1. Policing the Blue Helmets:
Accountabilityfor Sexual Exploitation& Abuse in UN
Peacekeeping Missions
Spring 2014
CURTIS ROGERS
PS 737: TransnationalOrganizations and Processes
Dr. Karen Mingst

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Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………….3
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………....4
Part I: Crimes of SEA Among UN Peacekeepers: The History, Issues, and Challenges……5
History of SEA
Main Issues
Challenged of Holding Peacekeepers Available
Peacekeepers Unpunished
Part II: The United Nations’ Response: Important Documents and Available Actions….16
Important Documents
Available Actions
Peacekeepers “Punished:” Uruguayan & Pakistani Peacekeepers in Haiti
Part III: Moving Forward: Evaluating, Explaining, and Reforming the Response………27
Evaluating The UN’s Response to SEA
Commonly Proposed Solutions
Addressing The Causes: Political Economy of Peacekeeping
A New Approach
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………39
Figures…………………………………………………………………………………………..41
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………………….45

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List of Abbreviations
CDU- Conduct and Discipline Unit
DPKO- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG- Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ICC- International Criminal Court
MINUSMA- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH- United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC- United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOU- Memorandum of Understanding
OIOS- United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
SEA- Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SOFA- Status Of Forces Agreement
SRSG- Special Representative of the Secretary General
TCC- Troop Contributing Country
UNHCR- United Nations High Commission on Refugees
UNMIL- United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNTAG- United Nations Transition Assistance Group

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Introduction
The iconic blue helmets of UN peacekeepers have become a common sight amidst the
most unstable regions and intractable conflicts on earth. The rise in the number of peacekeepers
deployed since the Cold War has resulted in a multitude of problems for the UN and troop
contributing countries (TCCs) as well as the states in which the peacekeepers operate (referred to
as host states throughout). Among the most troubling problems for all parties is the issue of
peacekeepers committing crimes in host countries. Though explicit agreements are drawn
between TCCs and the UN assuring that peacekeepers will be tried and punished for any crimes
they commit, this rarely occurs. This paper will explore the problem of holding UN peacekeepers
accountable for their crimes by focusing on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), which has
become the most high profile and unfortunately most frequently occurring example of legal
transgressions within the organization. Through reviewing the UN response to the problem and
the current makeup of peacekeeping forces, this paper concludes that the UN has failed to
adequately address the problem of SEA in order to avoid negative impacts on the number of
troops contributed to peacekeeping efforts. In order to properly approach the issue, it is
suggested that the UN make foundational changes in the way in which it procures peacekeepers.
The first section of the paper will frame the problem, reviewing the history of SEA by
UN peacekeepers and the major challenges in holding them accountable within the transnational
setting of the UN. This section will also draw upon examples in which offending peacekeepers
went unpunished, and in some cases without even an investigation into their alleged crimes. The
second section will shift the focus towards the UN’s response to the problem by looking at the
numerous publications that the organization has released on the topic as well the instances in

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which peacekeepers were in fact punished for their actions. This section will then address the
tools, both formal and informal, that the UN has used to ensure that SEA offenders are
prosecuted. Finally, the third section will review oft cited suggestions in the literature for further
reform and will suggest that the UN needs to drastically restructure the gender and national
makeup of its peacekeeping forces in order reduce the problem of SEA or it will run the risk of
completely delegitimizing the entire UN peacekeeping regime.1
1. Crimes of SEA Among UN Peacekeepers: The History, Issues, and Challenges
1.1 History of SEA
With the end of the Cold War the world witnessed a decrease in the prevalence of
interstate violent conflict and at the same time a significant rise in the occurrence of intrastate
conflict and human rights abuses. Multidimensional peacekeeping became the tool of choice of
the UN, which consists of an approach that includes military forces, police, and civilian
employees working towards the goals of development, peace, and the prevention of future
conflict (Karns & Mingst 329). The early 1990s alone saw peacekeeping operations involving
1 Two items are worth mentioning before continuing. First, it should be noted that though the
larger discussion of the lack of accountability for all crimes committed by UN peacekeepers is
certainly important, the focus here is specifically on the crime of SEA. Lessons learned and
suggestions offered here in reference to sexual abuse could, and should, be transferred to other
crimes committed during UN operations which include, theft, smuggling of illicit goods, and
murder. Second, it is important here to distinguish between acts that are explicitly criminal and
actions that reflect neglect or inaction on the part of peacekeepers such as the introduction of
cholera into Haiti by Nepalese peacekeepers, the accusations of compounding the problem of
HIV/AIDS transmission, or the events that led to the Mother’s of Srebrenica movement. This is
not to diminish the seriousness of which these cases should be taken, but simply to note that
these are actions that are much more difficult, if not impossible to prosecute in any legal setting
and thus require separate attention not afforded in this paper.

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the deployment of troops in Cambodia (1991) Somalia (1993) Haiti (1993) Liberia (1993)
Bosnia (1995) and Herzegovina (1995) among others. Figure 1 illustrates this rise in the use of
peacekeeping even further, showing that the number of troops deployed increased by over a
factor of five from 1991 to 2013, with the total number of all personnel including observers,
police and civilians seeing and even larger increase. While it would be naïve to assume that the
problem of crimes committed by UN peacekeepers is a development that has occurred only since
the 1990s, this paper will focus on the time period from the UN Transition Assistance Group in
Namibia (UNTAG) in 1989 to the present day. During this time period the exponential growth of
the number of troops in the field and their increasingly intermingled role in the societies in which
they work as a part of multidimensional peacekeeping, has provided the most frequent and
documented series of SEAs. Additionally, the increased attention given to the problem during
this timeframe, as will be seen below, makes the period the starting point in most of the
literature.
Problems of SEA among peacekeepers initially became publicized in the late 1980s and
the early 1990s, specifically within the case of Namibia (1989) and to a larger extent in
Cambodia (1991) where peacekeeper presence resulted in “a significant increase in human
trafficking and prostitution” (Alexandra 369). Other missions in the early 1990s that reported
incidences of SEA include Somalia and Liberia (1993) as well as Bosnia, Herzegovina, and
Kosovo (Defeis 187). In 1996 Graças Machel released a study that again linked peacekeeper
presence with a “rapid rise in child prostitution” (Kent 46). However, despite this rather
extensive list of occurrences, SEA failed to gain much public attention until the release of Sexual
Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra

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Leone, by Save the Children UK and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) in 2002 . Additionally, the steep increase in cases brought to the attention of the
international community between the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s prompted the UN
Secretary General to commission a study on the issue. The result was that in 2005, Prince Zeid
Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Jordan’s ambassador to the UN, released a monumental study on the
issue, discussed at length below. The report outlined abuses that took place in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), which has arguably become the most well known of all of the cases
of SEA by UN peacekeepers. Despite these reports and the general uncovering of the problem,
new accusations of abuse are still relatively common and have continued to surface since The
Zeid Report in missions to Liberia, Sudan, Haiti, and Cote d’Ivoire among others.
1.2 The Main Issues
Crimes of SEA are not UN specific problems. For as long as armies have existed so have
sexual abuses by those armies. Additionally, the difficulties of punishing and holding soldiers
accountable for their actions are not solely UN issues. This is evident in the recent debates in
America over whether or not the military court system should be allowed to hear trials of sexual
abuse in house as opposed to in civilian criminal courts. Armies of all forms and nationalities
have long tended to protect their own, which makes punishing criminals, at home and abroad,
problematic. It is not assumed here that SEA is a problem of only the developing world, nor is it
only relevant to peacekeeping missions as opposed to conventional wars. However, the incidents
of SEA in UN peacekeeping missions are unique in at least two ways. First the transnational
makeup of the actors involved from soldiers to NGOs, from the UN to the host states, pose
unique challenges in reporting, punishing, and preventing SEA. Additionally, the identity of the

