Space Law, AI, and Cybersecurity | SproutEd

Space Law, AI and
Cybersecurity
Presented By Charles Lee Mudd Jr.

Charles Lee Mudd Jr. is an experienced attorney
specializing in space law, Internet law, defamation,
data security, and intellectual property. He founded
Mudd Law in 2001, growing the firm to become an
internationally recognized practice. Offering diverse
representation, the firm serves clients in space,
advertising, employment, entertainment, securities,
challenge course, and Internet sectors.
Charles is a Board Member of ITechLaw, a founding
member of the Internet Law Leadership Summit, and
was elected to the International Institute of Space
Law in 2020. He's held leadership roles in the Illinois
State Bar Association and maintains memberships in
various legal and astronomical associations.
Charles Lee Mudd Jr.
2
Mudd Law

Protecting the Security and
Sustainability of the Next Frontier
Space Law, AI, and Cybersecurity
3

International Space Regime
(briefly….)
4

The US Space Regulatory Regime
5

FAA NOAA
DOS
DOC
NTIA
Congress
FCC ECFS
ITAR
EAR
6

DOT - FAA
Office of Commercial Space Transportation.
Enabling statute Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984
(51 U.S.C. § 50901-50923)
Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004
8

Launch or Reentry Vehicles
Experimental Permits Reusable Suborbital Rockets
DOT – FAA - OCST
Enabling Regulations
9
14 CFR Ch. III, Parts 400-460

Launch or Reentry Vehicles
Pre-Application Consultation
Policy Review and Approval
Safety Review and Approval
Payload Review and Determination
DOT – FAA - OCST
10

Financial Responsibility
Environmental Review
Compliance Monitoring
DOT – FAA - OCST
11

Evaluation of Space Transportation Demands/Needs
National Security Space Transportation Demands
“Other important technologies include data management,
cybersecurity, and [SSA].”
DOT – FAA - OCST
14
2020 National Spaceport Network Development Plan

13 Licensed Launches (10 SpaceX)
23 Launch Licenses
2 Human Spaceflight Licensed & Permitted Launches
DOT – FAA - OCST
15
2024 Statistics

New Launch and Reentry Regulations (157 submissions)
August 19, 2019 NPRM closed - published September 30,
2020
Effective March 10, 2021, March 10, 2026*
*Information Collection Requirements delayed pending OMB
DOT – FAA - OCST
16

Streamlined Launch and Reentry License Requirements
(SLR2)
Part 450 (combination of old 415, 417, 431, 435)
Part 450 licenses will be valid for up to 5 years (renewable)
DOT – FAA - OCST
17

Streamlined Launch and Reentry License Requirements
(SLR2)
Workshops held in November 2020
YouTube Videos and PDFs Available
DOT – FAA - OCST
18

In 2020, FAA began issuing circulars to update aspects of
its oversight of commercial space transportation.
Prior to 2020, last circular occurred in 2007.
DOT – FAA - OCST
19

2021 Computing System Safety
“It is intended to provide guidance for an applicant in
developing software and computing system safety
analyses and processes to comply with § 450.141.”
DOT – FAA - OCST
20

Commercial Remote Sensing Regulatory Affairs
(https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/)
DOC – NOAA - CRSRA
21

22
no person who is subject to the jurisdiction or control of the U.S. may
operate any private remote sensing space system without a license,
and authorized the Secretary of Commerce to license private sector
parties to operate private remote sensing space systems
Based on
National and Commercial Space Programs Act, 51 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq.

Within the CRSRA, there has been
coordination between…
DOS, DOD, DOI, JCS, and
Office Director of National Intelligence
23

