Startup genomereport2 why_startups_fail_v2

Startup Genome Report Extra
on Premature Scaling
A deep dive into why most high growth startups fail
This is an addition to the Startup Genome Report covering premature scaling
based on data from 3200+ high growth technology startups. The Startup
Genome Report is a 67 page analysis that was coauthored by researchers from
UC Berkeley & Stanford. Other contributors include Steve Blank, the Sandbox
Network, and 10 accelerators from around the globe. Your can download it at
http://blog.startupcompass.co
The goal of this mini-report is to describe our insights about premature scaling,
which we have identified as a major reason high growth technology startups fail.
If you are a startup and you would like to test whether your startup is scaling
prematurely, you sign up for our online web application, the Startup Genome
Compass, at http://startupcompass.co. It is specifically designed to help
startups reduce their chances of failure by benchmarking them to analyze
whether they are scaling prematurely.
Authors
Max Marmer, CSO Startup Genome, Bjoern Lasse Herrmann, CEO Startup Genome,
Ertan Dogrultan, CTO Startup Genome, Ron Berman, PHD at UC Berkeley
Supporters
Chuck Eesley, Stanford University; Steve Blank, Stanford University
Benchmark startupcompass.co
Blog blog.startupcompass.co
Report #1 blog.startupcompass.co/pages/startup-genome-report-1
Report #2 blog.startupcompass.co/pages/startup-genome-report-extra-on-
premature-scal
Methodology www.systemmalfunction.com/2011/08/startup-genome-compass-behind-
scenes.html
Contact feedback@startupcompass.co
Startups that scale prematurely are classified as inconsistent and startups that scale properly are classified as consistent
Startup Genome Report: premature scaling v 1.2 (edited March 2012) . Copyright 2011 . Page 1

Table of Contents
A. The Startup Genome Project and its Role in an Approaching
..................................................................Societal Transformation
3
........................................B. Summary of Startup Genome Report
6
.................................................................................I. The Startup Lifecycle
6
........................................................................II. Types of Internet Startups
7
............................................................................................III. Key Findings
8
...........................................C. Introduction to Premature Scaling
10
.............................................................................................I. Introduction
10
......................................................................II. Deﬁnition of inconsistency
11
.........................................................III. The anatomy of premature scaling
14
................................................D. Findings on Premature Scaling
18
........................................................................I. Summary of the ﬁndings
18
II. How Consistent Startups Compare to Inconsistent Startup On Key
.................................................Customer Related Performance Indicators
20
...................................III. Behavior of inconsistent vs. consistent startups
26
...................................................................................This graph shows ...
47
.................................IV. Similarities of inconsistent vs. consistent startups
48
.............................................................................................V. Conclusion
58
..................................................D. Acknowledgments & Sources
59

A. The Startup Genome Project and its Role in an
Approaching Societal Transformation
What makes startups succeed or fail? The Startup Genome Project is trying to
answer this question. We believe increasing the success rate of startups has the
potential to dramatically increase economic growth all around the world. On May
28th we released our first report at blog.startupcompass.co. On August 29th we
released our first benchmark application - the Startup Genome Compass to help
startups reduce premature scaling.
The role of technology startups in our global economy has never been more
important. Startups may seem insignificant compared to large multinational
companies that have trillions of dollars of wealth sloshing around in public
markets, but a recent Kauffman Foundation study found that the majority of job
growth in the United States is driven by technology startups.
The power of information technology has been steadily increasing for the last
three decades and has recently reached a level of maturity that has started to
trigger a reorganization of the global economy. It has never been easier or
cheaper to create a startup thanks to infrastructure like open source software,
software as a service, cloud hosting, globally ubiquitous payment processing,
viral distribution channels, real-time collaboration, on demand logistic services
and hyper-targeted advertising.
As a result, the pace of change is speeding up and the implications of this are
immense. Billion dollar startups are emerging faster and faster. The quick ascent
of startups like Google, LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, Zynga and Groupon are
harbingers of a major structural economic change on the horizon. The service
sector has dominated the global economy for the last few decades but its sun
will set. Just as machinery replaced most manual labor, software will replace
repetitive intellectual tasks. Turbo Tax eliminated many accountants, Amazon
eliminated many retail jobs and E-Trade eliminated the majority of stockbrokers.
In the near future jobs that are more complex yet still methodical will also be
replaced by software. Creative Commons is reducing the need for lawyers, Khan
Academy shows how one good teacher can replace many bad teachers and the
profession of doctors will be disrupted by startups like Halcyon Molecular that
turn healthcare from emergency care into a preventative self-care. Balancing out
that massive decrease in jobs will be what Richard Florida calls the rise of the
creative class.
As the waves of disruption come ever faster, the only way for a company to be
competitive will be to behave like a startup. In the landmark book the Innovator’s
Dilemma, Clayton Christensen found large companies are excellent at sustaining
innovation but by and large fail at disruptive innovation. Startups thrive on

creating disruptive innovations. Recently, thought leaders in entrepreneurship
have come to the conclusion that in order for large companies to be effective at
disruptive innovation they need to make structural changes that make them
behave nearly identically to startups.
The increasing economic importance of startups, along with decreased barriers
to entry has caused interest in entrepreneurship to explode around the globe.
New startup ecosystems are being built up all over the world with the hopes of
replicating the success of Silicon Valley. Spearheading this movement are
startup accelerators like Seedcamp, Techstars, Opinno, Founders Institute, 500
Startups, and Sandbox, but they are accompanied by hundreds of others. On an
individual level, the brightest people worldwide, are increasingly seeing
entrepreneurship as the career path of choice. The release of The Social
Network has captured the imagination of today’s young people, and catapulted
Mark Zuckerberg to the same status as Gordon Gekko in Wall Street almost 25
years ago.
But despite the increasing economic importance of scalable startups, we still
don't understand the patterns of successful creation. More than 90% of startups
fail, due primarily to self-destruction rather than competition. For the less than
10% of startups that do succeed, most encounter several near death
experiences along the way. Simply put, we just are not very good at creating
startups yet.
Eight months ago we launched the Startup Genome Project, with the goal of
increasing the success rate of startups and accelerating the pace of innovation
around the world by turning entrepreneurship into a science. If successful, it's
hard to imagine the type of impact this could have.
Some of the world's biggest transformations occurred when arts were turned
into sciences. The scientific revolution in the 16th century triggered the age of
enlightenment. The development of scientific management, which peaked in the
early 1910’s, made large companies dramatically more efficient and arguably
was one of the biggest causes of the explosion of wealth the world saw in the
last century.
We believe the effects of cracking the code of innovation by turning
entrepreneurship into a science will trigger a new era, that we are calling the
Entrepreneurial Enlightenment. In the midst of the largest global depression in
almost a century, a revolution in entrepreneurship could propel the world to a
level of wealth never seen before by enabling scientific discoveries and
technological breakthroughs to be integrated into the fabric of society faster
than ever before. Offering hope that we may finally be able to master some of
the most pressing challenges, including water, energy, food, health, security,
poverty and education.

No revolution is triggered alone. In the quest to make entrepreneurship a
science, we are standing on the shoulders of giants. In just the last 2-3 years the
number of people extracting and codifying the informal learning of entrepreneurs
has hit a point of critical mass. Steve Blank kicked off the move towards a
science of entrepreneurship with his seminal book The Four Steps to the
Epiphany. In the book, he introduced the concept of Customer Development. A
few years later Eric Ries combined Customer Development with Agile
Development and Lean Manufacturing principles to create the Lean Startup
methodology. Interest in the Lean Startup has morphed into a global movement.
Other major contributors to the science of entrepreneurship include Dave
Mcclure on Metrics, Sean Ellis on Marketing, Alex Osterwalder on Business
Models and Paul Graham with his essays.
Yet despite this huge knowledge base emerging about how startups work,
startups have been able to absorb little more than the basic patterns of how to
build a startup. Most founders don't know what they should be focusing on and
consequently dilute their focus or run in the wrong direction. They are regularly
bombarded with advice that seems contradictory, which is often paralyzing. And
while startups are now gathering way more qualitative and quantitative feedback
than they were just a few years ago, their ability to interpret this data and use it
to make better product and business decisions is sorely lacking. The primary
cause of these problems is that we lack the necessary structure to synthesize
our accumulated knowledge on the nature of startups. We are missing a
common language and framework to describe and measure entrepreneurship
and innovation.

