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Talking Chess: A Phenomenological Study of Strategy and Social Reasoning in Chess Players
Dissertation Manuscript
Submitted to Northcentral University
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PSYCHOLOGY
by
ERIC SMITH
La Jolla, California
March 2021
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Abstract
In this qualitative phenomenology study 9 chess players participated in semi-structured
interviews to discern their thematic descriptions of how social cognition operates to form
strategy. The Problem addressed in this study was the gap in understanding how chess players
experience cognitive processes that reference social reasoning traits related to interpersonal
strategy decision-making (Guntz et al., 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). The theoretical foundation
for this phenomenological design was Theory of Mind. The main themes were Cognitive
Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy, Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism
for Choosing Chess Strategy, and Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or
Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess
Strategies. There are implications related to the definition of the term “empathy”. That the
theme of cognitive empathy was well defined by chess player participants as a cognitive process
used to discern strategy was strong indication that cognitive empathy, as a ToM quality, was
prominent in chess play. Memory, intuition, and spatial calculations were also affirmed as
strong functions in deciding chess strategy. Recommendation include extending research into
how the temporo-parietal junction affects strategy, applications of empathy to artificial
intelligence, and how this research can help chess coaching.
Keywords: Cognitive empathy, chess, strategic decision-making, social reasoning, theory
of mind
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Acknowledgements
Dr. Ackerman, Dr. Tanksale, Dr. Verace, Jing Juan, and all the professors who helped me along
the way.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction................................................................................................................... 1
Problem Statement .................................................................................................................. 10
Purpose of the Study…………………………………………………………………………11
Theoretical Framework………………….………………………………………………...…12
Nature of the Study................................................................................................................. 17
Research Questions................................................................................................................. 19
Significance of the Study........................................................................................................ 20
Defintion of Key Terms……………………………………………………………………...21
Summary................................................................................................................................. 23
Chapter 2: Literature Review........................................................................................................ 24
Theoretical Framework........................................................................................................... 25
Theory could Reveal Strategic Processes ............................................................................... 39
How to Recognize a Cognitive Strategy................................................................................. 43
Geometric Considerations on Cognitive Strategy................................................................... 48
Role of Intuition in Strategy ................................................................................................... 51
Personality Correlates with Strategy....................................................................................... 54
Limits of What can be Known Strategically ........................................................................... 58
Cognitive Capacities for Strategy and its Perceptions ............................................................ 61
Spatial Relationships and Memory Effect Strategy ................................................................ 63
Some Chemical Maps of Cognitive Strategy.......................................................................... 68
Cognitive Mechanisms and Strategy………………………………………………………...71
Consciousness Affects/Effects Cognitive Strategy and Neural Mapping............................... 75
Language, Space, and Chess................................................................................................... 78
Perspective Taking in Chess and Strategy .............................................................................. 86
Summary................................................................................................................................. 87
Chapter 3: Research Method......................................................................................................... 90
Research Methodology and Design ........................................................................................ 91
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Population and Sample ........................................................................................................... 97
Materials/Instrumentation..................................................................................................... 100
Study Procedures................................................................................................................... 101
Data Collection and Analysis................................................................................................ 104
Assumptions.......................................................................................................................... 115
Limitations ............................................................................................................................ 115
Delimitations......................................................................................................................... 119
Chapter 4: Findings……………………………………………………………………………..126
Trustworthiness of the Data………………………………………………………………...126
Triangulation………………………………………………………………………………..130
Coding and Recoding…………………………………………………………………….…130
Discerning Collected Data and Prior Literature………………………………………….....131
Study Planning……………………………………………………………………………...132
Analysis and Recording Method…………..….………………………………………….…132
Bias and Coding………………………………...…………………………………………..134
Results…………………………………………...………………………………………….135
Evaluation…………………………………………...…………………………………...…165
Summary……………………………………………..………………………………….....171
Chapter 5: Implications, Recommendations, and Conclusions………………………………...175
Implications………………………………………………………………………….……..177
Further Implications of Theory………………………………………………………….…200
Recommendations for Practice……………………………………………………………..205
Recommendations for Future Research………………………………………………….…208
Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………...….212
References......................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined.
Appendix A: Recruitment Flyer.................................................................................................. 234
Appendix B: Screening/Demographic Questionnaire................................................................. 236
Appendix C: Screening Questions .............................................................................................. 241
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Appendix D: Site Permission.........................................................Error! Bookmark not defined.
Appendix E: Informed Consent Form......................................................................................... 242
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Theory of Mind (ToM) explains how it is understood that through social reasoning
then social emotions of others are interpreted and comprehended (Artinger, Exadakylos,
Koppel, & Sa”a”ksvuori, 2014). According to ToM, decision-makers construct an
understanding of other’s mental states and make inferences about other’s emotions, intentions
and beliefs (Artinger et al., 2014). The game of chess has been well studied through
experimental design due to its convenient format for discerning potential decision-making
processes and strategies (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da
Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Chess offers unique applications to the
study of ToM since chess both relies on predicting opponent’s sense of game conception and
strategy. It as well as well relies on ascertaining the value and sequencing of choices made by
opponents related to their confidence in controlling outcomes (Grabner, 2013; Powell et al.,
2017). In 1893, Alfred Binet set out to map the cognitive virtuosity of a chess player’s
decision-making processes and concluded (1966):
If one could see what goes on in a chess player’s head, one would find a stirring world
of sensations, images, movements, passions and an ever-changing panorama of states
of consciousness. By comparison with these our most attentive descriptions are but
grossly simplified schemata.
Chess, sometimes called The Royal Game, has its origins in India, and is perhaps
derivative of other Asiatic games (Fine, 2015). It can be considered a war game. It is now
played in every Western society as well. In the Middle Ages chess was the most popular
game of the leisure classes. First documentation of chess occurred around 1500 years ago. In
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2010 the United States Chess Federation (USCF) (2019) had approximately 80,000 members.
It has been stated that there are 40 million chess players in the United States and perhaps 700
million players worldwide (Shenk, 2007). There is a universal system accepted to rate
competitive chess players call Elo scoring (Albers & De Vries, 2001).
Chess is male dominated, and the participation of women declines with age (Fine,
2015). In elementary school 40% of the players are girls, while there is only one top one
hundred adult player who is female in the United States. Chess is by and large a middle-class
mind sport. It has little bias toward age as competitive level players can be found from age
four to one hundred, though cognitive diminishment has its negative affect. Magnus Carlsen,
current World Chess Champion, said that one way to tell an experienced player from a novice
is their insistence on perfectly arranging their pieces to be balanced in the center of their
positional “square” (Karolyi, T., 2018). Further expertise in chess will be quickly discerned
from players who move their pieces effectively to enact strategic combinations, in turn-based
play, that maneuver their contingents of low (pawns) and high (rooks, knights, bishops and
the Queen) pieces to trap the single King of their opponent (Shenk, 2007). A win, called a
checkmate, occurs, when the opponent’s King can no longer move in any direction without
being taken (Silman, 1998). Taking opposing pieces is simply done by landing on their
square with any piece of one’s own during turn play.
Chess has a constrained task environment with higher ecological validity as
contrasted with other domains (Conner & Campitelli, 2014). Like chess, domains such as
firefighting, football, or assembly lines require decisions based on spatial relations toward
objects, but these environments would be difficult to study. Chess is stochastic, heuristic,
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strategic, rule-based, played in a small-scale environment, has multitudes of pattern
formations, has a player rating system, as well as reliance on executive and long-term memory
functions of the brain. Thus, there is a large amount of quantitative research data involving
chess expertise. Conner and Campitelli (2014) did find, in one of the few qualitative studies
of chess, that chess experts qualitatively conceptualize representations of space different from
novice players. Hence though quantitative analysis dominates chess studies there has been
few effective cross-over studies that evaluate gameplay with qualitative methodologies.
Chess also adheres to the rule of form (Grivas, 2017). It is a mentally demanding game of
both memory and logical thought processes applied to vast variations. After a mere four-
piece series of movements between opponents there are 288+ billion possible tactical piece
positionings that both players can choose from to proceed (Grivas, 2017).
Cognitive empathy (CE) is a key aspect of ToM related to comprehending another’s
internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions (Ciaramelli, Bernardi,
& Moscovitch, 2013). CE has been measured to be a cognitive process involving specific
brain functions (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). This materialistic discernment into
another’s conceptual and feeling world, and subsequent comparison to one’s own inner world,
can be the basis for tactical and strategic decision-making during chess. It is a function,
biologically structured, that easily could have many ecological validities in many domains of
human effort and endeavor.
Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, and Crowley (2018) used quantitative designs to explore
if awareness of opponent’s eye-gaze, body posture, aspects of self-touching, and emotion are
utilized by chess players to solve difficult strategic problems. It was determined that
situational understanding, and expert knowledge applied toward strategic gameplay decisions
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could be discerned through accurate perception of an opponent’s variation in facial emotions
and increases in self touching. Otherwise, Buhren and Frank (2012) determined through their
quantitative study that chess players are not more rational, in a game theoretic sense, than
participants in other domains, but rather possess a particular combination of skills specific to
chess that explains their expertise. Chess itself can be divided in analysis in several ways, one
being tactical versus positional strategies and as well by levels of aggression and trickery
utilized during gameplay (Silman, 1998). Qualitative study of chess player’s cognitive
processes could lead to domain specific utilization of various cognitive processes that
correspond to various strategic situations and conceptions. In turn, linguistic interpretation
from phenomenological interviewing of cognitive awareness during gameplay could assist
further quantitative studies.
Still, Buhren and Frank (2012) determined rationality in chess does not necessarily
mean rationality in other domains. These researchers gained data from over 6000 chess
players who ranged in formal ranking from amateur to world class grandmasters. They found
that when tasked with evaluating a beauty contest these chess players, essentially considered
strongly rationally minded individuals while playing chess, were no more rational in their
decision-making process than other novices, who did not play chess, when judging a beauty
contest. Chess and beauty contests are both constant-sum games in that the sum of the
payoffs does not depend on the outcome of the game. One can win a series of moves in chess,
or portions of a beauty contest, and still lose overall. Both chess and beauty contests as well
can hardly be solved for advantage based on backward-induction due to the large number of
possible outcomes.
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Indeed, Buhren and Frank (2012) determined that chess experts, while playing chess,
do not realize that making non-equilibrium moves likely affects their opponent’s summation
of their rationality and would often cause the opponent to mimic the initial non-equilibrium
move with rational equivalence. Non-equilibrium is when one player in a game makes a
move not knowing, or believing, the move of the other player, or that the game is “tied” in
equilibrium at that point (Kline, 2017). Thus, it can be an upsetting move, because it breaks
the convention of choosing an optimal move due to the belief, or fact, that the game is in
equilibrium, balanced and unwinnable, because both players know each optimal move. In
equilibrium neither player may want to move, but since chess enforces moves until one player
concedes, or their King no longer can move, then to avoid a draw, one player must make a
move. That move disturbs the perceived equilibrium of the game to shuffle the pattern
outcome of choices in the hope of an unforeseen winning positioning, or further progression
toward a draw. This choice move at times could be called a gut choice, an instinct or
intuition, made at a specific time of perceived advantage by going into unpredictable non-
equilibrium. This could be considered a counter-intuitive, or a move that ignores an obvious
immediate, or even strategically conceived, advantage, in the hopes that it shuffles the
outcome through subsequent strategic decisions of the opponent. This can be so because a
draw allows for the possibility of a later win in a series of game. One way to consider this is a
player who makes a bad move in order to fool the opponent into making a worse move, or at
least a move that does not follow typical outcome patterns as memorized by players and often
followed in gameplay, so in a sense the whole game is in unknown, freed territory.
Nonetheless, Buhren and Frank (2012) cite that chess masters score higher on intuition
than logic in personality assessments. Sigirtmac (2016) found that children with chess
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training had statistically significant higher scores in both creative thinking and Theory of
Mind (ToM) than those without chess training. Further they found that ToM and creativity
development have a positive relationship. Additionally, chess training was found to enhance
children’s understanding of spatial concepts.
Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann (2016) note that there is such a great amount of
potential spatial relationships in chess that strategy can be based in size of the state space, size
of the legal move decision tree, and as well considerations about how actual and potential
spaces are connected. Again, this could indicate that finding one or more cognitive processes
utilized in chess could be both reflective of one type of framework of strategic gameplay, and
available to accurate generalizations of those cognitive processes in other domains. This
while the same, or other cognitive processes in gameplay, depending on how one or both
players are applying spatial conceptions, may not be effective or able to be generalized. It
would seem any study would have to demonstrate specific routes from cognitive process to
outcome, while specifically defining the conceptual frameworks that were active for the sets
of data collected from specific spatial aspects of games and player cognitive types. Further
experimental research as well could tie these thought processes to brain circuit systems. One
way to conceive of spatial difference in gameplay is that one player may value positioning
strategy based on using two less powerful pieces, a rook and a knight, in combination while
sacrificing the more powerful Queen piece. This while another player may rely on strategy
that utilizes the Queen in conjunction with several of the least powerful pieces, the pawns,
who move less in space per turn, while the Queen can move the greatest in space of any piece
on the gameboard. This of course reflects on time of strategy implementation and
countermanding moves by opponents in turn-based play. There is the additional factor that
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the object of both strategies, the cornering of the King piece, is made unpredictable because
the King moves as well, albeit one square at a time. In special first move conditions, the
King, can move two squares at a time (called a Castle). This is one of two extraordinary
moves in the game of chess. The other involves pawns taking pawns in special first move
circumstances. Adding to complication of strategy formulation, the King, in fact any chess
piece, can be defended by multiple pieces in various spatial formations that are both direct
and indirect (Silman, 1998). Hence chess gameplay includes for the four categories of spatial
relations; topological, directional, distance relations and relations by class (Stockdale &
Possin, 1998). Technically, the Knight piece transcends the two-dimensional game space as it
is the only game piece that can “jump” over other chess pieces to move, or even take an
opponent’s piece by landing on it after “jumping” one of its own or an opponent’s piece in
one of several L pattern movements (Silman, 1998).
Predominately, chess has been considered, and analyzed, as a game of memory (Postal,
2012). Postal’s (2012) experimental design found that chess experts do not need to inhibit
irrelevant information to increase performance but do rely on superior automatic and parallel
assessment of information than novice players. These chunks of pattern recognition from
memory form conceptual templates that predict outcomes from various spatial configurations
of chess pieces during gameplay. Postal (2012) cites that there is a larger visual span for
chess-related visual patterns. It is worth noting that chunking generally involves focus on one
set of one’s own chess pieces for tactics and strategy to the exclusion of other, inactive or
distracting, sets of one’s own pieces.
Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, and Garcia-fin Ana (2017) studies demonstrated that
chess and ToM have much overlap in neural networks, brain circuit patterns, which inhibit
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one’s own experience when evaluating the mental state of others and for visual evaluation of
action. These authors cite that memory of chess patterns is supported by “complex visual
processing out of conscious awareness” when decisions of game strategy are made. They
found that stress during complex chess gameplay creates sympathetic nervous system
reactions, psychophysiological responses, that reduces heartrate variability in both novice and
expert players. Artinger et al. (2014) assert that issues of game theory closely relate to
conceptualization of strategic interaction in ToM. Interestingly, psychometric ToM measures
are not able to capture the cues that chess opponents respond to in each other during play, but
an accuracy in a chess player’s belief of their opponents perceived strategy of future decisions
has been measured as effective to making superior piece movements during gameplay (Powell
et al., 2017).
Chess is a game that humans play, and as such concepts of game theory, lack of
omniscience in knowledge of possible game moves, and uncertainty about absolute outcomes
apply (Slezak, Sigma, and Cecchi, 2018). Slezak et al. (2018) acknowledge that in chess
players do not exhaustively search all alternatives. At some point they make a decision to
move a piece on limited knowledge and ability to plan ahead. This dynamic of choice was
often found to accompany smaller, rather than broad, sets of projections into various strategic
decision trees. How this decision is ultimately made is unanswered and remains a relevant
question to researchers. Classic Dividend Discount Model (DDM) cannot identify reaction
time (RT) distributions, as related to remember-know responses along confidence levels,
created by chess play. Reigning World Champion and former child chess prodigy, Magnus
Carlsen, states that he most always knows his exact move by a quick surmising of the chess
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pieces, but then takes up to 30 minutes verifying the actual move by presumably working out
decision tree patterns (Karolyi, 2018).
Coates (2013) discusses how chess players need intuition to access the positional and
strategic advantage at all points in gameplay. Indeed, chess players do find, or create for the
first time, original chess combinations of moves that make for superior play. Perception can
be interpreted as a sensory mode of the intentional state, or as a distinct component of
sensing. Perhaps conceptual and biological, cognitive and otherwise as heartrate variability is
associated with amygdala reactions and vagus nerve functions (Muppidi & Migles, 2017),
engaged at differing sequences, frequencies, durations change how players engage the game,
and correspondingly provoke, or do not, similar processes activated for gameplay decisions by
their opponents. Or possibly some overall pattern recognition is sparked by spatial
cognizance of that quality mentioned as outside the conscious mind by Powell et al. (2017).
Or it may be some combination of these two, or otherwise processes. As Coates (2013) states
in any way experience involves both intentional content and some feature that is distinctive of
perception as in an awareness of phenomena qualities. These qualities are as well connected
in some manner to external objects, perhaps the intuition or emotions of other players and
their intentions, as perceived and not as a part of any mental or concrete representation.
ToM’s cognitive empathy could account for this. Even cognitive choice that is based on
strategic memory of prior play is participant to the opponent’s originality of choice, strategy,
and unpredictable movement of pieces in chess as players respond in turn sequence to each
and every chess move. Each chess game is unique in structure, concept, awareness and
interpretation. Both players intentions form the direction of the game. Coates (2013) notes
that players, even at the highest levels, most often place strong emotional significance on
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chess pieces respectively. Each loss of a piece can create strong emotional resonance for both
the victor and loser of that piece.
Problem Statement
The problem addressed in this study was the gap in understanding how chess players
experience cognitive processes that reference social reasoning traits related to interpersonal
strategy decision-making (Guntz et al., 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). For instance, cognitive
empathy has been found to reveal accurate perception of other’s states of mind (Przybyszewki
& Polkowski, 2017). If chess players rely on cognitive empathy to pick strategy, then
descriptive narratives may address at what point in strategic decision making these systems
activate or the individual is aware of their activation and influence. Cognitive empathy has
been found to give competitive advantage in chess games (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017).
Researchers have investigated chess players use of Theory of Mind, or awareness of an
opponent’s body, thoughts, or emotions, and how these may lead to influence over game
move choices, while some found ToM traits are a form of perspective taking based on
imitation (Guntz et al., 2018; Laghi et al., 2016). If chess players could describe how they
learn from other players, this could be an indication to further theory.
Sigirtmac (2016) demonstrated how aspects of ToM influence modulations between
cognitive and affective memory. Further language on how memory of other chess players
feelings or impressions gained from social reasoning, such as cognitive empathy, in previous
games might be more informative than first believed in strategic choice making during a
current game for players. Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, and Crowley (2018) demonstrated
complex systems of phenomenology that cannot be separated from the specific experience or
reduced by study of specific cognitive mechanisms. These vague, yet active concepts could
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be initially revealed through qualitative interviews of chess players. Atashpendar, Schilling
and Voigtmann (2016) did research on how chess players interpret and represent space. Space
can be a abstract, or at least multi-dimensional fact of construct, and again data from chess
player interviews could give further indications of the differing elements, or conceptions, of
space active in chess strategy. The gap is how language might reveal connections between
spatial assessment and affective assessment might correspond. The lack of effective
understanding in the research of primary, yet vague, mechanisms of strategic choice like
intuition, or empathy, leaves research handicapped from a complete perspective of active
dynamics in strategy formation (Powell et. al., 2017).
Purpose of the Study
The Purpose of this qualitative phenomenological study was to investigate the gap in
descriptive narratives of chess players as to their perceptions of what influences tactical and
strategic moves. This phenomenological study collected data in approximately one hour long,
one-on-one semi structured interviews with up to twenty (1-20) chess players (Abayomi,
2017). Players were recruited from open online chess forums, through Facebook, and data
collection took place by the researcher until saturation was effectively achieved with 9
participants (Guest et. al., 2006). Saturation allowed for descriptive validity and confirmation
of how chess players experience the game of chess. Higher ranked chess players have been
found to give richer descriptive detail, have more cognitive memory pattern awareness and
apply unquantifiable qualities of intuition for effective strategy (Coates, 2013; Nippold, 2009;
Powell, 2017).
Strict criteria were included as the study sought adult participants who have played
chess monthly, once or more, and for at least the last three months. After flyer distribution,
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on open chess forums in Facebook, then snowball method recruitment was to be allowed, but
ultimately was not used as sufficient participants contacted the researcher individually from
the Facebook posts (Emerson, 2015). Interviews with chess players were done remotely by
ZOOM by the researcher and recorded in private. These recordings were later transcribed by
computer program then edited by the researcher (Grivas, 2017).
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012) is a
well-used framework for discerning how people describe meaning in events and phenomenon.
Repeated and thorough deep reading of the data, Nvivo 12 analysis, as well as earnest
bracketing of personal preconceptions, allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic themes
(Holroyd, 2001). Nvivo 12 aides the researcher in ensuing words is not missed that accurately
group and define potential themes that match the research questions.
IPA finds and defines the particulars of phenomenon. Any statements derived from
contrast and comparison within this method had sufficient instances of similar coding as to
ensure that participants are speaking, or not, of the same quality of phenomenon (Pietkiewicz &
Smith, 2012). Clustering themes that have alternatively been sorted from emic and etic
perspectives revealed new understanding as applied to the research questions. Such research
assisted in the development of higher-level theory (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012).
Theoretical Framework
The basic definition of Theory of Mind (ToM) is that of a process of mind that allows
one to understand the thoughts and intentions of others (Colle et al., 2019; Preckel et al., 2018).
A primary conception of ToM is that it includes cognitive processes that discerns, interprets, and
enhances self-other distinctions (Hajduk et al., 2018). The more one realizes the nuances in
difference between one’s own thoughts and intentions and those of others then the more
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accurately one’s understanding of the reality between individuals becomes. Cognitive Empathy
(CE) is a key cognitive process of ToM. CE is defined as one being able to comprehend
another’s internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions (Powell et
al., 2017). Theoretically individuals have differing levels of understanding various aspects of
difference between themselves and others. If so, then individuals also could understand the
participative differences within another more than that person understands those participative
differences within themselves. This could be a great strategic advantage in any game. In the
game of chess minimal superiority of knowledge in one context can outperform superior
knowledge in diverse contexts within any given game (de Bruin, Riker, & Schmidt, 2007). For
example, in chess one player can encircle an opponent with superior positioning, having taken
more key pieces, and still the player in the weaker position can suddenly exploit something
unseen, and then this is spontaneously discovered by both players, that then in turn secures
immediate or eventual victory for the player who seemingly was at disadvantage (de Bruin,
Riker, & Schmidt, 2007).
Researchers have proposed chess players use a variety of methods to pick tactics and
strategy such as instinct, analysis, intuition, logic, feeling, tactic, envisioning, pattern
recognition, reasoning and problem solving (Lane & Chang, 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). Through
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis some of these terms as defined in language by
participant interview may reflect uses of ToM’s cognitive empathy during chess gameplay
(Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006). Certainly, there are differences in style of play, and possible
differences in the scope of player’s access to dimensions of awareness. There are also
differences in scale of opponent’s conception of any given game and chess in general (Laws,
2014). Indeed, recent studies demonstrate that ToM has task functions for knowing that are
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automatic and unconscious and that operate without direct verbal measures or instructions
(Brock, Kim, & Kelly, 2017). This suggests something akin to intuition, mindreading, or
empathy can be used for decision making (Montero & Evans, 2011). That these ToM processes
are automatic and do not need prompting to be utilized may as well fit some conventional and
theoretical definitions of an instinct (Kulke, Johannsen, & Rakoczy, 2019). For concepts such as
empathy, intuition, and instinct there has not been conclusive science that illustrates how and
when these cognitive formats operate between various routes of necessity, perception and
physical mechanism (Duan et. al, 2012; Edwards, Beale, & Edwards, 2012). ToM is proposing
that there are superior and active senses of awareness that allow individuals to ascertain
accurately the inner workings of another’s thinking and belief processes (Artinger, Exadaktylos,
Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014). These are said to be able to be active, without dialogue, originate
from deep within the individual’s unconscious ability, know a truth (unconscious or otherwise)
about a person separate from oneself, and may or may not be able to be perfectly identified or
even consciously developed (Andrews, 2001).
ToM includes for interactive behavioral tasks that utilize a great deal of anticipatory
looking and facial emotion recognition (Zwick & Wolkenstein, 2017). Colle et al. (2018)
suggests when ToM is used it reflects qualities of what has been called mindreading. There is
interest in knowing how players will, when given time, describe how they knew the beliefs of
their opponent’s decision making and strategy (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al.,
2014).
A study of chess players’ descriptions of strategy choices revealed some of their
utilization of ToM processes and possibly could have applications to Game Theory (GM)
(Fuentes-Garcia, 2019). GM compliments ToM in the study of decision-making through chess
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as it relies on complex mathematics for its structural underpinnings that calculates choice for
greatest utility, and not necessarily from the furthest point of comprehended logic, hence
decisions can be called intuitive (Chakravarty, Manipushpak, & Sarkar, 2015; Young, Peyton, &
Zamir, 2015). Where ToM uses a sense like cognitive empathy to comprehend another’s internal
reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions, GM conceives the totality of
an interactive process then assigns a cost-benefit analysis of the best choice, to be implemented
strategically at any exact moment and point, for ending up in a superior position to one’s
opponent (Bosco, Berardinelli, & Parola, 2019; Guth, Huck, & Rapoport, 1998). There is
interest in knowing how chess players belief that they have an understanding of an opponent’s
process, scope and/or intention, and also believing they know how the combined dueling
strategies of two opponents will intersect at multiple points to influence gameplay outcome that
is operational and operationalized (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al., 2014). There
may be complimentary methods for predicting the sequenced outcome of tactical choices and
ways of stating time, matter, motion, direction and space as to infer intersecting future points
through a logical, yet ultimately unquantifiable process (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite
et al., 2014).
Like ToM, GM does rely on a process of comparing player’s underlying structure of
knowledge, belief and skills (Linhares, Freitas, Mendes, & Silva, 2012). In any game of two
players there exists amassed conceptions and accessible memory of prior game experience
(specific or generalized), and GM offers a framework of how the steps of choosing a game
decision is based on those conceptions, sometimes using a process called discounting that relies
on incomplete information that does remind one of the concepts of intuition (Linhares, Freitas,
Mendes, & Silva, 2012). Discount choices, sub-game moves that are less than perfect as to be
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non-equilibria, are made when the likelihood of deciding from one’s less than the total game
conception (and logical prediction of win/loss) - less logical outcome predicting - has perceived
higher benefit due to complex, various, uncontrollable, or random factors of mutual game play
(Buhren & Frank, 2012). This is especially relevant in chess where the combinations of
consequences are vast, while the game play is fluid and dynamic. One can never fully know how
their opponent will gamble, calculate, perceive, react, create error, or originate failing or
succeeding sequences of game moves. As well since choices are turn based all such calculations
have extended probabilities from each choice point of either player (Grabner, 2014).
While ToM theorists might have interest in narrative descriptions of cognitive empathy
during chess play, GM theorist do have interest in narrative descriptions of how and when
discount game play choices were made (Marchisotto, 2019). There is much interest in spatial
conception and analyzing of descriptions between scope and circumstance of chess players’
game conception across time and spatial dimensions that has theoretical merit (Leone, Slezak,
Cecchi, & Sigman, 2014). Inherent in ToM and GM is that at times logic no longer suffices as
the sole means of advantageous decision making (Crawford, Costa-Gomes, & Iriberri, 2012;
Ong, Zaki, & Goodman, 2018). Chess players do discuss visceral feelings of varying intensities
as moves instinctively indicate sudden shifts in player advantage (Slezak & Sigman, 2012). GM
defines simultaneous games, where players make their decisions at the same time instead of in
turn, as distinct from sequential games (Pozzulo, Reed, Pettalia, & Dempsey, 2016). Theoretical
overlap occurred in that as cognitive empathy was being described as utilized by both players
simultaneously, it seemed to indicate that such turn-based mind games, such as chess, are in fact
both turn based and simultaneous. Ultimately, the skill of cognitive empathy to comprehend
17
another’s internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions might
accurately be defined as the ability to predict the future choices of another (Powell et al., 2017).
Nature of the Study
An interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was utilized due to its efficacy for
examining a topic deeply and on its own terms (Eatough & Smith, 2017; Larkin, Watts, &
Clifton, 2006). This method had strength in gleaning meaning from particular participative
states and personal accounts. IPA offered research flexibility and applicability within a
rigorous framework that allows for interpretation of nuance and complexity.
A benefit of IPA was that it took both the researcher’s and participants interpretations
into account. The feature of epistemological reflexivity allows for defining the possible scope
of the research questions, how the study construction affects analysis, and exploring how
differing aspects of study affected the investigated phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012).
With IPA the researcher was able to interpret what the participant was attempting to say at any
given moment including unintended meanings. Since concepts like cognitive empathy,
mindreading, and intuition are elusive, and IPA’s allowance for interpreting meaning from direct
statements is especially useful. Intuition has been numerously, yet vaguely, assigned as a quality
of superlative chess players tactical and strategic decision game move choices (Buhren & Frank,
2012; Coates, 2013). IPA techniques seemed to reveal if chess players have a hidden talent that
even they themselves have not well defined or accepted awareness of. At the same time IPA lets
phenomenon speak for itself from appearance, substance, or participatively.
Chess does provoke great mental exertion and produces conditions for a variety of mental
states of awareness in scope, depth, diversity of game conception, opponent assessment and
gameplay choice. IPA was useful in categorizing distinct processes that occur during differing
18
times, and scopes of reflection, of game play. If not asked, players might not have been aware of
the variety of processes they apply to game move choices.
Participants were recruited from open chess forums online, through Facebook, and
actively playing at least once per month for the last three months. There were no restrictions
on gender or ethnicity. As players were found from one source, that was deemed acceptable,
and noted. Essentially participants were recruited by snowball sampling (Emerson, 2015)
arising from posts on open chess forums on Facebook.
The transcripts of recorded participant interviews were coded and compared as to
discern thematic analysis from player to player by the researcher and by using Nvivo 12
computer software (2020). Nvivo 12 offered easy integration of multi-media, affordable
pricing, user-friendly learning curve, easy file sharing in real time, and training support.
Coding annotations were completed for insights that reveal participants’ perspectives
describing any distinct perception of cognitive processes during chess play. Primary and
subordinate themes were discerned and documented paying particular attention to phrasing
indicating awareness of cognitive processes. Sources suggested saturation would be satisfied at
12 participant interviews, but essentially it was satisfied with 9 thorough interviews that began
repeating most themes early (Guest et al., 2006).
Saturation was justified when no new emergent themes or perspectives revealed
themselves (Abayomi, 2017). Data was continually analyzed as it is gathered to insure thus.
Repeated and thorough deep reading of the data, Nvivo 12 analysis, as well as earnest
bracketing of personal preconceptions, allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic themes
(Holroyd, 2001). This was the first form of triangulation (Arksey & Knight, 1999). A profile
of meaning-statements (Bartholomew et al., 2019) was best used to analyze if experience
19
contributed to theory in relation of chess players reports of cognitive processes as defined by
ToM. Referents (Richards, 2015) were extracted to be compiled as evidence of specific
aspects of cognitive processes being reported by participants. Finally, a synthesis was
obtained from the analysis of extended descriptions.
Trustworthiness was established through prolonged engagement, persistent
observation, triangulation, and referential adequacy (Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985). Each participant was asked the same set of questions. Participants were
allowed to review data collected, member-checking, and its interpretation. The essence of this
study was transferability in that chess was used to explore established theories of cognitive
processes and consciousness, simply because thought and being are involved in chess and no
one had yet asked these exact questions of perceptions of cognitive process shifts from chess
players themselves. This though experimental studies vastly indicate such cognitive shifts
exist in brainwave changes during play (Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana,
2017).
Any game or experience can be investigated as to its relation to cognitive processes.
Reliability was assured in that data will not be generalized beyond the sample. All criteria
were intensely, attentively and tentatively, recorded as to how category decisions arrive.
Overlaps and alterations were guarded against, while previously unobserved categories were
distinguished.
ResearchQuestions
1. What was the experience of cognitive empathy for chess players during game play?
2. How did chess players experience various cognitive processes such as Theory of
Mind, spatial assessment, and memory to formulate strategy during game play?
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3. How did chess players experience pattern awareness as a separate construct from
intuition, spatial calculating, or cognitive empathy, to make decisions about piece
movements and strategy during game play?
Significance of the Study
A descriptive expansion of chess players’ conceptions of cognitive processes during
gameplay contributed to how these processes apply to any form of game between opponents.
For instance, as cognitive empathy (CE), a key aspect of ToM, was found being used in chess to
any significant degree, it seemed likely to be used in other competitive venues and domains with
greater frequency, and/or accuracy than traditionally perceived. Researchers do have interest in
examples and elaborations of CE as an effective and relied upon method of perception
(Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). A descriptive analysis is a strong approach to begin to
define new theoretical and practical space where cognitive processes may be used. Then new
experimental methods generated for that expanded conceptual space. There seemed to be
cognitive processes and structures that relied on ill defined, unconscious or automatic biological
processes (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017) and these seemed to be revealed through
descriptive narrations. Researchers do have interest in examples and elaborations of CE as an
effective and relied upon method of perception (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). Themes
revealed through narrations seemed to indicate vague awareness’s of unexplored cognitive
processes by the chess players themselves. This was generalized to other games and domains of
strategic competition. Defined terms, proportions, and perceptual standards of various cognitive
processes were greater elucidated with a qualitative analysis of chess, which involved significant
sequential decision making that has been greatly studied quantitatively but has had few
phenomenological interviews.
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IPA techniques helped this research determine many chess decisions processes that until
now have been ambiguously filed under the general heading of intuition. It seemed to be found
that in chess cognitive empathy may be more specific than intuition to strategic decision making
(Ciaramelli et al., 2013). Cognitive empathy, unlike intuition, is attached to the established,
pervasive and pertinent Theory of Mind (ToM). Evidence gained from a phenomenology study
of chess opponents was expanded into arguments of larger scale, scope, and social consequence.
All transactions and competitions were viewed through the lens of how competing agents
are playing game moves with each other. Chess is a simple game, in the sense of having an
understandable and researchable format, that has complex processes. Chess allowed for
interpretation of these processes that are worthy of expanded application to all levels of
transactions and competitions that have significant social, economic, and political consequence.
As decisions of significance are being made in any game based on non-rational, unconscious
cognitive processes then research then this research is justified as having an interest in defining
these qualities.
Definitions of Key Terms
Chess. Chess is a two-player game where principals are applied to checkmate an
opponent’s highest-ranking game piece represented as a king (de Bruin, Rikers, & Schmidt,
2006)
Cognitive empathy. Cognitive empathy is the ability to comprehend another’s internal
reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions (Powell et al., 2017)
Intuition. Intuition is a rational ascertainment of information that could give strategic
advantage in the game of chess (Montero & Evans, 2011)
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Chess Tactic. Chess tactic is trying to figure out what is happening in the game during
the moment when chess piece positions do not conform to any known typical pattern of play and
strategic advantage (Montero & Evans, 2011)
Chess Strategy. Chess strategy is game choice is determined by applying reason, or
some cognitive perception, possibly from past game knowledge and pattern recognition of most
likely predictable sequences of chess piece moves to gain advantage (Montero & Evans, 2011)
Sequential Game. Sequential games are games where the player with the first move
generally gains advantage, or payoff, in turn-based game systems. The second player generally
responds with optimal move to the next worst payoff (Menon, Sasidevan, & Sinha, 2018)
Simultaneous Game. Simultaneous games are games where players implement game
moves by synchronous update (Menon, Sasidevan, & Sinha, 2018)
Game Discount. Game discount is a point in a game when if strategy is followed there is
no definitive cost in one strategy move over another, hence as player can choose from more than
one strategy without risking advantage to the second player in their typical strategic payoff. A
point in reducing expectations of benefit outcome and forcing a settlement to tactical strategies
that seem to offer the best expectation for strategic advantage. An intuition of the expected value
of a game move as anticipating strategic response and payoff of opponent to one’s own
calculated game move. Over time a player in a game can choose a sub-optimal move, a discount,
if later this sets in motion strategic advantage. This can involve alternating the perception of
game time in relation to traditional strategies by choosing an unpredictable, apparently lower
value game moves (Gransmark, 2012; Matros, 2018)
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Summary
Essential points of this study included utilizing phenomenological interviews with chess
players to gain data on their qualitative experiences of internal cognitive processes during
gameplay. Chess offered a suitable mechanism of study to apply coded themes from
phenomenological methods to identify and develop any common awareness or usage of various
cognitive processes during gameplay. Similarly, other intuitive processes, said to be common in
chess (Buhren & Frank, 2012), seemed to reveal other predictive methods of strategic game
choices that speculated on incomplete, or inferred knowledge, like GM theory discount choices,
mindreading, intuition, and empathy as used, but ill-defined methods of game play decisions that
produce variance in outcomes. IPA, alongside Nvivo 12 application, provided a strong method
for gathering and interpreting data. Traditional IPA criteria like saturation and trustworthiness
(Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Guest, et al., 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) were applied to the
analysis of the data. It was expected that if specific cognitive processes are described by chess
players then IPA would discern and be able to allow for elaboration of these themes. There was
a significant gap in the current research of any qualitative interviewing of chess players hence if
significant unreported, unclassified, cognitive phenomenon was occurring in tactical or strategic
decision making then this study had reasonable expectation of defining such occurrences and
their potential descriptions.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The topic of this study was the gap between experimental, quantitative designs and
qualitative designs that provide participant interviews of the intensely researched field of
cognitive processes that occurred during chess gameplay. While immense data has been
collected on measuring chess players physiological processes during gameplay, very few
researchers have endeavored to interview chess players to record how these processes are
experienced during gameplay, in the chess players own words (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, &
Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). While
certain cognitive-physiological processes have been definitively demonstrated to occur during
chess gameplay, many perceptions, such as intuition, that chess experts claim are essential to
chess gameplay have not been studied in depth (Coates, 2013). This paper endeavored to
qualitatively categorize the thematic language chess players may use to describe the
physiological processes that have been immensely studied quantitatively.
All searches for this dissertation study were initiated in Roadrunner of the Northcentral
University online library. A literature search was initiated using key search terms including:
“Phenomenological Methods”, “Chess”, “Theory of Mind”, “Cognitive Empathy”, “Strategy and
Cognition”, and “Intuition and Chess”, individually and combining these key words in different
combination. Generally, search limiters were not applied, though occasionally “full text” was
applied. This method was found to set wider search parameters on adjoining and subsequent
thematic fits for theoretical compiling and analysis.
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Theoretical Framework
Theory of Mind (ToM) states there is a perceptual, cognitive framework that allows
individuals to attribute mental state such as beliefs, intents, desires, and knowledge to oneself
and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). It proposes one can know the interior self or dialogue
of the other through referencing differences between self and other, or cognitively registering
attributes of other whether different or the same as self. Further it allows for one to acknowledge
that others have belief, desires, intentions, and perspectives that are different from their own. It
is considered a crucial daily skill to be used when socializing, evaluating, transacting, and
judging interactions with fellow human beings. It is considered to confer the ability to infer
through other’s behavior their beliefs, intents, desires, and knowledge. It is considered a proven
cognitive mechanism that has been mapped extensively by way of neurological circuits and
scientifically verified (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Deficit in ToM abilities are noted in some
disabled groups such as autism, schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and
consequence from some substance addictions (Korkmaz, 2011). Chess itself has often be
associated closely with obsessive personalities such as Marcel Duchamp and Bobby Fischer
(Taylor, 2011).
When considering a Theory of Mind (ToM) one can make the assumption that mind does
not exist, but one cannot prove that awareness of oneself and others does not exist, hence ToM is
considered a valid existential proposition (Baron-Cohen, 1991). One, considered by society to
be in their right mind, knows when another has acted an intent or desire through behavior onto
themselves. One knows when arguing over a tangible object, like a meal, with another that the
outcome maybe one, or both eat or do not eat. Empathy is often a related concept with ToM, as
in the ability to “walk in another’s shoes” or “put oneself in another’s frame of mind” (de Waal,
26
2007). Empathy in consideration to ToM is thought of as cognitive instead of affective. It is not
the ability to feel another person’s feeling, but simply to know what those feelings are and place
them in relevant context. Raphael (2011) in his senior Honors Thesis argues that chess is a
technical resource able to analyze social dimensions of human affairs. This concept was useful
and seemed to parallel the idea of chess as a tool for analyzing ToM.
Theory of Mind (ToM) has its origins from the time of Descartes when philosophy was
considered a science of the mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1991). Currently debate centers
between theory-theory and simulation theory, where in the first ToM abilities are innate and
automatic within the sustained environment of human interactions. Theory-theory represents the
intention of the shared world and other’s presumed needs (Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1987). In
essence it is first perceptions and is reality. This line of thinking could sustain an underlying
framework of ToM as significantly revealed through chess game play. Simulation theory posits
all experience and perception as social and historical constructs that are operant in a context.
This definition aligns well with Raphael’s (2011) thinking where all elements of identity are
constructed on learned identities. With either perspective, ToM seemed to be able to allow for
identifying differences of thinking between self and other.
The history of ToM is deep and wide, if not historically long. Ontogeny, phylogeny, and
study of infants in social setting indicated early forms of ToM (Meltzoff, 1995). Developmental
psychology currently indicates that infant’s imitate others through ToM, perspective-taking, and
empathy (Laghi et al., 2016). These are considered social-cognitive achievements. ToM
develops through the years as the prefrontal cortex, planning and decision-making neural space
as well develops. Two theories on language and ToM conjecture differing conceptualizations.
27
Conversations within families maybe creating ToM qualities (this through differentiating the
roles and desires of various family members), while another (Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990) is
that children learn to develop skills and perceptions when they are told or hear the words, and
accompanying concepts, emotions, etc. – as related to “think” and “believe”. The
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Saxe, 2003) involves in language acquisition and contains
specialization in facial and voice recognition as well as biological motion, in addition to
maintaining functions of ToM. TPJ as well contains aspects of spatial understanding (all of
which are addressed independently as significant factors in the research of strategy and chess)
(Saxe, 2003). This area of the brain has been found active when taking in data through inferring
other’s beliefs through reading or images, but TPJ is not active while observing physical control
stimuli (Saxe, 2003).
Culture may affect ToM abilities, the order they are acquired, or the strength of
precedence (Etel & Yagmurlu, 2015). Researchers have proposed five key aspects of ToM that
develop between ages 3 and 5, and they are diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access,
false beliefs, and hidden emotions (Shahaeian et al., 2011: Wellman, 2006). Collectivism or
Individualism of the society where the child grows up is considered to affect this ordering. It is
interesting to consider how in chess all five likely come into relevance. If one is using empathy
to predict another’s strategy, then strong ability to hide emotions is an advantage. Chess players
invariably choose to implement variations of one of numerously diverse opening strategies and
subsequent play into the middle and end portions of gameplay. This in turn at times seemed to
conflict with the player who has the deepest, or fastest, knowledge access to counterstrategies.
False beliefs about gambits in chess can be disastrous blunders or errors, both blunder and error
being official chess terms for rating mistakes. Blunder being the worst mistake one could make.
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An interesting feature of ToM is that regardless if a situation is real, or pretend like in a child’s
game, discerning other’s intents and beliefs can equally be active and sharp, including when
someone is being deceptive, or something is false. It would be interesting to consider if games,
likes chess, are real or pretend. Rapheal (2011) leans toward the game being a “reality”, if
metaphoric.
Theory of Mind (ToM) has many cognitive and affective nuances, many of which are
experimentally linked to specific bio-chemical brain processes (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, &
Moscovtich, 2013; Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana, 2017). Powell et al.
(2017) found that cortical regions, when examined with magnetic resonance imaging in
twelve healthy male novice level chess players, were identified as associated with ToM,
chess, and empathizing. Functional neuroimaging studies have also found that brain regions
that support ToM do overlap with strong significance to those that underlie episodic memory
(Ciaramelli, Bernardi, and Moscovtich, 2013). The temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is
responsible for processing affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all
ToM tasks) as well as being an important cognitive region for spatial processing skills
(Powell et al., 2017). As Ciaramelli et al. (2013) state that ToM allows for retrieving
experiences of the past and applies them to current strategy with flexibility that increases
probability of accuracy in perception of outcome. It was considered possible, as research
further described may suggest (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018; Salvaggio, 2018), that
ToM was selectively interpreting fragments of emotional memory (from various cumulative
timeframes or specific ones). Or these could be interpretations of memories, by utilization of
current cognitive perceptions that are then formed into beliefs. These beliefs then, in a game
like chess, are what strategic decisions are based upon. The beliefs themselves were most
29
likely, as the participant was queried, were put into words. Rapheal (2011) notes the slew of
famous philosophers who have used chess as verbal metaphor for their worldviews such as
Charles S. Pierce, Edmund Hurserl, Ferdinand de Saussure, Ludwig Wittgenstein, E.J.
Brouwer, Paul Grice, and Jurgen Habermas.
Chess does possess the general theme of strategy (Sillman, 1998). Experimental
science has observed and linked several distinct cognitive processes to the decision-making
structure of chess (Hangii et al., 2014). Experimental science has even identified when
aspects of ToM are active in the brain, during chess play, and otherwise (Ciaramelli, Bernardi,
& Moscovtich, 2013; Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana, 2017). The themes
seemed to develop and are the feelings, emotions, and thoughts that chess players experienced
while playing chess and how they felt these various processes were active and shift in
between themselves. These thematic accounts ranged from a diary of vast moods to a
chronology of precise thoughts, or likely some combinations of both, and for some seemed to
a roller-coaster ride between shifting cognitive states, much like what Binet (1966) earlier
hypothesized.
Since ToM has been demonstrated to work with specific areas of the brain,
experimental design of activities, like chess, are effective for measuring when these brain
regions are active (Hangii et al., 2014). Study of active brain regions during chess and
evident alterations during gameplay has generally focused on what is occurring in the present.
Even more recent, survey style research (Powell et al., 2017) has not studied how ToM and
chess perceptions have changed over long durations of chess training. There seemed as well
maybe natural and spontaneous processes of cognitive empathy that automatically activated in
30
any competitive situation no matter the prior experience with that form of competition. In this
regard, the experimental study of ToM during chess play does not draw many connections
between the theoretical development of ToM, which includes for much analysis of childhood
development of ToM skills (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Call, 1998; Etel & Yagmurlu, 2015;
Gagliardi et al., 1995; Meltzoff, 2003) and ToM development specific to chess. Powell et al.
(2017) did extensive research in regard to connections between cognitive empathy, ToM, and
chess. The neuropsychological protocols included participants completing an imposing
memory task (IMT). This allowed a measurement of participant’s ability to infer mental
states of others. Participants were asked questions that reveal their understanding of the
intentions and facts of each situation. fMRI activation tasks were then studied experimentally
where three images are presented to the participants and then measured for ToM and empathy.
Interestingly as participants were asked to imagine spatial moves that would be most
beneficial, from looking at chess images, MRI data collected indicated brain area activation
matching for all three categories: Empathy, ToM, and general chess strategic thinking with
significant overlap (Powell et al., 2017). This seemed to indicate imagining spatial problems
triggers brain processes that also activates empathy. This data seemed to synthesize with
what is known about the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as responsible for processing
affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all ToM tasks) as well as being
an important cognitive region for spatial processing skills (Powell et al., 2017). Results
further indicated that chess and ToM have much overlap in neural networks that inhibit one’s
own experience when evaluating the mental state of others and for visual evaluation of action.
Hence, ToM achieves its goals when one’s self awareness is reduced and awareness of the
other, an opponent, is enhanced. This again being confirmed in increased activation of the
31
temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Indeed, visual evaluation of action seemed to rely on the
same suppression of self-awareness. Research is demonstrating (Atashpendar, Schilling, &
Voigtmann, 2016; Powell et al., 2017) that the relation of a sense, or accuracy of perception,
of knowing what one’s opponent is planning, or feeling about plans, is pertinent to cognitive
strategic thinking. This sense self then knows how to gauge, incorporate, and evaluate space
(and its relations to strategy) as specifically existing in relationship to the opponent (and the
game). The thematic type of language one might expect from chess players when describing
some of these processes sounded like some of the early philosophical arguments of existence,
origin, and nature of ToM itself (Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1987; Fox, 2014). They also
sounded like reading body language, intuition, and perhaps even calculating another’s
limitations to conceive multiplicities of spatial relationships from the static present to the
dynamic future.
Further, cognitive emotional evaluations and spatial recognition processes seemed to
be more connected, or interdependent in strategic choice making than realized. This allowed
for play language to develop themes of where scientifically, specifically neural networks
might be indicated as experienced differently, or at differing time junctures or transitions.
This in combinations of experienced overlap, or reaction delays from when the neural network
is active in the brain, but felt by the chess player, or decided upon by the chess player for
strategic initiation of action. A defensive neural network in Player 1’s reaction might activate
from Player 2’s moves three turns earlier, but then the memory of that experience does not
activate a countermove choice until three turns later by Player 1. Player 2 might make the
next current strategic move based on his own memory of cognitive empathy from Player 1’s
initial neural defense network activation, these six moves earlier! Goffman, Lemert, and
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Branaman (1997) suggest some players may repress strategic thinking for rule-based thinking,
while Kuhn (1962) suggests game players may think outside the box, which suggests ideas of
ToM, empathy reading, and intuitive leaps. Durkheim and Lukes (1982) suggests games
contain aspects of social facts, sacredness, and profanity. Recall all pieces can potentially be
removed by any other piece within the game rules and they are labelled with names like
bishop, knight, pawn, queen, and king. Leading to the next section considering alternative
theories and subsequent sub-themes it is interesting to be reminded that De Saussure
frequently claimed that the language of chess is perfect for elucidating contrast between the
essentialisms of synchronic and diachronic relationships as well as between langue and parole
(Greenberg, 1971).
Alternative Theories
Game Theory (GM) was considered a strong alternate theory for phenomenological
interview design. GM would complement ToM in study of decision-making in chess as it relies
on complex mathematics that calculates for choices based on greatest utility. GM as well does
not attempt to calculate the furthest point of comprehended logic, hence decisions based on it can
be called intuitive (Chakravarty et al., 2015; Young, Peyton, & Zamir, 2015). Since chess cannot
be calculated to its endpoint, even by the most powerful computers such backward induction is
not possible, and due to so many possible choice combinations GM is especially relevant in
chess where the combinations of consequences are vast. Chess play is fluid and dynamic
between opponents, hence knowing how one’s opponent conceives, feels, gambles, calculates,
perceives, and many other modalities of knowing the given gameplay options, and even how
what opponent know or think they know of their opponent’s own beliefs, conception, feelings,
33
calculation, etc. of the game’s strategic possibilities is paramount. Aspects of GM are also
similar to ToM in that they do make such overall assumptions about intentions of opponents.
Game Theory (GM) includes sequential games where at each point of the decision-tree
there are various payoffs, and each point has its own equilibrium that can be optimized for
benefit of one player over another to percentage or degree based on games of deception, bluff,
randomness, accident, or calculation. GM also defines simultaneous games, where players make
their decisions at the same time instead of in turn, as distinct from sequential games. Chess
could be considered both a sequential and simultaneous game in that strategy is constantly
forming in neutral points in between moves. Further definition of sequential games could be a
game where the player with the first move generally gains advantage, or payoff, in turn-based
game systems. The second player generally responds with optimal move to the next worst
payoff (Menon, Sasidevan, & Sinha, 2018). Further definition of simultaneous games could be
games where players implement game moves by synchronous update (Menon et al., 2018).
Buhren and Frank (2012) determined that chess experts do not realize that making
non-equilibrium moves likely affects their opponent’s summation of their rationality and
would often cause the opponent to mimic the initial non-equilibrium move with rational
equivalence. Non-equilibrium is when one player in a game makes a move not knowing the
move of the other player or believing that the game is “tied” in equilibrium at that point
(Kline, 2017). Thus, it can be an upsetting move, because it breaks convention of choosing an
optimal move due to the belief, or fact, that the game is in equilibrium, balanced and
unwinnable, because both players know each optimal move. In equilibrium neither player
may want to move, but since chess enforces moves until one player concedes, or their King no
longer can move, then to avoid a draw one player may make a move that disturbs the
34
perceived equilibrium of the game to shuffle the pattern outcome of choices in the hope of an
unforeseen winning positioning. This could be called a gut choice, an instinct or intuition,
made at a specific time of perceived advantage by going into unpredictable non-equilibrium.
Often players concede without making such a choice, perhaps as to not appear foolish.
Chess does seem to use intuition somehow. In fact, Buhren and Frank (2012) cite that
chess masters score higher on intuition than logic in personality assessments. Sigirtmac
(2016) found that children with chess training had statistically significant higher scores in
both creative thinking and ToM than those without chess training. Further they found that
ToM and creativity development have a positive relationship. Additionally, chess training
was found to enhance children’s understanding of spatial concepts. Atashpendar, Schilling
and Voigtmann (2016) note that there is such a great amount of potential spatial relationships
in chess that strategy can be based in size of the state space, size of the legal move decision
tree, and as well considerations about how actual and potential spaces are connected. These
concepts have overlap with both GM and ToM. Aspects of brain interactions related to these
qualities also have neural overlap (Powell et al., 2017).
There are other advantages of using GM to study empathy and/or choice in chess. If
expertise can be enhanced by effective use of intuition, and chess is a strong zero-sum context
game, then defining this process and quality has research and practical validity. Creativity
has again been linked to ToM (Sigirtmac, 2016) and Game Theory (GM) has been linked to
ToM (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014). Like ToM, GM does rely on a
process of comparing player’s underlying structure of knowledge, belief and skills, the two
players amassed conceptions and accessible memory prior game experience. GM often adds the
steps of choosing a game decision based on those conceptions, sometimes using a process called
35
discounting that relies on incomplete information in a process that sounds like intuition
(Linhares, Freitas, Mendes, & Silva, 2012). Discount choices, sub-game moves that are less than
perfect as to be non-equilibria, are made when the likelihood of deciding from one’s less than the
total game conception, one’s with less logical outcome predicting, has perceived higher benefit
due to complex, various, uncontrollable, or random factors of mutual game play (Buhren &
Frank, 2012). This is especially relevant in chess where the combinations of consequences are
vast, while the game play is fluid and dynamic.
One can never fully know how their opponent will gamble, calculate, perceive, react, or
originate failing or succeeding sequences of game moves. As well since choices are turn based
all such calculations have extended probabilities from each succeeding choice point of either
player (Grabner, 2013). Further definition of discounting could be a point in a game when if
strategy is followed there is no definitive cost in one strategy move over another, hence as a
player can choose from more than one strategy without risking advantage to the second player in
their typical strategic payoff. There can be a point in reducing expectations of benefit outcome
and forcing a settlement to tactical strategies that seem to offer the best expectation for strategic
advantage. An intuition of the expected value of a game move as anticipating strategic response
and payoff of the opponent to one’s own calculated game move. Over time a player in a game
can choose a sub-optimal move, a discount, if later this sets in motion strategic advantage. This
can involve alternating the perception of game time in relation to traditional strategies by
choosing an unpredictable, apparently lower value game move (Gransmark, 2012; Matros,
2018).
36
Chess is a game that humans play, and as such concepts of game theory, lack of
omniscience in knowledge of possible game moves, and uncertainty about absolute outcomes
apply (Slezak et al., 2018). Slezak et al. (2018) acknowledge that in chess players do not
exhaustively search all alternatives. At some point they make a decision to move a piece on
limited knowledge and ability to plan ahead. This dynamic of choice was often found to
accompany smaller, rather than broad, sets of projections into various strategic decision trees.
How this decision is ultimately made is unanswered and remains a relevant question to
researchers. Classic Dividend Discount Model (DDM) cannot identify reaction time (RT)
distributions, as related to remember-know responses along confidence levels, created by
chess play. Reigning World Champion and former child chess prodigy, Carl Magnusson,
states that he most always knows his exact move by a quick surmising of the chess pieces, but
then takes up to 30 minutes verifying the actual move by working out decision tree patterns
(Thayqua, 2018). Coates (2013) discusses how chess players need intuition to access the
positional and strategic advantage at all points in gameplay. Thus, sense for where the
balance of power resides currently and toward future outcomes has many values. These are
the sorts of values that have use in politics, economics, and interpersonal relations.
Chess must create itself on some level if there are so many probabilities as of yet not
played. In chess players do find, or create for the first time, original chess combinations of
moves that make for superior play (Coates, 2013). Perception can be interpreted as a sensory
mode of the intentional state, or as a distinct component of sensing. As Coates (2013) states
either way experience involves both intentional content and some feature that is distinctive of
perception as in an awareness of phenomena qualities. These qualities seemed as well
connected in some manner to external objects, perhaps the intuition or emotions of other
37
players and their intentions, as perceived and not a part of any mental or concrete
representation. Even cognitive choice that is based on strategic memory of prior play is
participant to the opponent’s originality of choice, strategy, and unpredictable movement of
pieces in chess as players respond in turn sequence to each and every chess move (Larson,
2018). Each chess game is unique in structure, concept, awareness and interpretation (Matros,
2018). Both players’ intentions form the direction of the game. Coates (2013) notes that
players, even at the highest levels, most often place strong emotional significance on chess
pieces respectively. Each loss of a piece can create strong emotional resonance for both the
victor and loser of that piece. GM theory would have generally challenged emotional values
of individual pieces over utilitarian values but can as well account for illogical decision
making.
A study of chess players’ descriptions of strategy choices could have revealed their
utilization of ToM processes and possibly could have applications to GM (Fuentes-Garcia,
2019). Where ToM uses a sense like cognitive empathy to comprehend another’s internal reality
through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions, GM conceives the totality of an
interactive process then assigns a cost-benefit analysis of the best choice, to be implemented
strategically at an exact moment and point, for ending up in a superior position to one’s opponent
(Bosco, Berardinelli, & Parola, 2019; Guth, Huck, & Rapoport, 1998). There is interest in
knowing how chess players believe they have an understanding of an opponent’s process, scope
and/or intention. This can be a belief based on combined dueling strategies of two opponents
and the one who predicts the outcome of multiple points of future strategic outcome. Research
has identified complimentary methods for predicting the sequenced outcome of tactical choices.
This includes for ways of stating time, matter, motion, direction and space that can be inferred at
38
intersecting future points through a logical, yet ultimately unquantifiable process (Haladjian &
Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al., 2014). GM at times already labels these choice points with
descriptions that sound much like intuition, or possibly cognitive empathy (Garcia-Pola, Iriberri.
& Kovarik, 2017).
While ToM theorists might have interest in narrative descriptions of cognitive empathy
during chess play, GM theorist do have interest in narrative descriptions of how and when
discount game play choices were made (Marchisotto, 2019). There is much interest in spatial
conception and analyzing descriptions between scope and circumstance of chess players’ game
conception across time and space dimensions that has theoretical merit (Leone, Slezak, Cecchi,
& Sigman, 2014). Inherent in ToM and GM is that at times logic no longer suffices as the sole
means of advantageous decision making (Crawford, Costa-Gomes, & Iriberri, 2012; Ong, Zaki,
& Goodman, 2018). Again, chess players do discuss visceral feelings of varying intensities as
moves instinctively indicate sudden shifts in player advantage (Slezak & Sigman, 2012). GM
defines simultaneous games, where players make their decisions at the same time instead of in
turn, as distinct from sequential games (Pozzulo, Reed, Pettalia, & Dempsey, 2016). Theoretical
overlap could occur if cognitive empathy, being utilized by both players simultaneously,
indicates that such turn-based mind games, such as chess, as in fact both turn based and
simultaneous. Ultimately, the skill of cognitive empathy to comprehend another’s internal
reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions might as accurately be defined
as the ability to predict the future choices of another (Powell et al., 2017).
A descriptive analysis was considered a strong approach to begin to define new
theoretical and practical space where CE is used and then can develop new experimental
methods for that expanded space (Montero & Evans, 2011). Hence, theories like GM and
39
Chunking Theory that do not have to rely on ToM and cognitive empathy to explain strategic
choices could be most substantial since they relate to conscious awareness more than
unconscious awareness. Or if there are more unconscious structures, like cognitive empathy
choosing points of discount, in chess play then the unconscious processes might have played a
role of greater significance in many games and competitions that require decision making,
strategic thinking, and speculative knowing (Menon, Saisdeven, & Sinha, 2018). Defined terms,
proportions, and perceptual standards of CE were considered to offer greater elucidation with a
qualitative analysis of chess, which involved significant sequential decision making that has been
greatly studied quantitatively but has had few phenomenological interviews (Seyfarth & Cheney,
2013).
Theory could Reveal Strategic Processes
Which approach one used to study conscious and unconscious aspects of chess decision
making could have revealed which theory most incorporates strategic processes in chess. IPA
techniques helped research determine many chess decisions processes, that have been called
excellent and necessary, that until now have been ambiguously filed under the general heading of
intuition. CE is more specific than intuition (Bosco, Berardinelli, & Parola, 2019; Guth, Huck,
& Rapoport, 1998) and may be what chess experts mean by intuition, and CE is attached to
established, pervasive and pertinent Theory of Mind. Evidence gained from a phenomenology
study of chess opponents seemed to expand into arguments of larger scale, scope, and social
consequence. All transactions and competitions were viewed through the lens of how competing
agents are playing game moves with each other (Glykas, 2013; Mihailov & Savulescu, 2018).
Chess is a simple game in the sense of being an understandable and researchable format which
has complexities that make processes and interpretation of these processes worthy of expanded
40
application to all levels of transactions and competitions that have significant social, economic,
and political consequence (Matros, 2018). If decisions of significance are being made in any
game based on non-rational, unconscious processes research has an interest in defining these
qualities (Andersen, 2014). What is transporting a game forward, like chess, that has several
dimensional considerations intersecting in complexity and sophistication at all times has wider
applications on many possible decision-making constructs (Taillan, Dufau, & Lemaire, 2015).
Similarly, other intuitive processes, said to be common in chess (Coates, 2013), seemed
to reveal other predictive methods of strategic game choices that speculate on incomplete, or
inferred knowledge. Such theoretical concepts such as GM theory discount choices,
mindreading, intuition, and affective empathy; all as possibly indicated as often used, but ill-
defined methods of game play decision-making practices that produced variance in outcomes.
IPA, and Nvivo 12 application, provided a strong method for gathering and interpreting such
data. Traditional IPA criteria like saturation and trustworthiness (Rodham, Fox, & Doran, 2015)
were applied to the analysis of the data. It was expected that if unconscious processes of CE and
GM were applied to chess by players then IPA discerned these themes and began a significant
mapping of the language that describes them. There is a significant gap in the current research of
any quantitative interviewing of chess players (Nippold, 2009; Balata et al., 2015), hence if
significant unreported, unclassified, phenomenon was occurring in tactical or strategic decision
making than this study has reasonable expectation of defining new occurrences and their
descriptions.
Once again, application of any intersections or complimentary processing of CE with
choices made through Theory of Mind has wide potential in adding to the psychology of both
political and physical sciences (Feher & Huck, 2016; Linhares et al., 2012). For instance, in the
41
psychology of environmentalism, one can imagine majority agreement on several prominent
paths of bio-planetary life destruction or preservation paths. GM would as well include for a
discount decision point where, though ultimate conclusions and timeframes cannot be completely
known, if there were a planet wide political agreement to discount the game and vastly reduce
certain types of technological expansion then longevity of sustainable bio-planetary life would
increase (Garcia-Pola, Iriberri, & Kovarik, 2017).
In essence any understanding of finite and infinite choice games, with random factoring
or not, was considered to benefit from defining choice points between the knowledge of a full
game to its end. This could as well be examined from a freeze frame understanding of as much
of the totality of the game by either player at any given point in process. This being the earlier
expanded definition of sequential and simultaneous games. All possibly having universal aspect
in the physical sciences as at the quantum level, for now applying the Uncertainty Principal, it is
known only a position (simultaneous game/cognitive empathy/intuitive leap with or without
known conclusion, i.e., Schrodinger’s Cat (Halpern, 2015) or a momentum (sequential
game/pattern recognition/logic outcome with or without known conclusion) of a particle can be
known at any given point in time (Mureika, 2019). This again may be considered to open
doorways to applying human mechanisms to artificial intelligences in ways surpasses binary
decision processes.
Originally this study was to include both Theory of Mind (ToM) and Game Theory
(GM). Ultimately, GM was eliminated from primary considerations because ToM offers more
direct evaluation of potential Cognitive Empathy (CE) through qualitative feedback. CE is a
significant variable to this research in that it contains components of memory and cognition
related to strategic decision-making. IPA was considered best to discern cognitive empathy at
42
the rudimentary level by categorizing player language into themes that may suggests its use in
strategic decision making. Since there are many aspects of conscious and unconscious process
suggested in both chess game play and strategic choice, a rudimentary approach was considered
prudent as to begin to build a new structural base of analysis that research can add to as to better
solidify theoretical positions and constructionist arguments. ToM is developed in quantitative
design, but not strongly developed in qualitative design regarding chess strategic decision-
making processes.