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UN as a norm setter and protector in the realms of development, human rights, and peace make
crimes of SEA, by those installed to protect the rights of the very people they are abusing, that
much more serious. It is this hypocrisy that could pose major threats to the international
peacekeeping regime as whole, and become the impetus for the downfall of a much-needed force
in the international community.
Sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers entails a variety of actions. Perhaps
the most prevalent form of SEA is the solicitation of prostitutes. The literature is replete with
studies and figures noting the entrance of peacekeepers, or any soldiers for that matter, often
coincides with a precipitous rise in the number of sex workers in the same area. For example,
O’Brien suggests that in Cambodia, with the introduction of peacekeepers, the number of
prostitutes in the area increased from 6,000 to 25,000 (805). Additionally, the landmark 1996
UNICEF study The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children reported that “In 6 out of 12 country
studies on sexual exploitation of children in situations of armed conflict prepared for the present
report, the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a rapid rise in child
prostitution.” (A/51/306 paragraph 98). Even more troubling are the instances of what Defeis
calls “disguised rape” in which a peacekeeper offers a “gift” after sexually assaulting a victim in
order to make it appear to be both consensual and transactional (188). Such gifts could
conceivably be given not only to make the assault appear as prostitution, which may be legal in
the host country, but it also may be used as a way in which to keep the victim from reporting the
crime. Testimony from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) recount transactions between
peacekeepers and underage girls entailing bread, a few dollars, and the widely cited incident in
which two eggs were given in “exchange” for sex. Rape and statutory rape are also prevalent

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among the peacekeeping forces and reflect serious difficulties in enforcement and punishment,
which will be discussed below.
One of the underlying causes, or perhaps catalysts, of SEA is the vast economic
inequality between peacekeepers and the desperately poor societies in which they operate. Aning
et al. review the major economic impacts that peacekeepers have upon the host society including
the increased housing and healthcare prices, and even increases in trade imbalance. The study
also lists the criminal activities associated with these inequalities as trade in illegal goods,
elaborate usurious loan networks run by peacekeepers, and SEA (21-22). Additionally, the
amount of relief supplies and other goods that are accessible to peacekeepers and other UN
employees give them another form of leverage in coercing individuals into sexual relationships.
This massive imbalance of power makes even consensual sexual relationships between
peacekeepers and civilians suspect. As General Romeo Dallaire, the chief of the UN mission in
Rwanda (1993-1994) noted, “As far as I am concerned, there is no such thing as consensual sex
between soldiers and the local population in a war or conflict zone” (Patel 584). This same
sentiment is held here and should be extrapolated out beyond zones of actual conflict and applied
to situations of economic disparity between the peacekeepers and the host society. For the
purposes of this study lines will be drawn between acts of supposed consensual sex and criminal
activity because of the impossibility of bringing charges against an individual for the former. In
reality, the view held here is that sexual relationships that take place under such an imbalance of
power are at the very least coercive and essentially no different than acts of SEA.

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Human trafficking and SEA are highly intertwined. As the name implies, trafficking
involves the involuntary movement of people who in this case will eventually end up as victims
of SEA. Smith et al. suggest that trafficking can also be defined by “explicit coercion, often
coupled with deception, abduction, and involuntary confinement” (289). In the same study,
Smith et al. test the hypothesis that trafficking will increase with the number of UN peacekeepers
measured in interventions in Kosovo (UNMIK and KFOR) Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Sierra
Leone (UNAMSIL). Their results show that their hypothesis was in fact correct, as each case
saw increased trafficking in women from not only within the country, but from nearby states as
well. The study’s list of three observations concludes that: 1.) The history of wars and
intervention shows that soldiers and support personnel use prostitutes. 2.) UN interventions occur
almost entirely within environments within which there are small domestic militaries, and so the
insertion of peacekeepers increases the demand for prostitution. 3.) The introduction of
peacekeepers can suppress the activity of existing criminal networks and thus leave openings for
both domestic and transnational trafficking networks. Additionally, this suppression also offers
the possibility of the UN peacekeepers themselves to form new networks or create partnerships
with other networks in order to meet the increased demand for prostitution. This type of direct
participation in the process of illicit criminal networks, as well as the indirect participation by the
mere presence of peacekeepers shaping transnational trafficking networks, further illustrates the
many problems caused by vast income disparities between peacekeepers and the host society.
The problem of children fathered by peacekeepers, commonly referred to as
“peacekeeper babies,” is much easier to define but perhaps the most difficult to regulate. The
numbers of children reportedly fathered by peacekeepers are astounding, estimated at over

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30,000 in Liberia fathered by both Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG) and United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) soldiers (Aning & Afful
23). Similar studies of Cambodian peacekeeping operations estimate the number of peacekeeper
babies there to be 24,500 (Ndulo 157). Unsurprisingly, these children are often left behind when
the peacekeepers end their tour of duty. Beyond the obvious economic difficulties associated
with raising a child left with a single mother, several authors have noted the lasting social, racial,
and religious stigmas that many children and mothers are left with as well, further stunting
opportunities to emerge from poverty.
1.3 Challenges of Holding Peacekeepers Accountable
Immunities and privileges, both real and perceived, are the underlying challenge to
holding peacekeepers accountable for their crimes. The precedent of immunity from host state
prosecution for peacekeepers is not established in the Convention on The Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, rather it is generally established within the status of forces
agreements (SOFAs) that are set up between the UN and the host nation in accordance with
article 43 of the UN Charter. The model SOFA, created in 1989 and revised in 2007 in response
to The Zeid Report, states that “Military members of the military component of the United
Nations peace-keeping operations shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective
participating States in respect of any criminal offences which may be committed by them in [host
country/territory]” (47 b). This privilege of immunity from host state jurisdiction is absolute, and
one that is held only by military contingents of peacekeeping forces.

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Other positions within peacekeeping missions retain varying forms of immunity. Civilian
police officers (CIVPOL) are considered “experts on mission” as are military observers, and as
such both are afforded functional immunity from host state jurisdiction. However, unlike military
forces, this immunity from host state jurisdiction is caveated by applying only to official actions
and duties taken by these groups. The UN civilians serving in peacekeeping missions are
afforded various levels of functional immunity. Lower level employees are increasingly
considered to be “experts on mission” and so are also given functional immunity from host state
jurisdiction for official acts. Higher-level officials are given greater protection and considered to
have full diplomatic immunity, and as Hampson suggests it is somewhat unclear on whether this
means that these officials can face jurisdiction in their home states (199). Finally, the authority to
waive immunities is given to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and
can be done in the cases of any employee outside of the highest-level officials with diplomatic
immunity and in most cases, military contingents. Peacekeepers can have immunity from host
state jurisdiction waived only if such provisions are made in the SOFA, which is rarely done.
Another issue complicating the ability to hold peacekeepers accountable is the state of
TCC judicial systems (see the rule of law scores in Figure 2). In many of the top TCCs, judicial
systems are weak, lack the ability to investigate international crimes such as those committed by
peacekeepers, or both. Furthermore, investigations and the collection of evidence are nearly
impossible given the remote areas in which peacekeepers work and the distance of both space
and time between the crime and the court, even when a court has ample resources. Compounding
the difficulties of investigation is the environment of conflict in which many crimes of
peacekeepers take place. This results in many offenders never being brought before a court at all.

