 Moreover, in challenging others on issues that are as
sensitive as diversity can be, these
leaders make themselves unpopular.
But equally trying are difficulties in confronting our own
imperfections. No leader is free
from prejudiced attitudes regarding differences. Whether along
dimensions of race, gender,
national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other
differences, we all carry beliefs that range
from innocently embarrassing to profoundly hurtful to others.
Empathy, listening, and accepting
feedback help us in behaving more effectively, but we must also
be willing to confront aspects of
ourselves about which we are not proud.
Conclusion

Two important points should be made about the characteristics
and skills discussed here.
First, these are not simply skills for the leader who happens to
work with people who are
different along some obvious dimension. Even people who look
the same embody a vast array
of differences that, if managed effectively, can enhance what
happens in the organization.
12 M. N. Davidson, “The Value of Being Included: An
Examination of Diversity Change Initiatives in
Organizations,” Performance Improvement Quarterly 12 (1999):
164–180.
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Second, effective leadership in a diverse context is not a
competency reserved only for
individuals at the highest levels of management. Rather, each
of the competencies described
here is applicable for managers and team leaders trying to thrive
amidst diversity in their work
environments. Much is made of the importance of top
management commitment to engaging
diversity effectively, and there is no question that top
management buy-in is necessary. But in
most organizations, difference is engaged initially when lower-
level members of the organization
use the characteristics and skills described here to analyze how
work is done. It is the awareness
of problems on the margin that jumpstarts change.
Finally, consider that the one quality that pervades the greatest
leaders of diverse

organizations is that they are always learning. David Thomas
and Robin Ely wrote:
Leaders in diversity-valuing companies are proactive about
learning. They
encourage people to make explicit use of cultural experience at
work. They fight
all forms of dominance and subordination, and they ensure that
the inevitable
tensions that come from a genuine effort to make way for
diversity are
acknowledged and resolved with sensitivity.13
13 D. A. Thomas and R. J. Ely, “Making Differences Matter: A
New Paradigm for Managing Diversity,”
Harvard Business Review 74 (1996): 79–90.
__MACOSX/._LEADERS WHO MAKE A DIFFERENCE_
CRITICAL SKILLS FOR LEADING A DIVERSE
WORKFORCE - CL.pdf
making-dumb-groups-smarter - Sunstein and Hast.pdf
MAKING
DUMB
GROUPS
90 Harvard Business Review December 2014
Cass R. Sunstein is the Robert
Walmsley University Professor at
Harvard Law School. Reid Hastie

is the Ralph and Dorothy Keller
Distinguished Service Professor of
Behavioral Science at the University
of Chicago Booth School of Business.
They are the authors of Wiser:
Getting Beyond Groupthink to Make
Groups Smarter (Harvard Business
Review Press, 2015), from which this
article is adapted.
The new science
of group
decision making
by Cass R. Sunstein
and Reid Hastie
JO
SH
M
C
KI
BL
E SMARTER
HBR.ORG
December 2014 Harvard Business Review 91
have made decisions in groups. As the saying goes,
two heads are better than one. If so, then three heads

should be better than two, and four better still. With
a hundred or a thousand, then, things are bound to
go well—hence the supposed wisdom of crowds.
The advantage of a group, wrote one early ad-
vocate of collective intelligence—Aristotle—is that
“when there are many who contribute to the process
of deliberation, each can bring his share of goodness
and moral prudence…some appreciate one part,
some another, and all together appreciate all.” The
key is information aggregation: Different people take
note of different “parts,” and if those parts are prop-
erly aggregated, they will lead the group to know
more (and better) than any individual.
Unfortunately, groups all too often fail to live up
to this potential. Companies bet on products that
are doomed to fail, miss out on spectacular oppor-
tunities, pursue unsuccessful competitive strategies.
In governments, policy judgments misfire, hurting
thousands or even millions of people in the process.
“Groupthink” is the term most often applied to the
tendency of groups to go astray. Popularized in the
early 1970s by the psychologist Irving Janis, it has de-
servedly entered the popular lexicon. But Janis’s con-
tribution is more an evocative narrative than either a
scientific account of how groups go wrong or helpful
guidance for group success. Many researchers have
tried to find experimental evidence to support his
specific claims about how cohesion and leadership
styles shape group behavior, to little avail.
Since Janis produced his theory, though, psychol-
ogists and other behavioral scientists have built up a

rich base of evidence on how and when individual
decision makers blunder. This work has attained sci-
entific acclaim (including several Nobel prizes) and
widespread popularity thanks to best sellers such
as Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, Dan
Ariely’s Predictably Irrational, and Nudge (which
one of us, Sunstein, coauthored with the economist
Richard Thaler).
A smaller but nonetheless substantial body of
research—some of it our own—has focused on the
decision-making strengths and weaknesses of groups
and teams. But little of this work has trickled into
the public consciousness, and it has yet to have a no-
ticeable effect on actual practice. It’s time for that to
change. We aim to bring behavioral research into direct
contact with the question of group performance—to
describe the main ways in which groups go astray and
to offer some simple suggestions for improvement.
Why Do Errors Occur?
Groups err for two main reasons. The first involves
informational signals. Naturally enough, people
learn from one another; the problem is that groups
often go wrong when some members receive incor-
rect signals from other members. The second in-
volves reputational pressures, which lead people to
silence themselves or change their views in order to
avoid some penalty—often, merely the disapproval
of others. But if those others have special authority
or wield power, their disapproval can produce seri-
ous personal consequences.
As a result of informational signals and repu-
tational pressures, groups run into four separate

though interrelated problems. When they make poor
or self-destructive decisions, one or more of these
problems are usually to blame:
• Groups do not merely fail to correct the errors of
their members; they amplify them.
• They fall victim to cascade effects, as group mem-
bers follow the statements and actions of those
who spoke or acted first.
• They become polarized, taking up positions more
extreme than those they held before deliberations.
• They focus on what everybody knows already—and
thus don’t take into account critical information
that only one or a few people have.
Amplifying Errors
With the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and the
late Amos Tversky in the vanguard, behavioral scien-
tists have identified some common mental shortcuts
(known as heuristics) and biases that lead individuals
astray. The planning fallacy, for example, leads us to
underestimate how much time projects will take and
how much money they’ll cost. Overconfidence leads
us to believe that our forecasts are more accurate and
precise than in fact they are. The availability heuristic
SINCE THE BEGINNING OF
HUMAN HISTORY, PEOPLE
MAKING DUMB GROUPS SMARTER

leads us to seize on whatever springs most readily to
mind, because it is memorable or we recently experi-
enced it. The representativeness heuristic leads us to
believe that things or events or people that are similar
in one way are similar in other ways, too. Egocentric
bias leads us to exaggerate the extent to which our
tastes and preferences are typical. The sunk-cost fal-
lacy leads us to stick with a hopeless project because
we have already invested so much in it. Framing effects
influence our decisions according to the semantics of
how the options are presented. (For example, people
are more likely to agree to an operation if they are told
that 90% of people are alive after five years than if they
are told that 10% of people are dead after five years.)
For our purposes, the central question is
whether groups can avoid or mitigate these errors.
Experimental evidence indicates that they usually
do not. The psychologists Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin,
and Johanna Peetz have found, for example, that
the planning fallacy is aggravated in groups. That
is, groups are even more optimistic than individuals
when estimating the time and resources necessary
to complete a task; they focus on simple, trouble-
free scenarios for their future endeavors. Similarly,
Hal R. Arkes and Catherine Blumer have shown that
groups are even more likely than individuals to es-
calate their commitment to a course of action that
is failing—particularly if members identify strongly
with the group. There is a clue here about why com-
panies, states, and even nations often continue with
doomed projects and plans. Groups have also been
found to increase, rather than to lessen, reliance on
the representativeness heuristic; to be more prone to

overconfidence than individual members; and to be
more influenced by framing effects.
Both informational signals and reputational pres-
sures are at work here. If most members of a group
tend to make certain errors, then most people will
see others making the same errors. What they see
serves as “proof” of erroneous beliefs. Reputational
pressures play a complementary role: If most mem-
bers of the group make errors, others may make them
simply to avoid seeming disagreeable or foolish.
Fortunately, we have evidence that deliberating
groups can correct or reduce certain biases. For prob-
lems that have “eureka” solutions (the right answer,
once announced, is clear to all), groups do well even
if individual members start out biased. Groups are
also better than individuals at overcoming egocen-
tric bias. An individual will focus on his own tastes—
what he likes and what he doesn’t. If he consults
with others, he is likely to learn that his tastes are
idiosyncratic. In such cases, group deliberation sup-
plies an important corrective. Note that we’re less
apt to get that corrective if the group consists of like-
minded people. The influence of the availability heu-
ristic, too, is slightly reduced in groups. Individual
members may each rely on “what comes to mind,”
but they are likely to have different memories, yield-
ing a more representative sample at the group level.
The larger point, however, is that many individual
biases are not systematically corrected at the group
level and often get worse. The mechanisms by which
errors are compounded can usually be found in the
other three problems of group decision making.

