The book by Jan-Erik Johanson focuses on strategy formation and policy-making within government, discussing both macro and microstrategies as tools to guide public organizations. It emphasizes the interplay between politics and administration, resource-based management, and the importance of social capital in governance while exploring case studies demonstrating these principles in practice. Additionally, it examines the relationship between economic systems and government actions, providing insights on how different modes of capitalism shape public policy and administrative reform.

1. JAN-ERIK JOHANSON (2019) STRATEGY FORMATION AND POLICY
MAKING IN GOVERNMENT. PALGRAVE

2. OUTLINE
• INTRODUCTION
• MACROSTRATEGIES IN GOVERNMENT
• MICROSTRATEGIES IN PUBLIC AGENCIES
• STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE
• CONCLUSIONS

3. THE FRIENDLY FLOATEES
• SOME 28 800 PLASTIC DUCKS FELL
OVERBOARD FROM A CONTAINER SHIP IN
1992

4. WHAT IS THE LESSON?
• PREPARE FOR THE UNEXPECTED
• BE READY TO USE THE UNANTICIPATED FOR YOUR BENEFIT
• PREFABRICATED PLANS CANNOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FOR THE UNFORESEEABLE

5. JAN-ERIK JOHANSON:STRATEGY FORMATION AND POLICY
MAKING IN GOVERNMENT. BASINGSTOKE.
PALGRAVE (2019)
This book describes the options offered by strategic management in
guiding public organisations. The book is based on the idea that
planning is only one option in orienting the functioning of public
organisations and applies resource-based and network studies. This
book examines developments within central governments and public
agencies. The book also addresses the strategic distinction between
politics and administration, and illustrates the connection between
goal setting and actual performance of government organisations.
Ebook: 978-3-030-03439-9
DOI:10.1007/978-3-030-03439-9
Hardcover ISBN:978-3-030-03438-2

6. OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
• MACROSTRATEGIES: THE GOVERNMENT AND
INTERACTION BETWEEN POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION, ECONOMY AND CIVIL SOCIETY
• MICROSTRATEGIES: THE AGENCIES AND INTERACTION
BETWEEN MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEES
• STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE
• CONCLUSIONS
Central
government
Government
agencies
Strategy in
context

7. COMMON SENSE?
REMEMBERING REPEATING
IT IS SAID YOU NEED 10 000 REPETITIONS TO
MASTER A SKILL
THINK OF SOME SKILLS: IRONMONGERING,
FOOTBALL AND WRITING
VERY LITTLE DEMAND FOR BLACKSMITHS, BUT
STILL SOME FOR FOOTBALLERS AND
PROFESSIONAL WRITERS
ARE YOU GOING TO BE A MASTER BLACKSMITH
FOOTBALL PLAYER OR BESTSELLER WRITER ONLY
WITH REPETITION?
REPATRIATION
THINK ABOUT A SHOPPING LIST
IS IT A CORRECT BRAND?
DOES IT SAY HALF A DOZEN OR SECOND
CLASS QUALITY?
DO BLACK-EYED BEANS QUALIFY FOR
BLACK BEANS OR ARE THEY INHERENTLY
WHITE BEANS?
SHOPPING LIST IS A PLAN FOR YOUR
FUTURE ACTIONS AND EVENTUAL
SUCCESS
IN A TYPICAL FOLKSTORY THE HERO EMBARKS
INTO A JOURNEY (CAMPBELL 1949)
THERE ARE OBSTACLES AND DANGERS
THE HERO WILL SURVIVE THE THREATS AND
RETURNS TO HOME SOMEWHAT CHANGED BUT
MENTALLY ENRICHED
WE ARE ALL HEROS OF OUR OWN LIVES!

8. STRATEGY FORMATION AS COMMON SENSE
STRATEGIC DESIGN
LONG-TERM, PLANNING BASED
INTERNAL STRATEGIC
SCANNING
INWARD-ORIENTED, RESOURCE-BASED
STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE
DIRECTED TO EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT,
NETWORK-BASED

9. MACROSTRATEGIES
STRATEGIC PLANNING & EVALUATION, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, REGULATION

10. SOCIETY AND IT’S PARTS
• ANTIHOLISTIC NOTION OF SOCIETY: THE ECONOMY, POLITY AND SOCIETY (POLANYI 1944).
• THREE PARTS ARE SUBSETS OF SOCIETY.
• THE ECONOMY IS CONCERNED WITH THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS;
• POLITY DEALS WITH DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE;
• WITHIN SOCIETY, KIN RELATIONSHIPS AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS ARE CONCERNED WITH
PARTICULAR NORMS AND OBLIGATIONS IN THE REPRODUCTION OF SOCIETY
• A VIEW BASED ON SOCIAL MEANINGS WOULD ILLUSTRATE THE POLITY, THE ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY AS OVERLAPPING AREAS (LANGE ET AL. 2015).

11. PARTS OF THE SOCIETY
ECONOMY
COORDINATED MARKET ECONOMIES (CME)
LIBERAL MARKET ECONOMIES (LME)
AND
MIXED MARKET ECONOMIES (MME)
POLITY
PATRONAGE
MANAGERIAL
CORPORATIST
AUTONOMOUS
CIVIL SOCIETY
BONDING
BRIDGING

12. CASE: IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMME IN FINLAND (CASE 3.1) (JOHANSON ET AL. 2017).
1.4.2015 31.5.2019
1.1.2016 1.1.2017 1.1.2018 1.1.2019
GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMME
IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN
5.11.2015
GOVERNMENT CRISIS
SOCIAL AND HEALTH REFORM
11.6.2016
CONSERVATIVE PARTY
CHANGEOF CHAIRMANGOVERNMENT NEGOTIATIONS
1.7.2015
GREEK DEBT CRISIS
10.6.2017
TRUE FINN'S
CHANGEOF CHAIRMAN
SPLIT OF THE PARTY
PLANNED REGIONAL ELECTIONS
29.6.2017
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COMMITTEE
DAMNING REPORTON THE BILL
TO EXPAND PATIENTS'
CHOICE OF CARE PROVIDER
19.4.2019
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
29.2.2016
COMPETITIVENESS AGREEMENT
WITH SOCIAL PARTNERS
INCREASE OF ASYLUM SEEKERS

13. PARTS OF THE
SOCIETY
POLITY: CLOSED VS. OPEN BUREAUCRACIES,
SEPARATION BETWEEN POLITICAL AND
BUREAUCRATIC CAREERS
ECONOMY: THE RELIANCE ON MARKET
EXCHANGE VS. STRATEGIC COORDINATION
CIVIL SOCIETY: INTRA-GROUP
RELATIONSHIPS (BONDING), INTERGROUP
RELATIONSHIPS (BRIDGING)

14. ECONOMY
THE ECONOMY IS CONCERNED
WITH THE PRODUCTION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS
MARKET-BASED ECONOMIES ARE
DIFFERENT IN STRATEGY-
RELEVANT WAYS
THERE ARE QUALITATIVELY
DIFFERENT TYPES OF MARKET
ECONOMIES

15. ECONOMY
THE MACRO ECONOMIC VIEW IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
ALFRED CHANDLER SCALE AND SCOPE:THE DYNAMICS
OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 1990
• INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT HIERARCHY AS A ROOT FOR
GROWTH ”MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM”
• USA MARKET COMPETITION AND FORDIST MASS PRODUCTION
• GERMANY FORDIST MASS PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT
HIERARCHY, BUT MORE COOPERATION AMONG RIVALS ”CO-
OPERATIVE MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM”
• UK THE INTEGRATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
”PERSONAL CAPITALISM”
MICHAEL PORTER COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF
NATIONS 1990
• NATIONS ARE SUCCESFUL IN THE SAME INDUSTRIES FOR LONG
PERIODS OF TIME
• THE SUCCESS IS BASED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCES, TECHNOLOGY AND SKILS
”INTANGIBLE CAPITAL”
• INTERNATIONAL TRADE ONLY EMPHASISES THE DIFFERENCES IN
PRODUCTIVE ORIENTATIONS
• THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS EXPLAIN
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (STOCK BASED/BANK BASED)

