This document is a dissertation submitted by a student at Birkbeck College, University of London. The dissertation analyzes the behavior of emerging economies Brazil, China, and India within the G20 global governance forum. It uses historical institutionalism as a theoretical framework to understand how these countries' participation and compliance has changed over time. The dissertation argues that emerging economies' engagement and compliance with G20 agreements has increased as the forum's agenda expands beyond issues traditionally discussed within the G8. It analyzes the compliance performance of G20 members and finds emerging economies' preferences are converging with those of developed nations as they gain experience participating in global governance through the G20.

1. Date: 13/09/2012
Politics Department
Birkbeck College
University of London
Title: Emerging Economies as Global Governance Agenda Setters or Spoilers? How Historical
Institutionalism can explain the behaviour of Brazil, China and India in the G20
Student Number: 12630746
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc in Global Politics

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Emerging Economies as Global Governance Agenda Setters or Spoilers? How Historical
Institutionalism Can Explain the Behaviour of Brazil, China and India in the G20
he global financial and economic system suffered a near death experience in
2008. Under the behest of French President Nicholas Sarkozy and US
President George W Bush, the first G20 summit was convened at the level of
heads of state in Washington DC to strive for a multilateral response to the crisis
consuming the global system. Followed by summits in London (2009), Pittsburgh
(2009), Toronto (2010), Seoul (2010), Cannes (2011) and more recently in Cancun
(2012) the G20 is seen by many as the most significant institutional development in
global governance since the 1970’s and indicative of the tectonic shift in economic and
geopolitical power from the core triad of the US, EU and Japan toward the emerging
economies of Brazil, China and India amongst others. The G20 was now to act as an
informal “steering committee” not just for the monetary issues and economics but also in
issues as diverse as development, climate change and international security. At the
Pittsburgh summit, newly elected US President Barack Obama confirmed in a press
statement that the G20 was the newly assumed “premier forum for their international
economic cooperation”- superseding the G8 group.
Originally formed in 1999 as a US initiative to convene the finance ministers of the top
twenty systematically significant economies in response to currency crises in Asia,
Russia and Latin America, the network was relatively low key in comparison to the G8
in its first decade. Elevated to the level heads of states in 2008, the forum promised to
be a watershed in global economic governance; an inclusive and informal forum for the
management of global affairs. Advocates believe the G20 holds the potential to become
the key platform for global governance as the body moves from Crisis Committee to
Steering Committee (Cooper, 2010) and its agenda develops and evolves to encompass
an ever wider set of issues. A stable relationship among established and emerging
powers is a key foundation of the G20, and it can serve as a platform to enhance mutual
understanding and cooperation among key political and economic actors. The public
rhetoric from leaders has reflected this notion, with Chinese premier Hu Jintao stating:
“The G20 is now transforming from an effective mechanism in tackling the financial
crisis to the premier forum for international cooperation” (Huang, 2011)
T

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With the precedent already set in motion by the G8 Heiligendamm Process, the leaders’
summits saw for the first time emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India amongst
others yielding diplomatic and economic power at the highest level, and is arguably the
major institutional outcome of the global financial crisis. With the addition of South
Korea’s hosting of the G20 summit in 2010 and Mexico in 2012 a geopolitical milestone
was reached and demonstrated the internalisation of this shift in global economic and
political power from the G8 core of developed and industrialised nations to the new
emerging economies, reflecting the realities of the global economy at the start of the
new millennium.
The emerging economies such of Brazil, China and India were crucial to the stated goal
of restoring growth and refraining from a reversion to protectionism in the midst of
crisis; and it was the buy-in from such nations and leaders that was the key to global
economic recovery. As the focus of G20 summitry evolved from fire fighting recession
and financial crisis management in 2008, it turned its focus on the creation of a new
international regulatory framework for global financial activities and a more ‘risk-
management’ role. Members of the Basel Committee noted how it was the emerging
economies that were crucial in averting a backsliding on commitments pledged by the
G8 nations, under pressure by the lobby of powerful domestic financial institutions
whose profits recovered swiftly following the crisis, to resist implementation of new
financial regulation. (Woods, 2010)
Following the end of the cold war, global forums had consistently failed to reflect the
shifts in global geopolitical and economic power. The emergence of governance fora
such as the G20 reflects the realisation that the solutions to global problems could not
be achieved by Western states alone. Breaking old bonds of the ‘G8 versus the G77’
entrenched in institutions such as the UN and WTO, the institutional form of the G20,
through informality, unleashed greater flexibility into global diplomacy and breathed
new life into previously stultified bloc politics created by formal, treaty based
institutions. (Patrick, 2010)
The non-G8 emerging economies outnumber their G8 rivals by roughly two to one
within the G20, yet despite this, many scholars and commentators are critical of the
view that the numerical advantage of these states and a shift in public rhetoric has

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translated into credible policy outcomes. The criticism levelled against the forum is that
the G20 is, despite all the above, still dominated by the preferences, doctrines and self-
interest of G8 states. In effect G20 commitments, communiqués, agendas and tangible
goals are the product of the neoliberal doctrine that retains its dominance through the
policy preferences of G8 states. After years of summits and communiqués there is little
consensus about the achievements of this ‘premier forum for their international
economic co-operation’ and what in practice it has meant for the voice of developing
and industrialising economies in shaping global economic governance (Martinez-Diaz,
2010). To a degree, there is a neglect by researchers of the issue of developing countries
participation, focusing their attention instead on the dynamics that drove the
emergence of the G20 and assessing its performance in terms of providing a new
international financial architecture and reform of associated organisations such as the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Much of the literature on the G20 by Kirton et al is highly descriptive, focusing on
current policy issues that, by the very nature of ongoing G20 leaders’ summits, change
on an almost daily basis. Liberal Institutional approaches have focused on the formation
of the G20, underlying the need for a reduction in transaction costs in international
cooperation to explain the formation of the G20. (Porter, 2000) The aim of this
dissertation is to take a step back and critically use theories of political science to
explain the changing nature of state behaviour within these summits. Underlining the
key role that the emerging economies of the Brazil, China and India have played in the
management of the global economy, I will analyse their participative behaviour in the
G20 and question if as a group they are they global governance ‘spoilers’, ‘agenda
setters’ or simply ‘bandwagoners’?
I utilise the analysis of the Munk School of Global Affairs based at the University of
Toronto to analyse compliance performance of G20 member states. I attempt to
discerning patterns of compliance or institutional ‘cheating’ by emerging economies.
The comparison of the performance of Brazil, China and India against that of G8
member states is to ascertain a convergence or divergence of developed and emerging
economy preferences, and how these are expressed through the G20 communiqué
commitments and implemented by emerging economies.

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I conclude that emerging economies participation in global governance through the G20
is in fact constantly in flux, and their compliance is dependent not on their willingness
or otherwise to support multilateral global governance, but is rather dependent on the
degree of policy coordination that exists between this grouping, in addition to their
historically and socially constituted policy preferences on recurrent issues at summits.
I show that as the agenda of the G20 expands to include issues not traditionally
deliberated by G8, their engagement and compliance increases. This phenomenon
coincides with a degree of institutional and discursive learning as predicted by theories
of Historical and Sociological Institutionalism, and that over the period 2008 to 2011,
these emerging economies had ‘learned’ to better engage the prevailing global
governance agenda.
I focus on Brazil, China and India as case studies, aggregating their state preferences as
proxy for non-G8 developing economies engagement with global governance. Though
often labelled as ‘BRICs’ by the media and policy communities, I intentionally exclude
Russia and South Africa from my analysis. Firstly, given Russia’s membership of the G8,
it would be difficult to thus contrast G8 and G20 positions, and in addition its history as
a geopolitical superpower under the Soviet Union gives it a distinct historical
perspective on its role in global affairs, and one which is highly differentiated from that
of other BRICs. South Africa’s exemption from this debate is due to its relatively small
share of global economic output, trade and financial services. Given the centrality of
economic and monetary governance to the raison d’être of the G20, I felt it pertinent to
limit my analysis to the systematically significant economies of Brazil, China and India.
In addition to high GDP growth rates, their self-identity within the global community is
formed around the very notion of their emergence as global economic and geo-political
powers.
The case for Historical Institutionalism
How do theoretical approaches in political science help us explain the changing
behavioural patterns of countries such as Brazil, China and India within the institutional
setting of the G20? In political science today many scholars analyse how institutions
influence political behaviour and shape processes ranging from legislative decision
making to social movements (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Defining institutions as formal or

