The document discusses François Pinault's failed project to establish his private contemporary art foundation on Île Seguin in Boulogne-Billancourt, France. Pinault, one of the wealthiest men in France, wanted to display his extensive art collection in a new museum building. However, the project faced opposition from local groups and bureaucracy. In 2005, Pinault abandoned the plans and moved the foundation to Venice instead, citing delays. The document aims to understand why the project failed and analyze how private cultural initiatives impact urban development.

1. In Museums We Trust! Dr Elsa Vivant Urban Research Center London School of Economics 7th of June 2007

2. Context In France, most of studies on culture (and city) are focusing on public policies. A limited number are looking at underground cultures or subcultures. Almost nothing had been done about private cultural amenities and city development. Private investments into art and culture are rising, in both non profit and bankable cultural sectors. This is having an impact on city development, mostly by the creation (or extension) of cultural amenities. Moreover, cities are becoming a playground and a space for the power exhibition of cultural industries (Sassen, Roots, Hanningan 1998, Zukin, 1995) In 2005, François Pinault gave up the idea of placing his contemporary art foundation near Paris and moved it to Venice. This was very controversial. This example of a failure is very interesting because it leads to understand several issues about changes in the relationships between culture and cities.

3. Objectives of the research To understand why did the project fail? (in order to advise planner in the future) To analyse to what extent the “private” specificity of the project had an impact on the failure To reappraise the common expectation of the effect of art amenities in cities To enlarge the scope towards the understanding of the role of culture in contemporary society. For instance: to parallel museum’s and cities’ development strategies To provide a wider understanding of the contemporary changes of the society through the analysis of the use of culture in city planning

4. Presentation outline The François Pinault Foundation case The making of a megacollector Few basics about the art world and megacollector power A private artistic place as a flagship for an urban project The project process Interpretations of a failure Epilogue Museums and culture as issues for strategic planning Changes in museums’ duties Museums as a tool for planning Changes in museums’ strategies

5. Who is François Pinault? Self-made businessman 3rd wealthiest in France and 34th in the world (Forbes, 2007) Worth: $14.5billions (Forbes, 2007) Business based on : Retailing (La Redoute, Fnac, Printemps) Luxury goods (Gucci, Yves Saint Laurent, wineries…) Financial management (Artémis) medias (Le Point, le Monde)

6. Francois Pinault involvement in arts A genuine art lover His personal collection was started by his second wife. Then, it became his secret garden. First, he collected modern art, then contemporary art, especially abstraction.

7. Why do collectors collect? Look for social prestige and legitimacy Wish to join a happy few club. Because of prices, art market is a playground for the wealthiest Should love art and risk. Art could be a good investment, but it is generally not a speculative market (devaluation risk) Few mega collectors are very powerful on the market, due to the special relationships they have with galleries (objective collusion to rise up artists’ value by limiting the offer).

8. Francois Pinault involvement in arts Enlightened investor Owns Christies’ since 1998 (one of the two main auctions international firms) Has the best counsellors (first of all, Christies’ experts), ex minister of culture, ex directors of museums,….

9. The rise (or revival) of private involvement in the art New legal and fiscal rules for private sponsorship and philanthropy artwork are not included in the tax base In 2003, new law to encourage the mecenat . simplify administration. 60% of tax cut New legal scheme for non profit foundation, especially the new “corporate foundation” 3 types of “foundation”. All need to be approved by the government. Not only about culture Corporate foundation: should be financed by one firm and its employees. A way for firm to settle a real philanthropic policy and to communicate about it. Should implement a policy on a fix-term base

10. Francois Pinault’s Foundation Project Wanted to show his collection (which used to be secret) throughout a large scale exhibition place. Planned to build a large scale museum in the frame of a large urban project

11. Boulogne Billancourt Urban Project more info on the city’s website: http:// www.boulognebillancourt.fr and the planning authority’s website: http://www.ileseguin-rivesdeseine.fr /

12. History of the place Since the late 19 th century, Renault’s factory plants, mostly on the island. Land is owned by Renault, which used to be a public company. Desindustrialised since 1992 74 ha of unused polluted land. In the richest Parisian suburb (near La Défense, Neuilly and the 16th district) Since 1992, the State and local authorities are seeking for a redevelopment project