16. LATER MACRO-ECONOMIC VIEW. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM VIEW
(SEE JACKSON & DEEG 2006 FOR A REVIEW)
• FIRM-CENTRIC ANALYSIS: TO DEVELOP, PRODUCE
AND DISTRIBUTE GOODS AND SERVICES
PROFITABLY, A FIRM MUST EFFECTIVELY
COORDINATE WITH A RANGE OF ACTORS E.G.
INVESTORS, EMPLOYEES, UNIONS, THE STATE,
SUPPLIERS, BUYERS.
• LME: SECURING MARKETS (DISTANT STATE),
• CME: PROTECTING OF COLLECTIVE GOODS
(ENABLING STATE),
• MME: PUBLIC REGULATION AND COORDINATION
(ENCOMPASSING STATE)
• THERE ARE TWO IDEAL-TYPICAL FORMS OF CAPITALISM
– LIBERAL MARKET ECONOMIES (LME)
– COORDINATED MARKET ECONOMIES (CME)
BOTH OF THESE FORMS OF CAPITALISM INCLUDE A SET OF
‘COMPLEMENTARY’ INSTITUTIONS THAT FORM THE BASIS OF A
COUNTRY’S ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS AND LEAD TO
GOOD ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
• AND THIRD IMPURE FORM MIXED MARKET ECONOMY
(MME) WHICH COMBINES ASPECTS OF LME AND CME
• FRAGMENTATION OF ORGANISATIONS, POLITICIZATION OF
INTEREST GROUPS AND STRONG PRODUCTION AND REGULATION
ASPECT OF THE STATE, WELFARE MODEL IS NOT CLEAR

17. DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTION STRUCTURES? PATENTS
IN CME AND LME (HALL & SOSCISE 2001)
Germany USA
Patent specialization according to technology
Incremental
innovations
Radical
innovations

18. THREE DIRECTIONS OF LIBERALISATION (THELEN
2012)
Equality
Organisation of labour markets
And organization of employersUnorganized Organized
LessMore
Liberal market economy (LME)
Eg. USA, UK
Coordinated market economy
(CME) Germany
Dualisation
Nordic coordinated market economy
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland
Embedded flexibility

19. THREE DIRECTIONS TO LIBERALISATION (THELEN 2012)
DEREGULATION
REMOVING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR
MUTUAL COORDINATION AMONG
EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS
ESTABLISHING MARKETS TO REPLACE
COORDINATION
DUALISATION
SEPARATION OF JOB MARKETS TO CENTRE
- PERIPHERY STUCTURE
PRESERVATION OF PREVIOUS PRACTICES
WITHIN THE CENTRE
DECREASE OF BENEFITS WITHIN PERIPHERY
I,E, IN TEMPORARY AND ATYPICAL WORK
EMBEDDED FLEXIBILITY
SOCIAL POLICY ENABLES UNEMPLOYED
TO REGAIN EMPLOYMENT
COMPREHENSIVE AND CONTINUOUS
EDUCATION
BEFORE: WAGE MODERATION AND FULL
EMPLOYMENT
NOW: DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN
CAPITAL AND ADAPTATION TO THE
DEMANDS OF MACRO-ECONOMY

20. POLITY
• POLITY IS THE SPACE FOR POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
• POLITY DEALS WITH DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, BUT A VIEW FROM PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
DOES NOT ASSUME DEMOCRACY -> GOVERNANCE SUFFICES?
• STRATEGIC STATE THAT WORKS AS A CATALYST TO GUIDE SOCIAL LEARNING WHILE ALLOWING
THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY TO OCCUPY THEIR OWN TERRAINS AS INDEPENDENTLY AS POSSIBLE
(PAQUET 1996)
• DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES’ GOVERNMENT SPENDING, RANGING FROM 29 % OF GDP
IN IRELAND TO 57 % IN FINLAND IN 2015. THE PRIME REPRESENTATIVES OF LME AND CME
ECONOMIES LIE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES, AT 38 PERCENT IN THE USA AND 44
PERCENT IN GERMANY (OECD 2017)

21. POLI-CONCEPTS
• TRYING WITHOUT SEPARATION OF POLI-CONCEPTS
“ONE COULD SAY THAT POLITIK CONSTITUTES THE
REALISATION OF POLITIK IN THE SENSE OF POLICY, WITH
THE HELP OF POLITIK IN THE SENSE OF POLITICS ON THE
BASIS OF POLITIK IN THE SENSE OF POLITY”
…CONCEPTS LIKE ADMINISTRATION, PLANNING, AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS ARE PRIMARILY RELATED TO THE CONCEPT
POLICY. BUT WHEN POLITICAL THINKING INVOLVES
CONCEPTS LIKE POWER, AUTHORITY, CONFLICT AND
PARTICIPATION ONE WOULD SEEM TO DEALING WITH
STRONGER POLITICS ORIENTATION (HEIDENHEIMER 1986).
POLITY: COMMUNITY, CITY-STATE, NATION
STATE, EMPIRE
POLITICS: POWER STRUGGLE AMONG
ACTORS WITHIN POLITY
POLICY: PLANNED FORMATION OF SOCIAL
DOMAINS E.G. INDUSTRIAL POLICY, HEALTH
POLICY, EDUCATION POLICY

22. STRATEGY IS OFTEN
CONSIDERED OPPORTUNISTIC
IN POLITICS LITERATURE
‘THROWING GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD’ (INCREASING RESOURCES
AFTER LOSSES TO AVOID SUFFERING),
‘PASS THE BUCK’ (PLACE RESPONSIBILITY FOR A DECISION ON
SOMEONE ELSE),
‘JUMP ON THE BANDWAGON’ (DEFLECT BLAME BY SUPPORTING A
POPULAR ALTERNATIVE),
‘CIRCLE THE WAGONS’ (DIFFUSE BLAME BY SPREADING IT TO AS
MANY POLICYMAKERS AS POSSIBLE),
‘FIND A SCAPEGOAT’ (LOOK FOR SOMEONE ELSE TO BLAME),
‘STOP ME BEFORE I KILL AGAIN’ (E.G., PUT A COLLECTIVE CAP ON
SPENDING TO PREVENT SPENDING INCREASES IN INDIVIDUAL
MINISTRIES OR OFFICES),
‘BLAME THE PREDECESSOR’ (SEE TO THAT PRIOR RULERS GET SOME OF
THE RESPONSIBILITY) (WEAVER 1986).
BLAME AVOIDANCE AND
CREDIT-SEEKING

23. DEVELOPMENT OF BUREAUCRACY
THE CLERGY WAS INTIALLY A GOOD CHOICE FOR ADMINISTRATION, EDUCATION & INDEPENDENT MEANS
THE LAYMEN WERE MORE DEPENDENPT ON THEIR POSITION, SECURING OF POSITION IS IMPORTANT
PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATORS GAIN JOB SECURITY FOR OBEDIENCE AND EXPERTISE (ERTMAN 1997)

24. DEMARCATION BETWEEN
POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION IN
RESEARCH (ABERBACH ET AL 1981)
1. THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION, LATE 19TH CENTURY, WILSON)
2. INTERESTS/FACTS (BEGINNING OF THE 20TH
CENTURY, SIMON)
3. ENERGY/BALANCE (1960S)
4. HYBRIDISATION (1980S ONWARDS)