B. Summary of Startup Genome Report
This summary covers the sections of the Startup Genome Report on the different
types and stages of startups. These are important foundational concepts for you
to understand when you reach our section on Premature Scaling in part C. If
you’ve already read the full Startup Genome Report you can skip straight to part
C.
The goal of the Startup Genome report was to lay the foundation for a new
framework for assessing startups more effectively by measuring the thresholds
and milestones of development that Internet startups move through.
Through analyzing the results from our survey we found that Internet startups
move through similar thresholds and milestones of development, which we
segmented into stages. Startups that skipped these stages performed worse.
We also identified three major types of Internet startups with various sub types.
They are segmented based on how they perform customer development and
customer acquisition. Each type has varying behavior regarding factors like time,
skill and money.
These 2 findings lay the foundation for us to begin organizing and structuring all
of a startup’s customer related data, which entrepreneurs can use to make
better product and business decisions.
The three key ideas we set out to test were:
1.Startups evolve through discrete stages of development. Each stage can be
measured with specific milestones and thresholds.
2.There are different types of startups. Each type evolves through the
developmental stages differently.
3.Learning is a fundamental unit of progress for startups. More learning should
increase chances of success.
I. The Startup Lifecycle
Our foundational structure of startup assessment is the startup lifecycle.
Understanding where a startup is in their lifecycle allows us to assess their
progress. The startup lifecycle is made of 6 stages of development, where each
stage is made up of levels of substages. This creates a directed tree structure
and allows for more granular assessment by being able to pinpoint the main
drivers of progress at each stage. We call each of these stages the Marmer

Stages. However, in this report only the top level stages are discussed. Our first
four top-level stages are based loosely on Steve Blank's 4 Steps to the
Epiphany, but one key difference is that the Marmer Stages are product centric
rather than company centric.
Our 6 stages are:
1) Discovery
2) Validation
3) Efficiency
4) Scale
5) Sustain not covered in this report
6) Conservation not covered in this report
Our assessment of the stages does not include traditional ways of assessment
like funding, team size, user growth, etc. They are based on milestones and
thresholds that vary based on the type of startup. An example for a milestone is
building a minimum viable product. An example for a threshold is certain rate of
retention.
We attempt to provide evidence for the existence of the Marmer Stages in two
ways:
1) That the Marmer Stages correlate with traditional indicators of progress.
2) That startups that don't move through the stages in order show less progress.
II. Types of Internet Startups
We created our types by defining a spectrum of 100% marketing to 100% sales
and created 3 points by selecting the two end points and the mid point. In the
future, we plan to define a more fluid spectrum with more than 3 points, as we
understand the underlying variables better and see where startups cluster. Our
fourth type, Type 1N (The Social Transformer), is the same as Type 1 (The
Automator) but the product has network effects.
Here are the four different types of startups we identified:
The Automator / Type 1
These startups are product centric with a self-service customer acquisition
strategy, that focus on quick execution and often automate a manual process.
The majority of them target consumers in existing markets.
Examples: Google, Dropbox, Eventbrite, Slideshare, Mint, Pandora, Kickstarter,
Zynga, Playdom, Box.net, Basecamp, Kayak

The Social Transformer / Type 1N
These startups have a self-service customer acquisition strategy and often
create new ways for people to interact. They are almost always confronted with
the challenge of reaching critical mass. If they surpass this threshold they can
often have runaway user growth in a winner-take-all market.
Examples: eBay, OkCupid, Skype, Airbnb, Craigslist, Etsy, IMVU, Flickr,
LinkedIn, Yelp, Facebook, Twitter, Foursquare, YouTube, Mechanical Turk,
PayPal, Quora
The Integrator / Type 2
These companies thrive on acquiring customers by generating leads with
marketing and closing them with inside sales reps. They are product-centric and
rely on early monetization typically through subscriptions in smaller markets.
They often take innovations from Automator startups and rebuild it for smaller
enterprises.
Examples: Intuit, Square, Adobe, PBworks, Uservoice, Mixpanel, Dimdim,
HubSpot, Marketo, Xignite, Zendesk, GetSatisfaction, Flowtown
The Challenger / Type 3
These startups are focused on closing high paying customers in large but
fragmented markets. They are highly dependent on a small number of deals
being successful and usually operate in complex and rigid markets. To be
successful they need to ﬁnd a repeatable and scalable sales process.
Examples: Oracle, Salesforce, MySQL, Red Hat, Jive, Atlassian, Palantir,
NetSuite, WorkDay, Zuora, Cloudera, SuccessFactor, Yammer
III. Key Findings
1. Founders that learn are more successful. Startups that have helpful mentors,
track performance metrics effectively, and learn from startup thought leaders
raise 7x more money and have 3.5x better user growth.
2. Startups that pivot once or twice raise 2.5x more money, have 3.6x better
user growth, and are 52% less likely to scale prematurely than startups that
pivot more than 2 times or not at all. A pivot is when a startup decides to change
a major part of its business.
3. Premature scaling is the most common reason for startups to perform worse.
They tend to lose the battle early on by getting ahead of themselves.
Startups can prematurely scale their team, their customer acquisition strategies
or over build the product.
4. Many investors invest 2-3x more capital than necessary in startups in the
discovery phase. They also over-invest in solo founders and founding teams

without technical cofounders despite indicators that show that these teams have
a much lower probability of success.
5. Hands-on help from investors have little or no effect on the company's
operational performance. But the right mentors significantly influence a
company’s performance and ability to raise money. However, this does not
mean that investors don’t have a significant effect on valuations and M&A.
6. Solo founders take 3.6x longer to reach scale stage compared to a founding
team of 2 and they are 2.3x less likely to pivot.
7. Business-heavy founding teams are 6.2x more likely to successfully scale with
sales-driven startups than with product-centric startups.
8. Technical-heavy founding teams are 3.3x more likely to successfully scale
with product-centric startups without network effects than with product-centric
startups with network effects.
9. Balanced teams with one technical founder and one business founder raise
30% more money, have 2.9x more user growth and are 19% less likely to scale
prematurely than technical or business-heavy founding teams.
10. Founders that don’t work full-time have 4x less user growth and end up
raising 24x less money from investors.
11. Most successful founders are driven by impact rather than experience or
money.
12. 72% of founders find out that their initial intellectual property is not a
competitive advantage.
13. Startups need 2-3 times longer to validate their market than most founders
expect. This underestimation creates the pressure to scale prematurely.
14. Startups that haven’t raised money overestimate their market size by 100x
and often misinterpret their market as new.
15. B2C vs. B2B is not a meaningful segmentation of Internet startups anymore
because the Internet has changed the dynamics of customer interaction. We
found 4 different major groups of startups that all have very different behavior
regarding customer acquisition, time requirements, market risk and team
composition.

