Although almost five years have gone by since the issue of the first decision of the
President of the Polish Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish:
Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKIK) regarding multilateral
interchange fees, the case is yet to be resolved. In 2010, the Court of Appeals in Warsaw
annulled the judgment of the Court for Competition and Consumer Protection1 (in
Polish: Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, SOKiK), which in turn
overruled the original decision issued by the UOKiK President. The antitrust decision
and following judgments reflect varying views on how to apply competition law to
payment card systems. In addition, they appear to mirror the various approaches
adopted by the European Commission in its subsequent decisions with respect to
Visa and MasterCard.
This article aims to present the concept of two-sided markets on the example of
payment card systems, which have attracted the attention of regulatory and antitrust
authorities in recent years. First, the paper offers a few insights into the basic economic
theory behind two-sided markets. Second, it presents a brief description of payment
card systems and their features. The following analysis focuses on arguments that
speak in favour of a regulatory or antitrust intervention into payment card systems.
Finally, some of the potential problems that antitrust authorities must face when
assessing two-sided markets are presented on the basis of an assessment of the
decisional practice of the UOKiK President and the European Commission.
The global cards and payments market was valued at over $390 billion in 2017. North America was the largest region in the cards & payments market in 2017, accounting for more than 50% market share.
Read report: https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/cards-and-payments-global-market-report-2018
The global cards market was valued at over $250 billion in 2017. North America was the largest region in the cards market in 2017, accounting for around 60% of the global market.
Read report; https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/cards-global-market-report-2018
This presentation by CADE Brazil was made during the discussion “Competition and Payment Card Interchange Fees” held at the 19th meeting of the OECD-IDB Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum on 22 September 2021. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/laccf.
BRITS SUE MASTERCARD OVER HIGH FEES, BITCOIN FEES STILL LOWEST IN THE MARKETSteven Rhyner
MasterCard, {one of|among} the {largest|biggest} {credit card|charge card|bank card} {payment|repayment} {operators|drivers} {and|as well as|and also} {financial institutions|banks} worldwide, is being {sued for|demanded} US$ 19 billion for overcharging 46 million British {customers|clients|consumers} for 16 years
This article aims to present the concept of two-sided markets on the example of
payment card systems, which have attracted the attention of regulatory and antitrust
authorities in recent years. First, the paper offers a few insights into the basic economic
theory behind two-sided markets. Second, it presents a brief description of payment
card systems and their features. The following analysis focuses on arguments that
speak in favour of a regulatory or antitrust intervention into payment card systems.
Finally, some of the potential problems that antitrust authorities must face when
assessing two-sided markets are presented on the basis of an assessment of the
decisional practice of the UOKiK President and the European Commission.
The global cards and payments market was valued at over $390 billion in 2017. North America was the largest region in the cards & payments market in 2017, accounting for more than 50% market share.
Read report: https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/cards-and-payments-global-market-report-2018
The global cards market was valued at over $250 billion in 2017. North America was the largest region in the cards market in 2017, accounting for around 60% of the global market.
Read report; https://www.thebusinessresearchcompany.com/report/cards-global-market-report-2018
This presentation by CADE Brazil was made during the discussion “Competition and Payment Card Interchange Fees” held at the 19th meeting of the OECD-IDB Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum on 22 September 2021. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/laccf.
BRITS SUE MASTERCARD OVER HIGH FEES, BITCOIN FEES STILL LOWEST IN THE MARKETSteven Rhyner
MasterCard, {one of|among} the {largest|biggest} {credit card|charge card|bank card} {payment|repayment} {operators|drivers} {and|as well as|and also} {financial institutions|banks} worldwide, is being {sued for|demanded} US$ 19 billion for overcharging 46 million British {customers|clients|consumers} for 16 years
This presentation by Guilherme Mendes Resende from CADE Brazil was made during the discussion on Practical approaches to assessing digital platform markets for competition law enforcement at the 2019 edition of the OECD-IDB Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum held in San Pedro Sula, Honduras on 24-25 September 2019. Find all related materials at the forum website http://oe.cd/laccf.
This presentation by Norway was made during the discussion “Digital disruption in financial markets” held at the 131st meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 5 June 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/cclm.
Fintan Byrne, Senior Vice President and General Manager of TNS and Mark Beresford, a Director of EDC, opened proceedings in the Retailer Payments Theatre at RBTE. Their presentation, Changing Times: Trends in the Payments Value Chain, evaluated how evolving consumer behaviour is shifting power and influence to the customer.
This presentation by James Langenfeld (Senior Managing Director, Ankura) was made during the discussion “Conglomerate effects of mergers” held at the 133rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 10 June 2020. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at http://oe.cd/ceom
This presentation by Stephen DRURY, Santander UK, was made during the discussion “Digital disruption in financial markets” held at the 131st meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 5 June 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/cclm.
A preview of my latest article contribution to the ICA InCompliance magazine on VBs, taking a comparative look at developments in Singapore and Hong Kong.
The journey from open banking to open finance+. The evolution of open banking based on API as of now and where it could go from here. Risks and opportunities for market participants.
This presentation by Janos BARBERIS, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Institute of International Financial Law, was made during the discussion “Digital disruption in financial markets” held at the 131st meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 5 June 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/ddfm.
Transformation of the Electronic Payments Industry - Strategies for Growthfrancisfoo
This presentation provides a glimpse into the evolution of the digital payment industry and a discussion of both short-term and long-term strategies that players in this space could potentially adopt to stay ahead of the competition.
I've diverse interests across wide-ranging topics and industries and I thoroughly enjoy analyzing information and devising strategies to help companies better position themselves for the challenges ahead.
If you require more information and data, feel free to reach out to me at francisfoo@wustl.edu or connect with me on LinkedIn www.linkedin.com/in/francisfoo/.
Thank you for your interest! Hope you find the information useful.