13. Urban redevelopment project Mixed use planning: ZAC (Comprehensive planning zone): housing (1/3 public housing), offices, public services, retailing, green spaces, public transport (tramway) Public private partnership: SAEM (Société d’Aménagement d’économie mixte). Main stakeholders: City of Boulogne Billancourt (64%), Haut de Seine department council (10%); Caisse des dépots et consignation (15%), two private banks (5% each); Leaded by Jean Louis Subileau (Euralille) Costs : 537millions euros planning costs: new roads, depolution, new parks, public amenities, planning expertise, land purchase, new bridges): Benefits: City of boulogne (131millions), developers’ participation (sale – charge foncière) Time schedule: end in 2015

14. The Seguin Island: The Two Cultures Island Specific plan due to Location on the Seine River Historical symbol as a worker fortress Project: Science: University (NYU, AUP), Cancer national institute, … Culture: music centre, contemporary art centre (Fondation François Pinault, art galleries)

15. Francois Pinault’s project 1/3 of the island 30 000m² building to host his collection (pseudo) architectural contest, awarded by Tadao Ando

16. Chronology March: music centre and 4*hotel are planned in Seguin Island April: local organisation cancel their lawsuit March: François Pinault ends the call for tender to realise the building. Works may start in September May: Francois Pinault gives up the project 2005 April: Land use plan is adopted December: Land use plan is contested by local organisation September 2004: land deal agreement (not yet purchase) approved by Renault, Pinault and Saem Building permit is delivered 2004 July: Creation of the Zac and of Saem (planning authority) November: building permit demand 2003 General master plan is voted by the city council General dealing agreement with the landowner (Renault) 2002 Planning and feasibility study on the Seguin Island (done by François Barré): the two cultures Island October: Francois Pinault chooses Tadao Ando’s project 2001 Francois Pinault announces his will to settle down his foundation in Seguin Island 2000 Large scale planning contest, awarded by Bruno Fortier (to design the main idea of the project) 1997 Renault leaves the area Government and planners starts to think about the future 1992 Urban project Pinault’s project

17. Project’s specificities Project team: Project manager: no experience in large scale project management Communication : Francois Pinault’s personal assistant, no experience in this kind of project

18. Project’s specificities Project team Advisors and counsellors Francois Pinault can afford the most affluent councillors, in both urban and art issues (Francois Barré, Jean-Jacques Aillagon, Philippe Vergne) Nevertheless, it seems he was surprised by the urban project process

19. Project’s specificities Project team: Advisors and counsellors Legal structure: was never created The project was called “the Francois Pinault Foundation’s Project”, but the only structure that was planned was an association (but no created). Foundation rules were too constraining for him (should have a board of trustees). There are also constraints on art collections management The plan: an association has to manage and to valorise Francois Pinault’s collection. It should take place in a building owned by the Pinault’s company (Artemis) (3 legal actors, but only 1man)

20. Project’s specificities Project team: Advisors and counsellors Legal structure: was never created Estimated costs: Construction: 150 millions € Management: 5-6 millions € /year The collection: unknown

21. Project’s specificities Project team: Advisors and counsellors Legal structure: was never created Estimated costs: Fully funded by François Pinault himself: almost no costs for the community

22. Expected impacts To attract other investors in the project, such as art galleries, 4* hotel It is considered as an engine and a catalyst for the project

23. Expected impacts To attract other investors in the project, such as art galleries, 4* hotel To be the symbol of urban renewal through architectural flagship

24. Expected impacts To attract other investors in the project, such as art galleries, 4* hotel To be the symbol of urban renewal through architectural flagship To attract visitors they expected around 1million/year

25. Expected impacts To attract other investors in the project, such as art galleries, 4* hotel To be the symbol of urban renewal through architectural flagship To attract visitors To support and to promote French artists

26. Expected impacts To attract other investors in the project, such as art galleries, 4* hotel To be the symbol of urban renewal through architectural flagship To attract visitors To support and to promote French artists To open up opportunities for new kind of public-private relationships in the art

27. Why he moved, he said 10th of May 2005: public letter in Le Monde “Je renonce” ( www. lemonde . fr ) Bureaucracy Unwillingness form the local (authorities, association) Time: business man’s schedule is not urban planning’s schedule There is nothing nearby, my project is in a no man’s land  according to him, he is not responsible of the failure

28. Why he moved, others said Executive Life Councellors impact Heirs do not want to pay for their father’s mausoleum Frozen relationships between him and the mayor The French misunderstanding of private sector

29. Interpretations of a failure Do not believe on the excuse of time: a building project in a polluted area where planning orientation are not yet defined should take time.

30. Interpretations of a failure Weakness from the Francois Pinault Side: No real legal structure, almost no team No museum or cultural project, only an architectural project, neither a list of the artworks Land was never purchased (only a promise): he always protect himself in order to escape the project, just before implementation! Weakness from the planner’s side: A lot of expectations, but not safety net! No second scenario, in case of… Weakness of a planner facing a private investor financing the whole non profit project, so potentially symbolic and attractive. Too conciliatory.

