The Irresponsibility of a People United States Foreign Policy and the Chilean Coup, 1964-1973

Mulvey 1
Dylan Mulvey
Prof. Joel Wolfe
Inter-American Relations
29 April 2016
The Irresponsibility of a People: United States Foreign Policy and the Chilean Coup, 1964-1973
The Chilean Coup of 1973 was the epicenter of a period of heightened United States
involvement in the South American nation of Chile. The United States interest in Chile was initially
piqued by the political ambitions of the socialist presidential candidate Salvador Allende. In the wake
of the Cuban Revolution, the United States feared the rise of another Marxist government within the
Western hemisphere. With its vast financial resources, the United States funded opposition candidates
and propaganda campaigns against Allende in the elections of 1964 and 1970. The former resulted in
the presidency of the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei who advocated for moderate reforms. The
results of the 1970 Chilean election were unfavorable to the United States, however, with Allende
earning a plurality in a three-way race. In accordance with the Chilean constitution, the vote was turned
to the congress who maintained the tradition of electing the candidate with the most votes. For the
following three years, it was the goal of the Nixon administration to guarantee the fall of Allende. Also
upset with the Allende government, was the Chilean military, which would go on to work closely with
the United States government to launch a successful coup against Allende, under the leadership of
General Augusto Pinochet. The coup had the blessings of many Chileans who were unhappy with
Allende's socialist policies and welcomed the coup. Unfortunately, for Chile, however, Pinochet
consolidated power in the months following the coup, refusing to give up power and ruling an
authoritarian regime until the 1990s. The campaign of economic interference on behalf of the United
States government and the fierce political polarization within Chilean society were the leading causes
of the 1973 Chilean Coup.

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The Chilean presidential election of 1964 was between the Christian Democratic candidate
Eduardo Frei and the Socialist candidate Salvador Allende. Backed by the United States, Frei was a
proponent of stability through reforms to address the inflation and dependence on the United States
economy that was brought on by his predecessor, President Jorge Alessandri. Frei advocated in favor of
reforms that included moderate wealth redistribution and the nationalization of the copper mines in a
policy known as “Chileanization,” which would consist of the Chilean government buying a majority
of shares in the corporations that controlled the Chilean copper mines. This policy was favorable to the
American businesses that had stakes in Chile because the mines were worth over seven billion dollars
and Allende would no doubt nationalize them without compensation. The foreign policy towards Latin
American at large during this time was known as the Alliance for Progress. The program was launched
during the Kennedy administration and sought to achieve economic and social justice through
democratic means, as well as to preserve capitalism in the region. The primary facet of the policy was
to grant aid to the countries, with as much as twenty billion dollars in assistance going to Latin
American countries throughout the 1960s.1
The active threat of a Marxist ascending to the presidency
of Chile made the country a primary focus of the United States. In order to support Frei, the United
States covertly authorized the use of over three million dollars, in addition to the aid already promised,
in the years leading up to the election that would go towards the prevention of a far left candidate from
holding office. Specifically, the funds were used for a massive propaganda campaign that made
strategic use of various media outlets, such as the press, radio, television, as well as print media. The
content of the propaganda ranged from images of Soviet tanks and publishing an anti-communist letter
written by Pope Pius XI. One particularly dirty facet of the propaganda campaign was the employment
of disinformation, also known as “black propaganda,” which consisted of publishing material under the
guise that it was written by another party with the intent of tarnishing the reputation of communists,
1 Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, (Lanham, MD:
Lexington, 2009) 26-30.