Cascading to the Wrong Answer
The human brain may be wired from birth to syn-
chronize with and imitate other people. It is no
exaggeration to say that herding is a fundamental
behavior of human groups. When it comes to group
decisions and information flow, the favored term
among social scientists is “cascade”—a small trickle
in one direction that soon becomes a flood.
Consider a brilliant study of music downloads by
the sociologists Matthew Salganik, Peter Dodds, and
Idea in Brief
THE PROBLEM
Groups often fail to live up to their potential
as decision-making bodies. Instead of
aggregating the knowledge and wisdom of
their members, they end up making bigger
errors than individuals would.
WHY IT HAPPENS
Group members take informational signals
from what others say, even when the
information is wrong or misleading, while
reputational pressures can cause them
to silence themselves or change their views
in order to fit in. As a result, groups often
amplify individual errors, stampede
toward bad decisions, foment polarization
and extremism, and ignore information that
isn’t already widely held.
THE SOLUTION
Leaders can structure group deliberations
to make them more likely to succeed.

One very simple way is to let others speak
first. Another is to assign specific roles
or areas of expertise to members of the
group. The key is encouraging individuals
to share their diverse knowledge rather
than suppress it.
HBR.ORG
Duncan Watts. They allowed test subjects to listen
to and download one or more of 72 songs by new
bands. In the control group, individuals were told
nothing about what others had downloaded or liked
and were left to make independent judgments. In
other groups, the participants could see how many
people had previously downloaded particular songs.
The researchers were testing how much difference it
made, in terms of ultimate numbers of downloads, if
people could see the behavior of others.
It made a huge difference. Although the worst
songs (as established by the control group) never
ended up at the very top, and the best songs never at
the very bottom, essentially anything else could hap-
pen. If a song benefited from a burst of early down-
loads, it might do quite well. Without that benefit, it
might be a failure. And as the researchers later found,
these effects occurred even if they lied to the test
subjects about which songs were downloaded a lot.
If a project, a product, a business, a politician, or
a cause gets a lot of support early on, it can win over

a group even if it would have failed otherwise. Many
groups end up thinking that their ultimate conver-
gence on a shared view was inevitable. Beware of that
thought. The convergence may well be an artifact of
who was the first to speak—and hence of what we
might call the architecture of the group’s discussions.
Two kinds of cascades—informational and repu-
tational—correspond to our two main sources of
group error. In informational cascades, people si-
lence themselves out of deference to the information
conveyed by others. In reputational cascades, they
silence themselves to avoid the opprobrium of others.
Here’s an example of an informational cascade
in jury deliberations, which has important implica-
tions for business. One of us (Hastie) has conducted
dozens of mock-jury studies with thousands of vol-
unteer jurors, many of them from big-city jury pools.
In these studies the volunteers privately write down
their preferred verdicts before deliberations begin
and indicate how confident they are in their judg-
ments. Deliberations then start, as they often do in
real trials, with a straw vote to see where everyone
stands. The vote circles the jury table and frequently
begins with a small set of two or three jurors who
favor, with increasing confidence, the same verdict.
In one mock trial, jurors 1, 2, and 3 endorsed a
verdict of second-degree murder both privately and
in the straw vote. Juror 4 had voted not guilty and
indicated the highest level of confidence in his choice
on the pre-deliberation private ballot.
What did juror 4 do when confronted
with three second-degree murder ver-

dicts? He paused for a second and then
said, “Second degree.” Juror 7, an un-
decided vote, suddenly spoke up and
asked, “Why second degree?” The re-
searchers saw a deer-in-the-headlights
expression flit across juror 4’s face be-
fore he replied, “Oh, it’s just obviously
second degree.” We have no doubt that
similar scenarios play out every day in
jury rooms, boardrooms, and confer-
ence rooms all over the world.
A reputational cascade has a differ-
ent dynamic. Group members think
they know what is right, but they
nonetheless go along with the group
in order to maintain the good opin-
ion of others. Suppose, for example,
that Albert suggests that his compa-
ny’s new project is likely to succeed.
Barbara is not confident that he’s right,
but she concurs because she wishes
Many groups
end up
thinking that
their ultimate
convergence on
a shared view
was inevitable.
Beware of that
thought.

not to seem ignorant, adversarial, or skeptical. If
Albert and Barbara seem to agree that the project will
go well, Cynthia not only won’t contradict them pub-
licly but might even appear to share their judgment—
not because she believes it to be correct (she doesn’t),
but because she doesn’t want to face their hostility
or lose their good opinion. Once Albert, Barbara, and
Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their col-
league David will be most reluctant to contradict
them, even if he’s pretty sure they’re wrong and has
excellent reasons for that belief. (Incipient evidence
indicates that women are especially likely to self-
censor during discussions of stereotypically male
subjects, such as sports, and that men are especially
likely to self-censor during discussions of stereotypi-
cally female subjects, such as fashion. In both cases,
groups lose valuable information.)
“Political correctness,” a term much used by the
political right in the 1990s, is hardly limited to left-
leaning academic institutions. In both business and
government there is often a clear sense that a certain
point of view is the proper one and that those who
question or reject it, even for purposes of discussion,
do so at their peril. They are viewed as “difficult,”
“not part of the team,” or, in extreme cases, as misfits.
The group members in the examples above are, in
a sense, entirely rational. They care about their repu-
tations, but there’s nothing irrational about that. As
noted, however, people use heuristics, which can
lead them astray, and are subject to biases. For the

purposes of understanding how cascade effects
work, the most important heuristic involves avail-
ability: A vivid idea or example moves rapidly from
one person to another, eventually producing a wide-
spread belief within a group and possibly a city, a
state, or even a nation.
In the area of risk, availability cascades are com-
mon. A particular event—involving a dangerous pes-
ticide, a hazardous waste dump, a nuclear power ac-
cident, an act of terrorism—may become well-known
to the group, even iconic. If so, it will alter members’
perceptions of a process, a product, or an activity.
Availability cascades are familiar in business, too.
Reports of a success or a failure may spread like wild-
fire within or across companies, leading to judgments
about other, apparently similar events or products. If
a movie (Star Wars?), a television show (The Walking
Dead?), or a book (involving Harry Potter?) does well,
businesses will react strongly, eagerly looking for a
proposal or a project that seems similar.
A by-product of availability is “associative block-
ing” or “collaborative fixation,” whereby strong ideas
block the recollection of other information. This phe-
nomenon is a big problem when a group sets itself the
task of generating creative solutions. The innovative
thinking of individual members is suppressed by the
powerful ideas generated by other members.
In the actual world of group decision making,
of course, people may not know whether other
members’ statements arise from independent in-
formation, an informational cascade, reputational
pressures, or the availability heuristic. They often
overestimate the extent to which the views of others

