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Unicast   Example:
                  Each Attack = 10G
                  Total to server = 40G
                  Saturates uplinks.




The Internet
Example:
Anycast         Each Attack = 20G
                Total Attack = 100G
                Total to any one cluster = 20G
                Things are A.OK
                No one location is overloaded




 The Internet

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Unicast vs Anycast

  • 1. Unicast Example: Each Attack = 10G Total to server = 40G Saturates uplinks. The Internet
  • 2. Example: Anycast Each Attack = 20G Total Attack = 100G Total to any one cluster = 20G Things are A.OK No one location is overloaded The Internet