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causing infighting within their alliance, and confusing voters. The consensus surrounding the aid
toward the Frei campaign is that it awarded it a clear majority of the vote, as opposed to the plurality it
would have otherwise likely acquired.2
The 1964 election shows that the United States was willing to
commit numerous resources into guaranteeing the perceived stability of Latin America. The Alliance
for Progress and the covert aid to the Frei campaign were two sides of the same coin, the former being
the public face of the operation that maintained the narrative of the United States promoting democracy
and capitalism, while the latter subverted that message by undermining the democracy it claimed to
promote.
The Frei presidency, which lasted from 1964 to 1970, was largely a failure when measuring the
domestic policies of Frei. Likewise, the United States policy of the Alliance for Progress was also
deemed unsuccessful. The policy of “Chileanization” was carried out by the Frei administration and
Chile subsequently owned 51% of Braden Copper and 25% of Anaconda Corporation; Anaconda would
not sell any shares of the valuable Chiquicamata mine however. In its dealing with the foreign
companies, the administration acted weak, allowing them to depreciate their assets to pay lower taxes,
in addition to demanding tax deductions in exchange for their assurance that production would
increase. The consequence of the conciliatory policy is that the United States corporations maintained
their positions as people truly in control of the Chilean copper mines. Despite this, the Frei
administration carried out some reforms such as agrarian reform with compensated expropriation,
unionizing the peasants, and raising wages to match inflation. The reforms were mostly moot however
when it is taken into account that there was a recession in 1967, brought on by the drop in the price of
silver, and Frei refused to increase social spending, at the beckoning of the United States who wished to
maintain capitalist orthodoxy.3
The United States role in imposing its economic virtues on to Chile
2 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 14-17.
Lexington, 2009) 34-38.

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through the Alliance for Progress was greatly damaging to the country. The United States continued
pouring money into Chile, projects including the funding of a breakaway socialist party to split the vote
in future elections and the training of anti-communists.4
The exact numbers approach 1,100 Chilean
officers that were trained in counterinsurgency at the U.S. School of the Americas.5
All the while, the
people of Chile were suffering from a lack of medical care and 40% of Chileans were malnourished.6
Frei himself deemed the Alliance for Progress a failure, writing that “It cannot be said that since 1961
there has been a consolidation of democratic regimes in Latin America. On the contrary, various forces
have threatened democratic governments, seeking to overthrow them or to prevent the implementation
of their programs.” One of the key missteps he noted was that the Alliance did not include
representation for working class groups such as trade unions and student federations.7
The legacy of the
Frei administration is the failure of moderate, middle-of-the road policies that did not address the needs
of Chileans and brewed the masses for radicalization in the upcoming election. The inability of the
United States to prioritize the wellness of the Chileans over their own foreign policy initiatives likewise
contributed to the political instability that would arise in the 1970.
The 1970 Chilean presidential was among the most tumultuous in the nation's history. One
again, Socialist candidate Salvador Allende sought the office, with the other two contenders being
former president and conservative Jorge Alessandri, as well as Christian Democrat Radomiro Tomic.
Allende ran on a campaign of socializing the the banking and insurance industries, nationalizing the
copper mines, increasing wages, establishing ties with socialist countries, and land reform. Tomic also
ran a leftist campaign, a clear distinction between him and fellow Christian Democrat Frei, that
4 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 18.
Lexington, 2009) 40.
Lexington, 2009) 38-39.
7 Eduardo Frei Montalva, The Alliance That Lost Its Way, From Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, Latin American and the
United States: A Documentary History, (New York: Oxford UP, 2000), 256-257.

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platform of which constituted a policy of comprehensive land reform.89
The United States at this time
was run by Richard Nixon, who departed from the policies of his predecessors by stressing “trade and
not aid,” effectively abandoning the Alliance for Progress.10
Once more, the United States would raise
money on “spoiling operations” to fund the opposition candidates, however emphasis was placed on
hurting Allende rather than helping his rivals. Although 135,000 dollars was spent on these operations,
neither Alessandri nor Tomic gained the undivided financial support that Frei had benefited from in the
previous election.11
Part of the funds was dedicated to a “scare campaign” with the goal of causing
political polarization, financial instability, and ultimately encourage the military to mobilize and tack
action against undesirable results.12
The situation in Chile could have been forgone had the
conservatives and Christian Democrats allied and agreed to support the same candidate as the former
had done in the previous election, when they yielded tacit support to the Christian Democratic
candidate Eduardo Frei in order to prevent the election of Allende. Instead, the vote was split and
Allende attained a plurality of the vote. The consequence is that, in accordance with the Chilean
Constitution, the Chilean congress would choose who between the two front runners, Allende and
Alessandri, would be the next president.
The United States in response to this orchestrate a plan to prevent Allende from ascending to the
presidency. There were two facets to this plan, known as Track I and Track II. Track I was a covert
mission that included propaganda, economic, and political components with the intent of causing civil
unrest within Chile. The goal was to influence the congress into supporting Alessandri, who would then
be forced to resign so that Frei could run for another nonconsecutive term, which was allowed. The
Lexington, 2009) 49-50.

