The Pen is Mightier than the Sword MA Dissertation Final

MA WAR STUDIES
“The Pen is Mightier than the Sword”.
In the ‘InformationAge’, why doesCivil Resistance Appear to be a more Attractive Strategic Option
than Violence to Networked Social Movements?
Nicolas James Carr
Supervisor: Dr. David Betz
Submission: 15 December 2014
Word Count: 14893

This dissertation is the sole work of the author, and has not been
accepted in any previous application for a degree; all quotations and
sources of information have been acknowledged.
I confirm that my research did not require ethical
approval.
Signed: Nicolas James Carr
Date: 15 December 2014

Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................. 4
Literature Review. ........................................................................................................................ 6
Vanguardism.............................................................................................................................. 16
Regime Type............................................................................................................................... 26
International Factors................................................................................................................... 37
Conclusion. ................................................................................................................................ 49
Bibliography............................................................................................................................... 53

4
Introduction.
The dawn of the ‘informationage’hasseenwavesof political tumultsweepacrossthe globe.
Orchestrated by networked social movements, these revolutions are distinct in that they are
characterised by their use of non-violent resistance methods, specifically civil resistance. These
movements have beenchallenginggovernmentsanddemandingpolitical change withtacticssuchas
strikes, go-slows, boycotts, occupations and demonstrations. Good examples would be the colour
revolutions in Eastern Europe such as in Ukraine in 2004, the Arab Spring with the Egyptian and
Tunisian Revolutions in 2011 and finally the Occupy Movement protests. There appears to be an
increasing number of networked social movements that are adopting non-violent civil resistance
tactics where previouslywe wouldhave expectedthemtoadopt violentaction.However,compared
with the literature on violent action, comparatively little academic focus has been placed on non-
violent action. This knowledge gap needs to be rectified, given the dawn of the ‘information age’
where non-violent actionand in particular civil resistance appears to be an increasinglypopular and
powerful methodofchallengingthe state.The questioniswhy,inthe‘informationage’,civilresistance
appearstobe amore attractive strategicoptionthanviolence tonetworkedsocial movements?These
movements are not adopting non-violent civil resistance because theyhave a principled aversionto
violence;theyare adoptingitbecause it makesmore strategic sense todo so. There must be factors
whichare influencingthisdecisionmakingprocess.Thispaperseeks toanalyse some of these factors
byanalysingthree themeswhich,havingexaminedthepre-existingliterature,appeartobe influential.
These themes are vanguardism, regime type and international factors.
Thispaperwill be thematicinitsapproachand we shouldacknowledge the limitationsof this
method.Thematicapproachesallowsflexibilityinallowingforawide dataset,identifyingpatternsor
themes within a data set and allowing wide ranging conclusions to be drawn. However, thematic

5
treatment does have weaknesses and care must be taken whengeneralising about any findingsdue
to the unique contextsandhistoriesof eachexample selected.Thematicapproachescansometimes
overlookthe nuancesof anyparticularexample andcouldlimitthe reliabilityof anyresultsgarnered.
Because thematicapproachesallowawiderange of datatobe examineditisimportantnottocherry-
pick cases that service the hypothesis and as a result it is critical to note the limits of the hypothesis
when analysing examples.Failure to do so, may lead to misleading conclusions.Having taken the
above limitations into account, the overall structure of this paper will consist of five chapters.
Followingthe introductorychapter, the relevantacademicliterature willbe examinedtoestablishthe
conceptual framework. Certain theories attempt to explain social movements behaviour in the
’information age’ and it is imperative that we understand them to place the three case studies
examined within the appropriate theoretical context. This chapter, will therefore, demonstrate the
gapsin the literature,definekeytermsandestablishthe keythemeswhichwillbe usedtoanswerthe
research question. The following three chapters will consist of an analysis of the three themes
established in the literature review. Finally, there will be a concluding chapter, which will include a
summary and critique of the paper’s findings and finally areas for future research.

6
Literature Review.
Before examining the key literature surrounding civil resistance it is advantageous to
understandthe literaturethatprovidesthe broadtheoretical frameworkforthisthesis.Thisconcerns
the ‘information age’. Drucker, spoke of knowledge workers.1
Touraine, wrote of a programmed
society.2
The originsof the ‘informationage’beginwiththeworkof Bell,who states, “apost-industrial
societyrestson a knowledge theoryof value.Knowledge isthe source of inventionandinnovation”.3
The fundamental focus is on how societies were becoming increasingly orientated around
information, hence the ‘information age’. Manuel Castells, who contends that networks have
transformed human societies, has developed these ideas into the concept of a networked society,
which is “a social structure based on networks operated by information and communication
technology based in microelectronics and digital computer networks that generate, process, and
distribute informationonthe basisof the knowledge accumulatedinthe nodesof the networks”.4
As
Mackinlay explains, the use of digital networks has compressedthe space and time between nodes
(and therefore individuals) to almost zero.5
This allowsfor instantaneousmass communication.Due
to this change, individualsand,importantly,social movementsnow exercise counterpowerwhichis
the capacity of social actors to challenge power for the purpose of claiming representationfor their
own values and interests.6
Therefore, individuals and groups now have significant autonomy and
powerto orienttheirownbehaviourand the abilitytoself-organise.Because of the networksociety,
social movements defined as a “collective challenge to elites, authorities,other groups or cultural
1
Drucker,(1968) 264
2
Touraine,(1971) 3
3
Bell,(1973) xvii
4
CastellsandCardoso,(2005) 7
5
Mackinlay,(2009) 137
6
Castells(2012) 5

7
codes by some significant number of people with common purposes and solidarity”,7
have been
transformed into networked social movements. Gerlach, explains how now these networked social
movements are segmented with many flexible groups, polycentric with shifting leaderships and
networked in that they have multiple linkages and overlapping memberships.8
Moreover, their
behaviour has been transformed. The space of autonomy allows networked social movements to
organise, mobilise and coordinate campaigns and thus challenge the state.9
Most importantly, it
allows them to occupy cyberspace, whilst simultaneously occupying physical locations.10
They can
therefore exist both offline and online simultaneously. This new operational environment does not
totallydiscardoldermethodsof behaviour butoffersnew toolsthatnetworkedsocial movementscan
use to organise their campaignsbe they violent or non-violent.However, much focus has previously
been on violent insurgency campaigns.
Metz definesinsurgencyas“anorganizedmovementaimedatthe overthrow of aconstituted
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”.11
Insurgency has developed into
networkedinsurgency.Thisis formofinsurgencyis bestexplainedbyMackinlaywhoshowsthatwhilst
older forms of insurgency had a top down hierarchical structure, networked insurgencies have little
defined leadership and are instead held together by horizontallyordered networks.12
All forms of
insurgency employ violence to achieve their strategic objectives. With the change to networked
insurgency,the propagandaof the deedhasbecome the foremostformof thisviolence.Boltdefines
this as “a terrorist act of political violence aimed at creating a media event capable of energising
populations to bring about state revolution or social transformation”.13
What can be observed is
7
Tarrow, (1994) 3-4
8
Gerlach (2001) 289-290
9
Castells,(2012) 222
10
Ibid.,222
11
Metz, (2007) 5
12
Mackinlay,(2009) 224
13
Bolt,(2012) xvii-xviii

8
popular mobilisation using violence, with the battle for the narrative. Moreover, Bolt shows that,
insurgency is a form of revolution that uses violence to achieve objectives. Violence, and revolution
have long been considered to be linked concepts. Indeed, much work on revolution stipulates that
revolution must involve the use of or threat of force.14
Mao saw violence as inherent to insurgency
withthree stages,witheachemployingdifferenttypesandeverincreasinglevelsof violence,ranging
fromterrorismtoguerrillawarfare andfinallyutilisingcombinedarms.15
So,whilstgainingthesupport
of the population first was crucial for Mao, without violence he could not ultimately gain power.
Revolution and violence are seemingly inseparable and consequently civil resistance has been
overlookedasaform of collective actionbywhichpowercanbe created.Is there then,anyscope for
a revolution to be non-violent in nature and use non-violence to create power? By examining the
relationship between power and violence, we can observe that there is.
It is worth understandingthat there are many typesof violence,personal,interpersonal and
collective. This paper is interested in the collective violence of large groups of people, specifically
networkedsocial movements. However,afurthercomplicationisthatviolenceisaheavilysubjective
conceptand containsvariousdefinitions,some expansive andothersnarrower.Thispapertherefore
needsadefinitionof whatcollectiveviolence actuallyentails.Galtung’sbroaddefinitionseesviolence
as “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally life”.16
Contrastingly, Keane argues
that violence should be “the more or less intended, direct but unwanted physical interference by
groups and or individualswiththe bodiesof others,whoare consequentlymade tosuffera seriesof
effects ranging from shock…to death”.17
Too broad a definition of violence in which anything could
potentially be considered violent would not allow us to distinguish between social movementsthat
14
Tompkins,(2012) xvii
15
O’Neill (2005) 50
16
Galtung,(1990) 292
17
Keane,(2004) 35

9
employ violence and those that choose non-violence.Adopting too narrow a definition could mean
that actions such as vandalism and looting could be seen as non-violent simply because there is no
intended threat to a human being. Taking this into account, this paper defines violence as the
intentional use of physical force,designed to cause deliberate harm or damage to either individuals
or property by a group in the pursuit of their stated objectives.
The relationshipbetweenpowerandviolence hasbeenwidelyinvestigatedwithmuchof the
discourse seeingpowerandviolenceaslinked.Thisschool of thoughtidentifieswithMax Weberwho
arguedthat“poweristhe probabilitythatone actorwithinasocial relationshipwill be inapositionto
carry out hisown will despite resistance,regardlessof the basisonwhich thisprobabilityrests”.18
As
Goelher points out, this can be achieved through the use of violence.19
Less studied has been the
normative conceptof powerusuallyassociatedwithHannahArendt.Arendtargues“powerspringsup
when people get together and act in concert”.20
Therefore, Arendt adds that “violence can always
destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command,resulting in the most
instantandperfectobedience.Whatcannevergrow outof it ispower”.21
Goelher,arguesthatpower
cannot be reduced to one basic concept, but each approach must be seen as coexisting in
complementary relationship to each other because power is both empirical (power over) in the
Weberain sense and normative (power to) in the Arendtian, one potentially violent,the other not.22
The crucial pointisthat powermustbe seenasmulti-facetedinnature and,therefore,the creation of
power does not necessarily have to involve violence. It is clear, as Arendt has argued, wars and
revolutions are not totally defined by violence,23
and social movements can employ non-violent
18
Weber(1978) 53
19
Goelher,(2000) 41
20
Arendt,(1972) 151
21
Ibid.,152
22
Goelher,(2000) 42-43
23
Arendt,(1963) 9

