The Undercurrent Journal's 10th Anniversary Issue!

1. iii

3. 3

4. An undercurrent, by definition, is the unseen movement of water beneath the surface; its tug and motion are only
perceptible upon submersion. It is an apt metaphor both for international development studies and its
undergraduates. The intriguing tensions and debates within the field of IDS flow beneath a popularized veneer of
humanitarian charity. And we, its undergraduates, study at the margins of the arena of the academy – much of our
vitality and dynamism hidden from view. Undercurrent is a publication that immerses its readers in the ebbs and
flows of development studies through the perspective of Canadian undergraduates.
Indelibly marked by the legacy of colonialism and the onward march of global integration, international development
studies is a field illuminated by our confrontation with human difference and inequality. The just pursuit of unity in
diversity promises to be a reiterating challenge for the next century, and water is a fitting icon for such a pursuit: an
elemental reminder of our fundamental oneness that, through its definition of our planetary geography, also
preserves our distance.
With aspirations of distinction, we are proud to offer Undercurrent.
***
Un undercurrent (courant de fond), par définition, est le mouvement invisible de l’eau sous la surface. Son va-et-vient
est seulement apparent par submersion. Ceci est une métaphore à propos des études de développement international
et des étudiants au baccalauréat. Les tensions et les débats fascinants au sein du domaine du développement
international circulent sous l’aspect superficiel de la charité. De manière comparable, nous qui étudions aux marges
du champ académique voyons que notre vitalité et notre dynamisme sont souvent masqués aux regards d’autrui.
Undercurrent est une publication qui immerge ses lecteurs dans le flux et le reflux des études de développement
international à travers la perspective d’étudiants canadiens.
Indélébilement marquées par l’héritage du colonialisme et de l’intégration mondiale actuelle, les études de
développement international sont un champ éclairé par notre confrontation avec la différence humaine et l’inégalité.
La poursuite judicieuse d’une unité au sein de la diversité promet d’être un défi récurrent pour le siècle à venir. L’eau
est une image appropriée pour une telle quête : elle est un rappel élémentaire de notre unité fondamentale, qui, parce
qu’elle définit notre géographie planétaire, préserve aussi notre distance.
Avec des ambitions de distinction, nous sommes fiers de présenter Undercurrent.
iii

5. iv
Editor-in-Chief
Christie McLeod, University of Winnipeg/Menno Simons College
Managing Editor
M’Lisa Colbert, Concordia University
Outreach Coordinator
Nathan Stewart, University of Guelph
Associate Editors
Vivian Tam, McMaster University
Moira Hennebury, University of Waterloo
Caitlyn McGeer, Memorial University
Andrew Hay, Carleton University
Devon Matthews, Dalhousie University
Webmaster/Design Editors
Shidan Cummings, University of Ottawa
Translators
Kelvin Chu, University of Toronto
Advisory Committee
Clarke Foster, Dalhousie University
Emma Fieldhouse, University of Winnipeg/Menno Simons College
Amy Bronson, University of Guelph
Faye Williams, University of Ottawa
Faculty Editorial Advisors
Haroon Akram-Lodhi, Trent University
Ryan Briggs, American University
John Cameron, Dalhousie University
Robert Huish, Dalhousie University
Morten Jerven, Simon Fraser University
Alex Latta, Wilfrid Laurier University
Laxmi Pant, Special Graduate Lecturer - University of Guelph,
Barry Riddell, Queen's University
Paul Rowe, Trinity Western University
Matthew Schnurr, Dalhousie University
Alicia Sliwinski, Wilfrid Laurier University
Adam Sneyd, University of Guelph
Sharada Srinivasan, York University
Larry A. Swatuk, University of Waterloo
Chui-Ling Tam, University of Calgary
Cover Design
Christie McLeod, University of Winnipeg/Menno Simons College
Founding Editors
Geoffrey Cameron
Jill Campbell
Sam Grey
Erica Martin
Christoper Rompré
Deanna Verhulst
About
Undercurrent is the only student-run national undergraduate
journal publishing scholarly essays and articles that explore the
subject of international development. While individual authors may
present distinct, critical viewpoints, Undercurrent does not harbour
any particular ideological commitments. Instead, the journal aims to
evince the broad range of applications for development theory and
methodology and to promote interdisciplinary discourse by
publishing an array of articulate, well-researched pieces.
Undercurrent endeavours to raise the profile of undergraduate IDS;
to establish a venue for young scholars to undergo constructive
review and have work published; to provide the best examples of
work currently being done in undergraduate IDS programmes in
Canada; and to stimulate creative scholarship, dialogue and debate
about the theory and practice of development.
undercurrentjournal.ca
Ten
years
ago,
development
studies
students
gathered
in
the
central
Canadian
city
of
Winnipeg
for
the
Canadian
Association
for
the
Study
of
International
Development
(CASID)
Annual
Meeting.
It
was
at
this
fateful
gathering
that
the
students
decided
to
create
their
own
annual
meeting
-­‐-­‐
InSight
-­‐-­‐
which
then
gave
birth
to
the
Undercurrent.
The
Undercurrent
is
now
in
its
10th
year
of
publication.
Since
its
humble
beginnings
in
2004,
with
the
dedication
and
tireless
work
of
157
staff
members,
the
Undercurrent
has
published
158
papers
in
23
issues.
These
papers
have
offered
a
critical
perspective
of
development
studies
subjects,
which
have
positioned
the
Undercurrent
as
an
important
body
of
literature
within
the
Oield
of
development.
InSight
has
had
seven
annual
meetings,
and
the
Undercurrent
team
is
actively
preparing
for
the
2015
conference
occurring
in
Ottawa.
Additionally,
the
Undercurrent
has
also
executed
a
successful
mentoring
program,
is
initiating
a
National
International
Development
Student
Association
and
has
published
46
blog
posts
on
its
website
(including
the
recent
10
Posts
in
10
Days
feature
leading
up
to
the
release
of
this
issue).
The
Undercurrent
provides
a
space
for
students
to
voice
their
opinions
and
critically
engage
with
research
on
a
wide
array
of
topics.
Our
unique
editorial
process
serves
as
a
learning
instrument
for
the
dedicated
contributors
and
peer
editors.
This
fall’s
editorial
cycle
has
produced
a
remarkable
compilation
of
works
from
development
studies
students
Canada-­‐wide:
Patrick
Balazo
examines
the
international
community’s
responsibility
in
defending
the
human
rights
of
stateless
persons;
Hannah
Hong
presents
a
compelling
argument
for
the
problematic
injustices
concealed
by
‘single
story’
narratives
of
Africa;
Ayesha
Barmania
looks
at
the
differences
between
immigrant
communities
in
small
cities
and
urban
centres
in
Canada;
Colton
Brydges
discusses
the
role
of
external
actors
in
African
mineral
economies;
Melissa
Jackson
utilizes
a
postcolonial
feminism
lens
to
advance
the
role
of
women
as
integral
agents
of
social
change
in
the
Arab
world;
and
Matthew
Farrell
presents,
in
French,
a
neo-­‐Gramscian
case
study
to
argue
that
civil
society
cannot
solve
the
failure
of
globalization.
The
Undercurrent
would
like
to
thank
all
of
the
past
and
present
staff
and
authors
who
are
named
on
our
nifty
commemorative
front
and
back
covers,
respectively.
We
recognize
that
for
every
name
listed,
there
is
an
accompanying
cluster
of
people
who
supported
the
hard
work
and
ambition
of
these
individuals.
We
are
extremely
grateful
to
the
founding
editors,
whose
bright
ideas
and
perseverance
brought
the
Undercurrent
to
life
in
2004.
We
look
forward
to
seeing
where
the
next
generation
of
development
studies
students
take
the
Undercurrent
in
future
years!
On
behalf
of
the
Undercurrent
staff,
it
is
with
great
pleasure
that
I
present
you
with
the
10th
Anniversary
Issue
of
the
Undercurrent:
The
Canadian
Undergraduate
Journal
of
Development
Studies.
Happy
birthday
to
us
-­‐-­‐
and
happy
reading
to
you!
Sincerely,
Christie
McLeod
Editor-­‐in-­‐Chief
Undercurrent:
The
Canadian
Undergraduate
Journal
of
Development
Studies
Letter from the Editor

6. CONTENTS
iii Preface
iv Letter from the Editor
6 Truth & Rights: Statelessness, Human Rights, and the Rohingya
By: Patrick Balazo
16 “Africa Rising”: A Hopeless Falsity or a Hopeful Reality
By: Hannah Hong
23 Practically a Community: Dynamics of a Small City’s Immigrant Community
By: Ayesha Barmania
30 Feeling the Pressure: The Role of External Actors in the Development
of the Mining Sectors of Tanzania and Zambia
By: Colton Brydges
38 A Season of Change: Egyptian Women’s Organizing in the Arab Spring
By: Melissa Jackson
47 L’Union de l’Économie et de l’État: Un Analyse Néo-Gramscien de la Défaillance de la
! Mondialisation et ses Effets au Bangladesh
By: Matthew Farrell
56 Biographical Sketches
58 Contacting the Journal