Chunking Memory
Chunking Theory is often experimentally associated with cognitive processes of chess
play (Lane & Chang, 2018). Chunking Theory is the learning through memory of models and
patterns that can be recognized and reacted to in strategic play (Gobet, Lane, & Lloyd-Kelly,
2015; Simon & Gilmartin, 1973). This theory has been demonstrated to work to explain large
aspects of chess play (Hanggi et al., 2014). Still, it does not have application in the sense of
affecting the opponent’s intentions as does Theory of Mind (ToM) (Kulke, Johannsen, &
Rakoczy, 2019). Chunking accounts for degrees that information is grouped into explicit
categories of distinct valence (Wegener, 2001). Such a process compresses large, but finite
datasets into meaning (Bor, 2012). This data is specifically conscious as its structure relates
to existing knowledge (Bor, 2012). A ToM process, such as cognitive empathy, was
considered able to be studied in chess players distinctly from chunking in that it is an
instantaneous realization of strategic intentions of an opponent and not an accessing of one’s
own memory to choose a strategic pattern of implementation. Though primitive inputs maybe
accessed in both chunking and cognitive empathy, cognitive empathy seemed not to require
sophisticated levels of abstract thinking as would chunking. Chunking most reasonably seems
43
linked to Preservationism (Salavaggio, 2018), theory of memory, since it implies accessing
accurate components of memory. Still, since chess study is cumulative, chunking theory
maybe resembles Reconstructive, memory theory, in that it is processes memory over time
(Salavaggio, 2018).
How to Recognize a Cognitive Strategy
There are many ways of knowing that correlate specifically to activation in certain
regions of the brain (Schaigorodsky, Perotti, & Billoni, 2014). Schaigorodsky et al. (2014), in
research that may already be outdated or misapplied as to duration and operational exactitude
of how memory works (Salvaggio, 2018), found that expert chess players have stronger long-
range memory correlations. This would indicate that they match strategic pattern information
from the present to accurate information from the past. This indicating that memory of how
prior games resulted from current strategy based on chess pieces locating the same, or similar,
spaces on the gameboard. The research might indicate how many processes and how long
they can be held in memory. Salvaggio’s (2018) research does not necessarily suggest any
ToM, or empathetic quality, to strategic decision making in chess. Such a process as
empathetic knowing informing strategy might indicate a sense in the moment of comparing
sensed emotional resonances from the present to sense of what self, or opponents, were
feeling before strategic choices in prior games. This being Kuhn’s (1962) proverbial thinking
outside the box. To the inexperienced this could seem like mindreading in a sense but
reflecting on the theoretical development of ToM one can imagine its properties are long
term, and long lasting in recall and affect (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
As far as how memory works in chess strategy, a more productive direction of inquiry
may have been pursued by Eredita and Ferro (2015) in identifying a generalization process of
44
thinking which could more accurately define how chess players come to strategic decisions.
This means that accumulated knowledge in study and experience create configural concepts
where geometric patterns and logical expected developments coexist. This idea as well
seemed at times to stand alone and to exclude for empathy as a discerning factor in strategic
choice. Then again, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is responsible for processing affective
sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all ToM tasks) as well as being an
important cognitive region for spatial processing skills (Powell et al., 2017). It could also
mean that episodic memory (Ciaramelli et al., 2013) is being scanned for neural overlap that
activates pattern recognition cognitive processes, spatial strategic processes, or correlating
emotional resonances indicated by empathy, through body movement interpretation or
otherwise, and predicting strategy. Nevertheless, strategic choice in chess consistently
activates ToM, spatial, and empathy cognitive processes (Powell et al., 2017). Participants
with even intermediate descriptive skills seemed to be indicating these processes in language
that approximated these thematic categories.
Chess adheres to convenient general principles that allow for multiple perspectives or
processes of cognitive awareness that could be happening in sequence or all at once. Eredita
and Ferro (2015) claim chess strongly adheres to aspects of generalization, abduction, and
configural concepts. Abduction is when a chess player recognizes a situation they are in
during gameplay and is able to overlay it into a known class. Generalization is the predicting
of outcomes based on how that class is known to behave. The construction and
deconstruction of configural concepts, they suggest, are sensuous mental operations brought
into reality by continued generalizations. These sensuous mental operation seemed to at times
align with Brock, Kim, and Kelly’s (2017) demonstrated ToM task that are automatic and
45
unconscious and that operated without direct verbal measures or instructions (Andrews, 2001)
and to ToM definitions which stated as active, without dialogue, and originating from deep
within the individual’s unconscious ability, knowing a truth (unconscious or otherwise) about a
person separate from oneself, and may or may not have been able to be perfectly identified or
even consciously developed. These cognitive processes and structures are said to exist, but rely
on ill defined, unconscious or automatic biological processes (Przybyszewki & Polkowski,
2017). Shenk (2007) suggests chess origins are mythic as either Pythagoras used it for solving
math problems or Palamedes, a Greek military officer, used it for battle strategy practice.
Further implications of abstractions as a concept were investigated.
Several methods and processes have been designed to assess the qualities of ToM.
Powell et al.’s (2017) quantitative study includes for ToM and empathy. They define a chief
characteristic of ToM as accuracy in knowing the thoughts and intentions of others. Even
further ToM is defined as cognitive processes that discern for patterns of belief and thought
rooted in cultural matrixes and that this discernment is based on social instinct within context
(Cohen, Sasaki, & German, 2015). How chess is conceived of as a construct may divide
among cultural demographics. A chess player’s belief in generalizations, and how flexibility
is required to predict success due to complexity, may or may not align with simultaneous
cognitive processes that are registering beliefs formed and interpreted by ToM applications to
gameplay. Many chess players may not have words for concepts that they regularly use but
may be able to create a language when inquired upon with interview language. Chess players
generally like to solve problems and might be engaged to accurately describe strategy they
have experienced often, but never been asked about specifically. Ability for spatial awareness
and calculation maybe a social instinct that some possess to greater degree than others. So
46
too, could empathy have great variation in chess strategy. The TPJ seemed to be modulating
both processes interdependently or independently, alongside other known or unknown
cognitive brain mechanisms or not. Further, and detailed, study is required. For concepts
such as empathy, intuition, and instinct there has not been extensive research on how and when
these cognitive formats operate between various routes of necessity, perception, and physical
mechanism, as would be the demands if they are used during chess strategy decision making
(Duan et. al, 2012; Edwards, Beale, & Edwards, 2012).
Intuition is frequently cited by chess experts as the most important quality to strong
chess play (Buhren & Frank, 2012; Coates, 2013; Powell, 2017). Still, intuition needs to be
studied further, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in regard to chess and strategic decision
making. Intuition has similarly defined qualities to ToM, cognitive empathy, and affective
empathy, in that intuition seems to have an innate and immediate understanding of a situation
inclusive of other’s thoughts, intentions, and possibly emotions. An identification of intuition
during chess-play and corresponding neural pathways was considered to be useful.
Personality type, such a Myers-Briggs or others, was considered interesting additional
dimensional scale, alongside cultural demographics, to analyze chess players in relation to
how much ToM qualities, or spatial memory calculations, they utilized during play (Myers,
2016). Intuition is said to need to pull from all relevant sets of memory processes and
perceptions of the immediate environment (Betsch & Glockner, 2010). In chess, a game where
body language is evident due to the proximity of players to each other, ToM skills that include
for interactive behavioral tasks that utilize a great deal of anticipatory looking and facial emotion
recognition (Zwick, 2017) was considered to possible indicate connections between intuition and
reading body reactions. Some individuals according to Myers-Briggs possess more intuition, and
47
use it with various specializations, than others (Myers, 2016). Intuition, like forms of empathy,
may transcend typical conceptions of cognitive processes. More than one researcher suggests
empathy maybe related to mindreading (Bloom, 2017; Colle et al., 2019; Seyfarth & Cheney,
2013). Intuition could have neural overlap with any of the cognitive processes related to
theoretical and practical concepts of memory including visual-spatial, episodic, long-term,
dual processing, and working (Cohen et al., 2014; Markovits et al., 2019; McCabe et al. 2011;
Salvaggio, 2018).
ToM has been linked to both memory and types of memory as well as chess and both
are linked to spatial understanding. Cohen et al.’s (2014) work brings together an expanded
frame of reference for study, rather than merely Type I and II dual cognitive processing
mechanisms that separate decision-making on rapid belief judgements (Type I) and rule-
based, working memory processes (Type II) (Markovits et al., 2019). Their research focuses
on if ToM processes reflect representational processing or mental state processing. Mental
representations are beliefs, while representational processing relate to non-mental, linguistic
information. Both are represented propositionally. Since chess has been studied through
ToM and has aspects of belief processes (Intuition and cognitive empathy), then a further
flushing out of linguistic associations during mental processes was considered to be useful to
triangulate Cohen et al.’s (2014) finding that ToM is more closely associated with processing
specific mental states rather than representations more broadly. Indeed, there should be
further questions as Markovits et al. (2019) found that both Type I and Type II processes have
their own form of intuitive decision-making. Here, empathy was considered to be rapid belief
judgement, perhaps recalled from memory as Ciaramelli et al. (2013) asserted memory and
empathy are connected processes.
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Geometric Considerations on Cognitive Strategy
How space is conceived has been linked to strategic assessments and methods of both
chess and ToM. Atashpendar, Schilling, and Voigtmann (2016) stress in their study that the
complexity in configurations of movement is multiplied significantly by variations that can be
applied to any of the six chess piece types and further compounded in various combinations.
These configurations of movements could be the same configural concepts Eredita and Fero
(2015) suggest. With such dimensionality of gameplay, the possibility that many complex
cognitive processes overlap, concur, and randomly sequence was considered great, yet there
was as well the possibility that many, or all, are working in a wider precise network than
studies have yet to elucidate. Language, rather than quantitative study, was considered a
strong data collection source to be analyzed for such cognitive complexities. Powell et al.
(2017) experimentally verified previous studies in their finding that there is extensive neural
overlap of ToM processes during chess gameplay.
Activated brain systems include superior temporal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus,
superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction, orbital PFC, a role for cuneus, fusiform
gyrus, and right cerebellum, all of which are directly associated with ToM tasks. In this sense
ToM, and possibly specifically cognitive empathy (CE), has moved again into a central, or at
least completely adjoining, position to cognitive processes of concern to multiple sources of
inquiry. Since all these brain functions were found to have active processing during chess
gameplay it was considered interesting to begin the attempt to develop a thematic language
from chess players that may match, or indicate, perceptions, awareness, ratios of activation,
and sequencing of these brain activities during gameplay. Powell et al.’s (2017) study further
found that novice players activate ToM tasks to discern opponent’s inner states more than
49
they activate memory recall. Novice thematic language on strategy seemed to indicate more
awareness and interpretation of game-state space and empathy than experts who often study
strategy by rote. This could be explained in that novice players have less pattern recognition
than expert players. Or it could mean that CE is a superior initial, or primary, choice to be
developed for the most effective strategic decision-making cognitive processes. This was
considered to have interesting implications to how ToM is developed chronological from
beginner to expert, or even young to old. Likewise, Coates (2013), mentions that the Chess
Grandmaster Capablanca would find himself in a difficult endgame scenario and suddenly
“see” the correct strategic moves. Study was considered to discern if this sudden recognition
was of a pattern of play or a realization of the opponent’s strategy, or some combination of
both. It was also considered possible that empathy was so deeply embedded in expertise
memory recognition that it is, as of yet, indiscernible. Einstein stated imagination is more
important than knowledge and he might have been suggesting intuition (empathy) is broader
than condensed conceptual guarantees (Calaprice, Dyson, & Einstein, 2005).
The relationship between perspective acquisition and strategy has several categories
and labels, but it was considered possible that some of these are both themes and cognitive
processes that need to be combined for operational definition and practicality. Coates (2013)
suggests chess is more like an abstraction of mathematics when it utilizes intuition to select
gameplay. In essence, this he states has little to do with the position of the pieces on the
board, but more so where they will be at future points given estimations of conditions of play
both players are perceiving and sharing. He equates this to finding a geometrical proof. This
sort of abstraction sounds like the configural concepts where geometric patterns and logical
expected developments coexist in Eredita and Fero’s (2015) generalization concept,
50
Atashpendar et al.’s (2017) space-state conjectures, or a guessing game like intuition. Coates
(2013) adds that even the estimations of emotional attachment players place on certain
strategies or game pieces becomes active in strategic outcomes. These emotional attachments
were considered in turn to be picked up by CE and used by opponents (Coates, 2013; Powell
et al., 2017). Coates (2013) says phenomenologically players are adding rich meaning on top
of rule-based structure, which adds a sophisticated layer of play to be interpreted effectively
by both players. He says chess can become like a hallucinatory experience. Or it was
considered he was describing the deep mix of memory recognition of chess study and
experienced reinforced by every ToM experience of reading the other, in any domain
whatsoever going back to the developmental pretend play of childhood.
In technical terms this is veridical experience supervening as inner states upon
proximal brain states, casually linked distal object perception. The indication, according to
Coates (2013), is that visual-spatial analysis is a weaker factor. In turn a multiplicity of
natural complexities is perceived at higher-level monadic properties, powers, and norms. In
any case this is more than just looking at a decision tree, since chess is individuals with
various levels of specific expertise competing in a game that has social meaning, a learned
history, numerous rules, and multitudes of complex movement variations. The theme of
complexity in variation of chess is reinforced as by the work of Atashpendar, Schilling, and
Voigtmann (2016). Creswell and Poth (2018) trace the roots of Phenomenology in discerning
intentionality of consciousness, even to the point of refusing participant-object dichotomies
while instead seeking the what and the how of the essence of a participant (Moustakas, 1994).
Many of the cognitive functions this paper examined perhaps indicate there is such a
51
phenomenon occurring in the gameplay of chess be it empathy, reading body language,
intuition, or sudden abstract, and original, geometric calculations of future state-space.
Role of Intuition in Strategy
Not all researchers appreciate the possibility of intuition as an instantaneous grasping
of new strategic information. Montero and Evans (2011) made a strong argument against
Dreyfus’s argument calling intuition as maintaining a primacy in chess strategic success.
Dreyfus called intuition zeroing in. Montero and Evans (2011) interpreted zeroing in as
accessing previous chess play for similarities in memory recognition. But one could see
another definition of zeroing in. A process where a player’s focus narrows and transcends,
something akin to Coates (2013) hallucinatory experience, or an intuition that finds a sudden
solution not exactly from memory or pattern recall, but from empathy or spatial induction of
probabilities that results in a sudden successful strategic, or series of strategic choices as the
experimental science has changed since Montero and Evan’s 2011 work (Coates, 2013;
Powell et al., 2017). In fact, Balata et al. (2015) found visuospatial memory to be essential
for encoding chess strategy, while long-term memory is important for later processing. It was
considered to be of interest to find the role empathy may play in encoding of memory. There
is great interest in knowing the belief processes created in chess players that assures them they
have an understanding of an opponent’s process, scope and/or intention, and also how chess
players believing they know how outcomes of combined dueling strategies between themselves
and their opponents will intersect at multiple points to influence gameplay, and how this
outcome is operational and operationalized (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al., 2014).
Sensing technologies have been applied to the study of chess player’s physiological
responses to competition (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018). Guntz, Balzarini,
52
Vaufreydaz, and Crowley (2018) captured chess player’s displays of emotion and awareness
through non-verbal channels using such technologies. Guntz et al. (2018) stressed their study
enhanced understanding of situational awareness but did not connect that to what deeper
strategic thinking may have been taking place simultaneously. Again, there are theoretical
implications that a synthesis of cognitive processes could be occurring during gameplay. If
opponent’s shift eye gaze or move a foot, perhaps this triggered a sense of intuition and/or
empathy. Also, when one player’s body movement occurs naturally this could cause a
reorientation of visual-spatial calculation and possibly even memory within the opponent
(Duijivenvoorde, 2016). One mechanism could trigger many. How a player sees the
chessboard could shift if their opponent’s movements of any sort force them to reorient their
own gaze and thus their own interpretation of spatial-visual configurations, and possibly
memories thereof from many points in time.
Body and eye movement is registered strategically during chess game play. Duration
of eye gaze on a portion of the chess board does not necessarily indicate depth, or type of
cognitive strategic function determined from the information gained from that gaze, though
chances are a fixed orientation gives more time for analysis, as does voluntary scanning of the
board and its pieces at one’s own will and sense of timing (Nazareth et al., 2019). Again, the
synthesis is that depths of memory through accumulations of time have not been especially
studied on the numerous perspectival factors that go into chess strategic thinking. Intuition
has been said to be instantaneous (Pilard, 2018). Perhaps it is a response to interruption. Data
gained from gazing, which may have indicated a dissatisfied response, could be compounded
by data gained from another gaze and in accumulation create a satisfied response, as these
facial emotions were as well recorded (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018).
53
Indeed, since chess has so many variations, an intuitive play that seems like a bad
move, could in fact turn out through variation, intuition, game theory discount, or sudden
empathic subsequent choices to be a winning strategy (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, &
Saaksvuori, 2014; Coates, 2013). In this sense, a mistake could be sometimes merely an
unconscious pattern recall from memory that potentially advances the following sequencing of
moves to an advantageous chess position experienced and recalled, even unconsciously, from
prior play. Guntz et al. (2018) also recorded body posture as an indicator of negative stress
during gameplay. Chess, being strategic, allows for much deception, intensity, sacrifices of
key games pieces, misdirection, and defensive modes of play that eventually unleash a
winning strategy. These again are many qualities that ToM seeks to identify (Premack &
Woodruff, 1978). A pretend tense posture can indicate the deception of a coiled cobra
waiting to strike. Such deceptions could indicate counterstrategies are employed as to deceive
empathic skills of one’s opponent and/or disturb corresponding strategic memory pattern
recalls. These were interesting interview questions to be considered as to synthesize body
movement and deception into the proper thematic categorizations.
Some methods of perception, like intuition which is said to be crucial to effective chess
gameplay, are not strongly linked to any physiological-cognitive processes at all (Markovits, de
Chantal, Brisson, & Gagnon-St-Pierre, 2019). Indeed, intuition could be a combination of
several cognitive processes at once, including ones that have yet to be quantitatively mapped
(Newman, Gibb, & Thompson, 2017). Salvaggio (2018) states that many priors or schemas
that construct episodic memory are beliefs. Identity, sense of self, confidence, empathy,
intuition, all qualities of a chess player (and many of these with much attachment to ToM
skills) which could be required beliefs held in the moment from memory or direct current
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experience in order for the most effective gameplay (Pathman et. al., 2016). Many studies
suggest blending points of time and space where these, and outer realities, intersect to create
the feeling, awareness, and/or knowing that decision, and the future perhaps, is based on
(Bloom, 2017; Colle et al., 2019; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013).
Personality Correlates with Strategy
Personality is a dimensionality factor that affects ToM abilities. Finn et al. (2018)
found through quantitative methods that individuals with higher paranoia in their personality
structure had more activity in the mentalizing regions of the brain associated with Theory of
Mind. These researchers designed for various personality types to listen to a story that could
or could not be considered suspicious. In this naturalistic paradigm neural and behavioral
variation was measured over the dimension of paranoia though functional MRI. Inter-
participant correlation analysis identified synchronization of brain regions and analyzing
reflective speech of participants after listening to narrated scenario also indicated semantic
and syntactic features that scale with paranoid character. Here, is application of neutral
research to more than one neural network at a time, which is needed in the study of cognitive
strategy and chess, and as well its possibilities of developing the artificial intelligence systems
created for chess in much deeper, more actual and stronger reflection of reality programming.
The researcher states the intrinsic personality features primed for paranoid responses was
determined and this differs from other individuals without that trait in response to same
scenario stimulus. Ghiasi, Mohammadi, and Zarrinfar (2018) note that individual with
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) have deficits in Theory of Mind abilities. Their study
attempted to predict BPD traits based on theory of mind, emotional regulation and attachment
styles. In their study, they discerned that at times individuals with BPD rely heavily on forms
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of empathy (a ToM quality), even ultra-reading of the mind, because they have experienced
negative results from their inability to judge other’s states of mind. Hence BPD individuals
sometimes utilize skills to understand others and greatly hit or miss the mark. In their study
BPD individuals demonstrated greater Theory of Mind inferences. This research could
intersect with the investigation how connected and how separate are logical memory recalls of
chess strategy and intuitive leaps of chess genius, or failure. They note that some BPD
individuals resort to Theory of Mind cognitive techniques due to poor emotional regulation.
This could indicate that emotion is not a gateway to empathy use, or at least cognitive
empathy. Still, Davash and Shamay-Tsoory (2014) restated that empathy is believed to come
from both an emotional system and a cognitive system routed through separate yet interacting
neural pathways in the brain. Emotional empathy, often called affective empathy and
sometimes called simulation processing, is driven by simulation and mediates emotional
experiences through the amygdala and insula (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014). A chess
novice, or even a weaker chess player, maybe looking for signs in their opponent to mimic,
either emotionally, perceptually, or logically discerned all the time, or when in strategic
trouble during gameplay.
Indeed, much of chess is matching move for move until someone breaks a pattern.
The amygdala as previously cited controls automated fight, flight or freeze responses
(Muppidi & Miglis, 2017). If the amygdala causes a break in strategic directional choice, it
certainly is not voluntary, but maybe strategically functional, or not. Muppidi and Miglis
(2017) found that stress during complex chess gameplay creates sympathetic nervous system
reactions, psychophysiological responses, that reduce heartrate variability in both novice and
expert players. This brings in amygdala reactions, bio-sympathetic awareness of others,
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vagus trauma formations, and other possibly biological process engagements (Muppidi &
Miglis, 2017). Empathy does relate in part to these processes, and chess players words might
further let us know more about connections that might happen, first registered in the mind as
language, then sort through one of various conception making processes prior to decision-
making. This work reflects back and could relate to amygdala reactions created from personal
experience and even prior chess defeats internalized too deeply in a negative manner. These
researchers who are interested in the intersection of personality and strategy then state that a
decreased empathic response could reflect deficits in mentalizing (ToM) or simulation
processing (emotional empathy) (Bloom, 2017; Colle et al., 2019; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013).
Chess is known for its extreme personality types. Research into possible personality disorders
of chess experts could have significant value in multiple domains of inquiry.
Aforementioned studies did not consider how memory of accumulated influences, say
family or chess mentors, and their personality types are accessed in the moment by the player
and their proportion or degree of empathy or ToM as used or developed (Ciaramelli et al.,
2013; Coates, 2013; Powell et al., 2017). If someone learned chess from a family member
who also abused them, a conflicting style of play could develop. Ironically, some legendary
chess grandmasters like Bobby Fischer, are glorified for some of their various idiosyncratic,
conflicting strategy styles (Ponterotto, 2012). Granted these considerations add much
dimensionality to the depth of study but are strong indicators that such research might lead us
to believe of existing theory that must be studied to complete the structural analysis of the
total process of ToM in future studies of chess. Gillespie (2018) demonstrated through
hierarchical regression of experimental data, from sample of 80 incarcerated mixed ethnicities
teens, that affective ToM (awareness of feeling states of others) predicted proactive
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aggression greater than influences from clinically rated psychopathic tendencies. They
suggested the results indicated that being able to effectively identify others’ affective states
could be a significant variable in whether or not others are aggressed against by such teens for
personal gain. This could indicate that aggressive chess play, in some personalities, is
motivated by strong affective empathy.
Aggression and ToM might have a relationship. Gillespie’s (2018) study found
aggression to significantly greater extent in BPD teens than non-BPD teens, due to BPD teens
being more susceptible to reactive aggression that seems to rely on poor impulse control and
emotional regulation. One social interpretation is that some bullies, and violent criminals,
might have, or work toward, superior social-affective cognition to discern when, where, how
and who to victimize. This is somewhat like a criminal’s form of mind, or body, reading that
is a skill to be developed on how to pick weak victims. There are likely many chess players
who have BPD, psychopathic traits, paranoia traits and other personality qualities that effect
their game play and strategic decision making. Chess players describe visceral feelings, some
quite intense, as moves instinctively indicate sudden shifts in player advantage (Slezak &
Sigman, 2012). The famous former World Champion Bobby Fischer again comes to mind as
someone who had their mental health questioned by the public (Ponterotto, 2012). The
relationship between memory and cognitive empathy may create significant correlations
toward achievements and skill levels in mental games such as chess. As Ciaramelli et al.
(2013) studied showed memory modulates empathy. These researchers found that individuals
recall better aspects of another’s experiences based on experiences they themselves are
currently undergoing. In this study participants read the live story of two characters. One
experienced a long series of love-related failures, the other a long series of work-related
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failures. In addition to the two life-stories recall tasks, a faux recognition task and the
Interpersonal Reactivity Index Questionnaire (IRI) were administered. The Faux Pas
recognition task contained 27 scenarios with violations of accepted social norms and 10
scenarios that did not contained such “faux pas”. These were further divided almost evenly
between faux pas that hurt the victim’s love issues and their work issues. Participant’s had to
determine which scenarios did, and did not, contain faux pas. The Interpersonal Reactivity
Index is a self-report scale assessing empathy through perspective taking (ability to
spontaneously adopt the perspective of other people), fantasy (identifying with characters in
fiction), empathetic concern (tendency to experience feelings of warmth and compassion for
others who are experiencing negative aspects of life), and personal distress (levels of anxiety
for people going through suffering and afflictions).
Limits of What can be Known Strategically
Again, it seems a limitation of these studies, Powell et al. (2017) and Ciaramelli et al.
(2013), is that a lot of data was not collected on the participants personal history or inner
thoughts during experimentation. Researchers did not ask participants when they first
experienced feelings or abilities related to the skills as studied. They were not asked who and
when did this current experience remind them of. The time factor, and magnitude of memory
and experience is not accounted for. For instance, in Ciaramelli Life-stories recall task it was not
asked how many love failures, how painful, and how long ago did these occur to thus influence
outcomes. These studies as well do not qualitatively ask participants to give a robust description
of memory associations of like experiences or the qualities of any experiences they believed
helped them develop the said tested qualities of ToM or empathy. Ciaramelli et al. (2013) did
structure their method with consideration for prior experience in that if participants had more
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empathy for poor luck in love, as indicated in more sympathy for the love faux pas than the work
faux pas, then they significantly identified greater with the character Life-stories recall task who
failed in a series of love relationships. As relates to chess and ToM or empathy skills, Powell et
al. (2017) did not ask participants how they interpreted the intensity and level of belief in a chess
opponent before deciding if their empathetic impression was accurate or not. Chess does rely on
pattern memory. What emotional associations, or empathy registrations from an opponent
during previous gameplay, or even emotional reactions to studying chess from a book, are
primed or associated with memory of difficult or successful previous actual games, all may have
relevance toward what prompts strategy choice in a current game. The significance of memory
and belief cannot be discounted. Then there is that reconstructive memory differs over
preservationism concept of memory (Salvaggio, 2018).
Reconstructive memory means that memories are found to be reconstructed and not
stored. Further, they may be reconstruction with beliefs individuals hold now, and nothing to
do with the beliefs from the time of the experience memory is trying to reconstruct.
Preservationism would state that beliefs from memory are only justified when the belief
during the creation of the memory was justified. Again, why if generalization process is
applied with this (Eredita & Ferro, 2015) in that differing geometric configurations, ones that
like a key for a door lock work or not depending on accuracy of original imprint, combine to
activate accurate cognitive mechanism for strategic decision making or inaccurate ones. This
in one manner, possibly being determined by the original memory imprint, being justified or
not through certain beliefs of that preserved moment. If reconstructive memory applies in a
game like chess than the meaning is if any previous study or experience being applied to a
current game, if based on any current beliefs (possibly knowledge as well), then some process
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would have to validate the information accessed in memory for it to be effective strategic
decision making. This process could be accumulative or divergent in that some other process
steers its accuracy in the present. Salavaggio (2018) claims this is a process of inference.
Inference is the basis of ToM tasks as ToM is proposing superior and active senses of
awareness allow individuals to ascertain accurately the inner workings of another’s thinking and
belief processes (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014).
As well in such cases of complex memory layering the memory is being pieced
together, perhaps unreliably with other memories, of competition in any form, general
resemblance of feeling, person, or situation and levels of strategy, learned in conjoint or
independent memory files, and then all such experiences being complied, recreated, and
originated in new form. Most scholars agree reconstructive memory is most often, or always
the actual case. In this sense the timeframe from how many choices of similar or confused
memory adds to the chance that a new memory is more altered. Possibly as well the
emotional depth of experience could relate to how accurate or in what order memories are
reconstructed. In competition, memory then maybe more unreliable than an immediate
cognitive assessment tool such as ToM and its cognitive empathy (Coates, 2013). Certainly,
chess utilizes executive and long-term memory functions (Conners and Campitelli, 2014). As
well memory processes used in chess could be further categorized both as working memory
and executive functions (McCabe et al., 2011). It was found in study that as chess players
advance in skill, they conceptualize qualitatively representations of space different from
novice players (Conners & Campitelli, 2014).
It is possible that memory of spatial conceptions differs in aspects to that of memory
of linguistic learning or experience of movement. Then is could be asked if spatial estimation
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could be studied through the sciences or learned throwing darts and footballs. Or it could be
checked if elements of memory recall attached to learning and immediate interpretation of
spatial formations like an instinct to dodge bullets, or dodge balls, well. Buhren and Frank
(2012) determined through their study that chess players are not more rational, in a game
theoretic sense, than participants in other domains, but rather a particular combination of
skills specific to chess explains their expertise. Chess offers unique applications to the study
of ToM since chess both relies on predicting opponent’s sense of game conception and
strategy and as well relies on ascertaining the value and sequencing of choices made by
opponents related to their confidence of controlling outcomes (Grabner, 2013; Powell et al.,
2017). It might as well include for a way to use one’s body, spatially, to intimidate an
opponent, suddenly at important junctures, or throughout a game by certain posturing.
Cognitive Capacities for Strategy and its Perceptions
Measuring cognitive capacities for strategy has much area for further investigation.
Cognitive Empathy (CE) has been measured to be a cognitive process involving specific brain
functions (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). This materialistic discernment into another’s
conceptual and feeling world, and subsequent comparison to one’s own inner world can be the
basis for tactical and strategic decision-making during chess. It is a function, biologically
structured, that easily could have many ecological validities toward many domains of human
effort and endeavor. Chess itself can be divided in analysis in several ways, one being tactical
versus positional strategies and as well by levels of aggression and trickery utilized during
gameplay (Coates, 2013). Qualitative study of chess player’s cognitive processes could lead
to domain specific utilization of various cognitive processes that correspond to various
strategic situations and conceptions. In turn, some of these pathways from cognitive
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awareness of a discerning process in chess strategy would be generalized to how such
processes are and can be used in other domains. At its basis empathy is defined as the process
of sharing feelings with others, and the knowing that that feeling is originated in the other
(Preckel, Kanske, & Singer, 2018). These authors point out that such feeling of feelings can be
positive or negative. They contrast cognitive empathy, a ToM quality, from feeling, or socio-
affective processes, as socio-cognitive and merely taking another’s perspective.
Cognitive empathy offers propositional knowledge through inference of belief, thought,
and emotion of the other. Distinct brain mechanism has been demonstrated for socio-affective
vs. socio-cognitive awareness. This though takes the debate beyond early philosophical
distinctions during ToM development as a theory (Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1987; Fox, 2014)
since now, nonetheless both processes are found to work together. Shin and Ahn (2014) found
that use of video games in adolescents decreased cognitive empathy. This means games have the
potential to lessen cognitive empathy and chess has been called a war game, this could mean it
negatively affects some populations. Empathy and the idea that computer, robots, and AI can be
violent, is an interesting cross-section of this topic. Some would want robots to have empathy.
No computer has yet been made to calculate all possible decision nodes in any game of
chess, nor, as desired by programmers, effectively mimic human empathy to enhance artificial
intelligence gameplay (Matros, 2016). Deep Blue, a significant artificial intelligence computer,
proved its superiority over the best human players in 1997 when it exploited differentials in
tempo, positional strength, and king safety while evaluating 100 million positions every second
(Larson, 2018). Still, technically Deep Blue is considered less intelligent than the stupidest
human being and that many of today’s cellphone apps are more powerful chess AI than Deep
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Blue. Hence for all its cold calculation, Artificial Intelligence, does not approach the skills of
ToM and cognitive empathy. A computer can think ahead, but it cannot think what the opponent
is thinking. The deeper theoretical and practical answers, at this time, still reside in the human
mind. Again, Phenomenology may prove enlightening as textural and structural, descriptions of
participant experience are analysis for the consciousness they contain, or create, directed toward
the object of a winning strategic chess move (Creswell & Poth, 2018).
Spatial Relationships and Memory Effect Strategy
Space, or state space in a game sense, is the area of conception of possible movements
of strategic pieces on the chessboard. The board has 64-square and 32-pieces that can
combine in innumerable variations from present state space points to future state-space points
all within the rules of the game of chess. Higher ranked chess players have been found to
give richer descriptive detail, have more cognitive memory pattern awareness, and apply
unquantifiable qualities of intuition for effective strategy (Coates, 2013; Nippold, 2009;
Powell et al., 2017); it is memory of game states and spatial relationships that are often
considered key to understanding chess strategy.
Understanding spatial relationships and how they are processed is a large area of
research alone that could have vast application to gaining knowledge of cognitive strategic
thinking processes. Many researchers are interested in further study of interrelationships of
such constructs and dynamics (Lane & Chang, 2018; Slezak et al., 2018; Villiafaina et al.,
2019). Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann (2016) note that there is such a great amount
of potential spatial relationships in chess that strategy can be based in size of the state space,
size of the legal move decision tree, and as well considerations about how actual and potential
spaces are connected. If episodic memory is more powerful and applicable to ToM, and
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strategic decision-making based on the ability to call forth more memories, and or emotions,
these with CE then to be utilized to empathetically understand how an opponent is conceiving
current chess gameplay situations then they are likely connected processes between ToM,
spatial understanding, and CE. One way to relate to chess strategy is to see one player as
believing they are in the game, and where they believe the game is headed based on prior
memories of similar game positions, then a counter-intuitive, original, or prior strategic move,
an optimal one, can be selected from the superior perceiver’s memory to implement in the
moment. It seems simple, if not for all prior description of what might define a counter-
intuitive, original, or memorized moves that might be. Pathman, Couglin, and Ghetti (2018)
found that with episodic memory there is greater accuracy in relation to spatial location than
that of temporal order. Then perhaps episodic memory is related to all memory or memory
related to or acquired by space assessments. If so, just recalling accurately current positions
from prior games or lessons, might imply inaccurately predicting next strategic moves.
Further, researchers found that matching mental timelines by linearity and direction
influences temporal order and not spatial location (Pathman, Couglin, and Ghetti, 2018).
Backward induction has always been a problem with chess due to amount of game
moves, but if one is faulty on one or more several key games pieces location from memory
that is severely problematic to strategic thinking. Errors from memory depending on general
outcomes from patterning is a one-sided system of strategy choice. Memory of chess strategy
may be selections with more random success via spatial location overlay of strategic idea,
perhaps through ToM, and more consistently retrieved through temporal access of learning
and memory timelines. Hence chess could be flashes of inspiration interrupting methodical
practices of strategic retrieval from prior experience and training. It is interesting to note that
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Binet (1983) believed memorizing games of previous masters involved following a cadence
like reciting the cadence of poetry through logic of each move. There may be a relationship
between empathy and spatial relations, and even rhythm. It would be interesting to have
playing play with headphones of certain beats of music and measure the time and sequence of
their choices, between moves as well, and compared to non-music listening play. Berkowitz
and Ansari (2010) found that the r(TPJ) deactivates during melodic improvisation for
musician, but not non-musicians. So, with expertise to create an original sound of motion, or
perhaps creative chess moves, there is specific TPJ activity that delineates between novice
and expert. This is said to be to allow for inhibition of attentional shifts of task-irrelevant
stimulus while top-down, goal-oriented behavior is needed. Hironaga et al. (2017) suggest
that the TPJ is responsible for auditory coding, perhaps it as well is discerning rhythm.
Indeed, Heard and Lee (2019) insist TPJ is one of several interacting portions of the brain that
processes rhythm and syntax. Hence, the connection between language and rhythm, or how
chess players conceive strategic pacing in their mind has meaning and validity. Certainly, in
body language this might be indicated, but what about some form of empathy based on, or
triggered by, the object themselves, the chess pieces in this case.
Again, many of the cognitive functions this paper examines perhaps indicate there is
such a phenomenon occurring in the gameplay of chess be it empathy, reading body language,
intuition, or sudden abstract, and original, geometric calculations of future state-space.
Otherwise it is memory of game states and spatial relationships that are often considered key
to understanding chess strategy by others and this would again discount the role of empathy
(Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann, 2016). Still, even these researchers note that there is
more than a great amount of potential spatial relationships to be studied in chess. This
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meaning that strategy can be based in size of the state space, size of the legal move decision
tree, and as well considerations about how actual and potential spaces are connected.
Interestingly, Notter et al., (2019) found that activation patterns directly that relate specific
localization temporally are based Gestalt bilaterally in the temporoparietal junction. Perhaps
physical resonances in the moment or past associations, or some combination yet discerned by
study of physics itself are creating patterns of decision. Empathy related to body language
then would relate to episodic memory. The Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ) is influencing
spatial processing (Powell et al. 2017) and this area of the brain is active when taking in data
through inferring other’s beliefs (ToM tasks) through reading or images, but TPJ is not active
while observing information about a physical control stimulus (Saxe, 2003). Powell et al. (2017)
results further indicate that chess and ToM have much overlap in neural networks that inhibit
one’s own experience when evaluating the mental state of others and for visual evaluation of
action. Hence, ToM achieves its goals when one’s self awareness is reduced and awareness of
the other, an opponent, is enhanced.
Binet (1983) points out that expert players are actually often playing from an image of
the board in their minds and not as often referencing the actual board as this might lessen
mathematical reasoning. This might also include for empathy gleaned from body language
and emotional reactions to it. This again being confirmed in increased activation of the
Temporoparietal Junction during spatial processing (Powell et al., 2017). Perhaps while an
alternating process is taking over between observing physical control stimulus (TPJ off) and
processing spatial information (TPJ on) something interesting is occurring. Perhaps with
some excitement, since the TPJ region is so fundamental to possible strategic decision making
in chess, and the nature of this study is linguistic acquisition of such descriptions, that the TPJ
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will be influential in the ability to acquire new vocabulary. Make no mistake, TPJ, is
processing information from the external environment as well as from within the body (Abu-
Akel, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011) all the while incorporating information from the thalamus and
the limbic system and as well the visual, auditory and somatosensory systems. While the TPJ
has been active in chess strategy, then intuition maybe automatically storing an unconscious
dictionary for researchers to discover. TPJ can corrupt moral decision-making and be the
cause of out-of-body experiences (Notter et al., 2019). Insert any jokes, or not, of the rakish
morals of chess players, a sporadic theme from history (Sharples, 2015), and the possibility
that intuition is quantum, or connected to strategy gathering from the cosmos, or even simply
a way to break into “society”.
Sharples (2015, p.15) states historically, at times, chess has often been hardly
considered a “mind sport”:
Providing an alternative reading of the chess-player as a potentially disreputable figure on
display in the brightly-lit, notorious Parisian night, Walker depicts a loud, noisy,
crowded, ill-mannered, sexist, and money-grabbing environment filled with passion and
emotion, far removed from rational recreations that aimed at the individuals’
improvement of health and physique, and personal, civic and national prestige.
Just to make it more interesting each hemisphere of the brain has its, halved, portion
of the TPJ system (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). Its prime functions are maintaining
the ability to pay attention and analyzing signals. Empathy as perspective taking depends on
(right)TPJ (rTPJ) to perceive and judge social cues. The (left)TPJ (lTPJ) learns language by
observing conversation and making connection with memories that convert those associations
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to meaning (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). Downtime of lTPJ off during control
stimuli observation could be rTPJ, alternating function, as switched-on during empathy
gathering.
Research is demonstrating (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Powell et al.,
2017) that the relation of a sense, or accuracy of perception, of knowing what one’s opponent
is planning, or feeling about plans, is pertinent to cognitive strategic thinking. This sense self
then knows how to gauge, incorporate, and evaluate space (and its relations to strategy) as
specifically existing in relationship to the opponent (and the game). It could also mean that
episodic memory (Ciaramelli et al., 2013) is being scanned for neural overlap that activates
pattern recognition cognitive processes, spatial strategic processes, or correlating emotional
resonances indicated by empathy and predicting strategy. Ability for spatial awareness and
calculation maybe a social instinct that some possess to greater degree than others. So too,
could empathy have great variation in chess strategy. The TPJ maybe modulating both
processes interdependently or independently, alongside other known or unknown cognitive
brain mechanisms or not.
Chemical Maps of Cognitive Strategy
Essentially mapping the brain’s various responses to strategy formation is mapping how
stimuli effects chemical reactions. Tozman, Zhang, and Vollmeyer (2017) expressed interest in
their study of how cortisol release during chess affects the sense of competitive flow experience,
the sublime feeling that experience is advantageously advancing, and motivating. Seyfarth and
Cheney (2013) insist that ToM is a subconscious, reflexive process naturally selected to adapt
and bond individuals to advantageous social groups. Tozman et al.’s (2017) flow could be
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memory retrieval in chess related to assessment, awareness, of overlay of temporal strategic
learning (advantageous), while ToM’s instant assessment, awareness, of other’s intentions that is
triggering a heuristic spatial positioning assessment, awareness, that might even reflect
incongruencies in empathy from one’s opponent, i.e., their sense of an advantageous strategy in
the game. This awareness, in part or overall, could be intuition’s neural overlaps with any of the
cognitive processes related to theoretical and practical concepts of memory including visual-
spatial, episodic, long-term, dual processing, and working (Cohen et al., 2014; Markovits et al.,
2019; McCabe et al. 2011; Salvaggio, 2018).
How things are inferred has meaning and purpose to strategic choices. Markovits et
al. (2019) discuss belief-based cues that make rapid inferences, dual cognitive processes, and
another level that uses more conscious, working memory-based cognitions that are rule-based.
They suggest that fast processes use aspects of both rule-based and belief-based cues.
Believing one knows another’s belief is the core of ToM (Brock, Kim, & Kelly, 2017). There
could be transition points between temporal and spatial judgments. Any number of
combinations of neural processes, ways of deciding strategy, and conceptions of how memory
works might be the negotiating factors between temporal and spatial judgments.
Development of such parallelism in cybernetic systems might be essential to development of
superior artificial chess engines. Much of chess involves strategy that conceals game pieces
in plain sight. Sudden awareness of a superior or inferior position can be triggered at any
moment, to any number of future positional tactical changes, depending on circumstance and
ability for the chess player to realize the situation. Study of such questions could begin with
simple new focuses as how the size of the chessboard plays upon effect spatial-memory and
visual-strategy, as related to time frozen, linear, and circular, in differing players and
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corresponding, or otherwise, cognitive processes. A player, perhaps with narrow set eyes or
any outstanding variable, maybe superior on a smaller board while their strategic
effectiveness decreases on a larger board. Indeed, some process, or processes, are mandatory
in chess to connect the assessment of state-space to decision tree possibilities within rule-
based context. It cannot be simply logic as the numeracy of possible state-spaces is too great.
Yet winning strategies are consistently being chosen, and while they generally follow
patterns, this is not exact, and originality of strategic decision-making consistently is
generated during gameplay. These moves eventually become categorized doctrine studied for
mastery. State-space consists of multiple distinct pockets interconnected by relatively few
paths (Atashpendar et al, 2017). Some must be chosen to the exclusion of others. Qualitative
study could define a language that chess players choose to describe the identification,
selection, timing, sense of opponent’s awareness, sense of opponent’s awareness of their own
knowledge and conceptualization of any given junction between distinct pockets of state-
space. In other words, at any given point in a chess game strategy can go in many
combinations of effective decision-making, so research should focus on how chess players
feel they come to their decisions, which in turn could have various generalized and specific
advances toward its own, and other research domains.
Cognitive Mechanisms and Strategy
Variability in cognitive responses includes for differing regions of the brain
interacting in differing sequences for the same outcome, strategic decision making,
presumably prompting by variable challenges from the outside environment. Duijivenvoorde
(2016), cites that individuals differ systematically in their applied decision strategy-making
methods. This researcher mentions these differences are hardly studied in the literature.
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Their study observes the neural mechanisms underlying compensatory versus non-
compensatory strategies. Effect of tasks were measured on the parietal cortex. The
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) was identified as the brain region by Powell et al. (2017) that
is responsible for processing affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all
ToM tasks) as well as being an important cognitive region for spatial processing skills.
Again, there may be a cognitive link between empathy and strategic decision making (Hanaki
et al., 2016). Compensatory strategies are modifications of behavior strategies constructed to
bypass impairments in attention, memory, executive-function, and other cognitive skills
(Yoshio & Marler, 2006). TPJ relates to both attention-maintaining and empathy (Blakemore,
Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). Duijivenvoorde (2016) found those who were not able to use
compensatory functions experienced more conflict, activity in the greater dorsomedial PFC,
when conflicting strategic values were presented. This affects risk taking in strategy.
Compensatory strategic decision making is characterized by expected value (EV) maximizing
while non-compensatory is characterized by loss minimization. During study the
compensatory group showed EV coding in the parietal cortex, while the non-compensatory
group demonstrated limited indications of parametric EV signal. Focusing one’s empathy
assessments powers on an opponent may help determined how much risk to take in strategy.
Chess is a conflict mind sport. The effects of it on strategic decision making are likely
significant in these cognitive systems. Perhaps perception of conflict activates empathy
systems and self-awareness. Duijivenvoorde (2016) cites that visual cortex activation may be
linked to allocation of attention. Their study indicated visual cortex activation. Visual-spatial
assessment of state-size space through variation of recognition and memory has been
established as key to chess strategy (Fecher et. al., 2016). It is possible that chess initiates
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many further processes initially on visual stimulus of value threat and comparison. Person
and Koegh (2019) established many neural networks could control visual working memory at
differing times and ways. Spratling and Johnson (2004) indicate in their study that neural
representations are encoded using a distributed or local coding scheme. They state this is a
not a dichotomous process but rather pre-synaptic. As such processes progress it is
representational abstractions that code neural networks more than sensory data. This, in
chess, could indicate the need for overlaying prior strategic theory to current games as to
build a deeper network. One significance of this work is the further establishing that differing
regions and cognitive systems within the brain can network. Visual imagery and spatial
assessment are not the same qualities, but can work in conjunction, but not always. In the
study of chess and strategy all indications are that systems related to ToM, empathy, visual-
spatial assessment and memory are active a decision-making neural network. Blind chess
players must use efficient structures of visuospatial working memory and long-term memory
without visual stimuli (Balata et at., 2015). Haptic, through touch, memory maybe associated
with verbal coding. Visual images converted to strategy could be developed this way. In
chess combined, these concepts could indicate that larger conceptualization of memory
representations indicates strong access to strategic variations. Interestingly, in chess, once a
piece is touched the rule is it must be moved (Shenk, 2007).
Tracing the multiplicity of phenomenon, both external and internal, that create a strategic
choice and outcome is the focus of much diverse academic research. Wichary and Smolen
(2016) studied the neural underpinnings of multi-attribute choice. They measured the
noncognitive factors like affect, emotional arousal, effort and stress on strategy selection. They
claim that the rational Weighted Additive strategy and the rationally bounded heurism of Take
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the Best strategy can be combined into one unified neurophysiological mechanism. This work
could be further synthesized in artificial intelligence program that wish to add logic and emotion
into strategy decisions for superior play, but also for more human-feel interaction. They indicate
that impulses from brainstem activity might influence overall processes. This resonates with the
work on nervous system effect on strategy perception (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014;
Muppidi & Miglis, 2017).
If a computer could teach, or robot interact, or play chess, through haptic learning,
and actual sensory haptic learning simulated arms and hands, then the affect may feel more
real to the human counterpart (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014; Muppidi & Miglis, 2017).
Overall, it is possible that many common assumptions are inaccurate on risk evaluation and
perception. For instance, it has been said that autistic individuals, and schizophrenics, have a
naïve interpretation of danger. Measurements of moments where those in these demographics
did not sense danger when more neurotypical individuals did might be illuminating. Perhaps
they have a better sense than the neurotypical between a simulated, or even actual aggressor,
when actual violence is imminent or not based on some ultra-sensory understanding of reality.
Nazareth et al. (2019) argue for flexibility instead of dichotomy when evaluating optimum
strategy based on spatial problem-solving. They suggest advanced statistical algorithms will be
more useful than further empirical study of eye-tracking when determining factors of strategy.
This adds to the indication that there is more than meets the eye, that strategy is indeed utilizing
many cognitive, and otherwise, mechanisms. It is possible that each mechanistic cognitive
system, and even nervous system, has deep stores of memory that access and interact based on
flexible objective processes as filtered through myriads of participative experiences and
knowledge bases. Andersen et al. (2014) remind that strategy does not have to contain aspects of
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intention or awareness. They noted that differences in strategy, error feedbacks, are often linked
to control processes including expectation violations, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty.
Linking this with earlier mentioned studies on personality disorders (Ghiasi, Mohammadi, &
Zarrinfar, 2018) it is possible to imagine strategy as mechanistically categorical and contextually
based. In others words a borderline personality disordered strategy might be optimizing in
Vatican infighting politics of the 1400’s, while holistically maladaptive to 21st Century military-
corporate States. History, perhaps the ultimate incarnation of strategic memory, itself is
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle relates how one can ascertain a time and a direction, but
maybe not both. Andersen et al.’s (2014) research implies that development is shaped by
strategic experience over time to the point that there is a feedback process linking those
experiences with chemical-cognitive shifts again the key frontoparietal network (Powell et al.,
2017). Ultimately indications are that strategy is widely, perhaps vastly, heterogenous. Trauma
could be a valuable developmental, or confounding, variable in strategic cognitive processes
being shaped by experience.
Neural network processing may prove more complex and multidimensional than
understood or too difficult for simulation mechanisms to precisely replicate. Pearson and
Keogh (2019) note that there is little consensus among researchers on what neural networks
are mandatory, and control for capacity, of visual working memory. They mention that it
more likely that individuals do not remember visual information in the same way. They cite
multiple cognitive strategic processes involving visual imagery, semantic, propositional, and
spatial that correspond with brain regions to complete mnemonic tasks. Every region of the
brain again perhaps has its own memory. It is interesting to think that memories maybe
fought for in acquisition or usage for strategic choice based on situations. Taillan, Dufau, and
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Lemaire (2015) note that strategies are selected differently by populations from various
cognitive domains factored through education, memory, reasoning, decision making, and
language. As is known some cognitive processes are chosen and others automatically chosen.
Empathy, and intuition, themselves might have both chosen and automatic processes (Coates,
2013).
A game like chess is interesting because time and space (Sillman, 1998) must converge
within a specific set of turn based moves for a strategy to work or not. A complex strategy
can be foiled by a simple move of the opponent. Rellensman, Schukajlow, and Leopold
(2019) note that individuals on differing learning environmental paths each have distinct
development of cognitive, cultural, social, or economic resources. It is difficult to ascertain
what, or who, will survive socially. It can be imagined if Elo chess rating system could rate
population and individual type social survival ratios, which has been suggested (Neumann et
al., 2011). If so, then social structures could be devised to enhance hidden strengths and
develop misunderstood weaknesses. The Chinese are now using such computerized
calculation of social credit, though to perhaps some nefarious, as well as beneficial, ends
(Sithigh & Siems, 2019). AI does not though have to be the genie in the bottle that fools us.
Psychology Today notes as of now it can only beat us in two of recreation games, chess and
Go (Matson, 2020).
Consciousness Effects on Cognitive Strategy and Neural Mapping
Consciousness may have a quality that binary simulations cannot account for without
creatively compartmentalizing mechanism of stimuli and response. Villafaina et al. (2019)
used electroencephalographic responses of chess players under time pressure to demonstrate
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as isolation of memory chunks and analyze working memory tasks. What was not studied,
and compared, is that if cognitive empathy would facilitate similar rapid decision making.
The parts of the brain cognitive mechanisms engaged in cognitive empathy were not
simultaneously measured in this study. This further illustrates the bias of experimental
science to seek heuristic answers from memory retrieval and not cognitive empathy decision
making processes. Researchers have concerns in the area of asking if mind sports, like chess,
could be enhanced by pharmacological means (Mihailov & Savulescu, 2018). The concern
here is if cognitive abilities are enhanced. Interestingly these studies focus on amphetamine
type drugs that possibly enhance memory retrieval and processing speed skills, while ignoring
hallucinogenic drugs, these having been called mind expanding (perhaps space expanding),
which also might enhance cognitive empathy or intuitive skills (Mihailov & Savulescu, 2018).
Coates (2013) called chess strategy at the highest levels a hallucinatory experience, while
TPJ, establish as a critical brain functionary for several aspects of cognitive application of
chess strategy, is said to be responsible out-of-body experience (Blanke & Arzy, 2005;
Heydrich, Landis, & Seeck, 2002).
Theory of Mind (ToM) has been tapped for generalization into other domains of
strategic thinking related to organization psychology and even advancement for Artificial
Intelligence research. The desire for effective cognitive of neural network mapping of
cognitive processes related to strategic choice making is prevalent (Glykas, 2019). Strategic
planning is considering complex and neural networks can seem unpredictable, yet still be
asserted as a relevant from a number of aspects. Some of these aspects conjoin, or function in
an ordered pattern and some seem random, in either cases much has been identified
quantitatively that neural networks form strategic outlook and choices (Pearson & Keogh,
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2019; Wichary & Smolen 2016). Economics and business account for fuzzy variables that
seem counter-logical, but significantly have effect on the decision-tree branching. Much has
been made of seemingly illogical choices in the economic micro and macro markets that
turned out to have relevancy to evolutionary psychology motivations over what otherwise
would have seemed a more practical choice (Linhares et al., 2012; Matros, 2018). Work on
empathy, trauma, personality issues, and types of perceptual difference, if randomly predicted
for in artificial intelligence response programs could add the complexity, spontaneity, and
some semblance of naturalness lacking in current simulations. As indicted brain networks
could be linguistically mapped out for thematic, causative, and textural cues that proximate
various cognitive and strategic responses (Andersen et al., 2014). The suspension of belief
that one is playing a machine is often the desired effect. Fehr and Huck (2016) note that
beliefs change once one realizes they are in a game. They state that realization is non-linear
and involves aspects of cognitive ability and beliefs about another cognitive ability.
Interestingly TPJ is stated to be heavily responsible to ToM beliefs (Saxe, 2003), while
episodic memory matches mental timelines by linearity and direction influencing temporal
order, not spatial location (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018). It is known that chess
computers are currently superior to human players. It could be imagined that increases in the
uncertainty of that characteristic would be a desired effect in simulation.
In other words, if at escalating points the players began believing they were equal to
the computer simulation that would increase interest and possibly satisfaction. Hanaki et al.
(2016) note that participants with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic
uncertainty. It might appear that almost everyone likes a challenge. Indeed, when it comes to
chess simulation programs taking a que from the Air Force simulation designs could be useful
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in that Human-Computer biometric feedback devices might enhance reading of empathy and
confidence in both during gameplay and affect strategic complexity accordingly (Patel et al.,
2018). As well improve haptic learning and interactive experience (Balata et al., 2015).
The ultimate test of symbol logic is if artificial intelligence can respond with its
superiority over the human mind through automatically generated superior programs,
formulas, statistics, and algorithms prompted from input originated in human language by
human beings based on a conceptual or practical need or request. Then indeed language
would prove superior or equal to math, chemistry and physical formulas for interfacing with
reality on the most fundamental, creative, and scientific basis of essential fact, truth,
causation, and reality strata synthesis. This if so, it was the human’s description of the human
need given in language to the AI for the superior programming and knowledge acquisition
devising. Perhaps, creativity and empathy, live in the moment.
Language, Space, and Chess
There are two distinct qualitative studies that interviewed participants on how visual-
spatial memory, spatial assessment, and language influence strategy and learning in chess
gameplay (Coates, 2013). These, as compared to the scientific and theoretical configurations
explained and suggested this far, give researchers an idea of the starting point, the level
research is at, at tackling advancement of cognitive process understanding, what language
analysis can teach us of strategy, and some hints of what participant interviewing can add to
data that helps in the advancement of artificial intelligence simulations, both chess and
otherwise. The two research papers that were found to have utilized qualitative interviews of
chess players are: Nippold (2009) and Balata, Mikovec, & Slavik (2015).
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The learning, reflection, and use of language may have influence on ToM abilities and
strategic choice making. Nippold (2009) examined language productivity and syntactic
complexity in school children in relation to discussions of chess. Expert players were found
to know more about chess, while neither the novices nor the experts differed greatly on any
language factors for speaking tasks. Nippold (2009) concluded that when children are
interested in the topic, they explain it in finer, more robust detail to naïve adults. She also
determined that the language productivity and synaptic complexity in school children are
significantly influenced by the specific speaking task. This is based on research that
establishes that greater syntactic complexity indicates greater participant knowledge. Balata
et al. (2015) note that blind chess players face increased demands on chess play, especially for
beginners. Novice players have been demonstrated to activate ToM tasks to discern
opponent’s inner states more than they activate memory recall and that as chess players
advance in skill, they conceptualize qualitatively representations of space different from
novice players (Conners & Campitelli, 2014; Powell et al., 2017). This could indicate that
empathy is more reliant in novices than experts. Balata, Mikovec, and Slavik (2015)
discerned that blind chess players use mental images, have some limits in efficiency of play,
and that accessibility problems exist. The authors note that sighted chess masters play
multiplayer blindfolded games where they code the chess game states in their memory and
can solve chess problems against weaker players. They state the player who begins chess as
visually impaired must create efficient structures in visuospatial working memory and long-
term memory without visual stimuli. This could indicate the memory of spatial relationships
is more important to effective strategy than to perception of spatial relationships in the
moment. The authors were unclear if sight impaired players use similar mental images to
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those of sighted one, if loss of vision limited efficient use of mental images, and what is the
role and relationship of the impaired sight player to the chessboard itself. A primary question
of the researchers is if the impaired sight players cannot see the board then how they can keep
an accurate image and knowledge of where the given pieces are at all moments. This is
especially interesting since an opponent can take as long as they wish, in some versions of
chess, to make their move and thus change the state of the board, both in their mind as related
to number of spatial assumptions and in reality, as related to time. Further study could
indicate if cognitive empathy is used at all by impaired sight players. There may be a sense of
body language/movement, but certainly no direct perception of it through sight with a
completely blind chess player. They state that experts generally use mental imagery skillfully
in any number of domains from computer programming to surgery. They insist the
mechanisms of using mental imagery for skill-based tasks are ill defined. For chess expertise
it is believed that long durations of training and study of previous games develops the ability
to efficiently represent mental images of the game state including operators. Detail of such
internalized representations is what brings computational advantage to inference operations
and in localization. Sight impaired players may experience more difficulty creating and
maintaining numerous, detailed internalizations of game states of chess as mental images.
Perhaps this is due to the need to compare visually the current state-space to all prior
reference points, even to activate certain cognitive mechanisms.
Comparing how language and spatial understanding is acquired and relates is a large
area of research which adjoins much of the topic in this paper. Nippold (2009) results
included comparison of performance between chess explanation and chess conversations
tasks, and between chess conversation and general conversation tasks. Results indicated that
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performance was significantly higher on chess explanation tasks than on chess conversation
tasks for all variables. The summation being language productivity and syntactic complexity
were found greater when children talked about chess in exposition versus conversation, no
matter if they were an expert or a novice. Balata et al. (2015) relate that differences in long-
term memory are what separate blindfolded chess players from each other in skill level.
When moves are spoken out loud to blindfolded chess players, they demonstrate almost
perfect memory for game state position, unless an illegal move is declared. Visuospatial
memory has been found to be essential for encoding, while long-term memory for later
processing (Cohen et al., 2014; Markovits et al., 2019; McCabe et al. 2011; Salvaggio, 2018).
They cite that blindfolded players are most concerned with the position of the most current
piece being moved as to be critical toward effective strategy. Overall, from the four primary
theories of memory as related to blindfold chess play, Balata et al. (2015) indicate that
template theory best applies over chunking theory, long-term memory theory, or theory of
working memory.
Cognitive awareness may increase the need for more language. Nippold (2009)
concludes from the results of her study that complex thinking drives complex language usage.
She states this suggests thought and language cannot be separated and that encouragement of
inquiry of specialized knowledge in complex topic areas accessed deeper thought and
linguistic description. Finally, Nippod (2009) offers useful prompting words for questions to
chess players as to how they conceive game strategy such as confidence, defense, anticipate,
visualize, similarly, and fortunately. These words would be useful in phenomenology study to
parse out qualities of spatial relations analysis, intuition, empathy, and memory recall during
chess play. Devettere (2009) work suggests limitations in that it finds in chess a purely non-
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rational sociological tug of war, and Zerbubavel (1999) sees it as use of non-universal mental
software. Reti (1923) suggested chess strategy is all math abstraction without need of
linguistic internal monologues, and Vossen (2008) sees it as a self-constituting method
without symbology. It is Goffman et al. (1997), who most concurs with Nippold (2009)
stating chess as provision of a traffic code with the rules of syntax of language and interaction
that is evidence of itself of the relationship as verified by the very obligation to provide
evidence. This being something language, for better or worse, is great at doing. Chess may
create strategic and cognitive circuit complexity without any significant internal language
creation, or needed, to match it.
People play chess who are blind. Congenitally blind people can learn chess with, and
only, through access to proper learning material (Balata et al., 2015). They are not acclimated
to using visual stimuli but are able to generate visuospatial images. Visual and haptic
representation of space are not directly compatible. Differences are not described or
explained by holistic/visual as compared to haptic/serial encoding of space. The researchers
point out that haptic representation maybe be associated with verbal coding. How blind chess
players are conceiving spatial movement and position may shed insights into memory,
empathy, and competitive instincts as innate qualities that do not require all perceptual
faculties to process strategic decision-making (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016;
Balata et al., 2015).
Spatial conceptions vary among individuals. There is a possibility of multiple
cognitive processes as well as personal experiences (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann,
2016; Powell et al., 2017). Balata et al., (2015) found understanding the significance of
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where all pieces are and where they can move without creating a mental image of the board,
as reported by expert participant P1, could indicate a pattern and tactical mindset where taking
pieces is in the forefront or focus, or not. It could indicate that seeing the pathway of pieces
does is not required or used to trigger strategic pattern memory. In this sense, perhaps all
pieces are somewhat like the knight (a piece that defies purely linear movement) in imaginal
space, in that what counts is where they land and take other chess pieces, not necessarily the
pathway patterns on the board that are open (Coates, 2013). Still, the rules must be followed
and for a legal move to take place with any piece, other than for the knight, the pathway must
be clear. Intermediate participant, P4, has a description that could indicate either
conceptualization as he uses his limited sight to see clear pathways, but finally imagines their
distances from these initial angles and somewhat mystically claims the whole process is inner
sight having nothing to do with the eyes (Balata et al., 2015). This sounds possibly closest to
definitions of intuition in chess or even possibly some aspects of ToM and/or cognitive
empathy. P4 is using a form of memory and this could be more deeply investigated as
memory is a form of inner knowing and may include more processes than merely pattern
recall. In any case, P4 uses tactile senses merely for a sense of grounding, or control, as he
touches the actual board and pieces not to recall or choose strategic processes or methods.
These players are mostly playing entirely in their heads, with little or no sense perception. If
CE, ToM processes, or intuition are activated by sense perception, then this may or may not
be of interest in further study (Artinger et al., 2014). Participant P3, thinks of an actual board,
he holds in his mind the image of a real chessboard as he had seen one at one time when he
had been sighted, yet he does not use effort to imagine actual chess pieces only their
gameplay significance and locations (Balata et al. 2015). One wonders if any of this selective
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imagery has the cognitive purpose to free up brain processing space or perhaps is a byproduct
of sorrow and regrets for vital senses of perception lost or game losses. Indeed, blind chess
players must have some, at least conceptual, similarities to Artificial Intelligence chess
engines since they too do not “see”. Graphic diagrams, as chess aides to the sigh impaired,
were noted to be frustrating as the ideograms were always easily understood and had to be
resourced in textual form. Interestingly in some competition sighted players will request a
blind player use a sighted assistant. This was noted by P1 as a bad experience – He (sighted
player) uses my assistant, so he does not need to play my moves. In some such cases literally,
the sighted players are seated opposing each other on a second chessboard while the impaired
sight player is left alone at the chessboard. This raises intriguing possibilities as to CE,
sensing of body language (movement), and mindreading or intuition as a chess cognitive
tactic.
There are other indications of external generalizations of this knowledge. To get an
indication of external generalizations to other areas of study Atashpendar et al. (2017) say
there is reasonableness in estimating trajectories that infer connectivity of state-space in chess
and that these resemble closely to those in statistical physics where the branching number is
only slightly above unity. The knowledge of how to find such reactive paths, and even how
human empathy can be translated to machines, is of great interest to artificial intelligence
researchers (Jackson, 2013). It is possible there is a relation between this branching points
and the non-equilibrium points, or discounts, in Game Theory. Also interesting is that ToM
and pro-social behavior quantitatively have been found to have a positive relationship
(Artinger et al., 2014). Thus, the integration of ToM and memory processes allows for
adjustments to be made of mental state inferences in order to fit unique social targets.