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United States hoped to accomplish this by employing propaganda that would create concerns for the
Chilean elite, including the congress, the military, and Frei himself. In particular, the tactics included
the spread of predictions that the Chilean economy would collapse under an Allende presidency. In
order to give legitimacy to this prediction, the United States also cut investment into Chile and
encouraged other nations to do the same. The plan also included the bribing of the congress which was
unsuccessful because its members adhered to the tradition of electing the candidate with the most
votes.13
Track II of the plan was to sew the seeds for a coup in Chile. President Nixon instructed
instructed the CIA Director Richard Helms to begin plans to orchestrate a military coup in the country
immediately after Allende received the plurality.14
In a secret meeting between the 40 Committee, the
group in charge of covert actions in Chile, “Mr. Helms, noting that the congressional action was not
likely to succeed, offered his personal observation that once Allende was in office it is predicable that
the Chilean opposition to him will disintegrate and collapse rapidly. He expressed the view that Allende
will quickly neutralize the military and police after which there will be no effective rallying point for
opposition against him.”15
With the views of Helms being the leading perspective among the Nixon
administration, the United States acted on its fears and threatened to cut off military funding to the
Chilean armed forces if they sat idly by while Allende was elected.16
Perhaps surprisingly, the coercion
was actually in agreement with the consensus of the military at the time. The Chilean military held a
Manichean view in regards to communism, no doubt influenced by the close relationship it held with
the United States military from training in the School of the Americas, and had begun to look inward
for Marxist foes.17
There were other competing perspectives regarding Chile within the Nixon
administration, however. A notable of such example being the views of Governor Nelson Rockefeller
13 Ibib, 23-25.
14 Ibid, 23.
15 NSC, Secret Meeting Minutes, Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 8 September 1970 From Peter Kornbluh,
The Pinochet File, (New York: The New Press, 2003), Document 4.
17 Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 47.

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who was commissioned by Nixon to write a report about Latin America in 1969. Rockefeller was in
favor of shaping United States trade policy with Latin American nations to be favorable to their
economic growth, such as lowering trade barriers and lowering interest rates on loans.18
He also argued
that the United States should be more tolerant of Latin American regimes, writing that “For many of
these societies . . . the question is less one of democracy or a lack of it than it is simply of orderly ways
of getting along. . . . the fundamental question for the United States is how it can cooperate to help
meet the basic needs of the people.”19
However, the reason this policy was not adopted likely has to do
with Nixon's stubbornness in dealing with Latin American countries, which he believed to be inferior to
the United States.20
The most vicious aspect of Track II was certainly the murder of General René
Schneider. The United States had seen Schneider, who was a progressive and constitutionalist, as a
threat to the coup and as such bribed his fellow soldiers, led by General Robert Viaux, to kidnap him
and bring him to Argentina; the plot was unsuccessful and resulted in the death of Schnedier.21
Overall,
both Track I and Track II were unsuccessful in their missions to prevent the Allende from being sworn
in as president of Chile. The efforts on behalf of the United States to prevent the election of Allende
were just the beginning of what was to come. The United States role in extending financial resources to
Chilean elections and fostering discontentment among the Chilean people and military preserved a
precedent already in place that would only be carried out much more dangerously in the coup of 1973.
The Chilean economy during Allende's presidency illustrates the interconnected nature between the
United States policies to Chile, as well as the effects Chilean domestic policy itself had on radicalizing
the society.
Lexington, 2009) 8-9.
19 Nelson A. Rockefeller, The Rockefeller Report, From Robert H. Holden and Eric Zolov, Latin American and the United
States: A Documentary History, (New York: Oxford UP, 2000), 265.
21 Ibid, 59-62.