are based on independent information. Confident
(but wrong) group decisions are a result.
Polarizing Groups
Polarization is a frequent pattern with deliberating
groups. It has been found in hundreds of studies in
more than a dozen countries. We found it in dramatic
To examine the phenomenon of group polarization, the two of
us (along with the
social scientist David Schkade) created an experiment in group
deliberation—
one that, we believe, accurately reflects much deliberation in
the real world.
We recruited citizens from two Colorado cities and assembled
them in small
groups (usually six people), all from the same city. The groups
were asked to
deliberate on three of the most contested issues of the time:
climate change,
affirmative action, and same-sex civil unions. The two cities
were Boulder,
known by its voting patterns to be predominantly liberal, and
Colorado
Springs, known by its voting patterns to be predominantly
conservative. We
did a reality check on the participants before the experiment
started to
ensure that the Boulder residents were in fact left of center and
the Colorado
Springs residents were right of center.
Group members were asked first to record their views
individually and
anonymously and then to deliberate together in an effort to

reach a group
decision. After the deliberations the participants were again
asked to record
their views individually and anonymously. Here’s what we
found:
1 People from Boulder became a lot more liberal, and people
from Colorado Springs became a lot more conservative. Not
only were
the group “verdicts” more extreme than the pre-deliberation
averages
of group members, but the anonymous views of individual
members
became more extreme as well.
2 Deliberation decreased the diversity of opinion among group
members. Before the groups started to deliberate, many of them
showed considerable divergence in individual opinions.
Discussion
brought liberals in line with one another and conservatives in
line with
one another. After a brief period of discussion, group members
showed
a lot less variation in the anonymous expression of their private
views.
3 Deliberation sharply increased the disparities between the
views of Boulder citizens and Colorado Springs citizens. Before
deliberation,
many people’s opinions overlapped between the two cities.
After
deliberation, group dynamics left liberals and conservatives
much
more sharply divided.
A Tale of Two Cities

HBR.ORG
form when we conducted an experiment in which
residents of two Colorado cities discussed their po-
litical beliefs (see the sidebar “A Tale of Two Cities”).
The earliest experiments on the polarizing effects
of deliberation involved risk-taking behavior, with
a clear finding that people who are initially inclined
to take risks become still more so after they deliber-
ate with one another. (Examples of risky decisions
include accepting a new job, investing in a foreign
country, escaping from a prisoner-of-war camp, and
running for political office.) On the basis of this evi-
dence the conventional wisdom became that group
deliberation produced a systematic “risky shift.”
Later studies called this conclusion into ques-
tion—and created a puzzle. On many of the same
issues on which Americans made a risky shift,
Taiwanese participants made a cautious shift. Even
among American participants, deliberation some-
times produced cautious shifts. Cautious shifts
took place most often in decisions about whether to
marry and whether to board a plane despite severe
abdominal pain.
What explains these unruly findings? As the psy-
chologists Serge Moscovici and Marisa Zavalloni
discovered decades ago, members of a deliberating
group will move toward more-extreme points on

the scale (measured by reference to the initial me-
dian point). When members are initially disposed
toward risk taking, a risky shift is likely. When they
are initially disposed toward caution, a cautious shift
is likely. A finding of special importance for business
is that group polarization occurs for matters of fact
as well as issues of value. Suppose people are asked
how likely it is, on a scale of zero to eight, that a prod-
uct will sell a certain number of units in Europe in
the next year. If the pre-deliberation median is five,
the group judgment will tend to go up; if it’s three,
the group judgment will tend to go down.
Even federal judges—experts in the law and sup-
posedly neutral—are susceptible to group polariza-
tion. Research by one of us (Sunstein, along with
David Schkade, Lisa Ellman, and Andres Sawicki)
has found that both Democratic and Republican
appointees show far more ideological voting pat-
terns when sitting with other judges appointed by
a president of the same party. If you want to know
how an appellate judge will vote in an ideologically
contested case, you might want to find out whether
she was appointed by a Republican or a Democratic
president. It’s a pretty good predictor. But in many
Leaders can
refuse to take
a firm position
at the outset,
thus making
space for more
information
to emerge.
areas of the law, an even better predic-

tor is who appointed the other judges
on the panel.
Why does group polarization occur?
There are three principal reasons:
The first and most important in-
volves informational signals—but with
a few twists. Group members pay at-
tention to the arguments made by other
group members. Arguments in any
group with an initial predisposition will
inevitably be skewed in the direction of
that predisposition. As a statistical mat-
ter, the arguments favoring the initial
position will be more numerous than
those pointing in another direction.
Individuals will have thought or heard
of some but not all the arguments that
emerge from group deliberation. Thus
deliberation will naturally lead people
toward a more extreme point in line
with what they initially believed.
The second reason involves repu-
tation again. As we have seen, people
want to be perceived favorably by
other group members. Sometimes their publicly
stated views are a function of how they want to

present themselves. Once they hear what others be-
lieve, they will adjust their positions at least slightly
in the direction of the dominant position in order to
preserve their self-presentation.
The third reason stresses the close links among
three factors: confidence, extremism, and corrobo-
ration by others. When people lack confidence, they
tend to be moderate. The great American judge
Learned Hand once said, “The spirit of liberty is the
spirit which is not too sure that it is right.” As people
gain confidence, they usually become more extreme
in their beliefs, because a significant moderating fac-
tor—their own uncertainty about whether they are
right—has been eliminated. The agreement of oth-
ers tends to increase confidence and thus extremism.
Focusing on “What Everybody Knows”
Our last group problem may be the most interesting
of all. Suppose a group has a great deal of informa-
tion—enough to produce the unambiguously right
outcome if that information is elicited and properly
aggregated. Even so, the group will not perform well
if its members emphasize broadly shared informa-
tion while neglecting information that is held by one
or a few. Countless studies demonstrate that this re-
grettable result is highly likely.
“Hidden profiles” is the technical term for accurate
understandings that groups could but do not achieve.
Hidden profiles are a product of the “common knowl-
edge effect,” whereby information held by all group
members has more influence on group judgments
than information held by only a few. The most obvi-
ous explanation of the effect is that common knowl-
edge is more likely to be communicated to the group.

But faulty informational signals play a big role as well.
Consider a study by Ross Hightower and Lutfus
Sayeed on how groups make personnel decisions.
Résumés for three candidates for the position of mar-
keting manager were placed before three group mem-
bers. The experimenters rigged the résumés so that
one applicant was clearly the best for the job. But each
test subject was given a packet of information contain-
ing only a subset of attributes from the résumés.
Almost none of the deliberating groups made
what would have been, if all the information were
considered, conspicuously the right choice. The win-
ning candidates tended to be those about whom all
three test subjects were given positive information.
Negative information about the winner and positive
information about the losers (revealed to only one
or two group members) did not reach the full group.
While many hidden-profile experiments involve
volunteers from college courses, similar results
have been found among real-world managers. In a
study of hiring by high-level executives conducted
by Susanne Abele, Garold Stasser, and Sandra I.
Vaughan-Parsons, the experimenters did not con-
trol the information the executives had about the
various candidates; instead, the executives did their
own information searches. As a result, some infor-
mation was known to all, some was shared but not
by all, and some was held by only one person.
The finding? Common information had a dispro-
portionately large impact on discussions and conclu-
sions. The executives gave disproportionately little

weight to valuable information held by one person
or a few, and as a result made bad decisions.
The study also found that some group members
are “cognitively central,” in that their knowledge is
held by many other group members, while other
group members are “cognitively peripheral,” in that
their information is uniquely held. To function well,
groups need to take advantage of cognitively periph-
eral people. But in most groups, cognitively central
people have a disproportionate influence on dis-
cussion. A simple explanation for this is that group
members prefer to hear information that is com-
monly held—and prefer to hear people who have
such information. Cognitively central people are
thus accorded high levels of credibility, whereas cog-
nitively peripheral people are accorded low levels.
Making Groups Wiser
A central goal in group decision making should be to
ensure that groups aggregate the information their
members actually have and don’t let faulty informa-
tional signals and reputational pressures get in the
way. Here are six ways to achieve that goal, starting
with the simplest:
Silence the leader. Leaders often promote self-
censorship by expressing their own views early, thus
discouraging disagreement. Leaders and high-status
members can do groups a big service by indicating a
willingness and a desire to hear uniquely held infor-
mation. They can also refuse to take a firm position
at the outset and in that way make space for more
information to emerge. Many studies have found
that members of low-status groups—including