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Additionally, issues of TCC willingness to prosecute also prevent many criminals from being
punished. Some of these issues have been overcome to a degree by the use of TCC court martials
in the host state in order to more easily collect evidence and hear testimony. Such a court martial
was used in the case of the Pakistani peacekeepers accused of raping a young boy in Haiti,
discussed below.
Additionally, differences in laws between the various TCCs and host states have also
complicated the ability of the UN to hold peacekeepers accountable. Specifically within the
realm of SEA, differences in laws concerning the age of consent, what qualifies as rape, and
prostitution have all made reconciling crimes committed in one state with the laws of another
extremely difficult. Such was the case in Timor Leste where the sex industry thrived and
consisted of a complicated network of actors, compounded by the fact that prostitution was legal
(Koyama 33). Such difficulties have in part resulted in the UN creating standards of its own,
though still not punishable by law. Sentencing has been equally diverse as criminals may receive
lesser punishments in the TCC than they would have in the state of the offense, or in comparison
with stronger judicial systems.
An additional complicating factor is the pressures upon victims that lead to
underreporting incidents of SEA. The economic and social pressures mentioned above often
mean that victims of SEA do not come forward to report the crimes that have been committed
against them. The vast disparities in income and availability of resources have caused many to
quietly suffer in order to make a living or provide for children and other family members in what
are most often situations of war and survival. Weak justice systems in host countries also make

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the reporting of abuse less likely as many victims may see it as a waste of time or jeopardizing
their personal security further by going public with accusations in a formal trial. This
underreporting of cases of SEA results in many offenders going unpunished and continuing the
practices of abuse.
The unlikely prospect of being successfully prosecuted in the TCC has led many to
believe that peacekeepers have immunity for crimes committed in host states. Both the
difficulties and unwillingness in TCC prosecution and investigations, as well as the reluctance of
TCCs to allow local prosecution have led to a widespread feeling of invulnerability among
peacekeepers. This idea is captured in a quote from Didier Bourguet, a former civilian member
of MONUC, and one of the few who was punished (nine years in prison in his home of France)
for crimes of SEA, when he said, “Over there the colonial spirit persists. The white man gets
what he wants” (Alexandra 374).
The model SOFA states that it is the UN’s responsibility to promote discipline within the
ranks, help in any investigation into criminal activities, and also ensure that crimes are
prosecuted in the proper jurisdiction of the TCC. However, this is rarely done, especially among
the poorer and less democratic TCCs. The majority of the instances in which peacekeepers have
been punished for acts of SEA have occurred because of intense international pressure or
because the offender was from a state with an established record of protecting human rights,
coupled with a developed and independent judicial system. This has resulted in repatriation to
the TCC, without an ensuing trial, as the main punishment for crimes of SEA among

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peacekeepers and has also furthered the idea that many peacekeepers may act in an environment
of impunity.
1.4 Peacekeepers Unpunished: Impunity In Cote d’Ivoire and the DRC
Lack of transparency on the part of the UN and TCCs has led to little available
information about the processes and eventual outcomes of investigations into SEA. Though the
TCCs are required to follow up with the UN concerning actions taken against perpetrators, they
rarely do so, and when they do it is often to report suboptimal outcomes. One such case can be
found in the example of Moroccan peacekeepers in Cote d’Ivoire. After accusations of abuse
surfaced against the Moroccan contingent in 2007, the UN initiated an investigation alongside
Moroccan authorities. Though the investigation was undertaken largely in secrecy, it is known
that 14 peacekeepers were the subject of the investigation and that, by the use of DNA testing,
some of them were proven to have fathered children with the victims. However, the UN never
officially revealed the results of the investigation and the Moroccan government decided that
there was no conclusive evidence that acts of abuse had taken place, despite previously
contradictory claims, and eventually dropped the charges. Throughout this process Morocco
failed to inform the UN of the actions taken against the accused.
The abuses of Indian peacekeepers in the DRC have been among the most widely
publicized instances of SEA. A 2008 report from the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight
Services (OIOS) stated that “prima facie evidence” existed linking Indian peacekeepers to paying
underage girls for sex. Reports suggest that this incident was not a one-time event, rather an
established network of child prostitution that involved over 100 Indian peacekeepers (Caplan).

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This abuse by Indian peacekeepers also provides one of the few instances in which the UN
publicly admonished and named the TCC, noting that if found guilty the perpetrators should
receive, “disciplinary action to the maximum degree permitted by Indian law” (Stecklow).
Despite multiple investigations that confirmed the involvement of Indian peacekeepers, the
soldiers were eventually released without punishment.
The examples above are two cases in which seemingly incontrovertible evidence was
ignored by the TCC and perpetrators of SEA were not punished for their crimes. Despite the
publicity from the media given to these cases, they were still not decided in an appropriate
manner with any level of transparency outside of the release of information from “those close to
the situation.” These cases not only illustrate the difficulties of participation between the UN and
TCCs but they also seem to suggest that naming and shaming did not in fact have a significant
impact on the outcomes.
2. The United Nations’ Response: Important Documents and Available Actions
2.1 Important Documents
Status of Forces Agreements
Status of Forces Agreements are the instrumental documents in terms of establishing the
relationship between the host country, peacekeeping soldiers and the TCC. SOFAs are generally
created on a mission specific basis, but largely follow the model SOFA that was drafted by the
Secretary-General in 1989 and revised in 2007 to address issues of SEA. The model SOFA is
considered to be in effect until a mission specific one is agreed upon as well as in the case in

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which a mission specific SOFA is never established (Oswald 34). The model SOFA draws
heavily from the Convention on The Privileges and Immunities of The United Nations and
applies its statutes to peacekeepers as well as to TCCs, which may not be party to the original
convention. As mentioned above, the model SOFA establishes the TCC as having sole
jurisdiction over crimes by peacekeepers. Additionally, the model SOFA describes the process
that allows the SRSG to determine whether an act was committed during official duties and the
process of appeals that a host country may take to the SRSG in order to request that a member of
a mission be transferred to their custody. It is important to note here that there is no official UN
requirement that SOFAs must entail the provisions of peacekeeper immunity to host state
jurisdiction. Additionally, article 48 of the model SOFA states that the TCC will provide
assurances to the Secretary General that “they will be prepared to exercise jurisdiction with
respect to crimes of offences which may be committed by members of their national contingents
serving with the peace-keeping operations.”
The Memorandum of Understanding
Together with the SOFA, the Memorandum of Understanding between the United
Nations and [participating State] contributing resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping
Operation (MOU) is one of the most important documents for a peacekeeping mission. The
MOU, which was originally created in 1991 and revised in 1997, instructs peacekeeping
missions on conduct, treatment of equipment, administration, and logistics. In 2007 the MOU
was again revised in response to SEA and The Zeid Report. In Annex F of the MOU sexual
abuse and exploitation are defined and classified as “serious misconduct.” This definition of SEA
largely reflects definitions presented in the 2003 Secretary-General’s Bulletin. Additionally,