10
methodsinthe pursuitof theirgoals. This issupportedbyClausewitzwhostatesthatstrategyis“the
use of engagements for the object of war”.24
The focus has usually been on the violent aspects of
Clausewitz’s approach, particularly his emphasis that the “direct annihilation of the enemy’s forces
must always be the dominant consideration”.25
However, as Burrowes has noted this is qualified by
Clausewitzarguingthatthatan opponent’sforcesmustbe putintoa conditionwhere theynolonger
continue tofight,whichinterestinglycanbe inducedbymanyforms,andthusthe political objectcan
be potentiallybe achieved without using armed force.26
Revolutionstherefore, from a theoretical
standpoint do not have to be violent to create power and we can adopt Goodwin’s definition that
revolutionsare “irregularextra-constitutional andsometimesviolentchangesof political regimeand
control of state power brought about by popular movements”.27
Clearly, there is no theoretical issue with social movements engaging in non-violent
revolution. Given the recent and successful uses of non-violent action by social movements, it also
worksinreality.However,thereare manyformsof non-violentaction,andconsequentlyagreatdeal
of overlapbetweentheconceptswithinthe non-violentresistance literature.The formthatthispaper
is interestedin is civil resistance, whichhas its theoretical roots within the work of Ghandi who first
demonstrated, with his concept of Satyagraha, that regimes could be vulnerable to concerted
organisedcampaignsof civildisobedience.28
BuildingonGhandi’swork,GeneSharpisthekeytheorist.
As Schock shows us, whilst Ghandi’s form of non-violent action is based upon principled pacifism,
Sharp’sformof non-violentresistance isone whichsets“aside the questionof moral beliefsorcodes
to whichpractitionersmustadhere”,29
andistherefore chosen purelyasapragmaticstrategicchoice.
24
Clausewitz(1976) 128
25
Ibid.,228
26
Burrowes,(1996) 27-28
27
Goodwin,(2001) 9-10
28
Bondurant, (1988) 3
29
Schock (2013) 279

11
Sharp’swork on non-violentresistance isbaseduponhistheoryof powerthat states:“governments
dependonpeople,thatpoweris pluralistic,andthat political powerisfragile because itdependson
manygroupsforreinforcementof itspowersources”.30
SowhatSharpcallsnon-violentweaponssuch
as strikes and boycotts,31
can be used to challenge repressive governments. Such non-violent
campaigns are successful because of the four mechanisms of change. These mechanisms are:
conversion, where the opposition is convinced to make changes, accommodation where opponents
grant changesdue tothe perceivedcostsof notdoingso,non-violentcoercionwherethe non-violent
movement can implement change because the opponents will is blocked and finally disintegration
where non-violent resistance causes the opponents power to collapse.32
All forms of non-violent
resistance, including civil resistance, work using mechanisms to effect political change. How then is
civil resistance different from other forms? Civil resistance is:
“a type of political actionthatreliesonthe use of non-violentmethods…itinvolvesarange of
widespreadand sustained activities that challenge a particular power,force, policy or regime-hence
the term resistance. The adjective civil in this context denotes that which pertains to a citizen or
society,implyingthatamovementsgoalsare civilinthe senseof beingwidelysharedinasociety;and
it denotes that the action is…non-violent in character”.33
We can observe that we are using the term civil resistance because it shows us that non-
violence is being employed strategically, not for principled reasons and also that it is civic in nature,
being employed by the whole or greater part of a society.
The literature concerning civil resistance has looked principally at the outcomes of civil
resistance campaigns, repression, diffusion and motivations. Roberts has argued that to help
30
Sharp (1973) 8
31
Ibid.,110
32
Sharp (1990) p. 15-16
33
Roberts,(2011) 2

12
determine outcomes, civil resistance must be not be considered in isolation,moreover despite its
manysuccessesitcanleadtoadverse outcomes.34
The mostimportantworkthathasbeencarriedout
concerningoutcomeshasbeenChenowethandStephan’sempirical studythatfoundthatnon-violent
campaignsare generallymore successfulthanviolentonesbecause theyprovide variousparticipation
advantages to non-violent campaigns over violence.35
The literature concerning repression focuses mainly on how repression can rebound on the
regime that employsit.Gene Sharphas termedthisfeature political Ju-Jitsu.36
Aside fromSharp,the
mostthoroughworkdone hasbeenbyHessandMartin,whohavefoundthatunjustrepressive events
can generate a huge public backlash called backfire against those responsible, indeed it becomes a
huge transformative event that can sometimes lead to greater movement mobilisation.37
Social
movements onlygain from backfire,if they can communicate this story past regime censorshipand
narratives, thereby highlighting the importance of communication to social movements.38
There has been much focus within the civil resistance literature about how the message of
non-violenceistransmittedacrossstate borders.Givan hasfoundthatthree typesofdiffusionof social
movements exist, these are relational, non-relational and finally mediated.39
Scholars are examining
all three typestoestablishjusthowthedoctrineof non-violence isspreadingglobally.Some,however,
argue against placing too much emphasis on diffusionsince it can lead to the importance of local
context being overlooked. Nepstad and Vinthagen in their study of the International Plowshare
34
Roberts,(2011) 1
35
Chenoweth andStephan, (2011) 7
36
Sharp (1973) 110
37
Hess andMartin, (2006) 249
38
Ibid.,262
39
Givan,(2010) 209

13
Movementshowhowlocal movementsmustshape theoriesof non-violence tofitthe local context,if
mobilisation efforts are to be successful.40
Lastly,the current literature haslookedatthe motivationsbehindwhyviolentornon-violent
action is chosen. Pearlman and Cunningham have looked at the internal structure of movements
findingthat“actorfragmentationplaysacritical role inconflictprocesses”.41
Cunninghammeanwhile,
looks at self-determinationdisputes,concluding that non-violent action is chosen“when groups are
smaller, are less geographically concentrated, are excluded from political power, face economic
discrimination, make independence demands, and operate in non-democracies”.42
This area of the
factors influencing the choice of civil resistance has beenunderexplored and requiresfurther study.
This is where the three key themes can be utilised to explain what motivates networked social
movements to adopt civil resistance instead of violence.
The role of avanguardinorganisingarevolutionhastraditionallybeenassociatedwithMarxist
theoristssuchasLeninwhostronglyfavouredthe necessityof atrainedprofessionalvanguardtolead
and directarevolutionstating“norevolutionarymovementcanendure withoutastable organisation
of leadersmaintainingcontinuity…suchas organisationmustconsistchieflyof people professionally
engaged in revolutionary activity”.43
This thinking is in line with Marx and Engels in the ‘Communist
Manifesto’whoadvocatedthe use of a vanguard as theyhave the “theorisingedge inunderstanding
the conditions,heading,andthe general resultsof theproletarianmovement”.44
Thisschoolof Marxist
thought as a top-down approach to revolution, is naturally suspicious of spontaneous revolution;
hence the great debate between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. As Luban notes “Luxemburg put the
emphasis on the spontaneous action of the masses and on the socialist party’s forward driving
40
NepstadandVinthagen,(2008) 39
41
PearlmanandCunningham,(2012) 11
42
Cunningham(2013) 291
43
Lenin(1988) 185-186
44
Marx (2004) 74

14
agitation,notonthe organizational partyworkandonpure ordersof the leadership.45
Obviously,this
theorywasproblematicforLeninasit meant that he wouldnotbe able to directthe revolutionashe
sawfit.The ideaof spontaneousrevolutionhasmuchsupportinthe information age;indeedthe very
nature of the networksocietyappearstohave enhanceditsappeal.Carne Ross’stheoryof leaderless
revolutionseesthatinan interconnectedglobal system,the people andnotleadershave the agency
to elicitrevolutionarychangespontaneously.46
There isnoneedforavanguardfora social movement
to adopt non-violent civil resistance campaign. The role of professional vanguards has been
overlooked in favour of views that see the recent spate of civil resistance actions as being entirely
spontaneous. There is therefore a need for a reappraisal of this situation.
Schock states, “it is assumed that there are no special contexts where only violence can be
mobilized and effective. If violent resistance can be mobilized and be effective, then non-violent
resistance canbe mobilizedandeffective”.47
CarterstatesthatSharpbelievesthat“withgoodenough
organisation and sufficient courage, popular non-violence always has the potential to succeed”.48
Because of this belief, Sharp overlooks the issue of how different regime types can make civil
resistance more attractive thanviolence.Ghandi,firstdemonstrated,withhisconceptof Satyagraha,
that different types of regime could be vulnerable to concerted organised campaigns of civil
disobedienceconductedbysocial movements.49
However,Ghandi’sexample islimitedtonon-violent
resistance campaignsbased uponpacifismandnoton civil resistance whichisdeliberatelychosenas
a strategic option. Also, Ghandi’s work is not applicable to the networked social movements
conducting civil resistance campaigns in the informationage. In addition, we also needto avoid just
looking at repressive regimes. In the last decade civil resistance campaigns have been conducted
45
Luban (2012) 360
46
Ross,(2013) xx
47
Schock (2013) 282
48
Carter (2005) 51
49
Bondurant, (1988) 3

15
againstall typesof regime.Mostof the workinthisareamosthasfocusedprincipallyoncivilresistance
campaigns conducted against authoritarian regimesand relatively little consideration has beenpaid
to liberal democracies.Itis prudentto rectifythisoversightby examiningdifferentregime typesnot
just repressive ones.
Finally, in regards to international factors,the existing literature provides no clear narrative
as to its exact influence on the attractiveness of civil resistance, particularly in regardsto the role of
states and non-state actors. Ritter argues that because of liberal expectations placed on autocratic
regimes, they find themselves in an iron cage of liberalism that makes the repressionof non-violent
demonstratorspoliticallycostly.50
Othersare more pessimisticaboutstates.ChenowethandStephan
argue that non-violent campaigns can benefit from sanctions, diplomatic support, and allies in
international civil society.51
However,theyalsoargue that supportfor non-violentcampaignsisbest
when it comes from multilateral sources rather than from single states, as it is more legitimate and
lesspoliticized.52
Therefore, sincethe literature providesnoclearnarrative,thisisanareasuitable for
further academic study.
50
Ritter(2015) 5
51
Chenoweth andStephan, (2011) 223
52
Ibid.,225