25. TYPES OF BUREAUCRACY
(DAHLSTRÖM & LAPUENTE 2017)
PURE TYPES OR IDEAL TYPES. THEY APPEAR AS MIXED FORMS
IN EMPIRICAL REALITY
PATRONAGE: OPEN RECRUITMENT, INTEGRATION OF
POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC CAREERS
CORPORATIST: CLOSED RECRUITMENT, INTEGRATION OF
POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC CAREERS
MANAGERIAL: OPEN RECRUITMENT, SEPARATED CAREER
PATHS FOR POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS
AUTONOMOUS: CLOSED RECRUITMENT, SEPARATED CAREER
PATHS FOR POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS

26. CONCEQUENCES
(DAHLSTRÖM & LAPUENTE 2017)
• NOT A PROBLEM BETWEEN OPEN AND CLOSED BUREAUCRACY, BUT THE MICTURE OF POLITICAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE CAREERS. IF MIXED NO ONE IS ABLE TO ’SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER’
• NOT A PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY, BUT OF OVERLY RESTRICTIVE BUREAUCRATIC RULES
• PROFESSIONALISM IS IMPORTANT, BUT PROFESSIONALS NEED NOT BE INSIDERS
• THE KEY IS TO COMBINE FLEXIBILITY WITH PROFESSIONALISM
• BUREAUCRATS CAN BE RECRUITED AND PROMOTED SIMILAR TO PRIVATE EMPLOYEES AND BE
REWARDED ACCORDING TO PROFESSIONAL AND NOT POLITICAL CRITERIA

27. CIVIL SOCIETY
• KIN RELATIONSHIPS AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS ARE CONCERNED WITH PARTICULAR NORMS
AND OBLIGATIONS IN THE REPRODUCTION OF SOCIETY (POLANYI 1944)
• CITIZENS AND VOLUNTARY ACTIVITY, ACCOUNTS SOME 4.5 PER CENT OF THE GDP
• SOCIAL SERVICES, EDUCATION AND HEALTHCARE MORE THAN HALF OF THE PRODUCTION
• GOVERNMENT FUNDING (32%), SERVICE CHARGES (43%) AND PHILANTROPIC GIVING (25%)
• USA: DECREASE OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN THE 1980S ONWARDS, COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY TO
FUND PRIMARY VOLUNTARY GOALS
• EUROPE: INCREASE OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE 1980S ONWARDS, GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND
EMPHASIS ON THE UNEMPLOYMENT

28. SOCIAL CAPITAL DISCUSSION (PUTNAM 1993,
2000)
Comparison of North and South Italy,
Hierarchical versus egalitarian structures
of society
Decreasing voluntary
activity in US

29. SOCIAL CAPITAL MAP OF THE WORLD

30. MICRO ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL (WOOLCOCK 1998)
“Bridging” the
quality of contacts
to other
communities
Good Anomie Social opportunities
Bad “Amoral individualism” “Amoral familialism”
Bad Good
“Bonding”The quality of connections within community
Bridging and bonding social capital

31. COMPARISON OF ITALIAN REGIONS

32. WHY SOCIAL CAPITAL IS IMPORTANT IN
GOVERNANCE?
(A) REDUCTION OF TRANSACTION COSTS: THROUGH TRUST,
NORMS AND NETWORKS TRANSACTIONS COULD BE REDUCED.
COLLECTIVE NORMS HELP TO COME TO A COMMON
UNDERSTANDING.
(B) FACILITATION OF THE DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND
INNOVATIONS: THE SPREAD OF KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION
COULD BE EASIER INSIDE A COMMUNITY BUT ALSO SOCIETY
WHERE INDIVIDUALS OR ORGANISATIONS ARE WIDELY LINKED
AND NETWORK TOGETHER.
(C) PROMOTION OF COOPERATIVE AND / OR SOCIALLY-MINDED
BEHAVIOUR: THE APPLICATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IDEAS COULD
SOFTEN THE NARROW SELF-INTEREST OF INDIVIDUALS AND
PRODUCE NORMS THAT SUPPORT COLLECTIVE ACTION.
(D) BENEFITS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIAL SPILL-OVER: THE RESULTS
FROM A RANGE OF STUDIES SUGGEST THAT WELL-CONNECTED
INDIVIDUALS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE ‘HIRED, HOUSED, HEALTHY AND
HAPPY’ IT CAN ALSO HAVE SOCIAL SPILL-OVER EFFECTS TO SOCIETY
E.G. THE HEALTH AND WELFARE SYSTEM COULD BE RELIEVED.
(E) LESS CAPITAL INTENSIVE INTERVENTIONS: THE INTEGRATION OF
SOCIAL CAPITAL COULD, LEAD TO A MORE EFFICENT ALLOCATION OF
THE BUDGET. THE STATE COULD PROVIDE FRAMEWORKS AND AN
ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR SOCIAL CAPITAL TO FLOURISH
(F) PEOPLE CENTRED PERSPECTIVE: THE APPROACH PUTS PEOPLE IN
THE CENTRE. SOCIAL CAPITAL IS ALL ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS, CO-
OPERATIONS, LINKS AND NETWORKS.

33. MACRO STRATEGY MODES
STRATEGIC DESIGN:
STRATEGIC PLANNING
AND EVALUATION
PHYSICAL, MACROECONOMIC, SOCIO-
ENVIRONMENTAL, DEVELOPMENT,
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM
INTERNAL STRATEGIC
SCANNING:
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
SELF-REFERENTIAL ACTIONS
E.G. NPA, NPM, PVM, NPS, NPG
STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE:
REGULATION IN
GOVERNANCE
GOVERNMENT: STICK, CARROT AND SERMON
ECONOMY/CIVIL SOCIETY: SELF-
REGULATION, CO-REGULATION

34. DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
FOUNDED AT THE BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE IN 1944, WORLD BANK AND
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND HAVE COMPLEMENTARY MISSIONS
• THE WORLD BANK GROUP WORKS WITH
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO
• REDUCE POVERTY AND INCREASE
PROSPERITY.
• PROVIDE FINANCING, POLICY ADVICE,
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENTS
• STRENGTHENING THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
• INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
• SERVES TO STABILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
AND ACTS AS A
• MONITOR OF THE WORLD’S CURRENCIES.
• KEEPS TRACK OF THE ECONOMY GLOBALLY AND IN MEMBER
COUNTRIES,
• LENDS TO COUNTRIES WITH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
DIFFICULTIES,
• GIVES PRACTICAL HELP TO MEMBERS.
• COUNTRIES MUST FIRST JOIN THE IMF TO BE ELIGIBLE TO JOIN
THE WORLD BANK GROUP.