C. Introduction to Premature Scaling
I. Introduction
For the last 6 months the Startup Genome Project has been researching what
makes high growth technology startups successful and has gathered data on
more than 3200 startups. In our research one reason for failure has shown up
again and again: premature scaling.
We define startups as a developmental organism that evolves along 5
interdependent dimensions: Customer, Product, Team, Business Model and
Financials. How progress is measured varies depending on the stage of the
development.
If you find that definition too abstract, we have a less precise but more concrete
definition, that comes from merging and modifying definitions of a startup from
Steve Blank and Eric Ries:
Startups are temporary organizations designed to scale into large companies.
Early stage startups are designed to search for product/market fit under
conditions of extreme uncertainty. Late stage startups are designed to search for
a repeatable and scalable business model and then scale into large companies
designed to execute under conditions of high certainty.
A startup can maximize its speed of progress by keeping the 5 core dimensions
of a startup Customer, Product, Team, Business Model and Financials in
balance. The art of high growth entrepreneurship is to master the chaos of
getting each of these 5 dimensions to move in time and concert with one
another. Most startup failures can be explained by one or more of these
dimensions falling out of tune with the others.
In our dataset we found that 70% of startups scaled prematurely along some
dimension. While this number seemed high, this may go a long way towards
explaining the 90% failure rate of startups.
How is premature scaling assessed?
The Startup Genome Team trained machine learning algorithms to assess both
the behavioral and actual stage of a startup. If they are not identical the
company has scaled some dimension of the company prematurely.

II. Definition of inconsistency
Consistent startups keep the customer dimension, the primary indicator of
progress in a startup, in tune with product, team, financials and business model.
This means that each dimension progresses evenly compared to the others.
Inconsistent startups have one or more of these dimensions far ahead or far
behind the customer dimension. Premature scaling is the predominant form of
inconsistency, but its much rarer opposite, dysfunctional scaling is also
possible, although it’s not covered in this report. An example for dysfunctional
scaling would be Friendster. (Read more here).
Dimension Examples for inconsistency
Customer
• Spending too much on customer acquisition before product/
market fit and a repeatable scalable business model
• Overcompensating missing product/market fit with
marketing and press
Product
• Building a product without problem/solution fit
• Investing into scalability of the product before product/
market fit
• Adding “nice to have” features
Team
• Hiring too many people too early
• Hiring specialists before they are critical: CFO’s, Customer
Service Reps, Database specialists, etc.
• Hiring managers (VPs, product managers, etc.) instead of
doers
• Having more than 1 level of hierarch
Financials
• Raising too little money to get thru the valley of death
• Raising too much money. It isn’t necessarily bad, but usually
makes entrepreneurs undisciplined and gives them the
freedom to prematurely scale other dimensions. I.e. over-
hiring and over-building. Raising too much is also more risky
for investors than if they give startups how much they
actually needed and waited to see how they progressed.
Business
Model
• Business Model
• Focusing too much on profit maximization too early
• Over-planning, executing without regular feedback loop
• Not adapting business model to a changing market
• Failing to focus on the business model and finding out that
you can’t get costs lower than revenue at scale.

Quote about premature scaling by ...
Michael A. Jackson, serial entrepreneur and investor
“Having been both an entrepreneur and investor I've seen many entrepreneurs
(myself included) try to scale blindly. No one takes venture money to stay a small
business and scaling successfully is what separates eventual industry leaders from
long-forgotten startups in the deadpool. Far too often though entrepreneurs start
scaling before they know what is going to work.
Premature scaling is putting the cart before the proverbial horse, and in the case of
startups this can potentially relate to both engineering and operations. As an
entrepreneur there’s always the temptation to grow the sales team at the first sign
of revenue traction, but there is always the danger that this early traction is coming
from the subset of the market that are early adopters and not the actual market
itself. Additionally, too often I’ve seen startups ramp up sales before they’ve figured
out the most efficient way to achieve profitability. A vicious cycle ensues wherein the
more a company grows, the more it farther away from profitability it becomes.
Teams need to be obsessed with the metrics that drive their businesses’ growth,
constantly testing and challenging their assumptions.
For the engineering team, there’s the often obsessed about notion of having a
robust platform that can handle millions of users before the startup even gets to
10’s of thousands on there. The team starts to worry about all the technical issues
that they’ll have to deal with when success comes, but they lose track of what is
actually going to make them succeed. They can start to fixate on the Engineer’s "El
Dorado" : the Perfect Product. It makes for a nice story that one can dream about,
but it will always remain a fantasy…and the potential cause of opportunity lost.
Venture-backed startups have no option but to scale eventually. Investors have
made their investment based on the fact that they believe the startup is a scalable
business that can attack a large market. Getting venture money can be like putting
a rocket engine on the back of a car. Scaling comes down to making sure the
machine is ready to handle the speed before hitting the accelerator.”
Amir Banifatemi, entrepreneur, product strategist, and investor
“Only when a startup objectively demonstrates that product-market fit is achieved
and a pattern of revenue generation is clearly identified, it makes sense to scale the
business model and grow.
A startup business model, even when established, needs to be flexible enough to
evolve constantly with market conditions, competitive moves, alternative offerings,
and customer maturity and evolution. This constant evolution creates inflection
points that should be identified through a constant and data-driven monitoring of

the market responses and customer behavior. Failing to view those inflection points
may not capture the favorable context for scaling and can be adversely impactful.
Scaling can be analyzed differently based on the context and the circumstances
surrounding a startup and its market. In some instances, a startup can grow to a
certain point and be acquired by a stronger player, thereby avoiding most
premature scaling issues due to lack of resource or experience. However, not every
startup can be quickly acquired, and premature scaling is one of the reasons
startups fail even though they might have a great product, have received funding, or
verified positive market feedback.
Successful scaling for a startup is one of the measures of sustained growth and its
business model, and requires proper preparation and timing. Premature scaling can
happen in situations such as:
• Hiring too many people or paying high salaries before a strong visibility on cash
flow,
• Failing to hire sales oriented people and partners that are skilled, aligned, and
trained to deliver according to the initial patterns of a proven revenue model,
• Confusion between users and customers. In case of consumer focused startups,
when the attention is on scaling users that are not directly impacting profitability.
Many believe that an increase in users or members would somehow translate into
some forms of value.
• Focus on sustained marketing spending without established metrics,
• Early efforts to scale without a strong lock on the market. Market education is
costly for startups beyond early adopters. In addition, other new entrants or more
established companies can benefit from the market being opened by startups
that may not be prepared enough to reap the benefit of their work.
• Startups and their boards need to have mechanisms in place to monitor product
acceptance and market readiness so that they can change gears. Changing
gears does not necessarily mean pivot, but rather being able to capture a larger
portion of the market at a controlled cost/revenue ratio or margin.
• Chasing to increase revenue while decreasing profit. Many startups increase their
costs as they capture additional customers due to lack of fulfillment abilities and
products scaling, therefore putting their business model in jeopardy.”
Jim Pitkow, serial entrepreneur
“Premature scaling: growing in anticipation of demand instead of demand driven
growth.”