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Artinger et al. (2014) cite that memory of chess patterns is supported by “complex visual
processing out of conscious awareness” when decisions of game strategy are made. Knowing,
defining, and perhaps replicating complex processes that are out of conscious awareness is the
gateway to many emotional, cognitive, interpersonal, social, and even technical advances.
These processes of memory pattern recognition possibility activated, and/or interpreted by,
empathy, intuition, spatial prompting, or some combination thereof that qualitative study and
phenomenological design have opportunity to reveal and elucidate.
The blind may use mental imagery for strategic choice making. Balata et al. (2015)
concluded that even those impaired congenitally of their sight possibly are using some form of
mental imaging to solve chess problems. They state this suggests there may be no need for
visual stimuli when mental images are created. It might be of value to consider the spatial
relationship of opposing players as an equal, or existing variable, when mental imaging and
spatial representation is being calculated by both sighted and impaired sight players
(Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016). The player is displacing gravity, placing
intentional focus, has hands and limbs that interact and trespass on the chessboard space, and
produces reactive body movements and emotions in response to perceived vacillations in
gameplay (Coates, 2013). These qualities as well tax memory and senses because they must
be accounted, possibly adjusted for, during gameplay with opponents and one’s self. Balata et
al. (2015) calls for more research in impaired sight chess player’s ability to memorize large
amounts of information in spatial orientations, in sequential representation, and haptic
perceptual selectivity as toward formation of mental images. The mystery of how perceptions
of competition and choice generate various cognitive choices is speculatively, and
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experimentally, well laid out, but the synthesis of the literature and further propositions, data,
and studies are limited.
Perspective Taking in Chess and Strategy
How one is or uses personal qualities like body language and assuming roles might
affect strategic outcomes, as when one player swiftly moves his hand into the personal
“space” of a forward leaning opponent, or as one tenses one’s body in anticipation of some
result. Puddephatt (2003) interviewed twenty amateur chess players from an interactionist
perspective to see how players interact strategically. He measured for scales of incorporation
of routine activity and style, role taking, impression management, engrossment, and
composure. The author sees strategy from a more sociological points of view as an activity of
generic social process. This connects with body language and possibly empathy as processes
were considered signals of dominance, strategy giveaways, impression of opponent’s skills,
and strength that all relate (Artinger, 2014; Zwick, 2017). Puddephatt (2003) suggests chess
players set up a drama with their bodies to intimidate or influence their opponents. One
interviewee seemed to suggest that the personality of his small town is connected to how he
plays the game:
Because I’m not used to playing very high caliber players, just the various people from
my hometown, anywhere from beginner to nothing, and, when I play them, I usually
just wait for them to make a mistake.
Chess players may use tricks to get into the mind of opponents. Some of Puddephatt
(2003) interviewees seem to suggest that chess is about getting someone off-kilter from their
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game or knowing what the opponent wants to do. This same participant rejected the popular
strategy of exchanging pieces when things got complicated and for appearing more
complicated, to the opponent, by not exchanging a lot of pieces. Other participants speak of
feeling out who the opponent is. This seems to suggest an intuitive process (Coates, 2013).
Other participants discuss not getting too excited about a great move as this might reveal too
much of more strategy to come. One participant suggest engrossment of concentration in
chess is related to the black and white, hypnotizing, board. Famed Chess Grandmaster, and
former World Chess Champion, Viswanathan Annad suggests he gained intuition for chess
through playing Blitz, very fast chess with time limited moves (ChessNews.com, 2020). This
might suggest the faster cognitive processes in the brain are where intuition is being
developed or triggered.
Summary
Chapter 2 explored theoretical foundations of cognitive strategic processing as rooted
in ToM, memory, empathy, and spatial interpretation (Coates, 2011; Montero & Evans 2013;
Powell et al. 2017). It explored numerous experimental designs in these areas that map
assorted chemical and cognitive processes and interpreted them through strategic and
perceptual choice making. Many, but not all, studies reflected how these processes
specifically apply to chess strategy (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha,
Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Intuition and empathy are
primary processes and themes identified as having significance to chess strategy choices
(Powell et. al., 2017). Diverse, yet possibly interconnecting, cognitive systems like
personality and various types of memory processes, both practical and theoretical, were
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addressed through the primary lens of how they relate to strategic decision-making in
gameplay. The alternative theory of Game Theory was examined as another strong
foundation of strategic choice making. The possibilities of neural discernment, and
influencing, through language and artificial intelligence of these processes was examined.
It was shown that definitive links exist between chess, empathy, memory, and spatial
relationships (Astashpendar et al., 2016; Ciaramelli et al., 2013; Powell et al., 2017). The
concepts individually, like spatial understanding, intuition, empathy and memory processes
were fairly deeply explored and synthesized in Chapter 2. Many interrelations were revealed
or suggested. As well exclusions were defined between theoretical points of view. The
literature seems divided on, seemingly more participative participants like intuition relating to
strategy, in ranking or operational importance (Coates, 2013; Montero and Evans, 2011;
Salvaggio, 2018).
The gap in the literature strongly indicated there was an experimental interest in how
ToM, empathy, intuition, spatial processing, and memory relate to strategic decision making
in chess, but extremely limited qualitative interviewing of chess players on if and how they
experience these strategic formation and application qualities (Astashpendar, 2016; Coates,
2013; Salvaggio; 2018). Phenomenological approaches were considered best address this gap.
Linguistics thematic interpretation of chess players experiencing of strategy was indicated as
necessary to the literature by the gap to possibly be supportive of the multiplicity of
quantitative inquiries (Nippold 2009).
Others thematic and cognitive qualities were connected in Chapter 2. This included
perspective taking (Puddphatt, 2003), affective empathy (Bloom, 2017), and personality type
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and cognitive style (Bosco et al., 2019). Comparisons within the research were made between
personality and empathy capacity, spatial effectiveness for strategic formulation, and the
limits of intuition or reason in game rule sense (Atashpendar et al., 2016; Powell et al., 2017;
Montero & Evan, 2011). As well theoretical comparison was made (Kuhn, 1962; Matros,
2018). Some generalizations of theory were explored (Eredita & Ferro, 2016; Hanaki et al.,
2016).
The gap in literature was supported so that Chapter 3 could explain how method and
analysis of IPA to explore if chess players will linguistically form categories that represent
their perceptions of cognitive strategy methods, they may use during game play and this will
benefit the literature. Chapter 3 addressed data collection methods, categorization, and
analysis. Coding strategies and software use were addressed. Chapter 3 also discussed
assumptions, limitations, delimitations, and ethical assurances.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
In order to explore how ToM as a cognitive factor for social reasoning influences strategy
decisions in chess game play a qualitative method was decided upon. ToM provided a solid
theory that allowed for a framework of exposition from player narratives on how they are
experienced strategic decision-making during game play. The Problem to be addressed in this
study was how chess players would use descriptive narratives to elaborate on how ToM was
used as a social reasoning tool during gameplay to make strategic decisions.
For instance, cognitive empathy, a ToM quality, has been found to reveal accurate
perception of other’s states of mind (Ciaramelli et al., 2013) quantitatively and was found to
be active in chess for strategy decision-making. This paper endeavored to find out if chess
players rely on cognitive empathy to pick strategy during chess and how they described this
phenomenon in qualitative interviews. Additionally, aspects of ToM have been found to
relate to memory and spatial conceptualization, as do aspects of chess strategy (Atashpendar
et al., 2016; Colle et al., 2019). Descriptive narratives seemed to fill the gap of how these
various themes are interrelated. Saturation from a series of phenomenological interviews
allowed for descriptive validity and confirmation of how chess players experience strategy
formulation and execution during the game of chess.
The Problem addressed in this study was the gap in descriptive narratives of chess
players as to their perceptions of cognitive factors related to social reasoning influence
tactical and strategic moves. The Purpose of this qualitative study was to investigate the gap
in descriptive narratives of social reasoning and spatial reasoning overlapping, or not, in chess
players as to their perceptions of what influences tactical and strategic moves. This chapter
provided details on the study’s qualitative methodology and phenomenological design,
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wherein the methodology and design were explained, and justification were to be given for its
appropriateness in this particular study. Sufficient detail was be provided so that this study
can be replicated. Alternative designs were also be discussed, and justification were to be
given for why those designs were not utilized. The population, characteristics of said
population, and sample size were examined and justified as well as recruitment procedures for
the sample selection.
Chapter 3 provided information about the materials used in the study, information
about how the data was collected, organized, and analyzed. In addition, details of the
procedures of the study were provided. Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of the
study were stated, and any ethical concerns were addressed.
ResearchMethodology and Design
This study utilized qualitative methodology that is interpretive and of phenomenological
design based as to interview participants who play chess. Qualitative design allowed for
collecting and interpreted perceptions of participants lived experiences (Eatough & Smith, 2017).
A qualitative, phenomenological design, and interview data collection were considered to be
appropriate for obtaining the internal language that chess players used to describe strategic
decisions during gameplay (Haar, Norlyk, & Hall, 2014). Such designs allowed for saturation
which indicated enough thematic data to categories have been gathered and established that shed
light on aspects of the research questions. The key difference in gathering phenomenological
language instead of experimentally and quantitatively based designs was that instead of
identifying parts of the brain-chemical patterns activated during chess game play, there was the
possibility that processes adjunct, unknown, or mislabeled, like empathy or intuition, could
figure into strategic decision-making during gameplay more than experimental designs take into
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account. This in addition to gaining new language that elaborates on known physiological
processes.
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012) was used
for the research design as it allows for an analytical framework that derived meaning from
participants’ narrations of phenomenon. An interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was
utilized due to its efficacy for examining a topic deeply and on its own terms (Eatough & Smith,
2017; Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006). Since the nature of this study was to determine how
chess players described the way they conceive, calculate, and experience the cognitions of their
gameplay strategy IPA was an appropriate methodology (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). This
method had strength in gleaning meaning from particular participative states and personal
accounts. IPA offered research flexibility and applicability within a rigorous framework that
allowed for interpretation of nuance and complexity gleaned from thick, rich descriptions of
chess players experiences and perceptions.
There are many suggestions from the quantitative literature that multiple and diverse
cognitive systems related to memory, spatial relating, logic, and intuition are at play in strategic
formation during chess game play (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha,
Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). While no single experimental
design has differentiated all these indications, a gathering of first-person accounts of what
experiences, strategically, and internally of what the chess player was feeling or thinking, in
sequence, or simultaneously, gave an indication of cognitive overlaps, or sequences, in
processes. As well this qualitative method offered insight on brain circuit systems that may be
handling more functions that previously known, and/or verification of which cognitive processes
are dominant. Theory of Mind (ToM) offered a concept similar to intuition, and different from
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pattern recall, known as cognitive empathy (CE) which itself is known to be active during chess
game play and by its nature of gaining a sense of an opponent’s inner world seemed apt to verbal
description (Laghi et al., 2016). Even pattern awareness from memory recall could have a
linguistic sequence, unique, or in common, that seemed to be shown through development of
themes through phenomenological interviews.
A benefit of IPA was that it took both the researcher’s and participants interpretations
into account (Rodham, Fox, & Doran, 2015). The feature of epistemological reflexivity
allowed for defining the possible scope of the research questions, how the study construction
effects analysis, and exploring how differing aspects of study could affect the investigated
phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Distinctions in language between players who rely
heavily on studying strategy from previous chess games, and pattern memory, seemed to be able
to be discerned from players who rely on aggression and instinct, or defense and instinct based
on how they empathically, or otherwise, read their opponent’s strength in chess (Pathman,
Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018). Alfred Binet in his interviews of chess players to discern where their
mnemonic virtuosity arose from estimates that great masters make no moves without four to five
hundred deliberations per move (Binet, 1966). The editors of Binet’s modern translation note
that great players actually consider fewer potential options and to quote world renowned chess
play, Petrosian: “(I) am not in form; namely, when I fail to trust one line of combination as
suggests itself on intuitive grounds.”
With IPA the researcher could interpret what the participant was attempting to say at any
given moment including unintended meanings (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). Intuition has been
numerously, yet vaguely, assigned as a quality of superlative chess players tactical and the best
strategic decision game move choices (Buhren & Frank, 2012; Coates, 2013). IPA techniques
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seemed to reveal if chess players have a hidden talent that even they themselves have not well
defined or accepted awareness of. At the same time IPA let phenomenon speak for itself from
appearance, substance, or participatively. The semi structured interview provided the flexibility
to confirm themes within interviews and between participants of all interviews combined
(Abayomi, 2017).
A comprehensive analysis of the various participant’s narrations allowed for grouping
linguistic themes that indicated they are describing similar or identical phenomenon (Oizumi,
Albandtakis, & Tononi, 2014). These themes seemed to indicate cognitive processes that are
commonly used by chess players during game play. They could also reveal cognitive
processes that have not been completely associated with game play. In and of themselves,
since there is a great lack in qualitative interviews of chess players experience of game play,
the data derived from this study seemed to put common and uncommon language and
conceptual descriptors to known cognitive processes of game play that have been indicated
through the extensive quantitative research that has been implemented on chess game play
(Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar,
Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017).
Edmund Hurserl (1970) developed the descriptive tradition of phenomenological
inquiry, while Martin Heidegger (1962) originated the interpretative tradition of the same
(Kiikkala & Astedt, 2015). The descriptive tradition suggested focusing wholly on the
participants experience and viewpoints. The interpretative tradition acknowledged the
research to be of a piece generating data between both researcher and participant. Ultimately
effective coding of themes did require researcher decision-making. So did development of
what emergent themes suggested about new data and theory. Still, it was considered to add to
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general validity to adhere to the descriptive tradition while conducting interviews. This in
that the researcher did not want to presume, especially from limited exposition, the entirety of
what each participant was revealing as the interview was being conducted (Kiikkala & Astedt,
2015). Judicious use of follow up questions was often warranted, since participants seemed to
be describing complex and varied experiences (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Language could
have many meanings to many people aside from standard definitions. Language combinations
could be attempts by participants to describe phenomenon they do not have the words for, or
even original combinations of ideas or actions. IPA, as used in this research, mostly mirrored
Heidegger’s (1962) views, though ultimately it was the research data that reveals the themes,
not the researcher, ideally.
Overall IPA has the strength of finding and defining particulars of phenomenon. Any
statements derived from contrast and comparison within this method was considered to have
sufficient instances of similar coding as to ensure that participants are speaking, or not, of the
same quality of phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Clustering themes that have
alternatively been sorted from emic and etic perspectives seemed to reveal new understanding
as applied to the research questions. Such research seemed to assist in the development of
higher-level theory (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). For instance, intuition as defined by chess
players in this study, could be seen to boil down to alternating between cognitive empathy or
an instinct reflecting reason at its outermost most points of memory, and hence disappear, or
be incorporated as a mental concept. Still, as interpretative methods would suggest, insider
and outsider perspectives did merge as the interview progresses. Essentially, the researcher
and participant created a third, combined reality as the dialogue engrossed. As far as it is
known of the physical world any point where realities intersect is restricted to that moment of
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time and the content that fits within that time. The meaning experienced between any two
people in an interview can be different at any moment in time, with one, both, and none
knowing this as so. Then the delivery of that experience to third parties is an adaptation of
that original experience. Admittedly some follow up questions based on where the impression
of the researcher assessed where the participant’s directionality and depth of topic conception
was located in the present drew upon prior knowledge of chess, cognitive processes and game
play as to maintain topic intent and focus.
While experimental design has sought understanding as to how cognitive empathy, and
other aspects of ToM, influence game move choice there is a dearth of phenomenological
interviewing on these processes. There was not a lot of qualitative data on how cognitive
empathy is distinct from emotional/affective empathy. Other researchers suggested empathy
maybe related mindreading (Bloom, 2017; Colle et al., 2019; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013).
Qualitative research that defines qualities of empathy, and intuition, and either consolidates,
affirms, or distinguishes definitions and constructs could be useful.
Alternative qualitative designs were not chosen due to several considerations.
Ethnographical study was considered to be limited in understanding empathy as it observes the
milieu as is, essentially from the outside and words expressed during normal course of the milieu
in action and is not lent to probing for internal dialogues from individuals aside from their
participation in competitive play with another (Yardley, 2008). Still, there could be hidden
complexities in ethnography, especially for PhD students (Scholten, 2019). A PhD student could
use phenomenology with relative ease compared to ethnographic study. Ethnographical study
automatically benefits from developed sense of observation while phenomenology benefits from
astute categorization of responses, which can be done well with a less practiced researcher.
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Limited interviews could carry less risk of distortion, and ethical quandary, than immersion in a
culture that ethnographic study demands. Narrative design could be too limiting to answer the
specific question of cognitive empathy as a chess strategy. Most of the empirical evidence from
quantitative studies in memory and pattern recall, spatial relations and ToM qualities seemed
more given to cross-over analysis in phenomenological interviews, for matching language, than
direct observation of play, personal narratives and interaction of chess culture as in ethnography
or narrative design (Urquhart, 2013). Narrative design is looking for an expanded story, while
this research focused on reduction of language to themes within cognitive mechanisms. Finally,
grounded theory was not used, though the researcher did some extensive reading in that area,
because elaborating or suggesting theory is a larger goal of this research, so it was not considered
a suitable starting point (Yardley, 2008). There was enough data suggesting a mechanistic, if
thematic, understanding of how cognitive strategy works could be revealed through rich, robust
thematic, phenomenological analysis.
Population and Sample
Chess players in some ways represent a diverse group, mostly in age, and others a
hegemony, as in sex and class. There are an estimated 45 million chess players in the United
States, 3% are professional chess players, 39% play in tournaments, and 93% are male. Age
ranges are 4% as 17 years of age or younger, 11% ages 18-25, 30% ages 26 to 40, 38% ages 41
to 55, and those over 56 years of age and over are 16% of the players (Chess.com, 2020).
Approximately 70% of the population has played chess at some point. 15%, of players in the
United States, are said to play weekly or monthly. 78% of regular chess player are university
graduates with household incomes over $120,000. Chess players have been found to be 40-
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100% more likely to buy a luxury item. Younger girls tend to play chess in relatively equal
numbers to younger boys, but then stop playing as they age (Sillman, 1998).
From a sample of this population derived from open groups in Facebook that need no
permission for consent, participants were recruited who play chess at least once per month for the
last three months and agree to terms of this research design. See Appendix A and C for inclusion
and exclusion criteria. Further, higher Elo ratings were considered to be preferred over lower
rating, though in actuality the researcher ended up using the first nine participant responders.
Other criteria included being able to communicate well in English and that participants could
make time for a one-hour interview. A sample of 9 participants, recruited from a national sample
and were considered satisfactory for saturation (Abayomi, 2017). Sampling for interviews
through Zoom interviews had become necessary due to the Corona Pandemic. Signed releases
were obtained from all participants (See Appendix C). Each Facebook open group was asked if
they could email out flyer to their databases of chess players and snowball methodology allowed
for continuous responses to come in (See Appendix A). All participants were willing to
complete an approximately one-hour long semi-structured interview on what language, internal
dialogue, cognitive processes, or otherwise they associated with strategic choices during chess
gameplay.
Those who could not participate in this study included minors under the age of 18, those
who did not play chess at least once per month for the past three months, and those who did not
speak English. Anyone disabled to the point of where communication for interviews was
hindered could not participate. Those who could not follow through with the interview process
and follow up requirements as well could not participate. Those who disagreed with the
framework and ethical boundaries of the study as well could not participate. There were a few
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prospective participants who fell out of consideration based on their initial responses to these
criteria.
For frequent and tournament players there is a chess ranking called Elo that gives the
players estimated strength against other players (Albers & De Vries, 2001). Elo rating is based
on sequential estimations of individual dominance per interaction in gameplay. In order of
preference, participants would have an Elo rating between 800-2000 will be preferred over those
with Elo score under 800. This was to be screened with initial questions of “Do you know your
Elo score”, “is your Elo score between 800-2000”, and “is your Elo score above 2000”. Elo
scores of 2000 and above are rare and such players were not to be considered for this study.
None applied for the study and all who did apply, and qualified themselves, ended up having an
Elo rating between 1400-2000, except for the few that did not have a rating. Generally, scores
between 800-2000 are considered advanced novice to advanced intermediate (Antal, 2013). This
was considered a secondary eligibility criterion to be obtained if sample of volunteers included
enough middle ranked players. Ranking can be formalized though a chess association such as
FIDE (FIDE.com, 2020), but generally players self-identification of score was enough to qualify
for this study.
As Albers and De Vries (2001) point out chess is a game where differing intensities of
aggressive play can suddenly manifest that shift dominance hierarchies rapidly. These
authors remind that a ranking is as well a resource-holding potential gradation, one that style
of opponent’s play and tempo can readily increase or upset. As in all battles, good strategy
seems a question of when to attack. Elo visualizes dominance on a time scale (Antal, 2013).
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Materials/Instrumentation
The instrument used was a semi structured interview schedule based on Interpretative
Phenomenological Analysis to ascertain thematic, linguistic categories of chess players
responses to questions that aimed at revealing data about the research questions (Abayomi,
2017). The Research Questions (RQ) revolved around how chess players perceive their
cognitive strategy choices during game play. The interview protocol was field tested by two
participant matter experts. The interview protocol was developed by reviewing the RQs and
the theoretical sections of this paper (See Appendix B ). Questions were designed to prompt
responses as to gather impressions from chess players as to what skill or mental idea and
processes they associate with strategic formation and choices during game play. The
questions were open ended and allowed for suggestions of possibly more than one cognitive
mechanism they drew on while playing chess. Participants were encouraged to elaborate and
if indicated develop themes that have been proven in the literature to relate to strategic
decision making, through quantitative methods, such as memory and pattern recall, intuition,
ToM skills, empathy, and spatial reasoning. Questions about empathy, intuition, space, and
memory were the primary focus since those were the primary qualities associated in the
literature reviews for chess strategy (Coates, 2013; Colle et al., 2019; Conners & Campitelli,
2014; Guntz et al., 2018). The interview protocol was submitted for approval from three
participant matter experts. Feedback was incorporated in making changes to the construct as
to make sure it most matched the purpose, problem, RQs, and population as stated in those
sections of this paper. The interview protocol was revised based on feedback as warranted.
Participant matter experts were recruited through word of mouth through professors from
Trinity University, in San Antonio, Texas and Northcentral University (See Appendix B).
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Study Procedures
Approval was sought from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) from Northcentral
University. Once approved, the researcher delivered identical flyers (See Appendix A) to
Facebook open Chess Groups (See Appendix D) to recruit potential participants. Permission was
asked to pin up two flyers in closed Facebook groups, and often granted. This included snowball
sampling from emails to subsequent club members. The researcher did receive responses via
email and Facebook direct messaging. During initial contact, after obtaining informed consent
(See Appendix D), the researcher asked a series of screening questions to determine qualification
to participate in this study (See Appendix B). Qualified individuals were then be scheduled for
an interview at designated Zoom times. 9 participants were considered for saturation (Abayomi,
2017). All consents were collected in advanced of interviews. All interviews accounted for
privacy. Interviews were recorded using the video feature of Zoom then transcribed by a private
company with a non-disclosure secured.
These initial series of questions allowed for the researcher to get a general conception
of how these individual participants experienced and described the game. From this point
conflicting ideas and concepts were flushed out. Prompts that help guide the participants, if
they were having difficulty, to connect their own ideas or conflicting concepts to already
described modes or cognitive processes, as the participant has introduced, were explored. If
tangents were left unanswered then modest suggestions were introduced first from the
literature review as to see if thematic matching occurred and then from the research questions
themselves. The researcher did not act as if any ideas are certain, thus most allowing for the
participant’s mind to act independently.
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The researcher kept aware of heightened emotional responses to any concepts or
portions of the interviews, and these ideas were explored in more detailed as long they do not
cross ethical lines. If a participant wished to detail how strategy in chess compares, contrasts,
or developed from some life experience or other strategic situation that was explored within
reason. Participants that consistently described textbook strategy in formal, logical terms that
rest within the framework of ordinarily associated cognitive processes already connected to
chess decision-strategy in the literature were not be deliberately deterred from that line of
thought. This so, up until the point of a contradiction, or emotional or cognitive processes
that indicated by the participant that deviated from standard theory. This in turn explored, but
not beyond the reasonable comfort level of the participant for new ideas that may have
challenged his traditional mode of belief systems.
While interviewing, questions revolved around general concepts or ideas that players
plan or noticed in the middle of play to implement as strategic choice. Follow up questions
revolved around how to describe adapting to unpredictable scenarios, sudden insights to
success strategies, and connecting emotions, perceptions, and cognitive intellectual
awareness’s into portions, patterns, or sequences during any time of gameplay. At any time,
in any interview, if the researcher believed a participant had introduced an emotion, concept,
cognition, or strategy derivation that resonated similarity with another’s participant language,
this was explored for congruencies, depth of process similarities, and further implications. In
such an event that one such emergent theme seemed significant, even if introduced by two
participants alone, the researcher could, but did not, inquire about a second interview with
both participants.
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The voice transcription service Rev.com (Rev.com. 2020) was utilized. Transcriptions
were slightly edited for grammar by the researcher then interviews were sent to the participants
for review once through email. Each interviewee had the right to remove any interview content
but was reminded and encouraged that diverse and honest answers from multiple participants is
what makes a stronger academic study and hopefully this is why they participated in the study
initially. After review, each participant was asked if there are any additional comments they
would like included in their portion of the study and to verify that the transcribed interviews
reflect their actual, lived experience. Only one sent revisions and follow up data. An
endorsement of the interview was gained from each willing participant and any reflections
discerned as relevant to the overall finalizing of each interview process was noted by the
researcher (Abayomi, 2017).
Overall participants did not shape editorial content or analysis of the study. They did not
have access to other participant’s material pre-publication. They did not get informed of any
actual identities of other participants. During the interview process overall impression of what
the group of participants are defining was not shared by the researcher with individual
participants. Each interview kept in mind saturation points (Guest et al., 2006; Rodham et al.,
2015) as themes condensed beyond relevancy, or no new material indicating new themes were
determined to emerge and thus some interviews had differing lengths. This process assisted the
researcher in refraining from overlapping their preconceptions from theory, research questions,
and the literature onto the thematic dialogue the participant was elucidating from his
participative interpretation and experience. It is the participant’s personal and existential account
of the experience that the researcher was attempting to code and catalog. Note taking further
allowed the researcher to bracket when his own ideas, bias, original thinking, speculation,
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connecting of themes, and branching of categories maybe indicated, suggested, or originally
conceived by the researcher through a prompt of the participant, that did not carry the intention
of the new insights (Haahr et al., 2014). Following up questions from this point allowed for
deciphering the degrees of separation between the new thought by the researcher, the intent of
the wording by the participant, and perhaps even something previously suggested by another
participant or the literature itself. A new code or category not intended by the participant could
be prompted inadvertently and explored to fruition during subsequent interviews with other
participants (Hefferson & Rodriquez, 2011).
Data Collection and Analysis
Data was collected by first posting flyers in national Facebook open Chess Groups for
adults who play chess often that wanted to participate in a dissertation paper (See Appendix A).
Informed consent was be gained from 9 participants who qualified for participant criteria (See
Appendix D). Each participant did up to a one-hour semi-structured interview (See Appendix
C).
In data collection through interview, an important point of analysis is interpretation of
tone and rate of speech of both the interviewer and the interviewee. It is not uncommon in
qualitative designs for the researcher to misinterpret based on perception of tone, pitch of voice,
or rapidity of speech (Oliver-Hoyo & Allen, 2005). Clarification of speaking style, meaning, and
intentions could vary between participants as a necessity to qualify for interviewer. In the case
of when the researcher perceived he had asked a question with bias, it was his responsibility to
reframe that communication exchange, as much as possible, to allow for reorientation to
neutrality and objectivity of data collection and analysis. This was done on a few occasions, yet
sometimes inserted a future point of the interview as to allow for full participant exposition. It
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was inevitable that the researcher would consistently be analyzing statements based on his
previous knowledge of the design and literature. Also, there was the awareness of the participant
that increased as to the nature of the study as each interview progressed. This sometimes
progressed as interview questions revealed more about the study, and as the participants perhaps
sensed, or calculated, feelings of bias he perceived from the researcher. This was accounted for
by the researcher when perceived and seemingly generally redirected for. The participant may
have even had their own bias or wish to please the researcher, which was as well accounted for if
sensed. In all such cases it was incumbent on the researcher to redirect the interview to
neutrality and objectivity through techniques of communication, reframing, clarification,
revelation, explanation, consideration, and tact.
Memos were used to note research thoughts as they occurred to the interviewer in
process. Interviews began with open-ended and general questions about chess, strategy, tactics,
sense of the game, and sense of the opponent. More intensive questions followed related to
cognitive processes commonly known during strategy decision-making. Progressively the
researcher asked for detailed description of how the participant experienced any strategic
awareness during chess gameplay. Once saturation occurred, then concluding open-ended
questions were offered.
Coding of transcripts were conducted in the order of interview. These were
accomplished in small batches of 2 or 3 as to allow the researcher to reflect on the overall
process, the quality of the information gathered, and if any adjustment in interview technique,
style, or content maybe warranted. The sense of less is more can be a valued technique in coding
and even for the number of participants for IPA (Reid, 2005). Depth of analyses is more
important than number of participants for quality IPA (Eatough & Smith, 2006; Smith & Osborn,
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2007). Hence 9 participants seemed to prove trustworthy. There should not be too many themes
based on the general cognitive processes outlined and these should give way to synthesis as they
all combine from the one holistic mechanism of the brain thinking and working toward strategic
decision-making. There was a chance a multiplicity of sub-themes (Yardley, 2008), though
generally 2 or 3 occurred under each superordinate theme. Mediating for this involved attention
to four broad principles: sensitivity to context; commitment and rigor; transparency and
coherence; and impact and importance (Yardley, 2008). As well engagement with main themes
by reduction of intertwining voices was a useful interview tool (Hefferon & Gil-Rodriguez,
2011). There was as well the voice given by the researcher, its alignment with his intentions,
what was perceived from the interviewee as the intention of the voice, and anything the
researcher was not able to disguise as bias. Interpretation could happen very quickly. The goal
of finding generalized themes of cognitive processes, overall, argues that idiographic qualitative
research, such as IPA, has much to contribute to our understanding of phenomena, as it can
complement actual claims derived from combined and reviewed quantitative studies through a
focus on the particular which can help illuminate the universal (Warnock, 1987).
The semi structured interview format allowed for member checking to clarify and
validate the interviewer’s interpretation of theme descriptions. Thus, trustworthiness and rigor
was enhanced as the researchers narrowed the interview to specific such as, “are we now talking
about using intuition (or empathy) during the game?” or “are you now describing that seeing the
chessboard in the moment as a spatial whole with various future position possibilities triggers a
different cognitive strategy set of choices, or processes, than seeing where the pieces are sitting
on the board in the moment and fetching a memory from some game that you studied in a book
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or with a teacher?” These questions could be reduced further, or dismissed, depending on
answers from each participant.
It was imagined that themes would both converge and diverge from participant to
participant (Tuffour, 2017). Players experiences, since chess is a game with rules, would
have some general similarities. IPA accounted for this by separating commonalities and
differences into linguistic categories. IPA used the lived experiences of the participant, in this
case chess players, to explain themselves what the concept or event means to them, in this
case strategy in the game of chess. IPA allowed for unexpected connections to be made.
Coding helped reveal those patterns to the researcher.
Granted all data was gained from memory as the event, previous chess play, has
already been experienced in the past. Frequency of play was a factor on how active, most
likely, memories of play were. It was assumed that there were always degrees of inaccuracy
in memory, but there was an element of common sense in distinguishing when someone was
recalling in strong, accurate details or not. This is something the researcher noted and used in
interviews to clarify if he perceived a participant was having a weaker or stronger memory.
Repeated and thorough deep reading of the data, Nvivo 12 analysis, as well as earnest
bracketing of personal preconceptions, allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic themes
(Holroyd, 2001). Any statements derived from contrast and comparison within this method had
sufficient instances of similar coding as to ensure that participants were speaking, or not, of the
same quality of phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Clustering themes that have
alternatively been sorted from emic and etic perspectives seemed to reveal new understanding
as applied to the research questions. Such research could assist in the development of higher-
level theory (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012).
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Bracketing of personal preconceptions, allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic
themes (Holroyd, 2001). Bracketing was effective the more the researcher allowed to set
aside their own predetermined understanding and made coding decisions based on the least
amount of personal bias and judgements as to nature of the game of chess, game competition,
and cognitive processes and their descriptors (Kiikkala & Astedt-Kurki, 2015). In fact,
Hurserl (1970) suggests the researcher attempts to approach the participant as if they never
encountered it before.
Effective bracketing asks the researcher to maintain a high level of self-knowledge,
sensitivity and reflexivity (Kiikkala & Astedt-Kurki, 2015). The researcher was aware of
their personal value system and how that could affect interviewing. If the researcher had a
previous conceptual framework, and even presumed outcome ratios, in mind with effective
bracketing he was then be able to restrain from infiltrating the interview process with
questions, or indicators, that suggested participants answer in a manner that corresponded
with such ideas or personal hopes. Bracketing did not mean the researcher had to hold back
using empathy and enthusiasm during the interview. Authentic expression was sought to be
elicited from the interviewee by good technique of the interviewer.
Kiikkala and Astedt (2015) suggest that interviewers in some ways hold more power
than the participants. Feminist researchers indicate that interviewers at times generate fake
friendships and mutuality in order to elicit trust and data (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005). The
researcher’s assessment of the participant’s educational and social background could
influence his approach, and the delivery of the tone, of each question. The researcher strived
for consistency in approach, content and delivery, tonal or otherwise, of all interview
questions (Haahr, Norlak, & Hall, 2014).
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Overall the researcher’s prior feelings or beliefs about chess needed to be bracketed
during interviews. The researcher attempted, like meditation, a constant inner voice that reset
any bias to more objective and clear modalities of inquiry. The researcher was judicious in
their use of rapport building techniques that relate to joy or enthusiasm. If overused, then the
emotions this elicited could inflate reactions in a manner that distracts from participant’s
personal focus and even accuracy of reporting experience. Chess is so mentally complex,
sometimes near delusional states occur (Coates, 2013). These as well could be like where
Hurserl’s epoche’ occurs (Hurserl, 1970). This due to vast complexity seemingly condensing
into one crucial moment, where decisions must be made and there is a distinct knowledge of
limited understanding. This has been said to translate into an almost hallucinatory unseeing
of the board and pieces as indicted by Coates (2013) and Binet (1966). It is an interestingly
theosophical question if chess players are playing the physics of the pieces, or the geometry of
the board. Binet (1966) states that there are moments of complexity in mental imagining of
possible future moves and their consequences that looking at the chessboard itself becomes a
confusion. Because chess can be discussed in many forms of vocabulary, levels of
understanding, and perceptual styles during the interview process the researcher anticipated
moments of befuddlement, individually and mutually, with and between interviewer and
interviewee. Utilizing standard interview techniques of admitting the confusion, reframing
questions, or moving on to other questions is how such moments were handled on a case-by-
case basis as they may arise.
Coding
Coding allowed for compartmentalizing sets of data in manageable ways. It could also
add meaning. It should have prevented the researcher from placing too much meaning in the
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early parts of the study on any one quality or construct (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This seemed
so. All codes were done by hand through color highlighting word documents of transcripts in the
computer and then these results were input to Nvivo 12, the qualitative analysis computer
program. Coding by hand was followed up with Nvivo 12 coding, after about a two-week break,
to affirm and reorganize themes as needed. IPA methodology was followed through line-by-line
analysis, theme identification, synthesis of data and interviewer interpretation, and then a
comparison of the relationship between themes (Smith et al., 2009).
Nvivo 12 analysis added or affirmed other layers and dimensions to the researcher’s
analysis of emergent themes (Zhao, Li, Ross & Dennis, 2016). Nvivo 12 software could
quickly search text and sort frequencies of similar words and phrases that could indicate
themes chess players return to with some repetition. This allowed for further transparency as
audit trails were maintained. This in turn allowed for the researcher to reflect, define and
substantiate their methodology. Constant comparison of old data and new data was an effective
method of sorting for meaning and relevance (Birks & Mill, 2011; Urquhart, 2013). As
interviews progressed codes were at times revised for cohesion and sense making. When the
codes were refined then saturation of actual themes were more assured (Urguhart, 2013). Coding
line by line was the initial phase of coding where each line of the transcribed interview was
assigned a few words to define the data (Urguhart, 2013). This ensured depth of interpretation
and that themes emerged from the participant interview’s and not outside bias.
Selective coding was a secondary phase when no new codes appeared (Urguhart, 2013).
At this time in analysis core themes became clearer. Codes related at this point to one of the
primary defined cognitive processes from the literature such as spatial calculation, memory
retrieval, pattern recognition, logic, empathy, or intuition. Also, there was a possibility of new or
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combined descriptions of cognitive processes that do not sufficiently match anything from the
literature and may have to be considered independently. This was at times affirmed. Code
names were then revised to best match emerging themes. Periodic cross-analysis of code and
categories helped discern what level of descriptive language and cognitive processes were
matching and being defined. Interviews were analyzed and run in Nvivo 12 in batches of 2 to 3,
thus analyzed before the next batch of interviews took place. This allowed for synthesis of
emergent themes to be on the mind of the researcher as further interviews took place.
Nvivo 12 allowed for repetition of the design using the same software mechanism
other researcher interviews might have been conducted with. Since the researcher’s selection
of themes was recorded by the software, the researcher and others, can assess and replicate
accordingly. This methodological approach to the data was enhanced as the software acted as
if it is a mechanism of analysis with inherent high inter-rater reliability. While the
researcher’s overall abstract impression of the data could offer wide insights, Nvivo 12
offered technical precision that well compliments robust qualitative interpretation.
The final level of coding was theoretical where themes related to cognitive processes
were analyzed and compared to existing or emergent theory based on strength of definition,
quality of description, and frequency (Birks & Mill, 2011; Urquhart, 2013). This was the data
that could begin to explain phenomenon as emergent and perhaps as suggested in the research
questions. This was a process of comparing and contrasting relationships between well-defined
superordinate thematic categories, and between sub-themes within strong categories that
bifurcate, or more, between similar conceptual descriptions. Consistent and constant
comparisons of thematic categories continually discerned if some should be condensed into less,
or more, thematic categories. Analytical justification and researcher reporting on why and when
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such choices were made was an important part of inclusion in the study. These aided as well in
understanding how to repeat the study and how thematic conclusions were ultimately arrived
upon.
Trustworthy and Credible Themes
To ensue coding was trustworthy and credible refined steps were taken. The
researcher then could code from multiple re-readings of each transcript, highlighting,
comparing notations, extracting key wording, and defining codes and thematic categories with
rigorous examination (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). This method allowed for categories of
various cognitive processes as distinct, and as well related to differing perceptual process
choices during chess gameplay. Ultimately, each theme, or perceptual-cognitive process
could be matched to specific brain circuit systems that in turn maybe associated with intuition,
memory, pattern recognition, etc. Beyond that it was possible to design experimental research
that notes how and when these processes create and switch. This in turn could lead to
computer programmers having a better understanding of what sequencing, reaction, and effect
they should be mimicking in their computer coding to simulate artificial intelligence. Overall,
the structural and proximal phenomenon descriptions seemed to have great transferable value
(McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). Coded language did not make it into thematic categories if
reduced by Van Manen’s four levels: research bias, ontological situatedness, concreteness,
and eidetic reduction (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019).
Coding annotations were completed for insights that reveal participants’ perspectives
describing any distinct perception of cognitive processes during chess play. Meaning of
language was formulated into one of the known cognitive processes used during chess, discerned
through numerous experimental designs, or any emergent themes (Nippold, 2009). Primary and
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subordinate themes as discerned were documented paying particular attention to phrasing
indicating awareness of cognitive processes. There was the possibility that the same language
indicated multiple cognitive processes at once. Within reason these were evaluated as of
equivalent percentage per cognitive process of the complete portion of the lived experience and
sequencing if one process started first then led to another. Subsequent codes and categories were
account for what was useful from this level of analysis to avoid overrepresentation or
redundancy.
Saturation was justified when no new emergent themes or perspectives reveal
themselves (Abayomi, 2017). This seemed to begin occurring after the fifth or sixth interview
and definitely seemed to occur after the 7th and 8th interview of the 9 in total. Data was
continually analyzed as it is gathered to insure thus. One threat to trustworthiness that has
some inherent avoidance in a phenomenological study of chess cognitive processes was that
of being accused of analyzing lived experiences that is too philosophical, or even conceptual
or difficult (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). This could have been due to the benefit of so many
concrete quantitative studies of cognitive processes during chess gameplay and the set ruled,
formal nature of the game (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da
Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017).
A profile of meaning-statements (Bartholomew et al., 2019) was best used to analyze
if experience contributes to theory in relation of chess players reports of cognitive processes
as defined by ToM. The research questions provided focus of a concrete phenomenon in
gameplay. Since there were numerous interviews it was incumbent on the researcher to keep
the semi structured interviews within context of the research questions. Both these method
techniques increased credibility and dependability. Referents (Richards, 2015) were extracted
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to compile evidence of specific aspects of cognitive processes being reported by participants.
Finally, a synthesis was obtained from the analysis of extended descriptions.
Trustworthiness was established through prolonged engagement, persistent
observation, triangulation, and referential adequacy (Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln &
Guba, 1985). Rapport building was stressed in each interview. Each participant was asked
the same set of questions with the variation of flexibility based on responses. Participants
were allowed to review data collected, member-checking, and its interpretation during the
interview as inquired or prompted, and after as transcript review. Participants were
increasingly informed of the nature of the inquiry as question narrow, and transcripts are
presented. Thus, through time and eventually in total they could assess if their language
described in specific cognitive process categories or not. They could assert where opinion
overrode experience, theirs or the researchers (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). The essence of this
study was transferability in that chess was used to explore established theories of cognitive
processes and consciousness, simply because thought and being were involved in chess and
no one has yet asked these exact questions of perceptions of cognitive process shifts, though
experimental studies vastly indicate they exist in brainwave changes during play (Powell,
Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana, 2017).
Triangulation was best considered for validating results and procedures to increase
scope, consistency and depth (Flick, 2002). In chess instead of time, space, and person or
purpose, rationality, and content, or even function, space, and time, triangulation for research
questions related to cognition as one of several types of perceptual mechanism: such as
between player, opponent, and board (and/or pieces); sense of self, sense of other, and sense
of game; thinking ahead, seeing something suddenly in the moment, and guessing from
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opponent’s gesture or emotional resonances. These are the measures that captured the
construct containing the themes (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Chess was an intriguing
phenomenological study since its two-player rules are a construct, but also fixed, single and
agreed-upon (Oliver-Hoyo & Allen, 2005).
Any game or experience could be investigated as to its relation to cognitive processes.
Reliability could be assured in that data was not be generalized beyond the sample. All
criteria were intensely, attentively and tentatively, recorded as to how category decisions
arrive. Overlaps and alterations were guarded against, while previously unobserved
categories were distinguished.
Assumptions
A primary assumption of this phenomenological study was that participants had some
degree of thick, rich descriptive language to assert which resembled or defined known cognitive
processes that occur during strategic decision-making (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). It was also
assumed that 9 or more participants, sufficiently fluent in chess, would be found and agree to
interviews (Abayomi, 2017). It was assumed the interviews would progress with the least
amount of bias. It was assumed that themes would be easily coded and defined. It was assumed
that much of the analysis of perceptual strategic mechanism defined in the literature, and in the
exhaustive quantitative studies, were in the main reflect in the linguistic categories discerned
from the interviews. It was assumed that this study would be a worthy endeavor that add to the
literature in a thorough and interesting manner.
Limitations
One major possible limitation of the study, which could not be predicted, was the amount
of rich, thick descriptive vocabulary participants used to describe cognitive processes during
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strategic chess gameplay. This was why the semi-structured interview was chosen as to allow
for the researcher to give prompts toward participants further describing theoretical gaps. This
seemed to work well. Not everyone was equally skilled verbally and equally able to deeply
express some of their cognitive processes in language of their own, though the range of ability
was very high and closer than expected. Participants age might have affected their ability for
thick, rich vocabulary descriptions. Older participants, and higher educated, might have a
stronger command of vocabulary, but not with as much divergence as expected. Self-reporting
was considered as not always accurate, and memory can be erratic (Holroyd, 2001), but
generally the interviews seemed highly trustworthy. Since it might have been a few days since
last time each player played a game of chess, essentially the interviews relied on long-term
memory of overall feelings remembered during gameplay or recalled from recent games,
however frequent or infrequent. Analysis of the data could compare participants with stronger
and weaker memories, without knowing which participants have the stronger memory. The time
constraints of one-hour interviews did allow for teasing out of enough data to show some of the
secondary cognitive processes in strategy formation. Much of the data could be dominated by
dominating cognitive processes that were easier to recall. Something as basic as memory recall
has many operational mechanisms in the brain that were diverse and distinct. Phenomenological
interviews seemed to elucidate upon these primary levels of distinction. Since participants may
not have known what cognitive empathy is, they may not know they use it or how to describe it,
yet when pointed out to them they affirmed this theme. It was possible that the interview
protocols, or researcher questions that follow, may not prompt sufficient delineation between
cognitive processes, but this did not seem to occur.
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Self-reporting experiences often relies on memory of the experience (Abayomi, 2017).
Binet (1966) insists that memories of ideas are implanted, and last much longer, than memories
of sensation, though more modern scholars might dispute this finding as well (Binet, 1966;
Salvaggio, 2018). Still, what is empathy if not an idea, of the other, of implanted and then
removed. It is possible that a chess player who was avid, plays often weekly, would more likely
recall and describe feelings, memories, and ideas more on the top of their mind, but this did not
necessarily seem so as players who did not play as often as well gave thick, rich descriptions of
strategy. Still, chess is a unique sport that players often dwell upon, even as part of their
intellectual identity, so frequent players likely, when discussion was engaged, has a wealth of
sufficient data to speak upon. Securing privacy at chess clubs, at tournament venues or in public
places where the interview is to have sufficient comfort and privacy might have been a
challenge, but this was circumvented by the fact of remote and online Zoom interviews.
Environments did not have to be scouted and pre-planned for appropriateness of privacy.
With a qualitative design there was the risk that thematic categories that seem concrete
may not be (Oizumi et al., 2014). It was possible with language that several participants seem to
be describing the same cognitive quality but are actually referring to mechanisms that are highly
distinct in their operational capacities and usage among brain circuitries. Overall, this did not
seem the case. Theory of Mind itself has a strong establishment in the literature, but there are
some areas where academics disagree of its origins, purpose, and even operational mechanisms.
Hence, while several participants are superficially describing one seemingly equal quality, its
roots, purpose, and cognitive patterning maybe highly diverse. This is possible on some level
and further study to discern such confounding elements could be of interest. The risk of
participants coming from one chess club and share a common philosophy, such as a style of
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strategic memorization of previous game patterns, and may not wish, know how, or want to talk
about other possible strategic cognitive mechanisms that could be at play was avoided by the
sampling through Facebook on a national level. That certain cognitive processes could simply
be suppressed, unused, and unknown to any set of participants is always a possibility.
There were time constraints in that Dissertation process has to be completed within 7
years of beginning, and since the researcher studied online, and at times part time, that timeframe
was approaching limitations which restricted unlimited time to find participants that guaranteed
thick, rich descriptive capabilities. Still such participants seemed to be found. A one-hour
interviews themselves, could have been too short a time to again tease out good data from
participants that have less facility with descriptive language, but this did not seem the case.
Qualitative interviews can only gather ideas through language, unlike experimental design that
precisely measure when aspects of cognition are active empirically in differing regions of the
brain, as measuring during chess game play through sophisticated machinery. Still, thick, rich
descriptions came from the IPA design. The sample of the first participants might have
represented a narrower population than the population of chess players as a whole, though
instead they very much seemed to reflect the dominant characteristics of known chess
demographics. This could have been cause for uniformity of aspects of cognitive descriptions
that a wider population sample might resolve. The researcher ultimately would not know when
this has occurred unless he continuously expanded his study. Hence, generalizing, even to a
wider chess population, much less how cognitive strategy was formed in wider populations as a
whole has its limitations.
Phenomenological interviewing to seek cognitive processes in the brain is not an exact
match of empirical scientific methods with data collection. Still, it has been demonstrated to be a
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needed, and helpful, addition to the research gap that might provide missing indictors for
subsequent quantitative analysis. Coding could have proved difficult to sort for themes.
Language may have been so similar or so diverse that themes are indistinct. The semi-structured
interview seemed to allow for enough prompting that the more sophisticated participants began
to define concepts with language that categories marginal, or recurrent, phrases with more
distinction. Thus, the researcher could justify further segregations of vocabulary. Most
participants seemed to give rich, thick descriptions.
Overall, the limitations were mitigated by what seemed to be a solid interview protocol
that matched the diverse cognitive sets of skills that has been established for strategy formation
and decision-making in chess. Since the chess population in some ways is very uniformed,
generally males who are affiliated with some chess organization, there was a likelihood they
would describe some rich, thick aspect of strategy formation and decision-making. This seemed
so. Even if these matched within these thematic categories of more common cognitive uses there
was validity in this study. Indeed, the literature strongly suggests diverse cognitive processes at
work in chess game play and some of these were reflected in hour long, semi-structured
interviews from the existing interview protocols (See Appendix B) (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2014).
Finally, chess players tend to have higher IQ’s so their ability for descriptions seemed to be
higher than the norm (Coates, 2013).
Delimitations
Delimitations included not guaranteeing Elo ratings of participants be all of a certain
level. This might be desired in some sense, but as mentioned was in part difficult to procure.
Additionally, even if more volunteers came forth, no more than 12 participants would have been
selected for interviews. 12 participants would have completely satisfied saturation (Guest et al.,
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2006; Rodham et al., 2015) and allowed for a first-time phenomenological researcher to focus
intently on the coding. Though tempted, the research did not endeavor a full analysis attempting
to match all cognitive processes as defined as qualities to the counterparts as neural networks in
specific areas and conjunctions of the brain. This was likely limited to the often mentioned
temporoparietal junction as linguistic themes seem to, or not, match the primary functions of this
much discussed area of the brain.
Interviews were limited to a time frame of no longer than one hour. This amount of time
seemed reasonable to be asked of participants. Expectations were of one hour for interviews, but
that much time generally was not needed for perceived saturation. One hour seemed a realistic
estimate for how long it will take to define themes through semi-structured interviews
(Abayomi, 2017). Additionally, interviews sought general perceptions of cognitive awareness
of participant choice processes, and narrowed as suggested by the participant, unless no outlined
theme was identified well into a good portion into the interview. In that case, the well-defined
cognitive process themes in the paper thus far, spatial awareness, ToM skills, and memory were
probed more deeply by initiations from the interviewer (Guest et al., 2006; Rodham et al.,
2015). This aligned with general phenomenological procedures and methods (Pietkiewicz &
Smith, 2014).
Any quantitative designs were ruled out because within chess as related to cognitive
analysis of strategy, this because many of these designs have been accomplished with larger
participant pools and complex technical equipment. In qualitative design, narrative design was
considered too limiting to answer the specific research questions. This research focused on
reduction of language to themes within cognitive mechanisms. Grounded theory was not used
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because elaborating or suggesting theory is a larger goal of this research and phenomenological
approaches offer a better thematic outline to build from.
These measures ensured that the framework of this qualitative study was flexible enough
to get good data for the research questions and allow for some appropriate deviations from
established literature. The researcher could reframe questions if participants veered away from
the established literature in manners that did not indicate relevant content to the study as
rigorously defined. The privacy of the interview and ethical assurances allowed for participants
to speak freely in a safe space regarding their own lived experiences in choosing chess strategy
and since they are fans of chess, the likelihood of delving in depth as to the cognitive processes
they used while playing chess indicated the experience of the interviews to likely be more
enjoyable than threatening, such in contrast as if the purpose of the interview was to ask about
private sexual behaviors. The interviewer endeavored to tailor the language of the follow up
questions roughly to the intellectual style of the participants as to not threaten them with the
sense that these protocols are somehow measuring and comparing their specific intelligence
levels.
Ethical Assurances
Previous to any data collection, the study gained approval of Northcentral University’s
Review Board (IRB), which was standard procedure for all quantitative and qualitative studies
using human participants. Any risk to participants was minimal. Any complications or ill
feelings that participants experience during qualitative interviews had immediate remedies
available. Confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy was protected by following National
Commission for the Protection of Human participants of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(NCPHSSBBR) guidelines (NCPHSSBBR, 1979). All participants names have been changed to
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coded identification like participant 1 (S1). All interviews were performed on password
protected devices that were set to activated. Transcripts were delivered through password
protected formats. No other person had the ability to gain access to the computer that stored
dissertation documentation and notes, other than the researcher himself. All participants were
volunteers, who will sign a written consent to participate fully in the study (See Appendix E).
Privacy and confidentiality rights and laws were discussed and signed off on (See Appendix E).
Participants were informed before their participation that they could drop out of the study at any
time. See consent forms (See Appendix D). All follow up communication and emails were held
in confidence and as applicable password protected.
The researcher protocols were as follows: all potential participants were given
researcher’s contact information. Any concerns that were existing, or were discovered during
interview process or felt afterwards, allowed for the participant to contact the researcher, by
cellphone or email to address as suggested by researcher. Interviews were recorded and
transcribed, thus allowing participants a later opportunity to review and comment, or even raise
objections (Abayomi, 2017). The researcher made all efforts of understanding and
communicating with speech as to elicit a genuine, non-contrived or coerced, response from
participants during interview. The researcher refrained from putting knowledge or inflection in
interview questions that would indicate his own bias. This method should be sufficient to
provide thematic categories from the interviews related to the purpose of the study.
All prompted responses were within reasonable framework of the intention in the
problem and purpose of the study, and not be deliberately confusion, or have anything to do with
coercion or other habits of speech which can cause psychological harm. Prompts were generally
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simplified to bring forth further aspects of the story that the interviewee is already attempting to
outline. These processes were consistent throughout the interviews.
The study had some effective boundaries as participants were at least semi-frequent
players of chess. The interview environment was private and controlled, a room where one
researcher will be repeated the same interview protocol to all participants. The interview was not
seeking information outside of the theme of cognitive processes used during chess game play to
form and execute strategy. The researcher was not introducing chess to participants for the first
time and asking them how it made them feel or think. The reviewed literature all pertained to
aspects of cognition and strategy in some form.
Summary
A qualitative, IPA, study was be conducted to investigate how adult chess players,
who play frequently, describe their sense of strategy formulation and use during game play. 9
participants, who play chess one a month at least for the last three months, were administered
one-hour semi-structured interviews (See Appendix B). Participants were recruited by flyer
and snowball methodology from Facebook chess groups. Recorded interviews were
transcribed by Rev.com (Rev.com, 2020), and member checked. Transcribed data was coded,
and run through Nvivo 12, and separated into linguistics themes that most closely matched the
various cognitive qualities that were measured in the literature review and outlined by the
research questions. Trustworthiness, assumptions/limitations/delimitations, ethical issues
were checked and accounted for.
Each qualitative interview was analyzed for specific themes that matched the research
questions and/or the theoretical literature review. There were many suggestions in the
literature of cognitive processes used during chess game play. Grouping the linguistic themes
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of their cognitive processes from the words describing the lived experience of the chess
players was the goal of this study. It was possible that new or newly found conjoint themes
were revealed. An open-minded analysis of the interviews provided thick, rich data that
added to the overall literature. IPA allowed for interpretation of themes and if there were
suggestions of new cognitive combination during strategy formation in chess play. As well
chess, being a complex and multilayered game that often lives in the imaginations of players
as metaphor, or game recall, due to its unique rules of play, culture, and history (Coates,
2013; Sillman, 1998) provided a strong sample to develop linguistic themes.
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Chapter 4: Findings
The Purpose of this qualitative phenomenological study was to investigate the gap in
descriptive narratives of chess players as to their perceptions of what influences tactical and
strategic moves. Data were analyzed with the qualitative software program Nvivo12. Chapter
4 presents findings that generated from collected data from 9 experienced chess players who
met inclusion criteria of being 18 years of age or older, from the United States, can complete
one-hour interview in English, and have had played chess at least once per month for prior
last three months consecutively. The means by which the trustworthiness of this study was
established will be reviewed, then results of thematic data analysis will be discussed by
Research Question. By researcher emersion into the transcriptions definitive themes were
coded. Saturations was presumed to be found as evident by the completion of the interviews
(Abayomi, 2017).
Trustworthiness of the Data
Trustworthiness of data was ensured by rigorous data collection that was consistently
applied during the gathering of semi-structured interviews (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019).
Saturation allowed for descriptive validity and confirmation of how chess players experience
the game of chess (Abayomi, 2017). Member checking of transcriptions was offered to all nine
participants, while only one sent back a partially revised transcript (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019).
Saturation of the themes of spatial understanding, intuition, empathy, and memory recall, all
prominent in the literature promised that transferability (Smith et al., 2009) was highly likely
with continued interview sampling from a wider population active chess player that met the
study criteria. A methodical approach of following the interview protocols until themes revealed
themselves most clearly and then narrowing questions to specific participant interpretation of the
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four prominent themes was effective. The themes proved dependable as they well matched the
cognitive processes of chess strategy decision making well outlined in the literature (Guntz,
Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, &
Thomaz, 2017).
Thick-rich descriptions of intuition, empathy, spatial understanding, and memory recall
consistently appeared in participant elaborations of how they described their thinking and
conceptual framework during chess gameplay. Participants overarchingly were fiercely
independent thinkers, loyal to almost a chess purism and competitive spirit that confirmed a
strong lack of bias or being swayed by any interviewer expectations. The researcher used strict
sensitivity to adjust for reactions of interviewees to phenomenon that seemed to swat outside the
scope and intent of pure data collection through semi-structured interview process. For instance,
at times during interviews their tones or line of response bordered on the sarcastic, a few times
asking if the researcher played chess (at all). The language they developed, though sometimes
too technical for interpretation, was in depth and robust. For instance, participant 4 bluntly
states, and often echoed by other players, “I mean, with weaker players, you can go with more
aggressive strategies.” Participant 9 on defending his experience:
Probably somebody with not so much experience wouldn’t have that intuition or instinct,
(they are the same right – the way that you are defining them), but once you played 60
years or something like that, so 50, 60 years. So, let’s see, I’ll tell you when I started
playing. I started playing when I was about 12 years old and you know I’m 64 years old.
So, there’s 52 years right there
And participant 9 on opponents, “(sometimes) you know they made a mistake and they’re
about to crumble” and “you’re just waiting for them to throw in the towel.”
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Participant 1, “(Intuitive players) create issues and that is what tests your mettle because
now you are on your own.”
Participant 1:
you are seeing is the worlds collide and so, so the aggressive player versus positional
players or if they are much better than you, then you already realize that they consistently
picked the best move and even though you, you may only pick uh, a, an inferior move
twice and at higher levels of chess that is enough to do you in
And Participant 1 with a phone booth fighting analogy:
chew up more of the board, then that gives you more attacking possibilities and to play
cramped is to try to fight for the opponent, is to try to fight in a phone booth compared to
you being outside of that phone booth to be able to punch in (and) he has got a sword out,
thrusting it at my throat
Participant 5 with an example of technical chess talk:
I'm playing a Queen's Gambit. I have an isolated pawn. What does that mean? I'm
playing an e-4, my opponent plays a French. Okay, now it's e-4, d-4. We're stacked up
here on the left-hand side. So, we have this pawn structure that is going to kind of
determine where all of the pieces are going to be going (and) Well, the opponent can
berserk, which means that they play... I'm not trying to, I mean, I'm sure you're an
intelligent person here and all that. I'm not trying to over explain something to you, right?
Participant 6 indicates some feelings associated with losing and winning:
Playing moves that are a little bit more aggressive, sometimes playing a move that you
realize can be punished, but you think might not be. So, I was playing a game in
Memphis where I was forced into it, because I was losing the game. And so, I played a
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move that I knew was bad, but there was a trap built in. And my opponent fell for it and I
won (and) I’m trying not to get blown off the board (and) But I feel like in most games,
there’s a mental thing of, “I’m the better player, I’m the worst player.” (and) Sometimes,
especially when you're playing a weaker player, you'll basically, I was going to say,
"Give them some rope." That's probably not a politically correct term anymore. But you
know what I mean. Give them a chance to make a mistake, right?
Participants 5, “You can exploit people.”
Participant 7 with some technical chess talk:
they have a knight on F3, a bishop on D3 and your queen stays on D1, and your opponent
just castled king side, and there is no knight on F6 defending the pawn on H7. I was
trying to describe a particular situation when you can deliver a tactical motif that can lead
to checkmate. So, you can create a sacrifice there. You just play bishop check on the H7.
The queen takes, knight's check, the kings comes back, the queen H5
And finally, participant 8 on feelings toward strategic risks in chess:
I mean, we all want to be Mikhail Tal like everybody wants to be Elvis. We all want to be
Mikhail Tal but that's very dangerous because we can't all be Mikhail Tal. But we all
have that in us, maybe 30% of you wants to... And sometimes I'll just do it because if I
don't do it, I'll hate myself. Because I'm like, "You have this opportunity, you can attack,
you should do this." Now maybe that's a personality thing (and) So that's Carlsen, this
whole top 10 generation, Ding, Aronian, Vachier-Lagrave, all these guys, Nakamura, this
is like the apex predator result of technology, of databases, of coaching, of everything
available to them
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Overall prolonged engagement with participant transcripts by the researcher, persistent
observation of the data and data collection processes, triangulation, and ensuring referential
adequacy enhanced trustworthiness of this study. Data was not generalized beyond the sample
and thematic category determinations were well documented and reflect accurately participant
reactions to interview questions.
Triangulation. Triangulation was further by interviewer process of refining protocol
questions to match the overall level of understanding of each participant, the researcher’s
comprehensive understanding of the similarities in thematic language used between participants,
level of depth of participant description, and an intuitive sense of what approach would most
elicit thick, rich descriptions from individual participants (Arksey & Knight, 1999). Further an
approach of moderation of perception was sought by the interviewer, this in that is as some
participants seemed to think the researcher knew little of chess, the intensity of follow up
questions would be given as to achieve more perceived knowledge parity on chess between
participant and interviewer. This process helped serve as accurate bracketing of interviewer bias
(Holroyd, 2001). Conversely when the participants seemed to wonder, even feel threatened, that
the researcher had superior chess knowledge the interview protocols were modified to match
what it seemed like the participant most would feel fulfilled and confident in describing based on
their experience of the chess gameplay. Overall, this dynamic was managed well by the
interviewer and successful interviews were gained. Less than half of the participants though
filled out the demographic questionnaire, even on second prompts. Still, triangulation was
furthered by collection of robust meaning-statements (Bartholomew et al., 2019) that reflected
theory from existing literature. Referents were extracted to compile evidence that participants
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were speaking directly of cognitive processes of strategic decision-making that was well-
developed in the literature.
Coding and Recoding. Coding was done by hand after close read of the participant
transcripts (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Codes were input into Nvivo12 for analysis and
confirmation that clustered themes were distinct. As superordinate themes and sub-theme
further distinguished themselves under the headings of each research question three more
layers of recoding was performed. These included reviewing transcripts again to ensure all
superordinate themes and sub-theme were fully developed in the results section of Chapter 4.
Participant perspectives as related to themes and research questions were again reviewed to
ensure clustered themes were distinct from each other and reflected accurate constructs from
the literature. Specific phrases and portions of matching language were identified and
developed to create robust thematic categories.
Discerning Collected Data and Prior Literature. It is possible that some participants
derived strategy from access of the spatial assessment and language specialization inherent in the
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as there was a distinct difference between participants who
allowed for interpretations of the opponent’s manner and those who strictly played by chess
theory, or playing the board, not the person (Saxe, 2003). Further study of how opponent body
positioning affects perception of spatial awareness on the gameboard would be of interest. One
caution that came up from several participants is the fear of seeing “ghosts” or rather inferring
too great a foresight and strategy skill plan of an opponent and thus overthinking the current
strategic state of any given chess game. Powell et. al. (2017) did find that spatial problems,
active TPJ and ToM functions, did activate empathy during chess strategic decision-making.
Additionally, chess and ToM were found to inhibit one’s own awareness of self to evaluate the
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state of other and visual awareness of action, thus as well increased TPJ activation (Hironaga et
al., 2017). One aspect of the interviews that could develop further, and may not have been
answered, is at what point in game play certain memories are activated that relate to strategic
choice. The interviewer got the sense that the conversation about chess strategy was taking place
in the present time as reflecting of qualities and theory of chess, and not necessarily reliving
chess experience with the feeling of living in the past game play and talking about it. The
synchronic elements of participant language provided a sense of consistency, even when the
language itself differed to degree.
Study Planning. Factors were considered to increase credibility in that language was
derived directly from the participant’s lived experience regarding formation and implementation
of strategy during chess gameplay (Bartholomew et al., 2019). Data was reported in detail thus
fostering methodical coherence (Morse et al., 2002). Data was triangulated by multiple review
of each of the sources through a rigorous close read of participant transcripts for thematic content
that matched themes developed from the literature review (Padgett, 2016). Interviews were
gathered over a eleven week period and interview protocols updated as a comprehensive sense of
participants meaning-statements and descriptive narrative was formed. Theoretical triangulation
was based on extensive literature review of ToM, game theory, and various theories of memory.