16
Vanguardism.
The networkedsocialmovementsof the ‘informationage’thatemploycivil resistance suchas
the ‘Orange Movement’ are often seen as entirely spontaneous, leaderless, grassroots movements
that suddenly burst onto the streets and rapidly sweep away long entrenched oppressive regimes.
These spontaneously organised networked social movements comprise many individual digital
activistsandnetworkedgroupswhoact as a quasi-leadershipattemptingtocoordinate andorganise
the movement. This assortment of actors most likely has no formal training in the real-world
applicationof non-violentcivil resistance asa strategy.However,asMarxistthinkerAntonioGramsci
states, “pure spontaneity does not exist in history…hence in such movements there exists multiple
elementsof consciousleadership”.53
Thereforenosocial movementcaneverbe entirelyspontaneous
andwill have somedegreeof professional leadership.The questionishow fardothe presence ofthese
vanguards influence the choice of civil resistance to the networked social movements in the
information age? This chapter establishes that vanguardism plays a decisive role in making civil
resistance attractive tothatsocial movement.Indeed,oftenitisvanguardismthatallowsanetworked
social movement’s choice of civil resistance to appear entirely spontaneous. Professional training
enables vanguards to achieve this by; pre-protest information campaigns, understanding a regime’s
initial response to public opposition,preparations for the long term occupation of protest locations
and finally through creating dedicated activists and example setting.
Professional training means that vanguards understand techniques to engage with and
mobilise populationslonginadvance of the civil resistance campaign.Thislong-termeffortprepares
a populationtobe more likelytosupportacivil resistance campaign whenthe vanguardinitiates civil
resistance actions because the movement has built up social capital.Consider how the first stage of
53
Gramsci (2005) 196

17
the Pora! civil resistance campaign in Ukraine prepared the population for civil resistance with an
informationcampaign, Pora!achievedtwocritical objectives.Firstly,theyensuredthatthe Ukrainian
people thought that change was possible and that their votes trulymattered. Thus, when it became
clear,followingtworoundsof voting,that the electionhadbeenstolenfrom them, and Yanukovych
was declaredthe winnerwith49.5per centof the vote comparedto Yushchenko’s46.6,54
the people
would be angered and open to the idea of a civil resistance campaign. Secondly, this information
campaign meant that Pora! could build links within communities, build relationships and networks,
emphasise the role and message of the movement.In effect, Pora! would gain huge social capital
ensuring that the Ukrainian people would both recognise Pora! and be more open to support its
message and join the civil resistance campaign when the time came. The informational campaign
actually consisted of the two wings of Pora! running concurrent campaigns, Yellow Pora! connected
more with the political sphere, whilst Black Pora! focused on a grass roots mobilization campaign.
Both, campaigns sought to reduce people’s fear of the regime, providing important electoral
information and stressing the importance of voting. Both campaigns began well in advance of the
rigged 2004 Presidential election.The Yellow Pora! campaign coordinated heavily with the official
opposition to the extent that Yellow Pora! had access to the financial resources and contacts of the
opposition. By utilising these resources of Yushchenko’s opposition movement, Pora! could build
support networks, and better spread its message wider both within the official opposition and
throughoutUkraine.In effect,they couldbuildonpre-establishedanti-governmentsupportnetworks.
Simultaneously, Black Pora! the leaderless networked wing of Pora! ran a grassroots anti-Kuchma
campaign. This was popular amongst the Ukrainianyouth, known for its humour. As Alina Schpak of
Pora! noted "We mocked the power as much as possible…You can't be afraid of someone you're
laughing at".55
These campaigns by both Yellow and Black Pora! meant that before the election, the
54
Wilson,(2005) 116
55
Traynor, (6 June 2005) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/06/iantraynor

18
Pora! website,www.pora.org.uabecame Ukraine’sfifthmostpopularsite,andthat the organization
had distributed 70 million copies of printedmaterials.56
Pora! as a whole, had been able voting and
aroundthe country,57
thiswasdespite intimidationfromthe authorities. Asaresult,some 11,000,000
Ukrainians cast their ballots for Yushchenko,58
in the 2004 presidential elections. These were votes
notjustfor Yushchenko,butalsoforchange. Whenitbecame clearfromthe differencesbetweenexit
polls that gave the opposition an 11-point lead,59
and the government polls that showed a narrow
governmentvictory,itbecame clearthatthe resulthadbeenstolenfromthe people.Thus,the fruits
of this campaign’s success in terms of making civil resistance more attractive than violence can be
seeninthe secondstage,the rapid mobilizationcampaignwhichbeganwhenPora!beganto occupy
protest locations weeks before the election result.60
Given the speed and turnout of hundreds of
thousands of Ukrainians,61
especially in freezing winter temperatures, occupying the Maidan
Nezalezhnosti(Independence Square) inKievandotherlocationsthroughoutUkrainiancitiesandthat
there were nooutbreaksof violence duringthe Orange Revolutionthe informationcampaign,canbe
seenasbeinghighlyinfluential inthe choiceof civil resistance bytheOrange Movement.Itisthisstage
that made the protests appear to be spontaneous. However, in Ukraine, it must be noted that the
Pora! campaignwaslimitedbyUkraine’sethnicdivide,itwasfar more successful inWesternUkraine
than in the pro-Yanukovych east,where there were few sympathyprotests.Thisisevidencedbythe
Pora!Motorcade of Friendship,whichwasalastditchattempttogenerate supportforthe movement
56
Klid,(21 April 2005) https://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/announce/media/Media%202005/2005-04-
21_PORA%20Coordinator%20(eng).pdf
57
Kaskivetal, (2005) under,‘Developingthe volunteernetwork
and conductingthe campaign(Sept.-Nov.2004)’
58
Central ElectionCommission,(2005) http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/WP0011e
59
Traynor, (26 November2004) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa
60
Kaskivetal, (2005) under,‘Developingthe volunteernetwork
and conductingthe campaign(Sept.-Nov.2004)’
61
Khokhlova,(26November2004)
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C00EEDF123EF935A15752C1A9629C8B63

19
in easternUkraine.62
Evendespite thislimitation,there isevidence thatwhere there isthe long-term
preparationof a societyforcivil resistance byvanguards,thenthe attractivenessof civil resistanceto
social movements is increased.
Intermsof protestorganisationandcoordination,professionaltrainingmeansthatvanguards
are able to overcome obstacles;theyuse theirexpertise toorganise and coordinate protestssothat
citizens are able to overcome their fear of the regime to join the physical protests in such large
numbers that they are more likely to reach, and be able to occupy, the protest locations. Once
revolutionaryvanguardsare trained,theyhave the abilitytoorganise andcoordinatenon-violentcivil
resistance protests. One of the leaders of the April 6th
Movement Mohamed Adel went to Belgrade
where he receivedtrainingfromthe Centre forAppliedNonViolentActionsandStrategies(CANVAS)
states:“I got trainedinhow to conduct peaceful demonstrations,how toavoidviolence,andhowto
face violence from the security forces … and also how to organize to get people on the streets".63
Because of thisprofessional training,the April 6thmovementwasable to prepare detailedandwell-
constructedplansonhowtoorganise andprepare forthe protestsonline. One of thefoundersAhmed
Maher recounts how the movement:
“establishedthis‘operationsroom’ around15 daysbefore the beginningof the protests,…to
discuss routine details including assessing the reach of our calls to protest with regards to Internet
websites, looking at the data and information that was being provided to citizens and studying
innovative mechanisms of protestingwhich aimed to overcome the methods that the state security
services always use to pre-empt demonstrations and protests”.64
62
Kaskivetal, (2005) under,‘Protectingthe Election:
the Orange Revolution(November –December2004)’
63
MohamedAdel,quotedinRosenberg,(February17,2011)
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u
64
AhmadMaher, Interview byArshaqAl-Awsat,(10February2011)
http://www.aawsat.net/2011/02/article55247577

20
Maher goes on to add that:
“Two dayspriorto the demonstrationswe implementedanew mode of operationwhichsaw
activists being split into separate groups, with each group being made up of between 30 and 50
activists who would be posted to central areas and public squares to incite protests whilst only the
leaderof eachgroupwouldbe informedof the precise locationof where the protestswerescheduled
to begin…meetinghisgroupin a pre-selectedlocationjustpriorto the beginningof the protest,and
then guiding this group to the main rendezvous point”.65
This demonstratesthatthe April 6th
Movementwaspreparedto spark the initial protests.By
placing sizeable numbers of dedicated activists onto the streets to incite protests, ordinary citizens
would join, as they would see that they would not be protesting alone and therefore vulnerable to
repression.Thisstage was crucial ingettingpeople outof theirhomesonto the streets owingto the
inherent fear that many people felt about openly confronting the regime. We can see that the
movementreducedthe physical costsof participation.Theseactivistscouldthencoordinate directing
these groups to the main protest locations where they would be most effective. The planning,
however,wentevendeeperthanthis;co-founderof the April 6th
movementAhmed Salahhasnoted:
“the idea was to start these small rallies in densely populated areas, and to come out from
the back streets and into the main central points in every city. This way the security couldnot mass
their troops in one particular area, because whatever is happening is happening everywhere. By the
time the numbersreachthe central designatedareaswhere the dense policepresence is,youalready
65
AhmadMaher, Interview byArshaqAl-Awsat,(10February2011)
http://www.aawsat.net/2011/02/article55247577

21
have large numbers of people that can get through these police numbers, and you can take that
ground”.66
The initial protest locationswere thus strategicallyselectedin high population areas so that
the protestgroups had the best chance of gettingto a critical mass. By spreadingout geographically
andthenconverging,the protesterscouldavoidthe massedranksof the Egyptiansecurityforcesuntil
they had sufficient numbers to outnumber the police and occupy the final protest locations. This is
essentiallythe civil resistance version of Napoleon’s famous dictum of march divided, fight united.67
Withoutsufficientnumbersbeingpresent,the Mubarakregime wouldnothave hesitatedtoviolently
repress the protesters. By ensuring that the protest groups could get to critical mass, the vanguard
movement cleverly lowered the physical costs of participation, again making civil resistance more
attractive as there is more chance of anonymity for the individual in a large crowd. The costs of
repression for the regime were raised, as the attempted repressionof such large groups of peaceful
protesters would, thanks to new information communication technologies, be a huge international
mediaevent.The attemptedrepressionof protestersinTahrirSquare in the Battle of the Camel was
detrimental to the stability of the Mubarak regime by garnering much international and domestic
support for the protesters. Clearly, this preparationof the 2011 protests by the April 6th
movement,
whichtook intoaccount the regime’sresponse wascrucial,forif the protestershadnot reachedthe
protest final locations in large enough numbers then there would have been no protest and the
Mubarak regime could not have been provoked and pressurised non-violently.
The Pora! Movement,meanwhile providesanexcellentexample of arevolutionaryvanguard
that prepared protesters to be able to occupy a protest location for an extended period of time and
inextreme conditions.Throughextensivepreparations,Pora!helpedtoensure thatprotestlocations
66
AhmadSalah,InterviewbyInternational Centre onNon-violentConflict,(3March 2011)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HfFnpVBxQdA
67
Smith,(2006) 37