7. Truth & Rights: Statelessness, Human Rights, and the Rohingya
By: Patrick Balazo
Abstract - The Rohingya people are a stateless Muslim community that live within the borders of
Myanmar. This paper presents the gross human rights violations they have experienced and unveils a
paradox in international law concerning state sovereignty that prevents them from claiming their right to a
nationality and simultaneously prevents the international community from coming to their aid. This paper
examines the plight of the Rohingya people using a specific conceptual framework of statelessness and it
concludes that the inaction of the international community has caused their circumstances to worsen.
Résumé - Les Rohinya sont une communauté musulmane apatride qui vit à l’intérieur de Myanmar. Ce
papier présente les violations des droits humains qu’ils ont subies et dévoile un paradoxe dans le droit
international concernant la souveraineté d’un état, ce qui les empêche de revendiquer leur droit à une
nationalité et bloque simultanément l’aide de la communauté internationale. Ce papier examine la
situation difficile des Rohinya en utilisant un cadre conceptuel spécifique de l’apatridie. Il conclut que
l’inaction de la communauté internationale a aggravé leur situation.
INTRODUCTION
State sovereignty is paramount where it concerns international relations. Yet, for the Rohingya
people of Myanmar, state sovereignty is a double sided iron veil that keeps them in legal shadows as a
stateless people and simultaneously precludes the international community from bearing any
responsibility in defending their human rights. The thesis of this paper uses a conceptual framework of
statelessness to investigate the plight of the Rohingya people of Myanmar, drawing attention to the
gross human rights violations that this group suffers as a result of their statelessness. The importance of
such work lies in the fact that the dearth of academic literature regarding the plight of the Rohingya and
the human rights violations they have been subjected to is written with a focus on the concept of
statelessness in general, where the Rohingya serve merely as an example to this end. This thesis
provides a more specific and in depth analysis of the case of the Rohingya people. The paper highlights
how the suffering of the Rohingya has continued to escalate despite multiple international instruments
designed to offer stateless peoples redress, and though evidence of the desperate conditions under
which the Rohingya live is widely available, the international community is both unwilling and unable to
act; an inaction that some commentators have characterized a “slow genocide” (The Sentinel Project,
2013, p. 36).
WHO ARE THE ROHINGYA
The Rohingya people are a stateless Muslim ethnic minority living in what is now Myanmar’s
northwestern Rakhine state (historically referred to as Arakan). Today, they comprise over thirty percent
of the state’s population, while their total numbers in Myanmar exceed two million (Parnini, Othman &
Ghazali, 2013). Holliday (2010) argues that the Rohingya may be “the most distinctive of Myanmar’s
many ethnic groups” (p. 121), with their religion, social customs and physical features setting them apart
from the majority of Burmese society.
It is during the fifteenth century that the people now known as the Rohingya began to figure
prominently in the region’s history. In 1404, then king of Arakan Narmeikhla waged an attack on
neighbouring Burma, and upon his defeat sought refuge in the court of the Muslim Bengali ruler
Jalaluddin Shah (Oberoi, 2006, p. 172; Karim, 2000, p. 15). In 1430, Jalaluddin Shah’s forces reinstated
Narmeikhla as the ruler of Arakan, cementing the influence Islam was to have on Arakan’s future (Oberoi,
2006, p. 172; Jilani, 2001, p. 15; Karim, 2000, p. 15).
6 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

8. Arakan remained an independent Islamic kingdom until 1784 when Bodawpaya, the king of
neighbouring Burma, conquered Arakan and incorporated it into his kingdom (Ahmed, 2010; Bahar,
2010; Oberoi, 2006). This event also marked the first mass exodus of Muslims from Arakan to Bengal
(Bangladesh), with some 200,000 Muslims taking flight (Bahar, 2010; Oberoi, 2006). By 1798, two-thirds
of Arakan’s population had deserted their native land (Jilani, 2001, p. 70).
While this is indeed a dark chapter in the history of Arakan, an event that occurred the following
year is of invaluable importance: the publication of Francis Buchanan’s A Comparative Vocabulary of
Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma Empire. It is within this survey that the name Rohingya first
emerges:
“I shall now add three dialects, spoken in the Burma Empire, but evidently derived from the
language of the Hindu nation. The first is that spoken by the Mohammedans, who have long
settled in Arakan, and who call themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan.” (Buchanan &
Charney, 2003, p. 55)
Published in 1799, Buchanan’s work is the first recording of the endonym Rohingya (Rooinga). Before
Buchanan’s work was published, Arakanese Muslims had never been identified in the written record as
“Rohingya,” and though there is no absolute evidence as to when and where this endonym first
emerged, it should be understood that the Muslims of Arakan discussed above are in fact the same
group who would later identify themselves as the Rohingya.
Bodawpaya’s rule and that of his successor remained largely unchallenged until the arrival of the
British (Yegar, 1972, p. 12). Beginning in 1824, a force led by General Joseph Watson Morrison and
another led by Sir Archibald Campbell moved on Arakan, and by 24 February 1826 with the signing of
the Treaty of Yandabo, Arakan became a British Territory (Jilani, 2001, pp. 74-75).
British control meant stability, and many Rohingya who had fled to Bangladesh began returning
to their homes (Bahar, 2010, p. 107; Jilani, 2001, p. 76). As well, Arakan’s first civil ruler under the British,
Robertson, encouraged farmers from neighbouring Bengal (Bangladesh) to settle in Arakan so as to
increase the production of agricultural commodities for export (Karim, 2000, p. 108). Unfortunately, this
movement of Bengali farmers into Arakan obscures the Rohingya’s historical presence in the region, and
a number of subsequent events worked to further dispossess the Rohingya of their heritage.
The second and third Anglo-Burmese wars saw the whole of Burma come under British rule, and
with that Burma was designated as a province of India (Yegar, 1972, p. 29). Large numbers of Indians
entered Burma in numbers exceeding 1 million during the British occupation, much to the detriment of
the indigenous Rohingya population (Yegar, 1972, p. 31). The colonial tradition of order, quantification
and codification meant that the Rohingya became legally categorized as “Indian Muslims” (Bahar, 2010,
p. 108), and as such their historical legacy in Arakan was trivialized.
Tensions between Burma’s Buddhist and Muslim communities were first exposed in 1930 and
again in 1938 with the advent of the “anti-Indian riots” (Bahar, 2010, p. 108). Under colonial rule, many
Burmese felt as though they were being dispossessed of their land and that they did not have the same
social and economic opportunities as their Indian counterparts. During the riots of 1938, Burmese
nationalists warned the colonial government that “steps would be taken…to bring about the
extermination of the Muslims and the extinction of their religion” (Yegar, 1972, p. 36) if their concerns
were not addressed. Of course, with the Rohingya being understood as Indian Muslims, they were not
spared from these sentiments, and it is during this period that their collective persecution had begun to
intensify.
On 4 January 1948, Burma achieved its independence from Britain and became an independent
sovereign state (Tinker, 1967, p. 1) with the British leaving power in the hands of the Anti-Fascist
People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). What matters most is that under the leadership of prime minister U
7

9. Nu and the AFPFL, the Rohingya were recognized as citizens of Burma (Lay, 2009, p. 57). General Ne
Win’s 1962 coup d’état changed all of that however, for Ne Win declared the Rohingya to be “Indian
Bengalis” who came to Burma with the British during the first Anglo-Burmese War, a position that has
since become the official state line despite its historical inaccuracy (Bahar, 2010, pp. 109-110; Than &
Thuzar, 2012, p. 4). Ne Win ordered authorities in Arakan to restrict the Rohingya’s movement, outlawed
Rohingya associations and organizations, and cancelled all Rohingya language programming (Jilani,
2002, pp. 70-71).
In 1974, the passing of the Emergency Immigration Act informally stripped the Rohingya of their
Burmese nationality by supplanting their national registration certificates with foreign registration cards
(Cheung, 2011, p. 51; Ahmed, 2010, p. 51). 1978’s Operation Naga Min (Operation Dragon King) was
launched to “scrutinize each individual living in the state…taking action against foreigners who [had]
filtered into the country illegally” (Oberoi, 2006, pp. 174-175), with the country’s Rohingya population
being specifically targeted. This campaign was followed by widespread violence against the Rohingya
and some 200,000 fled to Bangladesh (Cheung, 2011; Ullah, 2011; Ahmed, 2010; Oberoi, 2006; Jilani,
2002). On 15 October 1982, the new Citizenship Act was passed rendering the Rohingya officially
stateless and placing them outside of Burma’s 135 ethnic groups located within the country’s eight
“national races” (Holliday, 2010, p. 118; Parnini, Othman, & Ghazali, 2013, p. 134). In 1990, Operation Pyi
Thaya (Operation Prosperous Country) was launched, and the Rohingya were subjected to forced
resettlement, forced labour, extortion, torture, rape and killings at the hands of the state, causing another
270,000 refugees to flee to Bangladesh (Oberoi, 2006, p. 180). It would be another twenty years until
violence of this degree flared up again, and between June and October 2012 nearly 8,000 Rohingya
homes were torched, 31 mosques were destroyed, and 140,000 Rohingya were left displaced in
response to reports that 3 Rohingya men had raped a Rakhine woman (Kipgen, 2013, pp. 4-7;
International Crisis Group, 2013, p. i).
ON STATELESSNESS
Statelessness is a contravention of both human dignity and humanity’s inalienable rights. Having
a nationality is one of the most basic of rights guaranteed to all members of the human family under the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). As Article 15 of the UDHR states: “(1)
Everyone has the right to a nationality;” and “(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality” (United Nations, 2007). However, in the sixty-six years since
the adoption of the UDHR, the inalienable rights espoused by Article 15 have not become universal in
scope, and it is currently estimated that there are approximately 12 million stateless peoples worldwide
(Staples, 2012, p. ix). This signals an intrinsic deficiency on the part of the UDHR, and one that applies
explicitly to the stateless.
In her analysis of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Arendt (1973) argues
that the “inalienable” rights of man (human rights) are concomitant with national emancipation, and
“whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any sovereign state” (p. 293), these
supposed rights “proved to be unenforceable” (p. 293). In other words, to be without a state is to exist
as “an anomaly for whom there is no appropriate niche in the framework of the general law” (Jermings as
cited in Arendt, p. 283, 1973), losing both the legal protection of the state system and an officially
recognized identity before the law. Assuming that human rights are in fact inalienable, it would follow
that he who has become stateless would be the foremost beneficiary of said rights by virtue of his
humanity, but because these rights are contingent on one’s political status as a citizen, “a man who is
nothing but a man” (Arendt, 1973, p. 300) loses that which makes it possible for others to treat him as
such. Following this logic, nationality is fundamentally “the right to have rights” (van Waas, 2008, p. 217;
Weissbrodt, 2008, p. 81). Through the loss of nationality and citizenship, and therefore the means
through which any guarantee of human rights can be actualized, the human being is reduced to a state
of bare existence, an existence that is itself the ultimate expression of precariousness.
8 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