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informal procedures, rules, norms and conventions embedded within structures of
organisations of the domestic or global political economy, institutions are intervening
or structural variables through which there is discursive interaction between political
actors. (Steinmo, 2001)
Historical Institutionalism (HI hereafter) assumes that organisationally embodied
routines play a crucial role in allocating resources and structuring the incentives,
options and constraints faced by political participants. In this sense, institutionalism is
indeed a broadly shared approach in contemporary political science. (Thelen, 1999)
The most fruitful insights generated by social sciences of recent decades flows from the
analysis of how regularised and rule-like properties of institutions structure and frame
the behaviour of system actors. Citing HI as a reaction against the structural
functionalist approaches of the 1960’s and 70’s that viewed societal, psychological and
derived cultural norms as motivating dynamics of actors in systems, HI scholars rather
saw the organisation and structure of institutions themselves as generating particular
actions and outcomes in group behaviour. (Hall, 2009)
In contrast to the liberal institutional model, institutions influence behaviour not
through the reduction of transaction costs (see Porter, 2000) but by influencing the
degree of uncertainty that actors must utilise in their calculated strategic interactions.
The logic of HI models state that if institutions can contribute to the resolution of
collective action problems then the robustness of the institution is self-fulfilling. HI
scholars emphasise the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in
broad terms, emphasising and the contribution of a multitude of factors in shaping
actors behaviour. (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002) Following from this is the second-order
problem in explaining how, why and when institutions change. The approach adopted
by HI is the most attentive to the issue of institutional stability and change, with
particular emphasis on ‘critical junctures’. (Hall, 2009)
Three important features characterise HI scholarship in contemporary political science.
They address big, substantive questions of interest to researchers taking the issue of time
as a significant as a factor, specifying sequencing in tracing transformations and
processes of change and temporality. HI likewise hypothesises about the combined
effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one institution or

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process at a time. (Pierson, 2000) HI utilises theories of institutions in order to find
sequential relationships between social, political and economic behaviour with
institutional change across time. Thus, this thesis utilises such an approach in analysing
the changing institutional dynamics and behaviour of actors in the G20. Taken together,
HI amounts to an arguably distinct approach that makes powerful contributions to
political sciences understandings of how governments, governance and international
relations work in public spheres. (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002)
Institutional change in the HI model is rare, non-incremental and relatively inelastic to
changes in domestic and international political changes. (Krasner, 1984) According to
this analysis only major shocks such as the 2008 global financial crisis can act as
catalysts that precipitate changes in institutional structures. Institutional inelasticity
can also be derived from problems of coordination, veto powers and positive historical
feedback. (Praca, 2009) For example, the G20’s initial formation was following the
financial crisis of 1997, yet the global economy did not suffer a financial crisis between
1999 and 2008, creating an illusionary positive feedback that such a system of
governance was legitimate and effective.
Fioretos emphasises historical efficiency in addition to path dependency - the sunk cost
of history and increasing returns in institutional design is significant in current
emergent formations, and this contrasts sharply to rational choice and sociological
approaches:
“Historical Institutionalist point to such costs and other legacy effects as key factors that
shape the evolution of designs” (Fiertos, 2011)
Recent research in economics suggests extensions to the world of political science.
Temporality being at the heart of the analysis, the increasing returns dynamic captures
two key elements central to path dependency. Pinpointing how the costs of switching
from one alternative to another can increase over time and drawing attention to the
issue of timing and sequencing, with increasing returns processes, what happens is as
important as when it happens. (Pierson, 2000)
HI predicts that institutional development will therefore be slow and less extensive than
predicted either by sociological or rational choice approaches. (Pierson, 2000) The
continuation of the G8 as a partner institution and the extension of its institutional

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framework to the G20 show in practice how emergent institutional forms will be
‘isomorphic’ with existing institutions; transplanting their operational logic to the new
framework because actors extract causal designations from the world round them:
“This means that even when policy makers set out to redesign institutions, they are
constrained in what they can conceive of by these embedded, cultural constraints”
(Thelen, 1999)
The 2008 global financial crisis is a vivid example of incremental reform where gradual
conversion occurs as opposed to radical change with an old institutional designs
rebranded for new purposes and challenges. Faced by the biggest economic crisis since
the Great Depression, the world’s leading economies opted to respond by expanding the
scope of an already established institutional format. Despite its roots in the financial
crises of the late 1990’s, the G20 had laid dormant for the best part of a decade. The G20
leaders summits that was a flexible institutional structure that adapted for the new
crisis.
It had become increasingly clear that actors in international policy settings are
themselves constrained by the historically constituted institutional structure of
domestic policy actors (such as civil service, civil society, media etc) in heterogeneous
economies. In recent years, through the strength and inter-linkages of epistemic
communities, national authorities have enhanced their character and increasingly play
significant roles in shaping international agreements through transgovernmental
networks. The cooperation fostered by such organisations as the G-20 is evidence and
manifestation of the difficulties of states in coordinating agreed international standards
due to historically formed variations in national forms of regulation (Gilpin, 2001)
“This approach holds a valuable key to theorizing finer variations in how states engage
international institutions….The approach provides a more nuanced and more
comprehensive explanations for why states respond differently to the same
international challenges and also explain when they exhibit continuity” (Fiertos, 2011)
Praca supports the centrality of ideas in studying institutional change but this he applies
only for institutions that are clearly identifiable with prevailing orthodoxies or
associations with certain political results (i.e. Central Banks that maintain low levels of
inflation). Furthermore, the presence of a particular institutional formation is key to

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whether new ideas are significant, and that they matter to political actors. Firoretos
asserts:
“Studies of the role of ideas have focused on the conditions under which ideas get
embedded within institutions in politically consequential ways and they often give more
attention to ideas as policy paradigms than as principled beliefs” (Fiertos, 2011)
Similarly to sociological and rational choice institutionalism, HI places great importance
on socialization and a dynamic, interactive learning process that shapes actors
preferences on institutional formation. The notion of institutions working as a shared
script between political actors obscures the conflicts among them and dominant
cultural norms emerge out of political conflicts. (Katzenstein, 1978)
One of the unique aspects of the G20 is its institutional thinness and fragility (Cooper,
2010) a result of the absence of a permanent secretariat and ill-defined membership
criteria. Mahoney and Thelen (1999) incorporate informality into the HI analysis and
shed light on an understanding of how certain actors have variable compliance to
agreements and agendas over time and in addition Mahoney and Villegas (2011) argue
that it offers specific analytical tools that are useful in studying institutional change,
with a robust ability to test hypothesis against empirical material.
Given the strong theoretical inter-linkages between constructivism and institutionalism,
the influence of norms on political actors is prevalent and can be understood to
influence political actors in a three-stage process. Stage one describes the inevitable
‘norm emergence’, which can be derived from the emergence of new schools of thought
or research, such as the rise on neoliberal research in the 1970’s. This is followed by a
‘norm cascade’, where these emergent norms start to intersperse though the network,
leading ultimately to an internalisation of normative beliefs in participative actors
through the ‘tipping point’. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that while little
theoretical work has focused on the emergence of norms, they recognise that the
building and cascade of normative values relies heavily on ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and the
organisational platforms from which they act. Socialisation is a dominant mechanism
for norm cascade in an international setting and empirical evidence suggests that
international or transnational norms influence political actor’s behaviour to a greater
degree than domestic factors and can be a greater catalyst to the changes in normative

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outlooks. In the context of leaders summits, many commentators have noted how
diplomatic breakthroughs are often by leaders, finance ministers or their Sherpa’s who
build up strong personal relationships with their counterparts over numerous summits,
exchanging personal phone numbers and emails, garnering a sense of trust and
professional approach to what are essentially the finer technical points of policies.
Indeed it was often personalities and good relationships that often drove policy
breakthroughs. Consequential individuals inside the G20 itself, such as President Lula of
Brazil, were credited with making the G20 “more of a personal club of leaders and
helping broker the deals to modernise the IMF and liberalise trade”
(Kirton, 2011)
Emerging economies, they like their developed counterparts, conceptualise their role in
global governance:
“To the degree that states and state elites fashion a political self or identity in relation to
the international community, the concept of socialisation suggests that the cumulative
effect of many countries in a region adopting new norms may be analogous to ‘peer
pressure’ among countries” (Ramirez, Soysal, Shanaham in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)
Institutionalists in sociology have made these internalised norms the centrepiece of
their research and they have shown how prominent norm cascades are in establishing
the aforementioned isomorphism’s in international institutional frameworks and
discourse - iterated and habitual behaviour are powerful mechanisms for the
internalisation of these norms:
“Diplomatic tools such as confidence building measures and track-2 diplomacy may
follow a similar logic. Generalized, this argument suggests that routes to normative
change may be similarly indirect and evolutionary: procedural changes that create new
political processes can lead to gradual and inadvertent normative, ideational, and
political convergence” (Rosenau in Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998)
Institutions confer power on to participants, but in an unequal fashion. (See Bremmer,
2010) It is increased for some, but diminished for others. The notion of institutions as
shared narrative spaces often obscures underlying conflict between actors (Streek and
Thelen, 2005). Cognitive dimensions of institutional change therefore should not eclipse
the strategic and political conflict dimension:

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“Both the economic-technological and the sociological-institutional perspectives
provide strong tools for understanding continuity, but by stipulating and privileging
particular mechanisms of reproduction....they have a hard time incorporating notions of
conflict and power, and they are not particularly helpful in talking about change”
(Thelen, 1999)
Can we reduce our theoretical approach solely to the explanatory power of HI alone?
How can other institutional approaches in political science be utilised in analysing the
G20, and to what extent do these approaches undermine or validate the historical
approach? Absent from HI analysis is an endogenization of agency in a way that explains
the dynamics of institutional change. Schmidt and others argue that sociological
institutionalism, is the missing framework that can provide this. (Schmidt, 2010).
Sociological institutionalist approaches focus on the power of ideas. Cognitive processes
and normative behaviour, including in the setting of international institutions,
discursive interactions between actors is the generator of ideas – whom, where, when
and why are key in producing institutional change.
Schmidt’s paper seeks to demonstrate that both sociological and HI approaches are in
fact complementary, and that both schools can learn a great deal from each other. While
HI approaches can be complemented by a greater focus on discursive interaction,
sociological institutionalism can broaden its explanatory power by adopting the insights
provided by historical institutional constraints (Schmidt, 2010). Leading HI theorists
such as Pierson take an approach that focuses on institutional continuity. In their model,
critical junctures set in motion patterns of ‘deep’ equilibrium, an institutional
architecture that is highly resistant to change. (Pierson 2000) Schmidt argues that we
need to get beyond such static interpretations and points to more recent HI theorists
who look beyond linear models of incremental change. They intend to put the history
back into HI.
Schmidt argues that sociological approaches are more effective in explaining why
‘programmatic ideas’ can be transformative. Schmidt however does also concede that
sociological approaches have a fundamental flaw; not least the difficulty in pinpointing
in detail ‘critical junctures’ and what exactly constitutes defining moments.

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How do we bridge the theoretical divide between these approaches? Interestingly, in
recent article Schmidt alludes to a cross fertilisation of all strands of institutionalism. All
three of the traditionally recognized new institutionalisms – rational choice, historical,
and sociological – have increasingly sought to ‘endogenize’ change, which has often
meant a turn to ideas and discourse. The emerging approach of each of these three
institutionalist traditions that take discourse seriously can best be grouped as part of a
new institutionalism known as discursive institutionalism which aims to interweave
substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in institutional
context. It argues that this newest of the ‘new institutionalisms’ has the greatest
potential for providing insights into the dynamics of institutional change by explaining
the actual preferences, strategies, and normative orientations of actors. (Schmidt, 2010)
To get a sense of where each of the authors cited in this analysis lies on the spectrum of
institutionalism, see Picture 1 for a breakdown, which able demonstrates the merging
and cross fertilisation of three approaches, rational choice (RI), historical (HI) and
sociological (SI):
Picture 1: Discourses in Institutionalism
I have aimed to demonstrate that HI is not without its limitations and indeed many of
the tenants of this school have in practice adopted and subsumed many of the
underlying assumptions or analyses of other schools of institutionalism in order to

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further bolster their explanatory power. Sociological institutionalism re-injects actual
preferences and agency into HI analyses - the strategies and normative orientation of
actors are key at critical junctures in determining where the equilibrium path may settle
(Schmidt, 2010)
The G20 initial institutional framework was isomorphic to that of the G8 and earlier G20
finance minister’s summits. As we shall see, there was early domination of the agenda
by the preferences of G8 members. Excluding the exceptional circumstances in late
2008 and early 2009 which saw universal commitment to avert a global meltdown with
a coordinated fiscal stimulus package, over the next set of summits considerable
backsliding was observed on compliance with the commitments made in communiqués.
Over time however, with both confidence building, institutional and iterated
behavioural learning, these emerging economies came to G20 summits with a greater
sense of determination and engagement, better prepared to articulate their national
interests. This translated into communiqués that better reflected their preferences and
as a result witnessed greater policy compliance and engagement in global governance.
The G20 Literature
As evidenced by the BRICs forum joint communiqué of March 2009, the three emerging
economies analysed here have used the G20 forum to call for a stronger voice in
international institutions. Indeed, they are already engaged in global governance
through membership of the UN, WTO and the IMF.
In a recent paper by Hazakis (Hazakis, 2012) he evokes Germain’s 2001 analysis of the
G20 and questions whether it as mechanism through which emerging market
economies are able to affect the way in which the global financial system is governed.
(Germain, 2001) By analysing the conception of causality in explaining the G20’s
decision making dynamics with specific regard to cooperation in monetary policy he
asks if the G20 a genuine mechanism through which emerging economies are to be fully
integrated into the management of the global economy, providing a platform for long
term embedded structural reforms? Tiberghien argues that the G20 process represents
the most systematic effort since 1971 and the collapse of the Gold Standard to rebalance
the relation between market and governance establishing an integrated structure of

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global governance, becoming the key focal point of the geopolitical “Great Game”
(Tiberghien, 2010)
Gnath and Schmucker focus on systematically analysing and assessing the preferences
of G20 members based upon official statements, press coverage and interviews with key
BRIC delegates and comparing and contrasting them with official G20 communiqués.
Their model takes the preferences of the US and EU member states as proxy for the
preferences of the G8 as a whole, and in doing so they highlight any juxtaposition
against the preferences of states such as Brazil, China and India. They identify a number
of variables that are historically replicated from the G8 and G20 finance ministerial
meetings with the upgraded G20 leader’s summits. In addition, they assess whether
emerging countries exercise agenda setting power or implicit veto powers at G20
summits or act as institutional ‘free-riders’. They conclude that in contrast to the
perception of the G20 as “G7 with extra chairs”:
“We argue that all the emerging countries are interested in participating as equal and
permanent members in the G20 as the premier forum for international economic
governance” (Gnath and Schmucker, 2010)
The establishment of the G20 was a key objective of the G8 in order to manage the
global financial crisis of 2008. While the emerging countries were less exposed and
vulnerable to the vagaries of the financial markets, they were less interested in engaging
in the governance of such systems. China’s attempt to bandwagon on the initial G20
agenda was based on its willingness to cooperate for reputational enhancement. In
addition it was seen as an instrument to consolidate the G20 as an alternative to the G8
and thus to secure greater influence for developing countries in global economic
governance. (Gnath and Schmucker, 2010)
Whilst emerging countries share some general preferences, in particular their desire for
major institutional reform of international financial institutions, a ‘joint BRIC position’ is
not discernible. Short of a ‘new Bretton Woods’ sought by the likes of Nicholas Sarkozy
and Gordon Brown (Financial Times, 2008) minor institutional changes set within a
‘neoliberal’ policy paradigm framework cannot be the catalyst for a new global financial
architecture. The G20, far from being an independent and innovative institution:

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“{the G20 is} Closely associated with a particular set of ideological assumptions and
policy prescriptions, promoting the sets of implicit/explicit norms, principles, rules and
decision making procedures of the dominant neoliberal paradigm” (Hazakis, 2010)
Multilateral global governance was witnessing resurgence at the time 2008 Washington
summit:
 Reform of voting system at the IMF under Dominique Straus-Khan as well
as increased resources for it and its sister organisation the World Bank
 The G20 pledge to revive the Doha Round WTO trade negotiations in
2009
 Resurgence of United Nations activism on many issues including climate
change and international security and the World Health Organisation
(WHO)
Despite these elements, Woods argues that what we are witnessing is not resurgence of
multilateralism, dragged from the doldrums of the Iraq war or the failure of the Doha
trade talks, but rather “the last gasp of an old fashioned concert of great powers”
embodied in both the G8 and G20. (Woods, 2010)
The original grouping of G20 finance ministers was in part a response to the perceived
failings of the IMF following the 1997 financial crisis. Woods asserts that failure to
reform the IMF following this crisis lead to greater global imbalances and was
significant in promoting regional bilateralism between Asian economies rather than
encouraging multilateralism through the IMF. Rather than honing criticisms of the IMF
and its legitimacy into a constructive reform agenda at the G20 finance ministerial
meetings, in its early years, the position and communiques of the G20 differed little
from that of the G7. The IMF governance reforms of 2008 were perceived as being
insufficient to sway the perception that it is an organisation dominated by the US. Its
governance reforms have not yet gone far enough to win the confidence of emerging
markets or transform its relationship with them, especially with regard to the
nationality and selection process of managing directors.
“The result is that different regions of developing countries, led to some degree by their
emerging economy neighbours, are finding regional solutions….far from witnessing a
new resolve by the G7 to open up and strengthen multilateral institutions….they have