This presentation by Xavier VIVES, IESE School of Business, was made during the discussion “Digital disruption in financial markets” held at the 131st meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 5 June 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/ddfm.
This presentation by Guilherme Mendes Resende from CADE Brazil was made during the discussion on Practical approaches to assessing digital platform markets for competition law enforcement at the 2019 edition of the OECD-IDB Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum held in San Pedro Sula, Honduras on 24-25 September 2019. Find all related materials at the forum website http://oe.cd/laccf.
This presentation by Norway was made during the discussion “Digital disruption in financial markets” held at the 131st meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 5 June 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/cclm.
Fintan Byrne, Senior Vice President and General Manager of TNS and Mark Beresford, a Director of EDC, opened proceedings in the Retailer Payments Theatre at RBTE. Their presentation, Changing Times: Trends in the Payments Value Chain, evaluated how evolving consumer behaviour is shifting power and influence to the customer.
This presentation by James Langenfeld (Senior Managing Director, Ankura) was made during the discussion “Conglomerate effects of mergers” held at the 133rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 10 June 2020. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at http://oe.cd/ceom
This presentation by Stephen DRURY, Santander UK, was made during the discussion “Digital disruption in financial markets” held at the 131st meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 5 June 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/cclm.
A preview of my latest article contribution to the ICA InCompliance magazine on VBs, taking a comparative look at developments in Singapore and Hong Kong.
The journey from open banking to open finance+. The evolution of open banking based on API as of now and where it could go from here. Risks and opportunities for market participants.
This presentation by Janos BARBERIS, Senior Research Fellow at the Asian Institute of International Financial Law, was made during the discussion “Digital disruption in financial markets” held at the 131st meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 5 June 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/ddfm.
Transformation of the Electronic Payments Industry - Strategies for Growthfrancisfoo
This presentation provides a glimpse into the evolution of the digital payment industry and a discussion of both short-term and long-term strategies that players in this space could potentially adopt to stay ahead of the competition.
I've diverse interests across wide-ranging topics and industries and I thoroughly enjoy analyzing information and devising strategies to help companies better position themselves for the challenges ahead.
If you require more information and data, feel free to reach out to me at francisfoo@wustl.edu or connect with me on LinkedIn www.linkedin.com/in/francisfoo/.
Thank you for your interest! Hope you find the information useful.
This presentation by Xavier VIVES, IESE School of Business, was made during the discussion “Digital disruption in financial markets” held at the 131st meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 5 June 2019. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/ddfm.
Similar to The very relevant market. Case comment to the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw of 22 April 2010 – Interchange fee (Ref. No. VI ACa 607/09)
This note by Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Practice Co-Leader, Global Antitrust & Competition, Brattle, was prepared for the discussion “Competition and Payment Card Interchange Fees” held at the 19th meeting of the OECD-IDB Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum on 22 September 2021. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/laccf.
PSD2 is the second Payment Services Directive, which is set to further revolutionise the payments industry. PSD2 is affecting everything from the way we pay online, to what information we see when making a payment.
Intersection between the activities of two regulators – shall prior actions t...Michal
The commented judgment of the Polish Supreme Court concerns Telekomunikacja
Polska S.A. (hereafter, TPSA)1 and the fines imposed upon the incumbent operator
by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish:
Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK) for the abuse of its
dominant position. TPSA is a Polish telecoms provider formally established in 1991.
It is a public company – its shares are traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange with the
controlling stake owned by France Télécom2. TPSA is often the subject of competition
law decisions issued not only by the UOKiK President but also by the European
Commission, particularly with respect to dominant position abuse
Facing increased regulatory oversight, more banks are opting for an integrated collateral management system that facilitates collateral optimization in coordination with central clearing counterparties (CCPs).
Software for Payment Cards: Choosing WiselyCognizant
As the use of card-based payments continues to grow, financial institutions must improve their response times, strengthen their security, hone their future-readiness and enrich their business value. When selecting a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution, banks must verify that the product and its support services are equipped to accommodate short and long-term business and IT objectives.
"Competition rules at European Union (EU) level, as well as in Romania, provide investigative powers for the competition authorities.", Andreea Oprișan, Managing Associate Tuca Zbarcea & Asociatii.
LAWYER IN VIETNAM DR. OLIVER MASSMANN – E-COMMERCE - THE WORLD BANK IS ASKING...Dr. Oliver Massmann
LAWYER IN VIETNAM DR. OLIVER MASSMANN – E-COMMERCE - THE WORLD BANK IS ASKING DUANE MORRIS VIETNAM ON THE LOGISTICS FOR E-COMMERCE – HERE ARE OUR ANSWERS:
Similar to The very relevant market. Case comment to the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw of 22 April 2010 – Interchange fee (Ref. No. VI ACa 607/09) (20)
To regulate or not to regulate – economic approachMichal
The aim of this paper is to present an Indefeasible Right of Use (IRU) as a possible
remedy for telecom infrastructure EU projects that (in Poland) have been lagged
behind the time. Thanks for IRU, Beneficiaries of these EU projects will be able
to save both: time and money and will finish projects successfully. The author
discusses two possible methods of implementing IRU: via regulatory obligation and
via incumbent’s goodwill. The author proposes a game theory model with payoffs
depending on regulator’s and incumbent’s strategies. Using a game theory tree,
the author shows that if only the incumbent is willing to offer his own network,
IRU may be signed and most delays in EU projects disappear. The success is not
so obvious while implementing IRU as an obligation – in this case EU projects
will probably fail.