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Annex H is a reprinting of “We Are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel” the document that
The Zeid Report recommended all peacekeepers carry on their person. The Annex forbids,
“sexual activity with children under 18, or exchange of money, employment, goods or services
for sex.” The MOU also reiterates the responsibility of TCCs and individual soldiers to report
abuses, as well as the TCC’s responsibility in investigating and punishing incidents of SEA or
any other serious misconduct.
The MONUC Code of Conduct (1999)
The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONUC) was established in 1999 as a result of years of debilitating conflict. From the outset
the mission was plagued by reports of SEA from several contingents of peacekeepers. As a result
of the increased media attention and scrutiny, MONUC developed a mission specific code of
conduct in 2002 specifically addressing SEA among peacekeepers. The code includes the
prohibition of:
 Visits to brothels and other areas declared off-limits.
 Sexual relations with anyone under the age of 18, with no excuse for ignorance of
age.
 Use of anyone to procure sexual services.
 Exchange of goods, services, employment, humanitarian assistance or money for
sex.

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Furthermore, the document states, “immunity, when it exists, will be waived by the Secretary-
General should this immunity impede the course of justice” (ST/SGB/1999/13). However, this
waiver of immunity did not apply to peacekeepers without a change made in the SOFA between
the TCCs and the UN, changes that never occurred. Mission specific codes of conduct have
repeatedly been altered to reflect the problems that missions face on a daily basis. Furthermore,
individual TCCs often have their own codes of conduct that further restrict peacekeepers,
particularly in issues such as curfews, sexual relationships, and limited travel to specific
locations within the host state known to be of ill repute.
Secretary-General’s Bulletin (2003)
Kofi Annan’s 2003 bulletin, Special Measures for the Protection from Sexual
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) took a much wider view of SEA and included
within the definition “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential
power, or trust, for sexual purposes including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or
politically from the sexual exploitation of another” (Section 1). The bulletin included and
expanded the purview of the MONUC Code of Conduct by both clarifying what constitutes SEA
and also by being applicable to all staff of the UN and UN related agencies. Furthermore, the
bulletin “highly discouraged” sexual relationships in general between UN staff members and
recipients of assistance “as they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics” (3.2 (d)). The
bulletin required that each mission empower an individual with the responsibility of receiving
reports on SEA, who is then in charge of the process of reporting to the UN hierarchy and, when
required, the national authorities.

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While the acknowledgement of the major imbalances of power in relationships and the
attempt to set up a reporting system are important, the bulletin still had major flaws. Ndulo notes
that the bulletin is only legally binding on non-military personnel (148). Throughout the
literature on this topic it becomes clear that UN civilian staff are treated and punished differently
than uniformed peacekeepers, which fall under their jurisdiction of their home country. The UN
has the ability to punish their own employees but lacks the ability to do so when it comes to
peacekeepers. Additionally, some civilian UN staff are not protected from local jurisdiction for
their crimes, and can in fact be arrested with the permission of the SRSG. (Oswald 36). Again,
this bulletin typifies the UN response, a valiant attempt to change the views of SEA within the
organization but largely ineffective without the active participation of TCCs.
The Zeid Report (2005)
In 2005, at the height of the media scrutiny over the MONUC scandal, Secretary General
Kofi Annan requested that Jordan’s ambassador to the UN, Prince Zeid, investigate the problem
of SEA and make recommendations for UN policy and action. Zeid became the special advisor
on sexual exploitation and abuse and released his report, A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate
Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations that Annan
referred to as, “the first comprehensive analysis of the problem of sexual exploitation and abuse
by the United Nations peacekeeping personnel” (A/59/710). Some of the recommendations from
the report include:
 The application of the 2003 Secretary-General’s bulletin to all categories of
peacekeeping personnel in regards to the prohibition of SEA.

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 The issuance of important UN codes of conduct including Ten Rules: Code of
Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and We are United Nations to all
peacekeepers. Additionally, the report called for the printing of cards that
peacekeepers would carry on their person laying out the 2003 bulletin and codes
of conduct.
 Guarantees from TCCs that the 2003 Bulletin and codes of conduct become
binding on peacekeepers.
 The establishment of a professional investigative unit for incidents of SEA.
 Inclusion of an expert in military law from TCCs in peacekeeping missions.
 Holding on-site court martials by TCCs in order to expedite and facilitate
investigations.
Additionally, the report prescribed that individuals guilty of SEA should be forced to pay
financial damages to victims, specifically in cases in which peacekeepers father children and
paternity was confirmed through required testing. The report also suggested that TCCs should be
required to report on the progress of cases within 120 days after referral from the UN. The Zeid
Report was the impetus for several changes within the UN including the 2007 revisions of the
Model SOFA and the MOU between TCCs and the UN. Additionally, the special task force for
the prevention of SEA was created as a result of the report. Finally, protocols were set in place in
order to assist victims of SEA, train peacekeepers on gender issues, and standardize codes of
conduct for all troops.

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Security Council Resolutions On Women, Peace, and Security
The Security Council has drafted multiple resolutions dealing with women, peace, and
security that have direct impact on the issue of SEA. Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000, notes at
the outset that, “civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those
adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons”
(Introduction). The resolution called for the need to “mainstream” a gender perspective in
peacekeeping missions, and requested that women make up a larger part of the decision making
process. A direct result of the resolution was the implementation of the Gender Resource
Package, which explained the concepts of gender mainstreaming to all members of peacekeeping
operations. Resolution 1820, adopted in 2008, called for the participation of TCCs in training
and preparing their personnel on the issues of sexual violence and other issues dealing with
women and children in conflict. Additionally, the resolution also requested that TCCs “ensure
full accountability in cases of such conduct (SEA) involving their personnel” (Operative Part [7])
and suggested that a method to do so may include “the deployment of higher percentage of
women peacekeepers or police (Operative Part [8]). Resolution 1888 expands even further and
calls for “vetting candidates for national armies and security forces to ensure the exclusion of
those associated with serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law,
including sexual violence (Operative Part [3]). As a whole, these three resolutions and a number
of others on the topic, give peacekeeping missions the explicit mandate to protect women and
ensure the promotion of their human rights.