10. Though the stateless are placed outside the apparatus of the international state system because
of their political non-status, this collective non-status in turn exposes them to all manner of state
violence. The reduction to an existence without political status does relieve the stateless of all rights and
privileges, but in this process the relationship between the state and the stateless is re-articulated, not
abandoned. Agamben (1998) refers to this state of existence as “bare life” (p. 10), wherein “the simple
fact of living common to all living beings” (p. 9) is still in fact recognized by the political realm. Central to
Agamben’s conception of bare life is an arcane figure derived from Roman law: “homo sacer, (sacred
man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (p. 12). Homo sacer represents “a life that may be killed
by anyone -- an object of a violence that exceeds the sphere both of law and of sacrifice” (p. 54) for he
has been forcibly removed from the political community, reduced to bare life, and placed beyond the
protection of divine law as understood by the Romans. Agamben states that in the modern political
sphere of national sovereignty “a zone of indistinction between sacrifice and homicide” (p. 53) is formed,
and in this sphere the sovereign “is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without
celebrating a sacrifice” (p. 53). However, although it has departed from all notions of divinity, the modern
system of national sovereignty has retained the figure of homo sacer in that one can be forcibly placed
outside the political community, wherein the sovereign is potentially free to kill without transgression.
According to Agamben, it is the capture of bare life and homo sacer within the political order on which
the entire political system rests. In other words, sovereign power maintains itself in relation to bare life “in
an inclusive exclusion” (p. 12), a form of recognition that for Agamben constitutes the nucleus of all
sovereign power. Ultimately, the modern sovereign order necessitates the existence of that which it is
not to delineate its own existence, creating both the fact of bare life and the conditions in which the
unbridled exercise of power over bare life is necessarily sanctioned (Agamben, 1998). Tragically, this is
the very situation in which the stateless person is in.
When denied one’s citizenship and nationality, the stateless person descends into a state of bare
life, unable to secure any semblance of rights, guilty of existence, and confined to and exploited by the
very system of which they are no longer a part. Without the right to have rights, the stateless have no
means through which they can seek justice, and it is in this space that the state exercises absolute
power and control over the stateless. This paradox cannot be overstated, and is repeatedly revealed
through the many international instruments designed to provide the stateless with redress. The
Rohingya’s descent into a state of bare life and the subsequent tribulation this group encounters are
real-world examples of the issues raised by both Arendt and Agamben, and the specificities of their
plight will now be outlined in order to proceed.
Though the Rohingya were recognized as citizens in Myanmar’s 1948 Constitution (Lay, 2009, p.
57; Yegar, 1972, p. 75), the passing of the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law repealed the Constitution’s
attendant Union Citizenship Act that designated the Rohingya as citizens (Aung, 2007, p. 272; Working
People’s Daily, 1982). Under the new law, if one were able to provide the state with “conclusive evidence
of their lineage” (Ullah, 2011, p. 149) in Myanmar as predating 1823, citizenship would theoretically be
granted. However, the aforementioned 1974 Emergency Immigration Act meant that most Rohingya were
officially documented as being foreign to Myanmar, and when coupled with repeated flight, internal
displacement, and the outright confiscation of identification, the Rohingya were left largely unable to
provide documentary evidence of their historical presence in the country. Further, in concert with the
passing of this law was the codification of Myanmar’s eight national races (Holliday, 2010, p. 118), in
which the Rohingya were not included. As a result, the Rohingya were officially stripped of their Burmese
citizenship and the onus was placed on them to prove to the state that they were eligible for one of the
three tiers of citizenship.
When considering these factors, it can be understood how the Rohingya have been rendered
stateless. The particularities of the 1982 Citizenship Law both deny the Rohingya citizenship and prevent
them from ever attaining it. Key to all of this is the official state line that the Rohingya are in fact illegal
Indian Bengali migrants, a position that prolongs and further entrenches the Rohingya’s collective status
as stateless. Even if a Rohingya man or woman were to present conclusive evidence of their historical
presence in Myanmar, “those who apply for the [sic] citizenship are subjected to scrutiny by…the Central
9

11. Body” (Myanmar President Office, 2013, para. 36), the same Central Body responsible for rendering the
Rohingya stateless. Under these circumstances, the granting of citizenship to Myanmar’s Rohingya
population amounts to little more than an illusion. Ultimately, the Citizenship Law is a well-crafted
encapsulation of the ethno-nationalist vision espoused by the country’s Burman elite, a law that allows
for the complete and utter violation of the Rohingya’s human rights. However, there is one mechanism
through which the Rohingya can garner legal recognition, and attention must now be placed on the key
legal document pertaining to statelessness, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons.
THE RIGHTS OF THE STATELESS
Adopted in 1954 and put into force in 1960, the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons is the most comprehensive codification of the rights of the stateless, providing a
framework for the international protection of stateless persons (United Nations, 2010). The Convention
lays out minimum standards of treatment for those who “qualify as stateless persons” (UN, 2010, p. 3),
addressing matters of religion, education, freedom of movement, identity, expulsion, assimilation, and
naturalization. Comprised of 42 Articles and grounded in the consideration “that it is desirable to
regulate and improve the status of stateless persons by an international agreement” (UN, 2010, p. 5), the
Convention currently has 23 signatories and 80 parties, and its enforcement is the responsibility of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (United Nations Treaty Collection, 2014a).
Due to their vulnerability, there is obvious need for an international framework to protect the
stateless. But, just as human rights fall short of protecting these people, so too does the very convention
designed with the intent of protecting them. Evidence of the Convention’s shortcomings first arises in the
document’s preamble where it is stated that the rights guaranteed by the Convention are only to be
afforded to those who “qualify as stateless persons” (UN, 2010, p. 3). This is problematic because the
Convention does not provide guidelines as to how a state should qualify a person as stateless, instead
leaving it to the discretion of the state in question. This means that under the guise of the Convention,
not only are the stateless burdened with the task of negotiating an inconsistent legal framework, but the
prospects for an internationally harmonized approach and solution to the repercussions of statelessness
are poor (van Waas, 2008, p. 228).
The plight of the stateless is further compounded by Article 7 (1) of the Convention where it is
stated that: “Except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a Contracting State
shall accord to stateless persons the same treatment as is accorded to aliens generally” (UN, 2010, p. 8).
However, only those who are lawfully present or lawfully resident are privy to this treatment (van Waas,
2008; Blitz & Lynch, 2011; Staples, 2012). Not only is this is a great difficulty for the person in question in
that they must “prove a negative” (Blitz & Lynch, 2011, p. 37) in proving their statelessness, it effectively
allows human rights protocols to fall under the discretion of a given state, thereby undermining the
purpose of this instrument in its entirety.
The 1954 Convention raises another issue, namely that of a “hidden exclusion clause” (Blitz &
Lynch, 2011, p. 27). Because states are “free to set the conditions for entry and residence of aliens (Blitz
& Lynch, 2011, p. 27), the stateless are at once denied the right to stay and leave, wherein they may
become stuck between the sovereign will of two states, spending years in detention (Staples, 2012;
Weissbrodt, 2008).
Further, not only is it the sovereign right of each state to determine who its citizens are (Staples,
2012, p. 19) the state itself “is constructed through power” (Redclift, 2013, p.33). Key to this power is the
state’s capacity “to categorise differently and hierarchically, to set aside by setting apart, and to exclude
from state protection” (Redclift, 2013, p. 33). To exercise unconstrained power over the stateless then is
a natural expression of state sovereignty, and while it may be at the expense of human dignity (Staples,
2012, p. 18), it is at the very least condoned and in accordance with the same Convention that seeks to
uphold the human rights of stateless persons.
10 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

