2. Preliminary note
• the UN officials and organizations don't use
different names for the old UNIFIL which has
been deployed in 1978 (425) or the 'robust'
UNIFIL, which has been deployed in 2006
(1701).
• However, this paper shall recall the terms:
UNIFIL I and UNIFIL II, for the sake of
differentiation and clarity.
3. In this research, I argue that:
1- There is ambiguity in the language of the UNSC Resolution 1701; it doesn't refer directly to
chapter VII, however uses the strong language of chapter VII. Some NATO contingents tried
to benefit from this ambiguity to apply their own national agendas, and practice wide
interpretation for 1701. However, the realities in the South made them more humble and
forced them to abide by the narrow interpretation of 1701.
2- UNIFIL II was sought to be a different force from UNIFIL I with more aggressive mandate,
different (RoE), and with an ability to enforce peace not just keeping it. Real politics moved
UNIFIL II away from overt peace enforcement type of activities towards a more UNIFIL I
style.
3- Religion shape the perceptions of the Lebanese towards UNIFIL, but it may not be the
dominant variable. The outcome of the surveys reveals that the political stances as well as
the behavior of the troops have the major role in the Lebanese attitudes towards UNIFILII.
4- While UNIFIL I was accused of inefficiency and weakness, UNIFIL II is accused of
aggressiveness, spying and lack of understanding of cultural sentiments.
5- UNIFIL I despite its shortcomings, could win the hearts and minds of the population and
became a part of the land.
6- UNIFIL is caught in the dilemma of credibility and impartiality. Credibility sometimes is the
price of keeping the impartiality image.
6. Are you satisfied with UNIFIL's role in providing
security/ keeping peace
23%
72%
5%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Security /satification
Satisfied
not satisfied
N/A
0
10
20
30
40
50
keeping peace
50%
40%
5%
Satisfied
Not
Satisfied
N/A
7. Provider of Security, in your opinion
57%
3%
40%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Provider of Security
Hezbollah
UNIFIL
UNFIL+LAF
8. Do you think UNIFIL
30%
65%
5%
Impartial between
Lebanon/ Israel
Yes
No
N/A
7%
90%
2%
Can stop Israeli
violations?
yes
No
N/A
40%
45%
15%
treat locals equally
yes
No
N/A
9. Which contingent do you trust most?
Sector East
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Trust/Nationality
4%
31%
5%
49%
11%
Indian
Indonisian
French
Spanish
N/A
10. Trust/ Religion of respondents
85%
0% 0%
15%
31%
11%
8%
50%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Spanish French Indian Indonesian
Christians
Muslims
11. Overall, How do you evaluate the
UNIFIL role in the South
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Positive negative
87%
13%
64%
36%
Christians
Muslims
12. Analyzing the results of questions (1,
2, and 3), we find:
• Locals' perceptions about security are different from
those of Peace:
UNIFILII has succeeded in conflict management and
mediation, but is still seen as ineffective, powerless
force despite all the heavy arms and powerful NATO
troops.
• Perceptions of weakness and inability are commonly
shared by all religious groups in Lebanon. Those are
due to UNIFIL's inability to deter Israeli
confrontations.
• "if they can't protect or defend themselves against
the Israelis, how can they provide security for us?“
13. Analyzing answers in (7, 8, and 9), we
can realize the following:
1. Overall, All Southern Lebanese of different
backgrounds, sects and religions have positive
perceptions towards UNIFIL major role in the South.
2. Trust and positive perceptions vary :
A- according to the religious affiliation of the
Respondents.
B- according to the nationality of the troops.
C- Noting that 77% of the respondents didn't benefit from
UNIFIL services:
the political opinions (suspicious of EU/ NATO agendas)
or the behavior of the troops are the dominant
variables in the trust given to the contingents.
14. Peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission?
• The 'SC Report' about Resolution 1701 stated clearly:
• "although the Resolution does not explicitly mention Chapter VII, 1701 was clearly
adopted by the Council using Chapter VII powers... [UNIFIL] was given an enforcement
mandate with strong (RoE)….
• After being threatened and targeted by Al-Qaeda in 2007- 2008:
1. UNIFIL discovered the importance of the good relationships with the locals even they
are supporters of Hezbollah.
2. It was obvious that Hezbollah's cooperation and its extensive intelligence repertoire in
the South are necessary to ensuring UNIFIL's security and preventing future terrorist
attacks against it.
3. French and Spanish contingents eased their aggressive postures, and substituted heavy
vehicles with smaller unaggressive ones.
4. Accepted that they should stick to the narrow interpretation of Resolution 1701 and do
not adopt any proactive positions of an enforcement mission.
therefore:
The robust UNIFIL II had been given - literally in UNSC resolution 1701- an
enforcement mandate, but it is actually applying just peacekeeping roles.
15. UNFIL: an evaluation
A- a Buffer zone between the parties.
B- a conflict management tool.
c- an economic mobilizer
D- excellent clean record
16. UNIFIL: Impartiality vs. credibility
• UNIFIL had been caught in the middle of this
dilemma for many years,
• Mr. Teneneti describes it as follows
"legitimacy can be gained on behalf of credibility.
You gain legitimacy from impartiality but you
tend to lose your credibility.
Sometimes it is frustrating if you cannot say who is
the oppressor and who is the victim, but how can
you go to a tripartite meeting if one of the parties
doesn't accept you as impartial. So, credibility
sometimes is the price".
17. Does HIIPO fit?
HIIPO
• Primacy of politics
• Analysis before deployment
• Field –oriented
• The will of the people
• Partnership /regional org.
Lebanese Realities
• A political solution is unlikely in
the short and medium terms
(Israel/Lebanon)
• Relevant…..
• Relevant
• Which people?
• The leb. Internal divisions
are reflections of Arab- Arab
conflicts. Arab league will
never be able to satisfy this.
18. Recommendations_ UNIFIL
1-Troops Should work on their fear, and most of all, they shouldn't appear terrified. A
terrified soldier cannot provide the local civilians a sense of security and stability.
2- should improve its outreach strategy, and develop better communications with the
locals, and try to win the hearts and minds of diverse communities in the South.
3- need to develop its impartiality, and try to gain more credibility.
4- "More doesn't mean better": UNIFILII consists of 39 contingents, however this rainbow
of forces, which have different military cultures and different agendas, make it less
effective.
5- Should work on to gain the support of the whole spectrum of different religions in the
South.
6- National contingents must minimize the rotations of the soldiers: It has been noticed that
the rotation of the troops is preventing soldiers from promoting better relations with
the locals.
7- Pre-deployment trainings and workshops should be adopted to introduce new officers
and soldiers to the coming challenges, facilitate their understanding of the mission and
the environment, as well as increasing their cultural awareness.