22
such as the Maidan inKievcouldbe occupiedbylarge numbersof protestersforlongperiodsof time
therebyloweringthe costsof participationforparticipants. Pora!hadpre-preparedtentsforprotest
locations across Ukraine in cities such as Kharkiv, Donetsk, Cherkassy, Dnipropetrovsk and Ternopil
and most importantly Kiev.68
In Kiev alone, some 1,500 tents were provided to help protesters to
continue tooccupythe Maidandespitethe extremelylow wintertemperatures.69
Byensuringthatthe
protesterscouldcontinuetooccupythe square,eveninwintertemperatures,itenabledthe pressure
on the Kuchma regime tobe continuous. Thistype of pressure thenforcesregimestorespondeither
by backingdown or with violent actionwhichallowsthe social movementstoportray themselvesas
victims, which gains support and raises the costs of further repression.
Finally, the presence of a vanguard ensures that civil resistance is more attractive through
teachingandexamplesetting.Professional trainingsuchasthatprovidedbythe CANVASorganisation
createsactivistsdedicatedtousingcivilresistance.Throughsuchtraining,activistsbecomeconvinced
of the valuesof usingcivilresistanceinsteadof violenceandthe dangersof notdoingso. EntsarQadhi,
a Yemeni activist,afterattendingAmericantrainingsessionsinYemenstatedthat“Ithelpedme very
much because I used to think that change only takes place by force and by weapons…but now, it is
clear that results can be achieved with peaceful protests and other non-violent means.70
Crucially,
once trained, theycan trainotheractivistsaboutboththe importance of non-violence andthe use of
non-violent strategies and then those activists can set examples of using non-violence to protesters
during protests thus guiding the movement as a whole towards civil resistance. This teaching
behaviourcanbe observedinmovementslike Kefayaandthe April 6th
movementinEgypt and Pora!
in Ukraine. They had memberships which had received extensive professional civil resistance
68
69
Ibid.,
70
Entsar Qadhi, quotedinRosenberg,(February17,2011)
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u

23
training.71
ConsiderApril6th
activistAdel,whotookaweek-longcourseinthe strategiesof non-violent
revolutioninBelgrade where he learnedhow toorganize people…andmostimportantly, he learned
howtotrainothers.Afterwards,he wentbacktoEgyptandbegantoteachothersthesame methods.72
This transmission of knowledge created a large number of dedicated civil resistance activists.
Once trained, theseindividuals couldbe strategicallyplacedinthe protestlocations,toensure
that the protests were as non-violent as possible with the activists leading by example. In Ukraine,
Pora! activists Andriy Husak, Andriy Rozhniatovsky, Ihor Kotsiuruba, and Mikhaylo Plotnikov were
presentto organize and coordinate the activitiesof the tentcamp in Kievto ensure thatthey stayed
peaceful.73
Indeed, such was the penetration of the Pora! values of non-violence that the Orange
Movement as a whole attempted to avoid violence by ensuring that police lines were protectedby
linesof olderdemonstratorsfacingthe crowds,tokeepouthot-headsandpossibleinfiltratorsplanted
by the authorities.74
Inaddition,tofurtherreduce tensions,theyusedyounggirlstoplace flowersin
riot policeman’sshields.75
Indeed,RomanZvarych,a pro-YushchenkoMPcommented,“It'sveryhard
to be angrywhenbeautiful Ukrainiangirlsare pushingflowersintoyourriotshield”.76
These activists
could also distribute civil resistance literature to protesters at protest locations. In Egypt, trained
activists distributed thousands of copies of Sharp’s 198 methods of non-violent civil resistance to
protesters.77
However, such measures and behaviour can never be totally effective due to the
enormityof the crowdsandasemotionsinsuchenvironmentsare hardtokeepincheckandcaneasily
71
Rosenberg,(February 17,2011) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u
72
Ibid.,
73
74
Wagstyl and Turner,(2 December2004) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43aae19c-4406-11d9-af06-
00000e2511c8.html#axzz3LDw3xa75
75
Ibid.,
76
Roman Zvarych,quotedinWagstyl and Turner,(2 December2004)
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43aae19c-4406-11d9-af06-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3LDw3xa75
77
Arrow,(21 February2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12522848

24
escalate towardsviolence.Indeed,inEgypt,there are numerouscasesof violence beingusedinself-
defence whenviolentrepressionwasusedbythe regime,mostnotablyduringthe Battleof theCamel.
Moreover,there are casesof pro-active violence,forexample,inSuezandinthe northernSinai area
of Sheikh Zuweid,several hundred Bedouins and police exchanged live gunfire, killing a 17-year-old
man.78
So obviously,there are limitstowhatevenaprofessional vanguardcanachieve.Nevertheless,
the handingoutof civil resistanceliteratureandthe example setbyprofessional activistsundoubtedly
helpedordinaryprotesterstounderstandthe importance of using civil resistance and not violence.
What emerges is that when professionally trained vanguards are present the likelihood of
networkedsocial movementsadoptingcivil resistanceinsteadof violenceisgreatlymagnified.Firstly,
theyare capable of conductinglarge scale informationcampaignswhichpreparesacivil societytobe
receptive towardsacampaign.Effectively,thesecampaignscreatesocial capitalmeaningthatcitizens
are more likelytosupportthe vanguardwhenthey choose to beginthe protests.However,instates
withsectariandivides,informationcampaignsbyvanguardsare likelytobe lesseffective astheymay
be seentoonlyrepresentthe interestsof onlyone sectionof asociety,therebymakingtheirmessage
lessappealingtootherdemographics.Secondly,wecanalsoobservethatcivil resistance ismade more
attractive by the way in which vanguards organise and coordinate the initial stages of protests so as
to be able toovercome the targetedregime’sinitial response.Consequently,the movementcanmore
easilymake the initial difficulttransitionfrombeingavirtual protesttoalsobeingaphysical one.This
is achieved because vanguards have an understanding of the regime’s repressive response to public
confrontation.These canthenbe overcome,whichlowersthe costsof participationtherebyallowing
more citizenstoovercome theirnatural fearof the regimetojointhe proteststhusprotestshave more
chance of getting to critical mass and a greater chance of being able to actually occupy protest
78
Al-Jazeera(14February2011)
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html

25
locations which exerts pressure on the regime. Moreover, once those anti-government forces have
reachedthe protestlocations,vanguardsmake preparationssothatthose locationscan be occupied
for extended periods of time evenin adverse conditionsthat enables the pressure on the regime to
be applied continuously. Finally, vanguards are best able to ensure that non-violence is adopted
through teaching and example setting. Overseas training creates dedicated civil resistance activists
whounderstandthe costsof employingviolence.Theycanthenreturnhome toteachothermembers
of the vanguard movementthese same values,therebyensuringthatall memberswill adhere tothe
non-violent doctrine. These trained activists can then be placed in strategic locations to prevent
violence from occurring by setting an example to ordinary protesters. They can also distribute civil
resistance literature to the crowds. However,with emotions so high in such environments there are
limits to how far these measures can be effective

26
Regime Type.
Throughout the last decade, networked social movements have carried out civil resistance
campaigns against regimes with diverse natures. In places as diverse as Egypt, Ukraine, Tunisia and
the United States, civil resistance appears to have become the tool of choice for networked social
movements.The regimestargetedare all sodifferentthatthe reasonsfor civil resistance beingmore
attractive than violence must be many and varied.The question is whether regime type affects why
networkedsocial movementsare adoptingcivil resistance?Byexaminingtwotypesof regime;liberal
and repressive, it will be argued that regime type is influential in the choice of civil resistance by
networkedsocialmovements.However,beforeembarkingonanexaminationof the effectsof regime
type on the attractiveness of civil resistance it is important to first classify the regime types being
examined. This chapter uses a dichotomous classification of regime type, these being liberal and
repressive. Liberal democratic regimes are defined as regimes that are based upon two principles.
Firstly,“political libertiesexisttothe extentthatthe people of acountryhave the freedomtoexpress
a variety of political opinions in any media and the freedom to form or to participate in any political
group”.79
Secondly, “democratic rule (or political rights) exists to the extent that the national
governmentisaccountable tothe general population,andeachindividual isentitledtoparticipate in
the governmentdirectlyorthroughrepresentatives”.80
Repressiveregimesare therefore regimesthat
seek to deny the liberties and freedoms that are available to citizens in liberal regimes through the
use of, or threat of, force in the maintenance of their own power.
Liberal democraticregimes increase the attractivenessof civil resistance forseveral reasons.
Firstly,theymakeitisexceedinglysimplefornetworkedsocialmovementstoorganiseandcoordinate
multiple campaigns of civil resistance, not just nationally but globally. This is achieved through
79
Bollen,(1993) 1208-1209
80
Ibid.,1209

27
guaranteeingthe freedomsof speechandof association.Bothtypesof freedomare oftenenshrined
inlaw.Article 11 of the HumanRightsAct allowsforthe freedomof assemblythatgrantscitizensthe
legal righttojointogetherforthe purposesof collectiveaction.81
Therefore,thecreationof networked
social movements critical of the government is not illegal. Furthermore, Article 10 allows for the
freedomof publicexpression,82
whichmeansthatthe social movementorganisationsandindividuals
withinthe entirenetworkedsocialmovementcanopenlycommunicate witheachothertocoordinate
civil resistance actionswithoutfearof governmentinterference.The ‘OccupyMovement’wasable to
openlyorganisenumerous well-supported ralliesand actionacrossthe globeagainstnumerousliberal
regimes because it had free access to social media networks via the Internet. The first of the
constituent movements, the ‘Occupy Wall Street Movement’, inspired copycat movements globally
such as ‘OccupyMelbourne’and‘OccupyLondon’.All the independentmovementsusedthe Internet
and social media such as Facebook and Twitter to plan and coordinate local Occupy protests whilst
simultaneouslycoordinatinggloballysothatcitiesin25countriescouldallbe simultaneouslyoccupied
on October 15th
, 2011.83
Alex Gard of ‘Occupy Melbourne’ stated, “We are inspired by what's
happening on Wall Street and loosely liaising with each other, but it's not organized in any central
way".84
This level andease of communicationandcoordinationwastosome extentpossible because
of the freedoms guaranteed by liberal democratic regimes. The measures that more repressive
regimesuse topreventnetworkedsocialmovementsorganisingare notpermissible. The prospectof
the Britishand AmericangovernmentsemployinganEgyptianstyle Internetblackoutisunthinkable.
Secondly, liberal regimes create very low costs for citizens to participate in civil resistance
campaignsmeaning,thatintheory,the mobilisationof participantsisnotaproblem.Again,thisstems
81
BBC News, (29 September2000) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/946400.stm
82
Ibid.,
83
Voigt, (October7,2011) http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/07/business/wall-street-protest-
global/index.html
84
Ibid.,