31. Never trust a business man! Presented as a large scale non profit private project. Moreover, it was an individual’s project = one man’s interests, one man’s bank account, one man’s decisions! Francois Pinault, even if he has the best advisors, does not listen to anyone. Only wants to follow his instinct and his vision as he used to do in business. But creating a new large scale art centre is not like attacking firms on the stock exchange! Has the best communication counsellor in Paris (Anne Méaux), and he is involved in medias. The city and the planner cannot compete in the communication war. Nobody had seen the collection before!

32. Trust as an inefficient project processing Everything based on trust: Francois Pinault’s willingness to realise his plans Planner’s skills and capacities to achieve the project. Thus, commitments were not strong enough. No control or regulation. In term of planning process: lack of definitive involvements (possible because one man’s interest). For instance, Francois Pinault has never buy any land (only a promise). When he changed his mind, no clear commitment that could be recover in a court (too uncertain). Above all: Trust in museum’s impact on the urban project

33. Epilogue Did he really want to achieve it? It is impossible to say But just to compare, the size of the planned building is 30000m², more or less as big as the Pompidou centre. Pinault’s collection should not be more than 2000 piece of art, instead of the 60 000 of the Pompidou centre. How could he occupied it? Moreover, …

34. What’s happen to Francois Pinault Moved to Venice, Palazzo Grassi (2000m²). http://www.palazzograssi.it/ He is fighting against Guggenheim Fondation to buy the Douane, in order to enlarge his museum

35. What’s happen to Francois Pinault Paid the cost of Boulogne Billancourt project by selling one piece of art to Moma (about $30 million) Robert Rauschenberg, Rebus

36. What’s happen to Francois Pinault Was considered in 2006 as the most important actor in the art market (art review) To what extent did the Boulogne project, besides its failure, have an impact on his reputation?

37. What’s happen to the urban project? Stopped for a long while : others investors hesitated or changed their mind In order to substitute the François Pinault’s project, the State announced in 2005 the future opening of a Centre Européen de la Création Contemporaine Public investment instead of private Project was in “stand by” before election, but now, it will probably be implemented (due to its location in “Sarkoland”) What should be question now: for whose sake this “centre de creation contemporaine” is going to be done?

38. Louis Vuitton’s project: a response to Pinault’s given up For information about the project (and architectural project) http://www.lvmh.fr/magazine/pg_mag_contenu.asp?int_id=497&archive=0&rubrique=ACTUALITE&srub=0&rub=&str_theme_id

39. A personal competition Who is Bernard Arnaud (head of LVMH)? 1st wealth in France, 7th in the world Polytechinicien, from a little bourgeoisie family As Francois Pinault, made a lot of money in the 80s, during privatisation process Very attract by glamour and quickly moved to luxury goods (first: Christian Dior). Then build the LVMH luxury empire. The Gucci affair started the war against François Pinault (even if it sounds anecdotic, this mythology of hate between the two is presented as something really important) Not an art lover (according to anyone in the art world), but he is becoming a megacollector in order to reinforce his social legitimacy and because his worst enemy is very important in the art world (François Pinault) One of the best friend of the newly elected president

40. Main specificities Corporate fondation (under creation) Architect: Franck Gehry, without any competition, only because of his reputation Location: the jardin d’acclimatation, a part of the Bois de Boulogne those management is outsourced to Lvmh group. Land: owned by the City of Paris, but leasehold to Lvmh The foundation will be leaded by Suzanne Pagé, former chief curator of the Paris’s museum of modern art Size: 5000m²

41. Changes in museums’ role Memory, conservation, heritage 19th century: artists worked in museum visitors were allowed to come in only one or two days a week. Then the museum became a storage and conservation place and exhibition space Education Education became an important mission Cultural democratisation = A goal for public policy But also a way to legitimize the increasings financial needs and to attract new fundraisors Urban amenity urban attraction that should attract a large public urban amenity that provide services : catering, shops, …. social venue: letting for private or corporate meeting, dating place…

42. … toward mass entertainment museums?