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not relinquished their command of the tiller of the main multilaterals – the IMF and the
World Bank – even as it becomes clear that the future efficacy of these institutions
requires them so to do” (Woods, 2010)
Networks of governance such as the G20 emerge in response to the perceived
illegitimacy and lack of credibility of formal international institutions. Woods and
Martinez-Diaz in their work Networks of Influence describe how the G20 leaders’
network may affect associated international organisations by providing non-
bureaucratic and flexible institutional environment to create complementary effects,
generating political support. To some degree it may hold competitive effects, subsuming
responsibilities from subsidiary bodies of the IMF, World Bank and G8 and finally it may
also instigate a rebalancing effect in global governance where emerging economies, once
brought into the fold, may wield agenda setting powers – but Woods and Martinez-Diaz
make explicit in their model the degree of information sharing, strategy and policy
coordination that would be required by emerging economies in order to attain the
desired influence over the network.
Acknowledging significant ‘capture’ of the G20 finance agenda by G8 members early on,
the G20 is a forum where developing countries can experience more influence and
power on agenda setting. (Martinez-Diaz and Woods, 2009). Significantly for the
utilisation of institutionalism in explaining the changing nature of emerging economies
participation in global governance, they emphasise the importance of institutional
learning:
“As our study on the G20 finance networks show, emerging economies have used the
last decade of G20 summits to learn how to use a forum of this nature to their
advantage. Over time, emerging economies have adapted to the rhythm of G20
summitry and have built up specialized capacity in their ministries of finance and
central banks to deal with G20 issues. They have also grown more confident and
assertive using the network to put on the agenda issues of interest to them”
(Martinez-Diaz and Woods, 2009)
Ten years of practice and institutional experience in the G20 finance network allowed
leaders of emerging economies to be much better prepared for global summitry of 2008
than in 1999. At the level of leaders’ summit, there was a repeated process of

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institutional learning from the summits of Washington in 2008 to Seoul in 2010, and
Cannes in 2011.
Emerging economy governments display heterogeneous policy preferences and the
catch all terms such as ‘BRICS’ belie considerable variance in economic models and
strategic aspirations. What elements can we extract from the modern economic
histories of these countries to explain the nature of state actors preferences and the
inherent character of the economic diplomacy of states in international institutions?
How does history shape their conceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy? If we are to
ascertain how HI can explain the patterns of behaviour observable in international
summitry, and effectively legitimise this analysis, we need to accommodate for a
narrative of how history shapes the behaviour of actors within institutional
frameworks.
Brazil
"We are talking about the G20 because the G8 doesn't have any more reason to exist, in
other words, the emerging economies have to be taken into consideration in today's
globalised world”
Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva, Former President of Brazil
Throughout much of the inter-war and post-war era, the development strategy of the
Brazilian economy was a state centric approach of import substitution, protectionism
and market dominance of state enterprises. This was reversed in the 1990’s with
comprehensive liberalisation of trade, privatisation of state firms and a tentative
opening up of financial markets. Brazil’s participation in international trade has seen
promising growth over the 1990’s, despite this compared to the emerging economies of
Asia, Brazil’s integration into global trade markets has been comparatively modest.
Successive governments have overseen profound changes in its economic and political
position, especially in the decade following from the financial crisis of 1997. Brazil’s
external image as a vibrant emerging power is consolidated by strong economic
performance, with large and stable internal market conditions (despite the crisis of
2008) with a vibrant, pluralistic and democratic society. As a result, Brazil’s
participation in global economic and political forums should be understood as a

18. 18
consolidation of its long garnered “soft power”; leveraged by it moral capabilities as a
confident advocate for Latin American interests, distinctive social-economic model and
material capabilities buttressed by accumulated budget and trade surpluses.
Brazil’s increasing political weight in the G20 and its relative position are resultant from
the changes in its economy and its strength vís-a-vís other states. Recent economic
success had been determined not only by exogenously factored economic growth, but
also by institutional factors – the presidency of Lula da Silva was striking in its
commitment to macroeconomic stabilisation. Equally, conservatism in the regulation of
relatively closed financial markets with limited operations in foreign denominations
limited its exposure to international fluctuations and crises. (Lins and Silva, 2011)
The Brazilian government responded to the world recession with a set of strong
expansionary measures, in line with other systematically significant economies as
agreed and coordinated in the G20. Given that the source of the global crisis was laxly
regulated US financial institutions, negotiations on the regulation of financial markets of
the most developed countries were at the very least expected to be on the negotiating
table. The crisis of 2008 was quantitatively and qualitatively different to that which
precipitated the creation of the G20 in 1999. Unlike the G20 finance ministers’ summits,
emerging economies gained broader room and a louder voice in the international arena
for these very reasons. (Lins and Silva, 2011) While the G20 has become the main forum
for international economic cooperation, many observers state it has done little to face
up to the crucial issue of global imbalances of vast accumulations of reserve currency
(mainly $US) in countries with trade surpluses. Within the international institutional
framework of monetary governance, the ‘BRIC’ countries were integrated through
membership of the Financial Stability Board.
Some question how loud is their voice within this club. Brazil’s prominence and
participation in a new global monetary order is hard to dispute, but Brazil has no
definite strategy for the G20:
“Brazil has been waiting for the big powers to disclose their positions, thus avoiding
previous alignments with any specific country, including the BRICs” (Barbosa and Mendes, 2010)
Though strategies and aims of reform for Bretton Woods institutions exists across
emerging nations, the acronym ‘BRICS’ coined by Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill masks

19. 19
highly heterogeneous economies, societies and polities, each with their own historically
constructed notions of legitimacy and effectiveness, backed up by differing material
capabilities. Brazil, for its part, was aligned to the overall objectives and agenda of the
creation of the G20, ensuring the mandate was adequately elevated from the G8, and
ensuring the centrality and primacy of the former institution in global governance.
Brazilian participation in the G20 was vital to the incremental remodelling of the
Bretton Woods institutions. (Tedesco Lins and Pignatari Silva, 2011) Brazil avoided the
typical ‘north-south’ confrontational dialogue, adopting instead a moderate position;
they ensured that a Brazilian presence was ever present at FSB and Basel Committee
summits. (Barbosa and Mendes, 2010)
By contrasting the language employed in policy positions of Brazil’s government
through official statements and G20 summit communiqués, Brazil can be seen as
bearing a cautious and pragmatic approach, and only from Pittsburgh onwards is it
possible to identify a louder Brazilian voice. As a historic beneficiary of the Bretton
Woods system, there was less incentive for them to demand its reform in contrast to the
position of India and China. In addition, conflicting interests in the ‘currency wars’ over
exchange rate policies, which came to dominate the agenda in 2010, demonstrate how
easily cracks may appear in the coalition of emerging economies in international
diplomacy.
In an address to the 2011 ENERI conference in Brasilia, Kirton stated how Brazil had
been pivotal form the start of the G20 leaders’ summits, and how their contribution to
the meetings at finance ministerial level grew over successive summits. When the 2008
crisis came, it was Guido Mantega as Brazil’s Finance Minister who hosted the first
emergency ministerial meeting in Washington in October 2008, to which US President
George W Bush was a guest. As Kirton states:
“(Bush) acknowledged that the financial crisis had been born in the USA. He noted that
they were all in this crisis together and needed to work through the G20 to get it solved.
The meeting clearly showed that leadership was passing to a new generation of
emerging powers with Brazil at the head” (Kirton, 2011)
Initially a hesitant and reluctant participant due fears of the G20 undermining
traditional multilateral forums such as the UN, Kirton notes how President Lula was key

20. 20
in galvanising the G20 into a more personal club of leaders and helping broker the deals
to modernise the IMF and liberalise trade. Brazil’s compliance to G20 governance is
evident by its strong record of compliance. With an overall score of 81% it is well above
the average compliance score, ranking as high as G8 members. It’s highest compliance
scores are in the areas of energy (100%), food and agriculture (100%), climate change
(50%) and macroeconomics (50%) – these are policy areas where Brazil has
traditionally been most active and capable. (Kirton, 2011)
China
“The G20 is now transforming from an effective mechanism in tackling the financial
crisis to the premier forum for international cooperation”
– Chinese Premier Hu Jintao
Given the informal secretariat and institutional frailty of the G20, it is not surprising
that the Chinese approach to this forum of global governance is “keeping a low profile
and taking a proactive role when feasible.” (Huang, 2010) Observers note how emerging
countries like China continue to play the ‘long-game’ in international relations, hedging
its bets on instrumental outcomes and taking a cautious approach that mask
geopolitical strategies. (Cooper, 2010) Huang’s assessment of Chinese participation in
the G20 argues that the general attitude of Chinese government towards the G20 is
positive. The forum offers an ideal opportunity for China to give emphasis to its ‘soft
power’ and play a participative role in global governance, and ensure the peaceful
nature of its rise as a global power:
“China has changed from passive state to proactive state, from peripheral to core. China
looks to the G20 as the most important and representative multilateral global
governance platform” (Huang, 2010)
HI approaches emphasise institutional learning as a process that defines the parameters
of path dependency and the period of China actively participating in the top tier level of
governance is historically very brief. In contrast to members of the G8, the official
representatives from the G20’s emerging economies have less experience with the peer
review process, including the ‘Mutual Assessment Process’, which have allowed a
facilitation of the policy process. Being an inexperienced player in global governance,