The European Commission published a White Paper on 2 April 2008 on damages
actions for breach of EU antitrust rules. The content of the White Paper is since
then being prepared to be converted into EU legislation on private antitrust
enforcement. This paper presents the developments in private antitrust enforcement
in Poland after 2 April 2008. It commences with an outline of EU actions in
this field which act as an introduction to the more detailed analysis of recent
jurisprudential and legislative developments in Poland. The latter part of the paper
covers, in particular, the 2009 Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Group Proceedings
and the 2011 Act Amending the Civil Procedure Code and Some Other Acts which
abolishes all specific elements of commercial proceedings, including the statutory ‘non-admission of evidence’ principle. These two legal acts are assessed in order
to establish whether their introduction is likely to help facilitate private antitrust
enforcement in Poland and to consider to what an extent are these developments
responding to the challenges outlined by the European Commission.
Sieci szerokopasmowe w polityce telekomunikacyjnej a book reviewMichal
A new book from Professor Stanisław Piątek, an established authority on
telecommunications law, brings the reader closer to the inner workings of broadband
technology in its legal environment. The title reflects the focus of telecoms policy
on access whereby the only access that matters is to the broadband network in its
many variations. The subject matter itself makes the book worth reading, particularly
in the absence of other major Polish works on this topic. Even if some authors
regarded broadband technologies as obsolete years ago1, in reality it still represents
a lion’s share of the telecoms business. Professor Piątek himself is well aware of the
historical and transitory nature of the subject matter when he defines broadband not
by association with any particular technology but as the ability of whatever technology
available at any given moment to provide a certain minimum transmission speed.
Thus the central notion is open to absorb technologies nonexistent as of yet. This in
turn may pose serious regulatory issues as to what future industries will be subject to
regulation, particularly since the distinction between content and carrier regulation
is becoming increasingly blurred.
Media audiovizualne. konflikt regulacyjny w dobie cyfryzacji a book reviewMichal
The book under review here is entitled Audiovisual Media: regulatory conflict in
the digitalisation era by Katarzyna Chalubinska- Jentkiewicz. As the title suggests,
I expected it to be a monograph on new regulatory problems in the increasingly
digital audiovisual field. The sector itself is well known to cause competence conflicts
between the as many as three different regulatory bodies overseeing it in Poland: the
national telecoms regulator (the UKE President), the audiovisual media supervisory
body (the KRRiT) and the competition authority (the UOKiK President). The impact
of the European Commission can also not be overlooked. The book does indeed
deal in great detail with what is seen as the ‘regulatory conflict’ in the audiovisual
field but the approach applied therein is that of the theory of administration and
administrative/constitutional law rather than that of market regulation. As a result,
the analysis focuses primarily on the perceived ‘conflict’ between Poland’s interests
and regulatory competences and the impact exercised by the European Union as
a whole, rather than on any existing or potential internal conflicts. Key to the entire
analysis is the contraposition of the notion of ‘public interest of a nation’ (State) and
the ‘general interest of the EU’ whereby the special characteristics of ‘national’ public
interest are associated with the notion of ‘public morality’ and also, ‘public mission’.
Legislative developments in the aviation sector in 2011 in polandMichal
The Polish Aviation Law Act of 3 July 2002 was amended six times in
2011. The only major change introduced in this period resulted from the
Amendment Act to the Aviation Law Act of 30 June 2011, most of which
entered into force 30 days after its publication1. In fact, changes introduced
thereby were so widespread and crucial to the entire aviation sector that it
can easily be referred to as a completely new law. Considerable effort went
into the preparation of this Act – its first draft was presented as early as 2009
followed by long consultations and the ultimate introduction of a number of
further changes.
Legislative developments in rail transport in 2011 in polandMichal
Most amendments of the Polish rail transport law in 2011 concerned the
organisation of rail transport including: improvements in timetable changing
procedures; mechanisms to ensure the observance and early publication of
timetables; interoperability of the rail system and; certification of train drivers.
Introduced were also some changes meant to restructure the incumbent state
rail operator (in Polish: Polskie Koleje Państwowe; hereafter PKP).
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the telecommunications sector...Michal
The Telecommunications Law Act1 (in Polish: Prawo Telekomunikacyjne,
hereafter: PT) was subject to a number of amendments in 2011 introduced by
the Amendment Act of 14 April 2011 and the Amendment Act of 16 September
2011 as well as by the separate Act of 30 June 2011 on the implementation of
digital terrestrial television.
In response to the reservations expressed by the European Commission
regarding the compatibility of the way in which regulatory obligations
concerning the setting of wholesale prices are imposed in Poland, the
Amendment Act of 14 April 2011 changed Articles 39 and 40 PT2. The direct
reason for this amendment was set out in a reasoned opinion prepared by the
Commission in October 2010 under Article 258 TFEU3. It was stated therein
that Polish rules regarding the establishment of wholesale prices may give
rise to legal uncertainty and may be discriminatory towards certain telecoms
operators.
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the postal sector in 2011 in ...Michal
Postal services in Poland are governed by the Postal Law Act of 2003 (in
Polish: Prawo Pocztowe)1 which maintains the monopoly of the public operator
Poczta Polska with respect of letters weighing up to 50 grams. However, Poland
will have to fully liberalize its postal services market by 31 December 2012.
For this reason, the Government adopted on 5 October 2010 Assumptions
for the Draft Postal Law Act as proposed by the Minister of Infrastructure2.
However, the Draft was not placed on the Government’s legislative agenda
for 2011. Thus, the majority of legislative work will have to be completed in
2012, a fact that jeopardizes the implementation of Directive 2008/6/EC. The
latter indicates 31 December 2012 as the deadline beyond which Member
States must not maintain a privileged position of operators providing universal
postal services
Legislative and jurisprudential developments in the energy sector in 2011 in ...Michal
The year 2011 brought about fundamental changes to the legal framework
affecting energy markets in Poland. The most important of these changes
concerned rules on obligatory public trading of electric energy (so-called,
exchange obligation) and the implementation of Nuclear Facilities Projects
and Obligatory Natural Gas Reserve System Projects.