HBR.ORG
less-educated people, African-Americans, and
sometimes women—have less influence within de-
liberating groups (and may self-silence). Leaders
who model an open mind and ask for candid opin-
ions can reduce this problem.
“Prime” critical thinking. We have seen that
when people silence themselves in deliberating
groups, it is often out of a sense that they will be pun-
ished for disclosing information that runs counter
to the group’s inclination. But social norms are not
set in stone. Social scientists have done a lot of work
on the importance of “priming”—that is, triggering
some thought or association in such a way as to af-
fect people’s choices and behavior. In experiments
on group decision making, engaging participants in a
prior task that involves either “getting along” or “crit-
ical thinking” has been shown to have a big impact.
When people are given a “getting along” task, they
shut up. When given a “critical thinking” task, they
are far more likely to disclose what they know. So if
the leader of a group encourages information disclo-
sure from the beginning, even if it goes against the
grain, members will probably do less self-silencing.
Reward group success. People often keep si-
lent because they receive only a fraction of the ben-
efits of disclosure. Careful experiments have shown
that incentives can be restructured to reward group
success—and hence to encourage the disclosure of

information. Cascades are far less likely when each
individual knows that he has nothing to gain from
a correct individual decision and everything to gain
from a correct group decision. The general lesson is
that identification with the group’s success is more
likely to ensure that people will say what they know,
regardless of whether it fits “the party line.” (This, by
the way, is one reason that prediction markets work
and deserve careful attention.)
Assign roles. To understand one especially
promising strategy, imagine a deliberating group
consisting of people with specific roles that are
known and appreciated by all members. One person
might have medical expertise; another might be a
lawyer; a third might know about public relations; a
fourth might be a statistician. In such a group, sen-
sible information aggregation would be far more
likely, simply because every member would know
that each of the others had something to contrib-
ute. Indeed, experiments have found that the bias
in favor of shared information is reduced when test
subjects are openly assigned specific roles. If a group
wants to obtain the information that its members
hold, they should be told before deliberations begin
that each has a different and relevant role—or at least
distinctive information to contribute.
Appoint a devil’s advocate. If hidden profiles
and self-silencing are sources of group failure, a
tempting approach is to ask some group members to
act as devil’s advocates, urging a position that is con-
trary to the group’s inclination. Those who assume
that role can avoid the social pressure that comes
from rejecting the group’s dominant position, be-

cause they have been charged with doing precisely
that. But be careful with this approach: Authentic
dissent and a formal requirement of devil’s advo-
cacy are different; the latter does far less to improve
group performance, because members are aware
that it’s artificial—a kind of exercise or game.
Establish contrarian teams. Another method,
related to appointing a devil’s advocate but shown
to be more effective, is “red teaming.” Red teams
come in two basic forms: those that try to defeat
the primary team in a simulated mission, and those
that construct the strongest possible case against a
proposal or a plan. Red teams are an excellent idea
in many contexts, especially if they sincerely try
to find mistakes and exploit vulnerabilities and are
given clear incentives to do so.
The Delphi method. This approach, developed
at the RAND Corporation during the cold war, mixes
the virtues of individual decision making with social
learning. Individuals offer first-round estimates (or
votes) in complete anonymity. Then a cycle of re-
estimations (or repeated voting) occurs, with a re-
quirement that second-round estimates have to fall
within the middle quartiles (25%–75%) of the first
round. This process is repeated—often interspersed
with group discussion—until the participants con-
verge on an estimate. A simple (and more easily ad-
ministered) alternative is a system in which ultimate
judgments or votes are given anonymously but only
after deliberation. Anonymity insulates group mem-
bers from reputational pressures and thus reduces
the problem of self-silencing.
Group failures often have disastrous conse-

quences—not merely for businesses, nonprofits,
and governments, but for all those affected by them.
The good news is that decades of empirical work,
alongside recent innovations, offer some practical
safeguards and correctives that can make groups a
lot wiser. HBR Reprint R1412F
HBR.ORGMAKING DUMB GROUPS SMARTER
__MACOSX/._making-dumb-groups-smarter - Sunstein and
Hast.pdf
Manzoi%252C%2BJ.%2BBaroux%252C%2BJ.%2B-
%2BThe%2BSet-Up-To-Fail%2BSyndrome.pdf
How bosses create their own poor performers.
The Set-Up-to-FaU
Syndrome
by Jean-Frangois Manzoni and Jean-Louis Barsoux
W HEN AN EMPLOYEE FAILS - or e v e n j u s t p e r f o r m
spoorly - managers typically do not blame themselves.
The employee doesn't understand the work, a manager
might contend. Or the employee isn't driven to succeed,
can't set priorities, or won't take direction. Whatever the
reason, the problem is assumed to be the employee's fault-
and the employee's responsibility.
But is it? Sometimes, of course, the answer is yes. Some

employees are not up to their assigned tasks and never will
he, for lack of knowledge, skill, or simple desire. But some-
times-and we would venture to say often-an employee's
poor performance can be blamed largely on his boss.
ARTWORK BY SIDNEY HARRIS
THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
Perhaps "blamed" is too strong a word, but it is
directionally correct. In fact, our research strongly
suggests that bosses-albeit accidentally and usually
with the best intentions-are often complicit in an
employee's lack of success. (See the insert "About
the Research.") How? By creating and reinforcing a
dynamic that essentially sets up perceived under-
performers to fail. If the Pygmalion effect describes
the dynamic in which an individual lives up to
great expectations, the set-up-to-fail syndrome ex-
plains the opposite. It describes a dynamic in which
employees perceived to be mediocre or weak per-
formers live down to the low expectations their
managers have for them. The result is that they
often end up leaving the organization - either of
their own volition or not.
The syndrome usually begins surreptitiously.
The initial impetus can be performance related,
such as when an employee loses a client, under-
shoots a target, or misses a deadline. Often, however,
the trigger is less specific. An employee is trans-
ferred into a division with a lukewarm recommen-
dation from a previous boss. Or perhaps the boss
and the employee don't really get along on a per-

sonal basis-several studies have indeed shown that
compatibility between boss and subordinate, based
on similarity of attitudes, values, or social charac-
teristics, can have a significant impact on a boss's
impressions. In any case, the syndrome is set in
motion when the boss hegins to worry that the em-
ployee's performance is not up to par.
The boss then takes what seems like the obvious
action in light of the subordinate's perceived short-
comings: he increases the time and attention he
focuses on the employee. He requires the employee
to get approval before making decisions, asks to see
more paperwork documenting those decisions, or
watches the employee at meetings more closely
and critiques his comments more intensely.
These actions are intended to boost performance
and prevent the subordinate from making errors.
Unfortunately, however, subordinates often inter-
pret the heightened supervision as a lack of trust
and confidence. In time, because of low expecta-
tions, they come to doubt their own thinking and
fean-Frangois Manzoni is an assistant professor of ac-
counting and control at INSEAD, in Fontainebleau.
France. His research and consulting work focus on man-
agement control and the management of change at botb
the individual and organizational levels. Jean-Louis
Barsoax is a research fellow at INSEAD. wbere he spe-
cializes in organizational bebavior. He is the coauthor
witb Susan C. Schneider of Managing Across Cultures
(Prentice-Hall, 1997I
ABOUT THE RESEARCH

This article is based on two studies designed to
understand better the causal relationship be-
tween leadership style and subordinate perfor-
m a n c e - i n other words, to explore how bosses
and subordinates mutually influence each oth-
er's behavior. The first study, which comprised
surveys, interviews, and observations, involved
so boss-subordinate pairs in four manufactur-
ing operations in Fortune 100 companies. The
second study, involving an informal survey of
about 850 senior managers attending INSEAD
executive-development programs over the last
three years, was done to test and refine the find-
ings generated by the first study. The execu-
tives in the second study represented a wide
diversity of nationalities, industries, and per-
sonal backgrounds.
ability, and they lose the motivation to make au-
tonomous decisions or to take any action at all. The
boss, they figure, will just question everything they
do - or do it himself anyway.
Ironically, the hoss sees the suhordinate's with-
drawal as proof that the subordinate is indeed a
poor performer. The subordinate, after all, isn't con-
tributing his ideas or energy to the organization. So
what does the boss do? He increases his pressure
and supervision again-watching, questioning, and
double-checking everything the subordinate does.
Eventually, the subordinate gives up on his dreams
of making a meaningful contribution. Boss and sub-
ordinate typically settle into a routine that is not
really satisfactory but, aside from periodic clashes,
is otherwise bearable for them. In the worst-case
scenario, the boss's intense intervention and scru-

tiny end up paralyzing the employee into inaction
and consume so much of the boss's time that the
employee quits or is fired. (For an illustration of the
set-up-to-fail syndrome, see the exhibit "The Set-
Up-to-Fail Syndrome: No Harm Intended-A Rela-
tionship Spirals from Bad to Worse.")
Perhaps the most daunting aspect of the set-up-
to-fail syndrome is that it is self-fulfilling and self-
reinforcing - it is the quintessential vicious circle.
The process is self-fulfilling hecause the boss's
actions contribute to the very behavior that is ex-
pected from weak performers. It is self-reinforcing
because the boss's low expectations, in being ful-
filled by his subordinates, trigger more of the same
behavior on his part, which in tum triggers more of
the same behavior on the part of subordinates. And
102 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998
on and on, unintentionally, the relationship spirals
downward.
A case in point is the story of Steve, a manufac-
turing supervisor for a Fortune 100 company. When
we first met Steve, he came across as highly moti-
vated, energetie, and enterprising. He was on top of
his operation, monitoring problems and addressing
them quickly. His hoss expressed great confidence
in him and gave him an excellent performance rat-
ing. Because of his high performance, Steve was
chosen to lead a new production line considered

essential to the plant's future.
In his new job, Steve reported to Jeff, who had just
been promoted to a senior management position at
the plant. In the first few weeks of the relationship,
Jeff periodically asked Steve to write up short analy-
ses of significant quality-control rejections. Al-
though Jeff didn't really explain this to Steve at the
time, his request had two major objectives; to gen-
erate information that would help both of them
learn the new production process, and to help Steve
develop the habit of systematically performing root
cause analysis of quality-related problems. Also,
being new on the job himself, Jeff wanted to show
his own boss that he was on top of the operation.
Unaware of Jeff's motives, Steve balked. Why, he
wondered, should he submit reports on informa-
tion he understood and monitored himself? Partly
due to lack of time, partly in response to what he
considered interference from his boss, Steve in-
vested little energy in the reports. Their tardiness
and below-average quality annoyed Jeff, who began
to suspect that Steve was not a particularly pro-
active manager. When he asked for the reports
again, he was more forceful. For Steve, this merely
confirmed that Jeff did not trust him. He withdrew
Up to 90% of all bosses treat some
siiboidiiiates as tliough they were
part of an in-group, while they
consign others to an out-group.
more and more from interaction with him, meeting
his demands with increased passive resistance. Be-
fore long, Jeff became convinced that Steve was not

effective enough and couldn't handle his job with-
out help. He started to supervise Steve's every
move-to Steve's predictable dismay. One year after
excitedly taking on the new production line, Steve
was so dispirited he was thinking of quitting.
How can managers break the set-up-to-fail syn-
drome? Before answering that question, let's take a
closer look at the dynamics that set the syndrome
in motion and keep it going.
Deconstructing the Syndrome
We said earlier that the set-up-to-fail syndrome
usually starts surreptitiously - that is, it is a dy-
namic that usually creeps up on the hoss and the
subordinate until suddenly both of them realize
that the relationship has gone sour. But underly-
ing the syndrome are several assumptions about
weaker performers that bosses appear to accept uni-
formly. Our research shows, in fact, that executives
typieally compare weaker performers with stronger
performers using the following descriptors:
• less motivated, less energetic, and less Ukely to go
beyond the call of duty;
• more passive when it comes to taking charge of
problems or projects,-
• less aggressive about anticipating problems;
• less innovative and less likely to suggest ideas;
• more parochial in their vision and strategic
perspective;
• more prone to hoard information and assert their
authority, making them poor bosses to their own
suhordinates.
It is not surprising that on the hasis of these

assumptions, bosses tend to treat weaker and
stronger performers very differently. Indeed, nu-
merous studies have shown that up to 90% of all
managers treat some subordinates as though they
were members of an in-group, while they consign
others to membership in an out-group. Members of
the in-group are considered the trusted collabora-
tors and therefore receive more au-
tonomy, feedback, and expressions
of confidence from their hosses. The
boss-subordinate relationship for
this group is one of mutual trust and
reciprocal influence. Members of the
out-group, on the other hand, are re-
garded more as hired hands and are
managed in a more formal, less per-
sonal way, with more emphasis on
rules, policies, and authority. (For
more on how bosses treat weaker and stronger per-
formers differently, see the chart "In with the In
Crowd, Out with the Out.")
Why do managers categorize subordinates into
either in-groups or out-groups? For the same reason
that we tend to typecast our family, friends, and ac-
quaintances: it makes life easier. Labeling is some-
thing we all do, because it allows us to function
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998 103

NO HARM INTENDED-A RELATIONSHIP SPIRALS FROM
BAD TO WORSE
1 Before the set-up-to-fail syndrome begins, theboss and the
subordinate are typically engaged
in a positive, or at least neutral, relationship.
2 The triggering event in the set-up-to-failsyndrome is often
minor or surreptitious.
The subordinate may miss a deadline, lose a client,
or submit a subpar report. In otber cases, the
syndrome's genesis is tbe boss, wbo distances
bimself from tbe subordinate for personal or social
reasons unrelated to performance.
3 Reacting to tbe triggering event, the hossincreases his
supervision of the subordinate,
gives more specific instructions, and wrangles
longer over courses of aetion.
4 The subordinate responds by beginning tosuspect a lack of
confidence and senses be's
not part of tbe boss's in-group anymore.
He starts to withdraw emotionally from the boss
and from work. He may also fight to cbange tbe
boss's image of bim, reaching too high or running
too fast to be effective.
L04 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998
THE SET-UP-TO-PAIL SYNDROME

5 The boss interprets this prohlem-hoarding,overreaching, or
tentativeness as signs that the
subordinate has poor judgment and weak capabih-
ties. If the subordinate does perform well, the boss
does not acknowledge it or considers it a lucky
"one off."
He limits the subordinate's discretion, withholds
social contact, and shows, with increasing open-
ness, his lack of confidence in and frustration with
the subordinate.
6 The subordinate feels boxed in and under-appreciated. He
increasingly withdraws from
his boss and from work. He may even resort to
ignoring instructions, openly disputing the hoss,
and occasionally lashing out because of feelings of
rejection.
In general, he performs his job mechanically and
devotes more energy to self-protection. Moreover,
he refers all nonroutine decisions to the boss or
avoids contact with him.
7 The boss feels increasingly frustrated and isnow convinced
that the subordinate cannot
perform without intense oversight. He makes this
known by his words and deeds, further under-
mining the subordinate's confidence and prompting
inaction.
8 When the set-up-to-fail syndrome is in fullswing, the hoss
pressures and controls the sub-
ordinate during interactions. Otherwise, he avoids
contact and gives the subordinate routine assign-
ments only.

For his part, the subordinate shuts down or
leaves, either in dismay, frustration, or anger.
more efficiently. It saves time by providing rough-
and-ready guides for interpreting events and inter-
acting with others. Managers, for instance, use cat-
egorical thinking to figure out quickly who should
get what tasks. That's the good news.
The downside of categorical thinking is that in
organizations it leads to premature closure. Having
made up his mind about a subordinate's limited
ability and poor motivation, a manager is likely to
notice supporting evidence while selectively dis-
missing contrary evidence. (For example, a manager
might interpret a terrific new product idea from an
out-group subordinate as a lucky onetime event.)
Unfortunately for some subordinates, several stud-
ies show that bosses tend to make decisions about
in-groups and out-groups even as early as five days
into their relationships with employees.
Are bosses aware of this sorting process and of
their different approaches to "in" and "out" em-
ployees? Definitely. In fact, the bosses we have
studied, regardless of nationality, company, or per-
sonal background, were usually quite conscious of
behaving in a more controlling way with perceived
weaker performers. Some of them preferred to label

this approach as "supportive and helpful." Many of
them also acknowledged that-although they tried
not to - they tended to become impatient with
weaker performers more easily than with stronger
performers. By and large, however, managers are
aware of the controlling nature of their behavior
toward perceived weaker performers. For them,
this behavior is not an error in implementation; it
is intentional.
What bosses typically do not realize is that their
tight controls end up hurting subordinates' perfor-
VVhai bosses do not realize is that
their tight controls end up hurting
subordinates' performance by
undermining their motivation.
mance by undermining their motivation in two
ways: first, by depriving subordinates of autonomy
on the job and, second, by making them feel under-
valued. Tight controls are an indication that the
boss assumes the subordinate can't perform well
witbout strict guidelines. Wben tbe subordinate
senses tbese low expectations, it can undermine his
self-confidence. This is particularly problematic
because numerous studies confirm tbat people per-
form up or down to the levels tbeir bosses expect
from tbem or, indeed, to tbe levels tbey expect from
tbemselves.'
Of course, executives often tell us, "Ob, but I'm
very careful about tbis issue of expectations. I exert
more control over my underper form ers, but I make
sure tbat it does not come across as a lack of trust or

confidence in tbeir ability." We believe wbat these
executives tell us. Tbat is, we believe tbat they do
try bard to disguise their intentions. Wben we talk
to tbeir subordinates, bowever, we find that tbese
efforts are for tbe most part futile. In fact, our re-
searcb sbows tbat most employees can - and do -
"read tbeir boss's mind." In particular, tbey know
full well whether they fit into tbeir boss's in-group
or out-group. All they bave to do is compare bow
tbey are treated witb bow their more bigbly regarded
colleagues are treated.
Just as tbe boss's assumptions about weaker per-
formers and tbe rigbt way to manage tbem explains
bis complicity in tbe set-up-to-fail syndrome, tbe
subordinate's assumptions about wbat the boss is
thinking explain bis own complicity. Tbe reason?
When people perceive disapproval, criticism, or
simply a lack of confidence and appreciation, they
tend to sbut down-a behavioral phenomenon that
manifests itself in several ways.
Primarily, shutting down means disconnecting
intellectually and emotionally. Subordinates sim-
ply stop giving tbeir best. Tbey grow tired of being
overruled, and tbey lose tbe will to figbt for tbeir
ideas. As one subordinate put it, "My boss tells me
how to execute every detail Rather than arguing
witb bim, I've ended up wanting to say, 'Come on,
just tell me what you want me to do, and I'll go do
it.' You become a robot." Another
perceived weak performer explained,
"When my boss tells me to do some-
tbing, I just do it mechanically."

Shutting down also involves dis-
engaging personally - essentially re-
ducing contact with the boss. Partly,
this disengagement is motivated by
tbe nature of previous exchanges
that bave tended to be negative in
tone. As one subordinate admitted,
"I used to initiate mucb more contact with my boss
until tbe only tbing I received was negative feed-
back; tben I started shying away."
Besides tbe risk of a negative reaction, perceived
weaker performers are concerned with not tainting
their images further. Following the often-heard
aphorism "Better to keep quiet and look like a fool
than to open your moutb and prove it," tbey avoid
asking for belp for fear of further exposing their lim-
itations. They also tend to volunteer less informa-
tion-a simple "heads up" from a perceived under-
performer can cause the boss to overreact and jump
into action when none is required. As one perceived
weak performer recalled, "I just wanted to let my
boss know about a small matter, only slightly out
of the routine, hut as soon as I men-
tioned it, he was all over my case. I
Finally, shutting down can
hecoming defensive. Many perceived

underperformers start devoting more
energy to self-justification. Antici-
pating that they will be personally
blamed for failures, they seek to find
excuses early. They end up spending
a lot of time looking in the rearview mirror and less
time looking at the road ahead. In some cases-as in
the case of Steve, the manufacturing supervisor de-
serihed earlier-this defensiveness can lead to non-
compliance or even systematic opposition to the
hoss's views. While this idea of a weak subordinate
going head to head with his boss may seem irra-
tional, it may reflect what Albert Camus once ob-
served: "When deprived of choice, the only freedom
left is the freedom to say no."
The Syndrome Is Costly
There are two obvious costs of the set-up-to-fail
syndrome: the emotional cost paid by the suhordi-
iiate and the organizational cost associated with
the company's failure to get the best out of an em-
ployee. Yet there are other costs to consider, some
of them indirect and long term.
The hoss pays for the syndrome in several ways.
First, uneasy relationships with perceived low per-
formers often sap the boss's emotional and physical
energy. It can he quite a strain to keep up a facade
of courtesy and pretend everything is fine when
both parties know it is not. In addition, the energy
devoted to trying to fix these relationships or im-
prove the subordinate's performance through
increased supervision prevents the boss from at-
tending to other activities - which often frustrates
or even angers the boss.

Furthermore, the syndrome can take its toll on
the hoss's reputation, as other employees in the
organization observe his behavior toward weaker
performers. If the boss's treatment of a subordinate
is deemed unfair or unsupportive, observers will be
quick to draw their lessons. One outstanding per-
former commented on his hoss's controlling and
hypercritical behavior toward another subordinate:
"It made us all feel like we're expendahle." As orga-
nizations increasingly espouse the virtues of learn-
ing and empowerment, managers must cultivate
their reputations as coaches, as well as get results.
The set-up-to-fail syndrome also has serious con-
sequences for any team. A lack of faith in perceived
' Strong performer said ol his
boss's hvpercri ticul bctiavior
fOWOrd aTlOthcr eiliploVee: '* 11
S all fccl like We're exDendable/'
weaker performers can tempt bosses to overload
those whom they consider superior performers;
bosses want to entrust critical assignments to those
who can be counted on to deliver reliably and
quickly and to those who will go beyond the call of
duty because of their strong sense of shared fate. As
one boss half-jokingly said, "Rule number one: if
you want something done, give it to someone who's
busy-there's a reason why that person is busy."
An increased workload may help perceived supe-
rior performers learn to manage their time better,

especially as they start to delegate to their own sub-
ordinates more effectively. In many cases, however,
these performers simply ahsorh the greater load
and higher stress which, over time, takes a personal
toll and decreases the attention they can devote to
other dimensions of their johs, particularly those
yielding longer-term henefits. In the worst-ease
scenario, overburdening strong performers can lead
to burnout.
Team spirit can also suffer from the progressive
alienation of one or more perceived low performers.
Great teams share a sense of enthusiasm and com-
mitment to a common mission. Even when mem-
hers of the boss's out-group try to keep their pain to
themselves, other team members feel the strain.
One manager recalled the discomfort experienced
by the whole team as they watched their boss grill
one of their peers every week. As he explained, "A
team is like a functioning organism. If one memher
is suffering, the whole team feels that pain."
In addition, alienated suhordinates often do not
keep their suffering to themselves. In the corridors
or over lunch, they seek out sympathetic ears to
vent their recriminations and complaints, not only
wasting their own time hut also pulling their col-
leagues away from productive work. Instead of fo-
cusing on the team's mission, valuable time and
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998

energy is diverted to the discussion of internal poli-
tics and dynamics.
Finally, the set-up-to-fail syndrome has conse-
quences for the suhordinates of the perceived weak
performers. Consider the weakest kid in the school
yard who gets pummeled by a bully. The abused
child often goes home and pummels his smaller,
weaker sihlings. So it is with the people who are in
the hoss's out-group. When they have to manage
their own employees, they frequently replicate the
hehavior that their bosses show to them. They fail
to recognize good results or, more often, supervise
their employees excessively.
Breaking Out Is Hard to Do
The set-up-to-fail syndrome is not irreversihle. Suh-
ordinates can hreak out of it, hut we have found
that to be rare. The suhordinate must consistently
deliver such superior results that the boss is forced
to change the employee from out-group to in-group
status - a phenomenon made difficult hy the con-
text in which these suhordinates operate. It is hard
for suhordinates to impress their bosses when they
must work on unchallenging tasks, with no auton-
omy and limited resources; it is also hard for them
to persist and maintain high standards when they
receive little encouragement from their hosses.
Furthermore, even if the subordinate achieves
hetter results, it may take some time for them to
register with the hoss hecause of his selective oh-
servation and recall. Indeed, researeh shows that
bosses tend to attribute the good things that happen
to weaker performers to external factors rather
than to their efforts and ahility (while the opposite

is true for pereeived high performers: successes
tend to he seen as theirs, and failures tend to be
attributed to external uncontrollable factors). The
suhordinate will therefore need to achieve a string
of successes in order to have the hoss even contem-
plate revising the initial categorization. Clearly, it
takes a special kind of eourage, self-confidenee,
competence, and persistence on the part of the sub-
ordinate to hreak out of the syndrome.
Instead, what often happens is that members of
the out-group set excessively amhitious goals for
themselves to impress the boss quickly and power-
fully-promising to hit a deadline three weeks early,
for instance, or attacking six projects at the same
time, or simply attempting to handle a large prob-
lem without help. Sadly, such superhuman efforts
are usually just that. And in setting goals so high
that they are hound to fail, the subordinates also
come across as having had very poor judgment in
the first place.
The set-up-to-fail syndrome is not restricted to
incompetent hosses. We have seen it happen to peo-
ple perceived within their organizations to he ex-
cellent hosses. Their mismanagement of some suh-
ordinates need not prevent them from achieving
success, particularly when they and the perceived
superior performers achieve high levels of individ-
ual performance. However, those hosses could he
even more successful to the team, the organization,
and themselves if they could hreak the syndrome.
Getting It Right
As a general rule, the first step in solving a prohlem
is reeognizing that one exists. This ohservation is

especially relevant to the set-up-to-fail syndrome
because of its self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing
nature. Interrupting the syndrome requires that a
manager understand the dynamic and, particularly,
that he accept the possibility that his own behavior
maybe contributing to a subordinate's underperfor-
mance. The next step toward cracking the syn-
drome, however, is more difficult: it requires a care-
fully planned and structured intervention that
takes the form of one (or several) candid conversa-
tions meant to bring to the surface and untangle
the unhealthy dynamics that define the hoss and the
subordinate's relationship. The goal of such an in-
tervention is to hring ahout a sustainahle increase
in the suhordinate's performance while progres-
sively reducing the hoss's involvement.
It would he difficult-and indeed, detrimental-to
provide a detailed script of what this kind of con-
versation should sound like. A hoss who rigidly
plans for this conversation with a suhordinate will
not he ahle to engage in real dialogue with him, he-
cause real dialogue requires flexibility. As a guiding
framework, however, we offer five components
that charaeterize effective interventions. Although
they are not strictly sequential steps, all five com-
ponents should be part of these interventions.
First, the boss must create the right context for
the discussion. He must, for instance, select a time
and place to conduct the meeting so that it presents
as little threat as possihle to the suhordinate. A
neutral location may be more conducive to open di-
alogue than an office where previous and perhaps
unpleasant conversations have taken place. The
hoss must also use affirming language when asking

the subordinate to meet with him. The session
should not be hilled as "feedback," because such
terms may suggest haggage from the past. "Feed-
hack" could also he taken to mean that the conver-
sation will be one-directional, a monologue deliv-
ered by the hoss to the subordinate. Instead, the
IN WITH THE IN CROWD, OUT WITH THE OUT
Boss's behavior toward perceived
stronger performers
Discusses project objectives, wjth a limited focus
on project implementation. Gives subordinate the
freedom to choose his own approach to solving
problems or reaching goals.
Treats unfavorable variances, mistakes, or
incorrect judgments as learning opportunities.
Makes himself available, as in "Let me know if I
can help." Initiates casual and personal
conversations.
Is open to suhordinate's suggestions and discusses
them with interest.
Gives suhordinate interesting and challenging
stretch assignments. Often allows subordinate to
choose his own assignments.

Solicits opinions from subordinate on
organizational strategy, execution, policy, and
procedures.
Often defers to subordinate's opinion in
disagreements.
Praises suhordinate for work well done.
intervention should be deseribed as a meeting to
discuss the performance of the subordinate, the role
of the hoss, and the relationship between the suhor-
dinate and the boss. The hoss might even acknowl-
edge that he feels tension in the relationship and
wants to use the conversation as a way to decrease it.
Finally, in setting the context, the boss should
tell the perceived weaker performer that he would
genuinely like the interaction to he an open dia-
logue. In particular, he should acknowledge that he
may be partially responsihie for the situation and
that his own behavior toward the suhordinate is fair
game for discussion.
Second, the boss and the subordinate must use
the intervention process to come to an agreement
Boss's behavior toward perceived
weaker performers
Is directive when discussing tasks and goals.
Focuses on what needs get done as well as how it
should get done.
Pays close attention to unfavorable variances,

mistakes, or incorrect judgments.
Makes himself availahle to suhordinate on a need-
to-see basis. Bases conversations primarily on
work-related topics.
Pays little interest to suhordinate's comments or
suggestions about how and why work is done.
Reluctantly gives suhordinate anything hut
routine assignments. When handing out
assignments, gives suhordinate little choice.
Monitors suhordinate heavily.
Rarely asks subordinate for input ahout
organizational or work-related matters.
Usually imposes own views in disagreements.
Emphasizes what the subordinate Is doing poorly.
on the symptoms of the problem. Few employees
are ineffective in all aspects of their performance.
And few-if any - employees desire to do poorly on
the joh. Therefore, it is critical that the interven-
tion result in a mutual understanding of the specific
joh responsibilities in which the suhordinate is
weak. In the case of Steve and Jeff, for instance, an
exhaustive sorting of the evidence might have led
to an agreement that Steve's underperformance was
not universal but instead largely confined to the
quality of the reports he suhmitted (or failed to sub-
mit). In another situation, it might he agreed that a
purchasing manager was weak when it came to
finding off-shore suppliers and to voicing his ideas
in meetings. Or a new investment professional and

his hoss might come to agree that his performance
was suhpar when it came to timing the sales and
purchase of stocks, hut they might also agree that
his financial analysis of stocks was quite strong.
The idea here is that before working to improve per-
formance or reduce tension in a relationship, an
As [)art ofthe intervention, the
boss should bring up the subject of
how his own behavior may affect
lhe subordinate's performance.
agreement must he reached about what areas of per-
formance contrihute to the contentiousness.
We used the word "evidence" above in discussing
the case of Steve and Jeff. That is hecause a hoss
needs to back up his performance assessments with
facts and data - that is, if the intervention is to be
useful. They cannot be based on feelings-as in Jeff
telling Steve, "I just have the feeling you're not
putting enough energy into the reports." Instead,
Jeff needs to describe what a good report should
look Uke and the ways in which Steve's reports fall
short. Likewise, the suhordinate must he allowed-
indeed, encouraged - to defend his performance,
compare it with colleagues' work, and point out
areas in which he is strong. After all, just hecause it
is the hoss's opinion does not make it a fact.