21. 21
despite its economic clout, China is a very cautious at every stage of negotiation. As
Bremmer (Bremmer, 2012) and others lucidly argue, institutions create winners and
losers, and as a result are not viewed as ‘non-neutral entities’ and China’s reticence
stems from this perception.
In contrast to Brazil’s new found confidence in playing an international role, China will
continue to focus on primarily on domestic issues, including the maintenance of
domestic growth rates, including the target 8% GDP growth rates that are needed in
order to sustain social cohesion (BBC News, 2012) and thus China’s primary strategy
within the G20 is cost minimization rather than benefit maximisation.
Scott and Wilkinson’s analysis of China’s trade diplomacy in ascension to the WTO as an
example of how the HI theoretical framework can complement our understanding of
how institutions can help shape China’s capacity to act in international institutional
settings, an analysis which is possible to replicate for the G20. Admitted in to the WTO
in December 2001, the accession negotiations being a long and arduous process given
the specific nature of the Chinese economy. In their case study, the WTO was a key
mediating variable for a number of reasons:
 Trade has become a fundamental driver of Chinese growth
 Trade is a highly institutionalised realm of international relations
 Governance systems in global trade are multilateral
 China is a relatively recent user of such systems and have undergone
significant learning processes in becoming accepted into the
organisations
China’s participation in WTO negotiations can be split into an early ‘low profile’ phase
and a later, more assertive phase. The WTO’s institutional practices, procedures and
working culture influence Chinese diplomatic strategies and behaviour through a
“learning the WTO ropes” phase (Scott and Wilkinson, 2011). Citing domestic political
pressure as a factor in explaining Chinese policy preferences, they emphasise:
“The complex, reciprocal relationship between domestic factors affecting the WTO, and
the WTO as an institution in turn affecting its member states….an appreciation of how
the institutional character of the WTO impacts on its member states is necessary”
(Scott & Wilkinson, 2011)

22. 22
India
“We have come here not as petitioners but as partners”
– Dr Manmohan Singh, Heiligendamm G8 Summit, 2007
Measured at purchasing power parity, India is now the third largest economy in the
G20. It accounts for just 2% of global GDP and an even smaller share of trade. When
accounting for GDP per head, it is the poorest in the forum, with income per head at
$1,389 per annum, compared to the G20 average of $23,000. (IMF, 2012)
India’s public and political elite are mostly indifferent to the G20 (Cox, 2009). However,
at the G20 summits in Washington and London, India was finally welcomed as a partner
in global governance. India’s delegation to early summits, including Prime Minister Dr
Manmohan Singh (with a doctorate in Economics from Oxford) and his ‘Sherpa’
Monteck Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman of India’s Planning Commission (and
former World Bank Director) and the highly effective Rakesh Mohan, deputy governor
of the Reserve Bank of India, meat that India was well served in G20 summits. (Cox,
2009)
India derived much ‘soft’ power from the cautious, even conservative, central bankers
who were derided by their western peers prior to the crisis. With hindsight, they came
to be seen as an example of sound and prudential monetary management. Once granted
membership of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) by the G20, India was represented
not only by its finance minister and financial regulator, but also by its Reserve Bank
governor. Its contingent of three was exceptional, and put it on parity terms with the
largest economies such as the US. (Cox, 2009)
At the London summit, the Indian delegation favoured a ‘concerted’ initiative to
alleviate the global recession with both monetary and fiscal stimulus, arguing that the
dangers of doing little were greater than too much. Indeed, India would be of
considerable direct benefit from the vast increases in IMF, World Bank and Asian
Development Bank funds and lending, and so naturally it was supportive of moves to
achieve this. (Cox, 2010)
The contribution of Indian delegates lead to some key successes at the G20 summits
including IMF quota reform by January 2011 and extra funds for the Multilateral

23. 23
Development Banks (MDB). Its economy was not central to the 2008 crisis or its
resolution. Like China and Indonesia, its economy continued to grow throughout this
period despite the crisis.
The communiqué published at the London summit in 2009 largely reflected Indian
concerns, with one Indian journalist noting how closely the communiqué matched the
speech given by Dr Singh at 10 Downing Street the evening before its publication. (Cox,
2010) Regardless, policy makers and the public back home showed little enthusiasm
and interest in the G20. India has been here before. India’s attitude to the G20 in 2008 is
similar to how it perceived the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 15
years ago. Despite India being a founding member of GATT, it was not an agenda setter
or active participant for the first eight trade rounds. (Bery, in Cox 2010) Rather than
trying to mould a global agenda for trade, it was interested only in preserving its
freedom to shelter domestic industries. After the Uruguay Round, it realised it could no
longer insulate itself from global trade rules and WTO rulings. India realised that if it
wished to retain sovereignty in its policy space, then it needed to actively define and
defend it. The 2008 crisis demonstrated that it could not insulate itself from the global
economy or financial markets as it had done in the Asian financial crisis ten years
previously. India’s major companies were globalising fast, even if its financial system
remained relatively closed. And in the midst of the crisis, these companies were shut out
of global capital markets - it demonstrated to India that it could not turn its back on the
reform of global financial regulation.
“The crisis....may force India to rethink its position on international finance, much as it
rethought its stance on trade 15 years ago” (Bery, in Cox 2010)
From the end of the 1990’s onwards it was clear that G8 was no longer a capable and
legitimate forum for managing the global economy. The importance of emerging and
developing nations had accelerated markedly in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. In fact as
one can see from the Figure 1 their share of global GDP, measured at purchasing power
parity, had increase from 31% to 48% over the period 1990 to 2009.

24. 24
Table 1 (Angeloni and Pisani Ferry, 2012)
Until the 1990’s global trade routes were still dominated by north-north exchange
amongst developed economies. Emerging economies have since seen both a surge and a
transformation in their share of global trade and the extent to which their economies
are integrated and reliant on trade for growth. This is shown in Table 2. In addition,
recent research by Kubelec and Sa (2010) on bilateral trade and financial networks
demonstrate the systematic significance of these economies in global trade and finance
flows. As can be seen from Figure 1, China stands out as a major trading power with
Brazil and India, though to a lesser degree, commanding considerable space in these
networks.
Table 2 (Angeloni and Pisani Ferry, 2012)

25. 25
Figure 1 (Kubelec and Sá, 2010)
It is therefore apparent that China, India and Brazil are countries are of systematic
significance in global trade. What of global finance? While the G7/G8 economies
completed their financial account liberalisation in the early 1990’s, emerging economies
of the G20 have had a significantly different and heterogeneous experience of capital
account liberalisation. IMF data up to 2009 shows that assets and liabilities of
developed economies were at an excess of 400% in comparison to just 100% in
emerging and developing countries as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 (Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry, 2012)

26. 26
Figure 3 (Kubelec and Sá, 2010)
Figure 3 above, similarly to Figure 1, shows the network significance of economies with
regard to international financial flows in the global economy. Though the emergence of
financial centres in mainland China, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, India, Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico are observable; the pivotal roles are still played by the worlds five
dominant financial hubs: the US, UK, Germany, France and Japan – all G8 members.
What can this data then help explain about the compliance performance of Brazil, China
and India in the G20? As I will show, the agenda of G20 finance summits and early
leaders’ summits were dominated by issues of ‘G7-esque’ paradigms. The dissonance
between emerging economies as reluctant participants in global financial governance
can be in part attributable to this dichotomy. Emerging economies have gained
considerably from the boom in global trade over the last three decades – they have a
vested interest in preserving global aggregate demand and maintaining trade
liberalisation. While their economies are little exposed to the vagaries of global
liberalised capital they have comparatively less to gain in comparison to their G8
counterparts in complying with greater regulation of their financial industries. As we
shall see, the compliance performance of Brazil, China and India from Pittsburgh, and
especially Seoul onwards steadily increases. This was in great part due to the expansion