Key legislative and jurisprudential developments of Polish Antitrust Law in 2011Michal
The article presents key developments in Polish antitrust legislation and jurisprudence
of 2011. Its legislative part focuses on the renewal of Polish Group Exemption
Regulations for vertical agreements, specialization and R&D agreements as well as
cooperation agreements in the insurance sector. Noted is also the sole amendment
of the Competition Act introduced in 2011 which concerns the financial liability of
the Polish competition authority. The article covers also the new Guidelines of the
UOKiK President on the criteria and procedures of merger notifications. Presented
in its jurisprudential part is a number of 2011 rulings, mainly those rendered by
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, divided according to their subject
matter with respect to particular types of restrictive practices and other problems
related to the decision-making process of the UOKiK President.
Is the parallel competence set out in regulation 12003 totally clear. case co...Michal
With a motion dated 28th of April 2005 submitted to the President of the Office of
Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish: Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji
i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKiK President), Tele2 Polska Sp. z o.o. (currently:
Netia S.A., hereafter, Applicant) requested the initiation of antitrust proceedings
against Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (hereafter, TP). The Polish incumbent, TP, was
alleged to have engaged in practices restricting competition covered by Article 8(1)
and 8(2)(5) of the Act on Competition and Consumer Protection of 15th December
2000 (hereafter, Competition Act 2000) and in Article 82 of the Treaty establishing
European Community (hereafter, TEC), presently, Article 102 of the Treaty on the
functioning of the European Union (hereafter, TFEU).
How to facilitate damage claims private enforcement in croatiaMichal
Ever since the Croatian Competition Agency started functioning in 1997, public
enforcement of competition law has been the norm. Civil actions for breaches of
competition law have been the exception in Croatia. The existing legislation in the
area of competition law makes no effort to incentivise private enforcement. There
are no specific rules in the Competition Act 2009 dedicated to civil actions, except a
single provision that assigns jurisdiction over damages claims to commercial courts.
General tort law is applicable in order to prove damages. A number of issues arise
here mostly due to the complexity of competition cases. These issues were described
in the European Commission’s White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of
EC Antitrust Rules (2008). The level of uncertainty as regards the outcome of the
claim is high. It seems that special rules need to be adopted in Croatia in order
to improve the position of the injured side. The paper deals with a number of
procedural and substantive law issues relevant to the facilitation of civil proceedings
for antitrust damages. A domestic law perspective is applied taking into account
recent developments in EU competition law and policy.
European audiovisual sector – where business meets society’s needs a book r...Michal
The Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies (CARS), responsible for this
yearbook, also prepares the publication of textbooks and monographs. An Englishlanguage
textbook European Audiovisual Sector: Where business meets society’s needs
written by Dr. Ewelina D. Sage is one of the latest publication in this series
Differentiation between entrepreneurs and its legal consequences. case commentMichal
The discussed judgment was rendered in relation to the dispute between the
President of the Polish Competition Authority (hereafter, UOKiK President) on the
one hand and the Polish Football Association and the broadcaster Canal+ on the
other hand. These two undertakings were party to an agreement on exercising media
rights to football games of the two highest classes of the Polish league. The core of
the dispute consisted of the possibility of deeming the pre-emption right reserved
for Canal+ as a contractual provision restricting competition. The Courts involved
were also forced to answer the question whether performing tasks of a public service
character justified a decrease in the fine imposed by the competition authority
Development of the judicial review of the decisions in slovakiaMichal
The article provides an analysis of the most important judgments rendered by
Slovak courts at the end of 2010, in the course of 2011 and at the beginning of 2012.
The article focuses solely on judicial review of decisions issued by the National
Competition Authority of the Slovak Republic.
Slovak courts dealt with several key issues concerning public enforcement
of competition law such as: the application of the so-called ‘general clause’;
competences of the Slovak competition authority in regulated sectors; and the
application of the economic continuity test. Some of the conclusions resulting from
these judgments may be considered disputable. It may be argued, in particular, that
they may jeopardize the effective enforcement of competition law in the Slovak Republic. At the same time, the discussed jurisprudence has managed to clarify
a number of key issues which had been subject to debate for a number of years. The
article presents a review of these judgments, summarizes their key conclusions and
considers their possible impact on the system of public enforcement of competition
law in the Slovak Republic. The article is divided into a number of parts, each of
which covers an individual case, the titles of which refers to the main topic that was
under discussion in the presented judgment.
Commission guidelines on assessment of significant market power. case commentMichal
The ruling of the Court of Justice (hereafter, CJ) in the PTC case concerns the
interpretation of Article 58 of the Treaty of Accession1 establishing an obligation
to publish EU legal acts in the languages of Member States which accessed the EU
on 1 May 2004. A controversy emerged in this context whether the said obligation
also applied to European Commission Guidelines on relevant market analysis and
the assessment of significant market power in the field of electronic communication
(hereafter, 2002 Guidelines)2. In general, guidelines issued by the Commission are
regarded as acts of soft law, also called innominate acts or sui generis acts.
In the fifth year of its activities CARS focused on the pursuit of a number of
goals set in its founding documents. It was a particularly busy year for its Publishing
Programme which saw the issue of 6 separate titles: two monographs, an Englishlanguage
textbook, a collective works and two volumes of the ‘Yearbook of Antitrust
and Regulatory Studies’ [a special edition vol. 4(4) and the yearly vol. 4(5)]. 2011 was
also a very active period for the CARS Open PhD Seminar series with four meetings
taking place throughout the year. Several CARS members engaged also in the second
edition of a research project dedicated to regulatory and antitrust aspects of airport
activities (first phase of the project completed in 2010).
What do limitation periods for sanctions in antitrustMichal
Limitation periods represent a legal safeguard for a person who has once
broken the law in order not to be put at risk of sanctions and other legal liabilities
for an indefinite amount of time. By contrast, public interest can sometimes require
that a person who has committed a serious breach of law cannot benefit from
limitation periods and that it is necessary to declare that the law had indeed been
infringed and that legal liability shall be expected irrespective of the passage of
time.