III. The anatomy of premature scaling
Startups are temporary organizations that are designed to evolve into large
companies. They move through 6 stages of development throughout their
lifecycle: Discovery, Validation, Efficiency, Scale, Sustain & Conservation. Early
stage startups are designed to search for product/market fit under conditions of
extreme uncertainty. Late stage startups are designed to search for a repeatable
and scalable business model and then scale into large companies designed to
execute under conditions of high certainty.
Every startup has an actual stage and a behavioral stage. Actual stage is
measured by customer response to a product. We measure it by looking at
metrics like numbers of users, user growth, activation rate, retention rate and
revenue. The behavioral stage is made up 5 top level dimensions that the
startup can control. The 5 dimensions are Customer, Product, Team, Financials
and Business Model. Each dimension, both the actual and the 5 behavioral
dimensions are always classified into one of the 6 developmental stages.
A startup is classified as inconsistent when any behavioral dimension is at a
stage that is different than the actual stage. When a behavioral dimension is at a
stage larger than the actual stage we call this premature scaling. Its lesser
known sibling, dysfunctional scaling, occurs when the stage of a behavioral
dimension is smaller than the actual stage.
A clear example of premature scaling would be a web startup that rapidly scales
up its team to 30-40 people before it has any customers. In this example, the
actual stage of the startup would be in Validation (Stage 2) but the behavioral
stage of the team would be in Scale (Stage 4).
Let's go through some more examples and stats for how each dimension can be
scaled prematurely.
Customer
How to scale customer dimension prematurely
Spending too much on customer acquisition before product/ market fit
Overcompensating missing product/market fit with marketing and press
Spending money in poor performing acquisition channels.
Stats
Inconsistent startups are 2.3 times more likely to spend more than one standard
deviation above the average on customer acquisition.
Examples of startups that prematurely scaled on the customer dimension
Color, Webvan, Pets.com

Product
How to scale product dimension prematurely
Building a product without having validated problem/solution fit, Investing into
scalability of the product before product/market fit, Adding lots of “nice to
have” features
Stats
Inconsistent startups write 3.4 times more lines of code in the discovery phase
and 2.25 times more code in efficiency stage. Inconsistent startup outsource 4-5
times as much of their product development than consistent startups.
In discovery phase 60% of inconsistent startups focus on validating a product
and 80% of consistent startups focus on discovering a problem space. In the
validation phase, where startups should be testing demand for a functional
product, inconsistent startups are 2.2 times more likely to be focused on
streamlining the product and making their customer acquisition process more
efficient than consistent startups. It's widely believed amongst startup thought
leaders, that successful startups succeed because they are good searchers and
failed startups achieve failure by efficiently executing the irrelevant.
Examples of startups that prematurely scaled the product dimension
Cuil, Webvan, Joost, Google Wave, Slide, 6Apart, most startups that don't find
product market fit or "build something nobody wants".
Team:
How to scale team dimension prematurely
Hiring too many people too early, Hiring specialists before they are critical:
CFO’s, Customer Service Reps, Specialized Network/System Adminstrators or
Database specialists, etc., Adopting multilevel management hierarchy, hiring
managers (VPs, product managers, etc.) instead of doers, Having more than 1
level of hierarchy,
Stats
The team size of startups that scale prematurely is 3 times bigger than the
consistent startups at the same stage. However startups that scale properly end
up having a team size that is 38% bigger at the initial scale stage than
prematurely scaled startups, and almost surely continue to grow. Startups that
scale properly take 76% longer to scale to their team size than startups that
scale prematurely.
Examples of startups that prematurely scaled the the fundraising dimension
Webvan, Pets.com, VOX.com.

Financials:
How to scale fundraising dimension prematurely
Raising too much money, thereby making the startup undisciplined, giving lots
of breathing room for other dimensions to scale prematurely, and eliminating exit
optionality.
Stats
Before scaling, funded inconsistent startups are on average valued twice as
much as consistent startup and raise about three times as much money.
Examples of startups that prematurely scaled the the fundraising dimension
Cuil, Webvan, Color.
Business Model:
How to scale business model prematurely
Focusing too much on profit maximization too early, Over-planning, executing
without a regular feedback loop, Not adapting business model to a changing
market, Failing to focus on the business model and finding out that you can’t get
costs lower than revenue at scale.
Stats
Inconsistent startups monetize 0.5 to 3 times as many of their customers early
on.
Examples of startups that prematurely scaled the business model dimension
Myspace, Groupon (time shall tell), 6Apart, Lala.
The focus of this post is on premature scaling, but for context, here are a few
example of dysfunctional scaling: Tokbox, Friendster, Orkut, Wesabe, Digg,
SixApart, Myspace (on product), and ChatRoulette.
In our research we also found that the following attributes have no influence on
whether a company is more likely to scale prematurely: market size, product
release cycles, education levels, gender, time that cofounders knew each other,
entrepreneurial experience, age, number of products, type of tools to track
metrics and location.
Now to further illustrate how we describe startups let's look at an example
mapped onto theStartup Lifecycle Canvas.
Below we have an infographic where we plot Color, today's most talked about
inconsistent startup, against Rally, a startup we worked closely with while
building out the model, that was consistently in the Efficiency stage 2 months
ago when they made this announcement. Although now we're happy to say
they're starting to scale.

D. Findings on Premature Scaling
I. Summary of the findings
Based on our analysis of about 3200 high growth internet startups
approximately 70% of the startups in our dataset scaled prematurely.
(inconsistent startup = show signs of premature scaling)
1. 74% of high growth internet startups fail due to premature scaling.
2. No startup that scaled prematurely passed the 100,000 user mark.
3. Startups that scale properly grow about 20 times faster than startups that
scale prematurely.
4. 93% of startups that scale prematurely never break the $100k revenue per
month threshold.
5. Before scaling, funded inconsistent startups are on average valued twice as
much as consistent startup and raise about three times as much money.
6. The team size of startups that scale prematurely is 3 times bigger than the
consistent startups at the same stage. However startups that scale properly end
up having a team size that is 38% bigger at the initial scale stage than
prematurely scaled startups, and almost surely continue to grow. Startups that
scale properly take 76% longer to scale to their team size than startups that
scale prematurely.

7. Inconsistent startups are 2.3 times more likely to spend more than one
standard deviation above the average on customer acquisition.
8. Inconsistent startups write 3.4 times more lines of code in the discovery
phase and 2.25 times more code in efficiency stage.
9. Inconsistent startup outsource 4-5 times as much of their product
development than consistent startups.
10. In discovery phase 60% of inconsistent startups focus on validating a
product and 80% of consistent startups focus on discovering a problem space.
In the validation phase, where startups should be testing demand for a
functional product, inconsistent startups are 2.2 times more likely to be focused
on streamlining the product and making their customer acquisition process more
efficient than consistent startups. It's widely believed amongst startup thought

leaders, that successful startups succeed because they are good searchers and
failed startups achieve failure by efficiently executing the irrelevant.
11. Inconsistent startups monetize 0.5 to 3 times as many of their customers
early on.
12. The following attributes have no influence on whether a company is more
likely to scale prematurely: market size, product release cycles, education levels,
gender, time that cofounders knew each other, entrepreneurial experience, age,
number of products, type of tools to track metrics and location.
Salim Ismail, serial entrepreneur, founding ED Singularity University
“Startups are by nature extremely fragile. I'd define premature scaling as expending
money and resources in anticipation of major growth without necessary evidence.
The biggest dangers I've seen in premature scaling are the following areas:
• putting too many features into your product on day 1. At Brickhouse, we'd ask
what are the two features that will have you succeed over everyone else; just build
those. If they work, then add the others. If you have more than 6 major features in
your product, strip it down.
• adding too much management overhead. Once there's a bit of success, it's easy
to go hire the 'rockstar' team. It's critical that the founders keep selling non-stop
and only hire because they can't handle the demand; too often they hire to create
a pipeline rather than responding to existing demand.
• tracking the wrong metric. Often startups look purely at pageviews or unique visits
without looking at the underlying drivers. Tracking metrics that don't fit the business
model is a killer.
• living on the dream. Often, startups are so bought into their own hype they don't
notice that no one is actually buying it. That's great for continued motivation, but it
can lead to real problems. There's a balance between living the dream and the
patience that it'll take time.”