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Before a coup could be successfully launched, Allende led Chile for approximately three years
with his tenure legitimizing the economic fears of the United States. The Allende government was
successful in passing legislation to nationalize the copper mines. The corporations were compensated
but there were “retroactive deductions” applied based on excess profits the businesses had acquired
since 1953. The result was that American companies such as Kennecott and Anaconda ended up having
to deduct more than the actual value of the mines, meaning that in effect the companies owed Chile
money on top of losing their assets.2223
The economic policy Allende espoused did little for the civilians
of Chile either and by the time Allende's days as president were numbered, many in the country were
openly calling for a coup. Notable examples included individuals who had had their property and
privileges taken away and housewives who were tired of waiting in food lines.2425
Part of the economic
troubles that face Chile can be attributed to the United States who had cut aid in Chile from 234 million
dollars in 1967 to nothing in 1971; the World Bank also issued no new loans to Chile during the
Allende years.26
The fears of the United States government, on behalf of corporations based around the
Chilean copper mines, were valid as Allende did not double down on his promise of nationalization of
the mines.
The military threat from Allende's Chile was essentially nonexistent and Washington's fears
were overplayed. There never a serious Soviet presence in the country and even if there was, the
Soviets would not have been any more of a potent threat to the United States because the advent of
intercontinental missiles meant that the Soviet Union could strike the United States from their
homeland already.2728
Moreover, Allende had little interest in freeing Chile from United States, only to
25 Ibid, 28.
27 Ibid, 27-28.

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subjugate his country to the whims of the Soviet Union.29
Contrary to this however, in a recorded
conversation with his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, Nixon said, “Now, I know all the
argument, of course, is that if we get out, then we lose our stroke there. And then, the Russians will be
—have to come in, and so forth and so on. The point is that he’s just going to weave us in. And the
point—And also, that treating him well is going to encourage others to go do likewise. That’s what I’m
more concerned about.”30
Nixon's worries of the Russians maintaining a military presence in Chile
were unwarranted. It is difficult to doubt the sincerity of his claims as it was a private conversation, but
it important to also mention that the CIA fabricated a connection of the Cuban military to Allende
during the same period.31
Although the Allende government posed no real military threat, the United
States would continue the tradition of pouring money into Chile with the intent of halting meaningful
reforms in the country.
In the years immediately before the coup of 1973 while Allende was still in power, the United
States supported the opposition to the government and maintained close ties to the Chilean military.
Fueling the rhetoric of the opposition groups to Allende manifested itself in a number of ways. One
such example is through the funding of opposition political parties directly, as well as an effort to break
up the Allende-led coalition, Unidad Popular. The United States also extended a significant amount of
financial support to the most popular newspaper in Chile, El Mercurio, sending 1.5 million dollars in
subsidies to the organization. The newspaper was right-leaning and served as a major propaganda
house for the United States; funds were also committed to businessmen's organizations and voter
registration drives. The most notorious opposition group to Allende was Patria y Libertad who had
previously received aid from the United States as a part of Track II. The residual effects of this played
out during the Allende presidency when they dressed in “full riot gear” during a truckers strike in an
29 Ibid, 86.
30 Richard Nixon, H.R. Haldeman, and Henry Kissinger, Conversation 517-004, 6-7 From Nixontapes.org - Nixon Tapes
and Transcripts.

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attempt to shut down the country's transportation system.32
In regards to the military, as previously
stated, the United States coerced the military into instigating a coup after Allende was declared
president. In justification for his support of the coup, Kissinger infamously declared “I don't see why
we need to stand idly by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own
people.”33
Using the military for intelligence, it is clear that the United States was aware of that the
1973 coup was being plotted in the months leading up to its execution.34
Furthermore, the United States
granted the military its blessings by guaranteeing support if the coup was successful.
On 11 September 1973, the tradition of uninterrupted democracy in Chile35
would come to an
abrupt end as the political climate of the country turned to the authoritarian. The revolutionary actor of
the coup was General Augusto Pinochet, who served as the head of the army under Allende. Pinochet
had largely stayed out of the political demonstrations up to coup and had convinced Allende of his
loyalty. Just days before the coup, however, Pinochet was approached by the other heads of the armed
service to pledge support for the coup, citing that it was the last opportunity.36
In the move of “a
cautious, apolitical opportunist,”37
Pinochet agreed to the terms of the coup, becoming its leader. In a
matter of days, the Chilean military would lead strike with a coup against Allende, attacking the
presidential palace, La Moneda, killing Allende, and pitting the nation in a civil war. The conflict itself
was relatively short, as the majority of Chileans submitted to the coup. The only real resistance came
from Allende's most fervent supporters and troops were sent throughout the working-class areas of the
Chilean capital Santiago, as well as in factories and universities.38
In an attempt to justify the military
coup, the CIA compiled a book known as the White Book which described Plan Z, an alleged plot by
33 Quoted by Seymour Hersh, in New York Times, September 11, 1974, 14 From Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela,
A Nation of Enemies, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 23.
35 Two short coups withstanding that both resulted in transitions back to democracy.
36 Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 50-52.
37 Ibid, 53.
38 Ibid, 17.

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Allende to assassinate the high-ranking military officers.39
The coup culminated in the establishment of
a military junta, with Pinochet at the head.
Following the coup, Pinochet worked decisively to consolidate power in his own hands. He
removed from power all of his rivals and most of the generals involved in the coup were dead or retired
after three years into his regime.40
Pinochet passed Decree Law 527 which granted indefinite terms to
the commanders of each branch of the military, himself serving as head of the army.41
The system of
government he developed constituted him as the executive, and then the heads of the military serving
as a legislature, Pinochet also having a vote on that.42
Chile under Pinochet featured immensely
repressive measures as well, including the use of secret police and widespread torture. Military
barracks, abandoned convents, and villas had been turned into prisons, with popular torture techniques
including shock therapy to the genitals, dunking in excrement, cigarette burns, blinding light, and sleep
deprivement.43
Indeed, in 1977, the United Nations condemned Chile for humans rights abuses.44
By
this point in time, attitudes in the United States towards Chile had become more unfavorable as the
Nixon years came to a close.
In conclusion, the primary cause for the Chilean coup of 1973 was the United States role in
destabilizing the country with its financial resources. The effect these funds fueled the fervor of the
Chilean society, straining the differences in political beliefs. The election of 1964 was a success in the
sense the Eduardo Frei won the presidency handily, however it set a precedent for the United States
involvement in Chilean politics and a specific distaste for Salvador Allende. By the election of 1970,
the United States tactics had grown worn and antiquated. The people of Chile were unhappy with
moderate reforms of candidates supported by the United States and the economic drain of corporations
39 Ibid, 37.
40 Ibid, 56.
41 Ibid, 57.
42 Ibid, 66.
43 Ibid, 94-95.
44 Ibid, 67.

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based in the United States. Allende would go on to win the election through a congressional vote and
the United States would subsequently work to guarantee that the government of Chile would function
improperly under Allende. The coupling of Allende's reforms which appealed to a niche group and the
United States economic attacks stood to further radicalize the people of Chile to the point that they
called on the military to overthrow the government. The Chileans made a miscalculation because the
junta established by General Pinochet would not relinquish power as in the coups of the past, but rather
consolidate power and rule Chile as an authoritarian leader with an iron fist. Although Allende was not
the greatest leader for Chile, it is apparent that the United States interests are best served if they are
more selective in choosing their battles and allowing countries to handle their own affairs without any
interference.

The Irresponsibility of a People United States Foreign Policy and the Chilean Coup, 1964-1973

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