Universal service obligation and loyalty effectsMichal
In network industries, a Universal Service Obligation (USO) is often seen as a burden
on an incumbent, which requires compensation for the net cost of such service
provision. This paper estimates the effects of consumer loyalty as an intangible
benefit of USO in the postal sector. In doing so, the agent-based modelling (ABM)
approach is applied, which makes it possible to model the behaviour of boundedly
rational consumers and is thus particularly appropriate for taking into account
intangibles considerations. The analysis shows that loyalty is crucial to whether
the USO uniform pricing constraint results in loss-making or profitability. Under
certain conditions and in the presence of a loyalty parameter, uniform pricing gives
a USO provider an advantage, when the size of the rural area is sufficiently big
and a disadvantage, if its size is too small. This finding is counterintuitive as USO
providers in countries with sparsely populated areas are typically expected to incur
a significant net cost of USO.
2010 and 2011 eu competition law and case law developments with a nexus to po...Michal
This third overview of EU competition and sector-specific regulatory jurisprudential
and case law developments with a nexus to Poland covers the years 2010 and 2011.
This period of time is worth noting for several reasons. First, EU courts delivered
a significant number of judgments in ‘Polish’ cases including an increased number of
preliminary rulings. Second, 2010-2011 developments were dominated by judgments
and decisions concerning telecoms. Finally, the Commission adopted only a handful
of Polish State aid decisions following a formal investigation procedure under
Article 108(2) TFEU.
3.0 Project 2_ Developing My Brand Identity Kit.pptxtanyjahb
A personal brand exploration presentation summarizes an individual's unique qualities and goals, covering strengths, values, passions, and target audience. It helps individuals understand what makes them stand out, their desired image, and how they aim to achieve it.
Kseniya Leshchenko: Shared development support service model as the way to ma...Lviv Startup Club
Kseniya Leshchenko: Shared development support service model as the way to make small projects with small budgets profitable for the company (UA)
Kyiv PMDay 2024 Summer
Website – www.pmday.org
Youtube – https://www.youtube.com/startuplviv
FB – https://www.facebook.com/pmdayconference
Enterprise Excellence is Inclusive Excellence.pdfKaiNexus
Enterprise excellence and inclusive excellence are closely linked, and real-world challenges have shown that both are essential to the success of any organization. To achieve enterprise excellence, organizations must focus on improving their operations and processes while creating an inclusive environment that engages everyone. In this interactive session, the facilitator will highlight commonly established business practices and how they limit our ability to engage everyone every day. More importantly, though, participants will likely gain increased awareness of what we can do differently to maximize enterprise excellence through deliberate inclusion.
What is Enterprise Excellence?
Enterprise Excellence is a holistic approach that's aimed at achieving world-class performance across all aspects of the organization.
What might I learn?
A way to engage all in creating Inclusive Excellence. Lessons from the US military and their parallels to the story of Harry Potter. How belt systems and CI teams can destroy inclusive practices. How leadership language invites people to the party. There are three things leaders can do to engage everyone every day: maximizing psychological safety to create environments where folks learn, contribute, and challenge the status quo.
Who might benefit? Anyone and everyone leading folks from the shop floor to top floor.
Dr. William Harvey is a seasoned Operations Leader with extensive experience in chemical processing, manufacturing, and operations management. At Michelman, he currently oversees multiple sites, leading teams in strategic planning and coaching/practicing continuous improvement. William is set to start his eighth year of teaching at the University of Cincinnati where he teaches marketing, finance, and management. William holds various certifications in change management, quality, leadership, operational excellence, team building, and DiSC, among others.
Event Report - SAP Sapphire 2024 Orlando - lots of innovation and old challengesHolger Mueller
Holger Mueller of Constellation Research shares his key takeaways from SAP's Sapphire confernece, held in Orlando, June 3rd till 5th 2024, in the Orange Convention Center.
Cracking the Workplace Discipline Code Main.pptxWorkforce Group
Cultivating and maintaining discipline within teams is a critical differentiator for successful organisations.
Forward-thinking leaders and business managers understand the impact that discipline has on organisational success. A disciplined workforce operates with clarity, focus, and a shared understanding of expectations, ultimately driving better results, optimising productivity, and facilitating seamless collaboration.
Although discipline is not a one-size-fits-all approach, it can help create a work environment that encourages personal growth and accountability rather than solely relying on punitive measures.
In this deck, you will learn the significance of workplace discipline for organisational success. You’ll also learn
• Four (4) workplace discipline methods you should consider
• The best and most practical approach to implementing workplace discipline.
• Three (3) key tips to maintain a disciplined workplace.
Digital Transformation and IT Strategy Toolkit and TemplatesAurelien Domont, MBA
This Digital Transformation and IT Strategy Toolkit was created by ex-McKinsey, Deloitte and BCG Management Consultants, after more than 5,000 hours of work. It is considered the world's best & most comprehensive Digital Transformation and IT Strategy Toolkit. It includes all the Frameworks, Best Practices & Templates required to successfully undertake the Digital Transformation of your organization and define a robust IT Strategy.
Editable Toolkit to help you reuse our content: 700 Powerpoint slides | 35 Excel sheets | 84 minutes of Video training
This PowerPoint presentation is only a small preview of our Toolkits. For more details, visit www.domontconsulting.com
Affordable Stationery Printing Services in Jaipur | Navpack n PrintNavpack & Print
Looking for professional printing services in Jaipur? Navpack n Print offers high-quality and affordable stationery printing for all your business needs. Stand out with custom stationery designs and fast turnaround times. Contact us today for a quote!
B2B payments are rapidly changing. Find out the 5 key questions you need to be asking yourself to be sure you are mastering B2B payments today. Learn more at www.BlueSnap.com.