35. PHYSICAL PLANNING (INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON URGAN AND TERRITORIAL PLANNING, UN 2015)
LEVELS
• SUPRANATIONAL (E.G CLIMATE CHANGE)
• NATIONAL
• CITY-REGION OR METROPOLITAN
• CITY AND MUNICIPALITY
• NEIGBOURHOOD
FEATURES
• ENFORCEABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
• SOUND & FLEXIBLE URBAN DESIGN
• AFFORDABLE & EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL
PLANNING

36. CASE: ONE CHILD POLICY IN
CHINA (CASE 3.3)
DESIGNING THE SIZE OF THE POPULATION.
FEAR OF POPULATION GROWTH AND ITS STRAIN ON THE
ECONOMY
HAS LEAD TO
OVERPRESENTATION OF MEN IN THE POPULATION
GROWTH IN THE PROPORTION OF THE ELDERLY
STRAIN ON THE PENSION SYSTEM
STRESS ON THE SOCIAL CARE

37. CASE: INTERNATIONAL SPACE
STATION (CASE 3.2)
ONE OF THE LARGEST AND MOST COMPLICATED TECHNOLOGICAL
PROJECTS IN THE HUMAN HISTORY
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE MODULES
INDEPENDENT MANAGEMENT OF THE PARTS OF THE STATION
LIMITED TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY AFTER THE RETIREMENT OF THE
SPACE SHUTTLE FLEET IN 2011
THE AIMS: SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH,
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS

38. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM STRATEGIES (TABLE 3.1)
Administrative
reform strategy
New Public
Administration
(NPA)
New Public
Management
(NPM)
Public Value
Management
(PVM)
New Public
Service
(NPS)
New Public
Governance
(NPG)
Vision of public
good
Social equity in
less bureaucratic
administration
The bankruptcy of
bureaucracy
Guidance for
public
executives,
reaction to the
weakness of the
NPM
Democratic
ideal as
antithesis to the
economic
approaches of
the NPM
Integration of
policymaking
and service
delivery
Nature of the
state
Unitary Disaggregated Pluralistic Pluralistic Pluralistic
Role of public
administration
Public
administration as
part of
policymaking
Guiding service
inputs and
outputs in
particular
Creating public
value to satisfy
citizens and
politicians
Servicing
through
negotiation and
brokering
Collaborating
with other
suppliers and
users
Means Managing
boundary
exchanges
Market
contracting,
internal
government
contracts
Providing
service,
establishing
legitimacy,
evaluating public
value
Building
coalitions
among public
and private
organisations
and non-profits
Trust and
informal,
relational
contracting
Adapted from Pyun & Gamassou 2018, pp. 255-258.

39. NEW REGULATIVE
ORDER (LEVI-FAUR 2013)
• BUREAUCRATIC REGULATION IS
SEPARATED FROM SERVICE DELIVERY.
• REGULATION IS SEPARATED FROM
POLICYMAKING.
• REGULATION IS A SEPARATE STAGE IN
POLICYMAKING.
• FORMAL RULES AND CONTRACTS
REPLACE DISCRETION AND INFORMAL
RELATIONSHIPS.
Adapted from Steurer 2013

40. REGULATIVE METHODS (BALDWIN, CAVE ET AL. 2012)
• COMMAND AND CONTROL,
• INCENTIVE-BASED REGIMES,
• MARKET-HARNESSING CONTROLS,
• DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS,
• DIRECT ACTION AND DESIGN SOLUTIONS,
• RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES,
• PUBLIC COMPENSATION,
• AND SOCIAL INSURANCE SCHEMES
• LEGISLATIVE BACKING, IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
• E.G. OFFERING A TAX REDUCTION ON ELECTRIC CARS
• PROVIDING ADEQUATE SERVICE TO CUSTOMERS
• PROHIBITIONS ON MISLEADING INFORMATION
• E.G. REGULATION OF CONSTRUCTION THROUGH BUILDING STANDARDS
• TOLERANCE LEVELS FOR HARMFUL ACTIVITIES SUCH AS POLLUTION
• REDUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL RISK

41. CASE: WHO IS THE HAPPIEST?(CASE 3.4)
(UNITED NATIONS HAPPINESS REPORT 2018)
THREE WAYS TO HAPPINESS:
THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE. IMMEDIATE GRATIFICATION OF DESIRES,
EUDEMONIC: THE POSSIBILITY TO FOLLOW ONE’S OWN VIRTUES AND TO USE
THEM FOR THE BENEFIT OF OTHERS.
THE PRINCIPLE OF ENGAGEMENT IN WHICH THE SENTIMENT OF ’FLOW’ MAKES
YOU FORGET TIME AND PLACE.
HAPPIEST COUNTRIES: SWITZERLAND, NORWAY, DENMARK, FINLAND. SMALL
DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES WITH VARIETY OF PUBLIC SERVICES
THE CONTAGION OF HAPPINESS. IMMIGRANTS ACHIEVE HAPPINESS LEVELS OF
THE HOST COUNTRIES, BUT RETAIN A FOOTPRINT OF THE COUNTRY OF THE
ORIGIN
THREATS TO HAPPINESS IN INDUSTRUALIZED COUNTRIES: OBESITY, SUBSTANCE
ABUCE, DEPRESSION
I am an anarchist
Don't know what I want
But I know how to get it

42. CHOICE OF REGULATION BY SCALE OF ACTION (TABLE 3.2)
Constitutional Collective
Locus:
System
Designing
institutions
Policy management
Locus:
Organisation
Designing network
structures
Network management
• THINK OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
• FOLLOWING A RULE,
• DEFINING A RULE FOR ACTION,
• MAKING A RULE TO DEFINE ALL OTHER
RULES
Adapted from Hill & Hupe 2002, p. 183 Hill & Hupe 2006, p. 562, based on Ostrom.

43. MICROSTRATEGIES IN PUBLIC AGENCIES
STRATEGIC DESIGN, INTERNAL STRATEGIC SCANNING, STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE

44. MICRO STRATEGY MODES
STRATEGIC DESIGN
DESIGN FOR POLITICIANS,
ORGANISATIONAL PROCESSES,
PERFORMANCE REGIMES
INTERNAL STRATEGIC
SCANNING:
RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE AND
CAPABILITIES
STRATEGIC
GOVERNANCE
MEDIATOR, BENEFICIARY AND
MASTER

45. Internal strategic
scanning
Strategic governance
Strategic design
Programming
Combining Sharing
THREE STRATEGY MODES FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
(FIGURE 4.1) (JOHANSON 2009, 2014 SEE JOHANSON & VAKKURI 2017)
Looking ahead.
How is going to be?
Looking in.
How are we doing?
Looking out.
How to deal with
our partners?
Opportunities and threatsStrenghts and weaknesses

46. STRATEGY TRIANGLE ELABORATED (TABLE 4.1)
Strategic design Internal strategic
scanning
Strategic governance
The role of strategy Expanding and
organizing duties
(programming)
Novel ways of matching
resources to fulfil duties
(combining)
Sharing duties with external
partners (relating)
Assumption about
the environment
Disturbed-reactive Turbulent fields Turbulent fields, network
order
Primary type of
capital
Financial Human Social
The role of the
public manager
Structural:
Primus inter pares
Craft:
Hatchet man
Institution:
Ambassador
The position of the
professions
Planning aid Matching partner Boundary object
Managerial control Budget Division of labour Contract
Main challenges Unanticipated
situations
Rigid resources,
misinterpretation of
resources
Contracting costs,
Overwhelming external
stakeholders

47. STRATEGIC DESIGN IN PUBLIC AGENCIES
POLITICS, PROCESSES, PERFORMANCE

48. Internal strategic scanning Strategic governance
Strategic design What the future looks like?
What do we have?
Strenghts and
weaknesses
Who are our partners?
Threats and opportunities
Programming
Combining Sharing
Politics as markets
Organisational processes
Performance regimes
STRATEGIC DESIGN (JOHANSON 2009,2008)

49. THE FOCUS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING RESEARCH (TABLE 5.1)
(WOLF & FLOYD 2017)
Proximate outcomes Distant outcomes
Internal focus Quality of strategic decision-
making, integration and
coordination, shared
understanding and
commitment, strategic
thinking, planned emergence
Organisational performance,
strategic change and renewal,
realised strategy,
organisational learning,
dynamic capability
External focus Strategy communication,
legitimation
Adaptation, strategic legitimacy

50. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
RESEARCH
• DECREASE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING STUDIES WTIHIN BUSINESS FIRMS
• PRIVATE EMPHASIS ON THE PERFORMANCE, VERY LITTLE WORK DONE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
• INCONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE FOR THE STRATEGY - PERFORMANCE LINK
• SOME INDICATION THAT IN MEGA-TURBULENT ENVIRONMENTS COMPREHENSIVE LONG-TERM PLANNING PAYS
OFF IN BUSINESS
• PAST PRIVATE EMPHASIS ON THE INDUSTRY, NO EQUIVALENT OF INDUSTRY WITHIN PUBLIC SECTOR
• COMMON EMPHASIS ON THE FOCUS OF THE FEATURES OF THE ENVIRONMENT
• NOT MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE STRATEGIC INTER-ORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS IN BUSINESS OR IN
GOVERNMENT

51. POLITICS AS MARKETS
Public administration Corporate governance
Environmental
markets
Oversight bodies behave like markets Purchasing behaviour defines markets
Relationships
among key
actors
Collaboration among organisations
offering a given service
Competition among organisations
offering a given service
Source of
finance
Financed through budgets (free
services)
Financed through fees and charges
Political
influence
Buffering to deal with attempts to
influence
Political influence handled as
exceptions
Organisational
processes and
goals
Shifting, complex and difficult to
specify
Clear and agreed upon
Limits on
authority
Implementation contingent on
stakeholders outside of
management’s control
Implementation done by
management, who have the power to
act
Performance
regime and
performance
expectations
Vague and in constant flux Clear and fixed for long periods of
time

52. ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES
INFLUENCE OF POLITICS
• PLANNING OF RESOURCES AND
BARGAINING WITH THE GOALS
• SHORT PLANNING CYCLES: ELECTORAL
TERM, ANNUAL BUDGET CYCLE
• PATH DEPENDENCE OF THE INSTITUTIONS:
THE WEIGHT OF PREVIOUS LEGISLATION
ORGANISATIONAL PROCESSES
• THE POSSIBILITY OF AGENCIES TO COOPERATE
WITH OTHERS
• THE CONTRADICTION AND COOPERATION
BETWEEN PROFESSIONALS AND MANAGERS
• THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER NETWORKS IN
DIFFERENT LEVELS (COMMUNITY, NETWORK,
ORGANISATION/PARTICIPANT).

53. PERFORMANCE REGIMES
• AGENCIES ARE A RESULT OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE, TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IS NOT A GOOD
EVALUATION CRITERIA (MOE 1986)
• AGENCY FORMATION AS BLAME AVOIDANCE STRATEGY (HOOD 2011)
• POTENTIAL OUTCOMES OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ARE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENHANCED
ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITIES OR LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF PERFORMANCE (POISTER
2010).
• A PROSPECTING STRATEGY IMPROVES PERFORMANCE AND USUALLY PRODUCES BETTER
RESULTS THAN DEFENDER OR REACTOR STRATEGIES (BOYNE, WALKER 2010).

54. CASE: DESIGN OF
ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY (CASE
5.2)
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK WAS A SMALL AND NEW UNIVERSITY
ESTABLISHED IN 1965, BUT IT HAS EXPANDED AND GAINED ACADEMIC
RECOGNITION
IN 2013 OVER 23 000 STUDENTS, TOP 60 UNIVERSITY IN THE WORLD
(QS WORLD UNIVERSITY RANKING)
ENTREPRENEURIAL CULTURE, DIVERSIFIED FUNDING, ORIENTATION TO
APPLIED RESEARCH, PROJECTS AND RESEARCH CENTERS FOR EXTERNAL
INTERACTION
CRITICAL INCIDENT IN 1970: STUDENT UNREST AND DISCOVERY OF
DOCUMENTS INDICATING MANAGEMENT SPYING STUDENTS AND
FACULTY FOR OUTSIDERS. - BEGINNING OF A HEALTHIER IDENTITY?

55. CASE: VALUE-BASED HEALTHCARE
(PORTER & TEISBERG 2006) (CASE 5.1)
THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF HEALTHCARE: MAXIMAL HEALTH OUTCOMES
WITH THE GIVEN RESOURCES
THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM: CONCENTRATION OF ASSESSING
INPUT AND PROCESSES, BUT NOT HEALTH CONCEQUENCES
ASSESSMENT SHOULD CONSIST OF 1) HEALTH STATUS, 2) PROCESS
OF RECOVERY, AND 3) SUSTAINABILITY
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY: THE DEFINITION OF OUTCOMES NOT
ONLY IN TERM OF PROFITS, MORE VOICE TO THE CUSTOMERS

56. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF STRATEGIC DESIGN
• SIZE MATTERS: LARGER ORGANISATIONS ARE MORE LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN FORMAL PLANNING PROCEDURES
(BOYNE, GOULD-WILLIAMS ET AL. 2004).
• A CHANGE IN AN ORGANISATION’S MANDATE ENCOURAGES STRATEGY FORMULATION (BARZELAY, JACOBSEN
2009).
• STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ARE ADOPTED THROUGH NETWORK CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
AGENCIES AND CONTACTS WITH PRIVATE BUSINESSES (BERRY 1994).
• AVAILABLE RESOURCES ARE AN IMPORTANT DETERMINANT OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT EXERCISES (BOYNE ET
AL. 2004),
• THE BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO STRATEGY FORMATION TENDS TO INCREASE CONSENSUS REGARDING
GOALS BUT COMPLICATE IMPLEMENTATION (KISSLER, FORE ET AL. 1998, WHEELAND 1993, HENDRICK 2003).

57. DESIGN CHALLENGES
• STRATEGY AS AN ENTITY. SEPARATION OF STRATEGY FROM EVERYDAY ACTIVITIES. SEPARATE TASK WHICH BECOMES YET ANOTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE DUTY
• ENFORCED STRATEGY. OUTSIDE POLITICAL INFLUENCE DICTATES THE INITIATION OF STRATEGY FORMATION. RITUALISTIC TENDENCIES,
BOX-TICKING PRACTICES. LIMITS STRATEGIC OPTIONS OF THE AGENCY, BUT MIGHT INCREASE THE STRATEGIC NATURE OF THE
GOVERNMENT AS WHOLE.
• FALLACY OF PERFORMANCE. A LESSON FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING THE INTERCONNECTIONS
BETWEEN PROXIMATE OUTCOMES OF STRATEGY MAKING AND THEIR PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES INSTEAD OF TRYING TO TIE
PERFORMANCE TO THE INITIAL STAGES OF STRATEGY FORMULATION OR STRATEGIC PLANS.
• DOUBLE-BIND STRATEGIES. THE COMBINATION OF EX ANTE INPUT CONTROL AND EX POST PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT. AS A
RESULT, STRICTLY RESCTRICTED ACTIONS.

58. INTERNAL STRATEGIC SCANNING IN PUBLIC AGENCIES
RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE AND DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES

59. Internal strategic scanning Strategic governance
Strategic design
What the future looks like?What do we have?
Strenghts and
weaknesses
Who are our partners?
Threats and opportunities
Programming
Combining Sharing
Resource-based view
Knowledge-based view
Dynamic capabilities
THREE MODES OF STRATEGY FORMATION (JOHANSON 2009,2008)

60. RESOURCE-BASED VIEW
IDEAS FROM EDITH PENROSE: MANAGEMENT DEFINES BOTH SUPPLY AND DEMAND, PROBLEMS
OF GROWTH ARE PROBLEMS OF MANAGEMENT THINKING, MANAGEMENT HAS AN IMPORTANT
ROLE IN GUIDING ORGANISATIONS
RESOURCE-BASED VIEW: LEARNING, THE USE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE CREATION
AND CULTURE AS VALUABLE ASPECTS OF STRATEGY
INTERNAL FOCUS ON THE RESOURCES OF THE ORGANISATION