23. 23
2.2 Available Actions
The UN is limited in the direct actions that it can take in terms of punishment of SEA
offending peacekeepers. In response to SEA Hampson states that, “the maximum action the
United Nations can directly take is repatriation” (208). Because peacekeepers fall under the sole
jurisdiction of TCCs, there is essentially no legal recourse that the UN can take. The difficulties
of sending a peacekeeper to the TCC jurisdiction have already been mentioned above and so will
not be discussed again here. Because of the difficulties associated with the distance in space and
time from the crime that was committed, the UN can help in facilitating a court martial in the
country of offense. As will be seen below this was done recently in the case of Pakistani
peacekeepers in Haiti. While these on-site court martials tend to be extremely secretive and lack
transparency, they at least in theory provide a way to overcome some of the many problems
associated with crimes committed on peacekeeping missions.
Many have suggested that the UN “name and shame” countries and individuals guilty of
SEA. While this method is most certainly an option available to the UN, it is rarely used.
Extensive research of the many allegations of SEA reveals shockingly few cases in which the
nationality of the offender is given, and even fewer cases when the offender is named. In cases in
which the nationality of the offender or accused is known the overwhelming majority involve
photographic evidence, a multitude of witnesses, or the offering of the information from the
offending peacekeeper’s TCC. Some exceptions to this rule have occurred as the UN has
specifically named India in at least one case. In the overwhelming majority of the cases in which
nationality, personal identity, or even the specific nature of the crime is known, it is usually

24. 24
because of photographic evidence or investigative journalism, not because the data was willingly
revealed by the UN.
Another available action for the UN is that of investigating crimes. A 2007 revision of the
MOU afforded the OIOS the mandate to undertake initial investigations as well as investigations
in which the TCC proved unwilling or incapable (A/61/19 Article 7). Prior to this revision the
right to investigation rested solely with the TCC. However, jurisdiction still remains with the
TCC and so the investigations of the OIOS cannot result in punishment from the UN. Ferstman
suggests that such a role allows the UN to preserve evidence and prevent the tainting of crime
scenes both before a TCC investigative unit arrives and also in cases of unwilling or unable
TCCs (5). Though certainly an important step in solidifying investigative and judicial processes,
it seems that Ferstman over-exaggerates the benefits of such investigations. Such evidence
collecting may only prove useful in cases in which the TCC is determined to prosecute, and as
seen above in the examples of India and Morocco, evidence from investigations is not always
taken into account in TCC jurisdictions.
2.3 Peacekeepers “Punished:” Uruguayan and Pakistani Peacekeepers in Haiti
Because of the previously mentioned complications, finding instances in which UN
peacekeepers were actually punished for crimes of SEA is rare. However, two examples from
Haiti offer some insight into the process of punishment in TCCs. Both cases came to light
through the media and also seemingly in part because of the large international presence in Haiti.

25. 25
In September 2011 a video shot from a cell phone began circulating on the Internet
showing four Uruguayan peacekeepers holding 18-year-old Haitian boy Johnny Jean against a
mattress and sexually assaulting him. According to testimony, the sexual assault took place after
Johnny was forcibly taken from the street into the UN base and physically assaulted. The
attention drawn to the video caused the Uruguayan government to immediately recall the four
peacekeepers and replace the head of the contingent. The investigation and trial took place over
the span of a year in which the charges against the men were dropped from “sexual abuse” to
“private violence” to “coercion.” The investigation was halted at least once for lack of evidence
and the men were released, yet imprisoned once again after the testimony of the Haitian victim in
Uruguay, which eventually caused a formal trial to begin. The three soldiers were ultimately
convicted of “coercion.” The men were sentenced to two years and one month in prison, though
they were not required to return to prison after having served three months during the entire
process.
A second case of sexual assault concerns three Pakistani UN police officers. Though the
focus of this paper has been solely on UN troops there are lessons to learn from the methods used
in this case but certainly not the results. In March of 2012 the Pakistani government sent a team
to the Northern Haitian city of Gonaives, where the assault took place, in order to set up an on
site court martial of the three offenders. By all accounts the trial was held in secrecy and little is
actually known about the crimes other than that the victim was an un-named 14-year-old boy.
The results of the trial are known as all three men were discharged from the Pakistani army and
were sentenced to a year in prison each. Reports also suggest that there was a high level of

26. 26
communication between the Pakistani government and the UN about the trial and punishment of
the offenders.
Both cases illustrate the problems of convicting a peacekeeper and also the lack of
gravity afforded to the issue of SEA among peacekeepers by TCCs. In the Uruguayan case the
video evidence, made public for all to see, as well as the testimony of the victim was apparently
enough to lead to conviction but the ensuing jail time of three months was insufficient by most
standards. Many have argued that this was also the case in the instance of the Pakistani police.
Javier Zuñiga of Amnesty International notes, “Very little information is available on this case
and the nature of the sexual assault but what is clear is a military trial conducted in virtual
secrecy that resulted in a one year sentence is utterly unacceptable and a travesty of justice”
(Amnesty International). When asked about the appropriateness of the sentencing in the
Pakistani case the spokesmen of the Secretary General replied:
The United Nations will not comment on the terms of the punishment under the member-
states, the judicial procedure. That's obviously a matter between Pakistan and Haiti, but
as we stated from the outset, the United Nations considers this to be a case of the most
serious sexual exploitation and abuse (CNN).
Clearly, there remains a disconnect between the rhetoric of SEA put forth by the UN and
the actions taken both by TCCs and the UN itself. Though the UN faces limitations in its ability
to address the issue it could certainly take more assertive action as will be discussed in the
following section. What is important to remember in both of these cases is that these are

27. 27
supposedly positive instances in which the system worked, as the UN successfully handed over
troops who were then repatriated and tried in the TCC. Even when the processes follow the
proper protocol, the ultimate results are often lacking.
3. Moving Forward: Evaluating, Explaining, and Reforming the Response
3.1 Evaluating The UN’s Response to SEA
Most reports show that the number of formal allegations of SEA among peacekeepers has
declined since the peak numbers in the early 2000s. Additionally, the OIOS reports a significant
decline in the number of cases investigated since the same peak years. The OIOS also records
that, as of September 2013 (the last reported month), six cases of SEA had been under
investigation for over a year. Shortly after the publication of these statistics more reports of SEA
in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) came to light
and so one would expect the number of investigations for the year to increase. There is little
doubt that underreporting and other previously mentioned difficulties with investigations have
meant that these numbers are likely skewed and that the actual number of cases is significantly
higher, though again most likely still lower than the peak number of cases that occurred during
the MONUC fiasco. Even considering this decline, it is still unacceptable that any crimes of SEA
are occurring and going unpunished.
It would be impossible to attribute the relative decline in the reported instances of SEA
among peacekeepers to any specific UN action thus far. To date the UN response to the problem

28. 28
has been to issue statements, reports, and hold meetings on the topic, yet the underlying position
on the issue has still not changed. This unwavering stance is seen clearly in a recent quote from
the Secretary-General’s spokesman, Martin Nesirky in reference to an incident of SEA in Mali,
“The troop contributing country has primary responsibility for investigating the matter and
ensuring that appropriate disciplinary and judicial measures are taken should the allegations be
well founded” (UN News). When looking through the public statements from the UN this phrase
is oft repeated. The UN consistently states regret or anger over the incident and then quickly
shifts the emphasis to the TCCs. In short it appears that the UN utilizes the current system of
TCC jurisdiction to push blame away from itself and to avoid the issue of internal reform.
One major hindrance to the UN’s response has been lack of clarity. The varying protocols
dealing with immunities for CIVPOL, civilians, and peacekeepers have produced considerable
confusion amongst the general public and even among some of the non-military components of
peacekeeping missions as they may think that they too are immune from host state prosecution.
Many have noted that the supposed “zero tolerance” policy set out by the Secretary-General also
provides a false sense of accountability as the UN has no authority to punish the peacekeepers,
only civilians and CIVPOL. Additionally, within the peacekeeping forces, individual TCCs may
have differing rules regarding SEA and other discipline. Some TCCs set curfews and no go
zones for their troops, others forbid sex of any kind while on mission, and still others do not
allow civilians on base. The way in which a TCC provides for its troops also varies greatly. The
UN provides a “welfare allocation” of eight dollars per month per soldier to all TCCs, money
that is supposed to go towards recreation and other benefits for the soldier (Defeis 198). In
actuality how this money is spent varies greatly based upon the mission and the TCC. Perhaps