In the Adani-Hindenburg case, what is SEBI investigating.pptxAdani case
Adani SEBI investigation revealed that the latter had sought information from five foreign jurisdictions concerning the holdings of the firm’s foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) in relation to the alleged violations of the MPS Regulations. Nevertheless, the economic interest of the twelve FPIs based in tax haven jurisdictions still needs to be determined. The Adani Group firms classed these FPIs as public shareholders. According to Hindenburg, FPIs were used to get around regulatory standards.
Buy Verified PayPal Account | Buy Google 5 Star Reviewsusawebmarket
Buy Verified PayPal Account
Looking to buy verified PayPal accounts? Discover 7 expert tips for safely purchasing a verified PayPal account in 2024. Ensure security and reliability for your transactions.
PayPal Services Features-
🟢 Email Access
🟢 Bank Added
🟢 Card Verified
🟢 Full SSN Provided
🟢 Phone Number Access
🟢 Driving License Copy
🟢 Fasted Delivery
Client Satisfaction is Our First priority. Our services is very appropriate to buy. We assume that the first-rate way to purchase our offerings is to order on the website. If you have any worry in our cooperation usually You can order us on Skype or Telegram.
24/7 Hours Reply/Please Contact
usawebmarketEmail: support@usawebmarket.com
Skype: usawebmarket
Telegram: @usawebmarket
WhatsApp: +1(218) 203-5951
USA WEB MARKET is the Best Verified PayPal, Payoneer, Cash App, Skrill, Neteller, Stripe Account and SEO, SMM Service provider.100%Satisfection granted.100% replacement Granted.
Business Valuation Principles for EntrepreneursBen Wann
This insightful presentation is designed to equip entrepreneurs with the essential knowledge and tools needed to accurately value their businesses. Understanding business valuation is crucial for making informed decisions, whether you're seeking investment, planning to sell, or simply want to gauge your company's worth.
Personal Brand Statement:
As an Army veteran dedicated to lifelong learning, I bring a disciplined, strategic mindset to my pursuits. I am constantly expanding my knowledge to innovate and lead effectively. My journey is driven by a commitment to excellence, and to make a meaningful impact in the world.
An introduction to the cryptocurrency investment platform Binance Savings.Any kyc Account
Learn how to use Binance Savings to expand your bitcoin holdings. Discover how to maximize your earnings on one of the most reliable cryptocurrency exchange platforms, as well as how to earn interest on your cryptocurrency holdings and the various savings choices available.
An introduction to the cryptocurrency investment platform Binance Savings.
The very relevant market. Case comment to the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw of 22 April 2010 – Interchange fee (Ref. No. VI ACa 607/09)
1. YEARBOOK Peer-reviewed scientific periodical,
of ANTITRUST focusing on legal and economic
and REGULATORY issues of antitrust and regulation.
STUDIES Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies,
Creative Commons Attribution-No University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management
www.yars.wz.uw.edu.pl Derivative Works 3.0 Poland License. www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl
The very relevant market.
Case comment to the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in Warsaw of 22 April 2010 –
Interchange fee
(Ref. No. VI ACa 607/09)
Introduction
Although almost five years have gone by since the issue of the first decision of the
President of the Polish Office for Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish:
Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, UOKIK) regarding multilateral
interchange fees, the case is yet to be resolved. In 2010, the Court of Appeals in Warsaw
annulled the judgment of the Court for Competition and Consumer Protection1 (in
Polish: Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; hereafter, SOKiK), which in turn
overruled the original decision issued by the UOKiK President. The antitrust decision
and following judgments reflect varying views on how to apply competition law to
payment card systems. In addition, they appear to mirror the various approaches
adopted by the European Commission in its subsequent decisions with respect to
Visa and MasterCard.
It should be mentioned, as a way of introduction, that there is no general consensus
as to the definition of the multilateral interchange fee (hereafter, MIF). For the
purpose of this case comment it is sufficient to denote some of its characteristics
from the description contained in its very name. First of all, the MIF is multilateral
because it is set jointly and because it applies in a multi-party setting. The players
in a payment card system include: cardholders, issuers (i.e. banks that issue cards),
merchants and acquirers (i.e. banks which provide merchants with infrastructure
and services necessary to accept payment by cards). Interactions between all these
players are made possible thanks to the platform (for instance Visa or MasterCard),
which intermediates between the actors and supplies technical infrastructure to settle
the transactions. Secondly, MIF constitutes a fee because it consists of a transfer of
monies from merchants to issuers. Finally, it is an interchange, as it is relates to the
functioning of a platform described above and designed to facilitate the exchange or
meeting of two groups of customers and serving their respective needs.
1 Judgment of SOKiK of 12 November 2008, XVII Ama 109/07 (not reported).
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
2. 278 CASE COMMENTS
Facts
On 29 December 2006, the UOKiK President adopted a decision (hereafter, UOKiK
decision)2 directed at various Polish banks that issue payment cards. Anticipating
the decision of the Commission in the MasterCard case3 (hereafter, the MasterCard
decision), the Polish antitrust authority first defined the relevant market as the market
for acquiring payment cards and second, considered the practice, consisting in a joint
setting of the MIF by the scrutinized banks, as a restrictive agreement. The original
decision was appealed by its addressees on a number of grounds, the most interesting
of which included: flawed choice of addressees – it should have been directed at
appropriate associations of undertakings (banks) rather than individual banks
separately; incorrect delimitation of the relevant product market – a separate market
for acquiring services does not exist; failure to consider the fact that the contested
agreements are necessary for proper and effective functioning and development of
payment card systems in Poland; failure to consider the fact that cross-subsidization
is a common market practice. The decision was challenged also because the Polish
antitrust authority did not conduct a sufficient analysis of the efficiency gains brought
about by the contested agreements.