28
from the provisionof certain freedomsandprotections.Freedomof speechensuresthatnetworked
social movements can influence public opinion by freely broadcasting their message across the
Internetandsocial mediatoattractsupportfromsympatheticcitizens.Therefore,theycanpotentially
influencehuge swathesof societytoengage withtheircampaigns.However,inamediaenvironment
where everybody can expresstheir opinion and ideas it is possible that the message of a movement
can be drownedoutinsucha‘noisyenvironment’.Secondly, owingtofreedomof association,citizens
are free to join and support such movements without penalty. However, free riding is a problem
because of the lowcostsof joiningaFacebookgrouporfollowingaTwitter hashtagandhighpotential
benefitsif the movementsucceeds.Of the 13,000 likes,85
that‘OccupyLondon’hadprior to the 2011
protestsonlyabout200 tentswere actuallypitchedinthe piazzaoutside St.Pauls,86
suggestingthatit
is more likely that people will passively support a movement online then actually physically join the
protests. Furthermore, citizens are most likely to take to the streets and protest against the
government if they have grievances. For example, Article 11 of the Human Rights Act in the UK
providesforthe rightto protest,therebymakingmanycivil resistance tacticslegal.Legislationexists
whichcurtailsthe behaviourof the police,meaningthatliberal democraticregimesgenerallyhave a
very low capacity for the coercion of the population. As a result,when protests do take place, there
are restrictionsonpolicebehaviour indealingwithlargegroupsofprotestersandthe publicingeneral.
Police inthe UnitedKingdommayonlyuse “force as isreasonable inthe circumstances”.87
Police are
heldtoacertain code of conduct,indeed,asthe 1984Police andCriminal Evidence Actstates,“officers
are subject to the same rules as the rest of society, but must meet higher standards than the public
because police forces are public bodies,officers have a duty under the Human Rights Act not to use
85
Waldram, (14 October2011) http://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2011/oct/14/occupy-
england-protests-gather-momentum-via-facebook
86
Kingsley, (20October2011) http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/oct/20/occupy-london-st-
pauls-protesters
87
BBC NewsOnline, (8March 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6430073.stm

29
force that might constitute "inhuman and/or degrading treatment".88
This is not to say that police
forces in liberal regimes are incapable of brutality, it is just that if it does occur it is not used as a
systematic tool of repression designed to create an environment of fear. As a result, the costs of
participationare verylow,whichasa resultmeansthatcitizensare more likelytocome out ontothe
streetsandsupportapeacefulprotestastheyhave lessfearof beingviolentlyrepressedbythe police.
Most definitely, media freedom in liberal regimes encourages the use of non-violent tactics
because it is very simple for the media to demonstrate to the public social movements using violent
methods. Consequently, the movements may lose public support if the cause is delegitimised by
violence. According to a YouGov poll in the UK 64% of adults believe television to be the most
trustworthy news source.89
Therefore, the media can easily sway public opinion for or against a
movement.Civil resistance activistNaomi Kleinof OccupyWall Streetrecognisedthe valuesof using
non-violencebecauseof the influencethatthe mediawields.Indeed,shewrote,“You have refusedto
give the media the images of broken windows and street fights it craves so desperately”.90
Clearly,
Kleinrecognisesthe keydangerof usingviolent tacticsthatelementsof the mediacan seize uponto
delegitimise the movement. For example, consider the clashes in the City of Oakland betweenthe
Occupymovementandthe police inNovember 2011 whichturnedviolent.DanielHalperof the right-
wingAmericanmediamagazine ‘TheWeekly Standard’wrote “Giventhe choice betweensidingwith
the law or witha protestmade upof hooliganswhoplace police officersin headlocks,whowouldyou
pick?”91
These words demonstrate that when violence does occur it is invariably seized upon and
emphasizedby elements of the media, often to the detriment of the non-violent elements of the
88
BBC NewsOnline, (8 March 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6430073.stm
89
Thompson, (14 November2011) https://yougov.co.uk/news/2011/11/14/trust-media/
90
Elliot, (17 October2011)
http://www.salon.com/2011/10/17/occupy_wall_streets_struggle_for_non_violence/
91
Halper, (16 October2011) http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/does-obama-
endorse_595959.html

30
movement. This means that non-violence is more attractive if movements wish to avoid negative
publicity that can damage vital support for the movement, as people will not wish to be associated
with a violent organisation.
Liberal democratic regimes also make civil resistance less attractive to networked social
movements. Firstly,the minimal coercive state capacity for repression ensures that highlighting the
barbarity of the regime is generally not a tactic that can be employed against liberal democratic
regimes.Thispreventsasocial movementfrommobilisingdomesticandinternational supportforthe
movement.Consequently,liberal democraticregimeswill notface any increasedpressure toaccede
to the movement’s demands. It is largely impossible to present a liberal democratic regime as
repressive if protesters are unlikely to be violently treated. Secondly, because of the existence of
formal mechanismsof change,people’swillingnesstojoincivil resistance actionswill bereducedsince
they have a belief in the change that can be effectedby the system. Free and fair elections in which
citizenscanfreelyandsecretlyvote foranypolitical partyof theirchoice meansthatcivil resistance is
not the most effective way to effect political change. They provide citizens with a strong official
alternative tothe governmentof the day alongwith the realityof gettingthat oppositionintooffice.
IndependentwatchdogssuchastheElectoralCommissioninthe UKoverseeelectionstopreventfraud
and to ensure the correct resultis reached.Therefore,whenchange doesoccur,it is likelytobe free
and fairand therefore,lessopentochallenge. Optionssuchascivil resistance will be lesseffectiveas
they cannot guarantee real change, therefore people are less likely to support the movement.The
majority(60%) of the British population still believe that voting is the only way to have their say.92
Civil resistance appears, at first, to be an unattractive prospect to use against repressive
regimes.Thisisbecause theuseof repressionconstructswhatcanbestbe termed‘fearenvironments’.
92
Arnett,(20 February2014) http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/20/is-russell-
brand-right-are-we-disenchanted-by-politics

31
Thisenvironmentpresentsamajorobstacle totraditionallyorganisedsocialmovements,butitallows
networked social movements to flourish. Indeed, such regimes employ many mechanisms to limit
social movements from organising and mobilising support for a civil resistance campaign. At first
glance,itisextremelydifficulttoconvince peopletojoinsuchcampaignsforfearof violentrepression.
In Egypt, police brutality, and the use of torture were common tools of repression; one only has to
observe the deathof KhaledSaeedatthe handsof twopolicemeninanAlexandriancybercafé inJune
2010 toobserve the extentof violentstate repression.Itis,therefore,unsurprisingthatinEgyptsome
commonproverbsusedbyordinaryEgyptiansduringthe Mubarak era were “walkquietlybythe wall
(where youcannotbenoticed)andwhoeverisafraidstaysunharmed”.93
Itismore difficulttoorganise
campaigns if your prospective audience has an innate fear of the regime. Clearly, there are high
participation coststhatmustbeovercome.However,convincingpeopletodothisisextremelydifficult
whenthere are fewpublicmechanismstoexpressdissent.However,inrealitythe followingsections
will demonstrate this is not the case with the networked social movements operating against
repressive regimes in the ‘information age’.
Where repressive regimesdominate the traditional media environment, it forces dissenting
voicesandpublicopiniontoshiftintothe digital onlinesphere.Thisisattractive tosocial movements
because theycan more easilyorganise andmobilise apopulationripe fora civil resistance campaign
ina waynot possibleoffline.Indeed,withinthissphere theyare able toorganise andmobilise almost
as freely as in liberal regimes. The Internet and cellular communications played a key role in the
Orange Revolution. Pora!wasalsoable touse the Internettosetup an online networkof NGOsfrom
whom they received support such as legal advice and communications technology.94
Also, anti-
governmentwebsitessprungup,suchasGongadze’s‘Ukrayinska Pravda’whichspreadanalternative
93
Ghonim,(2012) 3
94
Kaskivetal, (2005) under‘WhoCreatedPora’
http://pora.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=141&Itemid=206

32
message to that of the regime. Likewise in Egypt, grievances were expressed freely and opinions
concerningdemocraticchangesharedinfinitelytolikemindedindividualsandgroupsinananonymous
environment. This was highlighted by activist Noha Atef who said of the online aspects of the
revolution“tohaveaspace,anonline space,towriteandtalktopeople,togive themmessages,which
will increase theiranger,thisismy favourite wayof online activism”.95
Facebookgroupssuchas ‘We
are all KhaledSaeed’were created,which calledforEgyptianstogatherinprotestonJanuary 25. “As
one Egyptianactivistsuccinctlytweetedduringthe proteststhere,we usedFacebooktoschedulethe
protests, twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world”.96
This was only possible because
people could be more easily mobilised and organised online, as the personal costs for joining these
groupswere low.Thefearbarrierwasovercomeasonlinepersonasofferedanonymityand,moreover,
it was not possible forthe securityservicestoarrest or intimidate everybloggeroronline journalist.
The availability of such tools increases the attractiveness of civil resistance to networked social
movements as it allows the campaigns to actually be organised and mobilised even in the most
repressive political environments.
The second effect of regimes repressing the traditional media is that it can be extremely
successful initspurposeinthatitcreatesanoverreliance onusingthosemethods. However, theresult
of this is that the regime can become blind to changes in societal structure and complacent to the
emergence of the newformsof organisationandmobilisationtakingplace inthe onlinesphere.They
unwittingly allow social movements to organise and mobilise almost unchallenged mass protests in
the online sphere. Traditional methods of repression are very effective in creating public
environmentsbasedonfearwhere traditional methodsof organisationforsocial movementscanbe
almost unworkable.However, as a result of this success, these regimes have little understanding of
95
Noha Atef, quotedinAouraghandAlexander,(2011) 1348
96
TilleyandWood,(2003) 97

33
how to the confrontnovel threatsto theirpowerpresentedbythe Internetand social mediaexcept
by using these trusted methods or by resorting to drastic measures both of which are ineffective.
Indeed, in many cases they do not appreciate the nature of the threat posed by protests organised
throughdigital networkscanpose until itistoolate;Egyptin2011,isaprime exampleof this.Although
the Mubarak regime hadsetupanonline ‘ElectronicCommission’totrytoinfluenceonlineopinions97
and routinelyarrestedonline bloggers,98
ittotallyunderestimatedthe powerthat the Internetcould
give to dissident groups and individuals to organise and mobilise protests. This can be seen further
fromthe experience ofactivistWaelGhonim.Afteraninterrogation,duringthe2011protests,Ghonim
noted that he was asked questions regarding his religious beliefs but not his Internet experience.99
Thisdemonstratesthatthe regimes’prioritiesconcerningthe control of dissentinthe populationlay
inlong-establishedmethodsof repression.SimilarlyinUkraine,the lawsconcerningthe Internetunder
PresidentKuchmawererelativelyliberal,demonstratingthe regime’slackof awarenessof itspotential
for massorganisationandmobilisation.Thatmanyrepressive regimessimplyresorttoshuttingdown
the Internet to combat protests, is further evidence of their lack of comprehensionconcerning both
the newinformationcommunicationtechnologiesandhow theycould be usedby social movements
to effect change via civil resistance. Again,examine Mubarak in Egypt, where the Internet was shut
downfor five days.This was a totallyineffective measure because the networkedsocial movements
andactivistsbehindthe protestshadbeenusingthe Internettoorganise the protestslongbeforethis
was implemented. This increases the attractiveness of civil resistance for networked social
movements since they can exploit a repressive regime’s slothful approach to countering such novel
methods of protest organisation and mobilisation.
97
Ghonim,(2012) 36-37
98
Greenberg, (2February2011)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/02/02/mubaraks-digital-dilemma-why-egypts-
Internet-controls-failed/
99
Ghonim,(2012) 27

34
As in more liberal regimes, the use of violence delegitimises a social movement’s cause
because of the media coverage. In Egypt, after the violence of the 2008 riots in El-Mahalla El-Kubra,
the April 6th
Movement, seeing how using violence had led to negative media coverage which had
underminedtheir domestic and international support,instead chose to adopt strict non-violent civil
resistance and received professional overseas training in this regard.100
The situation was similar in
Ukraine in2004 where the protestsfollowingthe Kuchmagate crisisare alsoindicativeof thisprocess.
Thiscrisis,createdprotestsfromsocial movementssuchas‘Ukraine withoutKuchma’and‘ForTruth’.
They occupied the Maidan in Kiev’s Independence Square with 5000 activists and soon gained the
supportof oppositiongroups.101
However,the protests,endedwhenthere wasviolence betweenthe
protestersandthe securityservicesmeaningthatthe protesterslostthe supportof the people.102
So
clearly, the media is a factor in making civil resistance more attractive than violence regardless of
regime type. However, repressive regimes will use any example of violence as a pretext for violent
crackdowns,whichraisesthe physical costsof participation,makingitharderforsocial movementsto
get support onto the streets. In Ukraine, the social movement Pora! learnt this lesson. Indeed,
Zolotariov a Pora! coordinator stated that “If we were not violent, we could compete. If we were
violent, they could have resorted to force. This was the only efficient strategy within the current
environment”.103
It is well established that networkedsocial movementsuse the Internet and social media to
highlightaregime’sbrutality.Non-violence isnecessaryforthisto be effective as,if violence isused,
social movements cannot portray themselves as the victims. If they can claim this status, then they
100
Frontline, (February22 2011) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-
cairo/inside-april6-movement/
101
Olearchyk, (21 December2000) http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-without-
kuchma-leader-yury-lutsenko-6683.html
102
Solodko, (9March 2011) http://www.istpravda.com.ua/videos/2011/03/9/30212/
103
Zolotariov,quotedinBinnendijk,(2006) 416

35
gaindomesticandinternationalsympathyand supportthatthenraisesthe costsof furtherrepression,
making it less likely and thus the protesters can continue to occupy protest locations and putting
continued pressure on the regime. However, this is only possible if a regime employs violent
repression,whichismore likelytohappeninrepressiveregimesthaninliberal ones.The Battle of the
Camel inTahrir Square on February2nd
2011 isan example of whatcan happenwhenrepressioncan
be highlighted.Priortothis,the regime appearedtobe cavinginto the protestor’spressure.Indeed,
Mubarak’s speechonFebruarydeclared“Ihave taskedthe vice-presidentwithholdingdialoguewith
all political groups over all of the issues at hand for political and democratic reform”.104
Ghaly
describedthisspeech,as“slickanddividingpublicopinion”.105
However,afterthe battle,Ghalystates
“the one good thing to come out of that day, was that all those who had wanted to give Mubarak a
‘chance’ changed their minds within hours…The divide that was palpable the day before
disappeared”.106
This change had occurred due to the extensive media coverage that the battle had
received both domesticallyand internationally, which had highlighted the brutality of the regime.
Consequently,the regime was on the receiving end of a domestic and international backlash, which
allowed the movement as a whole to generate further support, which increased the pressure on
regime. This is demonstrated by the Friday after the battle, where estimates of 700,000 protesters
came to Tahrir Square spontaneously.107
However,itshouldbe notedthatthis couldonlybe effective
if communicationwiththe outsideworldcanbe maintainedbyovercomingregimecensorship.Aswill
be seeninthe thirdchapter,thisis contingentonthe supportof the online international community.
Regime type certainly does affect the attractivenessof civil resistance to networked social
movements over violence. Liberal democratic regimes somewhat increase the attractiveness of civil
104
Kortam, (3 February2013) http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/03/the-battle-of-the-
camel-the-final-straw-for-mubaraks-regime
105
Ghaly,(2011) 150-151
106
Ghaly,(2011) 151
107
Sioufi,(2011) 249

36
resistance bymakingthemsimple toorganise andmobilise onaglobal scale.Moreover,the presence
of a free media makes the use of non-violence tactics imperative, due to the media’s ability to
delegitimiseasocial movement’scause.However,theyalsoensure thatcivilresistancetacticsare less
attractive because the tactic of highlightingthe barbarityof the regime,toharnessinternationaland
domestic support, cannot be employed. Most importantly the system has inbuilt mechanisms
(elections) whichprovidereal change,unlike civil resistance whichcannotguarantee anychange will
actually occur. Certainly, it makes it difficult for any of Sharp’s mechanisms to be effective. So,
evidently liberal regimes ability to increase the attractivenessof civil resistance is somewhat mixed.
In contrast, repressive regimes increase the attractiveness of civil resistance to networked social
movements.Most critically,they force dissenting opinions intothe online sphere,where networked
social movements can freely organise and mobilise large scale civil resistance campaigns. This is a
realmthatthe regime cannoteffectivelypolice fortworeasons.Firstly,theinfinite andflexiblenature
of the digital environmentmeansthatitisimpossible tocontrol everythingthatexistsonit.Secondly
by dominating the traditional media environment, regimes are likely to underestimate the potential
of the digital sphere formass organisationandmobilisation,therebydisregardingitas threat until it
is too late, only then implanting ineffective drastic measures such as Internet blackouts. As in more
liberal regimes,the use of violence delegitimisesamovement’scause.However,inrepressive regimes
the use of violence can also justify the use of violent repression, which makes future mobilisation
efforts much more difficult as the costs of participation are raised. Finally, repressive regimes allow
forthe brutalityof the regime tobe highlightedusingthe Internetandsocial media,whichcangarner
much international and domestic support.

37
International Factors.
In the ‘information age’ many social movements are choosing to employ non-violent civil
resistance overviolence.Thisformof non-violentresistanceappearstobe invogue giveneventssuch
as the Arab Spring, where social movements dedicatedto civil resistance appear to spread across
borders from state to state in an almost contagion like fashion. Interestingly, these campaigns are
occurring in an international environment that, because of globalisation,is one full of paradoxes. As
the FrencheconomistJacquesAttali hasnoted“We liveinaworldthatissimultaneouslyshrinkingand
expanding,growing closer and farther apart...National borders are increasingly irrelevant.And yet
globalism is by no means triumphant. Tribalisms of all kinds flourish. Irredentism abounds”.108
Thus
this international environment is one where the relevance of the established paradigm of Realist
Westphaliansovereigntyisbeingchallengedandthe importance of non-state actorsisgrowing.Non-
state actors (NSAs) are “abroadcategoryof actors inglobal politicswhorepresentinterestsandexert
influence but who do not exhibit the distinguishing state characteristics of legal sovereignty and
control of territoryandpeople”,109
whohave inrecentdecadesexplodedontothe international scene
in many forms. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multinational corporations, international
global media organisations and hacktivist organisations are self-activating popular political action
groups within cyberspace that seek to influence the offline world.110
All now play a key role in a
multidimensional international environment. Therefore,bothstatesandNSAsare influential partsof
the currentinternational environment.Indeed,statesdoappearto be diminishedasactors wielding
direct influence.In fact, when states attemptdirect involvementwhat results does not increase the
attractivenessof civilresistance.Asaresult,itisnon-stateactorswhonow wieldtheabilitytodirectly
108
Attali,(1991) 117
109
Calhoun,(2002) 338
110
Jordan andTaylor,(2004) 1

38
influence the international arena. However,as established by Manuel Castells, although stateshave
lostsovereignty,andcanonlycreatewieldinfluence ininternational arenaof sharedsovereignty,they
still wieldconsiderable influence,111
whichcanbe observedbystatesprovidingfundingfornon-state
actors, through which civil resistance campaigns can be funded and professional activists trained,
whose effectiveness we observed in chapter one.
States, as independent actors, make civil resistance less attractive to networked social
movements when they intervene individually because of their strategic interests. Firstly, to protect
these interests,statescanprovide regimeswiththe technical meanstorepressthe anti-government
forces. Prior to the 2011 revolution, and since the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt had been a
stalwartAmericanmilitaryallyinthe Middle EastagainstIslamism.Indeed,“between 1948 and 2011,
the UnitedStates has givenEgyptabout $71.6 billioninbilateral militaryandeconomicaid”.112
More
importantthough,wasthe aidusedspecificallyformilitaryandsecuritypurposes.Indeed,of the $1.5
billioninaidEgyptreceivedfromthe UnitedStatesforthe 2011 fiscal year,$1.3billionwasdesignated
for peace and security.113
More recently,AmnestyInternational hasdiscoveredthatevenduringthe
2011 protests three deliveries of arms were made to Egypt by American company Combined
Systems.114
Indeed,manyof the emptyteargascanisters,foundinTahrirSquare,have beenfoundto
have ‘Made inthe U.S.’ markingsmuchtothe irritationof the protestersinTahrirSquare.115
Thus,the
United States was directly funding and supplying the equipment used by Egyptian security forcesto
repressthe Egyptianprotesters.Obviously,simplyhavingthe equipmentreadytouse raisesthe costs
of participationforcitizensina civil resistance campaign,makingthemharderto mobilise since they
111
Castells(2004) 365
112
Plumer,(9July2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/09/the-u-s-
gives-egypt-1-5-billion-a-year-in-aid-heres-what-it-does/
113
Wingfield,(29January2011) http://www.forbes.com/sites/brianwingfield/2011/01/29/making-
sense-of-u-s-foreign-aid-to-egypt-and-elsewhere/
114
BBC, (7 December2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16075152
115
Ibid.,

39
are more likelytobe repressed.Moreover,itcanbe usedto provoke the protestersintoabandoning
non-violence, thereby justifying the use of further repression, which could leadto violent escalation
and the complete abandonment of non-violence.
The provision of technical support and aid, as detailed above, that direct efforts to prevent
repression,suchasstatementscallingfora regime notto employrepression,are likelytofall ondeaf
ears, whilst the threats of sanctions are unlikely to be seen as credible. Consequently, the threat of
repression to protesters remains high making it more difficult for social movements to mobilise
domestic support for their campaigns. The behaviour of the Mubarak regime in Egypt is a good
example of this. President Obama threatened to withdraw military aid unless the regime refrained
from violence against protesters and reversedthe Internet blackout,116
which the regime eventually
didon February2nd
. The protesterscouldagainorganise andmobilise the protestsusingsocial media
and mobile telephony, whilst also demonstrating to the world the brutality of the regime. They
thereby mobilised further domestic and international support, increasing the pressure on Mubarak.
The regime’s actions were, however, not down to the threat of sanctions. The Mubarak regime was
unlikelytobelieve thatthe threatsfrom the UnitedStates were credible giventhe sharedinterestin
tackling the Islamist terror threat, and the US having investedbillions of dollars of aid into Egypt.
Indeed, the Obama administration was reluctant to abandon Mubarak and the US adopted a Janus
like approach to the crisis; there was no concrete demand that Mubarak should stand down.117
Withoutan outrightdemandtostanddown,the Mubarak regime hadthe perceptionthatitcould,to
some extent,continuetorepressthe protestersviolentlywithoutgenuinelylosingthe supportof the
US. Indeed, with regard to Egypt, Obama’s statement was made on January 28th
whilst the violent
repression of the Egyptian people continued. Indeed, the worst of the violence against protesters
116
McGreal, (29 January2011) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/29/white-house-aid-
egypt
117
Ibid.,