II. How Consistent Startups Compare to Inconsistent Startup On Key
Customer Related Performance Indicators
In the following section we analyze how the performance of inconsistent
startups compares to consistent startups. Note that startups that scale
prematurely are classiﬁed as inconsistent and startups that scale properly
are classiﬁed as consistent.
This graph shows …
how consistent and inconsistent consumer facing startups compare in absolute
user numbers as they try to scale.
0%
20%
40%
500-5,000
5,000-100,000
100,000-1,000,000
1,000,000-5,000,000
5,000,000+
Number of users for consumer focused startups scaling
Scaling properly Scaling prematurely

This could be interpreted ...
Startups that try to scale before they have reached product/market fit and
streamlined their customer acquisition process don't do very well. In fact, no
inconsistent startup in our dataset was able to get more than 100,000 users.
Krzysztof Kowalczyk, investor and serial entrepreneur
"...Speaking about user base explosion - it is kind of a Holy Grail of the startup
world but if it happens too early and the tsunami of new users attracted by the
network effects will arrive just to find product below their expectations - their will not
come back (eventually at much higher cost). It's better to carefully draft a product
on a smaller, safer group of friendly users then to go after the general public too
soon. The perfect example is Color, which executed PR perfectly, attracted many
users and ... remains a ghost town, as users didn't hook to the product.
PR is important in the startup world so everyone dreams about being featured on
TechCrunch and getting subsequent calls from VCs.
But again, if the product itself is in its infancy, if the usage patterns, virality,
monetization strategy etc. is not thought through - then the media hype might
become a serious distraction to the founders - as their number is usually limited to
2-4 and coping with hype takes them away from the product development. Look
what happened to ChatRoulette - in the spring of 2010 it seemed to be a darling of
the online community, founder got invitation from best VCs - and...few months later
nothing came out of it (http://www.businessinsider.com/fred-wilson-chatroulette-
founder-doesnt-know-what-he-wants-to-do-2010-6). As for me, the media hype
scaled up much prematurely as for 17-years old to cope with."
Fred Destin, investor
Unprofitable Scaling / Absence of operating leverage
You may be able to sell more faster, but you might not be ready to scale
profitably. The more customers you get, the more bugs, new requests and
support issues start to bog your infrastructure down and ultimately come back to
rest on the door of your sales guy. I have lived through one experience of a
company that had not understood that it had a total quality problem on its hands
and kept ploughing money into the front of the funnel, to no discernible end.

This graph shows ...
how the monthly user growth numbers varies for consistent startups vs
inconsistent startups by stage in a logarithmic scale.
Inconsistent startups grow faster in the early stages, probably due to forcing or
over-engineering growth, and then relatively ﬂatline by the scale stage.
Meanwhile consistent startups have slow growth in the beginning and take off in
the scale stage in "hockey stick" fashion (a linear line on a log scale is a smooth
exponential curve). By the scale stage consistent startups are growing more
than 20 times faster than inconsistent startups per month.
0%
1%
10%
100%
1000%
10000%
Stage 1 / Discovery
Stage 2 / Validation
Stage 3 / Efficiency
Stage 4 / Scale
Average user growth per month by stage
Consistent startups Inconsistent startups

How the monthly user growth numbers varies for consistent startups vs
inconsistent startups by stage in a logarithmic scale.
Inconsistent startups grow faster in the early stages, probably due to forcing or
over-engineering growth, and then relative ﬂatline by the scale stage. Meanwhile
consistent startups have slow growth in the beginning and take off in the scale
stage in "hockey stick" fashion (a linear line on a log scale is a smooth
exponential curve). By scale stage consistent startups are growing more than 13
times faster than inconsistent startups over a 6 month period.
0%
1%
10%
100%
1000%
10000%
100000%
Stage 1 / Discovery
Stage 4 / Scale
Average user growth per 6 month by stage

the distribution of monthly revenue across ranges for consistent vs. inconsistent
startups that are trying to scale.
Only consistent startups had more than a $1 Million in revenue per month, no
inconsistent startup reached that threshold. 93% of Inconsistent startups make
less than 100k a month.
Inconsistent startups almost never reach a strong monthly run rate.
0%
25%
50%
0
1K - $10K
$10k-$100k
$100k-$1 Million
$1 Million-$10 Million
$10+ Million
Monthly revenue when scaling

how the average valuation for funded consistent vs funded inconsistent startups
varies by stage.
Startups that are inconsistent depict themselves as better than they are. The
illusion holds up until the scale stage, when consistent startups have a valuation
that skyrockets and inconsistent startups have a down round.
$ 0
$ 5000000
$ 10000000
$ 15000000
$ 20000000
Stage 1 / Discovery
Stage 4 / Scale
Average valuation for startups that raised money

III. Behavior of inconsistent vs. consistent startups
In the following section we analyze how the behavior of inconsistent startups
compares to consistent startups. Note that startups that scale prematurely are
classiﬁed as inconsistent and startups that scale properly are classiﬁed as
consistent.
The team size for startups in three different states. Startups that are consistent
before scaling, startups that scale prematurely and startups that scale properly.
0
7.5
15.0
22.5
30.0
Average teamsize
Consistent startups before scale
Inconsistent startups trying to scale prematurely
Consistent startup scaling properly

Startups that scale prematurely have teams that are signiﬁcantly larger than the
consistent startups that haven't scaled yet, but their team size also rarely gets
as large as startups that do scale properly since they aren't able to sustain their
growth. Scaling the team prematurely is a problem because it's very hard to
align a large team if there are still frequent changes in direction of the company,
as is usually the case in the early stages.
Bill Liao, serial entrepreneur and investor
“Great little team with fast product turn around and nimble development that listens
to customer data and does guerilla user testing and makes their product better and
better while seemingly getting into all the best blogs, being loved by opinion leaders
for what they do.
The company's compact team all share a visceral understanding about the product
and hyper growth is not just possible it's expected. The team is two hard core
developers, a designer a UI person who doubles as their tester and a visionary who
has a nose for cheap PR.
They have no cash and no revenues and someone tells them to get a senior
corporate sales guy on board to get some early revenues. He charms the team and
manages to bring on board a few friends who he knows. They all kick in a bit of
cash and start dialing for dollars.
Six months later the company is dead and no one understands why.
The premature scale fail here was not about cost blowouts or technical failures it
happened because the concentrated pool of companies vision was diluted
suddenly by 50 percent with "experience" and "sales feedback"
Scaling the team before the culture and product are really nailed is deadly and
scaling with sales people cuts out the possibility that the product is developed to
sell it's self and both are silent killers.”
Brad Feld, investor and serial entrepreneur
"Hiring any substantive number of sales or marketing people before there is
customer adoption is premature scaling. All the early hires should be technical or
product focused. At least one of the co-founders though should be obsessed with
sales / marketing from the beginning. Adding one sales person after the product is
in the market and one marketing person is ﬁne, but these should be "doers" not
"VPs"."

Krzysztof Kowalczyk, investor and serial entrepreneur
"...In terms of the infrastructure, both technical and HR, premature scaling is
investing too much upfront in building up the capacity which might turn out to be
unnecessary if product/market fit is not be found. It's very important to ensure that
you WILL BE able to scale up quickly once needed, but no more. Look at classic
Bubble1.0 example Webvan, which spent around $1B before understanding their
customers and refining their business model. On the other hand Instagram, a wildly
successful iPhone app, scaled up only when their user base started to grow rapidly.
(http://mashable.com/2011/03/30/scaling-instagram/)."
David Weekly, serial entrepreneur
Premature scaling can be Growth-Through-Hiring - thinking that a growing team
means a successful company and eagerly hiring lots of people that seem smart
before grasping the impact this will have on business speed and team dynamics. A
deliberately small team like 37 Signals and Craigslist can outperform teams orders
of magnitude larger.
Saad Khan, investor
“One of my most productive engineering teams was also my smallest. Three
engineers + the founder built and tested three different products over 6 months
before they settled on one that both spoke to them and felt like it was “big”.