61. RESOURCE-BASED VIEW
BASIC INGREDIENTS OF
RESOURCES (VRIN/VRIO)
• VALUABLE ’WORTH SOMETHING’
• RARE ’DIFFICULT TO FIND’
• INIMITABLE ’DIFFICULT TO ADAPT’
• NON-SUBSTITUTABLE, ORGANIZATION CAN
CAPTURE THEM ’UNIQUE QUALITIES,
AVAILABLE FOR USE’
RELEVANCE FOR PUBLIC AGENCIES
• VALUE IS EQUALLY RELEVANT IN AGENCIES
• THE OTHER CRITERIA SUPPOSE COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT WHICH DOES NOT PORTRAY
THE PURSUIT OF PUBLIC INTEREST
• CAN BE EMPIRICALLY RELEVANT

62. RESOURCE-BASED VIEW
• PUBLIC AGENCIES POSSESS VALUABLE RESOURCES (LABOUR. BUILDINGS, ICT)
• SOME OF THE RESOURCES HAVE MARKET VALUE, SOME DO NOT
• THE AIM IS TO CREATE VALUE, NOT SO MUCH TO CAPTURE IT
• THE FIRM TRIES TO CAPTURE VALUE, BUT OFTEN NEEDS TO PRODUCE SOME VALUE TO CAPTURE IT
• SOME VALUE CAPTURE IS NEEDED FOR SURVIVAL AND SOLVING OF CONFLICTS
• IF VALUE CREATION (AND NOT COMPETITION) IS THE AIM OF THE PUBLIC AGENCY THERE IS A
NEED FOR AUTONOMY TO BE ABLE TO FIND WAYS TO CREATE VALUE AND PERFORMANCE
BASED BUDGETING SYSTEM TO SHOW SUCCESS IN THE VALUE CREATION

63. THE RESOURCES OF
PUBLIC AGENCIES
• SPECIALISATION IS BENEFICIAL FOR AN AGENCY
• HIGHLY TECHNICAL DUTIES
• THE EXISTENCE OF DOMINANT PROFESSION WITHIN
AGENCY
• PERFORMANCE OF HIGHLY VALUED DUTIES IN SOCIETY
THE KNOWLEDGE AND CAPABILITIES OF
ADMINISTRATORS: THEIR EXPERTISE, ABILITY
TO GENERATE INFORMATION AND ADVICE,
AND POSSESSION OF A DOMINANT
PROFESSION

64. ROUTINES AND CAPABILITIES
ROUTINES CAPABILITIES
COLLECTIVE EQUIVALENT OF SKILL
REPETITIVE ACTIONS BEHAVIOURAL AND COGNITIVE
IMPROVE COORDINATION AND CONTROL,
REDUCE UNCERTAINTY,
HELP SETTLE UNDERLYING CONFLICTS,
PRESERVE COGNITIVE CAPACITY
STORE KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMATION
CONSISTS OF NUMBER OF ROUTINES
ABILITY TO ACQUIRE, CONVERT, APPLY AND
PROTECT KNOWLEDGE
ALTERING CAPABILITIES MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT
THAN CHANGING RESOURCES

65. KNOWLEDGE ASSETS
• TACIT AND EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE
• IN KNOWLEDGE CREATION THE CIRULATION BETWEEN EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT KNOWLEDGE IS
IMPORTANT (NONAKA & TAKEUCHI 1995)
• EXPLOITATION AND EXPLORATION
• USE OF THE EXISTING KNOWLEDGE IS SAFE AND PREDICTABLE
• SEARCH FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE DEMANDS TIME AND ENERGY, RESULTS ARE UNPREDICTABLE
(MARCH 1991)

66. EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE FINDINGS WITHIN PUBLIC
AGENCIES
• LIVELY INTERACTION WITHIN TEAMS COMBINED WITH LEADER DOMINATED EXTERNAL
INTERACTION INCREASES PERFORMANCE (JANHONEN & JOHANSON 2011)
• PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY PROMOTES KNOWLEDGE SHARING (KIM & LEE 2016)
• LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES INFLUENCE KNOWLEDGE SHARING (DAWES &
CRESSWELL 2012)
• FORMALITY DECREASES KNOWLEDGE SHARING, TRUST INCREASES IT (WILLEM & BUELENS
2007)

67. ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
(COHEN & LEVINTHAL 1990)
ABILITY TO GRASP NEW INFORMATION FROM
OUTSIDE
THE NEED FOR AGENCY-SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE
FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES
ENABLES TO MIX EXPLOITATION AND
EXPLORATION
CAN BE USED FOR DETECTING WARNING
SIGNALS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT

68. DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
(EISENHARDT & MARTIN 2000)
TO BUILD, INTEGRATE AND RECONFIGURE INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL COMPETENCES TO RESPOND TO A
RAPIDLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
HIGHER ORDER CONSTRUCT THAT ENCOMPASSES
BUNDLES OF ROUTINES BUT ALSO THE USE OF
DIFFERENT RESOURCES
THE SHIFTING CHARACTER OF THE ENVIRONMENT;
CERTAIN STRATEGIC RESPONSES ARE REQUIRED
WHEN TIMING IS CRITICAL

69. DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
PROCESSES
IDENTIFY THE THREATS AND
OPPORTUNITIES (SENSING)
TO MAKE STRATEGIC CHOICES (SEIZING)
RECONFIGURE THE ORGANISATION’S
RESOURCES, STRUCTURE AND
CAPABILITIES (TRANSFORMING)
KNOWLEDGE
THE ADAPTION OF KNOW-HOW, I.E.
SOCIALISATION PRACTICES TO EMBODY
TACIT KNOWLEDGE
THE CAPACITY TO LEARN AND TO EXPAND
KNOW-HOW INTO KNOW-WHY
STRATEGIC FEATURES
DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES DEAL WITH
STRATEGIC, GOAL-ORIENTED PROCESSES
THEY MAY INCLUDE EXPERIMENTAL ROUTINES
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES MAY REQUIRE THE APPLICATION
OF BEST PRACTICES AND SUBSTITUTABLE
CAPABILITIES
SOME INTEGRATE OR RECONFIGURE
RESOURCES, OTHERS ENABLE
ORGANISATIONS TO OBTAIN AND RELEASE
RESOURCES

70. CASE: PORT OF SINGAPORE (GORDON ET
AL. 2005) (CASE 6.1)
SMALL COUNTRY WITH HETEROGENEUOUS POPULATION AND FEW
NATURAL RESOURCES
THE FAVOURABLE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION GIVES A COMPETITIVE
EDGE FOR THE PORT OF SINGAPORE
THE AVAILABILITY OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO EXPAND THE PORT
THE EDUCATION OF THE SKILLED WORKFORCE FOR THE USE OF
DESIGN OF THE LOGISTICS OF THE PORT
THE COMBINED PORT OPERATIONS ACCOUNT FOR 7 PER CENT OF
THE GDP OF THE SINGAPORE

71. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES
WITH PUBLIC AGENCIES
• THE USE OF DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES THROUGH EXPERIMENTATION: LABOUR INTENSIVE & TIME
CONSUMING. MANAGERS HAD TO IDENTIFY LATENT CAPABILITIES, CREATING OPPORTUNITIES
FOR TRUSTING RELATIONSHIPS AS WELL AS BALANCING EMPLOYEE INITIATIVES WITH
ORGANISATIONAL GUIDANCE AND CONTROL. (PABLO ET AL. 2007)
• CROSS-FUNCTIONAL TEAMS SUPPORT CAPABILITY BUILDING (DANIEL, WILSON 2003).
• PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS AND SLACK RESOURCES INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT
ORGANISATIONS WILL SEARCH FOR INNOVATIONS (SALGE, VERA 2013).
• DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES INDIRECTLY INFLUENCE PERFORMANCE (PIENING 2011)

72. STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC AGENCIES
MEDIATOR, BENEFICIARY AND A MASTER

73. STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE (JOHANSON 2009, 2008)
Strategic scanning
Strategic governance
Strategic design
What the future looks like?
What do we have?
Strenghts and
weaknesses
Who are our partners?
Threats and opportunities
Programming
Combining Sharing
Mediator
”benevolent mediator”
Tertius Gaudens
”business partner”
Divide et impera
”antitrust agent”

74. THE TRIAD (SIMMEL 1950)
SOCIETY IN A NUTSHELL
• COMPOSED OF THREE ELEMENTS
• MINORITY/MAJORITY
• MEDIATION/RIVALRY/COALITION
• IF ONE LEAVES, A PAIR (DYAD) REMAINS
• ADDITION OF NEW MEMBERS DOES NOT
CHANGE THE SITUATION
POSSIBLE STRATEGIES
MEDIATION
COMPETITION ’ TERTIUS GAUDENS’
’DIVIDE ET IMPERA’ DIVIDE-AND-RULE

75. MEDIATION:
BROKERAGE ROLES (FERNANDEZ & GOULD 1994)
Think these constellations in terms of the actor A. The arrows point to a movement of resources
Information or otherwise. The oval circles denote group membership. There are maximum of three different groups.

76. COMPETITION: TERTIUS GAUDENS
(SIMMEL 1950, BURT 1992)
THINK THESE CONSTELLATIONS IN TERMS OF ACTOR A.
STRUCTURAL HOLE OFFERS TWO TYPES OF BENEFITS
1) ACCESS TO NON-REDUNDANT INFORMATION FROM
INDEPENDENT SOURCES
2) CONTROL BENEFITS FOR MANAGING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
B AND C.
IN RESTRICTED RELATIONSHIP BOTH INFORMATION AND CONTROL
BENEFITS ARE LOST

77. DIVIDE-AND-RULE: COALITIONS IN TRIADS (CAPLOW 1956)
Type 1 A=B=C
Type 2 A>B, B=C, A<(B+C)
Type 3 A<B, B=C
Type 4 A>(B+C), B=C
Type 5 A>B>C, A<(B+C)
Type 6 A>B>C, A>(B+C)
The power resources of actors
The plus signs denote to the likely alliances in a group. The size of
The actor refers to amount of power resources.

78. TYPES OF PUBLIC AGENCIES (DUNLEAVY 1989)
• 1) DELIVERY AGENCIES, DELIVER SERVICES AND
ARE LABOUR INTENSIVE;
• 2) REGULATORY AGENCIES, REGULATION OF
OTHER AGENCIES OR ENTERPRISES;
• 3) TRANSFER AGENCIES, PAYMENT OF
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES OR ENTITLEMENTS
TO INDIVIDUALS OR ENTERPRISES;
• 4) CONTRACTS AGENCIES, FOCUS ON
DEVELOPING SERVICE AND CONTRACTING
OUT TO PRIVATE-SECTOR FIRMS;
• 5) CONTROL AGENCIES, GRANT PROVISION
TO OTHER PUBLIC-SECTOR BUREAUCRACIES,
AND TO SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
• 6) TAXING AGENCIES, TAX COLLECTION,
• 7) TRADING AGENCIES, OPERATE
COMMERCIALLY PROVIDING SERVICES TO
OTHER GOVERNMENT BODIES, FULL CHARGE
• 8) SERVICING AGENCIES, FACILITIES OR
SERVICES TO OTHER GOVERNMENT BODIES,
NO CHARGE

79. TYPES OF AGENCIES IN TRIADIC CONTEXT
MEDIATOR
”BENEVOLENT
MEDIATOR”
•DELIVERY AGENCIES,
–DIRECT DELIVERY OF SERVICES, LABOUR
INTENSIVE
•TRANSFER AGENCIES,
–THE PAYMENT OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES TO
INDIVIDUALS OR ENTERPRISES;
•TAXING AGENCIES,
–TAX COLLECTION
•SERVICING AGENCIES,
–PROVIDE SERVICES TO OTHER
–GOVERNMENT BODIES, NO CHARGE
”TERTIUS GAUDENS”
BUSINESS PARTNER
CONTRACTS AGENCIES,
DEVELOPING SERVICE OR CAPITAL
SPECIFICATIONS AND THEN
CONTRACTING OUT TO PRIVATE-
SECTOR FIRMS
TRADING AGENCIES,
OPERATE COMMERCIALLY OR QUASI-
COMMERCIALLY PROVIDING SERVICES
TO OTHER GOVERNMENT BODIES,
FULL CHARGE
DIVIDE ET IMPERA
”ANTITRUST AGENT”
REGULATORY AGENCIES
CONCERNED WITH THE
REGULATION OF OTHER AGENCIES
OR ENTERPRISES;
CONTROL AGENCIES
SUPERVISE GRANT PROVISION TO
OTHER PUBLIC-SECTOR
BUREAUCRACIES, AND TO SUB-
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN
PARTICULAR

80. MEDIATION: CLIENT INTERACTION 1: KINDERGARDEN
AGAINST SHUTDOWN

81. MEDIATION:CLIENT INTERACTION 2: PRISON RIOT

82. TERTIUS GAUDENS: DUTCH AUCTION

83. DIVIDE ET IMPERA: INTERACTION UNDER SUPERVISION:
TELESCREEN

84. IMPLICATIONS
• NETWORK AS A RESULT OF AGENCY ROLE
• EMPHASIS ON THE IMMEDIATE SOCIAL SURROUNDING
• NETWORK RICH WORLD MIGHT BE A RELATIONSHIP POOR WORLD
• COMPETITION AND REGULATION ROLES DIMINISH SOCIALLY MEANINGFUL INTERACTION (BUT ALL
RELATIONSHIPS ARE SOCIALLY EMBEDDED)

85. CASE: TELECOMMUNICATION
STANDARDISATION (CASE 7.1) (VAN DE KAA & GREEVEN
2017)
STANDARDISATION IS NEEDED FOR THE TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS TO COMMUNICATE WITH ONE
ANOTHER
DEVELOPMENT OF ‘G’ :S, 1-5, THE INFLUENCE OF STANDARD SETTING ORGANISATIONS
TWO BASIC PROCESSES OF STANDARDIZATION:
1) OFFICIAL, THROUGH LEGISLATIVE BODIES OR REGULATORY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
AND 2) MARKET-BASED. VOLUNTARY BASIS WITHIN SINGLE FIRMS OR IN THEIR COORDINATED EFFORTS
FROM OFFICIAL TO MARKET-BASED:
GOVERNMENT: SECURING FAIR COMPETITION, GRANTING LICENSES TO OPERATORS, AND MAKING
RULES FOR THE INTEREST OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC. REGULATORY AGENCIES TO MONITOR INDUSTRY.
INDUSTRY STANDARD SETTING: VOLUNTARY STANDARD SETTING ORGANISATIONS WITH WIDE
REPRESENTATION. THE RELIANCE ON MARKETS SPEEDS UP THE STANDARDIZATION PROCESS AND THE
INCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION ENABLES CONSENSUS OVER THE ADOPTION.
THE GEOGRAPHICAL SHIFT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND STANDARD SETTING FROM
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA TO ASIA

86. STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE
STRATEGY MODES AND ECNOMY, EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS

87. HOW TO DEAL WITH
THE LINK BETWEEN
STRATEGY AND
PERFORMANCE?
TWO OPTIONS
INTEGRATING STRATEGIC AND PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IS
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT ON OPERATIONAL
LEVEL (POISTER 2004).
FINDING MULTIPLE POINTS OF CONTACT
BETWEEN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

88. STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE

89. STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE (SEE JOHANSON & VAKKURI 2017)
• PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY: ORGANISING
PROCESSES; HEURISTICS AND EXTERNAL
INTERACTIONS SIMPLY AND ECONOMICALLY
(FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY).
• PRINCIPLE OF EFFICIENCY: BUFFERING GOALS,
ADMINISTERING FRUITFUL DOSES OF
RESOURCES AND EVALUATION OF EXTERNAL
INTERACTIONS (EQUILIBRIUM).
• PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS: LONG-TERM
CONCEQUENCES OF ACTIONS, EVALUATION
OF INNOVATIONS, ROLE OF AGENCIES IN THE
SOCIAL INTEGRATION) (VALUE CREATION)
• STRATEGIC DESIGN: GOALS AND DIVISION OF
LABOUR TO MAXIMISE THE FUTURE BENEFITS
(LEGACY)
• STRATEGIC SCANNING: MODES OF OPERATION,
RESOURCES AND INNOVATIONS TO PRODUCE
A WHOLE THAT IS MORE THAN SUM OF ITS
PARTS (SOCIAL WELFARE)
• STRATEGIC GOVERNANCE: ORGANIZE
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS TO INTEGRATE
SOCIETY AS A WHOLE (SOCIAL CAPITAL)

90. STRATEGYWISE: STRATEGIC
DESIGN
• DEFINING ACTION SEQUENCES: A DESIGN FOR THE RULER, A DESIGN
FOR THE PROCESS, A DESIGN FOR THE USER/CUSTOMER
• BUFFERING GOALS: INSULATING BUREAUCRACY FROM THE POLITICS
• HARVESTING LEGITIMACY: ACCEPTANCE FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES
• LEGACY: THE WELL-BEING OF FUTURE GENERATIONS

91. STRATEGYWISE: INTERNAL STRATEGIC SCANNING
• EMPLOYING HEURISTICS: NEGATIVE, I.E. AVAILABILITY, ACHORING,
REPRESENTATIVENESS. POSITIVE, I.E. SPEED AND ACCURACY
• ADMINISTERING DOSES FOR SURVIVAL: COMBINING RESOURCES TO
ADVANCE VALUE. PARADOX: MANAGERS MUST EXPERIENCE
DISSATISFACTION TO CONSIDER A MAJOR CHANGE. RESOURCE
SCARCITY IS ONE OF THE MAIN IMPEDIMENTS TO CHANGE EFFORTS
• CREATING INNOVATIONS: E.G. GOVERNANCE INNOVATIONS THAT
ESTABLISH NEW FORMS OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC
FORUMS, AND POSITIONAL INNOVATIONS THAT CREATE NEW USER
GROUPS.
• SOCIAL WELFARE: THE WELL-BEING IN SOCIETY IN DIFFERENT
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES.

92. STRATEGYWISE: STRATEGIC
GOVERNANCE
• MANAGING EXTERNAL INTERACTIONS: WITH MINIMAL NUMBER OF TIES MAXIMAL
NUMBER OF CONNECTIONS. THE CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION OF
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT
• WEIGHING RECIPROCITIES: HOW RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE? “CREDIT SLIPS”
AND LEVERAGING STRATEGY. PARADOX: COMMUNITY BUILDING MOST OFTEN
REQUIRES REDUCTION OF CONTACTS TO OTHER GROUPS.
• INTEGRATING COMMUNITIES: BROKERING POSITIONS SHORTEN THE PATHS THAT
WOULD OTHERWISE BE LONGER (HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION),
BOTTOM-UP AND TOP-DOWN INTEGRATION.
• SOCIAL CAPITAL: INTERTWINED SOCIETY

93. FRONTIERS OF STRATEGY
CONCLUSIONS

94. LESSONS FROM THE PLASTIC DUCKS
• ANY ARTEFACT MAY CAPTURE OUR ATTENTION
• IN FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS SUDDEN HAPPENINGS
• CAN BE INCORPORATED IN PLANS,
• THEY MAY PROVE TO BE VALUABLE RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE GOALS,
• THEY MAY SERVE AS A MEANS TO COMMUNICATE NEW KNOWLEDGE TO THE SOCIAL
SURROUNDING

95. IMAGES OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
• THE MILITARY, BUSINESS AND POLITICAL
IDEAS PUT FORWARD AN IMAGE OF
WINNING AND LOSING
• DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY
• CONQUERING OF THE MARKETS
• CREDIT-SEEKING AND BLAME AVOIDANCE
• DOES NOT ENCOURAGE DECENT
BEHAVIOUR TOWARD ENEMIES, RIVALS OR
OPPONENTS
• STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IDEAS
• CONSENSUAL AND PEACEFUL IMAGE OF
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT WITHIN MACRO
AND MICRO LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT CAN BE
ACHIEVED.
• COOPERATION IS BOTH POSSIBLE AND
DESIRED ASPECT IN REACHING FOR PUBLIC
GOALS
• THE EXISTENCE OF THE VOICES OF
DISSONANCE IS IMPORTANT PART OF
FUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT

96. MACRO AND MICRO STRATEGIES
• DESIGN, RESOURCES AND RELATIONSHIPS
AS A STARTING POINT
• DESIGN OF SOCIETIES, DESIGN OF
ORGANIZATIONS
• COMBINING RESOURCES THROUGH
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, COMBINING
RESOURCES THROUGH KNOWLEDGE AND
CAPABILITIES
• CONSTITUTIONAL AND COLLECTIVE
REGULATION IN MACRO AND MICRO LEVELS
• MACRO: THE STRUCTURE DICTATES THE STRATEGY
• WE ARE BOUND TO OUR NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
• COMPATIBLE INSTITUTIONS BETWEEN POLITICS, WELFARE
MODEL AND ECONOMY IMPROVE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
• MICRO: STRATEGY DICTATES THE STRUCTURE
• PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS HAVE LIMITED MEANS TO DICTATE
THEIR FATE
• IMPOSED STRATEGY AND EXTERNAL PERFORMANCE
ASSESSMENT MIGHT DECREASE OPERATIONAL SPACE,
INDEPENDENT STRATEGY FORMATION AND PERFORMANCE
INCENTIVES MIGHT INCREASE IT
• THE WAVE OF DECENTRALISATION HAS INCREASED POWERS
OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND BROUGHT ABOUT
VARIETY IN THEIR COMPOSITION

97. MACRO AND MICRO STRATEGIES
• IN ONE SENSE THERE IS A ZERO SUM GAME BETWEEN MACRO AND MICRO STRATEGIES. THE
MORE COMPELLING THE MACRO STRATEGY, THE LESS MANOEUVRING SPACE THERE IS FOR
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
• IN ANOTHER SENSE MACRO AND MICRO STRATEGIES DEAL WITH GOALS IN DIFFERENTIAL
FASHION. MACRO STRATEGY RELATES TO A MORE ABSTRACT NOTION OF STRATEGY. MICRO
STRATEGIES CONCENTRATE ON THE MORE TECHNICAL SIDE OF THE STRATEGY

98. • HOW GOVERNMENTS AIM FOR THEIR GOALS IN DIFFERENT SOCIETIES? WHAT ARE THE
DIFFERENCES IN INTERACTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT, ECONOMY AND CIVIL SOCIETY?
• CAN A CORRUPT POLITICAL SYSTEM HOST A FULLY FUNCTIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?’
AND VICE VERSA ‘HOW TO ORGANIZE FUNCTIONING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION’, ‘IS THE
WEBERIAN BUREAUCRACY A BLUEPRINT FOR ALL FUNCTIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS?
• CAN AGENCIES FORMULATE THEIR GOALS IN ANOTHER WAY THAN WITH DETAILED
PLANNING?
QUESTIONS