43. Museums as tool for planning To built or represent power (large scale exhibition, large bourgeoisie’s cultural spaces) (historically) To attract visitors (spend money, do not need many services) To impact on other economic sectors in the UK: 1.5billion£/year (taking account of estimated visitors expenditure); major museums employ 9000 people; 42 millions visitor/years

44. Museums as tool for planning To change city image. (architecture radicalism as a brand logo and as way to play on international mental map) To offer good services (help to perform in international cities ranking) To increase local-pride To hide other local issues To encourage creative industries clustering

45. Risks and questions First-come effect: Is it still relevant to use culture as a distinctive planning tool while every city has similar strategies? Is it possible to copy the same scheme in different contexts? (scheme of strategies that have been successful in one city). Could culture be the solution to every urban problem? Problem: Non comment about failures, only about (few) success stories. Does not help to assess! Effects on land prices. May lead to gentrification (or is it one of the unsaid objective?)

46. Risks and questions Pride: It depends. Parisian examples :Pompidou centre is still consider by some as a sin. National Library and Bastille opera: general disagreement Do these strategies really support creation and artistic production or is it only consumption oriented? Museum, large amenities: more visible than an local population oriented policy for education in art for example. Museum in planning project: public good or money maker?

47. In Museums we trust! A reappraisal of museums’ effects on urban development has to be done. Indeed, the mediatisation of (very) few successful projects lead to spread : a new interpretation of “what is a museum” and what are its objectives and purposes (from conservation to education; from exhibition to consumption). a business-oriented development model of museum management (maximisation of collection by coproducing megacollection, fundraising, sponsorship, reorganisation of museum’s space toward more space for consuming activities) the use of museum for non-cultural purpose: city-image making or individual representation, power legitimacy building.

48. In Museums we trust! the consideration of museums as urban tools. For instance, the foundation Pinault’s project was an engine for the Seguin Island urban project itself. Other stakeholders planned to come: private art galleries, a 4stars hotel.. The belief in museums’ magic power : To what extend are there over-expectation on museum’s effect ? Indeed, museums should be: an educator, a market place, an urban flagship and image, a fundraised machine, a diplomatic tool, …. To what extend do these expectations lead to overpricing and over investment in large scale amenity?

49. Changes in museums strategies more market oriented and more business-model management strategy

50. Partnerships and coproduction The case of large touring mega exhibition coproduction (but also exchanges and loans) To share the cost of the exhibition. Several museums work together to create an large exhibition, share their resources (human, skills, space, and of course collection) To increase attractiveness of museum. To manage artworks storage issue: Very large collections: Louvre exhibit less than 10% of its collection Specific conditions of the storage (temperature, humidity, size of the material, etc…) Flood risk in Paris basement museums’ storage. To raise new incomes and new visitors

51. From the branded museum French museum: toward public brands. The RNM (reunion des musees nationaux) was created to improve museums’ management and to organise common large scale exhibitions; It is now developing branding strategies, for example by offering souvenirs or copies based on the RNM collections, with a common logo The same for Monum: centre des monuments nationaux: public joint management for several monuments http://www. museumbranding . co . uk to create an image by graphic design and storytelling The success of branding: we don’t see it anymore because they are everywhere!

52. To the franchised museum Guggenheim Several branches Spectacular architecture with worldwide famous signature Even some exhibitions are market-oriented Reaccessioning as a way of collection management

53. To the franchised museum Guggenheims 1959: New York (Franck Lloyd Wright) 1976: Venice (Peggy Guggenheim collection) 1992: Soho (closed in 2001) 1997: Bilbao (Franch Gehry) 1997: Berlin (joint venture with Deutche Bank) 2001: Las Vegas (Rem Khoolaas, in the Venetian Hotel, in partnership with Hermitage Museum) Soon: Guadalajara (Mexico), Abu Dhabi (Emirates) Every city wants a Guggenheim!

54. Few facts about Guggenheim Bilbao The project: Basque authorities’ project (not a foundation’s one) Part of a large regeneration project (with new transportation system, public space, …) those objectives are to switch from a decaying industrial economy to a post industrial economy where tourism and creative industry are driven the development. The museum : supposed to attract visitors and change the city’s image Construction costs supported by local authorities (almost 130millions €) Basque government paid a 20years franchise: use of the brand name, expertise (18millions€) Not owned by the Guggenheim foundation 1/3 of the collection is own by the Guggenheim foundation, 2/3 was bought by local authorities (30millions€)

55. Few facts about Guggenheim Bilbao The effects: To change of city image: yes. The image of the museum is used in advertising to symbolise modernity, challenging entrepreneurship, etc…(what ever the product is (car, insurance…)) To attract visitors: yes. The first year : 1.3millions visitors. Then around 700 000/year. The challenge: to maintain this frequentation To develop tourism industries: yes: museum’s visitors stay overnight. The museum participates in job creation and economic development of the tourist sector. To generate income through taxes: not as expected. According to local authorities, return on investment in 6 years (!); probably in 15 years

56. Few facts about Guggenheim Bilbao Risks Lead to gentrification (through the rise of real estate prices) No real impact on the creation of an innovative milieu Who does really benefit of the public investment? Local inhabitants? Visitors? Basque region? Or the Guggenheim Foundation itself? It is copied worldwide without any reserve. Considered as a model and visited by many city planners and policy makers. Overestimation of number of visitors, overinvestment, negligectment of other part of the regeneration project, ...

