Unnamed Interests and Informal Leaders: A Street Vendor Relocation in Yogyakarta City An elaboration of journal: Sheri Gibbings. “Unnamed Interests and Informal Leaders: "A Street Vendor Relocation in Yogyakarta City”. Indonesia, 96 (October 2013), pp. 151-185"; fulfilling the Indonesian Language and Culture subject in Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. by: Silvio Adriano & Laura Patricia

1. UNNAMED INTERESTS AND INFORMAL LEADERS:
A STREET VENDOR RELOCATION IN YOGYAKARTA
CITY
Silvio Adriano Shiddiq Suparyaman / 342806!
Laura Patricia / 344142!

2. Introduction

3. background
relocation plan had raised questions to
Pethikbumi (Paguyuban Pedagang Klitikan Mangkubumi)
municipal government was trying to impose this relocation onto the street
vendors in an undemocratic manner."
Herry wants to build a specialized market for antiques and second-hand
goods because the prospects would be good.

4. effect
urban political
environment has been
affected by the implementation
of new democratic and
decentralization policies"
legal aid organization and a student activists’ group were helping
to support Pethikbumi in its opposition of the relocation."
protest
engage mass
media
improved
government
transparency &
accountability

5. informal leaders
Three different generations
of informal leaders
at the neighborhood level
in Bandung."
headed
football and
wrestling clubs,
had strong
connections with
the army
leaders
in their own
right, based their
prominence on
past
different kind of
leader has
emerged—still
informal, but
less tough,
more
entrepreneurial,
and more
political
leaders
gained
recognition from
organizing informal
sector workers,
such as street
traders

6. focus
role of the mayor and informal leaders at the city level during
a government-organized street vendor relocation project that
took place in late 2007, which moved three groups of traders in Yogyakarta City
from downtown streets to an enclosed marketplace."

7. informal leaders
individuals who are not elected
to office or working as civil
servants, yet who hold significant
authority in the city."
informal
leaders are not
entirely separate
from the state.
state has
been active in
shaping the forms
of informal authority
that exist in the
city

8. reality
informal leaders, who were not street vendors themselves,
appeared to help facilitate the relocation (or its opposition)."
experience
organizing
protests
contacting
political parties
gain
authority by
navigate social-politic
channels
in city

9. informal leaders involved
professional
human-rights
advocate
tough guy
individual
influence change in the city
through formal and legal
channels while using the
discourses of human rights and
democracy
large number of followers, his
spiritual qualities, and his ability
to control populations through
both the use and inhibition of
violence
operates through any channel
necessary—whether formal,
legal in order to succeed
(professional/educated
individuals)
BPHK,
the NGO
Network,
and
PPIP
Ahmad -
Ethnic
Organization
Leader
Djoko -
Human Rights
Lawyer

10. formal leaders
listen to and “dialogue” with
the traders
forging ahead with the
relocation project—without
considering the possibility
of re-ordering the street as
the Pethikbumi traders had
requested.
to compete with the informal
leaders for the support of
traders

11. Informal Leaders in Context:
Suspicion and Rumors

12. informal leaders
democratization
and
decentralization"
transfer of administrative and
political authority to the lower levels
of government
municipalities are responsible for a
wide range of new administrative
tasks
Reformasi has given rise to
human rights organizations in
Yogyakarta City
mayor
has found himself having to
compete for the loyalty of traders
with the informal leaders who
oppose his plans

13. what really happened?
individuals continued to be suspicious
of various actors
there remains an off-stage realm of politics.
while the mayor
appeared to be
engaging in democratic
debate and diplomacy
created a horizontal
conflict among the
traders in order to
weaken the power of
their group.
plans
to kidnap
the street
vendor
preman
(thugs) were
being used to
intimidate
government
threat to label
person as
provokator and
blacklist him

14. hyper - hermeneutics
people’s inclination to distrust
appearances and search for
hidden meanings and messages"
operating “behind
the screen
paid agents of
unnamed interests
unnamed
interests

15. Patron–Client Relations
and the City

16. social and political life
networks of informal mass organizations were related
to political parties"
through these informal relations that people could gain access to
permits, loans, or other necessities"
Herry wants to build a specialized market for antiques and second-hand
goods because the prospects would be good.