27. 27
of the summit agenda to include issues more akin to the G77 – financial safety nets to
reduce the reliance upon trade and currency imbalances, economic development and
food security. (Gnath and Schmuker, 2011) These emerging economies were less
affected by the financial crises during the period 2008 to 2011 and thus showed
different priorities and preferences to their G8 counterparts. Indeed, while these
emerging economies share some general preferences with regard to increased voice in
global economic governance, a joint stance on policies at the G20 is difficult considering
the wide variation in preferences on a range of policies. (Gnath and Schmuker, 2011) In
addition to the issues of institutional learning and policy coordination, despite the G20’s
consensus based decision making structure (as opposed to vote based structure in the
UN for example) a numerical advantage of developing and emerging economies does
not translate to greater influence – G8 states simply have more staff and resources
available at their central banks and finance ministries devoted to the G20 matters, thus
enabling a greater degree of informed policy coordination. (Gnath and Schmuker, 2011)
G20 Compliance
Table 3 outlines a broad overview of the main topics and issue areas discussed at G20
summits and appear as significant policy announcements in G20 communiqués.
Table 3: The G20 agenda at each summit

28. 28
Both the G8 and G20 at each summit produce a communiqué (or written declaration)
for the public and can be seen as a kind of highly visible public contract which holds
their members to commitments endorsed and negotiated behind closed doors.
Compliance reports therefore allow us to asses empirically the value of communiqués,
the credibility of policy announcements and with cross sectional data analysis on a
country by country basis we can garner a proxy indication of countries compliance to
the global governance paradigms prevalent at G20 summits. Empirical approaches to
summitry compliance analysis, as opposed to reportage or eye witness accounts, can
explicate the measurable trends in such institutional environments. Further, they can
offer insight into three key questions: To what extent and under what conditions do G20
states live up to their commitments? How does the pattern of summit compliance vary
over time, issue area and by member? What causes high and low summit compliance?
The key variable under scrutiny then is the deviation from the commitment.
Commitments are defined as a:
“Discrete, specific, publicly expressed, collectively agreed to statement of intent; a
‘promise’ or ‘undertaking’ by summit members that they will undertake future action to
move forward, meet or adjust to meet an identified welfare target.”(G20 Research Group)
Firstly, commitments must be discrete, in that each specified action represents a
separate commitment. In addition, commitments must sufficiently specific that targets
must be identifiable and measurable in some form. Finally, commitments must future
facing and not simply a reaffirming past policy actions. While it could be argued that
that a summit that produces a great number of commitments can be indicative of a
productive summit, we must be wary of the trade off between quality and quantity.
Some summits may have provided fewer commitments only because each individual
commitment was qualitatively more ambitious. So it is important to acknowledge this
variation, which is the difference in individual and overall ambitions. By looking at an
average compliance score, in each distinct policy field, we ascertain a common indicator.
The study of G20 compliance has a comprehensive methodology of monitoring and
assessing the G20 members’ compliance performance with summit commitments.1
1 An overview of this methodology can be found here: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/#summits

29. 29
Every G20 member receives a score of either -1, 0 or +1. The scores are broken down as
follows:
+1: Indicates full compliance with the stated commitment
0: This mark is awarded for partial compliance, or if policy is in progress, with
initiatives already launched
-1: This is awarded to countries who fail to comply or take action
Hence, all countries within the G20 receive a mark between -1, 0, or +1 for each policy
commitment they collectively pledge. Time consistency in the analysis is maintained by
compliance period between the publication of the communiqué of the summit under
scrutiny and the beginning of the subsequent leaders’ summit.
Washington D.C. (2008)
Despite conflicting interpretations of which country undertook the initiative of
establishing the Washington summit, it was for all intents and purposes unexpected and
well received by the international financial markets and public opinion. (Angeloni and
Pisani-Ferry, 2012) The Washington summit was pivotal in establishing the G20 as a
forum of global importance and though the communiqué was brief (the concluding
statements at five pages long were considerably shorter than those that were to follow)
it concentrated on the situation in the financial markets and on the actions to be taken
to stabilise them. The communiqué at Washington conveyed a sense of urgency, focus
and action that read “like an extremely focused action plan”. (Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry,
2012) The communiqué focused on financial markets and institutions, transparency and
accountability; financial regulation, reinforcing international cooperation and reforming
the international financial institutions (IFI’s). Two of the key commitments made at the
summit were coordination of macroeconomic stimulus packages and the commitment
to reject protectionist trade policies.
The commitment of rejecting protectionism or reaffirming their commitment on
maintaining trade liberalisation specifically aimed at binding countries to not raise any
new barriers to investment and trade in goods and services, imposing any new export
restrictions, or for that matter implementing any measures inconsistent with WTO
rulings. Table 4 below shows the compliance scores of all G20 nations. The average

30. 30
score on compliance in regard to protectionist measure is 0.58. Taken as a group, Brazil
India and China score 0.33 with only Brazil yielding compliance scores in the positive
range. Brazil, while not undertaking any new measures to raise barriers to investment
or trade, had made substantial progress in bilateral trade negotiations, especially with
the EU. China on the other hand has breached several conditions of the commitments,
raising barriers on goods from the EU, while promoting exports with VAT rebates and
fiscal measures; a record number of anti dumping lawsuits were filed against China in
this period. (G20 Research Group) Meanwhile, India has introduced a range of tariff and
subsidy measures in the compliance period of 2008-09, including tariffs and import
restrictions on steel products and anti dumping duties on medium density fibre
products.
Table 4: Compliance Scores: Rejecting Protectionism” Compliance Performance
The commitments made in macroeconomics focused on an immediate stimulus of
domestic demand and address longer-term fiscal sustainability in policy frameworks.
Brazil fully complied with this commitment (+1) to use fiscal measures to rapidly
stimulate domestic demand while maintaining a fiscally sustainable policy framework.
Brazil’s fiscal plans to increase domestic demand have been primarily tax reductions
and fiscal measures amount to 0.5 per cent of Brazil’s GDP. (G20 Research Group)
China partially complied with its commitment (0). Despite a stimulus package at
$586bn announced on 10 November 2008, China had not published how it would
consolidate this cost, therefore unable to confirm how it would make this investment

31. 31
sustainable in the medium to long term. India fully complied with its commitment (+1)
passing three stimulus packages during this period, allowing the state to deviate from
its fiscal consolidation targets of 0.5 per cent but expected a return as outlined in the
2001 Fiscal Responsibility Bill. (G20 Research Group)
Table 5: Compliance Scores Washington 2008: Fiscal Stimulus
London (2009)
The London summit of April 1st and 2nd 2009 is likely to remain in history as the
moment when the international community united to stave off a global depression and a
return to inter-war era protectionist ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies. On financial
regulation the London summit maintained the momentum launched in Washington and
world leaders committed to reshape the FSF into the FSB with an enhanced mandate
and broader representation. In addition, one of the main innovations of the summit was
the strengthening of resources available both to developing and emerging economies
through the IFI’s with a $750bn boost to resources available to the IMF. (G20 Research
Group) The average compliance score of the G20 member states with the London
summit commitments is 0.23 as demonstrated in Table 7.

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Table 7 - G20 members’ compliance with 2009 London summit commitments
If we break down this analysis we can see that high levels of compliance have been
demonstrated by Canada, Australia, and the EU (0.6) and in particular Germany and
France (0.8). Russia, the US and Japan demonstrated rather lower compliance
performance scores at (0.4) and (0.2). Of particular note however are the other
industrialising G20 members, including India and China, who manifestly failed to
comply with the London commitments. Brazil meanwhile, whose compliance behaviour
as in the positive range, at 0.2 was less than the G20 average of 0.23. With an overall
score of -0.2 for China, India and Brazil against the average score of 0.23 for the G20 as a
whole, we can argue that these countries were not contributing to the commitments
made at London. The analysis presented by the Munk School highlights a significant
pattern of compliance from G8 members while the average compliance performance of
non-G8 members at the London summit compared to the G20 average is -2%.
The research conducted by the Munk School does however raise interesting analysis
when looking at cross sectional data of compliance performance by policy issues. The
highest level of compliance is registered in the resisting of protectionism and
maintaining global trade and investments. See Table 8.