Analysis and Recording Method. IPA allows for theoretical transferability (Smith et
al., 2009) which was achieved through matching extensive descriptions of cognitive processes
that were found to exist through quantitative analysis of strategic methods during chess and other
competitive activities. Since specific brain mechanisms were outlined the general sense of
cognitive processes used by chess players should match processes used in other strategic
endeavors. Dependability seemed established in that thematic and linguistic content from
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participant interviews seemed to achieved saturation and thus similar results could be expected
from wider samples of similar populations (Anney, 2014). That codes were reflected to directly
correspond to direct questions increases dependability about specific cognitive processes during
chess game play, or the interviewer’s sense of the participant reference point regarding the
research questions based on overall reaction to specific questions from the interview protocols.
Results are thoroughly documented thus adding to confirmability and replication of study
(Anney, 2014). Since extensive theory was generated in the literature review interview protocols
generally allowed for interviewer perspective to inform semi-structured format. Questions that
allow for participant to elaborate on established themes are readily outlined in interview
protocols and should allow for easy replication from subsequent researchers. IPA allows for
researcher interpretation and since participant content was a mixture of unique metaphors and
established chess theory language, then the interviewer expertise in the participant area was
needed to tease out more subtle definitions alternating between the two (Smith & Osborn, 2015).
IPA allows for fluid creation and interpretation of data as interviews progress between
researcher and participant and then further compound and adjust with each subsequent
participant interview (Smith & Osborn, 2015). The researcher focused his self-awareness
primarily on the reactions and content of the participant as they interpreted the interview in the
moment and as a whole. It was helpful to indicate to the participants that the researcher shared
an interest, and at times a passion, for chess. Allowing the participant to be the expert in chess
was helpful, and in most all cases seemed to be the fact that each participant had much more
chess experience than the interviewer, still putting the participant at ease about a game that
supposedly measured intellect and includes a lot of pride with definitive hierarchy rankings, was
a constant readjustment during interviews. Sometimes this was corrected for by re-balancing the
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interview to a more neutral point or summarizes several qualities the participant had strongly
defined this allowing the participant to expand the data into new directions. This gave the
additional benefit of adding synthesis to thematic categories that were indicated by more than
one participant as somehow linked or interdependent (Smith et at., 2012).
IPA method of analysis were followed such as line by line analysis of data, identification
of themes and patterns, synthesizing data and researcher intuition or prior knowledge, and
interrelatedness of themes (Smith & Osborn, 2015). During line review of interview transcripts
rich descriptions that revealed lived experience of cognitive qualities known to be active during
chess from prior study in the literature were color coded and as well input into Nvivo12 for
computerized analysis (Coates, 2013; Smith et al., 2009). Not all lines were coded. There
seemed a distinct relevance to some language as to be connected, defining, or interpreting the
prior data from the literature as to have the cognitive qualities were defined and activated.
Sometimes participants answers were irrelevant due to anecdotal experiences of prior chess play
or chess culture, or tactical descriptions of specific pieces movements that could not be
associated with a cognitive style of thinking. The synthesis of participant data and researcher
interpretation, due to the heavy influence of a strong literature review, seemed to match and code
themes with a pleasant precision that became more familiar as the interviews were conducted. It
was fairly clear when a cognitive theme was being developed by differing participants even
when their language did not match exactly, though perhaps through a few key words. The
contained nature of the rules of chess may have added to this perceived dynamic (Coates, 2013).
Overall, a deep sense of the themes and matching language was gained from the combined
interview data and interpretation.
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Bias and Coding. Effort was needed to distinguish impression participants gave
between their beliefs about chess itself as a strategy game and their interpretations of new
concepts like Theory of Mind’s cognitive empathy. This process generally seemed too to relate
to participants desire to be seen as a chess purist, not be judged on demographic data, and to
retain some position of expertise based solely on the interviewer’s perception of them as chess
strategists and not being fixed in a perceived social content. Interestingly, this seemed like a
variation on Hurresl’s desire for approaching the participant for the first time as if never
encountered before yet initiated by the participant themselves and not the researcher who
matched their pace of information revelation. Indeed, in aspect, it seemed like a contest at times
between abilities of researcher and participant on who can use most effectively Theory of Mind
skills to infer other’s beliefs, intents, desires, and knowledge (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), this
until trust was deepened into the interview as alliances of common appreciation of chess and
participant experience were firmly affirmed by the interviewer’s tone, manner, and style of
follow up questioning. Raphael (2011) proposition of chess as a technical resource able to
analyze social dimensions of human affairs was often a distinct feeling of the competitive aspects
of the interviews. This sense did shift when aspects of pure strategy were discussed, and
opponents moves were seen as independent of their personality features. The presumed need of
the other being to pick a winning strategy and not display some operant context of self.
Results
The study interviewed 9 chess players to assess their verbal and thematic categorization
of perception of cognitive mechanism utilized to form and implement strategy during game play.
Potential themes were researched through extensive literature review. Often these themes were
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generated from quantitative studies, and the literature indicated there would be benefit to
additional data collected qualitatively. An IPA design was utilized for this study.
Participants included professors, chess teachers, business owners, college students,
research scientists, and chess club members. Of the nine participants, six had formal Elo chess
rankings ranging from 1500 to 1900. All met the criteria of being 18 years of age or older,
ability to complete a one-hour interview, and having played chess for at least one time per month
for the last three months. Each had superlative communication skills in English. All were male.
At least three distinct ethnic groups were represented; these being Anglo-American, Hispanic-
American, and Middle Eastern American. Ages ranged from 20’s to 60’s, and several had or
were pursuing advanced degrees.
Participants represented at least three ethnicities, these being Middle Eastern American,
Hispanic-American, and Anglo-American. Most had an official Elo rating. All were
intermediate to high-intermediate level players. Most had studied chess from books, and few
from teachers. Several were tournament players, and two were chess coaches. All were male
and ranged in age from their 20’s to their 60’s. Most affirmed belief in more than one cognitive
strategy active during various stages of his chess strategic selection. All were white collar
professions seemingly middle class or higher having consistently described advanced education,
professional occupations, and leisure class attitudes to chess learning and participation such as
having been to chess camp or hiring a private chess tutor. Overall, they represented the primary
demographic of chess players in the United States. All seemed intellectual and some were
academics and scientists. Most had played chess for many years, but one was new to the game
after having been absorbed by the video game world for many years. One had a coach that was
at the International Master level of play.
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The results section includes the four thematic codes, their places of synthesis and
interdependence, the content of specific interviews, and indications of style and flavor of
thinking of individual participants. Zoom interviews proved effective for gaining data and
interpreting reactions of individual participants in the moment during interview processes. Zoom
created a familiarity and objectivity that both researcher and participant seemed comfortable
with. Again, given the competitive nature of chess players, in some ways it seemed the ideal
“distance” to challenge participants and allow participants to challenge the researcher, as
occurred frequently in interviews over micro-definitions and possible conclusions of cognitive
awareness’s. It seemed the study benefited overall from being able to interview participants
from all parts of the United States as well. Results benefit from IPA encouragement to include
direct quotes from participants as to insure validity of emergent themes (Finlay, 2011). Readers
will get a sense of the individual participants from their unique framing of language in response
to repetitive cognitive themes presented between participants by the interviewer. There were
some slight imperfections in transcription through (Rev, 2020) though these were adjusted after
interviews by the researcher and were mostly obvious fixes of grammar though some blanks
spots remained in a few transcripts. Only one participant, a research scientist, did a member
check with detailed revisions, which as well included a synopsis (as well included in this paper)
of what intuition might mean in chess strategy.
Ranges of frequency had some distinct variations. Codes for empathy in the nine
participant interviews ranged from 0 to 8, with a mean of 3.1, codes for intuition ranged from 1
to 13, with a mean of 6.9, codes for memory recall ranged from 2 to 13, with a mean of 6.9, and
codes for spatial understanding ranged from 2 to 15, with a mean of 7.2. There was a total of 28
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codes for empathy, 62 codes for intuition, 62 codes for memory recall, and 64 codes for spatial
understanding.
Researcher interview technique generally allowed for passive reception of interviewee
elaborations. This, along with one risk defined in the informed consent left the researcher with
the impression that most, possible all, participants had some suspicions that the study contained a
“trick” where the research was actually looking for another construct than the one stated. This in
part seemed inevitable due to the perception that those seriously involved in chess culture are
highly competitive and distrustful of qualities that can contribute to a game loss, including on
psychological levels (Coates, 2013). The implication that one possible risk, stated in the
informed consent, was a loss of self-esteem due to possible lack of linguistic skill and chess
comprehension to described in thick, rich detail complex cognitive processes known to be
involved in chess strategy formation and implementation. This sense of suspicion was evident
from the first interview, and in each subsequent interview, and instead of changing the verbiage
in the informed consent was used as a tool for the researcher to build trust and authenticity
during the progression of the interviews.
Eventually in each interview it became evident to the participants that indeed the
questions were about gathering data for descriptions of cognitive processes used during chess
strategy decision making. The researcher even got a sense that the initial defensiveness worked
in favor of getting deep responses from participants in that they felt challenged to put forth a
strong point of view. Another interesting observation was that well over half the participants at
one point or another in the interview asked if the researcher had any experience playing chess.
Though many of the participants were likely higher skilled, and more experienced to
degree, than the researcher in chess it seemed that this assumption related more to the
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effectiveness of the researcher’s passive approach to allowing for the minimal prompts to then
elicit participant, in depth answers. This akin to Hurserl’s pretending the researcher is from
Mars and never having known the participant (1970). After this phase of each interview the
researcher often pressed for more complex definitions establishing his own expertise in the
participant area. Each interview had some sense of the competitiveness of a chess game where
each player initially does not know the skill level of the opponent. The results made for
satisfactorily coded, and saturated themes.
Negotiating ongoing feedback loops (Richards, 2009) became a skill used by the
interviewer by tailoring the interview protocols to the style and content of each participant’s
initial, free form, elaborations. Often participants were verbose, and at times the researcher had
to redirect. Several times, often when questions of memory recall or spatial understanding came
up, participants delved into dense, complex, move by move, strategy that was known from chess
lore and included encrypted notation for game piece movement. Often the researcher was lost by
this detail and waited until an opportunity arose to engage the participant in more common
language.
The progression of interviews became more effective as the initial protocols were
curtailed or summarized and the participant was allowed to freely elaborate without much
descriptive prompting as to what the cognitive process the research was seeking to define. The
exception to this being cognitive empathy, from Theory of Mind, which most often had to be
explained in rough detail by the researcher before the participant could delve into the matter.
Once introduced cognitive empathy at times reoccurred without prompting at later points of
interview from its first being established as a valid cognitive process in chess strategy decision
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making. Some memoing assisted the researcher in keeping track of variations during and in
between interviews (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012).
Researchquestion 1. What is the experience of cognitive empathy for chess players
during game play? Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy emerged
from analysis of interview questions as a valid cognitive mechanism, and theme, chess player
was aware of, this from questions like “Do you ever get a sense of your opponent’s inner world?
- as if you understand something about his conception of strategy intuitively”, “If you access
your opponent’s inner world somehow, does how you access your opponent’s inner world, their
ideas of chess strategy, determine which strategy you choose?”, “What feelings or thoughts
about yourself, the game, or your opponent make you shift strategies, if you do shift strategies
during gameplay?”, “What natural skills or ways of knowing, or thinking do you use during
gameplay to pick strategy?, and “Do you feel like you use intuition or empathy for strategic
choice, if so which one or both, and how do they differ from each other? If you do use it, does
using intuition or empathy mean you have made a conscious choice to use those strategic
methods as opposed to reason, pattern recognition, or memory recall.” And when needed
cognitive empathy was defined to the participants by the researcher as a feeling or knowing what
the opponent believes about the strategy in the chess game, or what they desire to use as strategy
by reading something about this opponent’s feelings or beliefs and thus giving you an advantage
over this opponent.
Some participants denied any association with cognitive empathy as a process used to
determined chess strategy. Others, after being prompted by a definition of cognitive empathy,
elaborated various levels of engagement with this quality sporadically during gameplay. A few,
often those who reported high use of intuition, were most akin to the use and description of
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cognitive empathy during strategy decision-making as adjacent or distinct from intuition, and
some memory recall and spatial understanding.
While intuition, memory recall, and spatial understanding had code frequency that was
similar, cognitive empathy was referenced less than half as often as these other thematic and
cognitive qualities. Some participants questioned the definition of empathy as contrasted
between feeling care for another’s feelings until it was explained by the researcher that cognitive
empathy, in Theory of Mind, related to a certain knowing of another’s intents and beliefs. A few
times this quality was considered by participants to be very similar to intuition, but most often
intuition defined itself by participants as a separate quality related to an overall apprehension of
the strategy situation in a particular chess game that transcended either memory recall or spatial
understanding. Sometimes intuition was seen as an extension of memory recall and/or spatial
understanding.
Sub-Theme 1: Empathy Assessment - There is a way in one can read and interpret an
opponent’s inner beliefs. This theme was supported by interview data from 8 of the 9
participants. Participant 7 mentions empathy as reading gestures in opponents:
So, you're reading, at times you're reading the immediate emotional reaction in the face
of the opponent. At the same time, you're reading the board to know where the possible
game is headed based on both...
While participant 8 matched the interviewer’s given definition of empathy as assessing
your opponent’s inner world and related the ability to do so as increasing with higher level chess
players:
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Well, yes, I think we're always accessing our opponent’s inner world. If you can't access
your opponent’s inner world, you're in big trouble. And very often that's why you see
such lopsided results, like let's say a grand master versus an amateur.
Here participant 8 speaks of empathy but associated with a type of cognitive
reasoning:
Okay. Well then, yes, absolutely. That's why chess is not easy because you have to think
for yourself and you have to put yourself in that person's shoes. What do they want? Why
did they make this move? I know what they want, they want to beat me, they want to
checkmate me or take all my stuff and make me resign. So, I know what they want, now
what? Does this move serve that purpose? And that's the difference between good players
and weak players, good players, their moves serve a purpose, usually multifunctional,
more than one. Or sometimes just one, direct attack against the King, sacrifice the
exchange, open up the King's side, attack.
A few definitions of empathy included asking why an opponent is making their choice in
moves. These came from interviewer prompts on cognitive empathy but seemed overall less
satisfactorily to match what cognitive empathy might mean. The interviewer attempted to code
for words, even if it meant partial phrases from whole sentences, that seemed to reflect, and be
drawn from their definite rumination in the moment on that cognitive quality asked to be defined.
Participant 6 defined empathy as an imagined conception of the opponent’s personality:
It's one of those things where every person you see, you want to pigeonhole them in some
category, right? You want to look at your opponent and figure out what player you think
they are, right? And assume they're going along with your imagined personality of them.
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He went on to describe this condition as being a steady state awareness maintained
throughout a game once it is surmised, again broken down as most participants often did between
strong and weak players:
“But I feel like in most games, there's a mental thing of, "I'm the better player, I'm the
worst player."
Sub-Theme 2: Conscious Denial of Empathy. This sub-theme was support by 1 of 9
participants. Participant 9 also paralleled the strict definition of cognitive empathy as something
he is aware of, intentions, but does not heed it for strategy decision making:
“I may have had a slight feeling of what their intentions are, but usually I don't concern
myself with their intentions or their feelings or thoughts.”
And:
“I kind of turn myself off to their feelings… I personally try to keep my feelings out of it
and try to be logical.”
Researchquestion 2. How do chess players use various cognitive processes such as
Theory of Mind, Spatial assessment, and memory to formulate strategy during game play?
Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy emerged from analysis of
interview questions as a theme from questions like “Do you feel like you have a specific strategy
or sets of strategies you use while playing chess?”, “What are the key concepts, method, ways
you pick a strategy before or during gameplay?”, “Has your impression of strategy changed as
you aged?”
Connections between spatial assessment and cognitive empathy emerged as a theme
through analysis of interviews questions such as “Are there any uncommon strategies or
cognitive processes that you use or felt others have used when they play chess against you?” “If
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you have an awareness of it, how would you describe spatial relation and assessment of spatial
areas and possibilities as related to strategic choice in chess between you and your opponents?”
“Do you ever feel strong shifts in awareness of who is in a superior position during gameplay,
and thus how to change, if you do, your calculations of the game, and what perhaps led to that
point and what perhaps you could use a strategy from that point?”.
Overall, memory recall a face value seemed the dominant mode coded as a cognitive
process used during chess gameplay. This not in code frequency, but more so in length of
descriptions and reliance as a primary tool in the chess player’s cognitive arsenal to be verified
and relied upon during gameplay. Since much of chess is capable of being studied through
patterns learned in books, memory recall was an obvious skill source. Spatial understanding
seemed to divert, not in frequency of mentions, but in length of description and as well-being
more personalized in understanding to each participant. The language repeated less, such as
where anything that was not memory recall was often called by several participants “going out of
book” – spatial understanding felt more nebulous, like intuition, where it at times functioned as a
conceptual overlay, intuitively grasped, and other times as a concrete form of positional piece
analysis.
Memory recall was generally equated to learned chess strategies from books or
experiences. Specifically, it was often mentioned as the cognitive process used in the opening of
a game when the first series of moves set up predictable patterns and positioning of pieces on the
gameboard. Spatial understanding defined itself in participant descriptions as formations of
pieces on the chess board being strong or weak, familiar or unfamiliar, and where individual or
combinations of pieces could end up based on movement capacities and relationships to the rest,
or partial sets of pieces on the board. All these definitions closely matched what was outlined in
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the literature. Three coding categories were added due to thematic overlaps. These being
language that at once seemed to be describing intuition and memory recall, then spatial
understanding and memory recall, and finally intuition and spatial understanding. There were as
well several times that intuition code overlapped with empathy, but not enough to create a
separate color coordinated code. Overall intuition overlapped with the most frequency in codes
of the other three thematic categories.
Sub-Theme 1: Memory is Primary. This superordinate theme was validated by 9 of 9
participants. Memory recall is often the primary understood source of strategy formation for
chess players. Often memory recall was defined by participants as a form of calculation often
based on prior study of chess strategy. This statement by participant 7 seems to account for
memory of patterns and some spatial awareness of how interacting movements coordinate
differing strategic futures:
For example, something that I'm very aware of. It's the position of the piece in the
particular position. And when I start doing some calculations, for example, "Okay, pawn
takes pawn, and rook takes..." and so on, the position transforms somehow. And you need
to understand if all this change in the position will lead to an advantage or that position,
the transformation of the position would be bad for me when I'm playing.
Participant 5 discusses the role of memory recall for strategic decision making as often,
from account of multiple participants, related to the opening portion of a chess game:
I believe that the opening is fairly heavy upon memory, right? My opponent is playing
this particular move here. Okay, what's the theory on this? What's the actual play that
needs to be done here, that sort of thing and so I think that the opening kind of consists a
little bit more of memory. The endgame has some memory in the idea that very often
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you'll come to a situation where you're like, okay, "This is my rook and pawn versus rook
ending here. What exactly do I want to be doing at this point? How is it that I can work it
out?"
And again participant 5 elaborates on the role of memory:
I've got some time to think. I got some time to consider. I can play my opening kind of
quickly because I played it before. It's a memory sort of thing. He does this, I do this. He
does this. I do this. That you get it sort of set up there.
Participant 4 discusses memory as related to the tactical strategy of piece sacrifice and
defense:
Well, a sacrifice is when you give up a piece or compensation. It doesn't have to be
immediate. It could be long-term, or it can be immediate. I've seen some opponents
sacrifice their pieces against me and it ended up not working because I calculated the
sacrifice before they've done it.
Participant 2 defines memory recall as calculating the pieces on the board in opposition to
playing the awareness level of the opponent:
“never been one to try to play my opponent”
And:
“playing to some key fundamentals”
And:
“opening, and you're like, "Crap. I forgot which line I should do now." Yes. Memory is
definitely huge in this. But I don't know how to describe it though.”
And that memory is:
“It's just a high chess intelligence”
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Participant 8 refers to the concept of a checklist mentality, referenced as well by other
participants, as a form of memory and strategic calculation based on summation of game
knowledge:
But I try to start with the most concrete first, so there's a certain hierarchy and structure
of whenever my opponent makes a move there are certain checklists and things that you
go through, right? And so, you check off all these aspects of a position, King safety,
material development, threats, am I about to get checkmated? What does my opponent
want? Why did they do this? Right? That's the first thing that I try to do, and the more
experienced chess players do this stuff very quickly. And then you start, like, "Okay, I'm
not in danger. What are the threats? Are they real threats? Do I have to deal with them, or
can I ignore them and make threats of my own?" Things like checks, captures, threats to
capture, threats of made in one, this kind of hierarchy of thinking and organizational
method, like the reconnaissance.
Participant 1 equates playing a well memorized game with strength and victory to “create
multiple attacks and impose my will” and “creating uh, opportunities for yourself”.
And again principles – participant 1, “principles have to be the guiding force and then
you can work within it.”
And memory as more reliable than spatial understanding, and possible intuition, in chess
strategy decision making:
principles and strategy on that, I think that is a huge part and I would say it would
overtake originality because, because you may not understand the spatial relations of
things.
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Participant 4 discusses memory recall as critical to his strategy during the ending phase of
a chess game:
“I know a lot of end game strategies, where there's less pieces on the board. So, I think
towards the end of the game, I'll go to more of my recall”
Participant 6 leans heavily on memory recall as a playing at the highest level of strategic
awareness, “I'm calculating and I've got it in my head” and, “I'm trying to sometimes figure out
how to think like a computer, if that makes sense?” and “But more let's simplify it and maybe I
can calculate one more move than they can”.
Sub-Theme 2: Memory and Space. That memory and space trigger strategic associations
was validated by 7 of 9 participants. Participant 2 continues to begin the connection between
memory recall and spatial understanding:
And so, it's almost like, well, he's probably going to do this, rather than doing this. But
then let me use my spatial temporal, and I guess memory skills, to be able to maximize
on that weakness.
Yet also defines, as seen earlier with participants 5 and 7, that movement of pieces
creates a new board or strategic understanding after each play that may have to be accounted for
by more cognitive awareness processes than just memory recall (as well referencing current
World Chess Champion Magnus Carlson (Thayqua, 2018):
I think, I think more in terms of tactics rather than strategy because I ... Magnus said, and
I heard him say, I don't know if it was an interview or whatever, but he said that almost
with each time it's his turn again, it's a completely new position.
Participant 9 indicates awareness of position of pieces on the board sparks memory
recall:
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“So, well, the recall, I remember certain patterns from before, so I say, "Oh yeah, this
looks like I can complete this attack based on what I know from before."
And in a rational description of strategic logic:
“Understanding means you know the game, it's not a feeling or a gut feeling, it's like a
logical understanding.”
Though sometimes what sparks pattern recognition recall could be incomplete
information, thus possibly indicating cognitive empathy or chess intuition:
“Similar enough that I say I should try it even though I can't figure out every move
possibility that the pattern looks good enough for me to try it on recall.”
Sub-Theme 3: Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations. That spatial assessment and
cognitive empathy are related at times in strategic choice making during chess gameplay was
verified by 5 of 9 participants. Participant 8 goes on to contrast memory, as often mentioned by
participants as principles, and some more subtle cognitive understanding, perhaps intuition or
cognitive empathy:
So, these general principles, these general guidelines, these things that we follow, but
when do you not follow them? And I think that's the difference between very strong
players, really strong, super G... All right, grand masters and non-grand masters, right? Is
that they are not bound... Because we seek comfort, I'm guilty of this, I seek comfort in
rules and regulations and things that I know are true and when I have to stray outside of
those things it's like going out into the wild forest, like now I'm on my own and this is
where your chess skill and chess thinking, and chess culture and chess stability are tested.
That's why-
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Participant 1 suggests knowing an opponent accumulates with time and space progression
of game pieces on the board, “factors that reveal themselves both on the board and
outside the board with the person. So, you know prior games with this person. They
really liked bishops.
Subject 7 suggests chess piece moves spark cognitive empathy assessments:
When you do your move, you can see the expression of your opponent’s face will be like,
“Oh, okay.” Or just, “Hmm, I don’t know what’s going on.” And sometimes when you’re
playing in the real, like, face to face, you can tell how this difference (affects things).
And when you do a move, and this upsets your opponent. So, you can sense it, I look at
that and say, “Okay, that was a good one. My opponent has some pressure now. Now I
can keep pressing on… so you’re reading, at times you’re reading the immediate
emotional reaction in the face of the opponent. At the same time, you’re reading the
board to know where the possible game is headed based on both…”
Participant 4 speaks of piece movements revealing the goals of the inner mind of the
opponent:
Absolutely. Whenever your opponent moves any piece, the first question that you should
ask yourself is “Why?” Why did they do that?” Then you can think where they’re
coming from. What kind of goals they have in mind, and then use that to defend, but if
you’re not thinking about your opponent when they make a move and just thinking about
your own plans? It’s not going to be good because then you may very easily overlook
some threats.
Participant 5 states awareness of opponent’s skill at cognitive empathy as chess
piece progression continues in gameplay:
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I think other people have just a little bit more of this intuitive idea where you see the
move and immediately, you’re like, “Okay, he’s trying to do this. I need to be doing this.
I need to be working this around or doing something different or playing this way.”
Sometimes you might be thinking, my opponent must think I’m an idiot if they don’t see,
that I see exactly what it is they’re doing. I’m going to be able to counter that fairly
simple. This is an attack that really has no teeth to it that kind of thing. But then
sometimes, you might go at that with an attitude and then your opponent plays something
else and you’re like, “Oh, okay. I didn’t see that, so my opponent probably was correct
that I am an idiot and I didn’t quite get that sort of thing.”
Participant 7 echoes this idea that when an opponent’s emotional reaction seems
calm in what participant 7 believed was a superior position for himself, then perhaps he is
missing some key strategic assessment:
Definitely, definitely. I believe that. For example, when you are playing a particular
opening with some tactical motifs, but you know that some tensions start to happen in the
game. For example, you want to push E5 and your opponent wants to avoid it, but then
your opponent may oversee a tactical motif, this makes you feel how comfortable you are
with this, with that moves that you just did. So, I remember also there’s another game
that I as with a very lack of understanding of the position that was going on. And I
believed, in my point of view, that I was better, but it was funny though, because I don’t
really understand what was going on there. And my opponent was just exchanged some
pawns and he was quite calm. But it was funny though, because I thought I was with a
nice position and I reading the board, and I was looking at position and I get very anxious
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about, “Okay, what’s going on here?” Because it seems to me that I’m winning and he is
quite calm and playing confidently, and he created a strong attack that I didn’t see.
Researchquestion 3. How do chess players chess use pattern awareness as a separate
construct from intuition, spatial calculation, or cognitive empathy, to make decisions about piece
movements and strategy during game play established the theme that Pattern Awareness,
Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or
Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies. Interview questions that established for RQ3
during implementation of protocols with participants include, “Do you feel you have a specific
strategy or sets of strategies you use while playing chess? Do you ever get a sense of your
opponent’s inner world? As if you know or understand something about his conception of
strategy intuitively? What are key concepts, methods, ways you pick strategy before or during
game play? What natural skills or ways of knowing, or thinking do you use during game play to
pick strategy? Does memory relate to spatial reasoning in your experience? If you do use it,
does using intuition or empathy mean you have made a conscious choice to use those strategic
methods as opposed to reason, pattern recognition, or memory recall?
Overall, the research questions were provided enough data and analysis to create
effective and understandable codes that reflected actual thematic constructs of cognitive
processes that were directly derived or detailed from the literature. These effectively breaking
down into the four themes of intuition, empathy, spatial understanding, and memory recall. Each
directly related to specific, or closely associated cognitive processes quantifiably defined from
the literature. The language gained by participant interviews adds a unique dimension to the
large amount of quantitative data on these cognitive themes (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, &
Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). The
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first-person accounts were sufficient to saturate thematic coding through qualitative obtainment
of interview responses, analysis, and described data (Abayomi, 2017; Hurserl, 1931).
Sub-Theme 1: Memory Stands Alone. Pattern awareness through memory recall was
established as distinct from incorporating intuition, spatial calculation and assessment, and/or
cognitive empathy by 5 of 9 participants.
Participant 5 discussed the feeling that certain strategic conclusions are inevitable:
I'm trying to do as much as I can here, but it is simply this inevitable movement where we
at the level where we are at, now, obviously if I were that much better and I was playing
someone who wasn't, you might be able to still beat them in that situation there. But on
this level and all that it was inevitable that he was just going to kind of come down.
Participant 4 discussed spatial understanding as an awareness of the positions, spaces, on
the board, not necessarily the pieces:
Yeah, I mean, I try my best to take command of the game as far as base, like conquering
territory within the board. I want to do as much as I can to get as much space as I can,
center control. It's very important. I want to try to take that space more than my opponent.
That's really one of the main strategies of the game, space control.
Participant 4 suggests a simple chess strategic philosophy that perhaps reduces to one or
two cognitive abilities or expands to a definition of intuition as complete chess conception:
“just using the pieces to manipulate the king into a checkmate position.”
Participant 9 suggest spatial awareness and intuition for strategic assessment as he
surveils a potential board position:
“And I say, "Well, look, that just doesn't look right.”
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Participant 9 surmises a pure state of understanding, possibly an intuition, when asked of
spatial awareness:
“I would consider that pure understanding of what's going on - on the board.”
And:
“Not anything that I know logically, it's just the “spatialness” of it.”
Participant 6 suggests intuition and spatial awareness are more difficult to obtain than the
calculation of memory recall:
“So, I depend a lot on calculation, just using brain power. I've actually struggled to
develop more of a natural feel for the game.”
Participant 5 implies intuition as some cumulatively from experience that comes out
automatically as other cognitive development and actualize:
I just feel as though it is much more of just this kind of natural thing that comes, for that
the more you play and the more you have all this stuff internalized, the more that it just
sort of comes out that way. Does that make sense? I'm not sure if that answered your
question.
Participant 5 opposes intuition as to calculations memorized from chess strategy books:
Yeah, I'd say so. I mean, once you get out of theory, you have to think on your own. No
more relying on the book (and…) I think intuition has a lot more to do with experience
and you kind of get feel, like a gut move of what the right move should be, and then you
can think to back that up.
Sub-Theme 2. Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory. That perceiving sense of
space on the chess board, or piece movement progression, connects to feelings that might be
perceived by opponents or forces fall back reliance on strategy choose from memory was
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affirmed by 7 of 9 participants. Participant 2 mentioned feeling space constrict in the game in a
visceral way:
“I feel like I'm getting suffocated”
Participant 8 speaks of awareness of ramification of decision-making:
Now as another Grandmaster told me, and I understand this, I don't look for what's good
about the move, I know what's about the move. If I didn't think it were good, I wouldn't
be considering it. But now you start looking for what's wrong with the move. What am I
missing? What's the drawback? And so conversely, when my opponent plays a move, the
first thing... Well, obviously checks, captures, threats to capture, threats to made in one,
are there any threats, et cetera, et cetera, that I have to deal with. But then you start
looking for what's wrong with it. Like, "Really?" Especially if it surprises you, "Really,
are you sure about that? What's wrong with this? Is there something wrong?" There might
not be anything wrong with it and they're just much better than you and they're going to
crush you because they understand chess much better than you do.
Participant 1 echoes previous participant’s sense that space awareness relates to mood:
“Well taking up space is taking up territory on the board”
Or:
“play cramped”
He contrasts pattern recognition, or memory recall, to intuition:
So, you know and then when you are out of book as I mentioned before then you have to
rely on, on pattern recognition from books that you studied in the past and intuition.
Then participant 2 describes an opponent’s ability for spatial recognition:
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Spatial recognition. He is able to take a series of moves that would take me many many
more minutes and make them than such rapid progression because he knows where he is
supposed to wind up.
Or similar, defining spatial relationship as something keen strategy imposes on a weaker
opponent:
Well, with the space, with the spatial relationships again when you have been denied
space to the opponent, then they, then they wind up making more passive moves. And so,
anytime you can uh, chew up more of the board, then that gives you more attacking
possibilities and to play cramped is to try to fight for the opponent, is to try to fight in a
phone booth compared to you being outside of that phone booth to be able to punch in.
Participant 2 goes on to describe temporospatial awareness as a visualization
process of combing chess pieces in the mind as coordinating around some future strategic
position, chess square, on the gameboard:
spatial, temporospatial awareness, I guess, I think it is huge. It's like as the game develops
and the black side, my castle king side, and you're like, "All right," you identify the F7
square. And then the whole time, your kind of visualizing how to get your team over to
that F7 and line up everything and get the queen over to C3… he or she castles one side
or the other. But the spatial, temporal, I guess skill or ability is just huge.
And participant 2 continuing:
I would try to just call out a square in my head, and then make myself visualize what
color it is and where it is on the board. And I might try to visualize mating patterns, just
like simple rook, king, to king patterns. I don’t know. And then also, I might just try to do
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the patterns in my head, just play a game in my head. A game of blindfold chess I feel
like helps a lot with that.
Participant 2 then makes a possible connection between and memory recall as strategic
decision-making combination:
And so, it's almost like, well, he's probably going to do this, rather than doing this. But
then let me use my spatial temporal, and I guess memory skills, to be able to maximize
on that weakness.
Participant 1 discussed relationship between spatial awareness of the board, time
and known strategic memory choice progression:
Spatial recognition (skilled at this)… He is able to take a series of moves that would take
me many many more minutes and make them at such rapid progression because he knows
where he is supposed to wind up… (Spatial awareness) Yeah it plays a component
because you are, you are looking through, you are looking through what you have
covered in the past and then you start recognizing patterns. And so, you are seeing okay,
how can I create that pattern that I have studied that I know works, and put that in, into
the plan.
Participant 2 suggests that opponents sometimes move poorly in piece progression on the
space of the game board to deceive the eye from seeing certain spaces and strategies that exist on
the game board:
Or it’s a blunder with the intention to try to cause you to make a bad move as well, like
draw your attention away from a focal point, focal square, or region of the board.
Participant 7 suggest connections between space and memory:
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At the same time, you’re reading the board to know where the possible game is headed
based on both (space and memory)… Okay, how can I do that? I need to attack his knight
that maybe is defending the F7 pawn, or the queen or something else. That leads me to
something like to correlate this trap and at least try to think about the tactical motifs that
can appear from that position. So, I believe that strategy plays a very important role in
some types of openings. Right now, I can understand that there are positional openings
and more openings that lead to tactical motifs instead of a more closed positional one.
And depending on the strategy of the opening, it’s like queen’s gambit is a very
positional one and you need to understand very well what’s going on in the middle game.
So, understanding that the positioning of the piece and how to attack, how can you do
that? And so, you need to have a very good strategy and understanding of what’s going
on in the middle game.
Participant 9 insists that commanding space on the chess board can be related to seeing
something in the piece position that triggers and awareness of need for strategic evaluation
without an obvious logical perspective immediately noticed:
That spatial thing might actually come into play because I recognize the queen move is
not really placed in the best place, for example, my opponent’s queen move… and I say,
“Well, look, that just doesn’t look right. Not anything that I know logically, it’s just the
spatialness of it. It doesn’t look like the queen can do what it needs to do in the space that
it has or in a space that it needs to have and I’m thinking, “Well, if that’s the case, then
what would I follow up with?” And then I look at what I can follow up with based on,
say, his queen positioning on that last move, say. And I say, and then following moves,
same thing. Queen still doesn’t seem placed right on the board and stuff, just not doing
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what it needs to command... No, it wouldn’t be instinct because it’s clear, to me it’s clear
that the queen is misplaced or doesn’t have spatial command that it needs. I would
consider that pure understanding of what’ going on on the board. Actually, probably the
space will come out as initial thought and say, “Well, let’s see the space.” And then once
I see the space and the command of the men, then I start addressing the possible love
variations that I can go with. And based on placement of the opponent’s men, I say,
“Okay, let’s see what’s going on?”. If I see these men are placed here, I can see what
command they have with the board and what command they don’t. I’m thinking, “Well,
here’s the file. I need to take command of the file.”
Participant 4 notes that piece movement and aggression force strategic evaluations
drawn and based in memorized strategy.
Well, if I notice the opponent is being very aggressive and just coming at my kingside,
I’ll make sure I don’t get checkmated early in the game, so I might take a step back and
defend a little, but it really does depend on the position… It’s very hard, it’s one of the
hardest ones, to know, but once you get that you can understand a relationship between
those three pieces that you can implement in the middle game and even earlier on.
Participant 5 suggests spatial pattern recognition recalls memories of prior strategy
and a suggestion of increased awareness through cognitive empathy that the opponent is
conceiving the game differently from oneself:
A lot of times it is sort of this idea of a pattern. I recognize this situation. I’ve seen this in
a chessboard previously. I know how I have played that. I know how opponent has
played that and therefore, you know…. (Also knowing the) Opponent is having a
different way of thinking about the game.
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Sub-Theme 3. Intuition Exists. That intuition is acknowledged as a skill used to choose
chess strategy was affirmed by 9 of 9 participants. Participant 7 on speaking of intuition
mentions a forward-thinking element that combines with memory recall and advances positions
or understands how movement and time effect strategy, akin to a form of intuition:
For example, something that I'm very aware of. It's the position of the piece in the
particular position. And when I start doing some calculations, for example, "Okay, pawn
takes pawn, and rook takes..." and so on, the position transforms somehow. And you need
to understand if all this change in the position will lead to an advantage or that position,
the transformation of the position would be bad for me when I'm playing.
And that this effect might possible be:
deep calculation… I also believe that intuition could be related to some still unknown
aspect of the mind that are probably associated with positional/space awareness of the
board and the understanding of pieces arrangement on the board that creates particular
motifs (e.g., castle king-side or queen-side, bishop fianchetto, and so on). However, how
to use all this knowledge will depend on experience, I guess!
Participant 2 suggests intuition is a quality one feels an opponent has and is
implementing:
I feel like I can sense that someone's doing that (and…) I feel like that this player, where
it's almost like every move he or she makes is just slightly better than mine (and…) For
some reason, what comes to mind is that I feel that he might not have a long-term plan.
He may be just looking at the board, each individual move, and just saying, "Hey, what's
the best way I could improve my position in this position?" One thing that comes to mind
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whenever that happens, it's always like a pawn push. It's not like the queen comes down
suddenly, or something like that.
Participant 2 also echoes, with another Magnus Carlson quote (Karolyi, 2018) the sense
of other participants that intuition, and maybe spatial assessment, is a comprehensive quality that
changes with each piece moves and changes the order of the future possibilities:
I think, I think more in terms of tactics rather than strategy because I ... Magnus said, and
I heard him say, I don't know if it was an interview or whatever, but he said that almost
with each time it's his turn again, it's a completely new position.
He also suggests intuition is most useful against weaker opponents:
If I use intuition, then it's usually against someone that I know is a weaker player, or is
playing as a weaker player (and…) And so, I think there's times where you're thinking,
"Okay. I think he's going to do this," which may be considered intuition. But then I've
learned not to do that because with good players, I don't think that they necessarily mask
their moves. But I think that they're just playing on a different level than I am.
Participant 2 goes on to suggest opponents confuse his intuition play for strategy derived
from memory calculations:
But then after we'd played a little bit, he said that he felt like I was then making those
calculations in my head. It was just doing whatever I was doing (and…) again, it seems to
be more with weaker players than I am. You just feel that, and it can almost be at the very
beginning of an opening, where they go out of book so early that you know, or you
highly suspect that they're a weak person.
Participant 8 echoes similar sentiments:
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So, the result is it's like the man who has nothing to lose, nothing more dangerous, and
that's when I've had my best results. Now, is that an optimal way to play? I don't know. I
think a combination of my liberation and their underestimation also had something to do
with it (and…) Just reality, right? So, the things that you practice over and over and over
and over, and the work that you put in, the blood, sweat, and tears that you put in practice
so that you don't bleed in the fight, that's the saying. And everybody has a plan until they
get punched in the mouth, like (Iron Mike) Tyson would say, like you have a plan but all
of a sudden, your opponent does this, now what? Well, now you're on your own. Now
your chess ability and your chess skill comes through. How much tactics? How many end
games? What have you been doing and how do you understand chess? And people
understand chess differently, you could show this same position to two different kinds of
players and one would play this, and one would play that and they would both give you
reasons why it's correct for them.
Participant 1 implies intuition as a warning that something big strategically has taken
shape:
You get a feeling as you are playing you may not be able to see the entirety, but you feel
something coming on and you know when that big moment is there and you recognize
that you have got to respond to it. (and…) fever pitch at that moment and you know
either you are going to be able to burst through or if you do not respond to it, (and…) So,
so it is a, uhm, it is just a feeling, it is kind of like playing an instrument. You just know
you, you, you know that measure is coming and, and you have to anticipate it, you do not
know exactly when you just know it is, it is happening right at that moment. You respond
too early or too late. The magic is recognizing it and addressing it right then and there.
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And suggest this quality is somehow related to the body, perhaps like reading someone
with cognitive empathy:
“body is a, uh, uh, it gives you a, it tells a story about you.”
Participant 1 concludes intuition as a feeling one trusts based on a sort of blind faith and
even later defines intuition as a sort of courage:
I do not see, I do not see the answer, but you know what, my gut tells me I need to do this
and so, you go in a feeling at times. I do not like doing that but sometimes it comes to the
point where you go on a feeling. It is, this, this just feels like the strongest move. I do not
see a better one and I realized that if I play a passive one, I am just giving him another
opportunity for another tempo. I have got to do it.
And:
“No guts. No glory. So, let us just go ahead and do this.”
Participant 4 suggests intuition as his primary strategy that comes from his head:
but I think more of my strategy comes from being intuitive, to where I'm seeing the
position and I'm kind of using my head and seeing what works, (and…) What I mean by
intuition is, rather than just always making whatever, say the engine, whatever move the
engine would say would be the best, using my own head and I guess sort of seeing what I
think would work and what move comes to me first. Like the first thing that pops into my
brain. And then, I think like, "Would that move work?" Or... "This looks good." I say
like, "This looks..." I don't know if it's from my subconscious telling me like, "Oh, I've
seen this position before and I know this is good for me," or how exactly it works, but... I
almost want to say it's more of a feeling almost because I kind of look at it and some
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positions, I'll... I'm not the best chess player, so I'll just be like, "This feels good for me."
And I can't see any other moves, and I'm like, "This has to be good," almost.
Participant 4 suggest intuition is the primary thinking cognitive function that makes up
for his lack of memorized strategy from book learning:
I think when I'm thinking, I'm also using my intuition a lot, especially because I don't
know a ton of strategy with the game… I'll tend to try to use my head a lot more… I'd say
I use cognitive thinking
He also implies that knowledge of the other player, perhaps assessed through cognitive
empathy, allows for more use of intuition:
If you know a lot about the player and you know how to play against them, you would
just intuitively make certain moves against them that you wouldn't make against someone
else.
And as well echoes other participants’ idea that intuition relates to the moveable
adjustment of multidimensional reconfigurations of possible strategic combination that
materialize after each single piece move:
“Yeah. Every move, I'll try to be adjusting the position to have it favorable. Let's see,
where am I going with this?”
Participant 9 suggest intuition as a form of instinct:
And then the instinct, of course, I guess it's kind of like that because the instinct, even
though I can't recall the pattern, maybe it's not a recall, but just looks right based on what
I've done before as looks like the right thing to… Things happen or are caused to happen
by a certain move. And I say, "Well, those are all good instinct, even though I can't figure
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out all the following moves sequence." Let's see what else… Intuition. Intuition, instinct,
wouldn't they be very close to each other?
Though participant 9 confirms what many chess experts (Coates, 2013) say that intuition
is a higher-level player quality rather than a lower:
Probably somebody with not so much experience wouldn't have that intuition or instinct,
but once you played 60 years or something like that, so 50, 60 years.
Participant 6 suggest intuition as something that needed to be cultivated from early
learning onward and as well a free-wheeling sort of natural skill:
enough to know it's a little late to get that innate chess sense… But doesn't depend quite
as much on naturally knowing where to put things and naturally what the position feels
like… And I used to play a lot more haphazard than I do now. Sometimes I wonder if I
need to play a little bit more haphazard, if I'm going to get back to where I was.
Evaluation of the Findings
Cognitive empathy (RQ1), spatial assessment (RQ3), memory recall (RQ2), and intuition
(RQ3) have all been found by the literature to be cognitive mechanism used to decide chess
strategy (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves
Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Qualitative, semi-structure interviews with 9 experienced
chess players confirmed through their definitions that each of these cognitive mechanisms was
understood as used to determined chess strategy decisions-making. At times thematic definitions
of intuition and cognitive empathy resembled each other. Since intuition is less verified
quantitatively than cognitive empathy in the literature, yet intuition is more commonly claimed
by chess experts to be a high skills of experienced chess players, then it is possible these qualities
have similar properties and implications (Coates, 2013; Ciaramelli, Bernardi, & Moscovitch,
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2013). Still, intuition, though strongly cited by several participants overall remained more
elusive of definition even than cognitive empathy.
Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy had the most
words used by participants to define this quality that seemed to be generally accepted as
calculation learned from chess experience, book learning, and chess lessons. Participant facility
in seeming to agree on a general idea of the function of memory recall allowed the researcher to
adapt his protocol approach as to not provide elaborate definitions of memory recall during
question prompts. To a slightly lesser degree participants defined assessment of spatial
relationships as a chess strategy quality and this allowed for the researcher to reduce prompted
definitions of this cognitive mechanisms during the semi-structured interview and instead follow
up with linking questions on how the four cognitive modalities studied were perhaps interrelated
and experienced by chess players. These led to thick, rich descriptions of various cognitive
mechanism discussed in the literature and revealed thematically in interviews. Overall, cognitive
mechanisms discussed in the literature as active during chess strategy were matched what themes
in the interviews revealed, even to the point of intuition being consistently, yet somewhat
vaguely asserted as a primary skill of advanced chess players, and certainly that memorized
strategies patterns figure greatly at all levels of chess strategy formulation.
That chess has been found to be a male, middle-class, and professional competitive,
hobby was confirmed by all of the participants who applied for the study as being from that
precise demographic. Chess as a constrained task environment with higher ecological validity
(Conner & Campitelli, 2014) was demonstrated as trustworthy due to the consistent rich, thick
descriptions of each of the participants. That cognitive empathy is a concept familiar to chess
players, as knowing the inner world of opponents, was confirmed by most participants
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(Ciaramelli, Bernardi, & Moscovitch, 2013). These findings developed the sub-theme of
Empathy Assessment. That chess players could read intentions and strategic motives from
opponent’s faces, as suggested by Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, and Crowley (2018), was
confirmed by more than one participant. Though trickery was acknowledged by several
participants as a ploy used by opponents there was little thematic definition of Buhren and
Frank’s (2012) assertion of the usefulness of game theory as applying non-logical moves to
shift power balance of games, though something akin to this idea was discussed by topics of
intuition and sacrificing higher level chess pieces at unpredictable moments. Buhren and
Frank’s (2012) statement that higher level chess players use intuition was confirmed by
several participants but denied by a few others who saw it as a quality of weaker players.
This was associated with the development of the sub-theme Conscious Denial of Empathy.
Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann (2016) assertion of the vastness of potential
spatial combinations and movements during chess game play was generally affirmed by all
participants, though some mentioned a distinctive narrowing of vision during overwhelming
strategic challenges. This supported the sub-theme, Memory and Space, as cognitive
mechanisms that trigger strategic associations. Postal’s (2012) finding that there is no need to
inhibit possible irrelevant cognitive processes while using memory to choose chess strategy
could be an indication that some of these perceived irrelevant processes actually have
connection to the studied complimentary cognitive processes of spatial assessment, intuition,
and cognitive empathy. Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, and Garcia-fin Ana (2017) finding
that chess players inhibiting their own experience while evaluating mental states of others,
and visual assessments, could be considered confirmed by some of the participative and
thematic descriptions of study participants. Slezak et al. (2018) assertation that chess players
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do not attempt to over-analyze all possible movements before picking a strategy was generally
verified by most participant reports. These aspects of theory were developed in the thematic
descriptions of Empathy Assessment and Memory and Space as well as Space and Cognitive
Empathy Associations as predicting a relationship between cognitive functions that trigger
spatial assessments and cognitive functions that trigger empathy as having some possible
interdependence. This supported the overall theme of Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial
Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as
Cognitive Chess Strategies.
That chess has a distinctive culture formed around common language and concepts
strongly affirmed Etel & Yagmurlu’s (2015) that such concepts often create a symbolic
language that forms the basis for Theory of Mind is suggested. This portion of theory is
supported by the data collected to form the sub-theme Empathy Assessment. As well this portion
of theory was developed by the theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or
Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess
Strategies.
Cognitive empathy has been found to give competitive advantage in chess games
(Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). Results indicated a majority of participants were familiar
with cognitive empathy while playing chess, though some choose to ignore it in favor of other
cognitive mechanisms. This developed in the sub-theme Empathy Assessment. One or two
participants actively tried to suppress cognitive empathy as something that might get in the
way of strategy chosen from the logic of memory recall and/or spatial awareness. This
developed in the sub-theme Conscious Denial of Empathy.
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There was strong indication from similar thematic language in large portions of all
participant interviews suggesting a uniformed chess culture. There were as well indications
of linguistic and thematic saturation within the 9 participants. Saturation was thus justified
since no new emergent themes or perspectives revealed themselves (Abayomi, 2017) and did
not seem to begin any indication of new emergent themes. Data was continually analyzed as
it is gathered to insure thus. Overall, there was a lot of consistency in the data as reported.
Repeated and thorough deep reading of the data, Nvivo12 analysis allowed for revelation of
distinct and holistic themes (Holroyd, 2001). This was the first form of triangulation (Arksey
& Knight, 1999). A profile of meaning-statements (Bartholomew et al., 2019) was used to
analyze if experience contributes to theory in relation of chess players reports of cognitive
processes as defined by ToM. Referents (Richards, 2015) were extracted to compile evidence
of specific aspects of cognitive processes being reported by participants. Finally, a synthesis
was obtained from the analysis of extended description. Trustworthiness was established
through prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, and referential adequacy
(Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Each participant was asked the same set of
questions. Participants were allowed to review data collected, member-checking, and its
interpretation. The essence of this study is transferability in that chess is used to explore
established theories of cognitive processes and consciousness, simply because thought and
being are involved in chess and no one has yet asked these exact questions of perceptions of
cognitive process shifts from chess players themselves. This though experimental studies
vastly indicate they exist in brainwave changes during play (Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet,
& Garcia-fin Ana, 2017).
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ToM includes for interactive behavioral tasks that utilize a great deal of anticipatory
looking and facial emotion recognition (Zwick & Wolkenstein, 2017). The basic definition of
Theory of Mind (ToM) is that of a process of mind that allows one to understand the thoughts
and intentions of others (Colle et al., 2019; Preckel et al., 2018). The idea of self-other
distinction, Hajduk et al. (2018), in Theory of Mind was strongly described by participants as
each seemed hyper-aware of their own individuality and the competitive difference of their
opponent as another participant. These aspects of theory were well affirmed under the data
collected which formed the theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or
Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess
Strategies, the sub-theme Empathy Assessment, and the sub-theme Sense of Space relates to
Feelings and Memory that developed the idea that sense of space and movement during chess
play connected somehow to feelings of perception of the opponent’s strategy. Each participant
seemed to have a definite awareness of self-other in regard to life in general, and specifically to
the competitive nature of opponent each using differing, or similar, chess strategies during
gameplay as to prove who was ultimately superior in their strategy choice, awareness and
implementation. Still, there was a clear preference in most all participants for memory recall and
then spatial awareness as the style choice of choosing strategy over intuition and cognitive
empathy. This portion of theory well supported by the data that formed the sub-theme Memory
Stands Alone, Memory and Space, Memory is Primary, and the overall theme of Memory Recall
as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy. It seemed as if many participants trusted
memorized strategy over intuitive leaps and often suggested that superior players knew how to
develop and use intuition, though a few insisted that intuition is relied upon by weaker players.
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This portion of theory began to be developed under the sub-theme Intuition Exists and as well a
few times supported the sub-themes Memory Stands Alone and Conscious Denial of Empathy.
Researchers have proposed chess players use a variety of methods to pick tactics and
strategy such as instinct, analysis, intuition, logic, feeling, tactic, envisioning, pattern
recognition, reasoning and problem solving (Lane & Chang, 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). Laws
(2014) that each game can become its own unique conception without reference to prior games
or understanding at times seemed affirmed by some participant’s description of competitive
complexity suddenly appearing in a game (Kulke, Johannsen, & Rakoczy, 2019). Affirmations
that intuition, and ToM processes, operate automatically like instinct, was affirmed by more than
one participant. These portions of theory were well supported by thematic development of
Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function
Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies and the sub-themes Intuition
Exists, Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations, Memory and Space, and Sense of Space
relates to Feelings and Memory.
GM, the alternative theory in this study, compliments ToM in the study of decision-
making through chess as it relies on complex mathematics for its structural underpinnings that
calculates choice for greatest utility, and not necessarily from the furthest point of comprehended
logic, hence decisions can be called intuitive (Chakravarty, Manipushpak, & Sarkar, 2015;
Young, Peyton, & Zamir, 2015). Intuition has been numerously, yet vaguely, assigned as a
quality of superlative chess players tactical and strategic decision game move choices (Buhren &
Frank, 2012; Coates, 2013). This portion of theory got some support from the data collected
under the thematic development of Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or
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Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess
Strategies and the sub-theme Intuition Exists.
Summary
This study utilized a qualitative, phenomenological method that relied on data collection
from semi-structured interviews. Chess strategy has been demonstrated in the literature to derive
from several cognitive mechanisms (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha,
Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). IPA methodology was
determined to be the best way to code these mechanisms into linguistic themes.
Essential points of this study include utilizing phenomenological interviews with chess
players to gain data on their qualitative experiences of internal cognitive processes during
gameplay. Chess offered a suitable mechanism of study to apply coded themes from
phenomenological methods to identify and develop any common awareness or usage of various
cognitive processes during gameplay. Similarly, other intuitive processes, said to be common in
chess (Buhren & Frank, 2012), revealed other predictive methods of strategic game choices that
speculates on incomplete, or inferred knowledge, like GM theory discount choices, mindreading,
intuition, and empathy as used, but ill-defined method of game play decisions that produce
variance in outcomes. IPA, alongside Nivio12 application, provided a strong method for
gathering and interpreting data. Traditional IPA criteria like saturation and trustworthiness
(Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Guest, et al., 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) were applied to the
analysis of the data. Specific cognitive processes were described by chess players and IPA was
able to discern and allow for elaboration of these themes. The significant gap in the current
research of any qualitative interviewing of chess players was narrowed as significant unreported,
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unclassified, cognitive phenomenon occurring in tactical or strategic decision was richly defined
in occurrence and description.
The themes of cognitive empathy, intuition, memory recall, and spatial awareness were
all robustly illustrated in participant’s thick, descriptive language. Interpretation and synthesis
between themes were allowed for by the amount, and precision, of data collected in the semi-
structured interviews. Nine participants were interviewed to the point of theme saturation
(Abayomi, 2017).
Overall, the interviews seemed to verify Binet’s (1966) early assertation that a
multiplicity of cognitive mechanism overlap in complex and varied ways to form the
mechanisms by which elegant chess strategy is surmised during what has been called The Royal
Game (Fine, 2015). The study, through semi-structured interviews, confirmed through thematic
language of experienced chess players many of the quantitative findings of other studies related
to various cognitive mechanisms being active during chess gameplay (Guntz, Balzarini,
Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz,
2017).
Memory recall seemed to prevail as the dominant choice of established intermediate
chess players, followed by assessment of spatial awareness for strategy decision making during
gameplay. Intuition was acknowledged as a skill used for strategy formation, often interpreted as
something higher level players have access to, though some participant claimed it was a quality
that weaker players used. Definitions of intuition were earnest, if at times mysterious, though
overall useful to defining a solid thematic category. Cognitive empathy was generally
recognized as a mechanism active during chess, but often relied on for partial assessment, or
temporary assessment of strategy formation and implementation. Some participants actively
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rejected cognitive empathy as something they were aware of but preferred to “turn off” during
gameplay as to rely on the superior quality of rote memory recall of strategic patterns and
implementations.
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Chapter 5: Implications, Recommendations, and Conclusions
There are several cognitive processes verified in the literature, and in this study’s
findings, that work indicated processes that independently, or combine, to formulate and
implement strategic decision making (Guntz et al., 2018; Hajduk et al., 2018; Hangii et al.,
2014; Powell et. al, 2017). The Problem addressed in this study was the gap in understanding
how chess players experience cognitive processes that reference social reasoning traits related to
interpersonal strategy decision-making (Guntz et al., 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). For instance,
cognitive empathy has been found to reveal accurate perception of other’s states of mind
(Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). If chess players rely on cognitive empathy to pick strategy,
then descriptive narratives may address at what point in strategic decision making these systems
activate or the individual is aware of their activation and influence. Ultimately, the Problem to
be addressed in this study was how chess players would use descriptive narratives to elaborate on
how ToM is used as a social reasoning tool during gameplay to make strategic decisions.
The Purpose of this qualitative phenomenological study was to investigate the gap in
descriptive narratives of chess players as to their perceptions of what influences tactical and
strategic moves. This phenomenological study collected data in approximately one hour long,
one-on-one, remote through Zoom online, semi structured interviews with 9 chess players
(Abayomi, 2017). Players were recruited from open online chess forums and through
Facebook, and data collection took place by the researcher and saturation was effectively
achieved with 9 participants (Guest et. al., 2006). Participants were screened to self-report
they met inclusion criteria: they had played chess at least once per month for the last three
months, could communicate effectively in English, and were over 18 years of age. All
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interviews were conducted using Zoom and recorded with Zoom video option. Video were
sent to Rev.com and transcribed.
Results of this study identified four thematic codes, their places of synthesis and
interdependence, the content of specific interviews, and indications of style and flavor of
thinking of individual participants. Much of the thick, rich descriptions collected in the semi-
structured interviews well defined the dominant themes and cognitive processes of spatial
assessment, intuition, cognitive empathy, and memory recall. These were subsequently divided
into more precise sub-themes that reflected data and interpretation which aligned with the
research questions.
The data collected in interviews was thick and rich, and allowed for saturation (Abayomi,
2017). This was the hope and why the semi-structured interview was chosen as to allow for the
researcher to give prompts toward participants further describing theoretical gaps. All
participants were found to be articulate enough to compile satisfactory interview data.
Participant’s age did not affect their ability for thick, rich vocabulary descriptions. Older
participants were not necessarily found to have a stronger command of vocabulary. Self-
reporting is not always accurate, and memory can be erratic (Holroyd, 2001). Still, interviews
seemed robust and each participant had a fluency and mindful, conscious awareness of chess
strategy that seemed deep and comprehensive. Time constraints did not seem to be an issue as
most data was collected between 30 and 45 minutes and provided thick, rich descriptions. Much
of the data was dominated by the cognitive processes that are easier to recall, this primarily being
memory recall.
The small sample size included for some inherent limitations to transferability to
specific sub-groups within the chess community; however, that may help make this research
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further flourish. For the current study it can be viewed as a general assessment of the generated
themes among the most common chess player grouping. As well repeating the study with
various sub-groups of chess players could be of interest. Additionally, in IPA studies there is
the limitation of the subjective and temporary nature of the data collected (Smith & Osborn,
2015). Researcher bias is always a factor in such qualitative designs and repeatability could
have variations due to different researcher approach, tone, subject rapport, and interview
protocol interpretations. Participants generally represented intermediate to high level
intermediate chess players and novice or highly expert chess players were not interviewed for
this study. Further, only male participants volunteered for this study. It is possible results
might be different for a repetition of this study with all female chess players. All participants
as well lived within only the United States.
Implications
The results of the thematic codes counted for the four cognitive qualities used during
chess strategy formation and implementation, of the nine interviews. While intuition, memory
recall, and spatial understanding had code frequency that was similar, cognitive empathy was
referenced less than half as often as these other thematic and cognitive qualities. There are
overall implications of the findings and specific ones related to each research question that are
worth examining in some depth. First, there are implications related to the definition of the term
“empathy”. That the theme of cognitive empathy was well defined by chess player participants
as a cognitive process used to discern strategy was strong indication that cognitive empathy, as a
ToM quality, was prominent in chess play. For instance, some participants questioned the
definition of empathy as contrasted between feeling care for another’s feelings, or even
experiencing another’s pain, until it was explained by the researcher that cognitive empathy, in
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Theory of Mind, related to a certain knowing, cognitively inferred, of another’s intents and
beliefs. Generally, Theory of Mind relates to how individuals discern and know there is a
difference in consciousness perspective taking between ourselves and others. A few times in the
data collected through semi-structured interviews this quality was considered by participants to
be very similar to intuition, but most often intuition defined itself by participants as a separate
quality related to an overall apprehension of the strategy situation in a particular chess game that
transcended either memory recall or spatial understanding. Sometimes intuition was seen as an
extension of memory recall and/or spatial understanding. This could suggest validity of Coates
(2013) assertation that intuition in chess is like the abstraction of finding a geometrical proof.
Theory of Mind skills were studied and used in interviews to infer other’s beliefs, intents,
desires, and knowledge (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), at times by the researcher to progress the
interviews by assessing meaning from the intents of their statements. This method was used
until trust was deepened into the interview as alliances of common appreciation of chess and
participant experience were firmly affirmed by the interviewer’s tone, manner, and style of
follow up questioning. Then a common language was developed for each interview as to the
parameters of the intent of the study. Raphael’s (2011) proposition of chess as a technical
resource able to analyze social dimensions of human affairs was often a distinct feeling felt by
the researcher during the study from the participants as it kept circling around the competitive
aspects of competence in chess strategy. This sense did shift when aspects of pure strategy were
discussed during the current study interviews, and participants viewed opponent’s moves as
independent of their personality features. Indeed, overall, much of evidence that developed the
themes of Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess, Space and Cognitive
Empathy Associations, Memory and Space, Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation,
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and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess
Strategies, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory heavily support the specific
characteristics of Theory of Mind and how cognitive processes work within the brain system and
extrapolate well to general theory. In essence participants seemed to want to be judged fairly for
their knowledge and skill levels, but in no way wanted to be underestimated by the researcher or
opponents. The presumed need being that of the other being able to pick a winning strategy and
not display some operant context of self that revealed strategically compromising information. It
is possible that some participants derived strategy from assessing of the spatial assessment and
language specialization inherent in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as there was a distinct
difference between participants who allowed for interpretations of the opponent’s manner and
those who strictly played by chess theory, or playing the board, not the person. Development of
the themes of Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess, Space and Cognitive
Empathy Associations, Memory and Space, Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation,
and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess
Strategies, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory, Memory Stands Alone, Intuition
Exists, Memory is Primary, and Conscious Denial of Empathy during interviews all gave varied,
yet distinct indications that cognitive processes were used that relied both on internal knowledge
and memory and as well external perception of the opponents ideas or feeling for strategy
formation. Much of this supporting the relationship between ToM and the TPJ cognitive
functions (Powell et al., 2017; Saxe, 2003).
Another implication of using the themes of cognitive empathy or intuition in reading an
opponent was the danger of over-reaching into interpretating the other’s strategy. One caution
that came up from several participants is the fear of seeing “ghosts” or rather inferring too great a
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foresight and strategy skill plan of an opponent and thus overthinking the current strategic state
of any given chess game. Powell et. al. (2017) did find that spatial problems, active TPJ, and
ToM functions, did activate empathy during chess strategic decision-making. Additionally,
chess and ToM were found to inhibit one’s own awareness of self to evaluate the state of other
and visual awareness of action, thus as well increased TPJ activation. One aspect of the
interviews that could develop further, and may not have been answered, is at what point in game
play certain memories are activated that relate to strategic choice. The interviewer got the sense
that the conversation about chess strategy was taking place in the present time as reflecting of
qualities and theory of chess, and not necessarily reliving chess experience with the feeling of
living in the past game play and talking about it.
Research Question 1. RQ 1 - What was the experience of cognitive empathy for chess
players during game play? Hence RQ1 endeavored to know if cognitive empathy could be
described by chess players as a cognitive process, they were aware of using for strategic
decision making while they played chess. That cognitive empathy was generally affirmed by
most participants (8 of 9) suggests that Theory of Mind skills are used during chess to infer
the intents and beliefs an opponent has regarding chess strategy. That empathy was used and
known as a conscious strategy was developed from the data and created Cognitive Empathy as
a Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy as a superordinate theme within RQ1. Though at
times intuition seemed to conflate with cognitive empathy, more times than not it was defined
as a distinct cognitive construct. This implies that two cognitive awareness’s that chess
players reference, cognitive empathy and often cited intuition (Coates, 2013), differ from each
other in how they are perceived by chess players and possibly how they originate as cognitive
mechanisms. Often cognitive empathy was associated with reading the body or facial features
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and expressions of an opponent. This implication suggests it relates to visual awareness and
possibly spatial awareness in that motion detection and interpretation is suggested. There
were further suggestions that cognitive empathy is a cognitive mechanism that reaches beyond
just reading of another’s body and facial expressions and that it could be a deeply ingrained
cognitive mechanism inherent and developed though biological and social processes and
reinforcements as well as alternating brain mechanisms and functions. The implication here is
that cognitive empathy could be ascertained from a perceptual base beyond the five senses and
originate as an internal cognitive function that perceives eternal phenomenon. Cognitive
empathy was as well associated with some frequency from the data with comparing or reading
simultaneously predictions of where strategy was headed on the board. This tends to verify
the assertion that ToM qualities, cognitive empathy included, are self-evident in that it is
impossible not to prove there is an innate awareness of self and other in human beings and
their societies (Baron-Cohen, 1991). This could mean an overlap of spatial assessment, or
even memory recall, or both with the use of cognitive empathy. Overall, the findings
reinforced the implications of the first sub-theme of RQ1 that of Empathy Assessment as a
valid cognitive mechanism chess player use, are aware of, and can describe on reflection of
chess strategy. This in turn supports the ToM research that cognitive empathy is a strategic
process used during chess and other activities (Colle et al., 2019; Guntz et al., 2018; Zwick,
2017. A future design would allow for interpretations of how chess players experience
cognitive empathy during game play itself.
Strategy does assume another has opposing needs to one’s own and thus there is a
competition between distinct realities that ToM can reveal on reflection and during game play.
Overall, this formation of the concept would be akin to Theory-theory derivations of ToM
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origins (Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1987). Simulation derivations of ToM origins suggest all
experience is a social construct and indeed in chess when relying on rote memory recall of
traditional game moves one is operating within a construct of rules. Often the strict definition
of reading an opponent’s inner world as the ToM quality directly associated with cognitive
empathy was affirmed. Again, these findings affirmed the implications of the superordinate
theme of RQ1 and the first sub-theme of Empathy Assessment that the ToM quality of
empathy assessment is utilized during chess strategy. The implication here is that there are,
as this study set out to determine, cognitive mechanisms of social reasoning that can be
accessed to construct strategic choices during game play.
The relation between assessing cognitive empathy and predicting or anticipating future
strategy positions was developed through the interviews and indicated to be related, or even
interdependent, from other cognitive mechanisms such as memory recall. The implication is
that the various cognitive mechanisms that contributed to the development of the four
dominant themes, and their sub-themes, could in fact be working in tandem or sequential
order to filter perceptions and determine strategic choices. Developmental psychology
suggests that ToM skills begin as infants imitate others through perspective taking and
empathy (Laghi et al., 2016). There was further indication from the data of expanded
awareness of cognitive empathy into an imagined full construction of what the opponent’s
personality might be like as a whole, and thus what their capabilities or predilections for
strategy might be or lean toward. This findings in this study related to empathy as a cognitive
mechanism used for strategy assessment and implementation is an innate skill as suggested by
Theory of Mind (Zwick, 2017). This imagined construction of an opponent’s personality
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could be an advanced form of perspective taking contrived from cumulative ToM assessments
of that opponent.
Some of the themes identified from the semi-structured interviews indicated this
“personality” once identified was a somewhat locked phenomenon that regulated most all of
the opponent’s possibilities and came with very definite and inflexible structures. For
instance the theme of Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess seemed to
indicate a personal preference and even perhaps a personality disposition for using cognitive
empathy, a ToM quality, for strategic decision making. Further indications from the themes of
Empathy Assessment or Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy
were so ingrained in belief of the participants that it seemed like extensive training or even
ingrained disposition made them conditioned and predisposed to using these cognitive
mechanisms. Overall descriptions of these kinds seemed directly correlated to potential skills
levels of chess gameplay. This could indicate that empathy identifies fixed aspects of identity
in others that are hardwired portions of their personality. Identity for many participants
seemed linked to who is better and who is worse at chess on a fundamental level, almost as if
intelligence and or self-esteem was greatly affixed to one’s level of strategic capability and
this quality was generally fixed at a specific point of weak or strong player status. The
implication here is that empathy might be used to infer hierarchical group standing and
dominance ranking of individuals in a group. Chess as a culture provides cumulative
conversations through differentiation of roles and desires between various opponents over
time. If ToM is developed in chess through similar process then it would follow Moore, Pure,
and Furrow’s (1990) assertion that these differentiations are what formed abilities such as
cognitive empathy to develop. The implication is that through compiling of qualitative
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interviews of strategic perception a series of categories can be discerned that lead to what type
of communication forms, activates, and advances the various cognitive mechanism and ToM
skills used in strategic formulation and implementation. These could be fixed qualities like
aspects of personality or as several participants indicated, including the most experienced
ones, there are rare moments when the inspiration of intuition can propel a player beyond his
fixed skill level.
The TPJ brain function is involved in language acquisition and does contain
specialization in facial and voice recognition as well as biological motion (Saxe, 2003). This
implies a direct connection to empathy as connected to visual recognition. The TPJ is often
related to ToM qualities and thus could complement or reduce cognitive empathy to a form of
reading expressions or body language based on specific functions within the brain. Zwick’s
(2017) studies acknowledged that ToM skills generally include for interactive behavioral tasks
that use a great deal of anticipatory looking and facial emotion recognition. Another theory on
how ToM is developed includes for developing skills and perceptions as children are told what
certain words mean and associate accompanying concepts and emotions (Nippold, 2009), thus if
in chess ToM is being applied in such a developmental fashion than both language learning of
strategy and as well spatial understanding, another function propelled by the TPJ, maybe
combining to inform cognitive strategic choices in chess gameplay. This implies there is a
strong social learning component to strategic decision making.
Powell et al. (2017) did find that novice chess players activate ToM tasks to know
opponent’s inner state more than memory recall which reinforces some participants claim that
knowing inner states is a lessor form of strategy than memory pattern recollection. It is possible
that empathy separates in expert players in its cognitive form (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014)
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and then its affective form in novice players, which could explain the differences in reliance
and belief of effectiveness on empathy as a skill in chess strategy from the various participant
interviews. This could imply that empathy is a secondary strategy assessment skill developed
by individuals with weaker cognitive memory recall abilities. The second sub-theme of RQ1
was Conscious Denial of Empathy, which was strongly affirmed by 1 of 9 participants, and
tangentially affirmed on occasion by a few others (3 of 9), in that there is strategic benefit in
shutting down awareness’s of the opponent’s feelings, thoughts, movements, intents, and/or
beliefs. This sub-theme was referred to when participants strongly empathized heavy reliance
on pattern recognition from memorized strategy and thus actively shut down any strategic
perceptions gleaned or initiated by cognitive empathy. This implies that someone with strong
memory recall does not have to default to empathy assessment to choose their strategy and
that they may know the game framework better than individuals who rely on other social
instincts, like empathy, for strategic decision making.
Research Question 2. RQ2 - How did chess players use various cognitive processes
such as Theory of Mind, Spatial assessment, and memory to formulate strategy during game
play? The themes developed seemed to indicate that spatial assessment and memory can have
related, or complimentary, functions under sub-themes Memory and Space and theme Pattern
Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function
Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies which contained the sub-
theme Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory. All participants affirmed the
superordinate theme of RQ2: Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess
Strategy in chess strategic decision making. Memory as a strategic tool was a dominant theme
within the literature (Conner & Campitelli, 2014; Powell et al., 2017; Sigirtmac, 2016). As
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well there was some indication that some researcher conclusions from the literature review,
that spatial awareness triggers memory recall and this as a pattern of strategic choice seemed
validated by indicating piece positions triggers specific “calculations”. ToM has been found
to overlap with processes that pertain to episodic memory (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, and
Moscovtich, 2013). This could imply that aspects of cognitive memory function and
cognitive ToM function trigger each other, or interact, in some mechanistic and significant
way. It is possible that specific spatial awareness triggers access to memory of prior strategic
learning. Often participants discussed rote strategy from memory recall as pertaining to the
opening third of the game where pieces move in turn from their starting positions and take key
squares that set up strategic gambits. This seems to verify that some aspect of Chunking
Theory of memory where models are recognized and reacted to in strategic play is a cognitive
mechanism of recall active in chess (Gobet, Lane, & Lloyd-Kelly, 2015; Simon & Gilmartin,
1973). There is a possible implication that specific chunks of memory have magnitude of
effect for where and how strongly they trigger strategic decision and correlating processes
related to ToM and spatial assessment. The research of Gobet et al. (2015) and Simon &
Gilmartin (1973) both make this suggestion. This process is considered to function with a
conscious awareness and much of the participant thematic language supports this. The idea
could be expanded to explore possible varieties in the dimensions of individual memory, and
how it is formed, as related to outcome of intelligence and strategic decision-making variety
of options. Perhaps the wider perception of visual awareness indicates deeper, or wider
memory banks. The overall implications as to how individuals learn, how deeply individuals
choose to learn, and what individuals choose to learn is that experience may trigger
necessities of memory, perhaps like a pressure point activating a button, where commonality
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of experience, as perceived, activates areas of the brain that hold specific memories and
unfolding processes activated by those memory trigger. Overall, the superordinate theme of
Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy and the first sub-theme of
RQ2 of Memory is Primary indicate memory as a powerful force between experience,
knowledge retention, and/or action. The language describing checklists and going through a
series of various processes to rule in or out strategic choices, often described by participants,
further supports chunking theory’s grouping of compressed, but finite datasets of knowledge
into meanings with distinct valence (Bor, 2012; Wegener, 2001). What as well becomes
interesting is if some processes, like those revealed in the themes of Empathy Assessment and
Intuition Exists, somehow bypass any linear process of experience to action. They then
somehow would omit the need for knowledge retained and accessed, and substituting any
recall processing for creative invention, original ascertainment, or knowledge through
perception of what another knows, yet oneself does not yet know. Or simply some intuitive
process that bypasses the known linear mechanisms for knowledge retrieval and matches a
perceived experience with some using knowing, buried deeper in “memory”. Some ToM
qualities indicate such possibilities, such as cognitive empathy (Artinger et al., 2014), as well
as some theme development in this study.
Reconstructive memory that processes memory over time reminds of theory from the
literature of synchronic elements of language providing a sense of consistency, even when
language differs to degree. Much of this research suggests that key conceptual and
mechanistic components, once described independently in the literature, could in fact be the
same process or aspects of the same process. This also has meaning in that the abstraction of
meaning built through language over time as a method of learning strategy, ToM based in one
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essence, could contradict the ToM quality of cognitive empathy as perhaps an immediate
assessment of knowing, one that needs no abstraction. The quantitative chain of links is there
in the literature as ToM has been linked to more than one type of memory function (Cohen et
al., 2014) and spatial understanding, while ToM is less associated with representational,
language-based, memory than ruled-based, mental states. Interpretation of this study’s themes
supports this.
Still, if chess learning of strategy is reinforced by language that creates emotional
associations to strategic outcomes, then the validity of participant responses to qualitative
interviews as to discern cognitive processes has greater validity (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti,
2018; Salvaggio, 2018). The possibility exists that certain language, or ordering of language,
can prove to be better or faster for learning cognitive abilities or at least match up uniquely in
types of language with styles of learning or even personality or brain components. Chess
players have been found to have better long range-memory corrections (Salvaggio, 2018).
The established sub-theme of Memory is Primary and that of Memory and Space indicate that
perception of space somehow affects memory and possibly that memory influences how
individuals perceive space, all combining to form some sense of strategic vision. The
implication from this research is that the power of memory might go deeper than expected in
learning cognitive strategies and might in fact regulate other known cognitive processes like
empathy inference, intuition, and spatial recognition and understanding. These processes, and
what effect choice has on them, could derive from Eredita and Ferro (2015) construction and
deconstruction of configural concepts that are sensuous mental operations brought into reality
by continued generalizations. The sub-theme of Memory and Space was affirmed by 7 of 9
participants under RQ2, results that added support to aspects of the literature that suggest
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there are connection to cognitive processes of memory and spatial assessment (Atashpendar et
al., 2016; Colle et al., 2019). The great implication here is the furthering of the little
understood relation between sense perception and internal inference processes that discern
external data. Sense of perception and cognitive processing are two powerful information
gathering and interpreting systems that need further study to determine any interrelationships
or cause and effect dynamics between the two. Some data indicated surmising what the
opponent’s strategy might be, perhaps from cognitive empathy, leads to some combination of
spatial awareness of piece positions and memory recall as to how these intended belief
strategies of the opponent can and will be counteracted based on his chess logic and strategic
choice making from learn pattern recognitions. This somewhat sound like a “sensuous”, if not
intimate, process between self and opponent as Brock et al. (2017) indicated ToM tasks as
being automatic and unconscious as well as Andrews (2001) indication that ToM tasks
operate without direct verbal measures or prompts. The quality seems to be a deep biological
instant social judgment mechanism (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017), possibly hardwired as a
survival mechanism from the days of early humanity.
In most cases participants acknowledged chess as a multidimensional game, one that is
very fluid, and though it has predictable aspects there is the need of constant strategic
vigilance as surprises and turns of events can reverse the fortune of any particular players in
various moments of gameplay, especially between players of nearly equivalent talent. This
data began to affirm the third sub-theme of RQ2, that of Space and Cognitive Empathy
Associations which indicated that spatial assessment and cognitive empathy have some
correlation in strategic choice making. Overall, a majority of participants verified that spatial
awareness and cognitive empathy were somehow inter-related as strategic mechanisms during
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chess game play. This could be the beginning of evidence suggesting sense perception and
cognitive summations are interactive processes. Intuition is known to pull from all relevant
memory process and perceptions of the immediate surrounding environment (Betsch & Glocker,
2010). Zwick (2017) explored how intuition and body reactions interact. These are two just of
the possible many pieces of these aspects of cognitive process mapping to expound upon.
Powell et al. (2017) quantitatively found that when chess players were asked to
imagine spatial moves that would provide positive outcomes then cognitive empathy and ToM
regions of the brain were activated. So, it is significant that the themes of Memory and Space,
Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation,
and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess
Strategies, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory provide that there is direct
evidence that utilizing spatial assessment cognitive mechanisms in the brain activate cognitive
empathy mechanisms in the brain. This could imply a process of like an alternator in a car
which sparks the start of the more powerful engine, indeed perhaps the depth of information
processes within cognitive empathy and ToM mechanisms is only scratching the surface of
our evolutionary possibility as memory and spatial assessment has been deferred, or relied
upon, so significantly thus far. Essentially, expanding on known research, it may be the case
that awareness of spatial dimensions and connections of objects perceived outside the body
may trigger, or even formulate, inner knowledge of strategic value known more often as
empathy or intuition. Overall, themes, Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing
Chess Strategy and Intuition Exists, indicated that some players stick to comfort zones of
results through implementation of patterned strategies, or at times take risks and go “out of
book” and invent, or try, some innovative move seemingly based on an intuition. The
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implication here is that some people believe there is more glory, or proof of individual
strategic “genius” when they invent a strategy move from seemingly thin air. Expanding on
current literature, there is also the implication that memory association might be the easier
“muscle” to develop and that factors like empathy inference and intuition just take more
daring and practice to develop (Lane & Chang, 2018; Linhares, Freitas, Mendes, & Silva, 2012;
Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). This could be encouraged by research and learning.
Still some participant data affirmed a more common sense that “understanding” chess
strategy is a logical intelligence based on study of pattern progressions and not a “gut
feeling”. This was the beginning of affirmations of RQ3’s superordinate theme Pattern
Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function
Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies and one of its sub-themes
Intuition Exists that affirmed intuition as a valid cognitive mechanism chess player was aware of,
used, and could describe as a strategic function while reflecting on game play. The overall
implication being that there is the possibility that whatever drives an individual to learn and
develop certain cognitive systems could be expanding to include assess to more cognitive
systems.
At times, as the theme of Intuition Exists developed, it was a like hearing of the
mystical holy grail, something powerful that is indicated, but not fully trusted. Then a few
participants would imply, if I could only be brave enough to trust my intuition, then I would
be a much greater chess player. Betsch and Glockner (2010) contention that intuition is said to
need to pull from all relevant sets of memory processes and perceptions of the immediate
environment remains a broad definition of the quality that allows for the various thematic
descriptions from participants. The implication is that intuition is the definition of one’s total
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cognitive processing abilities, diverse and combined as they may be. Myers-Briggs (2016)
access that individuals possess varying degrees and types of intuition which could account for
the diverse explanations of this quality in participant interviews. There is a possibility that
intuition is like a rudder, or guidance system, steering individual between cognitive processes for
strategic choice making, a guidance system that may have its own cognitive mechanisms yet
defined.
Research Question 3. RQ3 - How did chess players chess use pattern awareness as a
separate construct from intuition, spatial calculating, or cognitive empathy, to make decisions
about piece movements and strategy during game play? The theme Memory Stands Alone
established that memory is a powerful cognitive process that can offer a complete mechanism
for strategic decision making that would not have to rely on other cognitive processes from
ToM, intuition, or spatial assessment. The superordinate theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition,
Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently
as Cognitive Chess Strategies indicated results suggesting some participants access aspects of
cognitive empathy, spatial assessment, and/or intuition at times uniquely and at other times
conjointly with memory to form strategic decisions.
Themes recurringly indicated participants’ sense of inevitable movement when two
players use their talent and cognitive mechanisms to the best of their abilities and the strategic
game plays out in a predictable fashion. Overall, the sub-theme Memory Stands Alone
indicated memory as a powerful strategic tool, perhaps the most valuable and consistent one,
that participants would prefer to rely on, and develop, as a cognitive decision-making
mechanism for chess strategy. White being the piece side that always moves first gives an
advantage in space reclamation and tactical tempo. Technically, as computer chess programs
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indicate, if both players follow rote logic from this point on the game can often have a
mechanical feel in outcomes (Larson, 2018). Such data adds in significance to the creation of
statistical probability outcomes when matching types of cognitive strategic functions to types
of competitions and arenas of enterprise be it science, economics, politics, or strategic games.
In chess, control of the center spaces is most often considered key to effective piece
placement and winning outcomes (Silman, 1988). There was some indication from the
developed themes that indicated awareness of who is controlling the center becomes an
overall sense that possibly even transcends which specific pieces are taking up central
positions. This could be akin to a “gut feeling” of which player is better placed and in the
stronger position overall and an intuitive sense of where future game piece positions will
likely most benefit simply based on overall sense of space and board and not individual piece
placement. Space was often described, by participants 1, 2, 4, 7, and 9, as a quality of
positioning that gives the player a feeling of freedom and power or limitation and
“suffocation”. The expanding of cognitive mechanisms for strategic choice has significance
in that so what is originated from these mechanisms has the possibility of creating new
strategic and tactical combinations, directions, and patterns that have not been explored
before.
Sub-theme 2 of RQ3, Sense of Space Relates to Feelings and Memory in strategic
choice making during chess was affirmed by 7 of 9 participants. Indeed, spatial problems in
interpreting best chess strategy might trigger cognitive empathy activation and the TPJ
(Powell et al., 2017). This too was at times described as a general sense and not necessarily
an assessment of tactical positions of each piece as they relate to the whole. The importance
of the developed themes in this research is to begin and further the developments of individual
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experiences through language of awareness of these cognitive processes. Indeed, language
might be found as the mechanism that enhances, develops, and structures some of the
cognitive processes themselves. It could be found as a solid tool as well for replicating
authenticity in these processes into fields like artificial intelligence and game theory strategic
choice making. What vision of this might be computers that are programmed directly by
language input. Developed themes of this study indicated temporospatial awareness as a
process of imagining pieces of perceptual data combining at some future point that gives or
takes away strategic advantage. This process would, in a way, transcend the simple logic of
predicting a piece-by-piece progression through some linear process and rather offer an
overall, gestalt, sense of where the game between two opponents sits and where differing
strategies inevitably is taking the game. The implication here is that at any point of strategic
process there may be a way to access an overall, and overarching, summary and direction of
where strategic choices are leading to. Indeed, there may be a distinct holistic level of
knowing for each dataset within any given cognitive process, be it intuition, empathy
inference, memory recall, and spatial assessment. Themes did indicate that curiosity about
opponent’s moves as to double check a sense of a poor move, for perhaps a superior strategic
“understanding” that is underpinning that move, but that one is blind toward. This implies
cognitive empathy may be vital to strategic assessment. Sense of touch, haptic, is associated
with verbal coding of perceptual knowledge while visual representations of space are a
different process and learning dynamic (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Balata
et al., 2015). Hence cognitive theories related to differences mechanism might have different
sense data input channels. Knowing the differing routes suggests differing learning strategies
are available.
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Research suggests that a perception of an opponent’s strategy enhances cognitive
strategic thinking (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Powell et al., 2017). Some
theme development strongly indicated pattern recognition as distinct from intuition. Themes
did indicate superior players making moves faster because they can assess where space on the
board will be taken up after a series or combination of moves between opponents. Some
results from participants and which formed thematic categorization strongly indicated taking
up space on the board inherently limits what options the opponents have for strategic motion
and thus they are turned into a more “passive” player. Some themes tied intuition to the end
game, as other participants had mentioned, in that what push of pieces toward the opponent’s
King piece where presumably corner it and remove all options for further King movement,
which is the checkmate and end of the game. This and subsequent sub-themes of Sense of
Space relates to Feelings and Memory and Intuition Exists. So, what overall is important is the
implication to a primary characteristic of humanity, that being it is a pattern seeking animal.
Pattern awareness being key to such concepts like mental health, strategic decision making,
global political and economic decision-making, successful science and experimental analysis,
and engineering on the physical and genetic levels. Pattern awareness can even be a mental
health issues when overactive. Building on studies such as this one allows for researchers the
possibility of precisely defining the cognitive processes that lead to various forms of pattern
awareness. The synergistic exploration of qualitative studies such as this one in such regards
as to where and how to look for participate explanation and perception of pattern awareness,
then combined with the precision of qualitative research would be of great use.
Results from developed themes, Memory and Space Pattern Awareness,, Intuition,
Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently
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as Cognitive Chess Strategies, Intuition Exists, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and
Memory, suggested that the look of piece configuration on the board can “look right” or “not
look right” and thus senses of spatial awareness and intuition are guides to inform players
how strong their strategic position is at any given point in a game. The implication being
there is an entire possible heuristic available to our understanding and use of strategic
decision-making that could speed up both robotic and human endeavors which otherwise
might have been more costly in time and resources. Participant 9 called this “pure
understanding” and not logical, but rather a sense of “space”. This indicates TPJ and ToM
aspects at work (Atashpendar et al, 2017 Hironaga et al., 2017; Powell et al. , 2017). The
literature review was full of spatial awareness as a definite cognitive quality measured and
able to be extrapolated as a mechanism for strategic decision-making (Guntz, Balzarini,
Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz,
2017). Participant 6 suggested intuition and spatial awareness as a “natural feel for the game”
that is more difficult to develop than calculation through raw “brain power”. Some
participants make the suggestion that intuition is merely the cumulative experience of pattern
recognition coming out in conscious and unconscious decisions with varying degrees of
effectiveness. This seemed to extend back to the possibility of sub-theme 1 that Memory
Stands Alone as a cognitive and strategic mechanism. These results indicate a refutation of
ToM and cognitive empathy as a cognitive strategic mechanism. Then other participants call
this intuition a “gut move” that has nothing to do with any previous recognized pattern. This
further developed third the sub-theme of RQ3 that Intuition Exists as a strong and viable
strategic and cognitive process during chess game play. Overall, the dichotomies of
mind/body, reason/intuition, and science/religion, among others, could greatly benefit from a
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more precise understanding of how cognitive processes work independently or collectively.
Goffman, Lemert, and Branaman (1997) do suggest that chess players may repress strategic
thinking for a form of rule-based thinking, this could be substituting intuition for memory
recall. So, there may be a whole new stratum, like new playbooks or instructions, on how
perception and cognitive processing create outcomes through strategic decision-making.
Some results suggested some players play the immediate position of the pieces on the
board, thus intuitively without prior pattern references, and thus do this so well that they
always make superior moves that force him to the weaker position – for each piece movement
after movement, strongly affirming Intuition Exists. This could indicate aspects of ToM at
work like cognitive empathy where beliefs and intentions of others are immediately
ascertained (Powell et al., 2017). Other results suggested that when one player imposes a
superior memorized tactic the other players feel disrupted and thus is forced to make a
guessing move that most likely will not work in their favor, again affirmations of Conscious
Denial of Empathy, and Memory Stands Alone. A general refutation of ToM. Players who
rely and trust memorized strategic do well in chess (Silan, 1988). Participants who affirmed
the themes of Conscious Denial of Empathy, and Memory Stands Alone were superiorly
skilled players. Cognitive empathy, and certainly intuition, can be a nebulous concept
(Coates, 2013; Powell et al., 2017). The overall implication is there is a possible default
hierarchy to which cognitive process is used for strategy and then so it could be studied to
find what events, their effect, and responses of various types of individuals and situations
affect such hierarchies. There is participant 1’s description of intuition as the sense that
something big strategically is coming soon to the game that one is not aware of precisely, yet
one knows it is coming. He concludes that when to react, the timing of response, to this big
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moment makes all the difference in success or failure of strategic outcome. These he calls the
“no guts, no glory” moments, thus suggesting Intuition Exists or Empathy Assessment as
strong and viable themes and cognitive mechanisms. It also implies a conscious awareness of
such cognitive process choices and hence a control over when one is selected over another.
Learning how to time such switches in process could be valuable in creating more successful
strategies.
Some results indicated intuition can be relied upon as the first instinct that pops into a
participant’s head during a strategic moment of play that possibly could originate in the
subconscious from memories of prior outcomes, but more likely is an original feeling based
on creating strategy in the moment for that specific game at that specific time with that
specific set of piece placements. This implies the unconscious maybe a field of strategic
processes waiting to be accessed and mastered. Other results contrasts definitions as saying
use of intuition is most often because there not a lot of strategy memorized and thus is playing
from the “head” using cognitive thinking is relied upon, which would be the same as intuition.
This implies that learning by conscious information assimilation is the most advantageous
way to master strategy. Developed themes then suggested that using cognitive empathy to
know a lot about an opponent’s strategic styles translates into making intuitive strategic piece
movements specific to the knowledge of that player’s inner beliefs and intentions toward the
chess strategy. This affirmed ToM as an active strategic decision-making process in chess
(Powell et al., 2017). These results establish the superordinate theme of Pattern Awareness,
Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or
Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies, and sub-themes of Empathy Assessment and
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Intuition Exists. The relationship between empathy and intuition may be more hierarchical
and complimentary than exclusive.
Sigirtmac (2016) did find that children with chess training have higher scores in
creative thinking and ToM skills than those without. That some participants in this study
bemoaned not having studied chess from an early age and felt that they would never get
certain natural or intuitive skills because of this fact is thematic confirmation in the language
that some of ToM processes that are fundamental and primary from early development may
indeed have limitations for further development in adulthood (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Call,
1998; Etel & Yagmurlu, 2015; Gagliardi et al., 1995; Meltzoff, 2003). Early strategy study
may develop cognitive processes in ways that further could be understood. Further research
could open up investigations into the cross-validity of these ideas and the sub-themes Space
and Cognitive Empathy Associations, Empathy Assessment, Sense of Space relates to Feelings
and Memory, and the theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive
Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies. This
especially since the literature intersects often on these topics between cognitive strategy and
ToM qualities. Two major influences that consistently connect with the intersection of cognitive
strategy and ToM qualities are the theoretical predictions of how memory and spatial assessment
coordinate within the cognitive mechanisms of cognitive strategy formation and implementation
and ToM abilities. In the sense that determining if cognitive aspects of memory and spatial
assessment are subordinate processes within ToM, which ToM accounts for, or if they are
somehow larger mechanisms needing to be related to a wider theory, one that incorporates the
whole scope of ToM and is possibility further dominated by memory mechanisms and spatial
assessment abilities, is speculated upon yet remains undetermined within the scope of this study.
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Further implications on theory. Findings related to the themes developed in
this paper regarding spatial assessment, empathy, intuition, and memory recall has numerous
implications to existing theory, future practice, and future research. Considering the
alternative theory of game theory in this study, several participants indicated that tempo, first
move privilege, and other tactical concerns create conditions where the second player
generally responds with optimal move to the next worst payoff (Menon, Sasidevan, & Sinha,
2018). Game Theory essentially states that in any strategic scenario participants choose from a
series of logical to less logical choices to estimate outcomes (Artinger et al., 2014). The
uncertainty of who is in a superior position at differing points of any given game was a common
theme, Memory and Space, most participants mentioned. This could relate to Game Theory’s
non-equilibrium and equilibrium moves, but would require further investigation (Kline, 2017).
That chess players often reported tactics and strategies involving deception and creation of
original gambits that relied on moves that initially appear sub-optimal corresponds with like
concepts from game theory. The implication of using chess to further study game theory is
strongly indicated by the developed themes from initial findings in this paper.
The further overall implication here of the themes Space and Cognitive Empathy
Associations and Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy
Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies, is that perhaps
spatial awareness processes trigger, or enhance, other cognitive strategic mechanisms analyzed
in this study under the themes of empathy, intuition, and memory recall. The implication on
interpersonal communication dynamic, psychoanalytic theory, and organization strategy that the
concept of the unconscious might be built upon, developed, and activated by the cognitive
processes of empathy, intuition, spatial assessment, and memory recall could be significant.
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Results established themes that created an effective picture of independent and interdependent
cognitive processes involved in chess strategy formation and implementation. Further perceptual
and mechanistic evidence of intuition and spatial awareness corresponding to known memory
mechanisms could give substance to abstract notions within psychoanalytic theory such as
introjections and libidinal drives, signal noise and encoder/decoder translations from
communication theory could have more flushed out explanations, and labor roles within
organizational theory could have greater fluidity and variety (Loewalk, 2017; Lounsbury and
Ventesca, 2003; McQuail, 2010).
That chess players chunk strategy into finite datasets (Lane & Chang, 2018) was often
affirmed by the theme of Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy.
Various theories of memory are supported by results. Postal (2012) found that chunks of
memory do form conceptual templates that predict chess outcomes from perceptions of various
spatial configurations. This implies that assessment of spatial elements might have an array of
skill levels that prompt more known cognitive assessment processes through logic and memory
recall. Sigirtmac (2016) found that ToM influence modulates between cognitive and affective
memory, thus cognitive empathy might be influences deeper and wider aspects of formal
memory than first considered. More skilled players have better command of descriptive
language, memory of patterns, and intuition so it is possible that higher overall intelligence leads
to higher ToM, cognitive empathy, and intuition skills as opposed to some bifurcated world
between the “emotionally intelligent” and the “intellectually intelligent”. Ciaramelli et al. (2013)
finding that episodic memory is association with ToM could indicate that cognitive empathy is a
process or mechanism for finding specific memory banks within the brain that hold information
to the current strategic needs. Expanding on other research would suggest that ToM might seek
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specific fragments of emotional memory to interpret for strategic advantage (Pathman, Couglin,
& Ghetti, 2018; Salvaggio, 2018). This could indicate a connection between cognitive
empathy and reconstructive memory theory (Salavaggio, 2018). The overall implication that
memory recall is triggered or enhanced by spatial assessment has significance in the further
study of developmental learning theory, psychological developmental theory, strategic
processing capabilities, and cognitive mechanism processing in biological systems.
The idea of chess as a social instinct was suggested by the theme of Empathy Assessment
(Cohen, Sasaki, & German, 2015). Overall, some unique language was created by
participants to describe chess strategy, but more often combinations of common and familiar
terms was used to talk chess strategy. Data of interest to both linguistic theories and social
structure theories were indicated in the result. The implication for the social and political
sciences of what is a natural and most optimal state of cognitive decision making for
individuals and groups regarding primacy and application of qualities such as empathy and
intuition could enhance functioning and harmony within said individuals and groups.
The strong, yet ill-defined manner in which most participants identified intuition as an
important skill in chess strategy choices may indicate that as Markovits, de Chantal, Brisson,
and Gagnon-St-Pierre, (2019) suggest, that it is not linked to any physiological-cognitive
processes, but rather an order or combination of other cognitive processes. This implies
cognitive biology theory that seeks to reveal the structural complexity embodied in organisms
would find the results of this study of interest (Kovac, 2000). A primary principal of cognitive
biology theory being examining the physical junctions of where a trait meets an effect in obvious
and simple representation. Additionally, the indication that higher states of awareness are
possible and developed through some combination of the themes explored in this paper is of
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interest so also theories of consciousness and levels of consciousness could benefit from an
analysis of the results (Bor, 2012; Haladjian, H., & Montemayor, 2016; Oizumi et al., 2014).
The implication that some access and combination of intuition, memory recall, spatial
assessment, and empathy creates higher order strategic decision-making methods and outcomes
is significant.
Some participant’s resistance to using empathy, reading the opponent, as a ToM skill
could relate to their concerns of being affected by the other emotions, either positive or negative
as suggested by Preckel, Kanske, and Singer (2018), rather than choosing strategic from pure
theory of memory recall. Indeed, interviews suggested so. Generally higher ranked participants
did give richer descriptive detail, but not with as a great variation as might be expected by the
literature (Coates, 2013; Nippold, 2009; Powell et al., 2017). This could relate to memory
recall, spatial assessment, and intuition. There are implications that language ability and
portions of the brain related to language had direct consequence on strategic decision-making
ability and this connection would be significant to further explore. In all participants many
points of description had a striving quality as if talking chess strategy has some innately
elusive, or difficult qualities. The implication here is that language that seems indistinct
could at times be indications of deeper, less clear cognitive processes and at other times of
strategic confusion. Gaining clarity between to the two would be significant.
That episodic memory is more accurate in relation to spatial location than temporal
order (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018) was indicated in several interviews where
awareness of space and piece positioning on the board was said by participants to spawn a
strategy knowing. This suggested some relation between the themes of spatial assessment and
memory recall. Yet, a distinct preference for choosing strategy from chess theory in temporal
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order was often suggested, especially by the most experienced or skilled participants. It could be
that intuition levels were somehow a dividing line on these skill sets. That chess is a social
group with commonalities bonded through language was generally, and strongly, affirmed
between participant interviews (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013), though that this culture is
unconscious was less indicated as compared to the common repetition of chess theory phrases
espoused by most participants. This seemed to most affirm the theme of memory recall. That
one could be surprised by a sudden strength of a weaker player was a theme, but not a common
one between participants and seemed the exception rather than the predictable rule (Brock, Kim,
& Kelly, 2017; Markovits et al., 2019). Again, possible due to memory recall, or then again
perhaps as well intuition. Overall, the implication that types of memory relate to
understanding of space and time judgments differently is interesting. Exploring how the
cognitive themes of empathy and intuition influence perceptions of time and space in strategy
assessment could be explored through analysis of language, memory, and spatial assessment
cognitive processing interactions.
Fehr and Huck (2016) noted that beliefs change when participants know they are in a
game, throughout the participant interviews the chess participants seemed as if the researcher
alternated between ally and inquisitor who somehow could measure their intellect which they
guarded with a great deal of pride. They in turn at times attempted to challenge or belittle the
researcher as to regain some balance or upper hand. It was as if being in a game within a
game aspect was occurring that turned on when participants felt their chess knowledge
challenged and they often came up with creative answers, drawing metaphors from science,
history and more – participant 8 stated “and if you're going to attack you better attack, there's
no, ‘Timeout.’ Like Napoleon said, ‘If you're going to take Vienna, take Vienna.’” The
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implication here being theories related to general social competitiveness could benefit by results
of this study. The three main criteria of social competition theorists somewhat elucidated in the
interviews, these being social hierarchies form spontaneously as resources become scarce, social
rank in the human hierarchy depends in part on attention-holding, and depression constitutes
involuntary responses to low social rank, entrapment, and defeat (Fournier, 2009). Essentially as
the interviews got into contentious points, questions of skills level, choices between strategic
methods, and who had more expertise, the interviewer or interviewee, often the dialogue became
terse even though the interviewer used extreme care to be objective and diplomatic. This could
be a byproduct of how competitive chess players are (Coates, 2013) and/or what occurs when
strategic mechanism is discussed in depth.
Recommendation for Practice
This study opens up options for further qualitative and quantitative studies. It as well
connects diverse themes from the literature on the functions of the TPJ parts of the brain that
may not have been as fully connected prior in the literature and tied to specific cognitive
processes within a strategic domain, especially chess. Further, it securely develops initial
thematic language for how intuition, cognitive empathy, memory recall, and spatial relations
may interact independently and in various conjunctions during chess gameplay as strategic
processes and resources. In the area of neuroscience how the functions of the TPJ contribute
to ToM and strategic decision-making by further mapping out linguistic themes that match
cognitive processes that originate in the TPJ is of interest (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, &
Saaksvuori, 2014; Salavaggio, 2018). This relates to the cognitive process question of how
inferences are generated in the mind and acted upon with corresponding process and outcomes.
Then how are these processes related to what has been traditionally defined as the unconscious
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(Andersen, 2014). The findings under the themes related to empathy and intuition could add to
psychoanalytic and neuroscientific understanding of how, when, why, and where in the brain itself
as mechanism the unconscious operates and defines itself. There additionally is the verification
from previous research that linguistic conceptualization has correspondence to the TPJ region and
possibly empathy, sense of movement, and spatial awareness (Hironaga et al., 2017; Powell et.
al. 2017) hence further qualitative interviews, through IPA methodology have value in adding
results and context. These results could have application toward counseling psychology, medical
health in post-trauma cause and effect understanding, what constitutes healthy psychological and
physical development, and the mechanical processes of how perceptions are turned into cognitions
within the human system.
That the TPJ region has influence over affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other
distinctions (all ToM tasks) there is strong indication that the field of artificial intelligence could
benefit from further exploration of linguistic connections and mechanistic processes related to as
such. If it is understood how humans collect perceptions and then turn them into cognitive
judgments through specific routes of data processing and interpretation, then the replication of
such processes through artificial intelligence design and robotics could be enhanced. Further the
TPJ shows increased activation during spatial processing, hence if an AI device could learn
nuance from language, mimic empathy, and associate decision making through simulated
cognitive process that mimic brain mechanistic functions of ToM, language processing, spatial
assessment, and cognitive empathy (all strongly indicated as active in the TPJ during strategic
decision-making) then the output experience could be more strategically relevant, effective, and
seemingly authentic. Computers can think ahead but simulating a feeling that they are reading
the opponent in real time, an aspect of cognitive empathy, could add much more enjoyment,
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realism, and interest to AI (Larson, 2018; Matros, 2016). Cybernetic processes that alternate
between temporal and spatial strategic judgments, as occur in TPJ and ToM inference processes,
could be key in advancing AI to new levels of sophistication. An awareness of the opponent in
AI, that then directs state-space decision branch procedures, would be more interesting, and
presumably more of a genuine “human” experience, than pure logic as determining factor
(Atashpendar et al, 2017). An AI that ran through the procedures of visual assessment, spatial
recognition, memory recall, and intuitive/empathic possibility could coordinate the program
of robotics with simulated reflexes and processes that more accurately reflect human social
and strategic interactions (Fecher et. al., 2016; Duijivenvoorde, 2016). Wichary and Smolen
(2016) indicate stress responses are key to making strategic process decision, hence perhaps the
direction of better AI lies in adding frailties to systems rather than the perfection of logic. This
resonates with the work on nervous system effect on strategy perception (Davash & Shamay-
Tsoory, 2014; Muppidi & Miglis, 2017). Ultimately, developing AI that could learn from
play and human counterparts from sensory data and even haptic (touch) learning of chess
piece movements would be a major breakthrough in technology (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory,
2014; Muppidi & Miglis, 2017).
Chess players and coaches could extensively benefit from the findings of the study.
Specially, some chess players may be able to access cognitive skills of empathy assessment
and intuition that formerly they were not aware of as viable strategic mechanisms.
Additionally, players could learn how and when to use memory instead of perception of the
opponent to formulate effective strategy. Finding one’s own ration, cognitive mixture, of
strategy assessment capabilities is enhance from hearing how other’s cope and invent with
strategic dilemmas.
207
Additionally, chess coaches could become versed in the various cognitive processes
that form strategic decision-making. Chess players could be evaluated for which processes
they have developed. Then exercises, and computer programs, could be designed and
administered that increase capabilities in the various cognitive strategic making mechanisms.
Controlling, or developing and strengthening how these processes interact with each other
within an individual, and perceiving how an opponent is using them, could add competitive
advantage and increase skill levels of chess players.
Chess coaches and players could benefit from increased flexibility instead of dichotomy
when evaluating optimum strategy based on spatial problem-solving (Nazareth, 2019). This
partially evidenced by the suggestion that advanced statistical algorithms will be more useful
than further empirical study of eye-tracking when determining factors of strategy.
Understanding patterns of strategic thinking is at least as important to improving strategy as
awareness of the opponent’s intents and body dynamics. The advantages to artificial intelligence
research from analysis of this study’s data is palpable. Eventually AI that learns from such
processes fulfills Andersen et al.’s (2014) research implying that development is shaped by
strategic experience over time. This to the point that there is a feedback process linking those
experiences with chemical-cognitive shifts again the key frontoparietal network (Powell et al.,
2017). Taillan, Dufau, and Lemaire (2015) note that strategies are selected differently by
populations from various cognitive domains factored through education, memory, reasoning,
decision making, and language. As is known some cognitive processes are chosen and others
automatically chosen. Empathy, and intuition, themselves might have both chosen and
automatic processes (Coates, 2013). Indeed, if AI can simulate alternating processes of
208
strategic decision-making, that simulate a sense of uncertainty of choice, then the experience
for the human participant might seem more real (Hanaki et al., 2016).
Recommendations for Future Research
There are several viable avenues for future research. If decisions of significance are
being made in any game based on non-rational, unconscious processes research has an interest in
defining these qualities (Andersen, 2014). Many participants articulated definite, yet hard to
define processes of strategy awareness often related to ToM qualities, cognitive empathy, and
intuition. The intersections of personality and chess strategy is another area worthy of further
research. More study of types of intuition based on Myers-Briggs (2016) introverted and
extroverted intuition. Ultimately it is unclear at what point, or what triggers, memory and ToM
skills to create inferences that see opportunity for chess players to make a strategic choice,
though inference is the common denominator in both skills sets (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel,
& Saaksvuori, 2014; Salavaggio, 2018). Further qualitative and quantitative studies on ToM,
TPJ, and cognitive empathy would be welcomed to form more conclusions in this area of thought
(Powell et al., 2017).
Additionally, qualitative studies where participants are interviewed during chess
gameplay could more precisely define moments where the various cognitive processes are
activated by specific strategic conditions on the gameboard or reactions to their opponents.
The use of online chess as an opponent could as well add dimensionality to data collection
and player feedback in real time without the complications of securing privacy between
players as they vocalize strategic thinking during gameplay. It was shown that definitive links
exist between chess, empathy, memory, and spatial relationships (Astashpendar et al., 2016;
Ciaramelli et al., 2013; Powell et al., 2017).
209
Again, Phenomenology may prove enlightening as textural and structural, descriptions of
participant experience are analysis for the consciousness they contain, or create, directed toward
the object of a winning strategic chess move (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The primary initial and
ideal follow up study would be placing participants in live chess matches where one participant
has a hearing blocking device and the other describes his strategic thinking in rich, thick detail as
the game play progresses. Then two more sets of participants would play either a computer
program and vocalize their strategy and a remote chess player through a computer program,
neither knowing if they were playing a real player or a computer. All three sets of data would be
compiled, analyzed, and compared for consistencies and contrasts in the initial thematic
categories of memory recall, spatial assessment, and especially intuition and cognitive empathy.
A variation on this design would include target sampling (Emerson, 2015) from participants of
various Elo rankings and as well with distinct personality traits/disorders that have shown
variation in ToM skills from the norm (Gillespie, 2018; Ghiasi, Mohammadi, and Zarrinfar
(2018). Researchers could code for participant vocalization of reactions to body movements
of opponents which could add to the thematic results of intuition and cognitive empathy.
Further understanding of the differences between cognitive empathy and intuition in
chess strategy would be useful since participants at times seemed to conflate these concepts.
Also, how intuition might be an extension of memory and/or spatial understanding was a
connection that several participants suggested but needs further examination. Additionally,
what cues to strategy choice or what information on strategy decision making is influenced by
reading body language and how this perhaps connects to cognitive empathy and/or intuition
would be useful since some participant answers indicated such connections. Specific relations
between the TPJ brain system and strategy formation through spatial awareness, linguistic
210
conceptualization, empathy, and sense of movement (Hironaga et al., 2017; Powell et. al. 2017;
Saxe, 2003). All these perceptional systems are known to be influenced or triggered by the TPJ
region.
Work on empathy, trauma, personality issues, and types of perceptual difference, if
randomly predicted for in artificial intelligence response programs could add the complexity,
spontaneity, and some semblance of naturalness lacking in current simulations. Gillespie
(2018) demonstrated through hierarchical regression that affective ToM (awareness of feeling
states of others) predicted proactive aggression greater than influences from clinically rated
psychopathic tendencies. As indicted brain networks could be linguistically mapped out for
thematic, causative, and textural cues that proximate various cognitive and strategic responses
(Andersen et al., 2014). Fehr and Huck (2016) note that beliefs change once one realizes they
are in a game. Gathering data in real time of participants strategic calculation processes could
further assess how belief changes during course of game play. Registering these changes
experimentally with biofeedback and cognitive mechanism measuring devices would further
advance the overall data (Andersen et al., 2014; Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017).
Participant’s detailing of biological processes such as eye/visual recognition of piece position,
imagining of piece future movements, assessments of spatial dimensions of the actual game
board and piece configuration, and feelings of opponents beliefs and intents (ToM) could be
categorized both thematically and experimentally then cross-calculated for process sequence and
determination of strategic decision-making (Cohen et al., 2014; Markovits et al., 2019; McCabe
et al. 2011; Salvaggio, 2018). Markovits et al. (2019) discussed belief-based cues that make
rapid inferences. How things are inferred has meaning and purpose to strategic choices.
211
These processes as related to the themes of spatial assessment, intuition, memory recall, and
cognitive empathy can be observed and analyzed with further study and design.
Finally, that blind chess players create effective visuospatial working memory
structure to choose chess strategy is of interest and worthy of further study (Balata, Mikovec,
& Slavik, 2015). That ToM, and cognitive empathy, and pro-social behavior quantitatively
have been found to have a positive relationship (Artinger et al., 2014) correlates interestingly
to the interviewer impression that the more social, and verbal, participants, versus competitive
and closed off, put forth cognitive empathy, and awareness of opponent, as a strategic quality
known and used to them, while the most competitive participants often denied its existence, or
usefulness, completely. The implications that various levels of social skill, recognition, and
social evaluation of circumstances, and their corresponding cognitive processes relate to
levels of skill and choice patterns in strategic decision-making is of interest. That how
individuals use, interpret, and evaluate others through their linguistic descriptions and how
that may categorize individuals on strategic style of an area of interest for further study.
Conclusions
This IPA study was based on 9 participant semi-structured interviews to gained thematic
language on their perceptions of cognitive processes as they formed chess strategy during game
play. Extension literature review identified four generally cognitive processes involved in chess
strategy. These being intuition, cognitive empathy, spatial assessment, and memory recall. All
these themes were affirmed by participant descriptive data and further broken down into several
sub-themes.
212
The study addressed the problem of the lack of supporting qualitative data for the
expansive amount of experimental data on cognitive functions of the brain related to strategy
formation and implementation. The data gathered was valuable in supporting quantitative claims
and expanding areas for further research as it identified interdependent processes individually
identified in the quantitative data but indicated further in the quantitative thematic development.
There is enough new data from the qualitative interviews to suggests interrelated cognitive
functionality during chess game play regarding strategic brain functions.
Some essential points discerned from the study is that players are generally aware of both
intuition and cognitive empathy as a strategy, cognitive mechanism active to access chess
strategy during game play. While intuition remained elusive in definition, such as basically a gut
feeling that when distinct, and trusted and acted upon, results in successful strategic choices
roughly 80 percent of the time or better, yet with the difficulty of taking a level of experience
and confidence to be aware of such intuition, and act upon it, which is rare. This while cognitive
empathy gained more precises definitions revolving around the traditional definition of a
knowing of other’s intentions and beliefs to a sense or reading of body language in an opponent.
Memory recall proved to be a dominant theme largely associated with learning traditional
chess theory from study or game playing experience. It seemed a trusted and integral part of all
participants awareness and preference for chess strategy formations and implementation. An
additional and corresponding element of cognitive mechanism that was frequently found in the
literature and essentially confirmed by participant results was processes that are centered in the
temporoparietal junction of the brain. This is the region between two of the four major sections
of the brain.
213
What was found interesting is the TPJ regulations of functions related to language, spatial
assessment, cognitive empathy, and self-other distinction awareness. All of these cognitive
functions had emphasis, or heavy emphasis, in cognitive empathy, originating in Theory of
Mind, spatial assessment, linguistic study of strategy, linguistic experimental design of chess
strategy, (Balata et al., 2015; Nippold, 2009), and spatial calculations as related to
interrelatedness, or even interdependence, between the dominant cognitive processes of the four
themes was further affirmed. For instance, chunks of pattern recognition from memory form
conceptual templates that predict outcomes from various spatial configurations of chess pieces
during gameplay. Postal (2012) cited that there is a larger visual span for chess-related visual
patterns. Empathy, ToM, and general chess strategic thinking was shown to have significant
overlap (Powell et al., 2017). This seemed to indicate imagining spatial problems triggers
brain processes that also activates empathy.
These results seemed to synthesize with what is known about the temporoparietal
junction (TPJ) as responsible for processing affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other
distinctions (all ToM tasks) as well as being an important cognitive region for spatial
processing skills (Powell et al., 2017). This again being confirmed in increased activation of
the Temporoparietal Junction during spatial processing (Powell et al., 2017). Overall, this
study indicated further mixed studies, qualitative studies, and quantitative studies, indicated
by participant observations, could add to the existing theory in Theory of Mind, possibly
artificial intelligence creation, and interrelatedness of strategic cognitive functions.
214
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Appendix A: Recruitment Flyer
Seeking Chess Players for Research Study
Volunteers are needed for research on strategic decision-
making during chess gameplay.
To qualify for the study you must:
 Have be actively playing chess at least once per month, for the last three
months consecutively
 Be an adult over the age of 18.
 Be able to recall and communicate details of chess decision-making of
strategy and/or tactics.
 Be willing to sign a consent to participate.
You will not qualify if you:
 Have not been active playing chess at least once per month over the last
three months.
 Are under the age of 18
 Are not able to sufficiently communicate details of chess decision-making
strategy and/or tactic.
235
Participating will involve:
 Attending 1 in-person recorded interview.
 Consent to interviews being audio-recorded.
 Answering questions about yourself, your background, and decision-making
during chess gameplay.
 The option of reviewing the initial results of the study and providing feedback
through email
This research is being done to fulfill a doctoral degree in psychology at Northcentral
University.
If you are interested in being part of this research project, please call (or send initial
text message):
Eric Smith
210-379-5961
236
Appendix B: Screening/Demographic Questionnaire
Demographics Questions
Researcher will ask:
Name: ____________________________________ Telephone: ____________________
Email address:
What would you like your alias name to be? __________________________________________
Year of Birth: _____________ Gender: Female  Male  Other _____
Race or Cultural background: _____________________
237
Education level: __________________________
Work Status: ________________ (If you work, what do you do?) _____________________
Marital status: ____________________________
Researcher will ask - Tell me a little about yourself:
Are you over 18 years of age?
Do you play chess at least once per month?
Have you played chess at least once per month during the last, previous, three months?
Do you have an Elo rating?
Is your Elo rating between 800 and 2000?
Do you feel you can answer interview questions about your chess decision-making processes in
English?
Interview Protocol for Gaining participant’s Perceptions on Strategy
Prompts Questions
You were included in this study because you
responded that you were an adult and active
chess player.
1. Do you feel you have a specific strategy or
sets of strategies you use while playing chess?
2. Do you ever get a sense of your
opponent’s inner world? As if you know or
understand something about his conception of
strategy intuitively?
238
So, the first research question I hope to
answer involves finding out:
What are some of the conceptual qualities that
go into your chess strategy?
A conceptual quality could be reason, instinct,
awareness, or memory recall.
For example, some common challenges in
chess, include surmising the opponent’s
strategy, thinking moves ahead, seeing and
seizing opportunities, and the like, so some of
these qualities might be used to pick a
strategy.
Chess has been said to use many qualities to
pick strategy from. Some of these are said to
include spatial recognition and pattern
memory awareness. Spatial recognition can
2. If you access your opponent’s inner world
somehow, does how you access your
opponent’s inner world, their ideas of chess
strategy, determine which strategy you
choose?
4. What feelings or thoughts about yourself,
the game, or your opponent make you shift
strategies, if you do shift strategies during
game play?
5. What are key concepts, methods, ways you
pick a strategy before or during game play?
What natural skills or ways knowing, or
thinking do you use during game play to pick
strategy?
6. Are there any uncommon strategies or
cognitive processes that you use or felt others
have used when they play against you?
7. Has your impression of strategy changed as
you aged?
239
rely on seeing, in the abstract imagination,
where pieces will end up as a result of certain
strategic patterns or movements.
I am looking for participants to put some of
these abstract notions into words, if they
experience them, and even common themes or
definitive categories, that describe how your
brain picks chess strategy, that your cognitive
processes might revolve around. There can
be more than one quality used or they can
conflict or go in various sequences.
Chess has been described by some as pattern
awareness, recognition, and memory
responses to learned chess strategic concepts.
Some may contrast this to inner qualities like
intuition and empathy where one surmises
strategy internally or just knows certain
answers that come up suddenly. Intuition
implies a sudden knowing that comes upon
one providing a strategic choice, or set of
choices, that seem to promise to be effective.
Empathy can be feeling or knowing what the
opponent believes about the strategy in the
chess game, or what they desire to use as
strategy by reading something about this
opponents’ feelings or beliefs and thus given
you an advantage over this opponent.
All methods of picking a strategy have
strengths and weaknesses.
8. If you have an awareness of it, how would
you describe spatial relation and assessment
of spatial areas and possibilities as related to
strategic choice in chess between you and
your opponents.
9. Does memory relate to spatial reasoning in
your experience?
8. Do you feel like you use intuition or
empathy for strategic choice, if so which one,
240
I hope to find out more about these differing
strategic modalities individuals use during
game play.
or both, and how do they differ from each
other?
9. Do you ever feel strong shifts in awareness
of who is in a superior position during
gameplay, and thus how to do change, if you
do, your calculations of the game, what
perhaps led to that point and what perhaps
you can use a strategy from that point.
10.. If you do use it, does using intuition or
empathy mean you have made a conscious
choice to use those strategic methods as
opposed to reason, pattern recognition, or
memory recall?
Is there anything I didn’t ask about that you would like to tell me about your experiences related
to strategy choice making during chess game play?
241
Appendix C: Screening Questions
Have you taken chess lessons?
Have you ever studied chess books?
If you have one, what is your exact Elo rating?
How often did you play chess in the last three months?
Do you have a strategic style or famous player that you try to play like?
Do you believe more than one method, way, or cognitive awareness is helping you pick your
chess strategy?
242
Appendix D: Informed Consent Form
Introduction
My name is Eric Smith. I am a doctoral student at Northcentral University and am conducting a
research study on how chess players describe strategic decision making. I am seeking your
consent to participate in this study. Your participation is completely voluntary, and I am here to
address your questions or concerns at any point during the study.
Activities
In this study, participants will:
Participate in a one on one approx. 1-hour interview with researcher
Eligibility
You are eligible to participate in this research if you:
1. Adult 18 years of age or older
2. Can complete a one-hour interview in English
3. Play chess at least once a month, at least for the last three months consecutively
I hope to include 12 people in this research.
243
Risks
Some possible risks include: Loss of self-esteem from being asked questions that indicate
researcher’s desire for thick, rich descriptions and somehow feeling they let themselves or the
researcher down due to lack of linguistic felicity
To decrease the impact of these risks, you can: participants can skip questions or stop
participation at any time. They can ask for specific clarification of a question or the point of the
overall study at any point.
Benefits
If you participate, there are no direct benefits to you.
This research may increase the body of knowledge in the participant area of this study.
Privacy and Confidentiality
In this study, certain identifying/private information may be collected. Any information
you provide will be kept confidential to the extent allowable by law. Some steps I will take to
keep your information confidential are: Each participant will be identified by coded fake names
as to not reveal their identity. participants names will not be asked for on the recorded interview.
Researcher will not share any participants actual identity with other academics, the public, or
researchers.
The people who will have access to your information are: The Dissertation Chair and
committee members will have some access to researcher’s participants as far as demographic
backgrounds, but not specific names. The Institutional Review Board may also review my
research and view your information.
I will secure your information with these steps: All identifying data will be locked in
filing cabinets as hard copy, and/or secured in computer through password encryption.
Even with this effort, there is a chance that your identifying/private information may be
accidentally released.
I will securely store your data for 3 years. Then, I will delete electronic data and destroy
paper data.
Contact Information
If you have questions, you can contact me at: Esmith at 210-379-5961 or
e.smith0310@o365.ncu.edu
My dissertation chair’s name is Dr. Michelle Ackerman. They work at Northcentral
University and is supervising me on the research. You can contact them at: 334-467-8864 or
mackerman@ncu.edu
If you contact us, your information will not be linked to your responses if your study is
otherwise anonymous.
If you have questions about your rights in the research or if a problem or injury has
occurred during your participation, please contact the NCU Institutional Review Board at
irb@ncu.edu or 1-888-327-2877 ext. 8014.
Voluntary Participation
If you decide not to participate, or if you stop participation after you start, there will be
no penalty to you: you will not lose any benefit to which you are otherwise entitled.
Audiotaping
244
I would like to use a voice recorder to record your responses. You cannot still participate
if you do not wish to be recorded.
Please sign here if I can record you for the purposes of this study:
Signature
A signature indicates your understanding of this consent form. You will be given a copy
of the form for your records.
participant Signature Printed Name Date
_____________________ _____________________ ____________
Researcher Signature Printed Name Date
_____________________ _____________________ ____________

Smith e d_mfinal_3_29_21

  • 1.
    1 Talking Chess: APhenomenological Study of Strategy and Social Reasoning in Chess Players Dissertation Manuscript Submitted to Northcentral University School of Social and Behavioral Sciences in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PSYCHOLOGY by ERIC SMITH La Jolla, California March 2021
  • 2.
    2 Abstract In this qualitativephenomenology study 9 chess players participated in semi-structured interviews to discern their thematic descriptions of how social cognition operates to form strategy. The Problem addressed in this study was the gap in understanding how chess players experience cognitive processes that reference social reasoning traits related to interpersonal strategy decision-making (Guntz et al., 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). The theoretical foundation for this phenomenological design was Theory of Mind. The main themes were Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy, Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy, and Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies. There are implications related to the definition of the term “empathy”. That the theme of cognitive empathy was well defined by chess player participants as a cognitive process used to discern strategy was strong indication that cognitive empathy, as a ToM quality, was prominent in chess play. Memory, intuition, and spatial calculations were also affirmed as strong functions in deciding chess strategy. Recommendation include extending research into how the temporo-parietal junction affects strategy, applications of empathy to artificial intelligence, and how this research can help chess coaching. Keywords: Cognitive empathy, chess, strategic decision-making, social reasoning, theory of mind
  • 3.
    3 Acknowledgements Dr. Ackerman, Dr.Tanksale, Dr. Verace, Jing Juan, and all the professors who helped me along the way.
  • 4.
    4 Table of Contents Chapter1: Introduction................................................................................................................... 1 Problem Statement .................................................................................................................. 10 Purpose of the Study…………………………………………………………………………11 Theoretical Framework………………….………………………………………………...…12 Nature of the Study................................................................................................................. 17 Research Questions................................................................................................................. 19 Significance of the Study........................................................................................................ 20 Defintion of Key Terms……………………………………………………………………...21 Summary................................................................................................................................. 23 Chapter 2: Literature Review........................................................................................................ 24 Theoretical Framework........................................................................................................... 25 Theory could Reveal Strategic Processes ............................................................................... 39 How to Recognize a Cognitive Strategy................................................................................. 43 Geometric Considerations on Cognitive Strategy................................................................... 48 Role of Intuition in Strategy ................................................................................................... 51 Personality Correlates with Strategy....................................................................................... 54 Limits of What can be Known Strategically ........................................................................... 58 Cognitive Capacities for Strategy and its Perceptions ............................................................ 61 Spatial Relationships and Memory Effect Strategy ................................................................ 63 Some Chemical Maps of Cognitive Strategy.......................................................................... 68 Cognitive Mechanisms and Strategy………………………………………………………...71 Consciousness Affects/Effects Cognitive Strategy and Neural Mapping............................... 75 Language, Space, and Chess................................................................................................... 78 Perspective Taking in Chess and Strategy .............................................................................. 86 Summary................................................................................................................................. 87 Chapter 3: Research Method......................................................................................................... 90 Research Methodology and Design ........................................................................................ 91
  • 5.
    5 Population and Sample........................................................................................................... 97 Materials/Instrumentation..................................................................................................... 100 Study Procedures................................................................................................................... 101 Data Collection and Analysis................................................................................................ 104 Assumptions.......................................................................................................................... 115 Limitations ............................................................................................................................ 115 Delimitations......................................................................................................................... 119 Chapter 4: Findings……………………………………………………………………………..126 Trustworthiness of the Data………………………………………………………………...126 Triangulation………………………………………………………………………………..130 Coding and Recoding…………………………………………………………………….…130 Discerning Collected Data and Prior Literature………………………………………….....131 Study Planning……………………………………………………………………………...132 Analysis and Recording Method…………..….………………………………………….…132 Bias and Coding………………………………...…………………………………………..134 Results…………………………………………...………………………………………….135 Evaluation…………………………………………...…………………………………...…165 Summary……………………………………………..………………………………….....171 Chapter 5: Implications, Recommendations, and Conclusions………………………………...175 Implications………………………………………………………………………….……..177 Further Implications of Theory………………………………………………………….…200 Recommendations for Practice……………………………………………………………..205 Recommendations for Future Research………………………………………………….…208 Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………...….212 References......................................................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. Appendix A: Recruitment Flyer.................................................................................................. 234 Appendix B: Screening/Demographic Questionnaire................................................................. 236 Appendix C: Screening Questions .............................................................................................. 241
  • 6.
    6 Appendix D: SitePermission.........................................................Error! Bookmark not defined. Appendix E: Informed Consent Form......................................................................................... 242
  • 7.
    1 Chapter 1: Introduction Theoryof Mind (ToM) explains how it is understood that through social reasoning then social emotions of others are interpreted and comprehended (Artinger, Exadakylos, Koppel, & Sa”a”ksvuori, 2014). According to ToM, decision-makers construct an understanding of other’s mental states and make inferences about other’s emotions, intentions and beliefs (Artinger et al., 2014). The game of chess has been well studied through experimental design due to its convenient format for discerning potential decision-making processes and strategies (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Chess offers unique applications to the study of ToM since chess both relies on predicting opponent’s sense of game conception and strategy. It as well as well relies on ascertaining the value and sequencing of choices made by opponents related to their confidence in controlling outcomes (Grabner, 2013; Powell et al., 2017). In 1893, Alfred Binet set out to map the cognitive virtuosity of a chess player’s decision-making processes and concluded (1966): If one could see what goes on in a chess player’s head, one would find a stirring world of sensations, images, movements, passions and an ever-changing panorama of states of consciousness. By comparison with these our most attentive descriptions are but grossly simplified schemata. Chess, sometimes called The Royal Game, has its origins in India, and is perhaps derivative of other Asiatic games (Fine, 2015). It can be considered a war game. It is now played in every Western society as well. In the Middle Ages chess was the most popular game of the leisure classes. First documentation of chess occurred around 1500 years ago. In
  • 8.
    2 2010 the UnitedStates Chess Federation (USCF) (2019) had approximately 80,000 members. It has been stated that there are 40 million chess players in the United States and perhaps 700 million players worldwide (Shenk, 2007). There is a universal system accepted to rate competitive chess players call Elo scoring (Albers & De Vries, 2001). Chess is male dominated, and the participation of women declines with age (Fine, 2015). In elementary school 40% of the players are girls, while there is only one top one hundred adult player who is female in the United States. Chess is by and large a middle-class mind sport. It has little bias toward age as competitive level players can be found from age four to one hundred, though cognitive diminishment has its negative affect. Magnus Carlsen, current World Chess Champion, said that one way to tell an experienced player from a novice is their insistence on perfectly arranging their pieces to be balanced in the center of their positional “square” (Karolyi, T., 2018). Further expertise in chess will be quickly discerned from players who move their pieces effectively to enact strategic combinations, in turn-based play, that maneuver their contingents of low (pawns) and high (rooks, knights, bishops and the Queen) pieces to trap the single King of their opponent (Shenk, 2007). A win, called a checkmate, occurs, when the opponent’s King can no longer move in any direction without being taken (Silman, 1998). Taking opposing pieces is simply done by landing on their square with any piece of one’s own during turn play. Chess has a constrained task environment with higher ecological validity as contrasted with other domains (Conner & Campitelli, 2014). Like chess, domains such as firefighting, football, or assembly lines require decisions based on spatial relations toward objects, but these environments would be difficult to study. Chess is stochastic, heuristic,
  • 9.
    3 strategic, rule-based, playedin a small-scale environment, has multitudes of pattern formations, has a player rating system, as well as reliance on executive and long-term memory functions of the brain. Thus, there is a large amount of quantitative research data involving chess expertise. Conner and Campitelli (2014) did find, in one of the few qualitative studies of chess, that chess experts qualitatively conceptualize representations of space different from novice players. Hence though quantitative analysis dominates chess studies there has been few effective cross-over studies that evaluate gameplay with qualitative methodologies. Chess also adheres to the rule of form (Grivas, 2017). It is a mentally demanding game of both memory and logical thought processes applied to vast variations. After a mere four- piece series of movements between opponents there are 288+ billion possible tactical piece positionings that both players can choose from to proceed (Grivas, 2017). Cognitive empathy (CE) is a key aspect of ToM related to comprehending another’s internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, & Moscovitch, 2013). CE has been measured to be a cognitive process involving specific brain functions (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). This materialistic discernment into another’s conceptual and feeling world, and subsequent comparison to one’s own inner world, can be the basis for tactical and strategic decision-making during chess. It is a function, biologically structured, that easily could have many ecological validities in many domains of human effort and endeavor. Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, and Crowley (2018) used quantitative designs to explore if awareness of opponent’s eye-gaze, body posture, aspects of self-touching, and emotion are utilized by chess players to solve difficult strategic problems. It was determined that situational understanding, and expert knowledge applied toward strategic gameplay decisions
  • 10.
    4 could be discernedthrough accurate perception of an opponent’s variation in facial emotions and increases in self touching. Otherwise, Buhren and Frank (2012) determined through their quantitative study that chess players are not more rational, in a game theoretic sense, than participants in other domains, but rather possess a particular combination of skills specific to chess that explains their expertise. Chess itself can be divided in analysis in several ways, one being tactical versus positional strategies and as well by levels of aggression and trickery utilized during gameplay (Silman, 1998). Qualitative study of chess player’s cognitive processes could lead to domain specific utilization of various cognitive processes that correspond to various strategic situations and conceptions. In turn, linguistic interpretation from phenomenological interviewing of cognitive awareness during gameplay could assist further quantitative studies. Still, Buhren and Frank (2012) determined rationality in chess does not necessarily mean rationality in other domains. These researchers gained data from over 6000 chess players who ranged in formal ranking from amateur to world class grandmasters. They found that when tasked with evaluating a beauty contest these chess players, essentially considered strongly rationally minded individuals while playing chess, were no more rational in their decision-making process than other novices, who did not play chess, when judging a beauty contest. Chess and beauty contests are both constant-sum games in that the sum of the payoffs does not depend on the outcome of the game. One can win a series of moves in chess, or portions of a beauty contest, and still lose overall. Both chess and beauty contests as well can hardly be solved for advantage based on backward-induction due to the large number of possible outcomes.
  • 11.
    5 Indeed, Buhren andFrank (2012) determined that chess experts, while playing chess, do not realize that making non-equilibrium moves likely affects their opponent’s summation of their rationality and would often cause the opponent to mimic the initial non-equilibrium move with rational equivalence. Non-equilibrium is when one player in a game makes a move not knowing, or believing, the move of the other player, or that the game is “tied” in equilibrium at that point (Kline, 2017). Thus, it can be an upsetting move, because it breaks the convention of choosing an optimal move due to the belief, or fact, that the game is in equilibrium, balanced and unwinnable, because both players know each optimal move. In equilibrium neither player may want to move, but since chess enforces moves until one player concedes, or their King no longer can move, then to avoid a draw, one player must make a move. That move disturbs the perceived equilibrium of the game to shuffle the pattern outcome of choices in the hope of an unforeseen winning positioning, or further progression toward a draw. This choice move at times could be called a gut choice, an instinct or intuition, made at a specific time of perceived advantage by going into unpredictable non- equilibrium. This could be considered a counter-intuitive, or a move that ignores an obvious immediate, or even strategically conceived, advantage, in the hopes that it shuffles the outcome through subsequent strategic decisions of the opponent. This can be so because a draw allows for the possibility of a later win in a series of game. One way to consider this is a player who makes a bad move in order to fool the opponent into making a worse move, or at least a move that does not follow typical outcome patterns as memorized by players and often followed in gameplay, so in a sense the whole game is in unknown, freed territory. Nonetheless, Buhren and Frank (2012) cite that chess masters score higher on intuition than logic in personality assessments. Sigirtmac (2016) found that children with chess
  • 12.
    6 training had statisticallysignificant higher scores in both creative thinking and Theory of Mind (ToM) than those without chess training. Further they found that ToM and creativity development have a positive relationship. Additionally, chess training was found to enhance children’s understanding of spatial concepts. Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann (2016) note that there is such a great amount of potential spatial relationships in chess that strategy can be based in size of the state space, size of the legal move decision tree, and as well considerations about how actual and potential spaces are connected. Again, this could indicate that finding one or more cognitive processes utilized in chess could be both reflective of one type of framework of strategic gameplay, and available to accurate generalizations of those cognitive processes in other domains. This while the same, or other cognitive processes in gameplay, depending on how one or both players are applying spatial conceptions, may not be effective or able to be generalized. It would seem any study would have to demonstrate specific routes from cognitive process to outcome, while specifically defining the conceptual frameworks that were active for the sets of data collected from specific spatial aspects of games and player cognitive types. Further experimental research as well could tie these thought processes to brain circuit systems. One way to conceive of spatial difference in gameplay is that one player may value positioning strategy based on using two less powerful pieces, a rook and a knight, in combination while sacrificing the more powerful Queen piece. This while another player may rely on strategy that utilizes the Queen in conjunction with several of the least powerful pieces, the pawns, who move less in space per turn, while the Queen can move the greatest in space of any piece on the gameboard. This of course reflects on time of strategy implementation and countermanding moves by opponents in turn-based play. There is the additional factor that
  • 13.
    7 the object ofboth strategies, the cornering of the King piece, is made unpredictable because the King moves as well, albeit one square at a time. In special first move conditions, the King, can move two squares at a time (called a Castle). This is one of two extraordinary moves in the game of chess. The other involves pawns taking pawns in special first move circumstances. Adding to complication of strategy formulation, the King, in fact any chess piece, can be defended by multiple pieces in various spatial formations that are both direct and indirect (Silman, 1998). Hence chess gameplay includes for the four categories of spatial relations; topological, directional, distance relations and relations by class (Stockdale & Possin, 1998). Technically, the Knight piece transcends the two-dimensional game space as it is the only game piece that can “jump” over other chess pieces to move, or even take an opponent’s piece by landing on it after “jumping” one of its own or an opponent’s piece in one of several L pattern movements (Silman, 1998). Predominately, chess has been considered, and analyzed, as a game of memory (Postal, 2012). Postal’s (2012) experimental design found that chess experts do not need to inhibit irrelevant information to increase performance but do rely on superior automatic and parallel assessment of information than novice players. These chunks of pattern recognition from memory form conceptual templates that predict outcomes from various spatial configurations of chess pieces during gameplay. Postal (2012) cites that there is a larger visual span for chess-related visual patterns. It is worth noting that chunking generally involves focus on one set of one’s own chess pieces for tactics and strategy to the exclusion of other, inactive or distracting, sets of one’s own pieces. Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, and Garcia-fin Ana (2017) studies demonstrated that chess and ToM have much overlap in neural networks, brain circuit patterns, which inhibit
  • 14.
    8 one’s own experiencewhen evaluating the mental state of others and for visual evaluation of action. These authors cite that memory of chess patterns is supported by “complex visual processing out of conscious awareness” when decisions of game strategy are made. They found that stress during complex chess gameplay creates sympathetic nervous system reactions, psychophysiological responses, that reduces heartrate variability in both novice and expert players. Artinger et al. (2014) assert that issues of game theory closely relate to conceptualization of strategic interaction in ToM. Interestingly, psychometric ToM measures are not able to capture the cues that chess opponents respond to in each other during play, but an accuracy in a chess player’s belief of their opponents perceived strategy of future decisions has been measured as effective to making superior piece movements during gameplay (Powell et al., 2017). Chess is a game that humans play, and as such concepts of game theory, lack of omniscience in knowledge of possible game moves, and uncertainty about absolute outcomes apply (Slezak, Sigma, and Cecchi, 2018). Slezak et al. (2018) acknowledge that in chess players do not exhaustively search all alternatives. At some point they make a decision to move a piece on limited knowledge and ability to plan ahead. This dynamic of choice was often found to accompany smaller, rather than broad, sets of projections into various strategic decision trees. How this decision is ultimately made is unanswered and remains a relevant question to researchers. Classic Dividend Discount Model (DDM) cannot identify reaction time (RT) distributions, as related to remember-know responses along confidence levels, created by chess play. Reigning World Champion and former child chess prodigy, Magnus Carlsen, states that he most always knows his exact move by a quick surmising of the chess
  • 15.
    9 pieces, but thentakes up to 30 minutes verifying the actual move by presumably working out decision tree patterns (Karolyi, 2018). Coates (2013) discusses how chess players need intuition to access the positional and strategic advantage at all points in gameplay. Indeed, chess players do find, or create for the first time, original chess combinations of moves that make for superior play. Perception can be interpreted as a sensory mode of the intentional state, or as a distinct component of sensing. Perhaps conceptual and biological, cognitive and otherwise as heartrate variability is associated with amygdala reactions and vagus nerve functions (Muppidi & Migles, 2017), engaged at differing sequences, frequencies, durations change how players engage the game, and correspondingly provoke, or do not, similar processes activated for gameplay decisions by their opponents. Or possibly some overall pattern recognition is sparked by spatial cognizance of that quality mentioned as outside the conscious mind by Powell et al. (2017). Or it may be some combination of these two, or otherwise processes. As Coates (2013) states in any way experience involves both intentional content and some feature that is distinctive of perception as in an awareness of phenomena qualities. These qualities are as well connected in some manner to external objects, perhaps the intuition or emotions of other players and their intentions, as perceived and not as a part of any mental or concrete representation. ToM’s cognitive empathy could account for this. Even cognitive choice that is based on strategic memory of prior play is participant to the opponent’s originality of choice, strategy, and unpredictable movement of pieces in chess as players respond in turn sequence to each and every chess move. Each chess game is unique in structure, concept, awareness and interpretation. Both players intentions form the direction of the game. Coates (2013) notes that players, even at the highest levels, most often place strong emotional significance on
  • 16.
    10 chess pieces respectively.Each loss of a piece can create strong emotional resonance for both the victor and loser of that piece. Problem Statement The problem addressed in this study was the gap in understanding how chess players experience cognitive processes that reference social reasoning traits related to interpersonal strategy decision-making (Guntz et al., 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). For instance, cognitive empathy has been found to reveal accurate perception of other’s states of mind (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). If chess players rely on cognitive empathy to pick strategy, then descriptive narratives may address at what point in strategic decision making these systems activate or the individual is aware of their activation and influence. Cognitive empathy has been found to give competitive advantage in chess games (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). Researchers have investigated chess players use of Theory of Mind, or awareness of an opponent’s body, thoughts, or emotions, and how these may lead to influence over game move choices, while some found ToM traits are a form of perspective taking based on imitation (Guntz et al., 2018; Laghi et al., 2016). If chess players could describe how they learn from other players, this could be an indication to further theory. Sigirtmac (2016) demonstrated how aspects of ToM influence modulations between cognitive and affective memory. Further language on how memory of other chess players feelings or impressions gained from social reasoning, such as cognitive empathy, in previous games might be more informative than first believed in strategic choice making during a current game for players. Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, and Crowley (2018) demonstrated complex systems of phenomenology that cannot be separated from the specific experience or reduced by study of specific cognitive mechanisms. These vague, yet active concepts could
  • 17.
    11 be initially revealedthrough qualitative interviews of chess players. Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann (2016) did research on how chess players interpret and represent space. Space can be a abstract, or at least multi-dimensional fact of construct, and again data from chess player interviews could give further indications of the differing elements, or conceptions, of space active in chess strategy. The gap is how language might reveal connections between spatial assessment and affective assessment might correspond. The lack of effective understanding in the research of primary, yet vague, mechanisms of strategic choice like intuition, or empathy, leaves research handicapped from a complete perspective of active dynamics in strategy formation (Powell et. al., 2017). Purpose of the Study The Purpose of this qualitative phenomenological study was to investigate the gap in descriptive narratives of chess players as to their perceptions of what influences tactical and strategic moves. This phenomenological study collected data in approximately one hour long, one-on-one semi structured interviews with up to twenty (1-20) chess players (Abayomi, 2017). Players were recruited from open online chess forums, through Facebook, and data collection took place by the researcher until saturation was effectively achieved with 9 participants (Guest et. al., 2006). Saturation allowed for descriptive validity and confirmation of how chess players experience the game of chess. Higher ranked chess players have been found to give richer descriptive detail, have more cognitive memory pattern awareness and apply unquantifiable qualities of intuition for effective strategy (Coates, 2013; Nippold, 2009; Powell, 2017). Strict criteria were included as the study sought adult participants who have played chess monthly, once or more, and for at least the last three months. After flyer distribution,
  • 18.
    12 on open chessforums in Facebook, then snowball method recruitment was to be allowed, but ultimately was not used as sufficient participants contacted the researcher individually from the Facebook posts (Emerson, 2015). Interviews with chess players were done remotely by ZOOM by the researcher and recorded in private. These recordings were later transcribed by computer program then edited by the researcher (Grivas, 2017). Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012) is a well-used framework for discerning how people describe meaning in events and phenomenon. Repeated and thorough deep reading of the data, Nvivo 12 analysis, as well as earnest bracketing of personal preconceptions, allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic themes (Holroyd, 2001). Nvivo 12 aides the researcher in ensuing words is not missed that accurately group and define potential themes that match the research questions. IPA finds and defines the particulars of phenomenon. Any statements derived from contrast and comparison within this method had sufficient instances of similar coding as to ensure that participants are speaking, or not, of the same quality of phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Clustering themes that have alternatively been sorted from emic and etic perspectives revealed new understanding as applied to the research questions. Such research assisted in the development of higher-level theory (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Theoretical Framework The basic definition of Theory of Mind (ToM) is that of a process of mind that allows one to understand the thoughts and intentions of others (Colle et al., 2019; Preckel et al., 2018). A primary conception of ToM is that it includes cognitive processes that discerns, interprets, and enhances self-other distinctions (Hajduk et al., 2018). The more one realizes the nuances in difference between one’s own thoughts and intentions and those of others then the more
  • 19.
    13 accurately one’s understandingof the reality between individuals becomes. Cognitive Empathy (CE) is a key cognitive process of ToM. CE is defined as one being able to comprehend another’s internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions (Powell et al., 2017). Theoretically individuals have differing levels of understanding various aspects of difference between themselves and others. If so, then individuals also could understand the participative differences within another more than that person understands those participative differences within themselves. This could be a great strategic advantage in any game. In the game of chess minimal superiority of knowledge in one context can outperform superior knowledge in diverse contexts within any given game (de Bruin, Riker, & Schmidt, 2007). For example, in chess one player can encircle an opponent with superior positioning, having taken more key pieces, and still the player in the weaker position can suddenly exploit something unseen, and then this is spontaneously discovered by both players, that then in turn secures immediate or eventual victory for the player who seemingly was at disadvantage (de Bruin, Riker, & Schmidt, 2007). Researchers have proposed chess players use a variety of methods to pick tactics and strategy such as instinct, analysis, intuition, logic, feeling, tactic, envisioning, pattern recognition, reasoning and problem solving (Lane & Chang, 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). Through Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis some of these terms as defined in language by participant interview may reflect uses of ToM’s cognitive empathy during chess gameplay (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006). Certainly, there are differences in style of play, and possible differences in the scope of player’s access to dimensions of awareness. There are also differences in scale of opponent’s conception of any given game and chess in general (Laws, 2014). Indeed, recent studies demonstrate that ToM has task functions for knowing that are
  • 20.
    14 automatic and unconsciousand that operate without direct verbal measures or instructions (Brock, Kim, & Kelly, 2017). This suggests something akin to intuition, mindreading, or empathy can be used for decision making (Montero & Evans, 2011). That these ToM processes are automatic and do not need prompting to be utilized may as well fit some conventional and theoretical definitions of an instinct (Kulke, Johannsen, & Rakoczy, 2019). For concepts such as empathy, intuition, and instinct there has not been conclusive science that illustrates how and when these cognitive formats operate between various routes of necessity, perception and physical mechanism (Duan et. al, 2012; Edwards, Beale, & Edwards, 2012). ToM is proposing that there are superior and active senses of awareness that allow individuals to ascertain accurately the inner workings of another’s thinking and belief processes (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014). These are said to be able to be active, without dialogue, originate from deep within the individual’s unconscious ability, know a truth (unconscious or otherwise) about a person separate from oneself, and may or may not be able to be perfectly identified or even consciously developed (Andrews, 2001). ToM includes for interactive behavioral tasks that utilize a great deal of anticipatory looking and facial emotion recognition (Zwick & Wolkenstein, 2017). Colle et al. (2018) suggests when ToM is used it reflects qualities of what has been called mindreading. There is interest in knowing how players will, when given time, describe how they knew the beliefs of their opponent’s decision making and strategy (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al., 2014). A study of chess players’ descriptions of strategy choices revealed some of their utilization of ToM processes and possibly could have applications to Game Theory (GM) (Fuentes-Garcia, 2019). GM compliments ToM in the study of decision-making through chess
  • 21.
    15 as it relieson complex mathematics for its structural underpinnings that calculates choice for greatest utility, and not necessarily from the furthest point of comprehended logic, hence decisions can be called intuitive (Chakravarty, Manipushpak, & Sarkar, 2015; Young, Peyton, & Zamir, 2015). Where ToM uses a sense like cognitive empathy to comprehend another’s internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions, GM conceives the totality of an interactive process then assigns a cost-benefit analysis of the best choice, to be implemented strategically at any exact moment and point, for ending up in a superior position to one’s opponent (Bosco, Berardinelli, & Parola, 2019; Guth, Huck, & Rapoport, 1998). There is interest in knowing how chess players belief that they have an understanding of an opponent’s process, scope and/or intention, and also believing they know how the combined dueling strategies of two opponents will intersect at multiple points to influence gameplay outcome that is operational and operationalized (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al., 2014). There may be complimentary methods for predicting the sequenced outcome of tactical choices and ways of stating time, matter, motion, direction and space as to infer intersecting future points through a logical, yet ultimately unquantifiable process (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al., 2014). Like ToM, GM does rely on a process of comparing player’s underlying structure of knowledge, belief and skills (Linhares, Freitas, Mendes, & Silva, 2012). In any game of two players there exists amassed conceptions and accessible memory of prior game experience (specific or generalized), and GM offers a framework of how the steps of choosing a game decision is based on those conceptions, sometimes using a process called discounting that relies on incomplete information that does remind one of the concepts of intuition (Linhares, Freitas, Mendes, & Silva, 2012). Discount choices, sub-game moves that are less than perfect as to be
  • 22.
    16 non-equilibria, are madewhen the likelihood of deciding from one’s less than the total game conception (and logical prediction of win/loss) - less logical outcome predicting - has perceived higher benefit due to complex, various, uncontrollable, or random factors of mutual game play (Buhren & Frank, 2012). This is especially relevant in chess where the combinations of consequences are vast, while the game play is fluid and dynamic. One can never fully know how their opponent will gamble, calculate, perceive, react, create error, or originate failing or succeeding sequences of game moves. As well since choices are turn based all such calculations have extended probabilities from each choice point of either player (Grabner, 2014). While ToM theorists might have interest in narrative descriptions of cognitive empathy during chess play, GM theorist do have interest in narrative descriptions of how and when discount game play choices were made (Marchisotto, 2019). There is much interest in spatial conception and analyzing of descriptions between scope and circumstance of chess players’ game conception across time and spatial dimensions that has theoretical merit (Leone, Slezak, Cecchi, & Sigman, 2014). Inherent in ToM and GM is that at times logic no longer suffices as the sole means of advantageous decision making (Crawford, Costa-Gomes, & Iriberri, 2012; Ong, Zaki, & Goodman, 2018). Chess players do discuss visceral feelings of varying intensities as moves instinctively indicate sudden shifts in player advantage (Slezak & Sigman, 2012). GM defines simultaneous games, where players make their decisions at the same time instead of in turn, as distinct from sequential games (Pozzulo, Reed, Pettalia, & Dempsey, 2016). Theoretical overlap occurred in that as cognitive empathy was being described as utilized by both players simultaneously, it seemed to indicate that such turn-based mind games, such as chess, are in fact both turn based and simultaneous. Ultimately, the skill of cognitive empathy to comprehend
  • 23.
    17 another’s internal realitythrough accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions might accurately be defined as the ability to predict the future choices of another (Powell et al., 2017). Nature of the Study An interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was utilized due to its efficacy for examining a topic deeply and on its own terms (Eatough & Smith, 2017; Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006). This method had strength in gleaning meaning from particular participative states and personal accounts. IPA offered research flexibility and applicability within a rigorous framework that allows for interpretation of nuance and complexity. A benefit of IPA was that it took both the researcher’s and participants interpretations into account. The feature of epistemological reflexivity allows for defining the possible scope of the research questions, how the study construction affects analysis, and exploring how differing aspects of study affected the investigated phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). With IPA the researcher was able to interpret what the participant was attempting to say at any given moment including unintended meanings. Since concepts like cognitive empathy, mindreading, and intuition are elusive, and IPA’s allowance for interpreting meaning from direct statements is especially useful. Intuition has been numerously, yet vaguely, assigned as a quality of superlative chess players tactical and strategic decision game move choices (Buhren & Frank, 2012; Coates, 2013). IPA techniques seemed to reveal if chess players have a hidden talent that even they themselves have not well defined or accepted awareness of. At the same time IPA lets phenomenon speak for itself from appearance, substance, or participatively. Chess does provoke great mental exertion and produces conditions for a variety of mental states of awareness in scope, depth, diversity of game conception, opponent assessment and gameplay choice. IPA was useful in categorizing distinct processes that occur during differing
  • 24.
    18 times, and scopesof reflection, of game play. If not asked, players might not have been aware of the variety of processes they apply to game move choices. Participants were recruited from open chess forums online, through Facebook, and actively playing at least once per month for the last three months. There were no restrictions on gender or ethnicity. As players were found from one source, that was deemed acceptable, and noted. Essentially participants were recruited by snowball sampling (Emerson, 2015) arising from posts on open chess forums on Facebook. The transcripts of recorded participant interviews were coded and compared as to discern thematic analysis from player to player by the researcher and by using Nvivo 12 computer software (2020). Nvivo 12 offered easy integration of multi-media, affordable pricing, user-friendly learning curve, easy file sharing in real time, and training support. Coding annotations were completed for insights that reveal participants’ perspectives describing any distinct perception of cognitive processes during chess play. Primary and subordinate themes were discerned and documented paying particular attention to phrasing indicating awareness of cognitive processes. Sources suggested saturation would be satisfied at 12 participant interviews, but essentially it was satisfied with 9 thorough interviews that began repeating most themes early (Guest et al., 2006). Saturation was justified when no new emergent themes or perspectives revealed themselves (Abayomi, 2017). Data was continually analyzed as it is gathered to insure thus. Repeated and thorough deep reading of the data, Nvivo 12 analysis, as well as earnest bracketing of personal preconceptions, allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic themes (Holroyd, 2001). This was the first form of triangulation (Arksey & Knight, 1999). A profile of meaning-statements (Bartholomew et al., 2019) was best used to analyze if experience
  • 25.
    19 contributed to theoryin relation of chess players reports of cognitive processes as defined by ToM. Referents (Richards, 2015) were extracted to be compiled as evidence of specific aspects of cognitive processes being reported by participants. Finally, a synthesis was obtained from the analysis of extended descriptions. Trustworthiness was established through prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, and referential adequacy (Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Each participant was asked the same set of questions. Participants were allowed to review data collected, member-checking, and its interpretation. The essence of this study was transferability in that chess was used to explore established theories of cognitive processes and consciousness, simply because thought and being are involved in chess and no one had yet asked these exact questions of perceptions of cognitive process shifts from chess players themselves. This though experimental studies vastly indicate such cognitive shifts exist in brainwave changes during play (Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana, 2017). Any game or experience can be investigated as to its relation to cognitive processes. Reliability was assured in that data will not be generalized beyond the sample. All criteria were intensely, attentively and tentatively, recorded as to how category decisions arrive. Overlaps and alterations were guarded against, while previously unobserved categories were distinguished. ResearchQuestions 1. What was the experience of cognitive empathy for chess players during game play? 2. How did chess players experience various cognitive processes such as Theory of Mind, spatial assessment, and memory to formulate strategy during game play?
  • 26.
    20 3. How didchess players experience pattern awareness as a separate construct from intuition, spatial calculating, or cognitive empathy, to make decisions about piece movements and strategy during game play? Significance of the Study A descriptive expansion of chess players’ conceptions of cognitive processes during gameplay contributed to how these processes apply to any form of game between opponents. For instance, as cognitive empathy (CE), a key aspect of ToM, was found being used in chess to any significant degree, it seemed likely to be used in other competitive venues and domains with greater frequency, and/or accuracy than traditionally perceived. Researchers do have interest in examples and elaborations of CE as an effective and relied upon method of perception (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). A descriptive analysis is a strong approach to begin to define new theoretical and practical space where cognitive processes may be used. Then new experimental methods generated for that expanded conceptual space. There seemed to be cognitive processes and structures that relied on ill defined, unconscious or automatic biological processes (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017) and these seemed to be revealed through descriptive narrations. Researchers do have interest in examples and elaborations of CE as an effective and relied upon method of perception (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). Themes revealed through narrations seemed to indicate vague awareness’s of unexplored cognitive processes by the chess players themselves. This was generalized to other games and domains of strategic competition. Defined terms, proportions, and perceptual standards of various cognitive processes were greater elucidated with a qualitative analysis of chess, which involved significant sequential decision making that has been greatly studied quantitatively but has had few phenomenological interviews.
  • 27.
    21 IPA techniques helpedthis research determine many chess decisions processes that until now have been ambiguously filed under the general heading of intuition. It seemed to be found that in chess cognitive empathy may be more specific than intuition to strategic decision making (Ciaramelli et al., 2013). Cognitive empathy, unlike intuition, is attached to the established, pervasive and pertinent Theory of Mind (ToM). Evidence gained from a phenomenology study of chess opponents was expanded into arguments of larger scale, scope, and social consequence. All transactions and competitions were viewed through the lens of how competing agents are playing game moves with each other. Chess is a simple game, in the sense of having an understandable and researchable format, that has complex processes. Chess allowed for interpretation of these processes that are worthy of expanded application to all levels of transactions and competitions that have significant social, economic, and political consequence. As decisions of significance are being made in any game based on non-rational, unconscious cognitive processes then research then this research is justified as having an interest in defining these qualities. Definitions of Key Terms Chess. Chess is a two-player game where principals are applied to checkmate an opponent’s highest-ranking game piece represented as a king (de Bruin, Rikers, & Schmidt, 2006) Cognitive empathy. Cognitive empathy is the ability to comprehend another’s internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions (Powell et al., 2017) Intuition. Intuition is a rational ascertainment of information that could give strategic advantage in the game of chess (Montero & Evans, 2011)
  • 28.
    22 Chess Tactic. Chesstactic is trying to figure out what is happening in the game during the moment when chess piece positions do not conform to any known typical pattern of play and strategic advantage (Montero & Evans, 2011) Chess Strategy. Chess strategy is game choice is determined by applying reason, or some cognitive perception, possibly from past game knowledge and pattern recognition of most likely predictable sequences of chess piece moves to gain advantage (Montero & Evans, 2011) Sequential Game. Sequential games are games where the player with the first move generally gains advantage, or payoff, in turn-based game systems. The second player generally responds with optimal move to the next worst payoff (Menon, Sasidevan, & Sinha, 2018) Simultaneous Game. Simultaneous games are games where players implement game moves by synchronous update (Menon, Sasidevan, & Sinha, 2018) Game Discount. Game discount is a point in a game when if strategy is followed there is no definitive cost in one strategy move over another, hence as player can choose from more than one strategy without risking advantage to the second player in their typical strategic payoff. A point in reducing expectations of benefit outcome and forcing a settlement to tactical strategies that seem to offer the best expectation for strategic advantage. An intuition of the expected value of a game move as anticipating strategic response and payoff of opponent to one’s own calculated game move. Over time a player in a game can choose a sub-optimal move, a discount, if later this sets in motion strategic advantage. This can involve alternating the perception of game time in relation to traditional strategies by choosing an unpredictable, apparently lower value game moves (Gransmark, 2012; Matros, 2018)
  • 29.
    23 Summary Essential points ofthis study included utilizing phenomenological interviews with chess players to gain data on their qualitative experiences of internal cognitive processes during gameplay. Chess offered a suitable mechanism of study to apply coded themes from phenomenological methods to identify and develop any common awareness or usage of various cognitive processes during gameplay. Similarly, other intuitive processes, said to be common in chess (Buhren & Frank, 2012), seemed to reveal other predictive methods of strategic game choices that speculated on incomplete, or inferred knowledge, like GM theory discount choices, mindreading, intuition, and empathy as used, but ill-defined methods of game play decisions that produce variance in outcomes. IPA, alongside Nvivo 12 application, provided a strong method for gathering and interpreting data. Traditional IPA criteria like saturation and trustworthiness (Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Guest, et al., 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) were applied to the analysis of the data. It was expected that if specific cognitive processes are described by chess players then IPA would discern and be able to allow for elaboration of these themes. There was a significant gap in the current research of any qualitative interviewing of chess players hence if significant unreported, unclassified, cognitive phenomenon was occurring in tactical or strategic decision making then this study had reasonable expectation of defining such occurrences and their potential descriptions.
  • 30.
    24 Chapter 2: LiteratureReview The topic of this study was the gap between experimental, quantitative designs and qualitative designs that provide participant interviews of the intensely researched field of cognitive processes that occurred during chess gameplay. While immense data has been collected on measuring chess players physiological processes during gameplay, very few researchers have endeavored to interview chess players to record how these processes are experienced during gameplay, in the chess players own words (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). While certain cognitive-physiological processes have been definitively demonstrated to occur during chess gameplay, many perceptions, such as intuition, that chess experts claim are essential to chess gameplay have not been studied in depth (Coates, 2013). This paper endeavored to qualitatively categorize the thematic language chess players may use to describe the physiological processes that have been immensely studied quantitatively. All searches for this dissertation study were initiated in Roadrunner of the Northcentral University online library. A literature search was initiated using key search terms including: “Phenomenological Methods”, “Chess”, “Theory of Mind”, “Cognitive Empathy”, “Strategy and Cognition”, and “Intuition and Chess”, individually and combining these key words in different combination. Generally, search limiters were not applied, though occasionally “full text” was applied. This method was found to set wider search parameters on adjoining and subsequent thematic fits for theoretical compiling and analysis.
  • 31.
    25 Theoretical Framework Theory ofMind (ToM) states there is a perceptual, cognitive framework that allows individuals to attribute mental state such as beliefs, intents, desires, and knowledge to oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). It proposes one can know the interior self or dialogue of the other through referencing differences between self and other, or cognitively registering attributes of other whether different or the same as self. Further it allows for one to acknowledge that others have belief, desires, intentions, and perspectives that are different from their own. It is considered a crucial daily skill to be used when socializing, evaluating, transacting, and judging interactions with fellow human beings. It is considered to confer the ability to infer through other’s behavior their beliefs, intents, desires, and knowledge. It is considered a proven cognitive mechanism that has been mapped extensively by way of neurological circuits and scientifically verified (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Deficit in ToM abilities are noted in some disabled groups such as autism, schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and consequence from some substance addictions (Korkmaz, 2011). Chess itself has often be associated closely with obsessive personalities such as Marcel Duchamp and Bobby Fischer (Taylor, 2011). When considering a Theory of Mind (ToM) one can make the assumption that mind does not exist, but one cannot prove that awareness of oneself and others does not exist, hence ToM is considered a valid existential proposition (Baron-Cohen, 1991). One, considered by society to be in their right mind, knows when another has acted an intent or desire through behavior onto themselves. One knows when arguing over a tangible object, like a meal, with another that the outcome maybe one, or both eat or do not eat. Empathy is often a related concept with ToM, as in the ability to “walk in another’s shoes” or “put oneself in another’s frame of mind” (de Waal,
  • 32.
    26 2007). Empathy inconsideration to ToM is thought of as cognitive instead of affective. It is not the ability to feel another person’s feeling, but simply to know what those feelings are and place them in relevant context. Raphael (2011) in his senior Honors Thesis argues that chess is a technical resource able to analyze social dimensions of human affairs. This concept was useful and seemed to parallel the idea of chess as a tool for analyzing ToM. Theory of Mind (ToM) has its origins from the time of Descartes when philosophy was considered a science of the mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1991). Currently debate centers between theory-theory and simulation theory, where in the first ToM abilities are innate and automatic within the sustained environment of human interactions. Theory-theory represents the intention of the shared world and other’s presumed needs (Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1987). In essence it is first perceptions and is reality. This line of thinking could sustain an underlying framework of ToM as significantly revealed through chess game play. Simulation theory posits all experience and perception as social and historical constructs that are operant in a context. This definition aligns well with Raphael’s (2011) thinking where all elements of identity are constructed on learned identities. With either perspective, ToM seemed to be able to allow for identifying differences of thinking between self and other. The history of ToM is deep and wide, if not historically long. Ontogeny, phylogeny, and study of infants in social setting indicated early forms of ToM (Meltzoff, 1995). Developmental psychology currently indicates that infant’s imitate others through ToM, perspective-taking, and empathy (Laghi et al., 2016). These are considered social-cognitive achievements. ToM develops through the years as the prefrontal cortex, planning and decision-making neural space as well develops. Two theories on language and ToM conjecture differing conceptualizations.
  • 33.
    27 Conversations within familiesmaybe creating ToM qualities (this through differentiating the roles and desires of various family members), while another (Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990) is that children learn to develop skills and perceptions when they are told or hear the words, and accompanying concepts, emotions, etc. – as related to “think” and “believe”. The temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Saxe, 2003) involves in language acquisition and contains specialization in facial and voice recognition as well as biological motion, in addition to maintaining functions of ToM. TPJ as well contains aspects of spatial understanding (all of which are addressed independently as significant factors in the research of strategy and chess) (Saxe, 2003). This area of the brain has been found active when taking in data through inferring other’s beliefs through reading or images, but TPJ is not active while observing physical control stimuli (Saxe, 2003). Culture may affect ToM abilities, the order they are acquired, or the strength of precedence (Etel & Yagmurlu, 2015). Researchers have proposed five key aspects of ToM that develop between ages 3 and 5, and they are diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access, false beliefs, and hidden emotions (Shahaeian et al., 2011: Wellman, 2006). Collectivism or Individualism of the society where the child grows up is considered to affect this ordering. It is interesting to consider how in chess all five likely come into relevance. If one is using empathy to predict another’s strategy, then strong ability to hide emotions is an advantage. Chess players invariably choose to implement variations of one of numerously diverse opening strategies and subsequent play into the middle and end portions of gameplay. This in turn at times seemed to conflict with the player who has the deepest, or fastest, knowledge access to counterstrategies. False beliefs about gambits in chess can be disastrous blunders or errors, both blunder and error being official chess terms for rating mistakes. Blunder being the worst mistake one could make.
  • 34.
    28 An interesting featureof ToM is that regardless if a situation is real, or pretend like in a child’s game, discerning other’s intents and beliefs can equally be active and sharp, including when someone is being deceptive, or something is false. It would be interesting to consider if games, likes chess, are real or pretend. Rapheal (2011) leans toward the game being a “reality”, if metaphoric. Theory of Mind (ToM) has many cognitive and affective nuances, many of which are experimentally linked to specific bio-chemical brain processes (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, & Moscovtich, 2013; Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana, 2017). Powell et al. (2017) found that cortical regions, when examined with magnetic resonance imaging in twelve healthy male novice level chess players, were identified as associated with ToM, chess, and empathizing. Functional neuroimaging studies have also found that brain regions that support ToM do overlap with strong significance to those that underlie episodic memory (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, and Moscovtich, 2013). The temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is responsible for processing affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all ToM tasks) as well as being an important cognitive region for spatial processing skills (Powell et al., 2017). As Ciaramelli et al. (2013) state that ToM allows for retrieving experiences of the past and applies them to current strategy with flexibility that increases probability of accuracy in perception of outcome. It was considered possible, as research further described may suggest (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018; Salvaggio, 2018), that ToM was selectively interpreting fragments of emotional memory (from various cumulative timeframes or specific ones). Or these could be interpretations of memories, by utilization of current cognitive perceptions that are then formed into beliefs. These beliefs then, in a game like chess, are what strategic decisions are based upon. The beliefs themselves were most
  • 35.
    29 likely, as theparticipant was queried, were put into words. Rapheal (2011) notes the slew of famous philosophers who have used chess as verbal metaphor for their worldviews such as Charles S. Pierce, Edmund Hurserl, Ferdinand de Saussure, Ludwig Wittgenstein, E.J. Brouwer, Paul Grice, and Jurgen Habermas. Chess does possess the general theme of strategy (Sillman, 1998). Experimental science has observed and linked several distinct cognitive processes to the decision-making structure of chess (Hangii et al., 2014). Experimental science has even identified when aspects of ToM are active in the brain, during chess play, and otherwise (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, & Moscovtich, 2013; Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana, 2017). The themes seemed to develop and are the feelings, emotions, and thoughts that chess players experienced while playing chess and how they felt these various processes were active and shift in between themselves. These thematic accounts ranged from a diary of vast moods to a chronology of precise thoughts, or likely some combinations of both, and for some seemed to a roller-coaster ride between shifting cognitive states, much like what Binet (1966) earlier hypothesized. Since ToM has been demonstrated to work with specific areas of the brain, experimental design of activities, like chess, are effective for measuring when these brain regions are active (Hangii et al., 2014). Study of active brain regions during chess and evident alterations during gameplay has generally focused on what is occurring in the present. Even more recent, survey style research (Powell et al., 2017) has not studied how ToM and chess perceptions have changed over long durations of chess training. There seemed as well maybe natural and spontaneous processes of cognitive empathy that automatically activated in
  • 36.
    30 any competitive situationno matter the prior experience with that form of competition. In this regard, the experimental study of ToM during chess play does not draw many connections between the theoretical development of ToM, which includes for much analysis of childhood development of ToM skills (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Call, 1998; Etel & Yagmurlu, 2015; Gagliardi et al., 1995; Meltzoff, 2003) and ToM development specific to chess. Powell et al. (2017) did extensive research in regard to connections between cognitive empathy, ToM, and chess. The neuropsychological protocols included participants completing an imposing memory task (IMT). This allowed a measurement of participant’s ability to infer mental states of others. Participants were asked questions that reveal their understanding of the intentions and facts of each situation. fMRI activation tasks were then studied experimentally where three images are presented to the participants and then measured for ToM and empathy. Interestingly as participants were asked to imagine spatial moves that would be most beneficial, from looking at chess images, MRI data collected indicated brain area activation matching for all three categories: Empathy, ToM, and general chess strategic thinking with significant overlap (Powell et al., 2017). This seemed to indicate imagining spatial problems triggers brain processes that also activates empathy. This data seemed to synthesize with what is known about the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as responsible for processing affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all ToM tasks) as well as being an important cognitive region for spatial processing skills (Powell et al., 2017). Results further indicated that chess and ToM have much overlap in neural networks that inhibit one’s own experience when evaluating the mental state of others and for visual evaluation of action. Hence, ToM achieves its goals when one’s self awareness is reduced and awareness of the other, an opponent, is enhanced. This again being confirmed in increased activation of the
  • 37.
    31 temporoparietal junction (TPJ).Indeed, visual evaluation of action seemed to rely on the same suppression of self-awareness. Research is demonstrating (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Powell et al., 2017) that the relation of a sense, or accuracy of perception, of knowing what one’s opponent is planning, or feeling about plans, is pertinent to cognitive strategic thinking. This sense self then knows how to gauge, incorporate, and evaluate space (and its relations to strategy) as specifically existing in relationship to the opponent (and the game). The thematic type of language one might expect from chess players when describing some of these processes sounded like some of the early philosophical arguments of existence, origin, and nature of ToM itself (Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1987; Fox, 2014). They also sounded like reading body language, intuition, and perhaps even calculating another’s limitations to conceive multiplicities of spatial relationships from the static present to the dynamic future. Further, cognitive emotional evaluations and spatial recognition processes seemed to be more connected, or interdependent in strategic choice making than realized. This allowed for play language to develop themes of where scientifically, specifically neural networks might be indicated as experienced differently, or at differing time junctures or transitions. This in combinations of experienced overlap, or reaction delays from when the neural network is active in the brain, but felt by the chess player, or decided upon by the chess player for strategic initiation of action. A defensive neural network in Player 1’s reaction might activate from Player 2’s moves three turns earlier, but then the memory of that experience does not activate a countermove choice until three turns later by Player 1. Player 2 might make the next current strategic move based on his own memory of cognitive empathy from Player 1’s initial neural defense network activation, these six moves earlier! Goffman, Lemert, and
  • 38.
    32 Branaman (1997) suggestsome players may repress strategic thinking for rule-based thinking, while Kuhn (1962) suggests game players may think outside the box, which suggests ideas of ToM, empathy reading, and intuitive leaps. Durkheim and Lukes (1982) suggests games contain aspects of social facts, sacredness, and profanity. Recall all pieces can potentially be removed by any other piece within the game rules and they are labelled with names like bishop, knight, pawn, queen, and king. Leading to the next section considering alternative theories and subsequent sub-themes it is interesting to be reminded that De Saussure frequently claimed that the language of chess is perfect for elucidating contrast between the essentialisms of synchronic and diachronic relationships as well as between langue and parole (Greenberg, 1971). Alternative Theories Game Theory (GM) was considered a strong alternate theory for phenomenological interview design. GM would complement ToM in study of decision-making in chess as it relies on complex mathematics that calculates for choices based on greatest utility. GM as well does not attempt to calculate the furthest point of comprehended logic, hence decisions based on it can be called intuitive (Chakravarty et al., 2015; Young, Peyton, & Zamir, 2015). Since chess cannot be calculated to its endpoint, even by the most powerful computers such backward induction is not possible, and due to so many possible choice combinations GM is especially relevant in chess where the combinations of consequences are vast. Chess play is fluid and dynamic between opponents, hence knowing how one’s opponent conceives, feels, gambles, calculates, perceives, and many other modalities of knowing the given gameplay options, and even how what opponent know or think they know of their opponent’s own beliefs, conception, feelings,
  • 39.
    33 calculation, etc. ofthe game’s strategic possibilities is paramount. Aspects of GM are also similar to ToM in that they do make such overall assumptions about intentions of opponents. Game Theory (GM) includes sequential games where at each point of the decision-tree there are various payoffs, and each point has its own equilibrium that can be optimized for benefit of one player over another to percentage or degree based on games of deception, bluff, randomness, accident, or calculation. GM also defines simultaneous games, where players make their decisions at the same time instead of in turn, as distinct from sequential games. Chess could be considered both a sequential and simultaneous game in that strategy is constantly forming in neutral points in between moves. Further definition of sequential games could be a game where the player with the first move generally gains advantage, or payoff, in turn-based game systems. The second player generally responds with optimal move to the next worst payoff (Menon, Sasidevan, & Sinha, 2018). Further definition of simultaneous games could be games where players implement game moves by synchronous update (Menon et al., 2018). Buhren and Frank (2012) determined that chess experts do not realize that making non-equilibrium moves likely affects their opponent’s summation of their rationality and would often cause the opponent to mimic the initial non-equilibrium move with rational equivalence. Non-equilibrium is when one player in a game makes a move not knowing the move of the other player or believing that the game is “tied” in equilibrium at that point (Kline, 2017). Thus, it can be an upsetting move, because it breaks convention of choosing an optimal move due to the belief, or fact, that the game is in equilibrium, balanced and unwinnable, because both players know each optimal move. In equilibrium neither player may want to move, but since chess enforces moves until one player concedes, or their King no longer can move, then to avoid a draw one player may make a move that disturbs the
  • 40.
    34 perceived equilibrium ofthe game to shuffle the pattern outcome of choices in the hope of an unforeseen winning positioning. This could be called a gut choice, an instinct or intuition, made at a specific time of perceived advantage by going into unpredictable non-equilibrium. Often players concede without making such a choice, perhaps as to not appear foolish. Chess does seem to use intuition somehow. In fact, Buhren and Frank (2012) cite that chess masters score higher on intuition than logic in personality assessments. Sigirtmac (2016) found that children with chess training had statistically significant higher scores in both creative thinking and ToM than those without chess training. Further they found that ToM and creativity development have a positive relationship. Additionally, chess training was found to enhance children’s understanding of spatial concepts. Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann (2016) note that there is such a great amount of potential spatial relationships in chess that strategy can be based in size of the state space, size of the legal move decision tree, and as well considerations about how actual and potential spaces are connected. These concepts have overlap with both GM and ToM. Aspects of brain interactions related to these qualities also have neural overlap (Powell et al., 2017). There are other advantages of using GM to study empathy and/or choice in chess. If expertise can be enhanced by effective use of intuition, and chess is a strong zero-sum context game, then defining this process and quality has research and practical validity. Creativity has again been linked to ToM (Sigirtmac, 2016) and Game Theory (GM) has been linked to ToM (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014). Like ToM, GM does rely on a process of comparing player’s underlying structure of knowledge, belief and skills, the two players amassed conceptions and accessible memory prior game experience. GM often adds the steps of choosing a game decision based on those conceptions, sometimes using a process called
  • 41.
    35 discounting that relieson incomplete information in a process that sounds like intuition (Linhares, Freitas, Mendes, & Silva, 2012). Discount choices, sub-game moves that are less than perfect as to be non-equilibria, are made when the likelihood of deciding from one’s less than the total game conception, one’s with less logical outcome predicting, has perceived higher benefit due to complex, various, uncontrollable, or random factors of mutual game play (Buhren & Frank, 2012). This is especially relevant in chess where the combinations of consequences are vast, while the game play is fluid and dynamic. One can never fully know how their opponent will gamble, calculate, perceive, react, or originate failing or succeeding sequences of game moves. As well since choices are turn based all such calculations have extended probabilities from each succeeding choice point of either player (Grabner, 2013). Further definition of discounting could be a point in a game when if strategy is followed there is no definitive cost in one strategy move over another, hence as a player can choose from more than one strategy without risking advantage to the second player in their typical strategic payoff. There can be a point in reducing expectations of benefit outcome and forcing a settlement to tactical strategies that seem to offer the best expectation for strategic advantage. An intuition of the expected value of a game move as anticipating strategic response and payoff of the opponent to one’s own calculated game move. Over time a player in a game can choose a sub-optimal move, a discount, if later this sets in motion strategic advantage. This can involve alternating the perception of game time in relation to traditional strategies by choosing an unpredictable, apparently lower value game move (Gransmark, 2012; Matros, 2018).
  • 42.
    36 Chess is agame that humans play, and as such concepts of game theory, lack of omniscience in knowledge of possible game moves, and uncertainty about absolute outcomes apply (Slezak et al., 2018). Slezak et al. (2018) acknowledge that in chess players do not exhaustively search all alternatives. At some point they make a decision to move a piece on limited knowledge and ability to plan ahead. This dynamic of choice was often found to accompany smaller, rather than broad, sets of projections into various strategic decision trees. How this decision is ultimately made is unanswered and remains a relevant question to researchers. Classic Dividend Discount Model (DDM) cannot identify reaction time (RT) distributions, as related to remember-know responses along confidence levels, created by chess play. Reigning World Champion and former child chess prodigy, Carl Magnusson, states that he most always knows his exact move by a quick surmising of the chess pieces, but then takes up to 30 minutes verifying the actual move by working out decision tree patterns (Thayqua, 2018). Coates (2013) discusses how chess players need intuition to access the positional and strategic advantage at all points in gameplay. Thus, sense for where the balance of power resides currently and toward future outcomes has many values. These are the sorts of values that have use in politics, economics, and interpersonal relations. Chess must create itself on some level if there are so many probabilities as of yet not played. In chess players do find, or create for the first time, original chess combinations of moves that make for superior play (Coates, 2013). Perception can be interpreted as a sensory mode of the intentional state, or as a distinct component of sensing. As Coates (2013) states either way experience involves both intentional content and some feature that is distinctive of perception as in an awareness of phenomena qualities. These qualities seemed as well connected in some manner to external objects, perhaps the intuition or emotions of other
  • 43.
    37 players and theirintentions, as perceived and not a part of any mental or concrete representation. Even cognitive choice that is based on strategic memory of prior play is participant to the opponent’s originality of choice, strategy, and unpredictable movement of pieces in chess as players respond in turn sequence to each and every chess move (Larson, 2018). Each chess game is unique in structure, concept, awareness and interpretation (Matros, 2018). Both players’ intentions form the direction of the game. Coates (2013) notes that players, even at the highest levels, most often place strong emotional significance on chess pieces respectively. Each loss of a piece can create strong emotional resonance for both the victor and loser of that piece. GM theory would have generally challenged emotional values of individual pieces over utilitarian values but can as well account for illogical decision making. A study of chess players’ descriptions of strategy choices could have revealed their utilization of ToM processes and possibly could have applications to GM (Fuentes-Garcia, 2019). Where ToM uses a sense like cognitive empathy to comprehend another’s internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions, GM conceives the totality of an interactive process then assigns a cost-benefit analysis of the best choice, to be implemented strategically at an exact moment and point, for ending up in a superior position to one’s opponent (Bosco, Berardinelli, & Parola, 2019; Guth, Huck, & Rapoport, 1998). There is interest in knowing how chess players believe they have an understanding of an opponent’s process, scope and/or intention. This can be a belief based on combined dueling strategies of two opponents and the one who predicts the outcome of multiple points of future strategic outcome. Research has identified complimentary methods for predicting the sequenced outcome of tactical choices. This includes for ways of stating time, matter, motion, direction and space that can be inferred at
  • 44.
    38 intersecting future pointsthrough a logical, yet ultimately unquantifiable process (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al., 2014). GM at times already labels these choice points with descriptions that sound much like intuition, or possibly cognitive empathy (Garcia-Pola, Iriberri. & Kovarik, 2017). While ToM theorists might have interest in narrative descriptions of cognitive empathy during chess play, GM theorist do have interest in narrative descriptions of how and when discount game play choices were made (Marchisotto, 2019). There is much interest in spatial conception and analyzing descriptions between scope and circumstance of chess players’ game conception across time and space dimensions that has theoretical merit (Leone, Slezak, Cecchi, & Sigman, 2014). Inherent in ToM and GM is that at times logic no longer suffices as the sole means of advantageous decision making (Crawford, Costa-Gomes, & Iriberri, 2012; Ong, Zaki, & Goodman, 2018). Again, chess players do discuss visceral feelings of varying intensities as moves instinctively indicate sudden shifts in player advantage (Slezak & Sigman, 2012). GM defines simultaneous games, where players make their decisions at the same time instead of in turn, as distinct from sequential games (Pozzulo, Reed, Pettalia, & Dempsey, 2016). Theoretical overlap could occur if cognitive empathy, being utilized by both players simultaneously, indicates that such turn-based mind games, such as chess, as in fact both turn based and simultaneous. Ultimately, the skill of cognitive empathy to comprehend another’s internal reality through accurate perception of their beliefs and intentions might as accurately be defined as the ability to predict the future choices of another (Powell et al., 2017). A descriptive analysis was considered a strong approach to begin to define new theoretical and practical space where CE is used and then can develop new experimental methods for that expanded space (Montero & Evans, 2011). Hence, theories like GM and
  • 45.
    39 Chunking Theory thatdo not have to rely on ToM and cognitive empathy to explain strategic choices could be most substantial since they relate to conscious awareness more than unconscious awareness. Or if there are more unconscious structures, like cognitive empathy choosing points of discount, in chess play then the unconscious processes might have played a role of greater significance in many games and competitions that require decision making, strategic thinking, and speculative knowing (Menon, Saisdeven, & Sinha, 2018). Defined terms, proportions, and perceptual standards of CE were considered to offer greater elucidation with a qualitative analysis of chess, which involved significant sequential decision making that has been greatly studied quantitatively but has had few phenomenological interviews (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013). Theory could Reveal Strategic Processes Which approach one used to study conscious and unconscious aspects of chess decision making could have revealed which theory most incorporates strategic processes in chess. IPA techniques helped research determine many chess decisions processes, that have been called excellent and necessary, that until now have been ambiguously filed under the general heading of intuition. CE is more specific than intuition (Bosco, Berardinelli, & Parola, 2019; Guth, Huck, & Rapoport, 1998) and may be what chess experts mean by intuition, and CE is attached to established, pervasive and pertinent Theory of Mind. Evidence gained from a phenomenology study of chess opponents seemed to expand into arguments of larger scale, scope, and social consequence. All transactions and competitions were viewed through the lens of how competing agents are playing game moves with each other (Glykas, 2013; Mihailov & Savulescu, 2018). Chess is a simple game in the sense of being an understandable and researchable format which has complexities that make processes and interpretation of these processes worthy of expanded
  • 46.
    40 application to alllevels of transactions and competitions that have significant social, economic, and political consequence (Matros, 2018). If decisions of significance are being made in any game based on non-rational, unconscious processes research has an interest in defining these qualities (Andersen, 2014). What is transporting a game forward, like chess, that has several dimensional considerations intersecting in complexity and sophistication at all times has wider applications on many possible decision-making constructs (Taillan, Dufau, & Lemaire, 2015). Similarly, other intuitive processes, said to be common in chess (Coates, 2013), seemed to reveal other predictive methods of strategic game choices that speculate on incomplete, or inferred knowledge. Such theoretical concepts such as GM theory discount choices, mindreading, intuition, and affective empathy; all as possibly indicated as often used, but ill- defined methods of game play decision-making practices that produced variance in outcomes. IPA, and Nvivo 12 application, provided a strong method for gathering and interpreting such data. Traditional IPA criteria like saturation and trustworthiness (Rodham, Fox, & Doran, 2015) were applied to the analysis of the data. It was expected that if unconscious processes of CE and GM were applied to chess by players then IPA discerned these themes and began a significant mapping of the language that describes them. There is a significant gap in the current research of any quantitative interviewing of chess players (Nippold, 2009; Balata et al., 2015), hence if significant unreported, unclassified, phenomenon was occurring in tactical or strategic decision making than this study has reasonable expectation of defining new occurrences and their descriptions. Once again, application of any intersections or complimentary processing of CE with choices made through Theory of Mind has wide potential in adding to the psychology of both political and physical sciences (Feher & Huck, 2016; Linhares et al., 2012). For instance, in the
  • 47.
    41 psychology of environmentalism,one can imagine majority agreement on several prominent paths of bio-planetary life destruction or preservation paths. GM would as well include for a discount decision point where, though ultimate conclusions and timeframes cannot be completely known, if there were a planet wide political agreement to discount the game and vastly reduce certain types of technological expansion then longevity of sustainable bio-planetary life would increase (Garcia-Pola, Iriberri, & Kovarik, 2017). In essence any understanding of finite and infinite choice games, with random factoring or not, was considered to benefit from defining choice points between the knowledge of a full game to its end. This could as well be examined from a freeze frame understanding of as much of the totality of the game by either player at any given point in process. This being the earlier expanded definition of sequential and simultaneous games. All possibly having universal aspect in the physical sciences as at the quantum level, for now applying the Uncertainty Principal, it is known only a position (simultaneous game/cognitive empathy/intuitive leap with or without known conclusion, i.e., Schrodinger’s Cat (Halpern, 2015) or a momentum (sequential game/pattern recognition/logic outcome with or without known conclusion) of a particle can be known at any given point in time (Mureika, 2019). This again may be considered to open doorways to applying human mechanisms to artificial intelligences in ways surpasses binary decision processes. Originally this study was to include both Theory of Mind (ToM) and Game Theory (GM). Ultimately, GM was eliminated from primary considerations because ToM offers more direct evaluation of potential Cognitive Empathy (CE) through qualitative feedback. CE is a significant variable to this research in that it contains components of memory and cognition related to strategic decision-making. IPA was considered best to discern cognitive empathy at
  • 48.
    42 the rudimentary levelby categorizing player language into themes that may suggests its use in strategic decision making. Since there are many aspects of conscious and unconscious process suggested in both chess game play and strategic choice, a rudimentary approach was considered prudent as to begin to build a new structural base of analysis that research can add to as to better solidify theoretical positions and constructionist arguments. ToM is developed in quantitative design, but not strongly developed in qualitative design regarding chess strategic decision- making processes. Chunking Memory Chunking Theory is often experimentally associated with cognitive processes of chess play (Lane & Chang, 2018). Chunking Theory is the learning through memory of models and patterns that can be recognized and reacted to in strategic play (Gobet, Lane, & Lloyd-Kelly, 2015; Simon & Gilmartin, 1973). This theory has been demonstrated to work to explain large aspects of chess play (Hanggi et al., 2014). Still, it does not have application in the sense of affecting the opponent’s intentions as does Theory of Mind (ToM) (Kulke, Johannsen, & Rakoczy, 2019). Chunking accounts for degrees that information is grouped into explicit categories of distinct valence (Wegener, 2001). Such a process compresses large, but finite datasets into meaning (Bor, 2012). This data is specifically conscious as its structure relates to existing knowledge (Bor, 2012). A ToM process, such as cognitive empathy, was considered able to be studied in chess players distinctly from chunking in that it is an instantaneous realization of strategic intentions of an opponent and not an accessing of one’s own memory to choose a strategic pattern of implementation. Though primitive inputs maybe accessed in both chunking and cognitive empathy, cognitive empathy seemed not to require sophisticated levels of abstract thinking as would chunking. Chunking most reasonably seems
  • 49.
    43 linked to Preservationism(Salavaggio, 2018), theory of memory, since it implies accessing accurate components of memory. Still, since chess study is cumulative, chunking theory maybe resembles Reconstructive, memory theory, in that it is processes memory over time (Salavaggio, 2018). How to Recognize a Cognitive Strategy There are many ways of knowing that correlate specifically to activation in certain regions of the brain (Schaigorodsky, Perotti, & Billoni, 2014). Schaigorodsky et al. (2014), in research that may already be outdated or misapplied as to duration and operational exactitude of how memory works (Salvaggio, 2018), found that expert chess players have stronger long- range memory correlations. This would indicate that they match strategic pattern information from the present to accurate information from the past. This indicating that memory of how prior games resulted from current strategy based on chess pieces locating the same, or similar, spaces on the gameboard. The research might indicate how many processes and how long they can be held in memory. Salvaggio’s (2018) research does not necessarily suggest any ToM, or empathetic quality, to strategic decision making in chess. Such a process as empathetic knowing informing strategy might indicate a sense in the moment of comparing sensed emotional resonances from the present to sense of what self, or opponents, were feeling before strategic choices in prior games. This being Kuhn’s (1962) proverbial thinking outside the box. To the inexperienced this could seem like mindreading in a sense but reflecting on the theoretical development of ToM one can imagine its properties are long term, and long lasting in recall and affect (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). As far as how memory works in chess strategy, a more productive direction of inquiry may have been pursued by Eredita and Ferro (2015) in identifying a generalization process of
  • 50.
    44 thinking which couldmore accurately define how chess players come to strategic decisions. This means that accumulated knowledge in study and experience create configural concepts where geometric patterns and logical expected developments coexist. This idea as well seemed at times to stand alone and to exclude for empathy as a discerning factor in strategic choice. Then again, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) is responsible for processing affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all ToM tasks) as well as being an important cognitive region for spatial processing skills (Powell et al., 2017). It could also mean that episodic memory (Ciaramelli et al., 2013) is being scanned for neural overlap that activates pattern recognition cognitive processes, spatial strategic processes, or correlating emotional resonances indicated by empathy, through body movement interpretation or otherwise, and predicting strategy. Nevertheless, strategic choice in chess consistently activates ToM, spatial, and empathy cognitive processes (Powell et al., 2017). Participants with even intermediate descriptive skills seemed to be indicating these processes in language that approximated these thematic categories. Chess adheres to convenient general principles that allow for multiple perspectives or processes of cognitive awareness that could be happening in sequence or all at once. Eredita and Ferro (2015) claim chess strongly adheres to aspects of generalization, abduction, and configural concepts. Abduction is when a chess player recognizes a situation they are in during gameplay and is able to overlay it into a known class. Generalization is the predicting of outcomes based on how that class is known to behave. The construction and deconstruction of configural concepts, they suggest, are sensuous mental operations brought into reality by continued generalizations. These sensuous mental operation seemed to at times align with Brock, Kim, and Kelly’s (2017) demonstrated ToM task that are automatic and
  • 51.
    45 unconscious and thatoperated without direct verbal measures or instructions (Andrews, 2001) and to ToM definitions which stated as active, without dialogue, and originating from deep within the individual’s unconscious ability, knowing a truth (unconscious or otherwise) about a person separate from oneself, and may or may not have been able to be perfectly identified or even consciously developed. These cognitive processes and structures are said to exist, but rely on ill defined, unconscious or automatic biological processes (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). Shenk (2007) suggests chess origins are mythic as either Pythagoras used it for solving math problems or Palamedes, a Greek military officer, used it for battle strategy practice. Further implications of abstractions as a concept were investigated. Several methods and processes have been designed to assess the qualities of ToM. Powell et al.’s (2017) quantitative study includes for ToM and empathy. They define a chief characteristic of ToM as accuracy in knowing the thoughts and intentions of others. Even further ToM is defined as cognitive processes that discern for patterns of belief and thought rooted in cultural matrixes and that this discernment is based on social instinct within context (Cohen, Sasaki, & German, 2015). How chess is conceived of as a construct may divide among cultural demographics. A chess player’s belief in generalizations, and how flexibility is required to predict success due to complexity, may or may not align with simultaneous cognitive processes that are registering beliefs formed and interpreted by ToM applications to gameplay. Many chess players may not have words for concepts that they regularly use but may be able to create a language when inquired upon with interview language. Chess players generally like to solve problems and might be engaged to accurately describe strategy they have experienced often, but never been asked about specifically. Ability for spatial awareness and calculation maybe a social instinct that some possess to greater degree than others. So
  • 52.
    46 too, could empathyhave great variation in chess strategy. The TPJ seemed to be modulating both processes interdependently or independently, alongside other known or unknown cognitive brain mechanisms or not. Further, and detailed, study is required. For concepts such as empathy, intuition, and instinct there has not been extensive research on how and when these cognitive formats operate between various routes of necessity, perception, and physical mechanism, as would be the demands if they are used during chess strategy decision making (Duan et. al, 2012; Edwards, Beale, & Edwards, 2012). Intuition is frequently cited by chess experts as the most important quality to strong chess play (Buhren & Frank, 2012; Coates, 2013; Powell, 2017). Still, intuition needs to be studied further, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in regard to chess and strategic decision making. Intuition has similarly defined qualities to ToM, cognitive empathy, and affective empathy, in that intuition seems to have an innate and immediate understanding of a situation inclusive of other’s thoughts, intentions, and possibly emotions. An identification of intuition during chess-play and corresponding neural pathways was considered to be useful. Personality type, such a Myers-Briggs or others, was considered interesting additional dimensional scale, alongside cultural demographics, to analyze chess players in relation to how much ToM qualities, or spatial memory calculations, they utilized during play (Myers, 2016). Intuition is said to need to pull from all relevant sets of memory processes and perceptions of the immediate environment (Betsch & Glockner, 2010). In chess, a game where body language is evident due to the proximity of players to each other, ToM skills that include for interactive behavioral tasks that utilize a great deal of anticipatory looking and facial emotion recognition (Zwick, 2017) was considered to possible indicate connections between intuition and reading body reactions. Some individuals according to Myers-Briggs possess more intuition, and
  • 53.
    47 use it withvarious specializations, than others (Myers, 2016). Intuition, like forms of empathy, may transcend typical conceptions of cognitive processes. More than one researcher suggests empathy maybe related to mindreading (Bloom, 2017; Colle et al., 2019; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013). Intuition could have neural overlap with any of the cognitive processes related to theoretical and practical concepts of memory including visual-spatial, episodic, long-term, dual processing, and working (Cohen et al., 2014; Markovits et al., 2019; McCabe et al. 2011; Salvaggio, 2018). ToM has been linked to both memory and types of memory as well as chess and both are linked to spatial understanding. Cohen et al.’s (2014) work brings together an expanded frame of reference for study, rather than merely Type I and II dual cognitive processing mechanisms that separate decision-making on rapid belief judgements (Type I) and rule- based, working memory processes (Type II) (Markovits et al., 2019). Their research focuses on if ToM processes reflect representational processing or mental state processing. Mental representations are beliefs, while representational processing relate to non-mental, linguistic information. Both are represented propositionally. Since chess has been studied through ToM and has aspects of belief processes (Intuition and cognitive empathy), then a further flushing out of linguistic associations during mental processes was considered to be useful to triangulate Cohen et al.’s (2014) finding that ToM is more closely associated with processing specific mental states rather than representations more broadly. Indeed, there should be further questions as Markovits et al. (2019) found that both Type I and Type II processes have their own form of intuitive decision-making. Here, empathy was considered to be rapid belief judgement, perhaps recalled from memory as Ciaramelli et al. (2013) asserted memory and empathy are connected processes.
  • 54.
    48 Geometric Considerations onCognitive Strategy How space is conceived has been linked to strategic assessments and methods of both chess and ToM. Atashpendar, Schilling, and Voigtmann (2016) stress in their study that the complexity in configurations of movement is multiplied significantly by variations that can be applied to any of the six chess piece types and further compounded in various combinations. These configurations of movements could be the same configural concepts Eredita and Fero (2015) suggest. With such dimensionality of gameplay, the possibility that many complex cognitive processes overlap, concur, and randomly sequence was considered great, yet there was as well the possibility that many, or all, are working in a wider precise network than studies have yet to elucidate. Language, rather than quantitative study, was considered a strong data collection source to be analyzed for such cognitive complexities. Powell et al. (2017) experimentally verified previous studies in their finding that there is extensive neural overlap of ToM processes during chess gameplay. Activated brain systems include superior temporal gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction, orbital PFC, a role for cuneus, fusiform gyrus, and right cerebellum, all of which are directly associated with ToM tasks. In this sense ToM, and possibly specifically cognitive empathy (CE), has moved again into a central, or at least completely adjoining, position to cognitive processes of concern to multiple sources of inquiry. Since all these brain functions were found to have active processing during chess gameplay it was considered interesting to begin the attempt to develop a thematic language from chess players that may match, or indicate, perceptions, awareness, ratios of activation, and sequencing of these brain activities during gameplay. Powell et al.’s (2017) study further found that novice players activate ToM tasks to discern opponent’s inner states more than
  • 55.
    49 they activate memoryrecall. Novice thematic language on strategy seemed to indicate more awareness and interpretation of game-state space and empathy than experts who often study strategy by rote. This could be explained in that novice players have less pattern recognition than expert players. Or it could mean that CE is a superior initial, or primary, choice to be developed for the most effective strategic decision-making cognitive processes. This was considered to have interesting implications to how ToM is developed chronological from beginner to expert, or even young to old. Likewise, Coates (2013), mentions that the Chess Grandmaster Capablanca would find himself in a difficult endgame scenario and suddenly “see” the correct strategic moves. Study was considered to discern if this sudden recognition was of a pattern of play or a realization of the opponent’s strategy, or some combination of both. It was also considered possible that empathy was so deeply embedded in expertise memory recognition that it is, as of yet, indiscernible. Einstein stated imagination is more important than knowledge and he might have been suggesting intuition (empathy) is broader than condensed conceptual guarantees (Calaprice, Dyson, & Einstein, 2005). The relationship between perspective acquisition and strategy has several categories and labels, but it was considered possible that some of these are both themes and cognitive processes that need to be combined for operational definition and practicality. Coates (2013) suggests chess is more like an abstraction of mathematics when it utilizes intuition to select gameplay. In essence, this he states has little to do with the position of the pieces on the board, but more so where they will be at future points given estimations of conditions of play both players are perceiving and sharing. He equates this to finding a geometrical proof. This sort of abstraction sounds like the configural concepts where geometric patterns and logical expected developments coexist in Eredita and Fero’s (2015) generalization concept,
  • 56.
    50 Atashpendar et al.’s(2017) space-state conjectures, or a guessing game like intuition. Coates (2013) adds that even the estimations of emotional attachment players place on certain strategies or game pieces becomes active in strategic outcomes. These emotional attachments were considered in turn to be picked up by CE and used by opponents (Coates, 2013; Powell et al., 2017). Coates (2013) says phenomenologically players are adding rich meaning on top of rule-based structure, which adds a sophisticated layer of play to be interpreted effectively by both players. He says chess can become like a hallucinatory experience. Or it was considered he was describing the deep mix of memory recognition of chess study and experienced reinforced by every ToM experience of reading the other, in any domain whatsoever going back to the developmental pretend play of childhood. In technical terms this is veridical experience supervening as inner states upon proximal brain states, casually linked distal object perception. The indication, according to Coates (2013), is that visual-spatial analysis is a weaker factor. In turn a multiplicity of natural complexities is perceived at higher-level monadic properties, powers, and norms. In any case this is more than just looking at a decision tree, since chess is individuals with various levels of specific expertise competing in a game that has social meaning, a learned history, numerous rules, and multitudes of complex movement variations. The theme of complexity in variation of chess is reinforced as by the work of Atashpendar, Schilling, and Voigtmann (2016). Creswell and Poth (2018) trace the roots of Phenomenology in discerning intentionality of consciousness, even to the point of refusing participant-object dichotomies while instead seeking the what and the how of the essence of a participant (Moustakas, 1994). Many of the cognitive functions this paper examined perhaps indicate there is such a
  • 57.
    51 phenomenon occurring inthe gameplay of chess be it empathy, reading body language, intuition, or sudden abstract, and original, geometric calculations of future state-space. Role of Intuition in Strategy Not all researchers appreciate the possibility of intuition as an instantaneous grasping of new strategic information. Montero and Evans (2011) made a strong argument against Dreyfus’s argument calling intuition as maintaining a primacy in chess strategic success. Dreyfus called intuition zeroing in. Montero and Evans (2011) interpreted zeroing in as accessing previous chess play for similarities in memory recognition. But one could see another definition of zeroing in. A process where a player’s focus narrows and transcends, something akin to Coates (2013) hallucinatory experience, or an intuition that finds a sudden solution not exactly from memory or pattern recall, but from empathy or spatial induction of probabilities that results in a sudden successful strategic, or series of strategic choices as the experimental science has changed since Montero and Evan’s 2011 work (Coates, 2013; Powell et al., 2017). In fact, Balata et al. (2015) found visuospatial memory to be essential for encoding chess strategy, while long-term memory is important for later processing. It was considered to be of interest to find the role empathy may play in encoding of memory. There is great interest in knowing the belief processes created in chess players that assures them they have an understanding of an opponent’s process, scope and/or intention, and also how chess players believing they know how outcomes of combined dueling strategies between themselves and their opponents will intersect at multiple points to influence gameplay, and how this outcome is operational and operationalized (Haladjian & Montemayor, 2016; Leite et al., 2014). Sensing technologies have been applied to the study of chess player’s physiological responses to competition (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018). Guntz, Balzarini,
  • 58.
    52 Vaufreydaz, and Crowley(2018) captured chess player’s displays of emotion and awareness through non-verbal channels using such technologies. Guntz et al. (2018) stressed their study enhanced understanding of situational awareness but did not connect that to what deeper strategic thinking may have been taking place simultaneously. Again, there are theoretical implications that a synthesis of cognitive processes could be occurring during gameplay. If opponent’s shift eye gaze or move a foot, perhaps this triggered a sense of intuition and/or empathy. Also, when one player’s body movement occurs naturally this could cause a reorientation of visual-spatial calculation and possibly even memory within the opponent (Duijivenvoorde, 2016). One mechanism could trigger many. How a player sees the chessboard could shift if their opponent’s movements of any sort force them to reorient their own gaze and thus their own interpretation of spatial-visual configurations, and possibly memories thereof from many points in time. Body and eye movement is registered strategically during chess game play. Duration of eye gaze on a portion of the chess board does not necessarily indicate depth, or type of cognitive strategic function determined from the information gained from that gaze, though chances are a fixed orientation gives more time for analysis, as does voluntary scanning of the board and its pieces at one’s own will and sense of timing (Nazareth et al., 2019). Again, the synthesis is that depths of memory through accumulations of time have not been especially studied on the numerous perspectival factors that go into chess strategic thinking. Intuition has been said to be instantaneous (Pilard, 2018). Perhaps it is a response to interruption. Data gained from gazing, which may have indicated a dissatisfied response, could be compounded by data gained from another gaze and in accumulation create a satisfied response, as these facial emotions were as well recorded (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018).
  • 59.
    53 Indeed, since chesshas so many variations, an intuitive play that seems like a bad move, could in fact turn out through variation, intuition, game theory discount, or sudden empathic subsequent choices to be a winning strategy (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014; Coates, 2013). In this sense, a mistake could be sometimes merely an unconscious pattern recall from memory that potentially advances the following sequencing of moves to an advantageous chess position experienced and recalled, even unconsciously, from prior play. Guntz et al. (2018) also recorded body posture as an indicator of negative stress during gameplay. Chess, being strategic, allows for much deception, intensity, sacrifices of key games pieces, misdirection, and defensive modes of play that eventually unleash a winning strategy. These again are many qualities that ToM seeks to identify (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). A pretend tense posture can indicate the deception of a coiled cobra waiting to strike. Such deceptions could indicate counterstrategies are employed as to deceive empathic skills of one’s opponent and/or disturb corresponding strategic memory pattern recalls. These were interesting interview questions to be considered as to synthesize body movement and deception into the proper thematic categorizations. Some methods of perception, like intuition which is said to be crucial to effective chess gameplay, are not strongly linked to any physiological-cognitive processes at all (Markovits, de Chantal, Brisson, & Gagnon-St-Pierre, 2019). Indeed, intuition could be a combination of several cognitive processes at once, including ones that have yet to be quantitatively mapped (Newman, Gibb, & Thompson, 2017). Salvaggio (2018) states that many priors or schemas that construct episodic memory are beliefs. Identity, sense of self, confidence, empathy, intuition, all qualities of a chess player (and many of these with much attachment to ToM skills) which could be required beliefs held in the moment from memory or direct current
  • 60.
    54 experience in orderfor the most effective gameplay (Pathman et. al., 2016). Many studies suggest blending points of time and space where these, and outer realities, intersect to create the feeling, awareness, and/or knowing that decision, and the future perhaps, is based on (Bloom, 2017; Colle et al., 2019; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013). Personality Correlates with Strategy Personality is a dimensionality factor that affects ToM abilities. Finn et al. (2018) found through quantitative methods that individuals with higher paranoia in their personality structure had more activity in the mentalizing regions of the brain associated with Theory of Mind. These researchers designed for various personality types to listen to a story that could or could not be considered suspicious. In this naturalistic paradigm neural and behavioral variation was measured over the dimension of paranoia though functional MRI. Inter- participant correlation analysis identified synchronization of brain regions and analyzing reflective speech of participants after listening to narrated scenario also indicated semantic and syntactic features that scale with paranoid character. Here, is application of neutral research to more than one neural network at a time, which is needed in the study of cognitive strategy and chess, and as well its possibilities of developing the artificial intelligence systems created for chess in much deeper, more actual and stronger reflection of reality programming. The researcher states the intrinsic personality features primed for paranoid responses was determined and this differs from other individuals without that trait in response to same scenario stimulus. Ghiasi, Mohammadi, and Zarrinfar (2018) note that individual with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) have deficits in Theory of Mind abilities. Their study attempted to predict BPD traits based on theory of mind, emotional regulation and attachment styles. In their study, they discerned that at times individuals with BPD rely heavily on forms
  • 61.
    55 of empathy (aToM quality), even ultra-reading of the mind, because they have experienced negative results from their inability to judge other’s states of mind. Hence BPD individuals sometimes utilize skills to understand others and greatly hit or miss the mark. In their study BPD individuals demonstrated greater Theory of Mind inferences. This research could intersect with the investigation how connected and how separate are logical memory recalls of chess strategy and intuitive leaps of chess genius, or failure. They note that some BPD individuals resort to Theory of Mind cognitive techniques due to poor emotional regulation. This could indicate that emotion is not a gateway to empathy use, or at least cognitive empathy. Still, Davash and Shamay-Tsoory (2014) restated that empathy is believed to come from both an emotional system and a cognitive system routed through separate yet interacting neural pathways in the brain. Emotional empathy, often called affective empathy and sometimes called simulation processing, is driven by simulation and mediates emotional experiences through the amygdala and insula (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014). A chess novice, or even a weaker chess player, maybe looking for signs in their opponent to mimic, either emotionally, perceptually, or logically discerned all the time, or when in strategic trouble during gameplay. Indeed, much of chess is matching move for move until someone breaks a pattern. The amygdala as previously cited controls automated fight, flight or freeze responses (Muppidi & Miglis, 2017). If the amygdala causes a break in strategic directional choice, it certainly is not voluntary, but maybe strategically functional, or not. Muppidi and Miglis (2017) found that stress during complex chess gameplay creates sympathetic nervous system reactions, psychophysiological responses, that reduce heartrate variability in both novice and expert players. This brings in amygdala reactions, bio-sympathetic awareness of others,
  • 62.
    56 vagus trauma formations,and other possibly biological process engagements (Muppidi & Miglis, 2017). Empathy does relate in part to these processes, and chess players words might further let us know more about connections that might happen, first registered in the mind as language, then sort through one of various conception making processes prior to decision- making. This work reflects back and could relate to amygdala reactions created from personal experience and even prior chess defeats internalized too deeply in a negative manner. These researchers who are interested in the intersection of personality and strategy then state that a decreased empathic response could reflect deficits in mentalizing (ToM) or simulation processing (emotional empathy) (Bloom, 2017; Colle et al., 2019; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013). Chess is known for its extreme personality types. Research into possible personality disorders of chess experts could have significant value in multiple domains of inquiry. Aforementioned studies did not consider how memory of accumulated influences, say family or chess mentors, and their personality types are accessed in the moment by the player and their proportion or degree of empathy or ToM as used or developed (Ciaramelli et al., 2013; Coates, 2013; Powell et al., 2017). If someone learned chess from a family member who also abused them, a conflicting style of play could develop. Ironically, some legendary chess grandmasters like Bobby Fischer, are glorified for some of their various idiosyncratic, conflicting strategy styles (Ponterotto, 2012). Granted these considerations add much dimensionality to the depth of study but are strong indicators that such research might lead us to believe of existing theory that must be studied to complete the structural analysis of the total process of ToM in future studies of chess. Gillespie (2018) demonstrated through hierarchical regression of experimental data, from sample of 80 incarcerated mixed ethnicities teens, that affective ToM (awareness of feeling states of others) predicted proactive
  • 63.
    57 aggression greater thaninfluences from clinically rated psychopathic tendencies. They suggested the results indicated that being able to effectively identify others’ affective states could be a significant variable in whether or not others are aggressed against by such teens for personal gain. This could indicate that aggressive chess play, in some personalities, is motivated by strong affective empathy. Aggression and ToM might have a relationship. Gillespie’s (2018) study found aggression to significantly greater extent in BPD teens than non-BPD teens, due to BPD teens being more susceptible to reactive aggression that seems to rely on poor impulse control and emotional regulation. One social interpretation is that some bullies, and violent criminals, might have, or work toward, superior social-affective cognition to discern when, where, how and who to victimize. This is somewhat like a criminal’s form of mind, or body, reading that is a skill to be developed on how to pick weak victims. There are likely many chess players who have BPD, psychopathic traits, paranoia traits and other personality qualities that effect their game play and strategic decision making. Chess players describe visceral feelings, some quite intense, as moves instinctively indicate sudden shifts in player advantage (Slezak & Sigman, 2012). The famous former World Champion Bobby Fischer again comes to mind as someone who had their mental health questioned by the public (Ponterotto, 2012). The relationship between memory and cognitive empathy may create significant correlations toward achievements and skill levels in mental games such as chess. As Ciaramelli et al. (2013) studied showed memory modulates empathy. These researchers found that individuals recall better aspects of another’s experiences based on experiences they themselves are currently undergoing. In this study participants read the live story of two characters. One experienced a long series of love-related failures, the other a long series of work-related
  • 64.
    58 failures. In additionto the two life-stories recall tasks, a faux recognition task and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index Questionnaire (IRI) were administered. The Faux Pas recognition task contained 27 scenarios with violations of accepted social norms and 10 scenarios that did not contained such “faux pas”. These were further divided almost evenly between faux pas that hurt the victim’s love issues and their work issues. Participant’s had to determine which scenarios did, and did not, contain faux pas. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index is a self-report scale assessing empathy through perspective taking (ability to spontaneously adopt the perspective of other people), fantasy (identifying with characters in fiction), empathetic concern (tendency to experience feelings of warmth and compassion for others who are experiencing negative aspects of life), and personal distress (levels of anxiety for people going through suffering and afflictions). Limits of What can be Known Strategically Again, it seems a limitation of these studies, Powell et al. (2017) and Ciaramelli et al. (2013), is that a lot of data was not collected on the participants personal history or inner thoughts during experimentation. Researchers did not ask participants when they first experienced feelings or abilities related to the skills as studied. They were not asked who and when did this current experience remind them of. The time factor, and magnitude of memory and experience is not accounted for. For instance, in Ciaramelli Life-stories recall task it was not asked how many love failures, how painful, and how long ago did these occur to thus influence outcomes. These studies as well do not qualitatively ask participants to give a robust description of memory associations of like experiences or the qualities of any experiences they believed helped them develop the said tested qualities of ToM or empathy. Ciaramelli et al. (2013) did structure their method with consideration for prior experience in that if participants had more
  • 65.
    59 empathy for poorluck in love, as indicated in more sympathy for the love faux pas than the work faux pas, then they significantly identified greater with the character Life-stories recall task who failed in a series of love relationships. As relates to chess and ToM or empathy skills, Powell et al. (2017) did not ask participants how they interpreted the intensity and level of belief in a chess opponent before deciding if their empathetic impression was accurate or not. Chess does rely on pattern memory. What emotional associations, or empathy registrations from an opponent during previous gameplay, or even emotional reactions to studying chess from a book, are primed or associated with memory of difficult or successful previous actual games, all may have relevance toward what prompts strategy choice in a current game. The significance of memory and belief cannot be discounted. Then there is that reconstructive memory differs over preservationism concept of memory (Salvaggio, 2018). Reconstructive memory means that memories are found to be reconstructed and not stored. Further, they may be reconstruction with beliefs individuals hold now, and nothing to do with the beliefs from the time of the experience memory is trying to reconstruct. Preservationism would state that beliefs from memory are only justified when the belief during the creation of the memory was justified. Again, why if generalization process is applied with this (Eredita & Ferro, 2015) in that differing geometric configurations, ones that like a key for a door lock work or not depending on accuracy of original imprint, combine to activate accurate cognitive mechanism for strategic decision making or inaccurate ones. This in one manner, possibly being determined by the original memory imprint, being justified or not through certain beliefs of that preserved moment. If reconstructive memory applies in a game like chess than the meaning is if any previous study or experience being applied to a current game, if based on any current beliefs (possibly knowledge as well), then some process
  • 66.
    60 would have tovalidate the information accessed in memory for it to be effective strategic decision making. This process could be accumulative or divergent in that some other process steers its accuracy in the present. Salavaggio (2018) claims this is a process of inference. Inference is the basis of ToM tasks as ToM is proposing superior and active senses of awareness allow individuals to ascertain accurately the inner workings of another’s thinking and belief processes (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014). As well in such cases of complex memory layering the memory is being pieced together, perhaps unreliably with other memories, of competition in any form, general resemblance of feeling, person, or situation and levels of strategy, learned in conjoint or independent memory files, and then all such experiences being complied, recreated, and originated in new form. Most scholars agree reconstructive memory is most often, or always the actual case. In this sense the timeframe from how many choices of similar or confused memory adds to the chance that a new memory is more altered. Possibly as well the emotional depth of experience could relate to how accurate or in what order memories are reconstructed. In competition, memory then maybe more unreliable than an immediate cognitive assessment tool such as ToM and its cognitive empathy (Coates, 2013). Certainly, chess utilizes executive and long-term memory functions (Conners and Campitelli, 2014). As well memory processes used in chess could be further categorized both as working memory and executive functions (McCabe et al., 2011). It was found in study that as chess players advance in skill, they conceptualize qualitatively representations of space different from novice players (Conners & Campitelli, 2014). It is possible that memory of spatial conceptions differs in aspects to that of memory of linguistic learning or experience of movement. Then is could be asked if spatial estimation
  • 67.
    61 could be studiedthrough the sciences or learned throwing darts and footballs. Or it could be checked if elements of memory recall attached to learning and immediate interpretation of spatial formations like an instinct to dodge bullets, or dodge balls, well. Buhren and Frank (2012) determined through their study that chess players are not more rational, in a game theoretic sense, than participants in other domains, but rather a particular combination of skills specific to chess explains their expertise. Chess offers unique applications to the study of ToM since chess both relies on predicting opponent’s sense of game conception and strategy and as well relies on ascertaining the value and sequencing of choices made by opponents related to their confidence of controlling outcomes (Grabner, 2013; Powell et al., 2017). It might as well include for a way to use one’s body, spatially, to intimidate an opponent, suddenly at important junctures, or throughout a game by certain posturing. Cognitive Capacities for Strategy and its Perceptions Measuring cognitive capacities for strategy has much area for further investigation. Cognitive Empathy (CE) has been measured to be a cognitive process involving specific brain functions (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). This materialistic discernment into another’s conceptual and feeling world, and subsequent comparison to one’s own inner world can be the basis for tactical and strategic decision-making during chess. It is a function, biologically structured, that easily could have many ecological validities toward many domains of human effort and endeavor. Chess itself can be divided in analysis in several ways, one being tactical versus positional strategies and as well by levels of aggression and trickery utilized during gameplay (Coates, 2013). Qualitative study of chess player’s cognitive processes could lead to domain specific utilization of various cognitive processes that correspond to various strategic situations and conceptions. In turn, some of these pathways from cognitive
  • 68.
    62 awareness of adiscerning process in chess strategy would be generalized to how such processes are and can be used in other domains. At its basis empathy is defined as the process of sharing feelings with others, and the knowing that that feeling is originated in the other (Preckel, Kanske, & Singer, 2018). These authors point out that such feeling of feelings can be positive or negative. They contrast cognitive empathy, a ToM quality, from feeling, or socio- affective processes, as socio-cognitive and merely taking another’s perspective. Cognitive empathy offers propositional knowledge through inference of belief, thought, and emotion of the other. Distinct brain mechanism has been demonstrated for socio-affective vs. socio-cognitive awareness. This though takes the debate beyond early philosophical distinctions during ToM development as a theory (Carruthers, 1996; Dennett, 1987; Fox, 2014) since now, nonetheless both processes are found to work together. Shin and Ahn (2014) found that use of video games in adolescents decreased cognitive empathy. This means games have the potential to lessen cognitive empathy and chess has been called a war game, this could mean it negatively affects some populations. Empathy and the idea that computer, robots, and AI can be violent, is an interesting cross-section of this topic. Some would want robots to have empathy. No computer has yet been made to calculate all possible decision nodes in any game of chess, nor, as desired by programmers, effectively mimic human empathy to enhance artificial intelligence gameplay (Matros, 2016). Deep Blue, a significant artificial intelligence computer, proved its superiority over the best human players in 1997 when it exploited differentials in tempo, positional strength, and king safety while evaluating 100 million positions every second (Larson, 2018). Still, technically Deep Blue is considered less intelligent than the stupidest human being and that many of today’s cellphone apps are more powerful chess AI than Deep
  • 69.
    63 Blue. Hence forall its cold calculation, Artificial Intelligence, does not approach the skills of ToM and cognitive empathy. A computer can think ahead, but it cannot think what the opponent is thinking. The deeper theoretical and practical answers, at this time, still reside in the human mind. Again, Phenomenology may prove enlightening as textural and structural, descriptions of participant experience are analysis for the consciousness they contain, or create, directed toward the object of a winning strategic chess move (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Spatial Relationships and Memory Effect Strategy Space, or state space in a game sense, is the area of conception of possible movements of strategic pieces on the chessboard. The board has 64-square and 32-pieces that can combine in innumerable variations from present state space points to future state-space points all within the rules of the game of chess. Higher ranked chess players have been found to give richer descriptive detail, have more cognitive memory pattern awareness, and apply unquantifiable qualities of intuition for effective strategy (Coates, 2013; Nippold, 2009; Powell et al., 2017); it is memory of game states and spatial relationships that are often considered key to understanding chess strategy. Understanding spatial relationships and how they are processed is a large area of research alone that could have vast application to gaining knowledge of cognitive strategic thinking processes. Many researchers are interested in further study of interrelationships of such constructs and dynamics (Lane & Chang, 2018; Slezak et al., 2018; Villiafaina et al., 2019). Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann (2016) note that there is such a great amount of potential spatial relationships in chess that strategy can be based in size of the state space, size of the legal move decision tree, and as well considerations about how actual and potential spaces are connected. If episodic memory is more powerful and applicable to ToM, and
  • 70.
    64 strategic decision-making basedon the ability to call forth more memories, and or emotions, these with CE then to be utilized to empathetically understand how an opponent is conceiving current chess gameplay situations then they are likely connected processes between ToM, spatial understanding, and CE. One way to relate to chess strategy is to see one player as believing they are in the game, and where they believe the game is headed based on prior memories of similar game positions, then a counter-intuitive, original, or prior strategic move, an optimal one, can be selected from the superior perceiver’s memory to implement in the moment. It seems simple, if not for all prior description of what might define a counter- intuitive, original, or memorized moves that might be. Pathman, Couglin, and Ghetti (2018) found that with episodic memory there is greater accuracy in relation to spatial location than that of temporal order. Then perhaps episodic memory is related to all memory or memory related to or acquired by space assessments. If so, just recalling accurately current positions from prior games or lessons, might imply inaccurately predicting next strategic moves. Further, researchers found that matching mental timelines by linearity and direction influences temporal order and not spatial location (Pathman, Couglin, and Ghetti, 2018). Backward induction has always been a problem with chess due to amount of game moves, but if one is faulty on one or more several key games pieces location from memory that is severely problematic to strategic thinking. Errors from memory depending on general outcomes from patterning is a one-sided system of strategy choice. Memory of chess strategy may be selections with more random success via spatial location overlay of strategic idea, perhaps through ToM, and more consistently retrieved through temporal access of learning and memory timelines. Hence chess could be flashes of inspiration interrupting methodical practices of strategic retrieval from prior experience and training. It is interesting to note that
  • 71.
    65 Binet (1983) believedmemorizing games of previous masters involved following a cadence like reciting the cadence of poetry through logic of each move. There may be a relationship between empathy and spatial relations, and even rhythm. It would be interesting to have playing play with headphones of certain beats of music and measure the time and sequence of their choices, between moves as well, and compared to non-music listening play. Berkowitz and Ansari (2010) found that the r(TPJ) deactivates during melodic improvisation for musician, but not non-musicians. So, with expertise to create an original sound of motion, or perhaps creative chess moves, there is specific TPJ activity that delineates between novice and expert. This is said to be to allow for inhibition of attentional shifts of task-irrelevant stimulus while top-down, goal-oriented behavior is needed. Hironaga et al. (2017) suggest that the TPJ is responsible for auditory coding, perhaps it as well is discerning rhythm. Indeed, Heard and Lee (2019) insist TPJ is one of several interacting portions of the brain that processes rhythm and syntax. Hence, the connection between language and rhythm, or how chess players conceive strategic pacing in their mind has meaning and validity. Certainly, in body language this might be indicated, but what about some form of empathy based on, or triggered by, the object themselves, the chess pieces in this case. Again, many of the cognitive functions this paper examines perhaps indicate there is such a phenomenon occurring in the gameplay of chess be it empathy, reading body language, intuition, or sudden abstract, and original, geometric calculations of future state-space. Otherwise it is memory of game states and spatial relationships that are often considered key to understanding chess strategy by others and this would again discount the role of empathy (Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann, 2016). Still, even these researchers note that there is more than a great amount of potential spatial relationships to be studied in chess. This
  • 72.
    66 meaning that strategycan be based in size of the state space, size of the legal move decision tree, and as well considerations about how actual and potential spaces are connected. Interestingly, Notter et al., (2019) found that activation patterns directly that relate specific localization temporally are based Gestalt bilaterally in the temporoparietal junction. Perhaps physical resonances in the moment or past associations, or some combination yet discerned by study of physics itself are creating patterns of decision. Empathy related to body language then would relate to episodic memory. The Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ) is influencing spatial processing (Powell et al. 2017) and this area of the brain is active when taking in data through inferring other’s beliefs (ToM tasks) through reading or images, but TPJ is not active while observing information about a physical control stimulus (Saxe, 2003). Powell et al. (2017) results further indicate that chess and ToM have much overlap in neural networks that inhibit one’s own experience when evaluating the mental state of others and for visual evaluation of action. Hence, ToM achieves its goals when one’s self awareness is reduced and awareness of the other, an opponent, is enhanced. Binet (1983) points out that expert players are actually often playing from an image of the board in their minds and not as often referencing the actual board as this might lessen mathematical reasoning. This might also include for empathy gleaned from body language and emotional reactions to it. This again being confirmed in increased activation of the Temporoparietal Junction during spatial processing (Powell et al., 2017). Perhaps while an alternating process is taking over between observing physical control stimulus (TPJ off) and processing spatial information (TPJ on) something interesting is occurring. Perhaps with some excitement, since the TPJ region is so fundamental to possible strategic decision making in chess, and the nature of this study is linguistic acquisition of such descriptions, that the TPJ
  • 73.
    67 will be influentialin the ability to acquire new vocabulary. Make no mistake, TPJ, is processing information from the external environment as well as from within the body (Abu- Akel, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011) all the while incorporating information from the thalamus and the limbic system and as well the visual, auditory and somatosensory systems. While the TPJ has been active in chess strategy, then intuition maybe automatically storing an unconscious dictionary for researchers to discover. TPJ can corrupt moral decision-making and be the cause of out-of-body experiences (Notter et al., 2019). Insert any jokes, or not, of the rakish morals of chess players, a sporadic theme from history (Sharples, 2015), and the possibility that intuition is quantum, or connected to strategy gathering from the cosmos, or even simply a way to break into “society”. Sharples (2015, p.15) states historically, at times, chess has often been hardly considered a “mind sport”: Providing an alternative reading of the chess-player as a potentially disreputable figure on display in the brightly-lit, notorious Parisian night, Walker depicts a loud, noisy, crowded, ill-mannered, sexist, and money-grabbing environment filled with passion and emotion, far removed from rational recreations that aimed at the individuals’ improvement of health and physique, and personal, civic and national prestige. Just to make it more interesting each hemisphere of the brain has its, halved, portion of the TPJ system (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). Its prime functions are maintaining the ability to pay attention and analyzing signals. Empathy as perspective taking depends on (right)TPJ (rTPJ) to perceive and judge social cues. The (left)TPJ (lTPJ) learns language by observing conversation and making connection with memories that convert those associations
  • 74.
    68 to meaning (Blakemore,Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). Downtime of lTPJ off during control stimuli observation could be rTPJ, alternating function, as switched-on during empathy gathering. Research is demonstrating (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Powell et al., 2017) that the relation of a sense, or accuracy of perception, of knowing what one’s opponent is planning, or feeling about plans, is pertinent to cognitive strategic thinking. This sense self then knows how to gauge, incorporate, and evaluate space (and its relations to strategy) as specifically existing in relationship to the opponent (and the game). It could also mean that episodic memory (Ciaramelli et al., 2013) is being scanned for neural overlap that activates pattern recognition cognitive processes, spatial strategic processes, or correlating emotional resonances indicated by empathy and predicting strategy. Ability for spatial awareness and calculation maybe a social instinct that some possess to greater degree than others. So too, could empathy have great variation in chess strategy. The TPJ maybe modulating both processes interdependently or independently, alongside other known or unknown cognitive brain mechanisms or not. Chemical Maps of Cognitive Strategy Essentially mapping the brain’s various responses to strategy formation is mapping how stimuli effects chemical reactions. Tozman, Zhang, and Vollmeyer (2017) expressed interest in their study of how cortisol release during chess affects the sense of competitive flow experience, the sublime feeling that experience is advantageously advancing, and motivating. Seyfarth and Cheney (2013) insist that ToM is a subconscious, reflexive process naturally selected to adapt and bond individuals to advantageous social groups. Tozman et al.’s (2017) flow could be
  • 75.
    69 memory retrieval inchess related to assessment, awareness, of overlay of temporal strategic learning (advantageous), while ToM’s instant assessment, awareness, of other’s intentions that is triggering a heuristic spatial positioning assessment, awareness, that might even reflect incongruencies in empathy from one’s opponent, i.e., their sense of an advantageous strategy in the game. This awareness, in part or overall, could be intuition’s neural overlaps with any of the cognitive processes related to theoretical and practical concepts of memory including visual- spatial, episodic, long-term, dual processing, and working (Cohen et al., 2014; Markovits et al., 2019; McCabe et al. 2011; Salvaggio, 2018). How things are inferred has meaning and purpose to strategic choices. Markovits et al. (2019) discuss belief-based cues that make rapid inferences, dual cognitive processes, and another level that uses more conscious, working memory-based cognitions that are rule-based. They suggest that fast processes use aspects of both rule-based and belief-based cues. Believing one knows another’s belief is the core of ToM (Brock, Kim, & Kelly, 2017). There could be transition points between temporal and spatial judgments. Any number of combinations of neural processes, ways of deciding strategy, and conceptions of how memory works might be the negotiating factors between temporal and spatial judgments. Development of such parallelism in cybernetic systems might be essential to development of superior artificial chess engines. Much of chess involves strategy that conceals game pieces in plain sight. Sudden awareness of a superior or inferior position can be triggered at any moment, to any number of future positional tactical changes, depending on circumstance and ability for the chess player to realize the situation. Study of such questions could begin with simple new focuses as how the size of the chessboard plays upon effect spatial-memory and visual-strategy, as related to time frozen, linear, and circular, in differing players and
  • 76.
    70 corresponding, or otherwise,cognitive processes. A player, perhaps with narrow set eyes or any outstanding variable, maybe superior on a smaller board while their strategic effectiveness decreases on a larger board. Indeed, some process, or processes, are mandatory in chess to connect the assessment of state-space to decision tree possibilities within rule- based context. It cannot be simply logic as the numeracy of possible state-spaces is too great. Yet winning strategies are consistently being chosen, and while they generally follow patterns, this is not exact, and originality of strategic decision-making consistently is generated during gameplay. These moves eventually become categorized doctrine studied for mastery. State-space consists of multiple distinct pockets interconnected by relatively few paths (Atashpendar et al, 2017). Some must be chosen to the exclusion of others. Qualitative study could define a language that chess players choose to describe the identification, selection, timing, sense of opponent’s awareness, sense of opponent’s awareness of their own knowledge and conceptualization of any given junction between distinct pockets of state- space. In other words, at any given point in a chess game strategy can go in many combinations of effective decision-making, so research should focus on how chess players feel they come to their decisions, which in turn could have various generalized and specific advances toward its own, and other research domains. Cognitive Mechanisms and Strategy Variability in cognitive responses includes for differing regions of the brain interacting in differing sequences for the same outcome, strategic decision making, presumably prompting by variable challenges from the outside environment. Duijivenvoorde (2016), cites that individuals differ systematically in their applied decision strategy-making methods. This researcher mentions these differences are hardly studied in the literature.
  • 77.
    71 Their study observesthe neural mechanisms underlying compensatory versus non- compensatory strategies. Effect of tasks were measured on the parietal cortex. The temporoparietal junction (TPJ) was identified as the brain region by Powell et al. (2017) that is responsible for processing affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all ToM tasks) as well as being an important cognitive region for spatial processing skills. Again, there may be a cognitive link between empathy and strategic decision making (Hanaki et al., 2016). Compensatory strategies are modifications of behavior strategies constructed to bypass impairments in attention, memory, executive-function, and other cognitive skills (Yoshio & Marler, 2006). TPJ relates to both attention-maintaining and empathy (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). Duijivenvoorde (2016) found those who were not able to use compensatory functions experienced more conflict, activity in the greater dorsomedial PFC, when conflicting strategic values were presented. This affects risk taking in strategy. Compensatory strategic decision making is characterized by expected value (EV) maximizing while non-compensatory is characterized by loss minimization. During study the compensatory group showed EV coding in the parietal cortex, while the non-compensatory group demonstrated limited indications of parametric EV signal. Focusing one’s empathy assessments powers on an opponent may help determined how much risk to take in strategy. Chess is a conflict mind sport. The effects of it on strategic decision making are likely significant in these cognitive systems. Perhaps perception of conflict activates empathy systems and self-awareness. Duijivenvoorde (2016) cites that visual cortex activation may be linked to allocation of attention. Their study indicated visual cortex activation. Visual-spatial assessment of state-size space through variation of recognition and memory has been established as key to chess strategy (Fecher et. al., 2016). It is possible that chess initiates
  • 78.
    72 many further processesinitially on visual stimulus of value threat and comparison. Person and Koegh (2019) established many neural networks could control visual working memory at differing times and ways. Spratling and Johnson (2004) indicate in their study that neural representations are encoded using a distributed or local coding scheme. They state this is a not a dichotomous process but rather pre-synaptic. As such processes progress it is representational abstractions that code neural networks more than sensory data. This, in chess, could indicate the need for overlaying prior strategic theory to current games as to build a deeper network. One significance of this work is the further establishing that differing regions and cognitive systems within the brain can network. Visual imagery and spatial assessment are not the same qualities, but can work in conjunction, but not always. In the study of chess and strategy all indications are that systems related to ToM, empathy, visual- spatial assessment and memory are active a decision-making neural network. Blind chess players must use efficient structures of visuospatial working memory and long-term memory without visual stimuli (Balata et at., 2015). Haptic, through touch, memory maybe associated with verbal coding. Visual images converted to strategy could be developed this way. In chess combined, these concepts could indicate that larger conceptualization of memory representations indicates strong access to strategic variations. Interestingly, in chess, once a piece is touched the rule is it must be moved (Shenk, 2007). Tracing the multiplicity of phenomenon, both external and internal, that create a strategic choice and outcome is the focus of much diverse academic research. Wichary and Smolen (2016) studied the neural underpinnings of multi-attribute choice. They measured the noncognitive factors like affect, emotional arousal, effort and stress on strategy selection. They claim that the rational Weighted Additive strategy and the rationally bounded heurism of Take
  • 79.
    73 the Best strategycan be combined into one unified neurophysiological mechanism. This work could be further synthesized in artificial intelligence program that wish to add logic and emotion into strategy decisions for superior play, but also for more human-feel interaction. They indicate that impulses from brainstem activity might influence overall processes. This resonates with the work on nervous system effect on strategy perception (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014; Muppidi & Miglis, 2017). If a computer could teach, or robot interact, or play chess, through haptic learning, and actual sensory haptic learning simulated arms and hands, then the affect may feel more real to the human counterpart (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014; Muppidi & Miglis, 2017). Overall, it is possible that many common assumptions are inaccurate on risk evaluation and perception. For instance, it has been said that autistic individuals, and schizophrenics, have a naïve interpretation of danger. Measurements of moments where those in these demographics did not sense danger when more neurotypical individuals did might be illuminating. Perhaps they have a better sense than the neurotypical between a simulated, or even actual aggressor, when actual violence is imminent or not based on some ultra-sensory understanding of reality. Nazareth et al. (2019) argue for flexibility instead of dichotomy when evaluating optimum strategy based on spatial problem-solving. They suggest advanced statistical algorithms will be more useful than further empirical study of eye-tracking when determining factors of strategy. This adds to the indication that there is more than meets the eye, that strategy is indeed utilizing many cognitive, and otherwise, mechanisms. It is possible that each mechanistic cognitive system, and even nervous system, has deep stores of memory that access and interact based on flexible objective processes as filtered through myriads of participative experiences and knowledge bases. Andersen et al. (2014) remind that strategy does not have to contain aspects of
  • 80.
    74 intention or awareness.They noted that differences in strategy, error feedbacks, are often linked to control processes including expectation violations, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty. Linking this with earlier mentioned studies on personality disorders (Ghiasi, Mohammadi, & Zarrinfar, 2018) it is possible to imagine strategy as mechanistically categorical and contextually based. In others words a borderline personality disordered strategy might be optimizing in Vatican infighting politics of the 1400’s, while holistically maladaptive to 21st Century military- corporate States. History, perhaps the ultimate incarnation of strategic memory, itself is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle relates how one can ascertain a time and a direction, but maybe not both. Andersen et al.’s (2014) research implies that development is shaped by strategic experience over time to the point that there is a feedback process linking those experiences with chemical-cognitive shifts again the key frontoparietal network (Powell et al., 2017). Ultimately indications are that strategy is widely, perhaps vastly, heterogenous. Trauma could be a valuable developmental, or confounding, variable in strategic cognitive processes being shaped by experience. Neural network processing may prove more complex and multidimensional than understood or too difficult for simulation mechanisms to precisely replicate. Pearson and Keogh (2019) note that there is little consensus among researchers on what neural networks are mandatory, and control for capacity, of visual working memory. They mention that it more likely that individuals do not remember visual information in the same way. They cite multiple cognitive strategic processes involving visual imagery, semantic, propositional, and spatial that correspond with brain regions to complete mnemonic tasks. Every region of the brain again perhaps has its own memory. It is interesting to think that memories maybe fought for in acquisition or usage for strategic choice based on situations. Taillan, Dufau, and
  • 81.
    75 Lemaire (2015) notethat strategies are selected differently by populations from various cognitive domains factored through education, memory, reasoning, decision making, and language. As is known some cognitive processes are chosen and others automatically chosen. Empathy, and intuition, themselves might have both chosen and automatic processes (Coates, 2013). A game like chess is interesting because time and space (Sillman, 1998) must converge within a specific set of turn based moves for a strategy to work or not. A complex strategy can be foiled by a simple move of the opponent. Rellensman, Schukajlow, and Leopold (2019) note that individuals on differing learning environmental paths each have distinct development of cognitive, cultural, social, or economic resources. It is difficult to ascertain what, or who, will survive socially. It can be imagined if Elo chess rating system could rate population and individual type social survival ratios, which has been suggested (Neumann et al., 2011). If so, then social structures could be devised to enhance hidden strengths and develop misunderstood weaknesses. The Chinese are now using such computerized calculation of social credit, though to perhaps some nefarious, as well as beneficial, ends (Sithigh & Siems, 2019). AI does not though have to be the genie in the bottle that fools us. Psychology Today notes as of now it can only beat us in two of recreation games, chess and Go (Matson, 2020). Consciousness Effects on Cognitive Strategy and Neural Mapping Consciousness may have a quality that binary simulations cannot account for without creatively compartmentalizing mechanism of stimuli and response. Villafaina et al. (2019) used electroencephalographic responses of chess players under time pressure to demonstrate
  • 82.
    76 as isolation ofmemory chunks and analyze working memory tasks. What was not studied, and compared, is that if cognitive empathy would facilitate similar rapid decision making. The parts of the brain cognitive mechanisms engaged in cognitive empathy were not simultaneously measured in this study. This further illustrates the bias of experimental science to seek heuristic answers from memory retrieval and not cognitive empathy decision making processes. Researchers have concerns in the area of asking if mind sports, like chess, could be enhanced by pharmacological means (Mihailov & Savulescu, 2018). The concern here is if cognitive abilities are enhanced. Interestingly these studies focus on amphetamine type drugs that possibly enhance memory retrieval and processing speed skills, while ignoring hallucinogenic drugs, these having been called mind expanding (perhaps space expanding), which also might enhance cognitive empathy or intuitive skills (Mihailov & Savulescu, 2018). Coates (2013) called chess strategy at the highest levels a hallucinatory experience, while TPJ, establish as a critical brain functionary for several aspects of cognitive application of chess strategy, is said to be responsible out-of-body experience (Blanke & Arzy, 2005; Heydrich, Landis, & Seeck, 2002). Theory of Mind (ToM) has been tapped for generalization into other domains of strategic thinking related to organization psychology and even advancement for Artificial Intelligence research. The desire for effective cognitive of neural network mapping of cognitive processes related to strategic choice making is prevalent (Glykas, 2019). Strategic planning is considering complex and neural networks can seem unpredictable, yet still be asserted as a relevant from a number of aspects. Some of these aspects conjoin, or function in an ordered pattern and some seem random, in either cases much has been identified quantitatively that neural networks form strategic outlook and choices (Pearson & Keogh,
  • 83.
    77 2019; Wichary &Smolen 2016). Economics and business account for fuzzy variables that seem counter-logical, but significantly have effect on the decision-tree branching. Much has been made of seemingly illogical choices in the economic micro and macro markets that turned out to have relevancy to evolutionary psychology motivations over what otherwise would have seemed a more practical choice (Linhares et al., 2012; Matros, 2018). Work on empathy, trauma, personality issues, and types of perceptual difference, if randomly predicted for in artificial intelligence response programs could add the complexity, spontaneity, and some semblance of naturalness lacking in current simulations. As indicted brain networks could be linguistically mapped out for thematic, causative, and textural cues that proximate various cognitive and strategic responses (Andersen et al., 2014). The suspension of belief that one is playing a machine is often the desired effect. Fehr and Huck (2016) note that beliefs change once one realizes they are in a game. They state that realization is non-linear and involves aspects of cognitive ability and beliefs about another cognitive ability. Interestingly TPJ is stated to be heavily responsible to ToM beliefs (Saxe, 2003), while episodic memory matches mental timelines by linearity and direction influencing temporal order, not spatial location (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018). It is known that chess computers are currently superior to human players. It could be imagined that increases in the uncertainty of that characteristic would be a desired effect in simulation. In other words, if at escalating points the players began believing they were equal to the computer simulation that would increase interest and possibly satisfaction. Hanaki et al. (2016) note that participants with higher cognitive ability are more sensitive to strategic uncertainty. It might appear that almost everyone likes a challenge. Indeed, when it comes to chess simulation programs taking a que from the Air Force simulation designs could be useful
  • 84.
    78 in that Human-Computerbiometric feedback devices might enhance reading of empathy and confidence in both during gameplay and affect strategic complexity accordingly (Patel et al., 2018). As well improve haptic learning and interactive experience (Balata et al., 2015). The ultimate test of symbol logic is if artificial intelligence can respond with its superiority over the human mind through automatically generated superior programs, formulas, statistics, and algorithms prompted from input originated in human language by human beings based on a conceptual or practical need or request. Then indeed language would prove superior or equal to math, chemistry and physical formulas for interfacing with reality on the most fundamental, creative, and scientific basis of essential fact, truth, causation, and reality strata synthesis. This if so, it was the human’s description of the human need given in language to the AI for the superior programming and knowledge acquisition devising. Perhaps, creativity and empathy, live in the moment. Language, Space, and Chess There are two distinct qualitative studies that interviewed participants on how visual- spatial memory, spatial assessment, and language influence strategy and learning in chess gameplay (Coates, 2013). These, as compared to the scientific and theoretical configurations explained and suggested this far, give researchers an idea of the starting point, the level research is at, at tackling advancement of cognitive process understanding, what language analysis can teach us of strategy, and some hints of what participant interviewing can add to data that helps in the advancement of artificial intelligence simulations, both chess and otherwise. The two research papers that were found to have utilized qualitative interviews of chess players are: Nippold (2009) and Balata, Mikovec, & Slavik (2015).
  • 85.
    79 The learning, reflection,and use of language may have influence on ToM abilities and strategic choice making. Nippold (2009) examined language productivity and syntactic complexity in school children in relation to discussions of chess. Expert players were found to know more about chess, while neither the novices nor the experts differed greatly on any language factors for speaking tasks. Nippold (2009) concluded that when children are interested in the topic, they explain it in finer, more robust detail to naïve adults. She also determined that the language productivity and synaptic complexity in school children are significantly influenced by the specific speaking task. This is based on research that establishes that greater syntactic complexity indicates greater participant knowledge. Balata et al. (2015) note that blind chess players face increased demands on chess play, especially for beginners. Novice players have been demonstrated to activate ToM tasks to discern opponent’s inner states more than they activate memory recall and that as chess players advance in skill, they conceptualize qualitatively representations of space different from novice players (Conners & Campitelli, 2014; Powell et al., 2017). This could indicate that empathy is more reliant in novices than experts. Balata, Mikovec, and Slavik (2015) discerned that blind chess players use mental images, have some limits in efficiency of play, and that accessibility problems exist. The authors note that sighted chess masters play multiplayer blindfolded games where they code the chess game states in their memory and can solve chess problems against weaker players. They state the player who begins chess as visually impaired must create efficient structures in visuospatial working memory and long- term memory without visual stimuli. This could indicate the memory of spatial relationships is more important to effective strategy than to perception of spatial relationships in the moment. The authors were unclear if sight impaired players use similar mental images to
  • 86.
    80 those of sightedone, if loss of vision limited efficient use of mental images, and what is the role and relationship of the impaired sight player to the chessboard itself. A primary question of the researchers is if the impaired sight players cannot see the board then how they can keep an accurate image and knowledge of where the given pieces are at all moments. This is especially interesting since an opponent can take as long as they wish, in some versions of chess, to make their move and thus change the state of the board, both in their mind as related to number of spatial assumptions and in reality, as related to time. Further study could indicate if cognitive empathy is used at all by impaired sight players. There may be a sense of body language/movement, but certainly no direct perception of it through sight with a completely blind chess player. They state that experts generally use mental imagery skillfully in any number of domains from computer programming to surgery. They insist the mechanisms of using mental imagery for skill-based tasks are ill defined. For chess expertise it is believed that long durations of training and study of previous games develops the ability to efficiently represent mental images of the game state including operators. Detail of such internalized representations is what brings computational advantage to inference operations and in localization. Sight impaired players may experience more difficulty creating and maintaining numerous, detailed internalizations of game states of chess as mental images. Perhaps this is due to the need to compare visually the current state-space to all prior reference points, even to activate certain cognitive mechanisms. Comparing how language and spatial understanding is acquired and relates is a large area of research which adjoins much of the topic in this paper. Nippold (2009) results included comparison of performance between chess explanation and chess conversations tasks, and between chess conversation and general conversation tasks. Results indicated that
  • 87.
    81 performance was significantlyhigher on chess explanation tasks than on chess conversation tasks for all variables. The summation being language productivity and syntactic complexity were found greater when children talked about chess in exposition versus conversation, no matter if they were an expert or a novice. Balata et al. (2015) relate that differences in long- term memory are what separate blindfolded chess players from each other in skill level. When moves are spoken out loud to blindfolded chess players, they demonstrate almost perfect memory for game state position, unless an illegal move is declared. Visuospatial memory has been found to be essential for encoding, while long-term memory for later processing (Cohen et al., 2014; Markovits et al., 2019; McCabe et al. 2011; Salvaggio, 2018). They cite that blindfolded players are most concerned with the position of the most current piece being moved as to be critical toward effective strategy. Overall, from the four primary theories of memory as related to blindfold chess play, Balata et al. (2015) indicate that template theory best applies over chunking theory, long-term memory theory, or theory of working memory. Cognitive awareness may increase the need for more language. Nippold (2009) concludes from the results of her study that complex thinking drives complex language usage. She states this suggests thought and language cannot be separated and that encouragement of inquiry of specialized knowledge in complex topic areas accessed deeper thought and linguistic description. Finally, Nippod (2009) offers useful prompting words for questions to chess players as to how they conceive game strategy such as confidence, defense, anticipate, visualize, similarly, and fortunately. These words would be useful in phenomenology study to parse out qualities of spatial relations analysis, intuition, empathy, and memory recall during chess play. Devettere (2009) work suggests limitations in that it finds in chess a purely non-
  • 88.
    82 rational sociological tugof war, and Zerbubavel (1999) sees it as use of non-universal mental software. Reti (1923) suggested chess strategy is all math abstraction without need of linguistic internal monologues, and Vossen (2008) sees it as a self-constituting method without symbology. It is Goffman et al. (1997), who most concurs with Nippold (2009) stating chess as provision of a traffic code with the rules of syntax of language and interaction that is evidence of itself of the relationship as verified by the very obligation to provide evidence. This being something language, for better or worse, is great at doing. Chess may create strategic and cognitive circuit complexity without any significant internal language creation, or needed, to match it. People play chess who are blind. Congenitally blind people can learn chess with, and only, through access to proper learning material (Balata et al., 2015). They are not acclimated to using visual stimuli but are able to generate visuospatial images. Visual and haptic representation of space are not directly compatible. Differences are not described or explained by holistic/visual as compared to haptic/serial encoding of space. The researchers point out that haptic representation maybe be associated with verbal coding. How blind chess players are conceiving spatial movement and position may shed insights into memory, empathy, and competitive instincts as innate qualities that do not require all perceptual faculties to process strategic decision-making (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Balata et al., 2015). Spatial conceptions vary among individuals. There is a possibility of multiple cognitive processes as well as personal experiences (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Powell et al., 2017). Balata et al., (2015) found understanding the significance of
  • 89.
    83 where all piecesare and where they can move without creating a mental image of the board, as reported by expert participant P1, could indicate a pattern and tactical mindset where taking pieces is in the forefront or focus, or not. It could indicate that seeing the pathway of pieces does is not required or used to trigger strategic pattern memory. In this sense, perhaps all pieces are somewhat like the knight (a piece that defies purely linear movement) in imaginal space, in that what counts is where they land and take other chess pieces, not necessarily the pathway patterns on the board that are open (Coates, 2013). Still, the rules must be followed and for a legal move to take place with any piece, other than for the knight, the pathway must be clear. Intermediate participant, P4, has a description that could indicate either conceptualization as he uses his limited sight to see clear pathways, but finally imagines their distances from these initial angles and somewhat mystically claims the whole process is inner sight having nothing to do with the eyes (Balata et al., 2015). This sounds possibly closest to definitions of intuition in chess or even possibly some aspects of ToM and/or cognitive empathy. P4 is using a form of memory and this could be more deeply investigated as memory is a form of inner knowing and may include more processes than merely pattern recall. In any case, P4 uses tactile senses merely for a sense of grounding, or control, as he touches the actual board and pieces not to recall or choose strategic processes or methods. These players are mostly playing entirely in their heads, with little or no sense perception. If CE, ToM processes, or intuition are activated by sense perception, then this may or may not be of interest in further study (Artinger et al., 2014). Participant P3, thinks of an actual board, he holds in his mind the image of a real chessboard as he had seen one at one time when he had been sighted, yet he does not use effort to imagine actual chess pieces only their gameplay significance and locations (Balata et al. 2015). One wonders if any of this selective
  • 90.
    84 imagery has thecognitive purpose to free up brain processing space or perhaps is a byproduct of sorrow and regrets for vital senses of perception lost or game losses. Indeed, blind chess players must have some, at least conceptual, similarities to Artificial Intelligence chess engines since they too do not “see”. Graphic diagrams, as chess aides to the sigh impaired, were noted to be frustrating as the ideograms were always easily understood and had to be resourced in textual form. Interestingly in some competition sighted players will request a blind player use a sighted assistant. This was noted by P1 as a bad experience – He (sighted player) uses my assistant, so he does not need to play my moves. In some such cases literally, the sighted players are seated opposing each other on a second chessboard while the impaired sight player is left alone at the chessboard. This raises intriguing possibilities as to CE, sensing of body language (movement), and mindreading or intuition as a chess cognitive tactic. There are other indications of external generalizations of this knowledge. To get an indication of external generalizations to other areas of study Atashpendar et al. (2017) say there is reasonableness in estimating trajectories that infer connectivity of state-space in chess and that these resemble closely to those in statistical physics where the branching number is only slightly above unity. The knowledge of how to find such reactive paths, and even how human empathy can be translated to machines, is of great interest to artificial intelligence researchers (Jackson, 2013). It is possible there is a relation between this branching points and the non-equilibrium points, or discounts, in Game Theory. Also interesting is that ToM and pro-social behavior quantitatively have been found to have a positive relationship (Artinger et al., 2014). Thus, the integration of ToM and memory processes allows for adjustments to be made of mental state inferences in order to fit unique social targets.
  • 91.
    85 Artinger et al.(2014) cite that memory of chess patterns is supported by “complex visual processing out of conscious awareness” when decisions of game strategy are made. Knowing, defining, and perhaps replicating complex processes that are out of conscious awareness is the gateway to many emotional, cognitive, interpersonal, social, and even technical advances. These processes of memory pattern recognition possibility activated, and/or interpreted by, empathy, intuition, spatial prompting, or some combination thereof that qualitative study and phenomenological design have opportunity to reveal and elucidate. The blind may use mental imagery for strategic choice making. Balata et al. (2015) concluded that even those impaired congenitally of their sight possibly are using some form of mental imaging to solve chess problems. They state this suggests there may be no need for visual stimuli when mental images are created. It might be of value to consider the spatial relationship of opposing players as an equal, or existing variable, when mental imaging and spatial representation is being calculated by both sighted and impaired sight players (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016). The player is displacing gravity, placing intentional focus, has hands and limbs that interact and trespass on the chessboard space, and produces reactive body movements and emotions in response to perceived vacillations in gameplay (Coates, 2013). These qualities as well tax memory and senses because they must be accounted, possibly adjusted for, during gameplay with opponents and one’s self. Balata et al. (2015) calls for more research in impaired sight chess player’s ability to memorize large amounts of information in spatial orientations, in sequential representation, and haptic perceptual selectivity as toward formation of mental images. The mystery of how perceptions of competition and choice generate various cognitive choices is speculatively, and
  • 92.
    86 experimentally, well laidout, but the synthesis of the literature and further propositions, data, and studies are limited. Perspective Taking in Chess and Strategy How one is or uses personal qualities like body language and assuming roles might affect strategic outcomes, as when one player swiftly moves his hand into the personal “space” of a forward leaning opponent, or as one tenses one’s body in anticipation of some result. Puddephatt (2003) interviewed twenty amateur chess players from an interactionist perspective to see how players interact strategically. He measured for scales of incorporation of routine activity and style, role taking, impression management, engrossment, and composure. The author sees strategy from a more sociological points of view as an activity of generic social process. This connects with body language and possibly empathy as processes were considered signals of dominance, strategy giveaways, impression of opponent’s skills, and strength that all relate (Artinger, 2014; Zwick, 2017). Puddephatt (2003) suggests chess players set up a drama with their bodies to intimidate or influence their opponents. One interviewee seemed to suggest that the personality of his small town is connected to how he plays the game: Because I’m not used to playing very high caliber players, just the various people from my hometown, anywhere from beginner to nothing, and, when I play them, I usually just wait for them to make a mistake. Chess players may use tricks to get into the mind of opponents. Some of Puddephatt (2003) interviewees seem to suggest that chess is about getting someone off-kilter from their
  • 93.
    87 game or knowingwhat the opponent wants to do. This same participant rejected the popular strategy of exchanging pieces when things got complicated and for appearing more complicated, to the opponent, by not exchanging a lot of pieces. Other participants speak of feeling out who the opponent is. This seems to suggest an intuitive process (Coates, 2013). Other participants discuss not getting too excited about a great move as this might reveal too much of more strategy to come. One participant suggest engrossment of concentration in chess is related to the black and white, hypnotizing, board. Famed Chess Grandmaster, and former World Chess Champion, Viswanathan Annad suggests he gained intuition for chess through playing Blitz, very fast chess with time limited moves (ChessNews.com, 2020). This might suggest the faster cognitive processes in the brain are where intuition is being developed or triggered. Summary Chapter 2 explored theoretical foundations of cognitive strategic processing as rooted in ToM, memory, empathy, and spatial interpretation (Coates, 2011; Montero & Evans 2013; Powell et al. 2017). It explored numerous experimental designs in these areas that map assorted chemical and cognitive processes and interpreted them through strategic and perceptual choice making. Many, but not all, studies reflected how these processes specifically apply to chess strategy (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Intuition and empathy are primary processes and themes identified as having significance to chess strategy choices (Powell et. al., 2017). Diverse, yet possibly interconnecting, cognitive systems like personality and various types of memory processes, both practical and theoretical, were
  • 94.
    88 addressed through theprimary lens of how they relate to strategic decision-making in gameplay. The alternative theory of Game Theory was examined as another strong foundation of strategic choice making. The possibilities of neural discernment, and influencing, through language and artificial intelligence of these processes was examined. It was shown that definitive links exist between chess, empathy, memory, and spatial relationships (Astashpendar et al., 2016; Ciaramelli et al., 2013; Powell et al., 2017). The concepts individually, like spatial understanding, intuition, empathy and memory processes were fairly deeply explored and synthesized in Chapter 2. Many interrelations were revealed or suggested. As well exclusions were defined between theoretical points of view. The literature seems divided on, seemingly more participative participants like intuition relating to strategy, in ranking or operational importance (Coates, 2013; Montero and Evans, 2011; Salvaggio, 2018). The gap in the literature strongly indicated there was an experimental interest in how ToM, empathy, intuition, spatial processing, and memory relate to strategic decision making in chess, but extremely limited qualitative interviewing of chess players on if and how they experience these strategic formation and application qualities (Astashpendar, 2016; Coates, 2013; Salvaggio; 2018). Phenomenological approaches were considered best address this gap. Linguistics thematic interpretation of chess players experiencing of strategy was indicated as necessary to the literature by the gap to possibly be supportive of the multiplicity of quantitative inquiries (Nippold 2009). Others thematic and cognitive qualities were connected in Chapter 2. This included perspective taking (Puddphatt, 2003), affective empathy (Bloom, 2017), and personality type
  • 95.
    89 and cognitive style(Bosco et al., 2019). Comparisons within the research were made between personality and empathy capacity, spatial effectiveness for strategic formulation, and the limits of intuition or reason in game rule sense (Atashpendar et al., 2016; Powell et al., 2017; Montero & Evan, 2011). As well theoretical comparison was made (Kuhn, 1962; Matros, 2018). Some generalizations of theory were explored (Eredita & Ferro, 2016; Hanaki et al., 2016). The gap in literature was supported so that Chapter 3 could explain how method and analysis of IPA to explore if chess players will linguistically form categories that represent their perceptions of cognitive strategy methods, they may use during game play and this will benefit the literature. Chapter 3 addressed data collection methods, categorization, and analysis. Coding strategies and software use were addressed. Chapter 3 also discussed assumptions, limitations, delimitations, and ethical assurances.
  • 96.
    90 Chapter 3: ResearchMethod In order to explore how ToM as a cognitive factor for social reasoning influences strategy decisions in chess game play a qualitative method was decided upon. ToM provided a solid theory that allowed for a framework of exposition from player narratives on how they are experienced strategic decision-making during game play. The Problem to be addressed in this study was how chess players would use descriptive narratives to elaborate on how ToM was used as a social reasoning tool during gameplay to make strategic decisions. For instance, cognitive empathy, a ToM quality, has been found to reveal accurate perception of other’s states of mind (Ciaramelli et al., 2013) quantitatively and was found to be active in chess for strategy decision-making. This paper endeavored to find out if chess players rely on cognitive empathy to pick strategy during chess and how they described this phenomenon in qualitative interviews. Additionally, aspects of ToM have been found to relate to memory and spatial conceptualization, as do aspects of chess strategy (Atashpendar et al., 2016; Colle et al., 2019). Descriptive narratives seemed to fill the gap of how these various themes are interrelated. Saturation from a series of phenomenological interviews allowed for descriptive validity and confirmation of how chess players experience strategy formulation and execution during the game of chess. The Problem addressed in this study was the gap in descriptive narratives of chess players as to their perceptions of cognitive factors related to social reasoning influence tactical and strategic moves. The Purpose of this qualitative study was to investigate the gap in descriptive narratives of social reasoning and spatial reasoning overlapping, or not, in chess players as to their perceptions of what influences tactical and strategic moves. This chapter provided details on the study’s qualitative methodology and phenomenological design,
  • 97.
    91 wherein the methodologyand design were explained, and justification were to be given for its appropriateness in this particular study. Sufficient detail was be provided so that this study can be replicated. Alternative designs were also be discussed, and justification were to be given for why those designs were not utilized. The population, characteristics of said population, and sample size were examined and justified as well as recruitment procedures for the sample selection. Chapter 3 provided information about the materials used in the study, information about how the data was collected, organized, and analyzed. In addition, details of the procedures of the study were provided. Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of the study were stated, and any ethical concerns were addressed. ResearchMethodology and Design This study utilized qualitative methodology that is interpretive and of phenomenological design based as to interview participants who play chess. Qualitative design allowed for collecting and interpreted perceptions of participants lived experiences (Eatough & Smith, 2017). A qualitative, phenomenological design, and interview data collection were considered to be appropriate for obtaining the internal language that chess players used to describe strategic decisions during gameplay (Haar, Norlyk, & Hall, 2014). Such designs allowed for saturation which indicated enough thematic data to categories have been gathered and established that shed light on aspects of the research questions. The key difference in gathering phenomenological language instead of experimentally and quantitatively based designs was that instead of identifying parts of the brain-chemical patterns activated during chess game play, there was the possibility that processes adjunct, unknown, or mislabeled, like empathy or intuition, could figure into strategic decision-making during gameplay more than experimental designs take into
  • 98.
    92 account. This inaddition to gaining new language that elaborates on known physiological processes. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012) was used for the research design as it allows for an analytical framework that derived meaning from participants’ narrations of phenomenon. An interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was utilized due to its efficacy for examining a topic deeply and on its own terms (Eatough & Smith, 2017; Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006). Since the nature of this study was to determine how chess players described the way they conceive, calculate, and experience the cognitions of their gameplay strategy IPA was an appropriate methodology (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). This method had strength in gleaning meaning from particular participative states and personal accounts. IPA offered research flexibility and applicability within a rigorous framework that allowed for interpretation of nuance and complexity gleaned from thick, rich descriptions of chess players experiences and perceptions. There are many suggestions from the quantitative literature that multiple and diverse cognitive systems related to memory, spatial relating, logic, and intuition are at play in strategic formation during chess game play (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). While no single experimental design has differentiated all these indications, a gathering of first-person accounts of what experiences, strategically, and internally of what the chess player was feeling or thinking, in sequence, or simultaneously, gave an indication of cognitive overlaps, or sequences, in processes. As well this qualitative method offered insight on brain circuit systems that may be handling more functions that previously known, and/or verification of which cognitive processes are dominant. Theory of Mind (ToM) offered a concept similar to intuition, and different from
  • 99.