The appealed decision was modified by SOKiK on 12 November 2008. The first
instance court annulled the original findings due to an incorrect definition of the
relevant market. SOKiK asserted that since the MIF does not occur on the acquiring
market, the decision should have been addressed to the organizations or associations
which set the MIF rather than to individual banks. The SOKiK judgment was appealed
to the Court of Appeals in Warsaw, which ruled on the case on 22 April 2010.
The Court of Appeals began by emphasizing that despite the EU character of
the case, the conditions were not met for stalling the proceedings until the Court
of First Instance (now the General Court) reaches its own verdict in the appeal
case concerning the MasterCard decision4. Despite its ‘declaration of independence’
from the European case, the Polish Court of Appeals has come close to the position
adopted by the European Commission in its MasterCard decision.
Key legal problems
The key legal problem of this case concerned the definition of the relevant product
market since solving this controversy would, to a great extent, predetermine the
outcome of the entire proceedings. Even the European Commission has reached
different conclusions with respect to the definition of the relevant market at various
2 Decision of the UOKiK President of 29 December 2006, DAR-15/2006, UOKiK Official
Journal 2006 No. 1, item 5.
3 Commission Decision of 19 December 2007, Cases COMP/34.579 MasterCard,
COMP/36.518 EuroCommerce, and COMP/38.580 Commercial Cards (not yet reported).
4 See Case T-111/08 MasterCard and Others v. Commission, OJ [2008] C 116/26.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
3. The very relevant market 279
points in time with respect to Visa and MasterCard. The same is true for the UOKiK
President and the Polish courts.
As noted, the UOKiK President used the market definition applied later by the
Commission in its MasterCard decision5, namely that the relevant product market is
that for acquiring payment card transactions, i.e. the acquiring market.
SOKiK on the other hand, allegedly following the Commission decision in the Visa
case6 (hereafter, Visa decision), took the view that defining the relevant market as that
for payment card systems is more appropriate. This was not to say that the acquiring
market does not exist, considering that an economic market can indeed be identified
where services are bought and sold that enable merchants to receive card payments.
According to SOKiK however, the MIF does not have any impact on the acquiring
market because it does not influence competition between acquirers in their relation
to merchants. MIF cannot be considered as compensation for services rendered by
acquirers to merchants because the acquirers do not pocket the MIF themselves but
transfer its full amount to the issuers instead. For SOKiK, the MIF constitutes an
element of the issuers’ remuneration for providing an electronic payment instrument
in the form of the card. SOKiK identified particular services rendered by card issuers,
which include: transaction settlement, payment warranty, deferring payment or free
of charge granting of short-term credit to cardholders. Unfortunately, SOKiK did not
explain why it is the merchant that should pay for this assistance by way of the MIF
seeing as most of the aforementioned services are actually provided to the benefit
of the cardholder. More surprisingly even, SOKiK ultimately concluded that the
MIF should be viewed as a price for the joint service rendered by the entire Visa or
MasterCard system. It remains unclear how can the MIF simultaneously constitute a
payment for the services rendered by one of the participants of the system (i.e. card
issuers) and at the same time payment for the use of the system. Further confusion is
brought about by SOKiK’s statement that both merchants as well as cardholders are
on the demand side of the market from the perspective of card issuers and should
thus be treated in a uniform manner, as consumers. Although it is true that payment
card systems, as an example of two-sided markets, are characterized by the existence
of two categories of consumers but both groups center around a platform, which
enables their interaction. It is thus not the perspective of card issuers that should be
adopted to notice the two-sidedness of the market and the balancing need resulting
therefrom, but the perspective of the platform. Issuers merely enable cardholders to
participate in the platform but without the Visa or MasterCard system and its second
side (i.e. acquirers and merchants), they are not attractive for cardholders. Thus,
although SOKiK moved in the right direction by focusing on payment card system
as a whole, it did not manage to identify all the characteristics of two-sided markets
and their consequences.
It is also worth presenting the position of the parties regarding the character of
the MIF and their postulated definition of the relevant product market. Visa and
5 MasterCard decision, para. 316.
6 Visa decision of 24 July 2002.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
4. 280 CASE COMMENTS
MasterCard see the MIF as a balancing mechanism necessary for the system as a
whole to function. The MIF ensures stability by equilibrating the costs and benefits
between the beneficiaries of the system (i.e. card holders and merchants). Thus, to
appreciate fully the MIF’s balancing function; the relevant market should be defined
as that for payment card systems.
Another important legal problem that was touched upon in the analyzed case is
the potential efficiency gains brought about by MIF. Efficiencies are relevant since
they could lead to an exemption on the basis of Article 101(3) TFEU or Article 8 of
the Polish Act on Protection of Competition and Consumers7. The insufficiency of
Polish antitrust authority’s analysis in this respect was listed among the many appeal
grounds. However, SOKiK finished its evaluation at the stage of market definition
and thus did not proceed to the problem of a potential exemption.
Key findings of the Court of Appeals
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals has not resolved the inconsistencies as to the
definition of the relevant product market despite the fact that it has rejected SOKiK’s
approach. The Court of Appeals first contested the opinion that the Commission
has assessed the MIF in its Visa decision on the basis of the relevant market for all
payment card systems. The Court of Appeals deemed this conclusion as erroneous and
resulting from an inaccurate lecture of the EU case. It is true that the Visa decision
is not very clear in its part devoted to relevant market definition: it mentions the two
different types of competition, which function in payment card systems (i.e. inter-
system and intra-system competition) and it analyses in detail the substitutability of
payment cards with other means of payment (such as cash, checks etc.). However, the
conclusion ultimately reached by the Court of Appeals appears incorrect. It seems that
the European Commission has indeed decided that the relevant product market is that
for payment card systems, albeit it took into account not only the competition between
different systems, such as Visa and MasterCard, (inter-system) but also among the banks
within each system (intra-system). Paragraph 52 of the Visa decision, to which the Court
of Appeals refers in order to support its assertions, does not invalidate this conclusion.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals quite rightly noticed the different
relations, streams and connections that take place inside every payment card system.