40
occurred on February2nd
duringthe Battle of the Camel some five dayslater.Asa resultthe chances
of repression were not lowered, thereby maintaining the physical costs of participationfor citizens,
makingcivil resistance lessattractive.Moreover,the Internetblackoutwasnotendedbecause of state
pressure – itendedbecause the economiccostsof maintainingthe blackoutwere extremelyhigh.All
economiesare now integratedwiththe Internet,meaningthatwhenthe Internetis removedsois a
sizeable portion of the economy. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
conservativelyestimatedthatthe InternetshutdownresultedinaUS$90 millionlossforEgypt,some
3-4% of GDP with other estimates being as high as US$110 million.118
Finally, because states support repressive regimes to protect their strategic interests, they
can become a toxic brand to the citizens repressed by that regime. This means that anything
associatedwiththatstatewouldbecomelessattractive.Thisisaparticularproblemforcivilresistance,
since it has American origins. Therefore, in states where the Unites States is not popular, civil
resistance couldbe unattractive,if itsoriginswere revealedtothe local population.Suchassociations
could make it harder for a movement to mobilise domestic support.Moreover,there are even fears
that it could potentially destabilise fragile protesting movements. This was a problem that civil
resistance activistshadtocontendwithduringthe Egyptianrevolution. The mixedmessagesthatthe
US propagatedinthe Middle East, paradoxicallysupportingbothdemocracyandthe maintenance of
authoritarianregimesmeantthat, in Egypt,the US was extremelyunpopular.Indeed,in 2010 “more
than four out of five Egyptians (82 percent) now rate the U.S. negatively, including nearly half (48
percent) whogivethe UnitedStatesa"veryunfavourable"rating”.119
Therefore,itisunsurprisingthen
that when told by a BBC journalist of the origins of the 198 non-violent methods given out to
118
Olsen,(3February2011) http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/02/03/how-much-did-
five-days-of-no-Internet-cost-egypt/
119
Blumenthal, (31January2011) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/31/egypt-poll-negative-
views-us-obama_n_816428.html

41
protesters,Mahmoud,aprotestorinTahrir Square stated:“Thisisan Egyptianrevolution,we are not
being told what to do by the Americans”.120
Could the organisers of the protests convince ordinary
Egyptiansto jointhe protestsif it were openlyknownthatthey were usingan American’smethods?
Given that, they refused to talk about Gene Sharp on camera and that his works were distributed in
Arabic because of fears that the work being of American origin could destabilise movements,121
it
seemsunlikely.Destabilisedmovementsare more likelytosplinter,potentiallyallowingradical fringe
movementstoadopt violence,astheyare nolongermarginalisedbythe majorityconsensus.Itshould
be noted however, that this problem only applies to some states in particular circumstances, since
adoptingcivil resistancewasobviouslynotanissue for the OccupyMovementor forPora!. However,
as long as the US retains its current role as the global superpower, this problem of association is
unlikely to disappear as a problem for the attractiveness of civil resistance.
In comparison to states, non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs), the
international media and hacktivist organisations and non-governmental organisations do have
significant power to influence making civil resistance more attractive than violence to networked
social movements. Firstly, let us examine the international media. Without doubt, the international
mediaorganisationscanbe a potentinfluence onthe attractivenessof civil resistance because of the
significant amount of pressure that negative news coverage can exert on a regime. Sophisticated
information communication technologies allow live around the clock broadcasting of events such as
the Orange Revolutionandthe ArabSpringtoaglobal audience.The storiesthatjournalistsreportare
often emotionally charged and designed to make the viewer empathise with those portrayed as the
victims. Indeed, most importantly, such coverage altered international and domestic public opinion
and turned it against the regime. Hillary Clintonhas remarked of Al Jazeera that “they are changing
120
Arrow,(2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12522848
121
Ibid.,

42
people's minds and attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective".122
During the Egyptian
Revolution, news stations like Al-Jazeera and CNN presented the regime in a bad light, raising the
political costs of repression and thereby, according to Wael Ghonim, kept the protesters safe by
highlighting the barbarity of the regime.123
Consider the example of the Battle of Camel in Tahrir
square, which as we have already seen, thanks to the coverage provided by international media
organisations, caused a huge domestic backlash which not only allowed greater mobilisation of the
populationtobe achieved,butalsomassivelyimprovedthe abilityof thenetworkedsocial movements
operating in Egypt to leverage pressure against the regime as the crowds grew in number.
In some situations, however,controlling the narrative is less possible for networked social
movements, because regime censorship of traditional media and the Internet can mean that social
movementscanstruggle to highlight the brutalityof the regime.Itseemsin such casesthat violence
would be the only option. However, other non-state actors, such as multinational corporationsand
hacktivistsgroups,canintervene withtechnical supportforthe networkedsocial movements sothat
non-violentmovementsgainvitalmediaexposure andovercomecensorship,ensuringthatthe global
newsand social medianetworkscan actuallycontinue to raise the costs of repressionandlowerthe
physical costsof participation.Ineffect,this technical supportthattranscendsnationalbordershelps
networked social movementsto control the narrative concerning the regimes brutality during the
blackout, thereby generating support both domestically and internationallythrough both traditional
and new media outlets. This coverage then sways domestic support that in turn puts pressure onto
the regime as more people join the protests. Examples of this support can be found during both
TunisianandEgyptianRevolutions.Whenthe Tunisianuprisingstarted,the hacktivistgroup knownas
‘Anonymous’ announced in an open letter:
122
HuffingtonPost,(3March 2011) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/03/hillary-clinton-
calls-al-_n_830890.html
123
Ghonim,(2012) 236

43
"Dear Journalists, It has come to our attention that the ongoing riots in Tunisia have by and
large escapedthe notice of the majorWesternnewsnetworks.Itis the responsibility of the free and
openpress to reportwhat the censoredpresscannot. The people of Tunisiahave asked for our help
and we have responded through launching a new operation,Operation Tunisia. We are asking you,
the journalists, to respond to the Tunisians' appeals for assistance at this most troubling time".124
More than just drawing attention to the non-violent struggle taking place in Tunisia,
Anonymous also actively helped the protesting social movements overcome regime censorship.
Indeed, Anonymous “created a care packet, translated into Arabic and French, offering cyber-
dissidents advice on how to conceal their identities on the web, in order to avoid detection by the
formerregime'scyberpolice”.125
Moreover,theyusedDenial of Service (DDoS) attackstobringdown
Tunisian government websites.126
In Egypt, “Anonymous worked in collaboration with Telecomix,a
clusterthatuseslegal meanstopromote free speech,to restore mirrorsandproxies tohelp maintain
Egyptians' access to sites being censored by the government”.127
Similarly, during the Internet
blackout in Egypt some MNCs had a similar impact. Indeed, “working withTwitter,Google acquired
SayNow, a start-up specialising in social online voice platforms, to make it possible for anyone to
‘tweet’byleavinga message at any of three telephone numbers”.128
Clearlythe online international
communityralliedtothe aid of the networkedsocial movements,ensuringthatthey couldcontinue
to inhabitboth online andphysical space and mobilisingsupporteveninanenvironmentwhere that
should not have been possible.
124
Anonymous,(3January2011) www.anonnews.org/index.php?p=press&a=items&i=133on.
125
Ryan, (19 May 2011)
126
Ibid.,
127
Ibid.,
128
Al-Jazeera, (2February2011)

44
Finally,non-state actorscanalsobe extremelyinfluential inthattheycanprovide fundingfor
the training of professional vanguards and their campaigns. Non-state actors are able to provide
significantcapital tofund othernon-state actorswho provide trainingincivil resistance andfundthe
training of individuals in specialised training workshops.The Centre for Applied Non-Violent Actions
and Strategies (CANVAS) is a good example of the former. They run workshops with a network of
internationaltrainers,129
aroundthe world.Indeed,from2002-2012, CANVAShasheld300workshops
for 3000 participantsfrom46 differentcountries.130
Moreover, non-state actorscanfundthe training
of activists directly. For Pora! training of activists was supported by small grants provided by the
German Marshall Fund of the United States, Freedom House and the Canadian International
DevelopmentAgency(inthe overall amountof approx.130, 000 USD).131
Similarly,the April 6 Youth
MovementinEgypt, the Bahrain Centerfor HumanRights and grass-rootsactivistslike EntsarQadhi,
a youthleaderinYemen,receivedtrainingandfinancingfromgroupslikethe InternationalRepublican
Institute, the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House.132
However, there is a crucial caveat to mention. In some cases it is sovereign states that are
surreptitiously providing the funding for these non-state actors. Direct state intervention in the
internal affairsof anotherstate canactuallydamagethe attractivenessof civil resistance.The question
is,howdostatesovercomethisdifficulty?How canstatesincrease theattractivenessof civilresistance
if theyare seenasa toxicbrand or donot wishto be seentobe directlyinfluencingeventsinanother
state? The answer lies with applying their influence through non-state actors, for example non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations that have transnational
connections and can operate where the state cannot venture openly.Non-state actors have always
129
CANVAS,http://www.canvasopedia.org/index.php/who-we-are
130
CANVAS,http://www.canvasopedia.org/index.php/what-we-do
131
Kaskivetal, (2005) under,‘Campaign’sfundingandresource supply’
132
Nixon,(14 April 2011)
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&

45
been able to influence public opinion.However, with the increasinglyprominent role played by the
Internetandsocial mediathe flexibilityandreachof suchnon-state actorshas increasedtothe point
that theycan nownetworkwitha huge range of other organisationsandindividualsaswell ashaving
the ability to access and distribute huge tracts of information instantaneously. Thus their ability to
influence public opinionis greatly enhanced withmodern informationcommunicationtechnologies.
Nowobviously,there are non-stateactorsandinternational organisationsthatoperate independently
of state government. However, many now rely heavily on private sources of funding meaning that
their impartiality is open to question. Indeed, whilst funding can come from many sources,one vital
source of income is governmental in origin. For example,the National Endowment for Democracy
receivesabout$100 millionannuallyfromCongress.133
Similarly,FreedomHouse alsogetsthe bulkof
itsmoneyfromthe Americangovernment,mainlyfromthe State Department.134
CANVASmostlikely
receives substantial sums from the American government in this fashion too. Their key text, Non-
violent Struggle was funded with a grant from the United States Institute for Peace,135
therefore
indicatingatleastsome levelof fundingandsupport.Thesenon-stateactorscantherefore verymuch
be the tools of the states that fund them because, if they do not spend that funding in the manner
that particulargovernmentwanted,thenthatorganisationwill mostlikelynotreceivefuture funding.
Whenstatesfundthese organisations,theyare able todirecttheiroperationssothattheybenefit the
interests of that state without direct involvement. Whenthose interests can best be fulfilled by civil
resistance campaigns then states can use non-state actors to fund and support them.
It is also worth noting that the funding of activist training by states is a grey area. It is very
difficult to establish concrete evidence of funding links from a state directly to a civil resistance
133
134
135
Popovicetal, (2007) 2