29. 29
nothing provides a better example of the lack of clarity and internal cohesion on the matter of
SEA within the UN than the fact that missions distribute five condoms per week for each soldier
as a measure to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS. The hypocrisy of passing out condoms while
promoting a code of conduct that acknowledges the exploitative nature of sexual relationships
between peacekeepers and the local citizens has not gone unnoticed.
Further compounding the problem of clarity is the lack of transparency provided by the
UN. The Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) was established in 2005 under the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in order to train and discipline peacekeepers as well as report
statistics on discipline and allegations of misconduct. Through the CDU website one can find
statistics on allegations of various forms of misconduct over time as well as on how member
states have responded to follow up questions regarding SEA. Again, though a step in the right
direction these statistics do not reveal the nationalities of the offenders, nor the nature of the
crimes alleged against them and so offers little useful data for specific action. The fact that these
statistics are collected also suggests that the UN does in fact know much more data than what is
being shared with the public regarding the offending peacekeepers and TCCs.
3.2 Commonly Proposed Solutions
The literature is filled with suggestions of how to correct the problem of SEA among
peacekeepers. These suggestions vary in terms of feasibility of implementation and the
likelihood of making a significant impact on the problem. Four of these suggestions: using the
International Criminal Court (ICC), incorporating more women into peacekeeping operations,
giving the host state jurisdiction, and the increased use of “name and shame” techniques are

30. 30
evaluated below. I conclude that the first two are not viable options while the latter two are
insufficient on their own and should be bolstered by a more direct and fundamental change in the
way the UN constructs peacekeeping forces.
Several studies suggest that UN peacekeepers accused of SEA should have jurisdiction
referred to the ICC. O’Brien notes several cases in the ICC in which crimes of SEA are treated as
crimes against humanity and war crimes, citing accusations against Joseph Kony, Al Bashir, and
Bemba Gombo, among others. In fact Article 7(g) of the Rome Stature clearly states that “rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity” all fall under the umbrella of “crimes against humanity”
(815-816). O’Brien also suggests that further revisions are required to the Rome Statute in order
to include the more nebulous, but equally reprehensible, concept of sexual exploitation.
Setting aside the debate over whether crimes of SEA should be considered crimes against
humanity and war crimes, and so fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC, this suggested reform is
lacking in several ways. First, as seen in Figure 2, many of the top TCCs are not party to the
Rome Statute. Even if the Security Council were to refer a case of peacekeeper crimes to the ICC
there is little evidence from history to suggest that the offending peacekeeper or the TCC would
comply and actually appear before the court. Second, the many problems of investigating crimes
from a distance of space and time are still present. Even if the ICC set up temporary hearings in
the host country where the offense took place it would most likely not be able to do so within a
short time frame, making the collection of evidence even more difficult. Third, because of the
large number of accusations of SEA either taking place in Africa or by Africans, this potential

31. 31
reform would do little to improve what many see as an “Africa bias” in the ICC. Overall this
suggestion has little merit not only because nearly half of the top TCCs are not party to the Rome
Statute, but also because many of the same problems in prosecuting a peacekeeper in the TCC
are still prevalent in the ICC.
Perhaps the most oft cited suggestion for correcting the problem is for the increased
inclusion of women in peacekeeping missions. Though the UN has improved considerably in this
area (20 uniformed women served from 1957 to 1989 and over 3,000 serve today), there remains
significant room for improvement as seen in the ratio of men to women in both CIVPOL and
military contingents. A larger female presence in missions is seen as making the force as a whole
more approachable by women and also increasing the sense of security for both women and
children in the host country. One study from the UN Division for The Advancement of Women
concluded that even the presence of a “token” female reduces the number of incidents of rape
and prostitution. The argument from the study is that the presence of females in the force makes
the military contingent more closely mirror the TCC sending society and thus reduce the sense of
lawlessness resulting in the male soldiers being “more likely to observe social conventions and
define civilized behavior” (Kent 57).
Any appropriate response to the problem of SEA by peacekeepers must include in part
the increased participation of female peacekeepers and CIVPOL. However, as a stand-alone
reform it is lacking for at least two reasons. The first is that it does not solve the problem of
holding peacekeepers accountable when crimes are actually committed. Even if the previously
mentioned study is correct, and it is not within the scope of this paper to review methods, the

32. 32
presence of women only lowers the incidents of SEA and does not create any type of
accountability for when they do occur. Second, and again reflected in the Gender Equality Index
in Figure 2, it appears naïve to assume that the mere presence of females in a peacekeeping force
would prevent attacks on host country women considering that many of the top TCCs records on
the treatment of women are subpar. The presence of a “token” female peacekeeper, and the
reflection of the TCC home society that they may bring, may not be as helpful in contingents of
peacekeepers from countries in which SEA against women is widely tolerated or unpunished.
Because of this, other reforms, such as the ones suggested in the following section must be
included in order to more comprehensively address the issue. The use of women in peacekeeping
operations is most certainly a valuable tool on multiple levels but it is not a panacea for the
problem at hand.
Many have argued that jurisdiction over crimes of SEA should be given to host states
either initially or only after the TCC has proven inability or unwillingness to prosecute. This
option is also problematic for a number of reasons. First, the suggestion that jurisdiction be
handed over to host states if the TCC does not prosecute is unlikely to solve anything as there is
little reason to believe that a TCC which does not punish its own citizen would allow another
country to do so. Additionally, there are legitimate questions concerning the partiality of any jury
in a host state, just as there are in a TCC. For one, as is the case with many TCCs, most host
states are low income and embroiled in conflict and so judicial systems are most likely
underfunded, underdeveloped, or both. Additionally, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which
a MONUC peacekeeper would receive a fair trial in the DRC, or a MINUSTAH peacekeeper in
Haiti, after the multiple and egregious accusations of SEA, physical abuse, or other actions such

33. 33
as the introduction of cholera in the case of Haiti. Though turning over jurisdiction to the host
state appears to be an option of appeasement towards the victimized community, in reality there
are just as many problems with host state jurisdiction as there are with expatriation for TCC
jurisdiction.
Another commonly suggested response is that the UN adopt the use of naming and
shaming. Specifically, many call for the UN to publicly admonish TCCs that do not manage to
take action against those guilty of SEA. The UN’s current policy appears to be one of not
revealing the identities of individuals or TCCs at all possible costs. Figure 3 reflects many hours
of scouring news sources and journals in an attempt to connect individual acts of SEA with
specific TCCs and also the punishment, if any, eventually meted out upon the offender. It
quickly became obvious that such a project could take months of research as inordinately few
cases of SEA in the news, whether released by private news agencies or the UN itself, include
the nationality of the offending peacekeepers. Further complicating this effort was the inability to
distinguish between incidents because of the lack of reporting on the nature of a crime. One news
article may speak of four UNMIL peacekeepers accused of rape and another of two UNMIL
peacekeepers repatriated for abuse. Without the release of details it is impossible to tell whether
these are two separate events accounting for six incidents of abuse, or if in fact it is one event in
which four were accused of rape and two repatriated.
The effectiveness of naming and shaming is contested. Many studies have addressed the
importance of naming and shaming both by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and NGOs,
but few, if any, have examined the impact that naming shaming could have on incidents of