12. THE CASE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Recent developments in and proposed solutions to resolving the Rohingya’s collective
statelessness are divided among two camps: what Myanmar can do to end the crisis and what the
international community can do to help bring an end to the crisis. This section will address how the
international community can help Myanmar move forward. A definite solution to ending the Rohingya’s
statelessness will not be proposed. However, by outlining what is happening at the international level, a
portrait of what is possible is provided so as to delineate what may or may not happen in the future.
Though it was not explicitly concerned with the Rohingya or the issue of statelessness, on 12
January 2007 both the United Kingdom and the United States presented the UN Security Council with a
draft resolution on Myanmar (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, 2014). The
resolution called on the Government of Myanmar to offer unhindered access to humanitarian
organizations; to cooperate fully with the International Labour Organization; to make concrete progress
towards democracy; and to release all political prisoners (ICRtoP, 2014). The resolution did receive
overwhelming support, but China and Russia used their powers to veto the resolution arguing that the
violence in Myanmar did not constitute a threat to international peace and security, and that the matter
was an internal affair of a sovereign state (Parnini, 2013, p. 291; United Nations Security Council, 2007,
para. 4). However, of greater concern is that the notion of state sovereignty was used to prevent
international intervention in Myanmar. This is particularly worrying in the sense that sovereignty already
provides states with an absolute right to determine who its citizens are. When that same sovereignty is
then used to justify violence against a state’s own citizens, let alone against those not recognized by the
state, a dangerous precedent is set. The end result is that the stateless are further deprived of having a
voice in an international legal framework that essentially condones acts of violence perpetrated against
them.
Another recent, real-world attempt to resolve the Rohingya issue is the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) adoption of the Bali Process with regard to the Rohingya. During 2009’s 14th
ASEAN summit in Thailand (ASEAN, 2012), the Rohingya issue was made a “sideline” concern, kept
from the official agenda of the summit but discussed nonetheless (Lay, 2009, p. 58). Leaders of the
ASEAN countries agreed the Rohingya issue was of regional concern, and it was brought under the Bali
Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking and Related Transnational Crime (Ahmed, 2010, p. 133).
Rather than falling back on human rights mechanisms embedded within ASEAN’s charter such as Article
1: Section 7’s promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Bali Process
turns the Rohingya issue into a matter of national security, and as such the human rights and protections
needs of the Rohingya are rendered obsolete (Ahmed, 2010, p. 133; ASEAN, 2008, p. 4; Cheung, 2011,
pp. 64-65). This move towards the Rohingya as a security issue was later confirmed in October 2012
during the violence that erupted in Rakhine state when Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary General of ASEAN,
warned that violence could radicalize the Rohingya and threaten peace and stability in the region
(Kipgen, 2013, p. 8). Despite this worrying claim, the Rohingya issue went without mention at two
ASEAN ministerial meetings in 2013 (Ganjanakhundee, 2013), and with Myanmar becoming Chair of
ASEAN in 2014, it is unlikely the Rohingya will get the attention they deserve from this body.
In March 2010, slightly less than a year after ASEAN’s adoption of the Bali Process, UN Special
Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar Tomas Ojea Quintana called for a UN-mandated commission of
inquiry into human rights violations being committed in Myanmar (Parnini, 2013, p. 292). Since making
this recommendation, the governments of Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France,
Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States have all given their support to the establishment of a commission of inquiry (Parnini, 2013,
p. 292). If it were to be completed, ASEAN and other regional governments would then have the
increased leverage needed to pressure the Government of Myanmar to make genuine political reforms
and end the continued violation of human rights in the country (Parnini, 2013, p. 292). However, during a
visit to Rakhine state in August of 2013, Quintana’s presence was met with violent protest (Rohingya
Blogger, 2013, para. 4). Such hostilities would not prevent a commission of inquiry from being
11

13. completed, but are a worrying indication of the need for such a commission. Since this visit,
humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya community in Rakhine state has been temporarily suspended in
some regions due to the harassment and intimidation of aid workers, and the blocking of access to
camps where internally displaced Rohingya men, women and children are housed (Rohingya Blogger,
2014, para. 8). Again, these events do not mean that a commission of inquiry cannot be established, but
signal both the degree of hostility under which such a commission would be carried out and the
immediacy with which it must be done.
A final real-world example of what has recently been done to resolve the Rohingya issue can be
taken from members of the international community who have agreed to resettle documented Rohingya
refugees from Bangladesh. Since 2006, a total of 920 recognized Rohingya refugees have been resettled
in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States (Azad & Jasmin, 2013). This is an incredible development, but it is worth considering whether this
third country resettlement honours the wishes of Myanmar’s President Thein Sein who has stated that “if
there are countries that would accept [the Rohingya], they could be sent there” (UNHCR, 2013, para. 6).
Of course, the resettlement of 920 Rohingya between eight countries should hardly be seen as President
Sein’s plan coming to fruition, but it does highlight the overwhelming complexity of resolving this issue.
As well, it should be noted that only those Rohingya who are recognized as refugees in Bangladesh are
permitted to apply for resettlement, and though it is an incredible opportunity to start life anew for those
who are eligible, this option falls extremely short of providing a solution for all the Rohingya who are not
among those counted by the UNHCR’s operations in Bangladesh.
Elsewhere in the international realm, theorists have proposed a variety of solutions to overcome
the impasse surrounding the Rohingya issue. Perhaps most radical is Gibney’s (2013) discussion of
extraterritorial obligations, an approach that mirrors the Responsibility to Protect. Through this approach,
the international community assumes the task of protecting the economic, social and cultural rights of
persons when the state is unable or unwilling to do so. However, the problem with Gibney’s approach is
threefold. First, moral obligations may very well be used as a pre-text for military intervention. Second,
the Extraterritorial Obligations Human Rights Consortium (ETO) charged with promoting these principles
only published said principles in 2013. Lastly, these principles may amount to little more than another list
of rules to be followed, or not.
CONCLUSION
Reverting back to this thesis’ introduction, it is quite apparent that the suffering of the Rohingya
has continued to escalate despite a multitude of international instruments designed to offer stateless
peoples redress, and though evidence of the desperate conditions under which the Rohingya live is
widely available, the international community is both unwilling and unable to act.
As we have seen, the Rohingya have a long history in what is now Myanmar’s Rakhine state, at
one time claiming the same soil as the independent kingdom of Arakan. In 1982, Burmese nationalists
were successful in stripping the Rohingya of their Burmese citizenship, and in so doing rendered the
Rohingya non-citizen resident foreigners. Since this time, the Rohingya’s legal non-status has effectively
enabled the perpetration of human rights violations against them, and tragically, with no resolution in
sight.
To be sure, there have been international efforts to bring an end to the displacement and human
rights violations the Rohingya seem almost destined to endure. Yet, those actors who have sought to
address human rights violations have only been able to secure non-binding resolutions or have had their
efforts impeded by the all-encompassing rhetoric of statelessness’ troubling bedfellow, sovereignty.
Still, the most pressing matter is the denial of the right to a nationality, the key human rights
violation experienced by the Rohingya. So as long as it is the sovereign right of each state to determine
who its citizens are, there is absolutely no reason for Myanmar or any other country to include the
12 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

14. Rohingya as part of its national community. Tragically, state sovereignty also reduces the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons to little
more than paper tigers, and when the most comprehensive legal documents pertaining to the rights of
the stateless are neutralized, an impasse on how to address statelessness takes hold.
The recent resettlement of Rohingya refugees to various Western nations has provided those
fortunate enough to be classified as refugees and selected for resettlement with a future they would
have otherwise been unable to secure. However, this could be invoked to justify the Burmese
Government’s calls for third country resettlement, and should be approached with caution.
As both Arendt (1973) and Agamben (1998) have shown, sovereignty ultimately trumps any
attempt to remedy statelessness. Citizenship is the right to have rights, and once it has been lost the
stateless have no means of pursuing legal recourse for any affront committed against them. In other
words, once one is not recognized as the national of any state, they are afforded no guarantees by the
state and yet are exposed to all manner of violence and control by the state. This is how sovereignty is
ultimately actualized. It is in this space that the Rohingya dwell, made to be everyone’s concern yet no
one’s responsibility, and as long as our current conception of sovereignty persists, so too will the
statelessness of the Rohingya.
13

15. REFERENCES
Agamben, G. (1998). Homo Sacer. Sovereign power and bare life. California: Stanford University Press.
Ahmed, I. (2010). The plight of stateless Rohingyas: Responses of the state, society & the international
community. Dhaka: The University Press.
Arendt, H. (1973). The origins of totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.
ASEAN. (2008). The ASEAN Charter. Retrieved from http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-
Charter.pdf
ASEAN. (2012). Fourteenth ASEAN Summit, Thailand, 26 February - 1 March 2009. Retrieved from http://
www.asean.org/news/item/fourteenth-asean-summit-thailand-26-february-1-march-2009
Aung, T. T. (2007). An introduction to citizenship card under Myanmar citizenship law. Modern Cultural
Studies Society, 38(3), 265-290
Azad, A., & Jasmin, F. (2013). Durable solutions to the protracted refugee situation: The case of
Rohingyas in Bangladesh. Journal of Indian Research, 1(4), 25-35.
Bahar, A. (2010). Burma’s missing dots: The emerging face of genocide. Bloomington: Xlibris
Corporation.
Blitz, B. K., & Lynch, M. (2011). Statelessness and citizenship: A comparative study on the benefits of
nationality. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Buchanan, F., & Charney, M. W. (2003). A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in
the Burma Empire. School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin of Burma Research, 1(1),
40-57.
Cheung, S. (2011). Migration control and the solutions impasse in South and South East Asia:
Implications from the Rohingya experience. Journal of Refugee Studies, 25(1), 50-70.
Ganjanakhundee, S. (2013, August 2014). No takers yet for the Rohingya. The Nation. Retrieved from
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/No-takers-yet-for-the-Rohingya-30212551.html
Gibney, M. (2013). Establishing a social and international order for the realization of human rights. In L.
Minkler (Ed.), The state of economic and social human rights: A global overview (pp. 251-270).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Holliday, I. (2010). Ethnicity and democratization in Myanmar. Asian Journal of Political Science, 18(2),
111-128.
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. (2014). Burma Resolution in Security Council,
vetoed by Russia and China: Implications for RtoP. Retrieved from
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/128-the-crisis-in-burma/793-burma-
resolution-in-security-council-vetoed-by-russia-and-china-implications-for-r2p
International Crisis Group. (2013). The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar
(Asia Report No. 251). Retrieved from International Crisis Group: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
regions/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/251-the-dark-side-of-transition-violence-against-
muslims-in-myanmar.aspx
Jilani, A. F. K. (2001). A cultural history of Rohingya. Dhaka: Ahmed Jilani.
Jilani, A. F. K. (2002). Human rights violations in Arakan. Chittagong: The Taj Library.
Karim, A. (2000). The Rohingyas: A short account of their history and culture. Chittagong: Arakan
Historical Society.
Kipgen, N. (2013). Conflict in Rakhine state in Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims’ conundrum. Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, 33(2), 298-310.
Lay, K. M. (2009). Burma fuels the Rohingya tragedy. Far Eastern Economic Review, 172(2), 57-59.
Myanmar President Office. (2013). Immigration & Population Ministry clarifies over “the government is
planning to amend the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Law” covered by the Daily Eleven Newspaper.
Retrieved from http://m.president-office.gov.mm/en/?q=issues/civil-right/id-2228
Oberoi, P. A. (2006). Exile and belonging: Refugees and state policy in South Asia. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Parnini, S. N. (2013). The crisis of the Rohingya as a Muslim minority in Myanmar and bilateral relations
with Bangladesh. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 33(2), 281-297.
Parnini, S. N., Othman, S. H., & Ghazali, A. S. (2013). The Rohingya refugee crisis and Bangladesh-
Myanmar relations. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 22(1), 133-146.
14 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

16. Redclift, V. (2013). Statelessness and citizenship: Camps and the creation of political space. Oxon:
Routledge.
Rohingya Blogger. (2013). US envoy says Myanmar failed to protect him in attack [Web log message].
Retrieved from http://www.rohingyablogger.com/2013/08/un-envoy-says-myanmar-failed-to-
protect.html
Rohingya Blogger. (2014). Quintana plans visit in midst of anti-UN protests [Web log message]. Retrieved
from http://www.rohingyablogger.com/2014/02/quintana-plans-arakan-visit-in-midst-of.html
Staples, K. (2012). Retheorising statelessness: A background theory of membership in world politics.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Than, T. M. M., Thuzar, M. (2012). Myanmar’s Rohingya dilemma. Institute of South East Asian Studies –
perspective, 1. Retrieved from http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS
%20Perspective_1_9jul121.pdf
The Sentinel Project for Genocide Prevention. (2013). Burma risk assessment (September 2013).
Retrieved from http://www.thesentinelproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Risk-
Assessment-Burma-September-2013.pdf
Tinker, H. (1967). The Union of Burma: A study of the first years of independence. London: Oxford
University Press.
Ullah, A. A. (2011). Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh: Historical exclusions and contemporary
marginalization. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 9, 139-161.
United Nations. (2007). Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 60th Anniversary Special Edition,
1948-2008. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. Retrieved from
EBSCOhost database.
United Nations. (2010). Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. Retrieved from United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729.html
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2013, December 7). Call to put Rohingya in refugee
camps. Refugees Daily. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?
pass=463ef21123&date=2012-07-13&cat=Asia/Pacific
United Nations Security Council. (2007). Security Council fails to adopt draft resolution on Myanmar,
owing to negative votes by China, Russia Federation. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2007/sc8939.doc.htm
United Nations Treaty Collection. (2014a). Chapter V: Refugees and stateless persons. Retrieved from
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?
&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en
van Waas, L. (2008). Nationality matters: Statelessness under international law. Antwerp: Intersentia.
Weissbrodt, D. (2008). The human rights of non-citizens. New York: Oxford University Press.
Working People’s Daily. (1982, October 16). Burma citizenship law. Working People’s Daily. Retrieved
from http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Citizenship%20Law.htm
Yegar, M. (1972). The Muslims of Burma: A study of a minority group. Germany: Otto Harrasowitz,
Wiesbaden.
15

17. “Africa Rising”: A Hopeless Falsity or a Hopeful Reality?
By: Hannah Hong
Abstract - According to The Economist and mainstream literature, two opposing narratives of Africa exist
in relation to its development: the long-standing view of Africa as “The Hopeless Continent” and the
recent emergence of an “Africa Rising,” as presented by The Economist covers in 2000 and 2011.This
paper argues that both dominant narratives are “single stories” that work to conceal problematic
inequalities and injustices that are increasing at the expense of growing economies (Adichie, 2009, para.
10) An analytical case study of Rwanda and its acclaimed post-genocide success is presented to
discuss the significant issues of inequality, poverty, and power in African countries that are often
obscured by the rhetoric of thriving development and the idea that Africa is rising.
Résumé - Selon The Economist et la littérature dominante, deux récits opposés de l’Afrique existent en
ce qui concerne son développement : la vision de longue date de l’Afrique en tant que « le continent
désespéré » et l’émergence récente d’une « Afrique montante », comme le présentent les couvertures de
The Economist en 2000 et 2011. Ce papier soutient que tous les deux récits sont des «histoires uniques »
qui cherche à cacher des inégalités problématiques and des injustices qui augmentent aux détriment des
économies croissantes (Adichie, 2009, para. 10). Une étude analytique de cas du Rwanda et son succès
acclamé post-génocide est présenté pour discuter les enjeux importants de l’inégalité, la pauvreté et la
puissance dans les pays africains, ceux qui sont souvent obscurcis par la rhétorique du développement
florissant et l’idée que l’Afrique est en train de monter.
In 2000, The Economist cover presented Africa as “The Hopeless Continent.” In 2011, the same
journal cover presented the continent as “Africa Rising.” These opposing representations indicate the
occurrence of a recent transformation of the image of Africa into one of a burgeoning victory with its
increasing integration into the global political-economic sphere. Africa is certainly no longer regarded as
hopeless. Nevertheless, today’s simplified vision of “Africa Rising” is a clear example of what
Chimamanda Adichie (2009) describes as a “single story” (para. 10). According to Adichie (2009), a
“single story” is one that becomes the definitive story for a certain place or group of people and leads to
critical misunderstandings and misconceptions. The rhetoric of “Africa Rising” presents an inaccurate
“single story” of Africa that highlights certain realities of recent success and simultaneously obscures
problematic realities that persist. It is necessary to examine the notion of hope as well; although
problematic realities should be addressed, a lack of response does not necessarily negate hope that
exists for the future. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, hope will be regarded as positive
expectations and aspirations for the future, specifically for the people living in the countries of Africa.
This paper will argue that Africa in the 21st century can be regarded as hopeful if local, national, and
global communities look beyond the “single story” paradigm in order to address deep-rooted problems
within the contemporary development framework. This paper will also discuss recent problems regarding
poverty and power in the general context of Africa and in the specific case of the country of Rwanda.
For centuries, the continent of Africa has been dominated by an ongoing narrative and image of
poverty, conflict, primitivism, and dependency. The overused term, “Africa,” itself as a referent for any
individual African country suggests a sense of uniformity of this “hopeless” condition across all of its
historically, politically, ethnically, and culturally diverse countries. In Mazrui’s (2005) discussion of the
various “inventions” of Africa throughout history, he identifies Europe’s “Africanization” of the continent
as the most dominant and persistent invention. Europeans drew from the Orientalist understanding of
“the Other,” who is characterized as “exotic, intellectually retarded, emotionally sensual, governmentally
despotic, culturally passive, and politically penetrable,” in order to define the people and continent of
Africa as a whole and assert Western power, and superiority over them (p. 69). Adichie (2009) argues that
the danger of a “single story” is created through the repetition of one story until it dominates as the only
16 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

18. story. Moreover, she argues that “single stories” ultimately stem from the issue of power: “Start the story
with the failure of the African state, and not with the colonial creation of the African state, and you have
an entirely different story” (Adichie, 2009, para. 19). The “single story” of Africa has led to narrow
stereotypes that reduce the diversity and complexity of the continent to particular histories and realities,
obscuring the rest in its entirety.
Smith (2003) identifies two recurring single stories of Africa today: Afro-pessimism and Afro-
optimism (p. 9). These two narratives are evident in the juxtaposition of the contrasting covers of The
Economist. Afro-pessimism is characterized by the long-standing view of Africa as a hopeless continent.
Afro-optimism is present in the recent rhetoric of “Africa Rising,” which emphasizes the emergence of
democracies, social movements, civil societies, new development initiatives, and various countries’
integration into the global economic sphere (Smith, 2003, p. 21). Despite its refreshing positive outlook
on Africa, the notion of “Africa Rising” is an equally dangerous “single story” of the continent that
obscures several problematic realities that continue to persist. Africa’s economic growth in this era of
globalization is certainly a positive occurrence that must be acknowledged. Statistics showed that seven
of the ten fastest growing economies between 2011 and 2015 would most likely be African countries
(Chimhanzi, 2012, p. 503). Other advances include increased foreign investment, growing access to
technology, growing urbanization, new oil and gas resources, and higher education rates (Slattery, 2013,
p. 88).
It is important to note that much of Africa’s progress has been fueled by neo-liberal agendas and
policies. Neo-liberalism is an economic and political ideology in which market capitalism is hailed as the
most effective way to achieve modernization, development, and prosperity for all. Its three major tenets
are privatization, free markets, and deregulation. (Harrison, 2005, p. 1305). Despite today’s deepening
inequality in the world, the neo-liberal ideology claims that everyone will benefit from market expansion
due to the “trickle-down” effect (M. Levin, personal communication, January 23, 2014). Moreover,
Harrison (2005) characterizes neo-liberalism, not only as an agenda to expand the market and remove
the government from the economy, but also a project to shape the economy, state, and society (p. 1306).
In the vast majority of the African continent, The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have
played a key role in this process by imposing neo-liberal agendas through lending conditionalities for aid
recipient countries, funding packages, and policy development and procedures since the 1980s
(Harrison, 2005, p. 1309-1311). The recent notion of “Africa Rising” and neo-liberalism as compulsory
counterparts presents the contemporary “single story” of Africa. In order to have legitimate hope for
Africa’s future, it is necessary to examine this single story and ask: who holds the power to maintain this
narrative? Who are the winners and losers? Where is it being reproduced and why? Which stories are
being obscured? The answers to these questions are different for every individual country with its
specific context and history. The following analysis investigates these questions in a broader scope with
regard to the continent’s recent economic growth.
While neo-liberalism has been extolled as the driver of Africa’s increasing economic and
developmental prosperity, the idea of “Africa Rising” obscures other realities that also exist alongside
the growth of market capitalism. Despite its increasing integration into the global market, sub-Saharan
Africa remains in an uneven balance of trade relations that are heavily dependent on other countries and
a few commodities. Moreover, countries with rising economies, such as South Africa, make up some of
the most unequal societies in the world according to data from the Gini coefficient, a measure of
inequality based on GDP and distribution (M. Levin, oral presentation, January 30, 2014). The
international community and the United Nations (UN) recognized these inequalities and the progress that
has yet to be made; in 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were created to establish
focused targets for development and poverty alleviation to be achieved by 2015. Despite the enormous
progress reported by the UN, the language of the MDGs, which focuses on poverty in terms of
percentage of population, fails to acknowledge the continued growth of poverty in actual numbers, as
well as the uneven distribution of this progress across socio-economic classes. Brikci and Holder (2010)
analyze the progress of MDG4, which aims to reduce the under-five mortality rate by two-thirds by 2015;
they argue that the MDGs have failed to consider equity issues and specify which groups would be
17

19. benefiting from these efforts. In other words, the MDGs could be achieved by benefiting the wealthy and
further marginalizing the poor, and national governments have been praised for their progress in
development regardless of such inequalities (Brikci & Holder, 2010, p. 75). Brikci and Holder’s (2010)
study reports that sub-Saharan Africa accounted for the highest levels of under-five mortality in 2007,
indicating the globally uneven distribution of the benefits of MDG4 (p. 80). These realities have been
obscured by the emergence of the single story of “Africa Rising.”
Rwanda is one country that has been acclaimed as a success story in economic and
developmental growth since the Rwandan genocide of 1994. It is one of the countries that have made
the greatest progress in lowering mortality rates since the formation of the MDGs in 1990 (Brikci &
Holder, 2010, p. 83-84). The World Bank and IMF have praised Rwanda for its thriving economy and
significant advancements in technology and development, in accordance with the MDGs (Ansoms &
Rostagno, 2012, p. 428). Rwanda is a valuable country for analysis for three reasons: first, Rwanda
exemplifies the “single story” of “Africa Rising” in its own narrative of ascendancy and success in the
post-genocide era. Second, the nature of its growth and development has been executed in accordance
with the neo-liberal agendas of the World Bank and IMF, as well as the MDGs. Third, a closer
investigation of the consequences of these actions and current realities reveals a range of stories and
perspectives that have been concealed by Rwanda’s mainstream success story narrative. Thus, the
following analysis of this country will substantiate the argument that Africa’s hope lies within its potential
to delve into an analytic framework that questions the dominant “single stories” of Africa and seeks to
reveal the uncomfortable truths that have been overlooked. It is essential to acknowledge that the very
discussion and analysis of Africa as a whole perpetuates the “single story” of Africa, regardless of the
perspective: every country has an individualized and unique case regarding its social and economic
issues. While maintaining this awareness, this paper attempts to examine certain patterns of events over
the recent years, using evidence from specific countries, in order to challenge the uncritical,
homogenized single story of Africa.
Rwanda’s “single story” of success appears to be genuine and hopeful in many ways. Indeed,
Rwanda has accomplished great successes in rebuilding its economy, infrastructure, and society after
the tragedies of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. In the two decades following the genocide, the Rwandan
government has established and worked towards specific developmental goals, outlined in Rwanda’s
Vision 2020 document and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (Government of Rwanda,
2009). According to the Government of Rwanda (2009), the aim of Vision 2020 is to “transform Rwanda
into a middle-income country by the year 2020” (as cited in Ansoms & Rostagno, 2012, p. 430). In
macroeconomic terms, Rwanda is well on its way to achieving this goal. The IMF (2011) reports that the
country has reached an average annual economic growth rate of eight percent, which is in line with the
goals of Vision 2020 (as cited in Ansoms & Rostagno, 2012, p. 428). The UN Development Programme
(2007) has also declared Rwanda an exemplary country that is likely to reach the MDGs and “showcase
the potential of the new Post-Millennium Declaration” (as cited in Ansoms & Rostagno, 2012, p. 428).
With regard to the PRSPs, poverty in Rwanda has decreased by 12 percent between 2005/6 to 2010/11
(p. 428). The country has also made significant strides in internet and mobile phone technology, which
has aided further development and poverty-reducing strategies. For example, the e-Soko project,
designed by the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture in 2011, provides market price information to rural
farmers and farming cooperatives via mobile phones, which gives them immediate access to determine
better prices at which to sell their goods (Vrakas, 2012, p. 84). Such technological developments support
President Paul Kagame’s goal to develop the country’s autonomy and push Rwanda to become a worthy
player in the global economic sphere. The progress Rwanda has made thus far has been met with praise
from the international community. However, these success stories conceal several problems in the
country that persist and worsen. In order to move the country forward in a hopeful direction, it is
necessary to address the realities that this single story excludes. Two major issues have emerged with
Rwanda’s success: institutional land reforms and Kagame’s leadership and government.
The first problem, which has emerged with globalization and Rwanda’s adherence to the neo-
liberal agenda, concerns small-scale agriculture and its conflicts with land reforms. The Rwandan
18 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

20. government has worked towards transforming their primarily subsistence agriculture-based country to a
modern sector service-driven country that is competitive in the global economy. However, small-scale
farmers and peasants have faced radical unforeseen changes and sudden dispossession of their land as
a result of the government’s considerable investments in land reforms (Oxresearch Daily Brief Service,
2010). One practice that has been imposed by the government is monocropping, in which farmers
cultivate only one crop per plot; this crop is designated by local authorities in accordance with market
demands (Ansoms, 2010, p. 106-107). It is important to note that monocropping was also imposed by
Belgian administrators during the colonial era, which demonstrated the power of the elites and resulted
in disastrous agricultural results for the peasant population (Ansoms, 2010, p. 107). Similarly, in
Ansoms’s (2010) interviews, local farmers mentioned the various disadvantages to monocropping, such
as decreased soil fertility with lack of crop rotation, increased vulnerability to disease and weather
fluctuations, and thus, the elimination of farmers’ financial and livelihood insurance (p. 108). Although
land reforms are part of the government’s effort to transform Rwanda into a more modern, developed
society, this top-down approach reveals the ways in which the government ultimately holds and
exercises its power over the people, and, in this case, disregards the exacerbated poverty of rural
farmers.
Swampland reorganization is another government intervention that has taken place for
agricultural reforms; land laws declared all swamplands as state property and the government assumed
the role of swampland developer (Ansoms, 2010, p. 111). In these restoration projects, financial and
agricultural considerations for poorer groups were completely excluded, and thousands of small-scale
peasants were dispossessed without any compensation (Ansoms, 2010, p. 111-113). Ansoms’s (2010)
case studies and interviews clearly show that, despite the implementation of PRSP policies to reduce
poverty, the Rwandan government has failed to consider the real negative consequences of institutional
actions at the local level. The World Bank (2007) reports assume that small-scale agriculture is inefficient
and unviable with the continuing spread of the free market (as cited by Ansoms, 2013, p. 16). The
Rwandan government’s objectives and policies conform to these neo-liberal beliefs; they ultimately
favour local elites and the government and further deepen the poverty of poorer populations. These
problems must be acknowledged and addressed by the government and the people in order for the
country to move forward in a hopeful direction. Ansoms (2013) proposes increased facilitation of
connections between small-scale farmers and intermediary local officials as one possible step to
mitigate the problems of current land reforms.
President Kagame has been another focal point of the country’s single story of success.
Desrosiers and Thomson (2011) argue that public speeches and presentations of benevolent leadership
hold a significant influence over a country’s development:
“They reflect choices made by political leaders as to how to present and position themselves in
relation to the international community, especially neighbors, donors, and allies, and to
Rwandans. As rhetorical artifices, these images and projections rarely accurately mirror reality,
but instead, embellish or disguise it.” (p. 437)
Kagame’s use of a national rhetoric and the vision of a new Rwanda conceals the fact that many of its
policies perpetuate poverty, deprive certain groups of their livelihoods, and ultimately allow for the
government to exercise their power for their own benefit while disregarding disadvantaged populations.
Land reforms serve as one illustration of this problem; another case of this issue is present in Kagame
and the Rwandan government itself. According to a survey of 60 foreign policy experts, Kagame was
voted as Africa’s most effective political leader (Slattery, 2013). However, Desrosiers and Thomson (2011)
and other scholars agree that post-genocide Rwanda is less reflective of a democracy and more
reflective of an authoritarian dictatorship with little regard for human rights and welfare for its large
peasant population (p. 438). In fact, the nation has been under the rule and power of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) since the end of the genocide in July 1994, and Kagame has failed to acknowledge
or bring to justice the crimes that were committed by the RPF before, during, and after the genocide
(Desrosiers & Thomson, 2011, p.447). Moreover, critical and opposing voices have been systematically
19

21. silenced by the RPF government (p. 438). Kagame won the presidential election with 95 percent of the
votes in 2003 and 93 percent in 2010; Human Rights Watch and other sources believe these elections
were skewed by “intimidation, exclusion of the opposition and critical voices, and a climate of
fear” (Naftalin, 2011, p. 23). Nevertheless, Kagame’s government has been able to reign for two decades
by rejecting the country’s colonial, ethnic, and violent past and proposing a new Rwanda, parallel to the
“single story” of “Africa Rising,” which points to a new era of good governance, peace, and development
(Desrosiers & Thomson, 2011, p. 444). The government focused heavily on national unity and
reconciliation during the post-genocide years to move towards ethnic solidarity built upon the Rwandan
identity; Kagame established the pride and identity of Rwandans by insisting that the development of the
country must be carried out by the Rwandans themselves (Desrosiers & Thomson, 2011, p. 445). This
top-down rhetoric of the new Rwanda, national pride, empowerment, and hope unfortunately works to
suppress the stories that exist at the local and individual levels.
Despite Kagame’s presentation of strong leadership that cares deeply about the development of
all the people of Rwanda and the international acclaim Rwanda has received for its progress, the
country’s poverty statistics present a different reality (Ansoms, 2010, p. 99). As previously mentioned,
poverty rates have decreased significantly since the implementation of the PRSP policies; however, in
numbers, poverty increased from 4.8 to 5.4 million people between 2001 and 2006 (Ansoms, 2010, p.
99). In the same years, Rwanda’s Gini coefficient increased from 0.37 to 0.44, indicating that Rwanda’s
successes have been unevenly distributed, deepening inequalities in the population (Ansoms, 2010, p.
99). Kagame’s government significantly contributed to these numbers by imposing development policies
that further marginalize peasant populations. While the UN Development Programme praised Rwanda for
its economic growth, their 2010 report notes that the country is unlikely to achieve the goal to eradicate
extreme poverty by 2015 because its growth is concentrated within Rwanda’s small elite class (Ansoms
& Rostagno, 2012, p. 428).
The same situation is evident in the African continent as a whole. While the World Bank (2005)
claims that many countries in Africa are “turning the corner” with regard to the MDGs, statistics reveal
that sub-Saharan Africa is substantially behind in achieving its targets (as cited in Hayman, 2007, p.
379). The World Bank’s interpretation of economic growth is fundamentally based on neo-liberal
principles, which ignore the issue of equity, as demonstrated by the case study of Rwanda. In West
Africa, Angola is another country that has risen in economic growth and power; however, 43 percent of
its population was undernourished in 2007 (M. Levin, oral presentation, January 30, 2013). Similarly,
Mozambique has also been praised by the World Bank and IMF for its economic progress and its
adherence to the neo-liberal agenda in liberalizing their resource sectors; the country also has
approximately 52 percent of its population living in poverty and a low rank of 184 out of 187 countries on
the UN’s Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index in 2011 (as cited in Silva, 2013, p. 24). Thus,
while varying factors and contexts differentiate each country, an overarching pattern emerges across
many of Africa’s diverse countries.
An examination of Africa as a whole and Rwanda as a specific case study reveals that The
Economist’s cover of “Africa Rising” is indeed a truth that has occurred and is continuing to occur on the
continent. Businesses and economies are booming, growth rates are increasing, and development is
progressing. However, this paper has argued that “Africa Rising” is also a “single story” that obscures
several problematic issues that remain, including those of poverty, power, and inequality. In order to
regard Africa as a hopeful continent, we must acknowledge the power and danger of the “single story”.
Analyses of the economic growth and success stories of Africa and its countries must assume an
analytic framework by asking critical questions: Who is benefiting? How are these processes unfolding?
Where is power located, and how are people’s lives being impacted? The first step involves interrogating
the dominant perspective and uncovering the obscured realities that exist alongside the single story.
From here, we may develop appropriate solutions and strategies to work towards a hopeful future.
20 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

22. REFERENCES
Baranyi, S. & Desrosiers, M. (2012). Development and cooperation in fragile states: Filling or
perpetuating gaps? Conflict, Security & Development, 12(5), p.443-459.
Baranyi, S. & Paducel, A. (2012). Whither development in Canada’s approach to fragile states? In S.
Brown (Ed.), CIDA and Canadian Aid Policy. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
BBC. (2011, February 8). Hamid Karzai says Afghanistan aid teams must go. Retrieved March 21, 2013
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12400045.
Beal, J., Goodfellow, T. & Putzel, J. (2006). Introductory Article: On the Discourse of Terrorism, Security
and Development. Journal of International Development, 18(1), p.51-67.
Bollen, M., Linssen, E. & Rietjens, S. (2006). Are PRTs supposed to compete with terrorists? Small Wars
and Insurgences, 17(4), p.437-448.
Buzan, B., Weaver, O. & de Wilde, J. (1997). Security: A new framework for analysis. Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers Inc.
Coombes, H. (2012). Canadian whole of government operations, Kandahar, September 2010-July 2011.
The Conference of Defense Associations Institute: Ottawa.
Davidson, J. (2009). Principles of modern American counterinsurgency: Evolution and debate. The
Brookings Institution: Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series. Retrieved February 26, 2013
from http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/counterinsurgency-and-pakistan-
paper-series.
DFATD. (2013). Baird reaction to John Kerry statement on Syria. Retrieved August 31, 2013 from http://
www.international.gc.ca/media/aff/news-communiques/2013/08/30a.aspx.
Duffield, M. (2001). Introduction. In Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development
and security (p.1-21). New York: Zed Books.
Fukuyama, F. (2004). The Imperative of State-Building. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), p.17-31.
Government of Canada. (2012). Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan: Fourteenth and final report to
parliament. Forward. Retrieved March 21, 2013 from http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca/canada-
afghanistan/documents/r06_12/for-ava.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.
Holland, K. (2010). The Canadian provincial reconstruction team: The arm of development in Kandahar
province. American Review of Canadian Studies, 40(2), p.276-291.
IRIN. (2011, April 13). Afghanistan: Volatile Kandahar - the polio capital. Retrieved March 21, 2013 from
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/92454/AFGHANISTAN-Volatile-Kandahar-the-polio-capital.
Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press.
Kells, B. (2011). Aid effectiveness in Afghanistan: The Canadian provincial reconstruction team.
Unpublished paper. University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON.
NATO. (n.d.). About ISAF: Troop numbers and contributions. Retrieved February 26, 2013 from http://
www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php.
NATO. (2003). NATO civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) doctrine. Retrieved March 20, 2013 from http://
www.nato.int/ims/docu/ajp-9.pdf.
OECD. (2005). The Paris declaration for aid effectiveness. Retrieved February 26, 2013 from http://
www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf.
OECD. (2007). Principles for good international engagement in fragile states & situations. Retrieved
March 21, 2013 from http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/38368714.pdf.
OECD. (2010). Monitoring the principles for good international engagement in fragile states and
situations: Country report 1: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Retrieved March 21, 2013 from
http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/44654918.pdf.
OXFAM. (2010). Quick impact, quick collapse: The dangers of militarized aid in Afghanistan. Retrieved
March 20, 2013 from http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/quick-impact-quick-collapse.
Perito, R., Abbaszadeh, N., Crow, M., El-Khoury, M., Gandomi, J., Kuwayama, D., . . . Weiss, T. (2008).
Provincial reconstruction teams: Lessons and recommendations. Retrieved February 25, 2013
from http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf.
Rid, T. & Keaney, T. (2010). Understanding counterinsurgency: Doctrine, operations, and challenges. New
York: Routledge.
21

23. Shannon, R. (2009). Playing with the principles in an era of securitizing aid: Negotiating humanitarian
space in post-9/11 Afghanistan. Progress in Development Studies, 9(1), p.15-36.
The Fund for Peace. (2013). Failed states index: 2013. Retrieved August 3, 2013 from http://
ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable.
US Marine Corps. (2006). FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Retrieved February 26, 2013 from http://
www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.
Valentino, B., Huth, P., & Balch-Lindsay, D. (2004). “Draining the sea”: Mass killing and guerilla warfare.
International Organization, 58(2), p.375-407.
Walther, H. (2007). The German concept for provincial reconstruction teams. Retrieved March 21, 2013
from http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/doctrine/doctrine13/version_us/etranger/
art8.pdf.
Waltz, K. (1988). The origins of war in neorealist theory. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18(4), p.
615-628.
22 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

24. Practically a Community: Dynamics of a Small City’s Immigrant
Community
By: Ayesha Barmania
Abstract - Based on completed original field research, this essay argues that immigrant communities in
small cities and towns in Canada are markedly different from the interactions of immigrants in urban
areas. Rather than immigrants of homogenous ethnic backgrounds grouping together, in Peterborough,
the small immigrant community renders this practice futile. Instead, supportive communities of
immigrants from highly varied backgrounds bond together using the local immigrant support organization
as a focal point. This community follows the same patterns as a “community of practice” theorized by
Wenger (2012).
Résumé - Basé sur des recherches originaux complétés sur le terrain, cet essai soutient que les
communautés des immigrants dans les petites villes au Canada sont manifestement différents que les
interactions des immigrants dans les régions urbaines. Les immigrants des milieux ethniques homogènes
ne se groupent pas ensemble à Peterborough, parce que sa petite communauté des immigrants rend
cette pratique futile. Plutôt, les communautés des immigrants se soutiennent et se joignent, utilisant
l’organisation locale de soutien aux immigrants comme un point de convergence. Cette communauté est
sur le même modèle d’une « communauté de pratique » théorisée par Wenger (2012).
METHODOLOGY AND BIASES
Peterborough is a small city of Southeastern Ontario nestled between Toronto and Ottawa in the
picturesque Kawarthas region. Similar to numerous other Ontario cities, Peterborough is struggling to
redefine its role in a globalized economy, as its history of industrial manufacturing is coming to a close,
yet the future focus of Peterborough’s development sector remains tenuous. Accompanying this identity
crisis are the same troubles many other cities are presently facing: high unemployment rates, a stagnant
economy and a lack of vision in municipal government. Despite these uncertain prospects, however, the
region still sports positive rates of immigration (Community Foundation of Greater Peterborough, 2014)1.
Upon arrival, newcomers are faced with a discrepancy between their needs and available opportunities
in the region. Multiple organizations have emerged in this area to assist migrants directly, as well as to
provide a catalyst for the development of an immigrant community. Due to the population size of
Peterborough, as well as the relative proportion of immigrants, the community is not predicated on
ethnic homogeneity, as is found in many larger Canadian cities (Ashutosh 2012, 2013). Rather, this
community is diverse in its ethnic composition; the defining characteristic that draws members together
is the shared struggle of integration.
This paper is the product of a community project for a local non-governmental organization
(NGO), the New Canadians Centre (NCC). This project aimed to document the stories of immigrants,
create positive coverage of migrant community members and investigate the motivations of and
challenges for Peterborough’s immigrant population. The participant sample used in this project, while
small, contributed to the author’s formulation of three preliminary insights into how immigrant
communities are formed in small cities. Firstly, there is a community of immigrants in Peterborough
comprised of immigrants from many different ethnicities that is organized around the NCC. Secondly,
23
1 The Community Foundation of Greater Peterborough (CFGP) reports that between 2006-2011, if
Greater Peterborough were comprised of 100 people: 1 person immigrated to the region from abroad, 22
people moved to Peterborough from within Ontario and 2 people moved to Peterborough from other
provinces (Community Foundation of Greater Peterborough, 2014). CFGP further reports that 8.2 percent
of the population are foreign born (Community Foundation of Greater Peterborough, 2014).