Visa or MasterCard, as the owners of their platforms, interact first of all with banks
(both issuers and acquirers). Second, the issuers interact with acquirers in the
course of the authorization process. And finally, issuers interact with their clients
– cardholders, while acquirers interact with their clients – merchants. However, the
existence of these relation streams was not sufficient for the Court of Appeals to
conclude that a single market for ‘payment card systems’ exists. The Court of Appeals
agreed with the European Commission’s MasterCard decision that, since the various
services rendered within payment card systems differ, they constitute distinct relevant
markets. According to the Court of Appeals the definition of the relevant product
7 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 331, as amended.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
5. The very relevant market 281
market adopted by SOKiK would have been appropriate only when the inter-system
competition was at stake. But since this case concerned intra-system competition,
the correct definition of the relevant product market should have been the acquiring
market.
However, in order to avoid the potential pitfalls of identifying anticompetitive
effects in a relevant market (acquiring market) distinct from the one on which the
restrictive agreement took place (issuing market – the MIF was agreed upon between
issuers and acquires), the Court of Appeals advanced the theory of related markets. It
asserted that the MIF has a significant impact on the acquiring market (even though
the court did not explain any further what the character and manifestation of this
effect was) and thus these two markets are related. This assertion, coupled with the
identification of a vertical element in every payment card system, that is the relation
between Visa and MasterCard on the one hand and banks on the other, has allowed
the Court of Appeals to detect anticompetitive effects in a relevant market distinct
from the one on which the agreement was concluded.
SOKiK’s failure to consider the substance of the case has led the Court of Appeals
to annul the first instance judgment and refer the case back to SOKiK.
It appears that the adoption of a different relevant product market definition would
have made it possible to conduct a full assessment of the competitive effects of the
MIF that would encompass the special characteristics of payment card systems as
an example of a two-sided market. The most apt definition would have been that
the relevant product market is that for payment card systems, albeit also taking into
account intra-system relations and competition. This is the only definition which
makes it possible to consider the balancing function of the MIF, its meaning as a
mechanism of maximizing the number of users (both cardholders and merchants)
and can be a good starting point for the assessment of its potential efficiencies. An
artificial separation of payment card systems into their issuing and acquiring segments
gives a false idea of the market in question. It does not demonstrate what convinces
customers to pay by cards and why are merchants willing to accept card payments. It
also does not explain why do issuers sometimes give cards without a charge and even
provide cardholders with free credit. Finally, it does not show why merchants are ready
to accept card payments without requesting an additional charge.
In addition, the ‘related markets’ theory followed by the Court of Appeals is not
entirely all-encompassing and convincing. It is true that in vertical agreements a
restriction of competition can appear in a related market8 when undertakings under
scrutiny have some degree of market power, which enables them to influence another
market. The Court of Appeals has failed however to mention or identify this element.
Also not clear is its understanding of the character and nature of the inter-relation
between the acquiring and issuing market. Accepting that the relevant product market
is that for payment card systems, with all their internal relations and two types of
8 See: A. Jurkowska [in:] T. Skoczny, A. Jurkowska, D. Miąsik (eds), Ustawa o ochronie
konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz [Act on Competition and Consumer Protection.
Commentary], Warszawa 2009, Para. 42.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
6. 282 CASE COMMENTS
competition (inter-system and intra-system), would reflect the true nature of this
market. It would also save the unnecessary trouble of proving that the conditions are
satisfied for identifying restrictive effect in a distinct market from the one on which
agreement is concluded.
Interestingly, the Court of Appeals has also criticized SOKiK for ignoring Article
81(3) TEC considerations (currently Article 101(3) TFEU). Unfortunately, the second
instance court did not give many indications as to how should such analysis proceed.
It merely reminded that the burden of proving the existence of efficiencies is to rest
on the undertakings concerned and that evidence is to be supplied at the outset
of the proceedings (following the principle of preclusion of evidence in economic
proceedings). Finally, the Court of Appeals suggested that even if the fulfillment of
the prerequisites of Article 101(3) TFEU is not proven to the requisite standard, such
allegations can be taken into account at the later stage of the assessment when the
correctness of the fine level is evaluated.
It should be emphasized that market definition problems will also influence the
assessment of potential efficiency gains because one of the conditions that must be
met for a restrictive agreement to be exempted, is the existence of counterweighing
consumer benefits. These gains must, as a rule, arise in the same relevant market
in which the anticompetitive effects occurred. It seems clear however that potential
efficiencies of the MIF go to the participants of the system as a whole (cardholders
and merchants) rather than being associated with consumers only. There is a risk
therefore that a narrow, one-sided definition of the relevant market will lead to an
unjustified disregard for these potential benefits.
Final remarks
Although neither SOKiK nor the Court of Appeals have managed to provide a
workable solution to the market definition problem in this case, it appears that SOKiK
was moving closer towards the most appropriate answer. However, its reasoning was
not entirely consistent because it saw the MIF as an element of the issuers’ fee for
providing cardholders with an electronic payment instrument (payment card) but at
the same time, it viewed the MIF as remuneration for the services of the system as
a whole. Still, its comprehensive treatment of payment card systems, which makes it
possible to assess the overall effect and influence of the MIF, should be appreciated.
The Court of Appeals tried to mirror the solution adopted by the European
Commission in its MasterCard case. Unfortunately, it has failed to demonstrate why
it finds this line of reasoning convincing. Not persuasive is, in particular, its reference
to the distinct character of the services rendered on the issuing and acquiring market.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals struggles in the following sections of the judgment to
show an inter-relation between these markets. It is precisely for this inter-relation
that payment card systems should have been considered as a single relevant market.
Dr. Katarzyna Tosza
Jagiellonian University
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES