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Social Engineering Tricks
Spotlight Forum June 2015
Michael Hendrickx
Senior Security Analyst
SOCIAL ENGINEERING
• You bought a firewall, great.
• Humans are helpful, by nature.
• Manipulate people to get things done
• A fancier way of “lying”
• We’ve all done it.
Find people Find info
Fake
Emails
SOCIAL ENGINEERING
• 2 ways of finding people:
• Casting a net (phishing)
• Quantity > Quality
• Whoever sticks is a victim
• Very noisy
• Targeting (spear phishing)
• Quality > Quantity
• Takes more time, more research, more effort.
PHISHING
• Humans haven’t change in the past few decades:
Recent “Rombertik” malware:
- State of the art malware (quite nasty though)
- Quite “lame” distribution
SPEAR PHISHING
• Email from somebody who
“knows you”
• You probably know them as well, else it’s
just embarrassing.
• Somebody who took time to
research about you
• Interested in you
• Rather, what you know
• Who you know
• What you have access to.
1. FINDING PEOPLE
• Target a domain, find its users:
• Maltego: visualizing OSINT
• Metasploit: finding email addresses
Emails are probably:
firstname.lastname@helpag.com
1. FIND PEOPLE (2)
• Emails are firstname.lastname@helpag.com
• Let’s look for more names
stephan.berner@helpag.com?
angelika.plate@helpag.com?
alexandra.pisetskaya@helpag.com?
nadia.zamouri@helpag.com?
ahmad.khaled.hawasli@helpag.com?
aashish.sharma@helpag.com?
prashant.jani@helpag.com?
…
Let’s dig just a bit further….
https://ae.linkedin.com/in/nsolling
STUDY TARGET
• Examine digital footprint
• Style of writing, topics, interests
STUDY TARGET
• Examine digital footprint further
• Interests:
• Porsche
• PADI diver
• Line6 (guitar) pod
• Merc GL550
• Trivial Pursuit ;)
TARGET SELECTION
• What can we do so far?
• Target Nicolai Solling
• Hey, we met at (Porsche club / ManAge
spa / PADI course / Rugkobbelskolen … )
• “Your Gargash Enterprises service…”
• Exploit Nicolai’s trust
• Target Nicolai’s contacts
• We know who he knows (social network)
• We know their email addresses (firstname.lastname@helpag.com)
• We know Nicolai’s writing style
• Exploit their trust
EXTRA, TECHNICAL TRICKS
• Need to trick a user to “believe us”
• Let technology help us
• Abuse 33 year old protocol: SMTP
• Fake email thread
• Fake CC
FAKE EMAIL THREAD
• SMTP just sends text to a
program.
• “Email threads” have no connection.
• Unless we have the entire thread,
digitally signed, we can’t trust it at all
• Modern equivalent of saying:
“Can I go dad? Mom said I could go”
FAKE CC
• CC doesn’t really exist
• It’s a MIME header we said we did
HELO blah
MAIL FROM: admin@flurk.org
RCPT TO: michael.hendrickx@helpag.com
DATA
From: Michael Hendrickx <michael@flurk.org>
Content-Type: text/plain;
Subject: Very important email
Cc: khaled hawasli <khaled.hawasli@helpag.com>,
barack.obama@whitehouse.gov
To: michael.hendrickx@helpag.com
Hey guys,
As per our conversation, please install the security update
located at http://evil.com/patch.exe
Well, in fact, this is an email that Khaled and Obama will
never get - but you can never find that out!
Thank you,
Security Admin
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
• A person who knows a lot about you can do a lot of
damage
• It’s from Nicolai
• Sounds like him
• To people that he knows
• The “right” people are in CC
• Shared responsibility
• Based on previous email
thread
• Which we can’t check.
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
• Creative spear phishing
To: Khaled Hawasli, Khalilov
cc: Michael Hendrickx
Hi Everyone,
I am very thrilled with the new VPN
software! It’s much faster. Have you
tried it?
Nicolai
To: Nicolai, Khaled Hawasli
cc: Michael Hendrickx
Hey man,
That’s awesome
> Hi Everyone,
> I am very thrilled with the new VPN
> …
To: Michael,
cc: Nicolai, Khalilov
Michael, you should try it!
> Hey man,
> That’s awesome
>> Hi Everyone,
>> I am very thrilled with the new VPN
>> …
In fact, all this is actually:
To: Khaled Hawasli, Khalilov
cc: Michael Hendrickx
Hi Everyone,
I am very thrilled with the new
VPN software! It’s much
faster. Have you tried it?
Nicolai
To: Nicolai, Khaled Hawasli
cc: Michael Hendrickx
Hey man,
That’s awesome
> Hi Everyone,
> I am very thrilled with the
new VPN
> …
To: Michael,
cc: Nicolai, Khalilov
Michael, you should try it!
> Hey man,
> That’s awesome
>> Hi Everyone,
>> I am very thrilled with the
new VPN
>> …
Nobody was ever CC’d
CONCLUSION
• The more people know about you, the more they
can target you.
• Minimize digital footprint
• Verify email contents
• Be cautious
• Use digital signatures
• Don’t trust anything sent to you
• Mommy said I could go.
CONTACT US | WWW.HELPAG.COM | INFO@HELPAG.COM
DUBAI, UAE
ARJAAN OFFICE TOWER,
OFFICE 1201 / 1208, PO BOX 500741
T +971 4 440 5666
F +971 4 363 6742
ABU DHABI, UAE
SALAM HQ BLDG,
BLOCK 6, EAST 1-16, OFFICE 503, PO BOX 37195
T +971 2 644 3398
F +971 2 639 1155
DOHA, QATAR
AL DAFNA – PALM TOWER
OFFICE 4803, WEST BAY, P.O. BOX 31316
T +974 4432 8067
F +974 4432 8069

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Social Engineering - Help AG spotlight 15Q2

  • 1. Social Engineering Tricks Spotlight Forum June 2015 Michael Hendrickx Senior Security Analyst
  • 2. SOCIAL ENGINEERING • You bought a firewall, great. • Humans are helpful, by nature. • Manipulate people to get things done • A fancier way of “lying” • We’ve all done it. Find people Find info Fake Emails
  • 3. SOCIAL ENGINEERING • 2 ways of finding people: • Casting a net (phishing) • Quantity > Quality • Whoever sticks is a victim • Very noisy • Targeting (spear phishing) • Quality > Quantity • Takes more time, more research, more effort.
  • 4. PHISHING • Humans haven’t change in the past few decades: Recent “Rombertik” malware: - State of the art malware (quite nasty though) - Quite “lame” distribution
  • 5. SPEAR PHISHING • Email from somebody who “knows you” • You probably know them as well, else it’s just embarrassing. • Somebody who took time to research about you • Interested in you • Rather, what you know • Who you know • What you have access to.
  • 6. 1. FINDING PEOPLE • Target a domain, find its users: • Maltego: visualizing OSINT • Metasploit: finding email addresses Emails are probably: firstname.lastname@helpag.com
  • 7. 1. FIND PEOPLE (2) • Emails are firstname.lastname@helpag.com • Let’s look for more names stephan.berner@helpag.com? angelika.plate@helpag.com? alexandra.pisetskaya@helpag.com? nadia.zamouri@helpag.com? ahmad.khaled.hawasli@helpag.com? aashish.sharma@helpag.com? prashant.jani@helpag.com? … Let’s dig just a bit further…. https://ae.linkedin.com/in/nsolling
  • 8. STUDY TARGET • Examine digital footprint • Style of writing, topics, interests
  • 9. STUDY TARGET • Examine digital footprint further • Interests: • Porsche • PADI diver • Line6 (guitar) pod • Merc GL550 • Trivial Pursuit ;)
  • 10. TARGET SELECTION • What can we do so far? • Target Nicolai Solling • Hey, we met at (Porsche club / ManAge spa / PADI course / Rugkobbelskolen … ) • “Your Gargash Enterprises service…” • Exploit Nicolai’s trust • Target Nicolai’s contacts • We know who he knows (social network) • We know their email addresses (firstname.lastname@helpag.com) • We know Nicolai’s writing style • Exploit their trust
  • 11. EXTRA, TECHNICAL TRICKS • Need to trick a user to “believe us” • Let technology help us • Abuse 33 year old protocol: SMTP • Fake email thread • Fake CC
  • 12. FAKE EMAIL THREAD • SMTP just sends text to a program. • “Email threads” have no connection. • Unless we have the entire thread, digitally signed, we can’t trust it at all • Modern equivalent of saying: “Can I go dad? Mom said I could go”
  • 13. FAKE CC • CC doesn’t really exist • It’s a MIME header we said we did HELO blah MAIL FROM: admin@flurk.org RCPT TO: michael.hendrickx@helpag.com DATA From: Michael Hendrickx <michael@flurk.org> Content-Type: text/plain; Subject: Very important email Cc: khaled hawasli <khaled.hawasli@helpag.com>, barack.obama@whitehouse.gov To: michael.hendrickx@helpag.com Hey guys, As per our conversation, please install the security update located at http://evil.com/patch.exe Well, in fact, this is an email that Khaled and Obama will never get - but you can never find that out! Thank you, Security Admin
  • 14. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER • A person who knows a lot about you can do a lot of damage • It’s from Nicolai • Sounds like him • To people that he knows • The “right” people are in CC • Shared responsibility • Based on previous email thread • Which we can’t check.
  • 15. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER • Creative spear phishing To: Khaled Hawasli, Khalilov cc: Michael Hendrickx Hi Everyone, I am very thrilled with the new VPN software! It’s much faster. Have you tried it? Nicolai To: Nicolai, Khaled Hawasli cc: Michael Hendrickx Hey man, That’s awesome > Hi Everyone, > I am very thrilled with the new VPN > … To: Michael, cc: Nicolai, Khalilov Michael, you should try it! > Hey man, > That’s awesome >> Hi Everyone, >> I am very thrilled with the new VPN >> … In fact, all this is actually: To: Khaled Hawasli, Khalilov cc: Michael Hendrickx Hi Everyone, I am very thrilled with the new VPN software! It’s much faster. Have you tried it? Nicolai To: Nicolai, Khaled Hawasli cc: Michael Hendrickx Hey man, That’s awesome > Hi Everyone, > I am very thrilled with the new VPN > … To: Michael, cc: Nicolai, Khalilov Michael, you should try it! > Hey man, > That’s awesome >> Hi Everyone, >> I am very thrilled with the new VPN >> … Nobody was ever CC’d
  • 16. CONCLUSION • The more people know about you, the more they can target you. • Minimize digital footprint • Verify email contents • Be cautious • Use digital signatures • Don’t trust anything sent to you • Mommy said I could go.
  • 17. CONTACT US | WWW.HELPAG.COM | INFO@HELPAG.COM DUBAI, UAE ARJAAN OFFICE TOWER, OFFICE 1201 / 1208, PO BOX 500741 T +971 4 440 5666 F +971 4 363 6742 ABU DHABI, UAE SALAM HQ BLDG, BLOCK 6, EAST 1-16, OFFICE 503, PO BOX 37195 T +971 2 644 3398 F +971 2 639 1155 DOHA, QATAR AL DAFNA – PALM TOWER OFFICE 4803, WEST BAY, P.O. BOX 31316 T +974 4432 8067 F +974 4432 8069