17. during New Order
street vendors paid off municipal officials, the military, or thugs
in return for protection"
“connections are always above the law”"
Yogyakarta City
primarily depended on
thugs, official and ethnic
networks
"
protect them in exchange
for the payment of informal
taxes

18. patron-client relationship
based on two different exchanges:
citizens
seeking favors
individual officials
was based on an exchange of
money, food, or goods.
exchange of political support
and an adherence to Pancasila

19. transition to democracy
state has been less able to monopolize
increase the roles of various groups (street gangs)
although violent, contribute to the well-being of the poor

20. decentralized clientelism
allows for multiple patrons to compete with each other for clients
clients to choose a patron willing to offer the highest reward
YK
mobilize
several
thousand
parking
agents for a
local election
hundreds of
traders on
Malioboro
Street during
the previous
election

21. Relocation for Remuneration:
A Divided Group

22. why relocation?
marketplace had recently been made available after the livestock traders that
had occupied it were moved outside the city limits
public considered the growing number of traders in downtown streets to be “dirty” and the
cause of chaos and traffic jams.
shop owners, many of whom lived above their shops, complained about the difficulty of
leaving or entering their homes and/or businesses due to the concentration of informal-sector
vendors.
government’s
desire to secure
revenue from the
traders
collecting
more from
individuals in the
informal economy
Trader Identity Card

23. a divided group
INDEPENDENT
(traders sold secondhand
merchandise, including
antiques)
support the
relocation
opposed the
relocation
PETHIKBUMI
(traders sold clothing,
shoes, and hardware)
)
selling in a marketplace as
opposed to on the street
would increase their
prestige, and give them a
valuable asset for the future
moving to an enclosed
marketplace would lead to
financial ruin
(required more capital and
involved more competition
among the traders)"

24. Unnamed Interests:
The Professional Leaders

25. NGO
Networks"
- give knowledge
and skills to be
independent
BPHK
supporting groups of traders who were facing eviction.
helped the street vendors sketch legal letters who opposed the relocation.

26. Educate Create democracy
PPIP
2000 in Salatiga,
Central Java
the Indonesian Movement for Change
‘revolution is practice’
Formed in
Totok defended street vendor along Selokan Mataram & Malioboro

27. PPIP - Totok
not paid
Staff are
volunteers
Not a mass
organisation
paid
PPIP
NGO
Professional human
right organization

28. BPHK vs PPIP
BPHK
Vendors are not
ready to fight
PPIP
Receives
kiosk after
relocation
Vendors should not fight

29. The Traditional Tough Guy

30. Ahmad
Supporter of anti relocation traders
Believe that posing a serious threat against
the government is the most effective
Sate seller in Surabaya
Leader of an ethnic organization
Uses violence to maintain own power
Believe to contribute to society:
helping thieves

31. Ahmad
Hindered the relocation project in
Mangkubumi
dilemma
as to whether
the government
should continue
their quest
may lead to
violence

32. The Hybrid Leader

33. Djoko
Mayor who supports relocation plan
Draw vendors in relation with an expensive political
network to aid them in supporting political network
Provide the vendors with
legal services
Memorandum of understanding
(MOU) with the government

34. Djoko
Decided to be a government official &
continue to defend the poor
Rough Past
Used
to fight against
the government
‘such
resistance
achieved little’

35. the breakdown of alliance:
blaming each other
November, 10th 2007
forced
relocation
strike
occurred in
front of Tugu
and governor
office
November, 11th 2007

36. Tension
BPHK PETHIKBUMI
YOGYA
MAJOR

37. The Major of ‘Dialoguing’
with the people
Mayor Henry transformed bureaucratic culture of
Yogyakarta more democratic &transparent.
Set up social media
Gain more supporters

38. Question

39. in your opinions, what gives rise to informal sectors in
Indonesia?
Unaware
of
the
need
to
pay
tax
Original
loca5on
is
more
strategic
Moving
cost
money

40. Is informal economy unique to developing countries?
It’s
common
made
up
60%
of
labour
force
Can
be
small,
such
as
street
vendors
or
big
such
as
black
market
Proper
job
with
proper
wage
or
salary
are
unavailable
Educa5on
level

41. In what way can informal sector describe the relation
between the state and the people?
Government
trying
to
eradicate
these
ac5vity
&
register
them
in
a
way
to
collect
tax
from
them
The
people
in
informal
sectors
feels
that
their
right
is
being
taken
away

42. Conclusion

43. Informal
Sector
is
not
taxed
New
Era
-­‐
Decentralize
Informal
Leader,
Professional,
Tough
Guy,
Hybrid
Irony
of
Informal
Leader

44. fin.