34. 34
unpunished SEA in TCCs. Krain suggests that the use of naming and shaming techniques by
NGOs, media and the UNCHR have proven to be effective in ameliorating “the severity of the
most extreme atrocities” in referenced to genocides and “politicides” (574). While genocide and
SEA are extremely different crimes it is reasonable to assume that the possibilities for similar
results exists. Nevertheless, the use of naming and shaming’s biggest contribution to the issue
may actually be in the transparency and information provided in the releasing of data. Naming
and shaming focuses largely upon the TCC, as opposed to the individual, after the incident of
SEA has taken place and so the impact on preventing SEA may be limited. The impact of
naming and shaming on the TCC may be greater, as the shamed state may be more likely to
punish an offending peacekeeper in future incidents. The conclusion here is that while naming
and shaming should be promoted as a crucial part of any attempt to address the problem, it is in
fact, like the addition of female peacekeepers, insufficient on its own.
3.3 Addressing The Causes: Political Economy of Peacekeeping
Any attempt to rectify to the dilemma of SEA among peacekeepers must address at least
three issues. The first is the way in which peacekeepers are procured within the UN, a system
that actually provides a disincentive for punishing peacekeepers. The second issue that any valid
policy must address is that it must reduce the number of incidents of SEA. Lastly, any solution
must also provide a guarantee that those who are found guilty of SEA will in fact be punished.
Historically, attempts to address the problem have focused on only one of the above tactics. Such
approaches will always be found lacking and so a more holistic approach is now required.

35. 35
Figure 2 provides a list of the top TCCs by number of military and CIVPOL personnel
provided to peacekeeping missions. Three important facts about the UN peacekeeping forces can
be drawn from this chart. First, notice that the preponderance of TCCs listed are either
designated as “lower middle income” or “low income” by the World Bank, with over a third
falling into the latter category. It is not the assertion here that lower income countries or their
people are more likely to commit acts of SEA, rather it is to suggest that there is a definite
correlation between the wealth of a nation and their willingness to contribute soldiers to
peacekeeping missions. Second, the countries that contribute the largest number of troops to
missions are also those with historically poor records of human rights abuses, particularly in
negative views towards women. The Gender Inequality Index is used here in order to attempt to
illustrate the plight of women in each TCC. The idea here is that a soldier from a country that
shows little value for women may be more inclined to commit acts of SEA. This is admittedly an
imperfect measurement and more reliable statistics on incidents of physical violence and SEA in
the TCC would be extremely useful to further this point. This statistic is also provided in order to
pose a counterargument to the idea mentioned above, that a token female peacekeeper may in
fact make male peacekeepers conform to social norms in their home society. In cases in which
home societies are also places in which gender inequality and SEA are largely tolerated, or even
promoted, this method alone may prove unsatisfactory. Lastly, both the ICC and the Rule of Law
Index offer indicators that not only point to the difficulties of investigating and punishing a
peacekeeper for his crimes but also illustrates that the idea of using the ICC is problematic as
well. With these three factors in mind, the question that needs answering is why the UN has
allowed the peacekeeping forces to be comprised from states that are largely weak across several
of the most championed issues of the organization.

36. 36
Perhaps unsurprisingly, though the majority of TCCs are lower income states, those that
give the most funding to peacekeeping missions are high income and have better records in
respecting human rights (see Figure 4). In 1973 the UN General Assembly Resolution 3101
created a system in which specific shares of peacekeeping funding, which are periodically
reviewed, are assigned to three different groups of member states, the five permanent members
of the Security Council (the largest share), industrialized nations outside the Security Council
(second largest), and the remaining UN members (smallest share) (Gaibulloev 829). Most
commentators have suggested at least two reasons for the lack of soldier contributions from the
higher income countries. First, the relatively low payment, US $1,028 per soldier per month, by
the UN to TCCs per soldier essentially eliminates participation of the more advanced armies in
developed nations (Bove 704). Secondly, the increased violence and risk of casualties in
peacekeeping missions has also led many countries to refrain from contributing troops (Karns &
Mingst 326).
Thus the UN remains in a quandary in which provocation of a TCC by naming and
shaming or through the use of forced repatriation runs the risk of losing the participation of a
large number of soldiers, a loss that would be difficult to sustain with the increased usage of
peacekeepers as seen in Figure 1. The UN response to this quandary, extensively discussed
above, has been to put forth volumes of directives which sound as if a hardline stance is being
taken but in fact have no way to be enforced beyond simply repatriating the offending soldier.
The UN has also attempted to divert all pressure onto the TCCs; consistently noting that
punishment ultimately falls under their jurisdiction. This seems all too convenient for the UN as

37. 37
it manages to still utilize the troops from an offending TCC while not having to actually
undertake any form of discipline. Despite the many documents and speeches that have attempted
to prove otherwise, it appears that the UN has placed self-preservation of the peacekeeping
regime above the welfare of thousands of people whom they are entrusted to protect.
3.4 A New Approach
An appropriate response must include a way in which to span the divide between the
unwillingness or inability of TCCs to punish those guilty of SEA and a way in which the UN can
assume responsibility for punishment and yet not intrude on TCC sovereignty. The following
responses propose to do so in a twofold solution. This first component is to reform the makeup
and compensation of the peacekeeping forces. The second is to establish a court specifically for
peacekeeper crimes that would require mandatory participation by TCCs.
First, in order to increase accountability and to attract peacekeepers from more highly
trained armies, the UN should consider increasing the pay given to the TCC per soldier per
month. This does not require increasing the pay of the peacekeepers while on mission, as pay
rates are determined by the TCC, and also the inequalities between peacekeepers and citizens
play a major role in the perpetuation of SEA. Instead, higher pay to the TCC would attract
peacekeepers from other countries, diversifying the troop makeup away from the poorest
countries that provide lesser training, both military training as well as on issues such as gender
and SEA. Additionally, higher pay would allow the UN to apply conditions to the contribution of
troops to peacekeeping missions, including the use of a special court further discussed below.
Given the option, developed countries would still most likely choose to contribute more money

38. 38
to peacekeeping as opposed to contributing actual soldiers yet either option would prove
beneficial. A critique of this plan would be that few developed countries would choose to
contribute more money or more troops. This seems unlikely, as the developed countries of the
world rely on UN peacekeepers to mediate some of the most intractable conflicts on the planet,
conflicts in which the developed countries cannot afford in soldiers or money to participate.
Second, the use of higher pay would give the UN some leverage over the TCCs. There is
a consensus throughout the literature that TCCs contribute troops for three main reasons. The
first is for political reasons, such as Brazil attempting to win some favor in the UN for a bid to
receive a seat on the Security Council. The second is in order to provide their armies with
valuable training in the field. The third reason is to essentially subsidize the pay of armies by
sending them to peacekeeping missions. Looking at Figure 2 and remembering that TCCs are
paid $1,028 USD per month per soldier shows that many of the top TCCs are receiving millions
of dollars in pay each year for their contributions. The UN should consider using this leverage in
order to establish a specific court for crimes committed by any member of a peacekeeping
mission. Such a court could be established within each mission or as a sort of itinerate body in
which crimes would be tried in the country in which they occurred in a timely manner. It could
also be suggested that such a court would be used only in cases in which the host country (if the
offender is a civilian) or TCC was unwilling or unable to try the accused, though the issue of
inadequate sentencing would still exist. The UN should demand that any trial take place in the
country of offense and within UN custody in order to avoid issues of extradition that have
plagued the ICC. There is reason to believe that if the UN compensated TCCs more