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Table 8 - G20 compliance with 2009 London summit commitments
(G20 Research Group)
Reiterating the commitments made at the Washington summit in 2008, the aim of
averting economic protectionist policies was at an average compliance of 0.58. A
minimal level of compliance was observed on pledges on the Millennium Development
Goals (MDG), Overseas Development Aid (ODA) and investment in the World Bank’s
Vulnerability Framework. In this sense the priority for the G20 was simply as a
“recession buster”. While countries such as Brazil, India and China had substantial trade
and budget surpluses, the agenda was distinctly G8 one, with little ‘buy in’ from
emerging economies.
Pittsburgh (2009)
The Pittsburgh summit was highly significant. In a climate of low expectations the
summit achieved important results, despite what many observers noted as a slowdown
in the productivity of the G20. The sense of urgency that had characterised both
Washington and London summits had abated and the focus of policy formulation
became open to more contestation. A key challenge was to maintain reform momentum
while avoiding micro management and an excessive top-down approach to financial
reform when at the very moment it was about to get increasingly technical. (Angeloni
and Pisani-Ferry, 2012)

34. 34
The first important result achieved at Pittsburgh concerned institution building where
the communiqué published set out the G20 as the “premier forum for their international
economic co-operation”, becoming not only a regular event, but also replacing the G8 at
the top of the international financial architecture. Significantly, the leaders pledged to
strengthen the voice of emerging and developing economies in the IMF through shifting
at minimum 5% of voting quotas from overrepresented countries to underrepresented
countries by January 2011. The Pittsburgh summit was also characterised by a
broadening of the G20 agenda to include energy security, climate change, poverty, jobs
quality and trade and investment.
Where Pittsburgh made the most important headway was in the issue of global
imbalances. Previous chairs had sidestepped this issue at both Washington and London
so as to avoid the issue becoming focal point of US-Chinese confrontations over the
valuation of the Renminbi. Not only was the concept of global imbalances as a
significant cause of the 2008 crash gaining traction following the publication of reports
by both Jacques de Larosiere (2009) and Adair Turner (2009), the IMF was projecting
for a rebound in global balances and the feared effect on demand in future years of
deleveraging and fiscal consolidation. On the eve of Pittsburgh, many commentators
saw it as unlikely that the leaders would entertain discussions in this sensitive area, yet
at the initiative of the US, an agreement was reached on macroeconomic frameworks
that included fiscal, monetary, trade and structural issues and finance ministers
established the ‘Mutual Assessment Programme’ (MAP) to evaluate their collective
compliance to the framework.
The average compliance of the G20 members is 0.24 (See Table 9) The compliance
performance to the Pittsburgh summit is marginally better than that of London (0.23).

35. 35
Table 9 - 2009 Pittsburgh G20 Summit Compliance Scores
(G20 Research Group)
When comparing the London and Pittsburgh summits, one can discern a pattern of
improved compliance performance from many of the countries under analysis. The
most significant positive change was demonstrated by South Korea (+0.75), China
(+0.53) and Argentina (+0.48). India gained a modest +0.02 while Brazil saw one of the
most significant decreases in compliance with its score decreasing by -0.83. According
to the G20 research group, the analysis reveals substantial differences in compliance
between non-G8 and G8 members of the G20. The average compliance scores for non-
G8 members of the G20 have changed from a negative of -0.02 to a positive of 0.01. The
authors note the average compliance performance for non-G8 members of the G20 has
changed from the negative score of -0.02 in 2009 to a positive of 0.01. Further if we look
at China, India and Brazil specifically we attain a compliance rate of -0.29. See Table 10.
Table 10 - 2009 Pittsburgh and 2009 London G20 Summits Compliance Scores
(G20 Research Group)

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Similarly to the analysis of the London summit, the compliance monitoring reveals
substantial differences in compliance performance when we look at cross sectional data
by commitment, sector and country groupings within the G20. See Table 11:
Table 11: G8 and Non-G8 compliance with Pittsburgh summit commitments
(G20 Research Group)
In relation to commitments made on global economic issues, global balances in current
account and the promotion of open trade regime remained high at 0.70, with financial
and regulatory reform trailing at 0.15 and reform of international financial institutions
at 0.05. Non-G8 members were effective in complying to the commitment on balancing
current accounts and promotion of open trade and investment (average 0.73)
surpassing the compliance of the G8 members, in their course ensuring macroeconomic
stabilisation and promoting open markets in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The
report highlights how non-G8 countries failed to comply with commitments expressed
in the areas of regulatory reform (-0.27) and international financial institution reform
(-0.45). Similarly to the two preceding summits, the G20 performance, as a collective,
proved to be weak on producing and complying to commitments on issue of
international development, gaining a score of just -0.05, with G8 compliance at 0.33 and
non-G8 compliance at -0.36. In summary, the Pittsburgh report states that the G8
grouping demonstrates higher rates of delivery and effectiveness in commitment
compliance. They conclude however that:

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“The rise in performance of non G8 members in the G20 is an important factor, which
gives hope that the institution can serve as a platform for their deeper engagement in all
global governance functions” (G20 Research Group)
Seoul (2010)
Seoul was the first G20 summit to be chaired by a non-G8 country and Korea was
especially keen on making it a success. (Financial Times, 2010) Like Pittsburgh, with the
easing of the financial crisis, normalcy brought with it the opportunity for conflict. The
‘Currency War’ was making headlines once more and the MAP was proving more
difficult than expected to implement, with countries only agreeing to policy agreements
that had already been agreed in previous summits. The very fact that all the participants
agreed to commit to headline goals vis-á-vis other nations were highly significant. Seoul
was also successful in delivering, ahead of schedule, the promised reforms of IMF
governance, with an overall shift of 6% in weighted voting rights to underrepresented
emerging economies, bettering the originally agreed 5% at Pittsburgh. (Angeloni and
Pisani-Ferry)
For the period under consideration in this compliance report between 13th November
2010 and Cannes summit on 19th October 2011 the G20 members attained an average
overall compliance rate of 0.5. At Seoul, the difference between the highest and lowest
performers is measured as +0.93.
Continuing the trends present through Washington, London and Pittsburgh, G8
members of the G20 yet again achieved a greater average compliance rate in contrast to
non-G8 members who achieved, in this instance 0.66 against 0.36 respectively.
However, the research stresses the narrative of a convergence in the patterns of
compliance performance over the period 2008-2010:
“This difference of 0.30 points has significantly decreased since 2009 as the compliance
performance of non-G8 members has increased. The gaps in compliance between G8
and non-G8 members have been narrowing steadily, if slowly” (G20 Research Group)
Analysing compliance data by country, we can see from Table 12 that Brazil, China and
India are, at 0.42, not even in the top ten performing nations within the G20, coming
twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth respectively.

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Table 12: 2010 G20 Seoul Summit Final Compliance by Member Ranking
With an average compliance of 0.44 the BRIC countries taken together– Brazil, Russia,
China, India and South Africa – though not equalling the compliance rate of G8 states, is
significantly higher in comparison to that of other non-G8 member states.
Looking across policy areas, the highest scoring commitments were attained in fiscal
consolidation and improving infrastructure 0.89 and the lowest scores were recorded
for commitments on international cooperation 0.05 and trade -0.05. As noted
previously, South Korea as chair had made big strides in pushing development on to the
agenda. The average compliance rate by policy area and commitment was at 0.52. On
development, coming in at 0.6, is better than average compliance and thus represents a
qualitative improvement. See Table 13.
Table 13: 2010 Seoul Summit Final Compliance by Commitment

39. 39
The research surmises that G20 compliance performance for the chosen priority
commitments, measured as a country average, have improved incrementally since 2009.
With an overall average score of 0.23 at London, 0.24 at Pittsburgh and 0.5 at Seoul, its
improving performance may validate its role and claim to legitimacy as the central
global governance institution.
Significantly for the emerging economies of Brazil, China and India at Seoul, South Korea
as chair of the summit was ambitious to open up new chapters in international
discussions and widen the agenda of the G20 to include issues of financial safety nets
and economic development, with clear substantive and political motivation for doing so
as a former developing economy and IMF structural funding recipient. (Angeloni and
Pisani-Ferry, 2012)
Cannes (2011)
The Cannes summit took place between the 3rd and 4th of November 2011. The French
Presidency started with an ambitious agenda at the beginning of 2011. However, the
crisis engulfing the Eurozone was soon to overshadow events and hijack the agenda at
Cannes. British broadsheet newspaper The Guardian reported on the eve of the summit:
“The G20 summit in Cannes is likely to turn into another eurozone crisis meeting amid
desperate attempts to avert a disorderly default by Greece” (The Guardian, 2011)
They also reported on the first day of the summit:
“The eurozone crisis has overshadowed Sarkozy's attempts to add his own personal
touch to the standard G20 agenda” (The Guardian, 2011)
The summit itself was dominated by developments on the Greek sovereign debt crisis
and disputes among EU leaders on the various proposals on the financial facilities
available to alleviate it. Nevertheless, the French did propose a theme of a successor to
the Bretton Woods system. France had hoped for considerable support from China on
these reform initiatives, but in the event the Chinese government maintained a very
cautious approach to these issues. (Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry, 2012) Meanwhile Brazil
caused headlines when its President Dilma Rouseff adopted a leadership role for BRIC
nations concerned about the deepening crisis in the Eurozone, and following from the
recent BRIC’s summit in Hainan, China, there was an agreed position that the Brazilian