57. French National museums franchises New French museums’ franchise strategies: national and local government strategies, instead of museum strategies Louvre-Lens Pompidou Metz

58. Museums’ Island Objectives: to face the petrol era’s end, Emirates government is currently implementing anew strategic policy in order to transform the State economy to a tourism and leisure oriented economy He is building a wide urban project which consists in a new off shore island dedicated to arts, culture, tourism and leisure: Saadiyat Island project (Island of happiness): www. saadiyat . ae or www. tdic . ae

59. Museums’ Island Several cultural institutions created by worldwide famous architects (objective: 2018): Guggenheim (Franck Gehry) Louvre (Jean Nouvel) Maritime Museum (Tadao Ando) National Museum Performing art centre (Zaha Hadid)

60. “ Universal” museum Louvre Abu Dhabi Agreement between Emirates and French governments www.culture.gouv.fr Involved all the “musées de France” collections and expertise that might be lease during the 30 years contracts to the Abu Dhabi museum Universal museum: mutual understanding between cultures… 1 billiard euros over 30 years (not included construction costs) Objective: 2012 24000m² Creation of the “Agence internationale des musées de France” (French public agency) that will provide museum expertise Over 10 first years of opening, France’s museums will loans artwork. At the same time, Agence provide expertise to Emirates to buy a create its own collection The largest cultural controversial of the year. But it should be also controversial on an urban point of view

61. Culture and museums as a branding tool More than a museum’s franchise strategy, the Abu Dhabi case reveals that museums are becoming a tool for national branding strategies : it is a part of a new France’s branding strategy , mostly based on culture [rapport Levy] (As it used to be here, 10 years ago, when the UK was rebranding as Cool Britania) In Abu Dhabi, not only Louvre, but also Sorbonne (opened in 2006) It is also a part of a wider trade contract with Emirates. And a part of the diplomatic strategy in the middle east

62. What city for whose sake? Abu Dhabi project’s effect: people seem to realise what are the real purposes of the use of cultural amenities in urban project. By many critics, the Abu Dhabi Project, that the governemnt could probably not refuse, is considered as a prostitution of culture, as a non-return point of the consumerisation of culture. Culture : alibi in order to avoid local resistance in urban regeneration processes. Culture : a consensual function that stops local organisations reclaims. Uncontroversial, it legitimizes urban regeneration process, even if their social effects could be doubtful.

63. What city for whose sake? The common interest for arts and culture of left-wings thinkers and urban activist as well, seems to blind them, to hide the dark side of the regeneration project, and to hind their opposition and reclaiming capacities. Even off cultural scene could be used by planners in order to make symbolic value of a place To what extend, on an urban planning point of view, cultural policies and the use of culture in urban regeneration project reveals the spread of the liberal thinking by attracting the wealthier people and by arguing that it would benefit to the whole community?

64. The limits of the leisure city Is it possible to plan a regeneration project without a cultural feature? Is there an alternative to culture ? Could planners imagine a no-culture urban project? this reveal the lack of imagination What are the effect of the marketing diktat in urban planning practices? Could a city’s economic activity focus only on leisure? Is the entertainment city a sustainable city? If we consider that creativity matters, does large scale amenities really improve creative atmosphere and cultural production? Are these amenities efficient for cultural policies? What about cultural education ? Support to artists and cultural production (« intermittent du spectacle »)

65. Is consumerisation of culture a no-return way? Does it mean we should not create cultural amenities any more? Does it mean that the embedment between culture and capital; art and business is a non return process? ------------ NO We should just never forget that when planners and business are dealing with culture, this does not concert art and culture anymore. The use of culture in urban policies is changing it into a communication strategy of a settlement policy. Let’s hope that political willingness still exist. Mac/Val in Vitry s/ Seine www.macval.fr Public Poor suburb Small scale (lower cost) Quite popular (local audience instead of Parisian one) Cultural democratisation (school group, low prices (while other Parisian contemporary museum are quite expensive) Not a planning tool. Even if we should not be genuine : Vitry, as other suburb is changing (not really gentrifying) But mac val: not easy access, not part of a planning project Political willingness of cultural democratisation and support to artist

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