39. 39
competitively with the condition of agreeing to handing over jurisdiction of peacekeepers to a
third party court, that the economic benefits would win out.
Lastly, as mentioned above, any strategy should also include the increased participation
of women as well as the use of naming and shaming offending countries. Women should be
afforded larger roles in all aspects of peacekeeping missions, if for no other reason because
women and children are often the most marginalized groups in areas in which the UN works.
Making peacekeepers more approachable and relatable to the public could provide a key step in
confidence building, especially in communities that have been victims of SEA at the hands of
peacekeepers. While adding more women to the civilian and CIVPOL ranks of missions is
admirable, it should not be conflated with the addition of women to military contingents where
the bulk of abuse takes place. Additionally, heightened transparency by the UN with full
disclosure of the crimes and the accused, as well as the punishment process, must be
incorporated into the solution. The increased pay to TCCs may also provide a more legitimate
threat against states that are repeat offenders as few would want to lose the money afforded by
the UN and many states would be willing to take the place of one which the UN barred from
participation.
Conclusion
The exploitation and abuse of marginalized populations by UN peacekeepers, the very
people meant to protect them, is abhorrent and unacceptable. It is in the interest of all involved,
host states, TCCs, the UN, and the international community as a whole to ensure that everything
possible is done in order to prevent and punish incidents of SEA. This paper has suggested that

40. 40
the UN has largely tolerated SEA, by only superficially addressing the problem and consistently
shifting the onus of responsibility to TCCs for the purpose of self-perpetuation, mainly to meet
the growing demand for peacekeepers. With this being the case, the solution proposed here lays
mainly within the UN itself. As long as the UN continues to respond to SEA with non-binding
and unenforceable resolutions, reports, and bulletins, the problem of SEA specifically, and
crimes of peacekeepers in general, will persist. If serious actions, like the ones suggested here,
are taken and the UN chooses to alter the very makeup of peacekeeping forces and how
peacekeepers are procured, then the UN itself could help solve the problem instead of constantly
looking towards the TCCs for the solution. If not, and the UN continues down the same path of
protecting the organization over the welfare of the people it is supposedly trying to protect, then
it will in fact destroy the reputation and legitimacy of peacekeeping, one of the international
community’s most valuable resources.

41. 41
Figure 1
Prepared by the Peace and Security Section of DPI in
consultation with the Office of Military Affairs of DPKO
DPI/2444/Rev.35 -- February 2014
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
NumberofUniformedPersonnel
Surge in Uniformed UN Peacekeeping Personnel from 1991- Present
Police Military Observers Troops Total
Jul 1993: 78,444
(Largest missions: UNPROFOR, UNOSOM, UNTAC)
Nov 2001: 47,778
(UNAMSIL, UNTAET)
Oct. 2006: 80,976
(MONUC, UNMIL,
UNMIS, UNIFIL)
Mar. 2010: 101,939
(UNAMID, MONUC, UNIFIL)
31 January 2014: 98,344
(MONUSCO, UNAMID,
UNIFIL)

42. 42
Figure 2
*http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/# The first score is out of 99 based on the rule of law. The number in
parentheses is the evaluation of the criminal justice system with 1 being the best possible score.
Figure 3
TCC
Total Contributions
CIVPOL and Troops
Male Female Troops
2012 Gender
Equality Index
(out of 186)
ROL Index
2014 (Criminal
Justice Score)*
ICC
World Bank
Classification
Pakistan 8,266 8,239 27 7,628 123 96 (.37) No LMI
Bangladesh 7,929 7,728 201 6,101 111 92 (.29) Yes LI
India 7,848 7,697 151 6,798 132 66 (.48) No LMI
Ethiopia 6,615 6,214 401 6,480 NR 88 (.45) No LI
Nigeria 4,850 4,516 334 4,128 NR 93 (.31) Yes LMI
Nepal 4,844 4,727 117 3,794 102 57 (.43) No LI
Rwanda 4,802 4,546 256 4,243 76 NR No LI
Jordan 3,263 3,250 13 1,687 99 38 (.56) Yes MI
Senegal 2,969 2,931 38 1,886 115 43 (.42) Yes LMI
Ghana 2,864 2,578 286 2,568 121 37 (.44) Yes LMI
Egypt 2,740 2,740 0 2,240 126 74 (.41) No MI
Tanzania 2,428 2,304 124 2,215 119 69 (.46) No LI
China 2,188 2,129 59 1,980 NR 76 (.43) No MI
South Africa 2,186 1,941 245 2,105 90 40 (.45) Yes MI
Uruguay 2,157 2,036 121 2,122 69 20 (.47) Yes HI
Burkina Faso 1,988 1,928 60 1,665 131 53 (.38) Yes LI
Niger 1,872 1,847 25 1,739 146 NR Yes LI
Brazil 1,755 1,736 19 1,716 85 42 (.37) Yes MI
Togo 1,753 1,734 19 1,410 122 NR No LI
Indonesia 1,699 1,664 35 1,535 106 46 (.37) No LMI
Morocco 1,573 1,573 0 1,572 84 52 (.35) No LMI
Benin 1,244 1,188 56 1,092 135 NR Yes LI
Chad 1,209 1,201 8 1,143 NR NR Yes LI
Italy 1,114 1,078 36 1,095 11 29 (.63) No HI
Sri Lanka 1,064 1,060 4 1,013 75 48 (.49) Yes LMI
Total 81,220 78,585 2,635 69,955
All TCCs 96,485 92,811 3,674 83,424

43. 43
TCC Accusations of SEA Instances of Punishment
Pakistan
Multiple cases in Haiti, DRC, Bosnia-
Herzegovina Haiti- 1 year prison sentence for two of three
Bangladesh South Sudan South Sudan- Four repatriated
India Many cases in DRC Congo- exonerated
Ethiopia Possibly* Burundi Burundi- two soldiers repatriated
Nigeria DRC Nigeria recalled the unit
Nepal DRC Congo- Six jailed
Rwanda
Jordan Timor Leste, Bosnia/Herzegovina
Senegal
Ghana
Egypt
Tanzania
China
South Africa DRC
Uruguay DRC** Haiti
Haiti- Apology was issued, three months in jail
during trial, despite video evidence
Burkina Faso
Niger
Brazil Haiti Haiti- Insufficient evidence
Togo
Indonesia
Morocco Ivory Coast, DRC, Mali
Ivory Coast- Battalion suspended told to
"leave city" DRC- Six arrested
Benin Ivory Coast Ivory Coast- 16 repatriated
Chad Mali
Italy Eritrea
Sri Lanka Multiple cases in Haiti, one last year
Haiti- 100 soldiers repatriated three of which
were discharged
*UN refused to reveal nationality but some reports suggest Ethiopian
* * Abuse was reportedly so widespread by Uruguayans in Congo that the force was withdrawn
Figure 4

44. 44
Top Financial Contributors to Peacekeeping Missions
Country Percentage
United States 28.38%
Japan 10.83%
France 7.22%
Germany 7.14%
United Kingdom 6.68%
China 6.64%
Italy 4.45%
Russia 3.15%
Canada 2.98%
Spain 2.97%
Total 80.44%

45. 45
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