And it was. After an initial launch they built a platform that was a customer
acquisition dream – it was all free PR and word of mouth. Nonetheless, we were
very particular about the customers that we let onto the platform until we could
convince ourselves about the ROI – everyone else went in to a long backlog that
was to “stay tuned”. Only when we really started to see the platform delivering for
our growing set of handpicked customers did we bring on our first jack-of-all trades
sales contributor to get tactical. By this point, everyone assumed we were a big org
but we were still a skeleton crew. Except now we had a huge backlog, evangelical
customers, and big smiles. We opened the floodgates.
It’s been game on since. J”

Patrick Paulisch, serial entrepreneur and investor
“Adapting one of my favorite entrepreneurial quotes from race car driver Mario
Andretti: "If everything seems under control, you probably scaled prematurely".
Premature scaling is one of the wrong sides of a fine line any entrepreneur walks on
on a constant basis during the initial phases of a high-growth venture. Anyone not
being on his first venture knows the accompanying signs: on the HR side it starts
with things like spending more than one hour every day in meetings, continues with
the endless discussion of job titles and ends with handing out the pink slips. Things
that help, other than critically reflecting by asking yourself the right questions on a
constant basis: this not being your venture, not buying into your own hype, having
experience on the team and/or board…..or riding on a hockey stick”
Quote about premature scaling by …
Mike Maples, entrepreneur and investor at FLOODGATE
“A startup has only a tiny number of ergs of energy. It cannot afford a single minute
or dollar of wasted motion. Pre-mature scaling happens when a startup wastes
valuable ergs of energy on unproven programs and ideas prematurely, before the
winning ideas that are worthy of precious energy are discovered. Startups should
only scale when they know that applying extra energy will create the yields on the
business that they expect. Or as Nathan Furr and Paul Ahlstrom say -- "nail it
before you scale it."”

Inconsistent startup raise a lot of money before validating their market properly
and optimizing their conversion funnels, etc. In stage 3 they raise on average
$800k which is three times more money than consistent startups.
Raising too much money too early can be harmful for startups. It puts a
company under pressure to scale even though they are not ready.
$ 0
$ 750000
$ 1500000
$ 2250000
$ 3000000
Stage 1 / Discovery
Stage 4 / Scale
Average amount of funding by stage

How many startups in a stage raised >1 standard deviation of the stage average
of funding based.
This could be interpreted...
If startups raise too much money before the scale stage they have a very high
chance of being inconsistent. Founders may think they can be disciplined if they
raise too much money, but the numbers show that by and large they aren't.
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Stage 1 / Discovery
Stage 4 / Scale
Startups that raise funding above average - inconsistent vs. consistent

Bernard Moon, investor and serial entrepreneur
"If you raise too much capital, especially for inexperienced entrepreneurs, you can
become undisciplined and anxious from the pressure to succeed and grow big.
You might hire too many people, hire too quickly without adequate checks, you
might rush to launch when it might be better to launch late, or you might let inertia
takeover. The last point I mean that you scale too quickly and this could prevent
you from pivoting. Most successful startups change their business model mid-
stream at least once, so premature scaling could blind an entrepreneur from the
company's "real business model".
During my 2nd startup where we raised too much capital, $7 million for our first
round, and proceed to burn through our money like it was doused in gasoline. We
almost went through bankruptcy, by a miracle closed our 2nd round of $7.5 million
during the bust of 2000, changed the business model (premature scaling at it's
best), and then became a profitable company."
Fred Destin, investor and serial entrepreneur
“The Tail Wagging the Dog (Board Pressure)
You've raised a fair bit of money on the back of an ambitious set of projections,
and now you feel compelled to hit these numbers. Never mind that the market
may change or that you may discover these new verticals aren't as easy to
crack as you thought, it will be difficult to go back to the board and tell them you
won't spend the new cash, or hit the numbers.”
Nathan Furr, author of “Nail it and scale it”
“Spending money beyond the essentials on growing the business (e.g., hiring
sales personnel, expensive marketing, perfecting the product, leasing offices,
etc.) before nailing the product/market fit.”

How much money consistent vs inconsistent startups spend per month on
customer acquisition before optimizing their conversion funnels and customer
acquisition costs.
Before a startup can cost effectively acquire customers they should not be
spending a lot of money on customer acquisition. If you consider spending more
than $15,000 on customer acquisition before you are ready to scale, then the
data shows that Inconsistent startups are 2.3x times more likely to spend too
much on customer acquisition.
0%
20%
40%
$0-$100
$100-$2,000
$2,000-$15,000
$15,000-$100,000
$100,000+
Money spent on customer acquisition per month before funnels & costs optimization

When startups spend this much money on customer acquisition, they are trying
to scale, the problem is it's not very effective and leads to inconsistency if
startups haven't first built a product customers want and can efficiently acquire
customers.
Fred Destin, investor and serial entrepreneur
“Illusions of product market fit or price discovery
The classic mistake is to confuse a few early adopters with a market. This was
perfectly documented by Geoffrey Moore and is still relevant today. Not being
able to replicate early successes also occurs in consumer businesses, usually
through the rapid degradation of customer acquisition and conversion
economics. It's one thing to spend $50K a month through online marketing
channels with high marketing efficiency, but quite another to spend 5 or 10 times
that amount without shooting the economic contribution of each new user or
consumer.”
“Confusing Founder Heroics with a Repeatable Model
As Peter Lynch famously said, "go for businesses that any idiot could run,
because some day one will". The parallel here is that it is an easy mistake to
assume that hired salespeople or marketing people will be able to replicate the
same rate of success as an incredibly motivated, tenacious and compelling
founding team did in the early days. Of course that's rarely true. The
commercial proposition needs to be baked enough and repeatable enough that
possibly less talented and less determined sales organizations will be able to
shift product efficiently enough.”
Daniel Zumino, investor
Premature scaling is indeed a frequent cause of failure for web-related start ups. I
have witnessed it several times.
1) Definition
For me premature scaling refers to a situation where money is spent towards
growing the business before a viable business model has been identified. Until that
point has been reached, money should only be used to test a wide array of options
to determine which model might work. Variations in product features, claimed
benefits, distribution channels, customer targets, partnership arrangements, etc.,
result in a huge number of combinations, most of which do not constitute viable
businesses. Unless many of these are tested, the initial model is likely to be way

under-optimized. Betting on growth first, and 'refining' the model along the way is
exceedingly dangerous because the alternatives are often incompatible strategies,
not just minor refinements. Having committed a lot of cash - and therefore
reputation - to a course of action makes it very difficult to change course. By the
time various operational adjustments have failed to resolve the problem, the
company may run out of money and, most damning, credibility.
2) Example
This french company introduced the first 100% on-line gift-cheque (as opposed to
paper coupons, with a complex logistics attached). The business concept looks
wonderful and eminently scalable: it consists of literally issuing money at zero
variable cost; all the operating cost consists of running the web platform. The big
issue is to reach scale to satisfy both vendors and users, and of course cover the
fixed costs.
A 300k € seed round allowed to build the platform, garner a few vendors and start
operations. The next step was to sign up a range of vendors to provide a wide
enough choice of products, and to draw customers in large enough numbers to
satisfy the vendors' expectations. A substantial additional round was completed to
launch a full scale marketing campaign, mostly aimed at attracting individual
customers to the site. Because a disproportionate share of the business takes
place in the Xmas season, it took almost a year to ascertain that the direct
approach to individual customers didn't work. For the following season, the focus
shifted to partnering with existing communities of potential users, some of which
already using paper gift-cheques. Another round was raised to bankroll the new
strategy. The results were much better, but still not good enough to reach self-
financing. By that time, the main investor had lost faith in the business and the
team. The company was sold to one of the direct competitors.
This business doesn't easily lend itself to quick, low cost testing, but, with
hindsight, I can see how we should have reversed the approach: first go for very
narrowly defined deals (in partnership, with focused targets), and based on the
learning, move gradually to larger segments and a more autonomous model. This
could have been done with a much reduced team, and a ratio of revenue/marketing
cost that would have justified sustained investing until break-even.
Enrique Allen, Founding Designer at 500 Startups
“Premature scaling is when a baby tries to run before it knows how to walk. In other
words, spending excessive amounts of resources to expand upon activities that are
fundamentally flawed. However, at some point entrepreneurs need to attempt to
scale to learn. Therefore, premature scaling may mean lack of intention around
systematic scaling experiments to validate assumptions.”