46
movementorindividual activists.Thisisdue to states seekingto emphasise theirdistance fromsuch
directinvolvementinthe internal affairsof anotherstate and non-state actorswishingto maintaina
façade of independence. Vladyslav Kaskiv of Pora! is keen to downplay the role of international
involvement in the funding and support given to the movement. Kaskiv acknowledges that the
international community provided “small grants for the training of activists”,136
and also that the
“financial support by international donors geared at developing a network of civil society centers in
Ukraine…made itpossibleforthe campaigntodraw onconsiderablematerialandtechnicalresources
of regional NGOs.137
However, Kaskiv also states that “Pora!, unlike its counterparts in Serbia and
Georgia, received only minimal financial support from the international community”.138
Indeed, he
puts the figure at about $130,000 USD.139
Considering the huge costs of the Pora! information
campaignandcostsof preparingforlong-termprotests whichmadeuse oflaserlights,plasmascreens,
sophisticatedsoundsystems,rockconcerts,tentstocampinandhugequantitiesoforange clothing,140
thisfigure seemsimpossiblylow.Indeed,documentsreleasedbyWikiLeaksfromU.Sintelligencefirm
Stratfor appear to confirm the extensive relationship between the US government and CANVAS.141
However,the veracityof these documentsisquestionable andtherefore theycannotbe reliedupon
to categorically prove relationshipssuch as this exist. Therefore, the enigma of funding connections
between states, non-state actors, their subsidiaries, social movements and activists is most likely
impossible tosubstantiateandtherefore the influence thatstateswieldthroughnon-stateactorswill
remain at best an open secret.
136
137
Ibid.,under,‘WhoCreatedPORA?’
138
Ibid., under,‘Campaign’sfundingandresource supply’
139
140
Laughland,(27 November2004)
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/nov/27/pressandpublishing.comment
141
WikiLeaks,(18June 2012) https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2012-06-18-08-canvas-how-
a-us-funded-group-trains-opposition.html

47
The above evidence, allows us to draw several conclusions, concerning the effect of
international factorsonthe attractivenessof civil resistance tonetworkedsocial movements.Firstly,
states can provide repressive regimes with the very tools that are then used to repress anti-
government forces, therefore escalating the chances of violent clashes whilst also making it more
difficult for social movements to mobilise support. Secondly, where states have given support to
repressive regimesinline withprotectingtheirvital strategicinterestsinthe region,theyare unable
to directlyintervene topreventthe violentrepressionof anti-governmentforces.Thisisbecause such
support provides these regimes with the evidence that they are valuable allies to those states and
therefore that they are unlikely to jeopardise their own long-term strategic interests in support of
anti-government forces who, if they took power, may not be as accommodating. This allows these
regimes to ignore both requests not to violently repress protesters and to dismiss the threat of
sanctions if protesters are violentlyrepressedas not credible. Finally,where states have practised
such behaviours as above, that state can becomes a toxic brand to the citizens, making anything
associatedwithittaintedbyassociation.Thisisaparticularproblemforcivil resistance sinceitsroots
layin the work of American,Gene Sharp.Therefore,the originsof civil resistancehadtobe obscured
so as to prevent potential destabilisationof the movement, whereby the destabilised aspects could
potentiallyadoptviolence.Incontrast,non-state actorssuchas the internationalmediacanhighlight
a regime’s brutalitythatcanincrease international anddomesticsupport.Moreover,othernon-state
actors such as hacktivistsgroupswill readilylendtechnical supporttoanti-governmentforcessothat
theycan overcome regime censorshipwhichimprovesthe abilityof the networkedsocial movement
to control the narrative and thus receive the benefitswhichstemfromsuchcontrol.However,these
influencesare minorcomparedto the role that some non-state actorsplay inprovidingbothfunding
for civil resistance campaignsandthe trainingof revolutionaryvanguards.Aswe observedinchapter
twotheirinfluenceisconsiderable,when present,inaffectingthe choice of civilresistance.However,

48
it must be understood, that many non-state actors are not completely independent, receiving
significantfunding from states that utilise them to operate in environment where states dare not.

49
Conclusion.
This paperhas examinedthree factorsthatmay influence whynetworkedsocial movements
are choosing to adopt civil resistance instead of violence as a strategic option. On the basis of the
evidence presented in this paper, several conclusions can be drawn as to why networked social
movementsare choosingtoadoptcivil resistance insteadof violenttactics.Alsodiscussedwill be the
limitations of this paper and some areas for further research.
Vanguardism plays a hugely significant role in influencing the choice of civil resistance to
networked social movements. Through information campaigns, initial protest organisation and
coordination,preparationsforlong-termoccupationof protestlocationsandfinallythroughteaching
and example setting, vanguards guide networked social movements into almost unknowingly
adoptingcivil resistance. Tentatively,wecan side withLeninand suggestthatRoss’sconceptthatthe
movements involved in the recent political turmoil have adopted non-violent tactics spontaneously
without vanguards is debateable. However, it must be noted that societal divisions such as
sectarianism can limit the appeal of a vanguard’s information campaigns. Moreover, teaching and
example settingbyvanguardshaslimitationsinemotionallychargedenvironments,whereitisdifficult
to control large diverse crowds.
Regime type alsoinfluencesthe attractivenessof civil resistance overviolence.The evidence
suggests that Sharp was misguidedin his contentionthat civil resistance can be equally attractive in
one context as in another. Liberal democratic regimes tend to limit the scope for any of Sharp’s
mechanisms to actually bring about change. These regimes have built in systems of guaranteed
political change (elections),whichcivil resistance cannotoffer.Thismakesitmore difficulttogenerate
support as citizens support the established system. Civil resistance is actually a more attractive
prospectin repressive regimesthaninliberal ones.The digital sphere providesafree space in which

50
to organise and mobilise. Most importantly, this is a space which repressive regimes neither
understand, nor can effectively control. Before this change, there was little way in which social
movements could openly challenge such regimes aside from using violence. As with liberal regimes,
using violence will delegitimise a movement’s cause. However, movements operating against
repressive regimeshave additional incentivestoemploynon-violence inthat,repressive regimes will
use any example of violence asa pretextforviolentcrackdowns. Unlike inliberal regimes,the use of
violentrepressionallowsnetworkedsocial movementstohighlightthe barbaritytothe world,thereby
generating domestic and international support, although this is contingent on international support
helping the movement to overcome regime censorship.
Whenconsideringinternational factors,the directinterventionsof individual statesdamages
the attractiveness of civil resistance to networked social movements. This is primarily because they
have strategic interests. These interests can lead to states providing regimes withtechnical support
and aid that can be used to repress anti-government forces. They also inhibit an individual state’s
ability to intervene to prevent the repression of protesters. We can cautiously argue that Ritter’s
conception of an iron cage of liberalism is questionable, since regimes appear to understand that a
state’s strategic interests override all other concerns. Finally, because states support repressive
regimes,those statescanbecome taintedinthe eyesof the populationof those states.Thisevidence
supportsthe work of ChenowethandStephan,inthat whenindividual statesdointervene,itcan be
seen as politicised and therefore less welcome. Contrastingly, non-state actors play a subtle yet
markedrole inincreasingthe attractivenessof civil resistance.Internationalmediaorganisationshelp
to highlight the brutality of regimes, which leads to greater international support and domestic
participation in civil resistance campaigns. Hacktivist groups and multi-national corporations, can
provide technical support to anti-government movements allowing them to overcome regime
censorshipandreapthe mobilisationbenefitsthatcontrollingthe narrative brings.Mostimportantly,

51
non-state actors such as non-governmental organisationscanprovide the fundingforthe trainingof
revolutionary vanguard members and also the funding for their campaigns. There is however, a
significant caveat in that states often indirectly fund these non-state actors activities. This would
appearto confirmCastells’ argumentthatstatesstill retainsignificantinfluence inthe currentglobal
environment if theywork though the networksof power. However such links are extremely difficult
to demonstrate due to the indirect and covert nature of such relationships.
Thispaper,haslimitationswhichmustbe acknowledged.Mostimportantly,giventhe novelty
of this subject, there exists a distinct lack of primary sources concerning the networked social
movements that have adopted civil resistance. This paper has attempted to circumvent this issue
wherever possible. Nevertheless, such scarcity means that it has had to rely mostly upon the
secondaryliteraturewhichhasissueswithvalidityandreliability.Secondly,thispaperislimitedbythe
enormityof the three keythemesdiscussed.Thesethemescould easily be dividedintodistinctstand-
alone discussions where a greater level of analysis couldbe applied. Entire discussions could be had
justaboutthe role of hacktivistgroupsandtheirrelationshipstonetworkedsocialmovements’choice
of civil resistance.Onthispointof potential research,the conclusionsdrawnabove have made buta
dent into the civil resistance literature. Future research should focus on differentiating between
repressive regime types and how each impacts the choice of civil resistance by networked social
movements.The studyfoundthat civil resistance hasto be disguisedinorderfor it to be adoptedin
certain environments. This links back to the work of Nepstad and Vinthagen and highlights the
importance of local context plays in the acceptance of civil resistance. This is an issue for civil
resistance in particular because it has American origins, hence, wherever the United States has a
negative reputation,civil resistance will be less attractive to social movementsunless it is disguised.
Concealing the origins prevents potential destabilisation, which is a situation where more radical
groupscouldbe free topotentiallyadoptviolence.Aslongasthe UnitedStatesretainsitscurrentlevel

52
of global influence thiswill remainaproblemforthe attractivenessof civil resistance.Perhapsfuture
research should endeavour to discover how best to combat this image problem. The links that exist
between states, non-state actors and vanguards require further examination. As noted,establishing
these links would be extremely difficult, nevertheless, if achieved it would prove that states are
extremely influential actors as to why networked social movements adopt civil resistance. Civil
resistance appearsto be one of the most powerful leversforeffectingchange utilisedbynetworked
social movementsanditsrelativescholarlyneglectcannotcontinue,all thingsconsideredmuchwork
remains to be done.

The Pen is Mightier than the Sword MA Dissertation Final

The Pen is Mightier than the Sword MA Dissertation Final

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