Cybersecurity
Data Protection
24

May 8, 2002
NOAA Licensee
Data Protection Template
A. End-to-end process (high level)
1. Provide a high level description of the overall data protection strategy.
2. Provide a flow diagram that highlights the entire data protection process, from
satellite tasking orders and decks to delivery of imagery and finished products.
3. Provide a high level description for the end-to-end data protection process. This
description should delineate between protection methods implemented on the
spacecraft (e.g., data encryption) and ground based protection methods (e.g., ground
receiving station physical security). The combination of these protection methods
must clearly implement the license conditions regulating commanding authority,
tasking, imagery resolution and delivery time, country/regional access to imagery,
etc.)
B. Program Space Segment (detailed information)
Provide a brief description of the satellite system to include:
1. Orbital information (altitude, inclination, etc.)
2. Sensor type(s) (panchromatic, multispectral, hyperspectral, radar, etc.), basic design
features [example: for EO systems, resolution (IFOV), imaging modes, spectral range
(VNIR, SWIR, etc.), spectral bands (number of bands, center wavelength,
bandwidth), swath width (FOV)] and scanning mechanism description(s)
(pushbroom, step-stare, etc). Indicate which sensors produce co-registered imagery
(e.g., by common optical systems) and which are independent (e.g., PAN and SAR).
3. Top-level platform properties (e.g., in-track and cross track pointing ability, on-board
storage capacity, etc.)
4. General space/ground architecture (description with diagram).
5. Overview of the end-to-end system communications architecture (description with
diagram)
6. RF data downlinks
a. Link information (top level description of the number of RF channels and the
purpose of each)
b. Physical characterization of each link (frequency, modulation protocol, bit rates, link
margin, beam patterns, data compression protocol, encryption methodology, etc.)
c. Information type(s) carried by each RF channel (e.g., tasking of image collection;
telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C), satellite health/status, imagery metadata,
raw imagery data, etc.). The encryption level for each general information type must
be specified.
7. Indicate whether the satellite incorporates separate tasking links and/or data protocols
(e.g., encryption standards) for US Government and commercial operations. If
separate processes exist, describe the differences in detail. This would include:
encryption types used on all satellite up- and/or downlinks; key and re-key schemes;
26

Licenses
Annual Audits
27

When completed: FOUO/PROPIN/PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT
RELEASE OR DISSEMINATION BEYOND THE INTENDED RECIPIENT IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED
Page 1 of 10
Rev 3/14/2017
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA)
COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING REGULATORY AFFAIRS (CRSRA) COMPLIANCE AND
MONITORING
20__ AUDIT
LICENSEE OF RECORD: _
CORPORATE AFFILIATION: _
PROPOSED LICENSED SYSTEM(S) OF RECORD: _
Under the National and Commercial Space Programs Act (NCSPA or Act), 51 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq.,
the Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) has the obligation to ensure the national security and
international obligations of the United States are maintained by licensed operators of private remote
sensing systems. Further, pursuant to 51 U.S.C. § 60121, the Secretary may not grant any License,
unless the Secretary determines in writing that the Licensee will comply with the requirements of the
Act, any regulations issued pursuant to this Act, the terms of the resulting License(s), and any applicable
national security concerns and international obligations of the United States.
Pursuant to this mandate, the Secretary must continuously monitor the Licensee and the operation of its
licensed system(s) to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Act and the preservation and
protection of the national security and international obligations of the United States. Further, in
accordance with 51 U.S.C. § 60123, the Secretary may conduct investigations and inquiries or take other
actions concerning any matter relating to the enforcement of the NCSPA. This monitoring and
compliance audit is being conducted, pursuant to these legal authorities and any other applicable federal
law.
For Official Use
REVIEWED BY DATE REVIEWED BY DATE
One (1) year after the issuance of a NOAA License and no less than every year thereafter, the CRSRAO
shall conduct an Annual Compliance Audit (herein, the “Annual Audit”) of a NOAA Licensee. The
principal purpose of the audit is to determine compliance with the terms of the license and the
trustworthiness of the Licensee to preserve the national security and comply with international
obligations of the United States. By conducting the Audit, the CRSRAO assists the Secretary, or his
designee, to lawfully discharge the Secretary’s responsibility to exercise due diligence in making, or
confirming, an explicit determination that the Licensee will uphold such obligations, as required under
the NCSPA.
29

Cybersecurity
where propulsion systems, show ensured + control
Tier 2 and Tier 3 – could see specific requirements
(eg tracking, telemetry, and control)
30
Final Rules – May 19, 2020

31
Cybersecurity
Encryption
recommend taking higher level, provide for encryption of data
where possible

Cybersecurity
Indeed, they do provide recommendations
(Requirements less stringent that had been proposed)
32

Regulates any radio communication
47 CFR §§ 5, 25, 97
§ 5 - Experimental Radio Service
§ 25 – Satellite Communications
§ 97 – Amateur Radio Service.
FCC
33

Streamlined Small Sat
Regulations
FCC
34

§ 25.122 Applications for streamlined small space station
authorization.
To begin with….
a comprehensive proposal for Commission evaluation must be submitted
for each space station in the proposed system on FCC Form 312, Main
Form and Schedule S, as described in § 25.114(a) through (c), together
with the certifications described in paragraph (c) of this section and the
narrative requirements described in paragraph (d) of this section.
FCC
35

10 or fewer space stations requested
If same space stations, blanket application; otherwise, need
to certify requirements met for each space station iteration
FCC
36
§ 25.122 (b)

NGSO
Total in-orbit lifetime six years or less
Be 10 cm or larger in its smallest dimension;
Have a mass of 180 kg or less, including any propellant;
FCC
37
authorization.

Orbital altitude of 600 km or below
OR
Maintain a propulsion system and have the ability to make
collision avoidance and deorbit maneuvers using propulsion.
FCC
38
authorization.

Probability of accidental explosions has been assessed and
limited, including from the on-board conversion of NRG
resources
The probability of a collision between each space station
and any other large object (10 cm or larger) during the
orbital lifetime of the space station is 0.001 or less as
calculated using current NASA software or other higher
fidelity model
FCC
39
authorization.

Each space station will be identifiable by a unique signal-
based telemetry marker distinguishing it from other space
stations or space objects
Release no operational debris
FCC
40
authorization.

The space station(s) will be disposed of post-mission through
atmospheric re-entry. The probability of human casualty from
portions of the spacecraft surviving re-entry and reaching the
surface of the Earth is zero as calculated using current NASA
software or higher fidelity models
FCC
41
authorization.

Operation of the space station(s) will be compatible with
existing operations in the authorized frequency band(s).
Operations will not materially constrain future space station
entrants from using the authorized frequency band(s)
FCC
42
authorization.

Section 3 – Peaceful Purposes
Section 4 – Transparency
Section 5 – Interoperability
Section 6 – Emergency
Assistance
Section 7 – Registration of Space
Objects
Section 8 – Release of Scientific
Data
Section 9 – Preserve Outer Space
Heritage
47

Section 10 – Space Resources
Section 11 – Deconfliction
• Due Regard and Harmful Interference
• Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines (2019)
• Due Regard (again)
• Harmful Interference (again)
• Communication and Coordination to Avoid HI
• Safety Zones
49
Artemis Accords

Section 11 – Deconfliction
Section 12 – Orbital Debris
• Plan for Mitigation of Orbital Debris
• Limit as possible new, long-lived harmful debris
50
Artemis Accords

1. Space Debris
2. Extraction of Space Debris and Ownership Issues
3. Space Environmentalism - Earth’s Orbital Space
4. Liability Development – On-Orbit Operations
51
Emerging Issues

5. Defining Ownership Rights
6. ITAR and EAR – Space Operations
7. Cybersecurity in Space
8. Dark & Quiet Skies
52
Emerging Issues

What Cannot Work By Itself
Waiting for a Treaty
Reliance on Guidelines, Recommendations, Thoughts
Self-Governance
Antiquated Regulations
53

Multi-Jurisdictional, Multi-Disciplinary, and Obligatory
Continue to Develop Guidelines as Foundation
Push for New Treaty – Encompassing or Limited
International Agreements
Encourage Industry Best Practices
Modernize Regulations
Collaboration
54

United States New Space Regime
Two-Phases
Preparatory
Consolidated
55

AI/ML
Artificial Intelligence
57

58
AI represents the programmed simulation of
human intelligence in machines.
Natural Language Processing

Interaction Between Computers and Human Languages
To Enable Computers to Understand, Interpret, and Generate
Natural Language
59

Alan Turing (1950)
Shannon-Weaver (1949)
60

Alan Turing (1950)
Turing proposed that if a machine could carry out a
conversation that was indistinguishable from a human
conversation, it could be said to be intelligent.
63

64
1951 Checkers and Chess

video removed, slide will be
deleted
66

Connection Between Mark 1 and WWW
Conway Berners-Lee and Mary Lee Woods
Tim Berners-Lee
World Wide Web
67
Internet History

68
“Every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence
can in principle be so precisely described that a machine
can be made to simulate it.”
John McCarthy, Marvin Minsky, Nathaniel Rochester, and Claude Shannon, “A
Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence,”
1956.

69
Machine Learning
A subfield of AI that uses statistical and algorithmic
techniques to enable computers to learn from data without
being explicitly programmed.
The use of ML seeks to develop algorithms that can improve
their performance on a specific task as the algorithms
become exposed to more data.

70
Machine Learning
Arthur Samuel coined the term “Machine Learning” in
1959.
Returning to Checkers, Samuel developed a version of
the game that could play at an expert level by
“learning” from its mistakes and improving its strategy
over time.

deleted
71

An AI model trained on massive amounts of text
data
Employs deep learning techniques (e.g. neural
networks) to learn statistical patterns in language
Uses these patterns to generate new human-like
language output
72
Large Language Models (LLM)

73
Large Language Models (LLM)
First LLM developed in 2010 at the University of Toronto
Employs deep learning techniques (e.g. neural
networks) to learn statistical patterns in language
Uses these patterns to generate new human-like
language output

74
And from there, let’s travel to
November 30, 2022…

Unsupervised Learning
Neural Networks
76
ChatGPT
Generative Pre-Trained Transformer

2018 - GPT 1
117 Million Parameters
2020 – GPT 3
175 Billion Parameters
77
ChatGPT

78
ChatGPT
May 2021 – GPT 3.5
November 30, 2022 – ChatGPT

GPT 3.5 Fine-Tuning
GPT 4.0 Playground
ChatGPT Plus Embeddings
API
80
ChatGPT

Over 40 languages
Numerous countries
Google Lens
Share with Others
Modify Responses
89
Google Bard
Updates

Claralabs
Scheduling Assistant
96
AI Uses in Law

98
Cautions
Since March alone, our security analysts have found
around 10 malware families posing as ChatGPT and
similar tools to compromise accounts across the
internet. For example, we've seen threat actors create
malicious browser extensions available in official web
stores that claim to offer ChatGPT-related tools.
In fact, some of these malicious extensions did include
working ChatGPT functionality alongside the malware.
This was likely to avoid suspicion from the stores and
from users. We've detected and blocked over 1,000 of
these unique malicious URLs from being shared on our
apps, and reported them to our industry peers at file-
sharing services where malware was hosted so they,
too, can take appropriate action.

deleted
99

100
Cautions
Mata v. Avianca, Inc., No. 22-cv-1461 (PKC), Order to Show Cause
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2023) (issuing rule to show cause where “[a]
submission filed by plaintiff’s counsel in opposition to a motion to
dismiss is replete with citations to nonexistent cases.”) (D.E. 31);
Attorney Affidavit (D.E. 32-1) (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2023) (responding to rule
to show cause order by stating that the case authorities found by the
district court to be nonexistent “were provided by Chat GPT which also
provided its legal source and assured the reliability of its content.”).

Standing Orders
USDC N.D. Texas, Judge Brently Starr
(https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judge/judge-brantley-starr)
101
Arising Rules

I further certify that no portion of any filing in this case will be drafted by
generative artificial intelligence or that any language drafted by
generative artificial intelligence—including quotations, citations,
paraphrased assertions, and legal analysis—will be checked for accuracy,
using print reporters or traditional legal databases, by a human being
before it is submitted to the Court. I understand that any attorney who
signs any filing in this case will be held responsible for the contents thereof
according to applicable rules of attorney discipline, regardless of whether
generative artificial intelligence drafted any portion of that filing.
102
Arising Rules

Standing Orders
USDC N.D. Illinois
(https://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judge/judge-brantley-starr)
103
Arising Rules

Any party using any generative AI tool to conduct legal
research or to draft documents for filing with the Court must
disclose in the filing that AI was used, with the disclosure
including the specific AI tool and the manner in which it was
used.
104
Arising Rules

“Parties should not assume that mere reliance on an AI tool will be
presumed to constitute reasonable inquiry, because, to quote a phrase,
“I’m sorry, Dave, I’m afraid I can’t do that …. This mission is too important for
me to allow you to jeopardize it.” 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (MetroGoldwyn-
Mayer 1968).
One way to jeopardize the mission of federal courts is to use an AI tool to
generate legal research that includes “bogus judicial decisions” cited for
substantive propositions of law.”
Arising Rules
105

See Mata v. Avianca, Inc., No. 22-cv-1461 (PKC), Order to Show Cause
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2023) (issuing rule to show cause where “[a] submission
filed by plaintiff’s counsel in opposition to a motion to dismiss is replete
with citations to nonexistent cases.”) (D.E. 31);
Id., Attorney Affidavit (D.E. 32-1) (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2023) (responding to
rule to show cause order by stating that the case authorities found by
the district court to be nonexistent “were provided by Chat GPT which
also provided its legal source and assured the reliability of its content.”).
106
Arising Rules

Just as the Court did before the advent of AI as a tool for legal
research and drafting, the Court will continue to presume that the
Rule 11 certification is a representation by filers, as living, breathing,
thinking human beings, that they themselves have read and
analyzed all cited authorities to ensure that such authorities
actually exist and that the filings comply with Rule 11(b)(2).
Arising Rules
107

Standing Orders
U.S. Court International Trade
http://mlo.bz/intltradeai
USDC E.D. Pa.
https://mlo.bz/jlYOe
108
Arising Rules

Illinois
Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act
820 ILCS 42/5, et seq.
Use, Sharing, Destruction
113
Arising Claims

116
Space Law
AI
Cybersecurity

117
Cybersecurity
Space Industry
Hack-a-Sat Events
Hack-a-Sat 4
Winning Teams Accessed U.S. Government Satellite in
Hours

UN Space Treaties – absence of cybersecurity obligation,
but other requirements might imply implementation of
measures (eg debris, non-contamination)
Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines – absence of
cybersecurity provisions
118
Cybersecurity

NIST 1.1 | 2.0
Introduction to Cybersecurity for Commercial Space
Operations (2/22)
Space Cybersecurity Symposium III (6/16/22)
119
Cybersecurity

IEEE
Standard for Space System Cybersecurity
Space System Cybersecurity Working Group
120
Cybersecurity

NASA
19 Jan 2024
Space Security Best Practices Guide
121
Cybersecurity

National Security Agency
Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC)
https://www.nsa.gov/Resources/Commercial-Solutions-for-Classified-Program/
122
Cybersecurity

Implementation of AI to Protect Cybersecurity
And Beyond
123
Putting it All Together

Optimize Analysis Time
Accelerate Threat Detection
Expedite Responses
Protect User Identity and Datasets
124
AI and Cybersecurity

IBM Reports
93% Executives Considering AI in Cybersecurity
Average Reduction of $3,000,000 million in data breach costs
Reduction in response time (230 days to 99 days, as an
example)
125
AI and Cybersecurity

AI and Space
NASA
”Throughout NASA, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is profoundly
disrupting science, its methods, processes, and discoveries.”
126

AI and Space
NASA
Artificial Intelligence Group
127

AI and Space
NASA
Earth Observing Data
128

AI and Space
NASA
Science Mission Directorate AI Initiative
129

AI and Space – NASA
2022 Responsible AI Plan
130

AI and Space – NASA – 2023 Report
“Important AI projects are underway at each of the seven NASA
Centers represented at the workshop, many as pilot projects
and a few as partnerships across Centers”
131

“Achieving the full potential for advances in AI demands
greater collaboration between NASA centers, with other
government agencies and with private industry and
academia.”
132

“Continuing NASA investment in High-End Computing
infrastructure, including on-premises and commercial cloud,
and commitment to Open Science will accelerate current and
future work.”
133

“An expansion of efforts in ethical, explainable, and trustworthy
AI is needed to overcome the “fear” of AI that is hindering further
uptake of AI in the broader community.”
134

“AI-supported autonomy is fundamental for current and future
missions to maximize science returns from missions in deep
space and from those generating huge volumes of data.”
135

“Ongoing support for training and learning in the rapidly
changing ecosystem of AI is essential for our workforce to
continue making advances and to help recruit and retain that
workforce.”
136

Yet, no mention of cyber or data security.
137

NASA
AI Use Case Inventory – 2023
No cybersecurity, data security,
only “security” security camera
138

www.muddlawoffices.com
Call or email and I'd be happy to speak with you more in-depth or answer any questions.
Contact Information
140
Mudd Law
312-964-5051
charles@muddlaw.com

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