40. 40
delegation was able to press upon their European counterparts, in addition to the Sanya
Declaration calling for their greater voice and influence in international monetary
affairs. (BBC News, April 2011)
“Concern over ‘contagion’ meant the Brazilians were likely to arrive in Cannes with all
guns blazing. Rousseff, {I} believe, was likely to ‘provoke’ and ‘preach’ to the rich
nations – particularly the European powers and to a lesser extent the US. Rousseff
would point out that Brazil had learned from past financial crises and that ‘rich
countries should now do their homework’ to stop their crisis contaminating other
emerging economies. Whether Brazil is able to influence the outcome of the Cannes
talks or not....Brazil's leadership in uniting leaders from a variety of emerging
economies towards a common position was a positive sign of the country's growing
clout and reach on the global stage” (The Guardian, 2011)
For the first time these nations has made a strong effort to coordinate positions
between emerging economies prior to G20 summits and that this agreed common
position was key to their confidence and assertiveness in negotiations at Cannes.
At the summit a total of 282 commitments were made. The commitments identified by
the Munk School compliance report cover a range of issue areas - thirteen in fact.
Covering G20 institutionalisation, they also fell predominantly in the domain of
economics (32%), finance (13%) IFI reform (12%) and Trade (6%) with the remainder
split between development, agriculture, energy and development.
For their final compliance report, the research group produce an overall compliance
score for G20 members, measured for the period November 4th to June 1st 2012, of
+0.54. As the research group indicate, this final compliance score is a small increase
from the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit final compliance score off 75%. The UK saw the
highest compliance score at 0.87 while the country with the lowest compliance rate was
Argentina at 0. Looking at policy areas, the strongest compliance rates were recorded
for clean energy, food export restrictions and IFI’s, whilst the lowest three were
recorded for international cooperation, price volatility and fiscal consolidation. See
Table 14.

41. 41
Table 14: 2011 G20 Cannes Summit Final Compliance: Members’ Ranking
As in other compliance reports, the report helpfully looks at compliance as a cross
sectional analysis of countries. G8 members of the G20 achieve a compliance rate of 0.68
whereas non-G8 members achieved a slightly lower score of 0.47. BRIC countries
achieved an average of 0.56 which while being lower than the G8 members’ compliance,
was higher than that of other non-G8 members. The BRICS compliance has been steadily
increasing since London (0.04) through Pittsburgh (0.03), Toronto (0.07) and Seoul
(0.44) and at 0.51 Cannes is its highest compliance performance by far. Brazil and India
both scored a compliance rate of 0.6 while China scored 0.53. As one can see in Table 14,
while these three countries still fail to enter the top 10 of compliant nations at the
Cannes summit, we can discern from Table 15 that Brazil, China and India have all seen
their compliance rates initially dip after the Washington summit, but thereafter steadily
rise (with the exception of India at Pittsburgh) and peak at the Cannes.
Table 15: G20 Final Compliance by Member, 2008-2011

42. 42
The longer the continuation of G20 summitry, the greater is the scope not just of
institutional learning by diplomats and economic actors. In the conclusion to the Cannes
report, the authors make a significant contribution to understanding the changing
nature of observable compliance behaviour. What we must also consider is not the
compliance of actors within summits, but also the overlapping and interdependent
nature of policy coordination. A unique feature of the analysis offered by the Munk
School is the incorporation of deadlines for commitments monitored over multiple
compliance cycles. The raison d’être of the G20 as both ‘crisis committee’ and an
institution for the long term policy management of the global economy means the
convergence of both medium term and long term commitments in varying policy
spheres in overlapping time frames, illustrating the multifaceted nature of compliance
assessment. (G20 Research Group)
In addition to the reports provided by the Munk School, Angeloni and Pisani Ferry
(2012) provide an overview of compliance scores with their own calculations based
upon the data provided by the compliance reports and corroborate much of their
findings. In Table 16 below, we can see the distribution of compliance scores firstly by
topic and then by summit. With an average score of 0.11 for summit compliance, the
emerging economies (which include Brazil, China and India) have the worst compliance
scores of any of the set of economies under scrutiny only with the exception of deficit
emerging economies. That figure is in stark contrast to the average compliance rate of
0.63 for the G7. However, the compliance performance by the emerging economies
across time does see a considerable improvement, starting at 0.23, dipping to -0.14 after
London and rising again to 0.4 after Seoul.
As predicted by our analysis of the history and economic characteristics, when we look
at compliance by policy area the strongest compliance performance from the emerging
economies was with regard to macroeconomic policy (0.49) and the weakest in financial
reform (-0.05).

43. 43
Table 16: Average compliance scores (GDP-weighted) [Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry 2012]
Conclusion
In this analysis our timeline has extended from the Washington Summit of 2008 to the
Cannes Summit of 2011; a space of only three years. Mexico recently hosted the Cancun
Summit (for which we are still within its compliance time frame and therefore
impossible to conduct a performance review) with Russia, Australia and Turkey all set
to host summits between now and 2015 – these will be the true tests of how far the
priorities, scope and implementation of the G20 will truly evolve from simply being a
“G7 with a few extra chairs” to a more inclusive and broad formulation of global
governance. I hope to have shown how, following the critical juncture of the 2008
financial crisis; historically constituted institutionalism saw an isomorphic replication
of the G8 structure in the G20. The agenda of G20 finance meetings was dominated by
G7 priorities, and continued during the early summits of the level of heads of state from
2008 onwards with a commitment to liberalised trade and macroeconomics. As the
crisis receded the compliance performance of emerging economies waned somewhat,
but from Seoul onward, compliance rates improved as the agenda of the G20 expanded
to include traditional non-G7 topics such as development and financial safety nets.
Consistent throughout is the degree to which these emerging economies acted in their

44. 44
interests, often in coalitions of countries that continually shifted depending on the issue
at hand.
In this thesis I can identify three central flaws in the analysis. Firstly, the methodology
utilised by the Munk School of Global Affairs is at times inconsistent. Referring to the
methodology published, the analysts take a selective approach as to which policy areas
will be chosen as part of a weighted basket of commitments, and place a weighted value
for different commitments for different countries. (See compliance report
methodologies) Over a series of summits these commitments and policy areas change,
leading to insufficient like-for-like comparisons of the qualitative nature of policy
commitments though time. Secondly, the G20 leaders’ summits have existed for only
four years, and we have accounted for only five summits, with the exclusion of the 2010
Toronto summit due to a comparative lack of literature, meaning there is little
robustness in any statistical trends observable in compliance performance with such a
comparatively small data set. Finally, given the contested nature of intuitionalism as a
theory in political science with considerable cross fertilisation of underlying
assumptions between HI and sociological institutionalism (Schmidt, 2010) the
robustness of attempting to adopt a single theoretical approach may leave us with a
deficient model. As we have seen, it would be more appropriate to think of our approach
as being more akin to the new institutionalism of discourse. (Schmidt, 2010)
Given the successive crises that the G20 has dealt with, from the collapse of Lehman
Brothers to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, in all fairness it has had little time for
soul-searching its mission and role within the world economy. As a result, the only
systemic way to provide elements for a judgement of the G20 is to study compliance
with its own specific commitments. (Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry, 2012) Despite their
often narrow focus, especially in earlier summits, the communiqués published offer the
only primary explicit and detailed articulation of its agenda.
Despite the prevailing critiques of G20 inclusiveness as outlined in the literature, a
robust defence can be made. It openly debated crucial policy areas in the face of global
crisis and in some instances came to an agreement. In comparison to global governance
forums that came before, this was a major achievement. (Schirm, 2011) Several
unsettled agendas were finally agreed upon and several important steps were taken,

45. 45
especially in the field of IMF reform, to the benefit of emerging economies. The ad hoc
groupings and alliances of states in negotiations superseded those previously seen in
other international institutional forums such as the G7, G8, BRICS summits and the UN.
On the major issues such as global imbalances, debt sustainability and the effects of
monetary policy, the emerging economies demonstrated behaviour akin to developed
economies. They articulated their national interest and beliefs in legitimate global
economic governance without being obstructive on certain issues or being unduly
animated on others. Devoid of antagonism between the two groupings, emerging
economies are pragmatically pursuing their economic interests in the same manner as
the G8 had for the three decades beforehand:
“Both emerging and industrialised countries were reluctant in compromising domestic
interests and ideational beliefs. Thus, emerging powers can be seen as stakeholders in
the G20 process in the same way as old industrialised countries” (Schirm, 2012)
If the tenants of discursive institutionalism hold, we are to see an ever changing
relationship between key stakeholders in global economic governance. Key to the
institutional approach, the Munk School Compliance report offers this lucid analysis,
arguing that, especially in regard to financial regulatory policy coordination:
“The difference in the levels of compliance with the G20 commitments can be attributed
to the commitments’ complexity as well as different nature of these institutions. The G8
is an established forum of the most developed economies with a history of more than
thirty years of collaboration aimed at resolution of acute problems and implementation
of long term programmes....Thus compliance performance indicates a higher efficiency
of the G8 in comparison to the G20 on the global governance function of delivery”
(G20 Research Group)

46. 46
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