Third, the boss and the subordinate should arrive
at a common understanding of what might be caus-
ing the weak performance in certain areas. Once
the areas of weak performance have heen identified,
it is time to unearth the reasons for those weak-
nesses. Does the suhordinate have limited skills in
organizing work, managing his time, or working
with others? Is he lacking knowledge or capabili-
ties? Do the hoss and the suhordinate agree on their
priorities? Maybe the subordinate has heen paying
less attention to a particular dimension of his work
because he does not realize its importance to the
boss. Does the subordinate become less effective
under pressure? Does he have lower standards for
performance than the hoss does?
It is also critical in the intervention that the hoss
hring up the suhject of his own hehavior toward the
suhordinate and how this affects the suhordinate's
performance. The hoss might even try to descrihe
the dynamics of the set-up-to-fail syndrome. "Does
my behavior toward you make things worse for
you?" he might ask, or, "What am I doing that is
leading you to feel that I am putting too much pres-
sure on you?"
This component of the discussion also needs to
make explicit the assumptions that the hoss and
the subordinate have thus far heen making ahout
each other's intentions. Many misunderstandings
start with untested assumptions. For
example, Jeff might have said,
"When you did not supply me with

the reports I asked for, I came to the
conclusion that you were not very
proactive." That would have allowed
Steve to hring his buried assump-
tions into the open. "No," he might
have answered, "I just reacted nega-
tively because you asked for the re-
ports in writing, which I took as a
sign of excessive control."
Fourth, the boss and the subordinate should ar-
rive at an agreement about their performance objec-
tives and on their desire to have the relationship
move forward. In medicine, a course of treatment
follows the diagnosis of an illness. Things are a bit
more complex when repairing organizational dys-
function, since modifying hehavior and developing
complex skills can be more difficult than taking a
few pills. Still, the principle that applies to medi-
cine also applies to husiness: boss and suhordinate
must use the intervention to plot a course of treat-
ment regarding the root prohlems they have jointly
identified.
The contract hetween boss and suhordinate
should identify the ways they can improve on their
skills, knowledge, experience, or personal relation-
ship. It should also include an explicit discussion of
how much and what type of future supervision the
hoss will have. No hoss, of course, should suddenly
abdicate his involvement; it is legitimate for bosses
to monitor subordinates' work, particularly when a
suhordinate has shown limited ahilities in one or
more facets of his joh. From the subordinate's point
of view, however, such involvement hy the hoss is

more likely to he accepted, and possihly even wel-
comed, if the goal is to help the subordinate develop
and improve over time. Most suhordinates can ac-
cept temporary involvement that is meant to de-
crease as their performance improves. The prohlem
is intense monitoring that never seems to go away.
Fihh, the boss and the subordinate should agree
to communicate more openly in the future. The
boss could say, "Next time I do something that
communicates low expectations, can you let me
know immediately?" And the suhordinate might
say, or be encouraged to say, "Next time I do some-
thing that aggravates you or that you do not under-
110 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Marcb-April 1998
THE SET-UP-TO-PAIL SYNDROME
Stand, can you also let me know right away?"
Those simple requests can open the door to a more
honest relationship almost instantly.
No Easy Answer
Our research suggests that interventions of this
type do not take place very often. Face-to-face dis-
cussions ahout a suhordinate's performance tend to
come high on the list of workplace situations peo-
ple would rather avoid, because such conversations
have the potential to make hoth parties feel threat-
ened or embarrassed. Suhordinates are reluctant to
trigger the discussion because they are worried
ahout coming across as thin-skinned or whiny.

Bosses tend to avoid initiating these talks because
they are concerned about the way the suhordinate
might react; the discussion eould force the hoss to
make explicit his lack of confidence in the subordi-
nate, in turn putting the suhordinate on the defen-
sive and making the situation worse.̂
As a result, hosses who ohserve the dynamics of
the set-up-to-fail syndrome being played out may
be tempted to avoid an explieit discussion. Instead,
they will proceed tacitly by trying to encourage
their perceived weak performers. That approach
has the short-term henefit of hypassing the discom-
fort of an open discussion, but it has three major
disadvantages.
First, a one-sided approach on the part of the hoss
is less likely to lead to lasting improvement he-
cause it focuses on only one symptom of the
prohlem-the boss's behavior. It does
not address the subordinate's role in
the underperformance.
We are not saying that intervention is always the
hest eourse of action. Sometimes, intervention is
not possible or desirable. There may he, for in-
stance, overwhelming evidence that the suhordi-
nate is not capahle of doing his joh. He was a hiring
or promotion mistake, which is hest handled by re-
moving him from the position. In other cases, the
relationship between the hoss and the suhordinate
is too far gone - too much damage has oecurred to
repair it. And finally, sometimes hosses are too
husy and under too much pressure to invest the
kind of resources that intervention involves.

Yet often the biggest ohstacle to effective inter-
vention is the hoss's mind-set. When a boss believes
that a subordinate is a weak performer and, on top
of everything else, that person also aggravates him,
he is not going to he able to cover up his feelings
with words; his underlying convictions will come
out in the meeting. That is why preparation for the
intervention is crucial. Before even deciding to
have a meeting, the boss must separate emotion
from reality. Was the situation always as bad as it is
now? Is the subordinate really as bad as I think he
is? What is the hard evidence I have for that belief?
Could there he other factors, aside from perfor-
mance, that have led me to label this suhordinate a
weak performer? Aren't there a few things that he
does well? He must have displayed ahove-average
qualifications when we decided to hire him. Did
these quaiifieations evaporate all of a sudden?
The hoss might even want to mentally play out
part of the conversation beforehand. If I say this to
The boss must separate emotion
Second, even if the boss's encour- —
were successful in improv- froiTi reaUtv: Is tile s u b o r d i n a
t e
employee's performance, a -̂
approach would limit really a s Dad a s I til ill k h e is?
what both he and the subordinate ^
could otherwise learn from a more
up-front handling of the prohlem. The suhordinate,
in particular, would not have the benefit of observ-
ing and learning from how his hoss handled the dif-
ficulties in their relationship - prohlems the subor-

dinate may come across someday with the people
he manages.
Finally, bosses trying to modify their behavior in
a unilateral way often end up going overboard; they
suddenly give the suhordinate more autonomy and
responsibility than he can handle productively. Pre-
dictably, the subordinate fails to deliver to the
hoss's satisfaction, which leaves the boss even
more frustrated and convinced that the suhordinate
eannot function without intense supervision.
the suhordinate, what might he answer? Yes, sure,
he would say that it was not his fault and that the
customer was unreasonahle. Those excuses-are
they really without merit? Could he have a point?
Could it he that, under other circumstances, I
might have looked more favorahly upon them? And
if I still helieve I'm right, how can I help the suhor-
dinate see things more clearly?
The hoss must also mentally prepare himself to
be open to the suhordinate's views, even if the suh-
ordinate challenges him ahout any evidence regard-
ing his poor performance. It will he easier for the
hoss to he open if, when preparing for the meeting,
he has already challenged his own preconceptions.
Even when well prepared, hosses typically experi-
ence some degree of discomfort during intervention

meetings. That is not all had. The suhordinate v̂ îll
prohahly he somewhat uncomfortahle as well, and
it is reassuring for him to see that his boss is a hu-
man being, too.
Calculating Costs and Benefits
As we've said, an intervention is not always advis-
able. But when it is, it results in a range of out-
comes that are uniformly hetter than the alter-
native - that is, continued underperformance and
tension. After all, hosses who systematically
choose either to ignore their suhordinates' under-
performance or to opt for the more expedient solu-
tion of simply removing perceived weak performers
are condemned to keep repeating the same mis-
takes. Finding and training replacements for per-
ceived weak performers is a costly and recurrent
expense. So is monitoring and controlling the dete-
riorating performance of a disenchanted suhordi-
nate. Getting results in spite of one's staff is not a
sustainahle solution. In other words, it makes sense
to think of the intervention as an investment, not
an expense -with the payhack likely to be high.
How high that payback will be and what form it
will take obviously depend on the outcome of the
intervention, which will itself depend not only on
the quality of the intervention hut also on several
key contextual factors: How long has that relation-
ship been spiraling downward? Does the suhordi-
nate have the intellectual and emotional resources
to make the effort that will be required? Does the
boss have enough time and energy to do his part?
We have observed outcomes that can he clustered

LEADERS WHO MAKE A DIFFERENCE_ CRITICAL SKILLS FOR LEADING A DIV.docx

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