Startups that have not raised money set their own valuation in stage 1 and stage
2. In stage 1 inconsistent startup set their valuation about 2.5 times higher than
consistent startups. In stage 2 inconsistent startup value themselves 15 times
higher than consistent startups.
All startups overestimate their valuation in discovery and then it drops once they
actually start validating their product. Inconsistent companies have rose-colored
glasses that are signiﬁcantly darker.
$ 0
$ 10000000
$ 20000000
Stage 1 / Discovery Stage 2 / Validation
Self Reported Valuation of startups that have not raised funding

Inconsistent startups that scale prematurely write 3.4 times more lines of code in
the discovery stage and 2.25 times more lines of code in the efﬁciency stage
compared to consistent startups.
Inconsistent startups over-engineer their products and spend too much time on
building out features that are not absolutely necessary. We often see engineers
that are entirely convinced that their product can only work if it has the same
product complexity of a mature product such as Facebook or twitter. Most of
the time this complexity leads to lower market adoption and eventually failure for
the startup.
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
Stage 1 / Discovery
Stage 4 / Scale
Lines of code written by stage

Alex Barrera, Serial Entrepreneur
"Premature scaling is trying to fix a problem you haven't encountered yet. It tends to
happen mainly to tech founders where their desire to build cool technology gets in
front of the real problem solving. You can detect it in long release cycles, constant
failure to deliver and unused capabilities and/or product features. Premature scaling
is probably the main reason why most startups end up spending all their cash (and
dying). One of my own startups incurred that and was fatal, but I know much bigger
startups that raised millions just to spend them hiring hardcore backend engineers,
building a robust and super scalable backend just cause their founders user goals
were X. What happen? Well, they spent all their cash, wasted 1 year and got 0
users."
David Weekly, Serial Entrepreneur
“1) Premature optimization - selecting tools or technology platforms that are slower
to develop on / not as-familiar to the team but theoretically higher-performance in
anticipation of potentially-large demand but in reality prevent there from being large
demand since the feature set of the product is so slow/hard to work on.
2) Platformization - building a platform to allow anyone to do anything in any way at
any time so that the whole world will be using your system, before you have a single
user. Utterly failing to make a compelling case for how this is useful to any specific
person because the team is afraid of getting confined to a niche. As a result,
nobody understands what the product does and nobody uses it beyond a very
small group of bright early adopters.”
Ivan Farneti, Investor
We have seen our fair share of premature scaling over the years.
Some in our own portfolio, some in companies we were looking at and (luckily)
decided to pass on.
If I look at these last 10 years, the one regular occurrence of the “cart before the
horses” syndrome was in the wrong estimate or market demand timing. As some
folks have already written, demand is not so easy to estimate when you are there.
After the fact, it does look simple, but it is not. The problem with premature scaling
was exacerbated by fixed nature of the technology costs (culprit #1). Before AWS
you could only buy technology with a step function cost structure. Some tech-led

companies with too much money (culprit #2) decided to install the latest Unix
servers to test beta customers. Other companies were mistaking a handful of
early adopter clients in a new country as the compulsory call to build a new full
infrastructure there. Then, at the first macroeconomic shake up (and we have
one every 2 years it seems) the new territory still has less than 10 clients, and
more than 10 staff. Unwinding a prematurely scaled organization may be more
expensive than building it in the first place. Back when Jeffrey Moore gospel
was new, a few companies (and VCs) misread the whole Gorilla theory. Get big
first, get the biggest market share and as the market leader reap the big
benefits. The serious fallacy in that argument was its assumption that market
demand is there now. And it assumes that demand will be there tomorrow.
I actually think that cloud computing and open source software and an ever
decreasing cost of bandwidth are contributing to help start ups from premature
scaling, at least on the area of fixed technology costs. The ability to tune down
the power, to test and pivot twice or more on the same seed funding dollar can
multiply the chances of success.

Almost 80% of inconsistent startups focus on product and 45% of consistent
startups focus on customer development before they reached product/market
ﬁt.
In the beginning startups can get easily lost in building a product without
validating the actual demand for it. Based on interviews most inconsistent
startups are under the impression that they are an exception to the rule. They
believe they have found a special insight for a disruptive startup that no one else
has. Unfortunately most of these startups fail.
0%
25%
50%
Customer Development
50/50
Product Development
Focus of the team in discovery

0%
40%
80%
Discovering problem
Validating product
Streamlining product
Scaling
Profit maximization
Diversifying product
Self assesed priority in discovery stage
0%
35%
70%
Discovering problem
Validating product
Streamlining product
Scaling
Profit maximization
Diversifying product
Self assesed priority in validation stage

Consistent startups in the discovery phase have a product that is primarily in the
concept phase. Inconsistent startups primarily are building prototypes or have
already built a product.
Consistent startups spend more time discovering who their customers are,
whereas inconsistent startups are focused on validating that customers want
their product. Consistent startups are searching. Inconsistent startups are
executing.
It's widely believed amongst startup thought leaders, that successful startups
succeed because they are good searchers and failed startups achieve failure by
efﬁciently executing the irrelevant.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
Concept
In Development
Prototype
Product (low
growth)
Product (high growth)
Mature Product
Product stage before product/market fit

Mick Liubinskas, serial entrepreneur and co-founder of Pollenizer
“Scaling at the right time is tough. Too early and you waste money and get
distracted. Too late and you miss the market or run out of runway.
It's not scientific but the number we talk about at Pollenizer is 60%. If you've got
your business model working to 60% of your projections then go for it. It means
you're past half way there but there is still plenty of room for optimization. We're
after confidence without perfection.
Don't think about scaling as purely about more customers. One of the most
dangerous ways you can scale is through new features. Every feature you add is
something else you need to maintain, manage, measure, market, understand and
support. The same applies to markets. Too many segments and you're juggling too
many needs with too few resources and hours in the day.
The main thing is for you and your team to choose the right time. Don't be under
pressure from investors, media or even customers. Right or wrong, you need to
trust your instincts.”
Alexander Galitsky, serial entrepreneur and investor
“Founders often forget that approximately >200k early adopters exist around the
globe. Their goal is to try every new product - but not to use or pay for it. Therefore
200K free users mean very little. Instead of scaling your user base prematurely
good startups are focusing on small defined user groups. Their goal is to
understand how their product/service offering fit well with this defined user group,
to estimate the size of this group, to discover the key triggers that turn the
members of this group into real customer, to learn what features need to be added
to the product/service keeping on mind to win the hearts of customer segments
beyond their original user group.
(…)
In modern time, you can't cultivate your start up in a very predicted "agriculture"
order. Market condition and requirements are changing so often that you need to
live the " jungle" culture. You need to react and balance your strategy more
dynamically. Since not the best and strong trees are surviving in the jungle, but
more flexible and adoptive.”

On average startups that scale prematurely have 15% and 19% of their product
development outsourced in discovery and validation - compared to consistent
startups that on average have only 3-4% outsourced.
Especially in an early stage it is dangerous to outsource the product
development. All dimensions: product, customers, business model, ﬁnancials
and team are typically changing at a high rate. If product development is not
done in house startups will have a hard time keeping up with the daily or even
hourly feedback loop a startups have at this stage.
0%
10%
20%
Stage 1 / Discovery Stage 2 / Validation
Average percentage of team outsorced before product/market fit

Consistent and inconsistent startups have an almost equal distribution in
existing markets where they differentiate their product by being better or niche.
Signiﬁcant differences in distribution can be seen with new markets and existing
markets with cheaper products.
Startups that are tackling new markets are more likely to be inconsistent
because they have more uncertainty than existing markets. Tackling an existing
market where the product is differentiated by being cheaper has the highest
certainty because people almost always prefer the same value at a lower price,
whereas differentiation by better or niche rely on more subjective qualities.
0%
25%
50%
Existing market (better)
Existing market (cheaper)
Existing market (niche)
New
Market
Type of market

Inconsistent companies of all types try to monetize their user base more heavily
before product market ﬁt.
Trying too hard to monetize leads to inconsistency. While money can be an
important validation indicator, stressing it too heavily will lead startups to ignore
opportunities and drift towards non-scalable opportunities that are likely to turn
into small business or custom consultant shops.
0%
20%
40%
Automator / Type1
Social Transformer / Type1N
Integrator / Type2
Challenger / Type3
Percentage of paid users by type before validation

What percentage of startups of a particular type are consistent vs. inconsistent.
Level of ‘difﬁculty’ or ‘uncertainty’ for the different types of startups is in the
following order: Type 2, Type 1, Type 1N, Type 3.
0%
35%
70%
Type1
Type1N
Type2
Type3
Distribution of startups by Type

IV. Similarities of inconsistent vs. consistent startups
The last section contained lots of data on how consistent companies behave
differently from inconsistent companies. This sections contains data to show the
many ways that they are very similar to each other, which highlights the
importance of the conclusions in the previous sections.
That consistency does not vary by estimated market size. There is an equal
distribution of consistent and inconsistent startups across all the different
market sizes.
0%
20%
40%
< $100 Million
$100 Million - $1 Billion
$1 Billion - $10 Billion
$10 Billion - $50 Billion
$50 - $100 Billion
$100 - $500 Billion
> $500 Billion
Estimated total available market size

How frequently startups push code into production or release a new version of
their product.
The frequency of your product release cycle has no effect on consistency.
0%
15%
30%
Multiple times per day
Once per day
2-3 times per week
Once per week
Every 1-3 months
Every 2-3 weeks
Every 3-6 months
More than 6 months
Frequency for product release cycle

How consistency varies by the level of education of the founders.
The education of the founder has no impact on whether a startup is consistent
or inconsistent.
0%
25%
50%
None
High School
Some College
Some Graduate School
Undergraduate Degree
Graduate Degree
Level of education of founders

How consistency varies by the gender of the founders.
The gender of the founder has no impact on whether a startup is consistent or
inconsistent.
0%
50%
100%
Female Male
Gender of founders

How consistency varies by how long the founders have known each other
before starting the company.
The time the founders have known each other has no impact or little impact on
whether a startup is consistent or inconsistent.
0%
25%
50%
Less than 3 months
3-6 months
6-12 months
12-18 months
18-36 Months
36 Months+
Time co-founders have known each other before starting

How consistency varies by the number of startups the founder has been a part
of where they were either the founder or one of the ﬁrst 5 employees.
Experience has no impact on whether an entrepreneur will be more consistent.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6+
Number of technology startups the founders have founded before
Founders of consistent startups Founders of inconsistent startups

the average of consistent companies vs the average age of inconsistent
companies
Age has no impact on whether you are consistent.
18 Years
39 Years
60 Years
Average Age
34 Years35 Years
Average age of the founders

We divided the distribution into three buckets. One product, two products and
three or more products. The distribution across these three buckets is almost
identical for consistent and inconsistent companies.
The amount of products a company is handling therefore does not inﬂuence the
performance
0%
40%
80%
1 2 3+
Number of products

Google Analytics, homegrown solutions and spreadsheets are the top 3 three
tools that are used by more than 90% of all startups to track their metrics and
make decisions.
There are slight differences between consistent and inconsistent companies but
we didn't interpret it as signiﬁcant.
0%
40%
80%
Google Analytics Homegrown Solution Spreadsheet
Top 3 tools to track metrics

How consistency varies by geographical region.
Geography has no impact on whether you are consistent.
0%
30%
60%
North America
Europe
Asia
Oceania
Middle East
Africa
South America
Distribution by country

V. Conclusion
Concluding we can say that we were surprised with the clarity of the results.
Since our last report we have grown our dataset to more than 3200 firms and
completely overhauled our classification methodology with machine learning
algorithms.
Our algorithms classify each firm into a behavioral stage and an actual stage
according to the Marmer stages model. Using this classification, we are able to
recognize firms whose behavioral stage does not match the actual stage. These
firms are called inconsistent, and their main problem is that they scale their
operations prematurely.
Premature scaling is a result of firms focusing on one dimension in their
operation and advancing it out of sync with the rest of their operation. Our data
indicates that inconsistent firms tend to overspend early on customer
acquisition, hire too many employees, designate executive management too
early, and focus too much on engineering at the expense of customer
development.
The issue with firms that scale prematurely is that they perform significantly
worse than firms that scale properly. Inconsistent firms have lower user growth,
raise less money in later stages and make less revenue per month.
A notable finding in our research is that so many firms were prone to premature
scaling. Specifically, 70% of the firms in our dataset exhibited such behavior. We
are able to show that many commonly quoted causes for failure are probably not
the causes of premature scaling. The age of entrepreneurs, their location, their
experience nor their education affect their chances of scaling prematurely.
The work is far from complete. Two future research topics currently seem
promising:
Improving our machine learning algorithms to classify and analyze data more
accurately, and make use of new firm data being collected.
Longitudinal data of firms and its analysis will allow firms to extrapolate
individual recommendations on how to operate in different environments.
In order to aid firms in avoiding the pitfalls of early scaling, we developed the
Startup Genome Compass. The Compass uses firm data to generate a
comprehensive report for each individual firm. The report contains benchmarks
and analyses that can be used by entrepreneurs to ascertain their startup Type
and Stage. We hope these insights will help firms identify issues that require
their attention when advancing through the Startup Lifecycle.

D. Acknowledgments & Sources
Authors:
Max Marmer, Bjoern Lasse Herrmann, Ron Berman, Ertan Dogrultan
Supporters:
Chuck Eesley, Steve Blank, Aleksandra Markova
Methodology:
In order to not bias the startups taking the survey we will not publish the
thresholds and milestones we use for the stage assessment. More info can be
found here http://www.systemmalfunction.com.
Underlying Assumptions:
• We assume that a company is tackling a large market from the get go or
navigates towards a large market as they evolve
• We assume that the company is able to place themselves in an ecosystem
where talent and money is accessible
• This view makes sense predominantly for companies with high market risk.
We assume a startup is able to surmount their technology risk. Companies
with large technology risk may fail for additional reasons.
Caveats / Current Problems We Are Working on Solving:
• We don’t yet have longitudinal data.
• We don’t assess much about the market and can’t assess where in the
lifecycle adoption curve a startup is.
• We don’t assess each dimension of the startup independently. This makes the
behavioral stage an aggregate score that express the startup’s “the center of
gravity” across the ﬁve dimensions (Customer, Product, Team, Business
Model, Financials).
Sample sizes:
• Total number of startups: 3200
• Startups that were consistent with the Marmer stages: 30%
• Startups that raised $50k+ funding (with speciﬁc amount disclosed): 316
• Startups that had funding but not disclose the amount: 392
• All startups were high growth technology startups
Inspiration:
Steve Blank, Dave McClure, Sean Ellis, Eric Ries, Paul Graham, Joel York

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