25. this community follows the definition of the anthropological theory of a ‘community of practice’ (Wenger,
2012). Thirdly, there is a centre-margin spectrum for involvement in the community, in which those who
are more successful at acquiring the skills for integration are less involved over time.
This paper will commence with an overview of the author’s methodology, as well as a critique of
the author’s research practices to reveal any potential biases in the data. Thereafter, this research will be
situated in the context of migration studies discourse, outlining applicable theories as needed. Lastly,
this paper will argue that Peterborough’s immigrant community resembles a ‘community of practice’.
METHODOLOGY AND BIASES
The mandate for this project was to document a living history of Peterborough’s immigrant
community. This ‘community-based education project’ was completed through a local organization that
connects students of Trent University (the university where the author of this paper presently attends)
with local NGOs. This research project sought predominantly to record stories of the NCC’s participants
for use in an immigrant inclusive public record through podcasts and participant profiles. The
conclusions illustrated in this essay were happenstance, as the author noticed a correlation between this
research and certain anthropological theories discussed in preparation for other courses.
The author conducted qualitative, in-depth interviews with eight participants, gathering
information on their experiences of migration. The interviews were approximately thirty minutes in length,
and covered the following topics: motivations for migration, the participant’s positive and negative
experiences and the participant’s overall assessment of Canada. This process elicited many interesting
responses, providing the author with intimate insight into participants’ lives. Story-sharing is an
important practice among members of the immigrant community, as it can be a mechanism for dealing
with hardships of migration, a tool to learn about other individuals’ coping techniques and assist in
fostering a sense of community. By listening to the participant’s stories, the author was able to observe,
in part, the role storytelling plays in the community, as well as listen to how the practice is enacted.
Two methods were utilized to contact participants. Primarily, the project coordinator connected
the author to individuals that were involved with the NCC who would potentially be interested in
participating in the project. Unexpectedly, however, several participants referred friends and family,
creating a secondary ‘snowball method’ for gathering participants.
It is important to note the clear gender and lifestyle biases that were present in the group of
participants, as seven of the eight participants were women, and all of the participants were parents.
Although the gender bias was unintentional, perhaps it speaks to the mechanisms of networking within
the immigrant community. The preliminary findings discussed in this paper indicate that women are more
involved in the immigrant community, but this conclusion requires further substantiation. This gender
bias, however, elicited several themes, which may have not been otherwise discussed. For instance, five
of the eight participants immigrated by following a male family member and many were reliant on their
partner for their household’s income at certain points of their life. The lifestyle bias that favoured parents
similarly revealed interesting motivations for migration, such as the majority of the participants stated
that they were migrating to seek better prospects for their children, and considered migration as an
investment in their children’s future that would allow the children with a wider range of choices. This
sentiment may not have been so prevalent and recurring if the sample had not been so biased towards
parents.
DISCURSIVE CONTENT
Many theories about the causes of migration mingle in academic disciplines, such as
economics, sociology and anthropology, amongst others. This field is constantly being renegotiated by
prominent theories and new findings. Four of these theories – neoclassical push-pull theories, the new
economics of labour migration, globalization theory and the segmented labour market theory – are
24 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015

26. reviewed below, in addition to the issues of Canadian public discourse and the identity crisis of our
public policy.
Neoclassical Economics
Neoclassical ‘push-pull’ theories of migration assert that migrants are pushed from their homes
by unfavourable economic circumstances and pulled toward localities with favourable conditions
(Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014). These conditions include employment prospects, education
opportunities and other conditions that contribute to a standard of living. With high rates of
unemployment and poverty, however, Peterborough has markedly poor prospects for newcomers,
whether Canadian nationals or foreign born. Thus, while there are certain aspects of the region that draw
migrants, there is often an insufficient supply of opportunities to fulfill the demand. In this regard,
neoclassical theories of migration fail to provide a thorough explanation for migration to the region.
New Economics of Labour Migration Theory
Several participants noted that they decided to emigrate after a period of long deliberation with
family and friends (Amany, 2014) (Shegufa, 2014) (Grace, 2014). The decisions of where and how to
immigrate were collaboratively made as a household. This data falls in line with the principles of the new
economics of labour migration theory, which stipulates that migrants are created from collective
household decision-making and may be instruments for diversifying the risks of a household (Castles, de
Haas, & Miller, 2014). As stated above, most participants followed a male family member to Canada,
which may be a tactic employed to mitigate risks, as the first migrant can then establish himself in the
country before the family follows.
Globalization
The process of globalization is seen in the ‘widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide
interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life’ (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton,
1999). This can be further understood as a proliferation of “trans-local” connections by which two
distinct localities are connected and can stimulate migration (Glick-Schiller, 2012). For Peterborough, the
increased geographic scope for local opportunities draws the qualified and interested from around the
world, whose expectations are met to varying degrees. For migrants, this interconnectedness translates
into increased opportunities for work, education and social participation transnationally.
Segmented Labour Market Theory
Canadian immigration policy and programs focus on filling niches in the labour market for
unskilled labourers or favouring highly skilled candidates that are deemed an asset to society. This focus
draws on the framework laid out in the segmented labour market theory (Castles, de Haas, & Miller,
2014). Under this theory and in Canadian practice, a migrant’s application has merit based on their
potential to be productive in the economy. Immigrants are considered attractive based on their score in a
points system that assesses categories such as age, education and adaptability (Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, 2013). This scoring system intends to attract economically productive individuals
that can play a beneficial role in Canadian society. Once in Canada, the social programs for immigrants
tend to focus on employing immigrants and limiting their reliance on social welfare programs (Banting,
2010). Migrants tend to be characterized in an economic manner during the admission period; however,
once they are in Canada, social concerns dominate the discussion. Both the integration of immigrants
into society, as well as the broader focus of the benefits of a multicultural Canada are examined.
Banting and Ryan both suggest that Canadians tend to support immigrants and the idea of a
multicultural society, so long as they are mostly integrated into Canadian society (2010; 2010). Thus
while Canadians support the ingress of migrants of many different backgrounds, there is a push for
these migrants to blend with Canadians. Migrant applicants are considered vastly different than migrants
25

27. once they have landed, however, with rhetoric of economic productivity dominating the discussion of the
former. In the translation from economic to social agents, there is a changing of services and discourse
to address the individual wellbeing of newcomers. Organizations such as the NCC are created to
mitigate the results of the apparent conceptual discrepancy. Families who join migrants admitted for
their economic productivity may find themselves at a loss for meaningful engagement. For instance, in
this project, half of the participants were employed, while the other half were dependent on a wage
earner. It is not surprising that those participants without day-time obligations were more actively
engaged with community building at the NCC than others. The Canadian policy on migration begins as a
purely economic rational effort, but due to on-the-ground social ramifications, practices veer from these
purely economic rational principles. Once landed, these organizations can help migrants find their role in
society through communities of practice.
A COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE
‘Communities of practice’ are a theoretical device, coined by Wenger & Lave (1991), which
imagine that certain communities are formed by “…groups of people who share a concern or a passion
for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly” (Wenger, 2012, p. 1).
Primarily, communities of practice are functional institutions that address a need in a community,
whether deliberate or circumstantial, to benefit the corporate members. These devices are comprised of
three things: 1) the domain, 2) the community and 3) the practice (Wenger, 2012). The author believes
that a fourth characteristic could be added, which is a centre-margin spectrum for engagement in the
immigrant community. These three components will now be elaborated on, and related to the data
collected during the Peterborough project.
(1) The domain refers to the topic of interest, which is the basis of the formation of the
community identity. In addition to implying interest, however, it is also a commitment to the subject
matter. In the case of the Peterborough immigrants, the domain is the integration into Canadian culture.
It serves as a common link between immigrants, and moreover, it is an important process that persists
throughout lifetimes — to greater or lesser degrees for individuals, depending on their circumstances.
Similar struggles create a stage for members to relate to one another and share wisdom through stories.
As one participant described to the author,
Sometimes I could stay at home for over two weeks and not even step out of the apartment.
When you go to the NCC you meet so many immigrants it's easy for all the other immigrants to
get together and talk because we all are immigrants, we all have something in common. (Mary,
2014)
Commonality makes it easier for people, such as Mary, to relate to fellow migrants, when she may have
otherwise felt excluded from mainstream Canadian society.
(2) The community refers to the interactions of members, who often learn collaboratively from
each other. In Peterborough, the community comes together at the NCC, through participating in
activities such as discussion groups, ESL classes and community events. The author had the privilege
of listening at a discussion group where the uniting idea was the struggles of integration into
Peterborough life. Many stories were shared and community leaders facilitated discussion from all. The
atmosphere was inclusive and compassionate. The NCC offers many events and programs that bring
together members of the immigrant population in the region; as such they become the focal point for
community formation.
During the author’s interviews, many of the participants spoke of their difficulties learning English
as a second language. Yet, because they were learning in an environment where everyone else had
experienced it as well, there was a feeling of acceptance and tolerance for mistakes. In these spaces,
participants are able to learn the hard skills of language acquisition and the soft skills of communication
and confidence.
26 Undercurrent Journal Volume XI, Issue I: Fall/Winter 2015