    93 pattern recall, knownas cognitive empathy (CE) which itself is known to be active during chess game play and by its nature of gaining a sense of an opponent’s inner world seemed apt to verbal description (Laghi et al., 2016). Even pattern awareness from memory recall could have a linguistic sequence, unique, or in common, that seemed to be shown through development of themes through phenomenological interviews. A benefit of IPA was that it took both the researcher’s and participants interpretations into account (Rodham, Fox, & Doran, 2015). The feature of epistemological reflexivity allowed for defining the possible scope of the research questions, how the study construction effects analysis, and exploring how differing aspects of study could affect the investigated phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Distinctions in language between players who rely heavily on studying strategy from previous chess games, and pattern memory, seemed to be able to be discerned from players who rely on aggression and instinct, or defense and instinct based on how they empathically, or otherwise, read their opponent’s strength in chess (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018). Alfred Binet in his interviews of chess players to discern where their mnemonic virtuosity arose from estimates that great masters make no moves without four to five hundred deliberations per move (Binet, 1966). The editors of Binet’s modern translation note that great players actually consider fewer potential options and to quote world renowned chess play, Petrosian: “(I) am not in form; namely, when I fail to trust one line of combination as suggests itself on intuitive grounds.” With IPA the researcher could interpret what the participant was attempting to say at any given moment including unintended meanings (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). Intuition has been numerously, yet vaguely, assigned as a quality of superlative chess players tactical and the best strategic decision game move choices (Buhren & Frank, 2012; Coates, 2013). IPA techniques
  • 100.
    94 seemed to revealif chess players have a hidden talent that even they themselves have not well defined or accepted awareness of. At the same time IPA let phenomenon speak for itself from appearance, substance, or participatively. The semi structured interview provided the flexibility to confirm themes within interviews and between participants of all interviews combined (Abayomi, 2017). A comprehensive analysis of the various participant’s narrations allowed for grouping linguistic themes that indicated they are describing similar or identical phenomenon (Oizumi, Albandtakis, & Tononi, 2014). These themes seemed to indicate cognitive processes that are commonly used by chess players during game play. They could also reveal cognitive processes that have not been completely associated with game play. In and of themselves, since there is a great lack in qualitative interviews of chess players experience of game play, the data derived from this study seemed to put common and uncommon language and conceptual descriptors to known cognitive processes of game play that have been indicated through the extensive quantitative research that has been implemented on chess game play (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Edmund Hurserl (1970) developed the descriptive tradition of phenomenological inquiry, while Martin Heidegger (1962) originated the interpretative tradition of the same (Kiikkala & Astedt, 2015). The descriptive tradition suggested focusing wholly on the participants experience and viewpoints. The interpretative tradition acknowledged the research to be of a piece generating data between both researcher and participant. Ultimately effective coding of themes did require researcher decision-making. So did development of what emergent themes suggested about new data and theory. Still, it was considered to add to
  • 101.
    95 general validity toadhere to the descriptive tradition while conducting interviews. This in that the researcher did not want to presume, especially from limited exposition, the entirety of what each participant was revealing as the interview was being conducted (Kiikkala & Astedt, 2015). Judicious use of follow up questions was often warranted, since participants seemed to be describing complex and varied experiences (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Language could have many meanings to many people aside from standard definitions. Language combinations could be attempts by participants to describe phenomenon they do not have the words for, or even original combinations of ideas or actions. IPA, as used in this research, mostly mirrored Heidegger’s (1962) views, though ultimately it was the research data that reveals the themes, not the researcher, ideally. Overall IPA has the strength of finding and defining particulars of phenomenon. Any statements derived from contrast and comparison within this method was considered to have sufficient instances of similar coding as to ensure that participants are speaking, or not, of the same quality of phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Clustering themes that have alternatively been sorted from emic and etic perspectives seemed to reveal new understanding as applied to the research questions. Such research seemed to assist in the development of higher-level theory (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). For instance, intuition as defined by chess players in this study, could be seen to boil down to alternating between cognitive empathy or an instinct reflecting reason at its outermost most points of memory, and hence disappear, or be incorporated as a mental concept. Still, as interpretative methods would suggest, insider and outsider perspectives did merge as the interview progresses. Essentially, the researcher and participant created a third, combined reality as the dialogue engrossed. As far as it is known of the physical world any point where realities intersect is restricted to that moment of
  • 102.
    96 time and thecontent that fits within that time. The meaning experienced between any two people in an interview can be different at any moment in time, with one, both, and none knowing this as so. Then the delivery of that experience to third parties is an adaptation of that original experience. Admittedly some follow up questions based on where the impression of the researcher assessed where the participant’s directionality and depth of topic conception was located in the present drew upon prior knowledge of chess, cognitive processes and game play as to maintain topic intent and focus. While experimental design has sought understanding as to how cognitive empathy, and other aspects of ToM, influence game move choice there is a dearth of phenomenological interviewing on these processes. There was not a lot of qualitative data on how cognitive empathy is distinct from emotional/affective empathy. Other researchers suggested empathy maybe related mindreading (Bloom, 2017; Colle et al., 2019; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013). Qualitative research that defines qualities of empathy, and intuition, and either consolidates, affirms, or distinguishes definitions and constructs could be useful. Alternative qualitative designs were not chosen due to several considerations. Ethnographical study was considered to be limited in understanding empathy as it observes the milieu as is, essentially from the outside and words expressed during normal course of the milieu in action and is not lent to probing for internal dialogues from individuals aside from their participation in competitive play with another (Yardley, 2008). Still, there could be hidden complexities in ethnography, especially for PhD students (Scholten, 2019). A PhD student could use phenomenology with relative ease compared to ethnographic study. Ethnographical study automatically benefits from developed sense of observation while phenomenology benefits from astute categorization of responses, which can be done well with a less practiced researcher.
  • 103.
    97 Limited interviews couldcarry less risk of distortion, and ethical quandary, than immersion in a culture that ethnographic study demands. Narrative design could be too limiting to answer the specific question of cognitive empathy as a chess strategy. Most of the empirical evidence from quantitative studies in memory and pattern recall, spatial relations and ToM qualities seemed more given to cross-over analysis in phenomenological interviews, for matching language, than direct observation of play, personal narratives and interaction of chess culture as in ethnography or narrative design (Urquhart, 2013). Narrative design is looking for an expanded story, while this research focused on reduction of language to themes within cognitive mechanisms. Finally, grounded theory was not used, though the researcher did some extensive reading in that area, because elaborating or suggesting theory is a larger goal of this research, so it was not considered a suitable starting point (Yardley, 2008). There was enough data suggesting a mechanistic, if thematic, understanding of how cognitive strategy works could be revealed through rich, robust thematic, phenomenological analysis. Population and Sample Chess players in some ways represent a diverse group, mostly in age, and others a hegemony, as in sex and class. There are an estimated 45 million chess players in the United States, 3% are professional chess players, 39% play in tournaments, and 93% are male. Age ranges are 4% as 17 years of age or younger, 11% ages 18-25, 30% ages 26 to 40, 38% ages 41 to 55, and those over 56 years of age and over are 16% of the players (Chess.com, 2020). Approximately 70% of the population has played chess at some point. 15%, of players in the United States, are said to play weekly or monthly. 78% of regular chess player are university graduates with household incomes over $120,000. Chess players have been found to be 40-
  • 104.
    98 100% more likelyto buy a luxury item. Younger girls tend to play chess in relatively equal numbers to younger boys, but then stop playing as they age (Sillman, 1998). From a sample of this population derived from open groups in Facebook that need no permission for consent, participants were recruited who play chess at least once per month for the last three months and agree to terms of this research design. See Appendix A and C for inclusion and exclusion criteria. Further, higher Elo ratings were considered to be preferred over lower rating, though in actuality the researcher ended up using the first nine participant responders. Other criteria included being able to communicate well in English and that participants could make time for a one-hour interview. A sample of 9 participants, recruited from a national sample and were considered satisfactory for saturation (Abayomi, 2017). Sampling for interviews through Zoom interviews had become necessary due to the Corona Pandemic. Signed releases were obtained from all participants (See Appendix C). Each Facebook open group was asked if they could email out flyer to their databases of chess players and snowball methodology allowed for continuous responses to come in (See Appendix A). All participants were willing to complete an approximately one-hour long semi-structured interview on what language, internal dialogue, cognitive processes, or otherwise they associated with strategic choices during chess gameplay. Those who could not participate in this study included minors under the age of 18, those who did not play chess at least once per month for the past three months, and those who did not speak English. Anyone disabled to the point of where communication for interviews was hindered could not participate. Those who could not follow through with the interview process and follow up requirements as well could not participate. Those who disagreed with the framework and ethical boundaries of the study as well could not participate. There were a few
  • 105.
    99 prospective participants whofell out of consideration based on their initial responses to these criteria. For frequent and tournament players there is a chess ranking called Elo that gives the players estimated strength against other players (Albers & De Vries, 2001). Elo rating is based on sequential estimations of individual dominance per interaction in gameplay. In order of preference, participants would have an Elo rating between 800-2000 will be preferred over those with Elo score under 800. This was to be screened with initial questions of “Do you know your Elo score”, “is your Elo score between 800-2000”, and “is your Elo score above 2000”. Elo scores of 2000 and above are rare and such players were not to be considered for this study. None applied for the study and all who did apply, and qualified themselves, ended up having an Elo rating between 1400-2000, except for the few that did not have a rating. Generally, scores between 800-2000 are considered advanced novice to advanced intermediate (Antal, 2013). This was considered a secondary eligibility criterion to be obtained if sample of volunteers included enough middle ranked players. Ranking can be formalized though a chess association such as FIDE (FIDE.com, 2020), but generally players self-identification of score was enough to qualify for this study. As Albers and De Vries (2001) point out chess is a game where differing intensities of aggressive play can suddenly manifest that shift dominance hierarchies rapidly. These authors remind that a ranking is as well a resource-holding potential gradation, one that style of opponent’s play and tempo can readily increase or upset. As in all battles, good strategy seems a question of when to attack. Elo visualizes dominance on a time scale (Antal, 2013).
  • 106.
    100 Materials/Instrumentation The instrument usedwas a semi structured interview schedule based on Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis to ascertain thematic, linguistic categories of chess players responses to questions that aimed at revealing data about the research questions (Abayomi, 2017). The Research Questions (RQ) revolved around how chess players perceive their cognitive strategy choices during game play. The interview protocol was field tested by two participant matter experts. The interview protocol was developed by reviewing the RQs and the theoretical sections of this paper (See Appendix B ). Questions were designed to prompt responses as to gather impressions from chess players as to what skill or mental idea and processes they associate with strategic formation and choices during game play. The questions were open ended and allowed for suggestions of possibly more than one cognitive mechanism they drew on while playing chess. Participants were encouraged to elaborate and if indicated develop themes that have been proven in the literature to relate to strategic decision making, through quantitative methods, such as memory and pattern recall, intuition, ToM skills, empathy, and spatial reasoning. Questions about empathy, intuition, space, and memory were the primary focus since those were the primary qualities associated in the literature reviews for chess strategy (Coates, 2013; Colle et al., 2019; Conners & Campitelli, 2014; Guntz et al., 2018). The interview protocol was submitted for approval from three participant matter experts. Feedback was incorporated in making changes to the construct as to make sure it most matched the purpose, problem, RQs, and population as stated in those sections of this paper. The interview protocol was revised based on feedback as warranted. Participant matter experts were recruited through word of mouth through professors from Trinity University, in San Antonio, Texas and Northcentral University (See Appendix B).
  • 107.
    101 Study Procedures Approval wassought from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) from Northcentral University. Once approved, the researcher delivered identical flyers (See Appendix A) to Facebook open Chess Groups (See Appendix D) to recruit potential participants. Permission was asked to pin up two flyers in closed Facebook groups, and often granted. This included snowball sampling from emails to subsequent club members. The researcher did receive responses via email and Facebook direct messaging. During initial contact, after obtaining informed consent (See Appendix D), the researcher asked a series of screening questions to determine qualification to participate in this study (See Appendix B). Qualified individuals were then be scheduled for an interview at designated Zoom times. 9 participants were considered for saturation (Abayomi, 2017). All consents were collected in advanced of interviews. All interviews accounted for privacy. Interviews were recorded using the video feature of Zoom then transcribed by a private company with a non-disclosure secured. These initial series of questions allowed for the researcher to get a general conception of how these individual participants experienced and described the game. From this point conflicting ideas and concepts were flushed out. Prompts that help guide the participants, if they were having difficulty, to connect their own ideas or conflicting concepts to already described modes or cognitive processes, as the participant has introduced, were explored. If tangents were left unanswered then modest suggestions were introduced first from the literature review as to see if thematic matching occurred and then from the research questions themselves. The researcher did not act as if any ideas are certain, thus most allowing for the participant’s mind to act independently.
  • 108.
    102 The researcher keptaware of heightened emotional responses to any concepts or portions of the interviews, and these ideas were explored in more detailed as long they do not cross ethical lines. If a participant wished to detail how strategy in chess compares, contrasts, or developed from some life experience or other strategic situation that was explored within reason. Participants that consistently described textbook strategy in formal, logical terms that rest within the framework of ordinarily associated cognitive processes already connected to chess decision-strategy in the literature were not be deliberately deterred from that line of thought. This so, up until the point of a contradiction, or emotional or cognitive processes that indicated by the participant that deviated from standard theory. This in turn explored, but not beyond the reasonable comfort level of the participant for new ideas that may have challenged his traditional mode of belief systems. While interviewing, questions revolved around general concepts or ideas that players plan or noticed in the middle of play to implement as strategic choice. Follow up questions revolved around how to describe adapting to unpredictable scenarios, sudden insights to success strategies, and connecting emotions, perceptions, and cognitive intellectual awareness’s into portions, patterns, or sequences during any time of gameplay. At any time, in any interview, if the researcher believed a participant had introduced an emotion, concept, cognition, or strategy derivation that resonated similarity with another’s participant language, this was explored for congruencies, depth of process similarities, and further implications. In such an event that one such emergent theme seemed significant, even if introduced by two participants alone, the researcher could, but did not, inquire about a second interview with both participants.
  • 109.
    103 The voice transcriptionservice Rev.com (Rev.com. 2020) was utilized. Transcriptions were slightly edited for grammar by the researcher then interviews were sent to the participants for review once through email. Each interviewee had the right to remove any interview content but was reminded and encouraged that diverse and honest answers from multiple participants is what makes a stronger academic study and hopefully this is why they participated in the study initially. After review, each participant was asked if there are any additional comments they would like included in their portion of the study and to verify that the transcribed interviews reflect their actual, lived experience. Only one sent revisions and follow up data. An endorsement of the interview was gained from each willing participant and any reflections discerned as relevant to the overall finalizing of each interview process was noted by the researcher (Abayomi, 2017). Overall participants did not shape editorial content or analysis of the study. They did not have access to other participant’s material pre-publication. They did not get informed of any actual identities of other participants. During the interview process overall impression of what the group of participants are defining was not shared by the researcher with individual participants. Each interview kept in mind saturation points (Guest et al., 2006; Rodham et al., 2015) as themes condensed beyond relevancy, or no new material indicating new themes were determined to emerge and thus some interviews had differing lengths. This process assisted the researcher in refraining from overlapping their preconceptions from theory, research questions, and the literature onto the thematic dialogue the participant was elucidating from his participative interpretation and experience. It is the participant’s personal and existential account of the experience that the researcher was attempting to code and catalog. Note taking further allowed the researcher to bracket when his own ideas, bias, original thinking, speculation,
  • 110.
    104 connecting of themes,and branching of categories maybe indicated, suggested, or originally conceived by the researcher through a prompt of the participant, that did not carry the intention of the new insights (Haahr et al., 2014). Following up questions from this point allowed for deciphering the degrees of separation between the new thought by the researcher, the intent of the wording by the participant, and perhaps even something previously suggested by another participant or the literature itself. A new code or category not intended by the participant could be prompted inadvertently and explored to fruition during subsequent interviews with other participants (Hefferson & Rodriquez, 2011). Data Collection and Analysis Data was collected by first posting flyers in national Facebook open Chess Groups for adults who play chess often that wanted to participate in a dissertation paper (See Appendix A). Informed consent was be gained from 9 participants who qualified for participant criteria (See Appendix D). Each participant did up to a one-hour semi-structured interview (See Appendix C). In data collection through interview, an important point of analysis is interpretation of tone and rate of speech of both the interviewer and the interviewee. It is not uncommon in qualitative designs for the researcher to misinterpret based on perception of tone, pitch of voice, or rapidity of speech (Oliver-Hoyo & Allen, 2005). Clarification of speaking style, meaning, and intentions could vary between participants as a necessity to qualify for interviewer. In the case of when the researcher perceived he had asked a question with bias, it was his responsibility to reframe that communication exchange, as much as possible, to allow for reorientation to neutrality and objectivity of data collection and analysis. This was done on a few occasions, yet sometimes inserted a future point of the interview as to allow for full participant exposition. It
  • 111.
    105 was inevitable thatthe researcher would consistently be analyzing statements based on his previous knowledge of the design and literature. Also, there was the awareness of the participant that increased as to the nature of the study as each interview progressed. This sometimes progressed as interview questions revealed more about the study, and as the participants perhaps sensed, or calculated, feelings of bias he perceived from the researcher. This was accounted for by the researcher when perceived and seemingly generally redirected for. The participant may have even had their own bias or wish to please the researcher, which was as well accounted for if sensed. In all such cases it was incumbent on the researcher to redirect the interview to neutrality and objectivity through techniques of communication, reframing, clarification, revelation, explanation, consideration, and tact. Memos were used to note research thoughts as they occurred to the interviewer in process. Interviews began with open-ended and general questions about chess, strategy, tactics, sense of the game, and sense of the opponent. More intensive questions followed related to cognitive processes commonly known during strategy decision-making. Progressively the researcher asked for detailed description of how the participant experienced any strategic awareness during chess gameplay. Once saturation occurred, then concluding open-ended questions were offered. Coding of transcripts were conducted in the order of interview. These were accomplished in small batches of 2 or 3 as to allow the researcher to reflect on the overall process, the quality of the information gathered, and if any adjustment in interview technique, style, or content maybe warranted. The sense of less is more can be a valued technique in coding and even for the number of participants for IPA (Reid, 2005). Depth of analyses is more important than number of participants for quality IPA (Eatough & Smith, 2006; Smith & Osborn,
  • 112.
    106 2007). Hence 9participants seemed to prove trustworthy. There should not be too many themes based on the general cognitive processes outlined and these should give way to synthesis as they all combine from the one holistic mechanism of the brain thinking and working toward strategic decision-making. There was a chance a multiplicity of sub-themes (Yardley, 2008), though generally 2 or 3 occurred under each superordinate theme. Mediating for this involved attention to four broad principles: sensitivity to context; commitment and rigor; transparency and coherence; and impact and importance (Yardley, 2008). As well engagement with main themes by reduction of intertwining voices was a useful interview tool (Hefferon & Gil-Rodriguez, 2011). There was as well the voice given by the researcher, its alignment with his intentions, what was perceived from the interviewee as the intention of the voice, and anything the researcher was not able to disguise as bias. Interpretation could happen very quickly. The goal of finding generalized themes of cognitive processes, overall, argues that idiographic qualitative research, such as IPA, has much to contribute to our understanding of phenomena, as it can complement actual claims derived from combined and reviewed quantitative studies through a focus on the particular which can help illuminate the universal (Warnock, 1987). The semi structured interview format allowed for member checking to clarify and validate the interviewer’s interpretation of theme descriptions. Thus, trustworthiness and rigor was enhanced as the researchers narrowed the interview to specific such as, “are we now talking about using intuition (or empathy) during the game?” or “are you now describing that seeing the chessboard in the moment as a spatial whole with various future position possibilities triggers a different cognitive strategy set of choices, or processes, than seeing where the pieces are sitting on the board in the moment and fetching a memory from some game that you studied in a book
  • 113.
    107 or with ateacher?” These questions could be reduced further, or dismissed, depending on answers from each participant. It was imagined that themes would both converge and diverge from participant to participant (Tuffour, 2017). Players experiences, since chess is a game with rules, would have some general similarities. IPA accounted for this by separating commonalities and differences into linguistic categories. IPA used the lived experiences of the participant, in this case chess players, to explain themselves what the concept or event means to them, in this case strategy in the game of chess. IPA allowed for unexpected connections to be made. Coding helped reveal those patterns to the researcher. Granted all data was gained from memory as the event, previous chess play, has already been experienced in the past. Frequency of play was a factor on how active, most likely, memories of play were. It was assumed that there were always degrees of inaccuracy in memory, but there was an element of common sense in distinguishing when someone was recalling in strong, accurate details or not. This is something the researcher noted and used in interviews to clarify if he perceived a participant was having a weaker or stronger memory. Repeated and thorough deep reading of the data, Nvivo 12 analysis, as well as earnest bracketing of personal preconceptions, allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic themes (Holroyd, 2001). Any statements derived from contrast and comparison within this method had sufficient instances of similar coding as to ensure that participants were speaking, or not, of the same quality of phenomenon (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Clustering themes that have alternatively been sorted from emic and etic perspectives seemed to reveal new understanding as applied to the research questions. Such research could assist in the development of higher- level theory (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012).
  • 114.
    108 Bracketing of personalpreconceptions, allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic themes (Holroyd, 2001). Bracketing was effective the more the researcher allowed to set aside their own predetermined understanding and made coding decisions based on the least amount of personal bias and judgements as to nature of the game of chess, game competition, and cognitive processes and their descriptors (Kiikkala & Astedt-Kurki, 2015). In fact, Hurserl (1970) suggests the researcher attempts to approach the participant as if they never encountered it before. Effective bracketing asks the researcher to maintain a high level of self-knowledge, sensitivity and reflexivity (Kiikkala & Astedt-Kurki, 2015). The researcher was aware of their personal value system and how that could affect interviewing. If the researcher had a previous conceptual framework, and even presumed outcome ratios, in mind with effective bracketing he was then be able to restrain from infiltrating the interview process with questions, or indicators, that suggested participants answer in a manner that corresponded with such ideas or personal hopes. Bracketing did not mean the researcher had to hold back using empathy and enthusiasm during the interview. Authentic expression was sought to be elicited from the interviewee by good technique of the interviewer. Kiikkala and Astedt (2015) suggest that interviewers in some ways hold more power than the participants. Feminist researchers indicate that interviewers at times generate fake friendships and mutuality in order to elicit trust and data (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005). The researcher’s assessment of the participant’s educational and social background could influence his approach, and the delivery of the tone, of each question. The researcher strived for consistency in approach, content and delivery, tonal or otherwise, of all interview questions (Haahr, Norlak, & Hall, 2014).
  • 115.
    109 Overall the researcher’sprior feelings or beliefs about chess needed to be bracketed during interviews. The researcher attempted, like meditation, a constant inner voice that reset any bias to more objective and clear modalities of inquiry. The researcher was judicious in their use of rapport building techniques that relate to joy or enthusiasm. If overused, then the emotions this elicited could inflate reactions in a manner that distracts from participant’s personal focus and even accuracy of reporting experience. Chess is so mentally complex, sometimes near delusional states occur (Coates, 2013). These as well could be like where Hurserl’s epoche’ occurs (Hurserl, 1970). This due to vast complexity seemingly condensing into one crucial moment, where decisions must be made and there is a distinct knowledge of limited understanding. This has been said to translate into an almost hallucinatory unseeing of the board and pieces as indicted by Coates (2013) and Binet (1966). It is an interestingly theosophical question if chess players are playing the physics of the pieces, or the geometry of the board. Binet (1966) states that there are moments of complexity in mental imagining of possible future moves and their consequences that looking at the chessboard itself becomes a confusion. Because chess can be discussed in many forms of vocabulary, levels of understanding, and perceptual styles during the interview process the researcher anticipated moments of befuddlement, individually and mutually, with and between interviewer and interviewee. Utilizing standard interview techniques of admitting the confusion, reframing questions, or moving on to other questions is how such moments were handled on a case-by- case basis as they may arise. Coding Coding allowed for compartmentalizing sets of data in manageable ways. It could also add meaning. It should have prevented the researcher from placing too much meaning in the
  • 116.
    110 early parts ofthe study on any one quality or construct (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This seemed so. All codes were done by hand through color highlighting word documents of transcripts in the computer and then these results were input to Nvivo 12, the qualitative analysis computer program. Coding by hand was followed up with Nvivo 12 coding, after about a two-week break, to affirm and reorganize themes as needed. IPA methodology was followed through line-by-line analysis, theme identification, synthesis of data and interviewer interpretation, and then a comparison of the relationship between themes (Smith et al., 2009). Nvivo 12 analysis added or affirmed other layers and dimensions to the researcher’s analysis of emergent themes (Zhao, Li, Ross & Dennis, 2016). Nvivo 12 software could quickly search text and sort frequencies of similar words and phrases that could indicate themes chess players return to with some repetition. This allowed for further transparency as audit trails were maintained. This in turn allowed for the researcher to reflect, define and substantiate their methodology. Constant comparison of old data and new data was an effective method of sorting for meaning and relevance (Birks & Mill, 2011; Urquhart, 2013). As interviews progressed codes were at times revised for cohesion and sense making. When the codes were refined then saturation of actual themes were more assured (Urguhart, 2013). Coding line by line was the initial phase of coding where each line of the transcribed interview was assigned a few words to define the data (Urguhart, 2013). This ensured depth of interpretation and that themes emerged from the participant interview’s and not outside bias. Selective coding was a secondary phase when no new codes appeared (Urguhart, 2013). At this time in analysis core themes became clearer. Codes related at this point to one of the primary defined cognitive processes from the literature such as spatial calculation, memory retrieval, pattern recognition, logic, empathy, or intuition. Also, there was a possibility of new or
  • 117.
    111 combined descriptions ofcognitive processes that do not sufficiently match anything from the literature and may have to be considered independently. This was at times affirmed. Code names were then revised to best match emerging themes. Periodic cross-analysis of code and categories helped discern what level of descriptive language and cognitive processes were matching and being defined. Interviews were analyzed and run in Nvivo 12 in batches of 2 to 3, thus analyzed before the next batch of interviews took place. This allowed for synthesis of emergent themes to be on the mind of the researcher as further interviews took place. Nvivo 12 allowed for repetition of the design using the same software mechanism other researcher interviews might have been conducted with. Since the researcher’s selection of themes was recorded by the software, the researcher and others, can assess and replicate accordingly. This methodological approach to the data was enhanced as the software acted as if it is a mechanism of analysis with inherent high inter-rater reliability. While the researcher’s overall abstract impression of the data could offer wide insights, Nvivo 12 offered technical precision that well compliments robust qualitative interpretation. The final level of coding was theoretical where themes related to cognitive processes were analyzed and compared to existing or emergent theory based on strength of definition, quality of description, and frequency (Birks & Mill, 2011; Urquhart, 2013). This was the data that could begin to explain phenomenon as emergent and perhaps as suggested in the research questions. This was a process of comparing and contrasting relationships between well-defined superordinate thematic categories, and between sub-themes within strong categories that bifurcate, or more, between similar conceptual descriptions. Consistent and constant comparisons of thematic categories continually discerned if some should be condensed into less, or more, thematic categories. Analytical justification and researcher reporting on why and when
  • 118.
    112 such choices weremade was an important part of inclusion in the study. These aided as well in understanding how to repeat the study and how thematic conclusions were ultimately arrived upon. Trustworthy and Credible Themes To ensue coding was trustworthy and credible refined steps were taken. The researcher then could code from multiple re-readings of each transcript, highlighting, comparing notations, extracting key wording, and defining codes and thematic categories with rigorous examination (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). This method allowed for categories of various cognitive processes as distinct, and as well related to differing perceptual process choices during chess gameplay. Ultimately, each theme, or perceptual-cognitive process could be matched to specific brain circuit systems that in turn maybe associated with intuition, memory, pattern recognition, etc. Beyond that it was possible to design experimental research that notes how and when these processes create and switch. This in turn could lead to computer programmers having a better understanding of what sequencing, reaction, and effect they should be mimicking in their computer coding to simulate artificial intelligence. Overall, the structural and proximal phenomenon descriptions seemed to have great transferable value (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). Coded language did not make it into thematic categories if reduced by Van Manen’s four levels: research bias, ontological situatedness, concreteness, and eidetic reduction (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). Coding annotations were completed for insights that reveal participants’ perspectives describing any distinct perception of cognitive processes during chess play. Meaning of language was formulated into one of the known cognitive processes used during chess, discerned through numerous experimental designs, or any emergent themes (Nippold, 2009). Primary and
  • 119.
    113 subordinate themes asdiscerned were documented paying particular attention to phrasing indicating awareness of cognitive processes. There was the possibility that the same language indicated multiple cognitive processes at once. Within reason these were evaluated as of equivalent percentage per cognitive process of the complete portion of the lived experience and sequencing if one process started first then led to another. Subsequent codes and categories were account for what was useful from this level of analysis to avoid overrepresentation or redundancy. Saturation was justified when no new emergent themes or perspectives reveal themselves (Abayomi, 2017). This seemed to begin occurring after the fifth or sixth interview and definitely seemed to occur after the 7th and 8th interview of the 9 in total. Data was continually analyzed as it is gathered to insure thus. One threat to trustworthiness that has some inherent avoidance in a phenomenological study of chess cognitive processes was that of being accused of analyzing lived experiences that is too philosophical, or even conceptual or difficult (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). This could have been due to the benefit of so many concrete quantitative studies of cognitive processes during chess gameplay and the set ruled, formal nature of the game (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). A profile of meaning-statements (Bartholomew et al., 2019) was best used to analyze if experience contributes to theory in relation of chess players reports of cognitive processes as defined by ToM. The research questions provided focus of a concrete phenomenon in gameplay. Since there were numerous interviews it was incumbent on the researcher to keep the semi structured interviews within context of the research questions. Both these method techniques increased credibility and dependability. Referents (Richards, 2015) were extracted
  • 120.
    114 to compile evidenceof specific aspects of cognitive processes being reported by participants. Finally, a synthesis was obtained from the analysis of extended descriptions. Trustworthiness was established through prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, and referential adequacy (Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Rapport building was stressed in each interview. Each participant was asked the same set of questions with the variation of flexibility based on responses. Participants were allowed to review data collected, member-checking, and its interpretation during the interview as inquired or prompted, and after as transcript review. Participants were increasingly informed of the nature of the inquiry as question narrow, and transcripts are presented. Thus, through time and eventually in total they could assess if their language described in specific cognitive process categories or not. They could assert where opinion overrode experience, theirs or the researchers (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). The essence of this study was transferability in that chess was used to explore established theories of cognitive processes and consciousness, simply because thought and being were involved in chess and no one has yet asked these exact questions of perceptions of cognitive process shifts, though experimental studies vastly indicate they exist in brainwave changes during play (Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana, 2017). Triangulation was best considered for validating results and procedures to increase scope, consistency and depth (Flick, 2002). In chess instead of time, space, and person or purpose, rationality, and content, or even function, space, and time, triangulation for research questions related to cognition as one of several types of perceptual mechanism: such as between player, opponent, and board (and/or pieces); sense of self, sense of other, and sense of game; thinking ahead, seeing something suddenly in the moment, and guessing from
  • 121.
    115 opponent’s gesture oremotional resonances. These are the measures that captured the construct containing the themes (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Chess was an intriguing phenomenological study since its two-player rules are a construct, but also fixed, single and agreed-upon (Oliver-Hoyo & Allen, 2005). Any game or experience could be investigated as to its relation to cognitive processes. Reliability could be assured in that data was not be generalized beyond the sample. All criteria were intensely, attentively and tentatively, recorded as to how category decisions arrive. Overlaps and alterations were guarded against, while previously unobserved categories were distinguished. Assumptions A primary assumption of this phenomenological study was that participants had some degree of thick, rich descriptive language to assert which resembled or defined known cognitive processes that occur during strategic decision-making (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). It was also assumed that 9 or more participants, sufficiently fluent in chess, would be found and agree to interviews (Abayomi, 2017). It was assumed the interviews would progress with the least amount of bias. It was assumed that themes would be easily coded and defined. It was assumed that much of the analysis of perceptual strategic mechanism defined in the literature, and in the exhaustive quantitative studies, were in the main reflect in the linguistic categories discerned from the interviews. It was assumed that this study would be a worthy endeavor that add to the literature in a thorough and interesting manner. Limitations One major possible limitation of the study, which could not be predicted, was the amount of rich, thick descriptive vocabulary participants used to describe cognitive processes during
  • 122.
    116 strategic chess gameplay.This was why the semi-structured interview was chosen as to allow for the researcher to give prompts toward participants further describing theoretical gaps. This seemed to work well. Not everyone was equally skilled verbally and equally able to deeply express some of their cognitive processes in language of their own, though the range of ability was very high and closer than expected. Participants age might have affected their ability for thick, rich vocabulary descriptions. Older participants, and higher educated, might have a stronger command of vocabulary, but not with as much divergence as expected. Self-reporting was considered as not always accurate, and memory can be erratic (Holroyd, 2001), but generally the interviews seemed highly trustworthy. Since it might have been a few days since last time each player played a game of chess, essentially the interviews relied on long-term memory of overall feelings remembered during gameplay or recalled from recent games, however frequent or infrequent. Analysis of the data could compare participants with stronger and weaker memories, without knowing which participants have the stronger memory. The time constraints of one-hour interviews did allow for teasing out of enough data to show some of the secondary cognitive processes in strategy formation. Much of the data could be dominated by dominating cognitive processes that were easier to recall. Something as basic as memory recall has many operational mechanisms in the brain that were diverse and distinct. Phenomenological interviews seemed to elucidate upon these primary levels of distinction. Since participants may not have known what cognitive empathy is, they may not know they use it or how to describe it, yet when pointed out to them they affirmed this theme. It was possible that the interview protocols, or researcher questions that follow, may not prompt sufficient delineation between cognitive processes, but this did not seem to occur.
  • 123.
    117 Self-reporting experiences oftenrelies on memory of the experience (Abayomi, 2017). Binet (1966) insists that memories of ideas are implanted, and last much longer, than memories of sensation, though more modern scholars might dispute this finding as well (Binet, 1966; Salvaggio, 2018). Still, what is empathy if not an idea, of the other, of implanted and then removed. It is possible that a chess player who was avid, plays often weekly, would more likely recall and describe feelings, memories, and ideas more on the top of their mind, but this did not necessarily seem so as players who did not play as often as well gave thick, rich descriptions of strategy. Still, chess is a unique sport that players often dwell upon, even as part of their intellectual identity, so frequent players likely, when discussion was engaged, has a wealth of sufficient data to speak upon. Securing privacy at chess clubs, at tournament venues or in public places where the interview is to have sufficient comfort and privacy might have been a challenge, but this was circumvented by the fact of remote and online Zoom interviews. Environments did not have to be scouted and pre-planned for appropriateness of privacy. With a qualitative design there was the risk that thematic categories that seem concrete may not be (Oizumi et al., 2014). It was possible with language that several participants seem to be describing the same cognitive quality but are actually referring to mechanisms that are highly distinct in their operational capacities and usage among brain circuitries. Overall, this did not seem the case. Theory of Mind itself has a strong establishment in the literature, but there are some areas where academics disagree of its origins, purpose, and even operational mechanisms. Hence, while several participants are superficially describing one seemingly equal quality, its roots, purpose, and cognitive patterning maybe highly diverse. This is possible on some level and further study to discern such confounding elements could be of interest. The risk of participants coming from one chess club and share a common philosophy, such as a style of
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    118 strategic memorization ofprevious game patterns, and may not wish, know how, or want to talk about other possible strategic cognitive mechanisms that could be at play was avoided by the sampling through Facebook on a national level. That certain cognitive processes could simply be suppressed, unused, and unknown to any set of participants is always a possibility. There were time constraints in that Dissertation process has to be completed within 7 years of beginning, and since the researcher studied online, and at times part time, that timeframe was approaching limitations which restricted unlimited time to find participants that guaranteed thick, rich descriptive capabilities. Still such participants seemed to be found. A one-hour interviews themselves, could have been too short a time to again tease out good data from participants that have less facility with descriptive language, but this did not seem the case. Qualitative interviews can only gather ideas through language, unlike experimental design that precisely measure when aspects of cognition are active empirically in differing regions of the brain, as measuring during chess game play through sophisticated machinery. Still, thick, rich descriptions came from the IPA design. The sample of the first participants might have represented a narrower population than the population of chess players as a whole, though instead they very much seemed to reflect the dominant characteristics of known chess demographics. This could have been cause for uniformity of aspects of cognitive descriptions that a wider population sample might resolve. The researcher ultimately would not know when this has occurred unless he continuously expanded his study. Hence, generalizing, even to a wider chess population, much less how cognitive strategy was formed in wider populations as a whole has its limitations. Phenomenological interviewing to seek cognitive processes in the brain is not an exact match of empirical scientific methods with data collection. Still, it has been demonstrated to be a
  • 125.
    119 needed, and helpful,addition to the research gap that might provide missing indictors for subsequent quantitative analysis. Coding could have proved difficult to sort for themes. Language may have been so similar or so diverse that themes are indistinct. The semi-structured interview seemed to allow for enough prompting that the more sophisticated participants began to define concepts with language that categories marginal, or recurrent, phrases with more distinction. Thus, the researcher could justify further segregations of vocabulary. Most participants seemed to give rich, thick descriptions. Overall, the limitations were mitigated by what seemed to be a solid interview protocol that matched the diverse cognitive sets of skills that has been established for strategy formation and decision-making in chess. Since the chess population in some ways is very uniformed, generally males who are affiliated with some chess organization, there was a likelihood they would describe some rich, thick aspect of strategy formation and decision-making. This seemed so. Even if these matched within these thematic categories of more common cognitive uses there was validity in this study. Indeed, the literature strongly suggests diverse cognitive processes at work in chess game play and some of these were reflected in hour long, semi-structured interviews from the existing interview protocols (See Appendix B) (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2014). Finally, chess players tend to have higher IQ’s so their ability for descriptions seemed to be higher than the norm (Coates, 2013). Delimitations Delimitations included not guaranteeing Elo ratings of participants be all of a certain level. This might be desired in some sense, but as mentioned was in part difficult to procure. Additionally, even if more volunteers came forth, no more than 12 participants would have been selected for interviews. 12 participants would have completely satisfied saturation (Guest et al.,
  • 126.
    120 2006; Rodham etal., 2015) and allowed for a first-time phenomenological researcher to focus intently on the coding. Though tempted, the research did not endeavor a full analysis attempting to match all cognitive processes as defined as qualities to the counterparts as neural networks in specific areas and conjunctions of the brain. This was likely limited to the often mentioned temporoparietal junction as linguistic themes seem to, or not, match the primary functions of this much discussed area of the brain. Interviews were limited to a time frame of no longer than one hour. This amount of time seemed reasonable to be asked of participants. Expectations were of one hour for interviews, but that much time generally was not needed for perceived saturation. One hour seemed a realistic estimate for how long it will take to define themes through semi-structured interviews (Abayomi, 2017). Additionally, interviews sought general perceptions of cognitive awareness of participant choice processes, and narrowed as suggested by the participant, unless no outlined theme was identified well into a good portion into the interview. In that case, the well-defined cognitive process themes in the paper thus far, spatial awareness, ToM skills, and memory were probed more deeply by initiations from the interviewer (Guest et al., 2006; Rodham et al., 2015). This aligned with general phenomenological procedures and methods (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2014). Any quantitative designs were ruled out because within chess as related to cognitive analysis of strategy, this because many of these designs have been accomplished with larger participant pools and complex technical equipment. In qualitative design, narrative design was considered too limiting to answer the specific research questions. This research focused on reduction of language to themes within cognitive mechanisms. Grounded theory was not used
  • 127.
    121 because elaborating orsuggesting theory is a larger goal of this research and phenomenological approaches offer a better thematic outline to build from. These measures ensured that the framework of this qualitative study was flexible enough to get good data for the research questions and allow for some appropriate deviations from established literature. The researcher could reframe questions if participants veered away from the established literature in manners that did not indicate relevant content to the study as rigorously defined. The privacy of the interview and ethical assurances allowed for participants to speak freely in a safe space regarding their own lived experiences in choosing chess strategy and since they are fans of chess, the likelihood of delving in depth as to the cognitive processes they used while playing chess indicated the experience of the interviews to likely be more enjoyable than threatening, such in contrast as if the purpose of the interview was to ask about private sexual behaviors. The interviewer endeavored to tailor the language of the follow up questions roughly to the intellectual style of the participants as to not threaten them with the sense that these protocols are somehow measuring and comparing their specific intelligence levels. Ethical Assurances Previous to any data collection, the study gained approval of Northcentral University’s Review Board (IRB), which was standard procedure for all quantitative and qualitative studies using human participants. Any risk to participants was minimal. Any complications or ill feelings that participants experience during qualitative interviews had immediate remedies available. Confidentiality, anonymity, and privacy was protected by following National Commission for the Protection of Human participants of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (NCPHSSBBR) guidelines (NCPHSSBBR, 1979). All participants names have been changed to
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    122 coded identification likeparticipant 1 (S1). All interviews were performed on password protected devices that were set to activated. Transcripts were delivered through password protected formats. No other person had the ability to gain access to the computer that stored dissertation documentation and notes, other than the researcher himself. All participants were volunteers, who will sign a written consent to participate fully in the study (See Appendix E). Privacy and confidentiality rights and laws were discussed and signed off on (See Appendix E). Participants were informed before their participation that they could drop out of the study at any time. See consent forms (See Appendix D). All follow up communication and emails were held in confidence and as applicable password protected. The researcher protocols were as follows: all potential participants were given researcher’s contact information. Any concerns that were existing, or were discovered during interview process or felt afterwards, allowed for the participant to contact the researcher, by cellphone or email to address as suggested by researcher. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, thus allowing participants a later opportunity to review and comment, or even raise objections (Abayomi, 2017). The researcher made all efforts of understanding and communicating with speech as to elicit a genuine, non-contrived or coerced, response from participants during interview. The researcher refrained from putting knowledge or inflection in interview questions that would indicate his own bias. This method should be sufficient to provide thematic categories from the interviews related to the purpose of the study. All prompted responses were within reasonable framework of the intention in the problem and purpose of the study, and not be deliberately confusion, or have anything to do with coercion or other habits of speech which can cause psychological harm. Prompts were generally
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    123 simplified to bringforth further aspects of the story that the interviewee is already attempting to outline. These processes were consistent throughout the interviews. The study had some effective boundaries as participants were at least semi-frequent players of chess. The interview environment was private and controlled, a room where one researcher will be repeated the same interview protocol to all participants. The interview was not seeking information outside of the theme of cognitive processes used during chess game play to form and execute strategy. The researcher was not introducing chess to participants for the first time and asking them how it made them feel or think. The reviewed literature all pertained to aspects of cognition and strategy in some form. Summary A qualitative, IPA, study was be conducted to investigate how adult chess players, who play frequently, describe their sense of strategy formulation and use during game play. 9 participants, who play chess one a month at least for the last three months, were administered one-hour semi-structured interviews (See Appendix B). Participants were recruited by flyer and snowball methodology from Facebook chess groups. Recorded interviews were transcribed by Rev.com (Rev.com, 2020), and member checked. Transcribed data was coded, and run through Nvivo 12, and separated into linguistics themes that most closely matched the various cognitive qualities that were measured in the literature review and outlined by the research questions. Trustworthiness, assumptions/limitations/delimitations, ethical issues were checked and accounted for. Each qualitative interview was analyzed for specific themes that matched the research questions and/or the theoretical literature review. There were many suggestions in the literature of cognitive processes used during chess game play. Grouping the linguistic themes
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    124 of their cognitiveprocesses from the words describing the lived experience of the chess players was the goal of this study. It was possible that new or newly found conjoint themes were revealed. An open-minded analysis of the interviews provided thick, rich data that added to the overall literature. IPA allowed for interpretation of themes and if there were suggestions of new cognitive combination during strategy formation in chess play. As well chess, being a complex and multilayered game that often lives in the imaginations of players as metaphor, or game recall, due to its unique rules of play, culture, and history (Coates, 2013; Sillman, 1998) provided a strong sample to develop linguistic themes.
  • 131.
    125 Chapter 4: Findings ThePurpose of this qualitative phenomenological study was to investigate the gap in descriptive narratives of chess players as to their perceptions of what influences tactical and strategic moves. Data were analyzed with the qualitative software program Nvivo12. Chapter 4 presents findings that generated from collected data from 9 experienced chess players who met inclusion criteria of being 18 years of age or older, from the United States, can complete one-hour interview in English, and have had played chess at least once per month for prior last three months consecutively. The means by which the trustworthiness of this study was established will be reviewed, then results of thematic data analysis will be discussed by Research Question. By researcher emersion into the transcriptions definitive themes were coded. Saturations was presumed to be found as evident by the completion of the interviews (Abayomi, 2017). Trustworthiness of the Data Trustworthiness of data was ensured by rigorous data collection that was consistently applied during the gathering of semi-structured interviews (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). Saturation allowed for descriptive validity and confirmation of how chess players experience the game of chess (Abayomi, 2017). Member checking of transcriptions was offered to all nine participants, while only one sent back a partially revised transcript (McGaha & D’Urso, 2019). Saturation of the themes of spatial understanding, intuition, empathy, and memory recall, all prominent in the literature promised that transferability (Smith et al., 2009) was highly likely with continued interview sampling from a wider population active chess player that met the study criteria. A methodical approach of following the interview protocols until themes revealed themselves most clearly and then narrowing questions to specific participant interpretation of the
  • 132.
    126 four prominent themeswas effective. The themes proved dependable as they well matched the cognitive processes of chess strategy decision making well outlined in the literature (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Thick-rich descriptions of intuition, empathy, spatial understanding, and memory recall consistently appeared in participant elaborations of how they described their thinking and conceptual framework during chess gameplay. Participants overarchingly were fiercely independent thinkers, loyal to almost a chess purism and competitive spirit that confirmed a strong lack of bias or being swayed by any interviewer expectations. The researcher used strict sensitivity to adjust for reactions of interviewees to phenomenon that seemed to swat outside the scope and intent of pure data collection through semi-structured interview process. For instance, at times during interviews their tones or line of response bordered on the sarcastic, a few times asking if the researcher played chess (at all). The language they developed, though sometimes too technical for interpretation, was in depth and robust. For instance, participant 4 bluntly states, and often echoed by other players, “I mean, with weaker players, you can go with more aggressive strategies.” Participant 9 on defending his experience: Probably somebody with not so much experience wouldn’t have that intuition or instinct, (they are the same right – the way that you are defining them), but once you played 60 years or something like that, so 50, 60 years. So, let’s see, I’ll tell you when I started playing. I started playing when I was about 12 years old and you know I’m 64 years old. So, there’s 52 years right there And participant 9 on opponents, “(sometimes) you know they made a mistake and they’re about to crumble” and “you’re just waiting for them to throw in the towel.”
  • 133.
    127 Participant 1, “(Intuitiveplayers) create issues and that is what tests your mettle because now you are on your own.” Participant 1: you are seeing is the worlds collide and so, so the aggressive player versus positional players or if they are much better than you, then you already realize that they consistently picked the best move and even though you, you may only pick uh, a, an inferior move twice and at higher levels of chess that is enough to do you in And Participant 1 with a phone booth fighting analogy: chew up more of the board, then that gives you more attacking possibilities and to play cramped is to try to fight for the opponent, is to try to fight in a phone booth compared to you being outside of that phone booth to be able to punch in (and) he has got a sword out, thrusting it at my throat Participant 5 with an example of technical chess talk: I'm playing a Queen's Gambit. I have an isolated pawn. What does that mean? I'm playing an e-4, my opponent plays a French. Okay, now it's e-4, d-4. We're stacked up here on the left-hand side. So, we have this pawn structure that is going to kind of determine where all of the pieces are going to be going (and) Well, the opponent can berserk, which means that they play... I'm not trying to, I mean, I'm sure you're an intelligent person here and all that. I'm not trying to over explain something to you, right? Participant 6 indicates some feelings associated with losing and winning: Playing moves that are a little bit more aggressive, sometimes playing a move that you realize can be punished, but you think might not be. So, I was playing a game in Memphis where I was forced into it, because I was losing the game. And so, I played a
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    128 move that Iknew was bad, but there was a trap built in. And my opponent fell for it and I won (and) I’m trying not to get blown off the board (and) But I feel like in most games, there’s a mental thing of, “I’m the better player, I’m the worst player.” (and) Sometimes, especially when you're playing a weaker player, you'll basically, I was going to say, "Give them some rope." That's probably not a politically correct term anymore. But you know what I mean. Give them a chance to make a mistake, right? Participants 5, “You can exploit people.” Participant 7 with some technical chess talk: they have a knight on F3, a bishop on D3 and your queen stays on D1, and your opponent just castled king side, and there is no knight on F6 defending the pawn on H7. I was trying to describe a particular situation when you can deliver a tactical motif that can lead to checkmate. So, you can create a sacrifice there. You just play bishop check on the H7. The queen takes, knight's check, the kings comes back, the queen H5 And finally, participant 8 on feelings toward strategic risks in chess: I mean, we all want to be Mikhail Tal like everybody wants to be Elvis. We all want to be Mikhail Tal but that's very dangerous because we can't all be Mikhail Tal. But we all have that in us, maybe 30% of you wants to... And sometimes I'll just do it because if I don't do it, I'll hate myself. Because I'm like, "You have this opportunity, you can attack, you should do this." Now maybe that's a personality thing (and) So that's Carlsen, this whole top 10 generation, Ding, Aronian, Vachier-Lagrave, all these guys, Nakamura, this is like the apex predator result of technology, of databases, of coaching, of everything available to them
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    129 Overall prolonged engagementwith participant transcripts by the researcher, persistent observation of the data and data collection processes, triangulation, and ensuring referential adequacy enhanced trustworthiness of this study. Data was not generalized beyond the sample and thematic category determinations were well documented and reflect accurately participant reactions to interview questions. Triangulation. Triangulation was further by interviewer process of refining protocol questions to match the overall level of understanding of each participant, the researcher’s comprehensive understanding of the similarities in thematic language used between participants, level of depth of participant description, and an intuitive sense of what approach would most elicit thick, rich descriptions from individual participants (Arksey & Knight, 1999). Further an approach of moderation of perception was sought by the interviewer, this in that is as some participants seemed to think the researcher knew little of chess, the intensity of follow up questions would be given as to achieve more perceived knowledge parity on chess between participant and interviewer. This process helped serve as accurate bracketing of interviewer bias (Holroyd, 2001). Conversely when the participants seemed to wonder, even feel threatened, that the researcher had superior chess knowledge the interview protocols were modified to match what it seemed like the participant most would feel fulfilled and confident in describing based on their experience of the chess gameplay. Overall, this dynamic was managed well by the interviewer and successful interviews were gained. Less than half of the participants though filled out the demographic questionnaire, even on second prompts. Still, triangulation was furthered by collection of robust meaning-statements (Bartholomew et al., 2019) that reflected theory from existing literature. Referents were extracted to compile evidence that participants
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    130 were speaking directlyof cognitive processes of strategic decision-making that was well- developed in the literature. Coding and Recoding. Coding was done by hand after close read of the participant transcripts (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Codes were input into Nvivo12 for analysis and confirmation that clustered themes were distinct. As superordinate themes and sub-theme further distinguished themselves under the headings of each research question three more layers of recoding was performed. These included reviewing transcripts again to ensure all superordinate themes and sub-theme were fully developed in the results section of Chapter 4. Participant perspectives as related to themes and research questions were again reviewed to ensure clustered themes were distinct from each other and reflected accurate constructs from the literature. Specific phrases and portions of matching language were identified and developed to create robust thematic categories. Discerning Collected Data and Prior Literature. It is possible that some participants derived strategy from access of the spatial assessment and language specialization inherent in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as there was a distinct difference between participants who allowed for interpretations of the opponent’s manner and those who strictly played by chess theory, or playing the board, not the person (Saxe, 2003). Further study of how opponent body positioning affects perception of spatial awareness on the gameboard would be of interest. One caution that came up from several participants is the fear of seeing “ghosts” or rather inferring too great a foresight and strategy skill plan of an opponent and thus overthinking the current strategic state of any given chess game. Powell et. al. (2017) did find that spatial problems, active TPJ and ToM functions, did activate empathy during chess strategic decision-making. Additionally, chess and ToM were found to inhibit one’s own awareness of self to evaluate the
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    131 state of otherand visual awareness of action, thus as well increased TPJ activation (Hironaga et al., 2017). One aspect of the interviews that could develop further, and may not have been answered, is at what point in game play certain memories are activated that relate to strategic choice. The interviewer got the sense that the conversation about chess strategy was taking place in the present time as reflecting of qualities and theory of chess, and not necessarily reliving chess experience with the feeling of living in the past game play and talking about it. The synchronic elements of participant language provided a sense of consistency, even when the language itself differed to degree. Study Planning. Factors were considered to increase credibility in that language was derived directly from the participant’s lived experience regarding formation and implementation of strategy during chess gameplay (Bartholomew et al., 2019). Data was reported in detail thus fostering methodical coherence (Morse et al., 2002). Data was triangulated by multiple review of each of the sources through a rigorous close read of participant transcripts for thematic content that matched themes developed from the literature review (Padgett, 2016). Interviews were gathered over a eleven week period and interview protocols updated as a comprehensive sense of participants meaning-statements and descriptive narrative was formed. Theoretical triangulation was based on extensive literature review of ToM, game theory, and various theories of memory. Analysis and Recording Method. IPA allows for theoretical transferability (Smith et al., 2009) which was achieved through matching extensive descriptions of cognitive processes that were found to exist through quantitative analysis of strategic methods during chess and other competitive activities. Since specific brain mechanisms were outlined the general sense of cognitive processes used by chess players should match processes used in other strategic endeavors. Dependability seemed established in that thematic and linguistic content from
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    132 participant interviews seemedto achieved saturation and thus similar results could be expected from wider samples of similar populations (Anney, 2014). That codes were reflected to directly correspond to direct questions increases dependability about specific cognitive processes during chess game play, or the interviewer’s sense of the participant reference point regarding the research questions based on overall reaction to specific questions from the interview protocols. Results are thoroughly documented thus adding to confirmability and replication of study (Anney, 2014). Since extensive theory was generated in the literature review interview protocols generally allowed for interviewer perspective to inform semi-structured format. Questions that allow for participant to elaborate on established themes are readily outlined in interview protocols and should allow for easy replication from subsequent researchers. IPA allows for researcher interpretation and since participant content was a mixture of unique metaphors and established chess theory language, then the interviewer expertise in the participant area was needed to tease out more subtle definitions alternating between the two (Smith & Osborn, 2015). IPA allows for fluid creation and interpretation of data as interviews progress between researcher and participant and then further compound and adjust with each subsequent participant interview (Smith & Osborn, 2015). The researcher focused his self-awareness primarily on the reactions and content of the participant as they interpreted the interview in the moment and as a whole. It was helpful to indicate to the participants that the researcher shared an interest, and at times a passion, for chess. Allowing the participant to be the expert in chess was helpful, and in most all cases seemed to be the fact that each participant had much more chess experience than the interviewer, still putting the participant at ease about a game that supposedly measured intellect and includes a lot of pride with definitive hierarchy rankings, was a constant readjustment during interviews. Sometimes this was corrected for by re-balancing the
  • 139.
    133 interview to amore neutral point or summarizes several qualities the participant had strongly defined this allowing the participant to expand the data into new directions. This gave the additional benefit of adding synthesis to thematic categories that were indicated by more than one participant as somehow linked or interdependent (Smith et at., 2012). IPA method of analysis were followed such as line by line analysis of data, identification of themes and patterns, synthesizing data and researcher intuition or prior knowledge, and interrelatedness of themes (Smith & Osborn, 2015). During line review of interview transcripts rich descriptions that revealed lived experience of cognitive qualities known to be active during chess from prior study in the literature were color coded and as well input into Nvivo12 for computerized analysis (Coates, 2013; Smith et al., 2009). Not all lines were coded. There seemed a distinct relevance to some language as to be connected, defining, or interpreting the prior data from the literature as to have the cognitive qualities were defined and activated. Sometimes participants answers were irrelevant due to anecdotal experiences of prior chess play or chess culture, or tactical descriptions of specific pieces movements that could not be associated with a cognitive style of thinking. The synthesis of participant data and researcher interpretation, due to the heavy influence of a strong literature review, seemed to match and code themes with a pleasant precision that became more familiar as the interviews were conducted. It was fairly clear when a cognitive theme was being developed by differing participants even when their language did not match exactly, though perhaps through a few key words. The contained nature of the rules of chess may have added to this perceived dynamic (Coates, 2013). Overall, a deep sense of the themes and matching language was gained from the combined interview data and interpretation.
  • 140.
    134 Bias and Coding.Effort was needed to distinguish impression participants gave between their beliefs about chess itself as a strategy game and their interpretations of new concepts like Theory of Mind’s cognitive empathy. This process generally seemed too to relate to participants desire to be seen as a chess purist, not be judged on demographic data, and to retain some position of expertise based solely on the interviewer’s perception of them as chess strategists and not being fixed in a perceived social content. Interestingly, this seemed like a variation on Hurresl’s desire for approaching the participant for the first time as if never encountered before yet initiated by the participant themselves and not the researcher who matched their pace of information revelation. Indeed, in aspect, it seemed like a contest at times between abilities of researcher and participant on who can use most effectively Theory of Mind skills to infer other’s beliefs, intents, desires, and knowledge (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), this until trust was deepened into the interview as alliances of common appreciation of chess and participant experience were firmly affirmed by the interviewer’s tone, manner, and style of follow up questioning. Raphael (2011) proposition of chess as a technical resource able to analyze social dimensions of human affairs was often a distinct feeling of the competitive aspects of the interviews. This sense did shift when aspects of pure strategy were discussed, and opponents moves were seen as independent of their personality features. The presumed need of the other being to pick a winning strategy and not display some operant context of self. Results The study interviewed 9 chess players to assess their verbal and thematic categorization of perception of cognitive mechanism utilized to form and implement strategy during game play. Potential themes were researched through extensive literature review. Often these themes were
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    135 generated from quantitativestudies, and the literature indicated there would be benefit to additional data collected qualitatively. An IPA design was utilized for this study. Participants included professors, chess teachers, business owners, college students, research scientists, and chess club members. Of the nine participants, six had formal Elo chess rankings ranging from 1500 to 1900. All met the criteria of being 18 years of age or older, ability to complete a one-hour interview, and having played chess for at least one time per month for the last three months. Each had superlative communication skills in English. All were male. At least three distinct ethnic groups were represented; these being Anglo-American, Hispanic- American, and Middle Eastern American. Ages ranged from 20’s to 60’s, and several had or were pursuing advanced degrees. Participants represented at least three ethnicities, these being Middle Eastern American, Hispanic-American, and Anglo-American. Most had an official Elo rating. All were intermediate to high-intermediate level players. Most had studied chess from books, and few from teachers. Several were tournament players, and two were chess coaches. All were male and ranged in age from their 20’s to their 60’s. Most affirmed belief in more than one cognitive strategy active during various stages of his chess strategic selection. All were white collar professions seemingly middle class or higher having consistently described advanced education, professional occupations, and leisure class attitudes to chess learning and participation such as having been to chess camp or hiring a private chess tutor. Overall, they represented the primary demographic of chess players in the United States. All seemed intellectual and some were academics and scientists. Most had played chess for many years, but one was new to the game after having been absorbed by the video game world for many years. One had a coach that was at the International Master level of play.
  • 142.
    136 The results sectionincludes the four thematic codes, their places of synthesis and interdependence, the content of specific interviews, and indications of style and flavor of thinking of individual participants. Zoom interviews proved effective for gaining data and interpreting reactions of individual participants in the moment during interview processes. Zoom created a familiarity and objectivity that both researcher and participant seemed comfortable with. Again, given the competitive nature of chess players, in some ways it seemed the ideal “distance” to challenge participants and allow participants to challenge the researcher, as occurred frequently in interviews over micro-definitions and possible conclusions of cognitive awareness’s. It seemed the study benefited overall from being able to interview participants from all parts of the United States as well. Results benefit from IPA encouragement to include direct quotes from participants as to insure validity of emergent themes (Finlay, 2011). Readers will get a sense of the individual participants from their unique framing of language in response to repetitive cognitive themes presented between participants by the interviewer. There were some slight imperfections in transcription through (Rev, 2020) though these were adjusted after interviews by the researcher and were mostly obvious fixes of grammar though some blanks spots remained in a few transcripts. Only one participant, a research scientist, did a member check with detailed revisions, which as well included a synopsis (as well included in this paper) of what intuition might mean in chess strategy. Ranges of frequency had some distinct variations. Codes for empathy in the nine participant interviews ranged from 0 to 8, with a mean of 3.1, codes for intuition ranged from 1 to 13, with a mean of 6.9, codes for memory recall ranged from 2 to 13, with a mean of 6.9, and codes for spatial understanding ranged from 2 to 15, with a mean of 7.2. There was a total of 28
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    137 codes for empathy,62 codes for intuition, 62 codes for memory recall, and 64 codes for spatial understanding. Researcher interview technique generally allowed for passive reception of interviewee elaborations. This, along with one risk defined in the informed consent left the researcher with the impression that most, possible all, participants had some suspicions that the study contained a “trick” where the research was actually looking for another construct than the one stated. This in part seemed inevitable due to the perception that those seriously involved in chess culture are highly competitive and distrustful of qualities that can contribute to a game loss, including on psychological levels (Coates, 2013). The implication that one possible risk, stated in the informed consent, was a loss of self-esteem due to possible lack of linguistic skill and chess comprehension to described in thick, rich detail complex cognitive processes known to be involved in chess strategy formation and implementation. This sense of suspicion was evident from the first interview, and in each subsequent interview, and instead of changing the verbiage in the informed consent was used as a tool for the researcher to build trust and authenticity during the progression of the interviews. Eventually in each interview it became evident to the participants that indeed the questions were about gathering data for descriptions of cognitive processes used during chess strategy decision making. The researcher even got a sense that the initial defensiveness worked in favor of getting deep responses from participants in that they felt challenged to put forth a strong point of view. Another interesting observation was that well over half the participants at one point or another in the interview asked if the researcher had any experience playing chess. Though many of the participants were likely higher skilled, and more experienced to degree, than the researcher in chess it seemed that this assumption related more to the
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    138 effectiveness of theresearcher’s passive approach to allowing for the minimal prompts to then elicit participant, in depth answers. This akin to Hurserl’s pretending the researcher is from Mars and never having known the participant (1970). After this phase of each interview the researcher often pressed for more complex definitions establishing his own expertise in the participant area. Each interview had some sense of the competitiveness of a chess game where each player initially does not know the skill level of the opponent. The results made for satisfactorily coded, and saturated themes. Negotiating ongoing feedback loops (Richards, 2009) became a skill used by the interviewer by tailoring the interview protocols to the style and content of each participant’s initial, free form, elaborations. Often participants were verbose, and at times the researcher had to redirect. Several times, often when questions of memory recall or spatial understanding came up, participants delved into dense, complex, move by move, strategy that was known from chess lore and included encrypted notation for game piece movement. Often the researcher was lost by this detail and waited until an opportunity arose to engage the participant in more common language. The progression of interviews became more effective as the initial protocols were curtailed or summarized and the participant was allowed to freely elaborate without much descriptive prompting as to what the cognitive process the research was seeking to define. The exception to this being cognitive empathy, from Theory of Mind, which most often had to be explained in rough detail by the researcher before the participant could delve into the matter. Once introduced cognitive empathy at times reoccurred without prompting at later points of interview from its first being established as a valid cognitive process in chess strategy decision
  • 145.
    139 making. Some memoingassisted the researcher in keeping track of variations during and in between interviews (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). Researchquestion 1. What is the experience of cognitive empathy for chess players during game play? Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy emerged from analysis of interview questions as a valid cognitive mechanism, and theme, chess player was aware of, this from questions like “Do you ever get a sense of your opponent’s inner world? - as if you understand something about his conception of strategy intuitively”, “If you access your opponent’s inner world somehow, does how you access your opponent’s inner world, their ideas of chess strategy, determine which strategy you choose?”, “What feelings or thoughts about yourself, the game, or your opponent make you shift strategies, if you do shift strategies during gameplay?”, “What natural skills or ways of knowing, or thinking do you use during gameplay to pick strategy?, and “Do you feel like you use intuition or empathy for strategic choice, if so which one or both, and how do they differ from each other? If you do use it, does using intuition or empathy mean you have made a conscious choice to use those strategic methods as opposed to reason, pattern recognition, or memory recall.” And when needed cognitive empathy was defined to the participants by the researcher as a feeling or knowing what the opponent believes about the strategy in the chess game, or what they desire to use as strategy by reading something about this opponent’s feelings or beliefs and thus giving you an advantage over this opponent. Some participants denied any association with cognitive empathy as a process used to determined chess strategy. Others, after being prompted by a definition of cognitive empathy, elaborated various levels of engagement with this quality sporadically during gameplay. A few, often those who reported high use of intuition, were most akin to the use and description of
  • 146.
    140 cognitive empathy duringstrategy decision-making as adjacent or distinct from intuition, and some memory recall and spatial understanding. While intuition, memory recall, and spatial understanding had code frequency that was similar, cognitive empathy was referenced less than half as often as these other thematic and cognitive qualities. Some participants questioned the definition of empathy as contrasted between feeling care for another’s feelings until it was explained by the researcher that cognitive empathy, in Theory of Mind, related to a certain knowing of another’s intents and beliefs. A few times this quality was considered by participants to be very similar to intuition, but most often intuition defined itself by participants as a separate quality related to an overall apprehension of the strategy situation in a particular chess game that transcended either memory recall or spatial understanding. Sometimes intuition was seen as an extension of memory recall and/or spatial understanding. Sub-Theme 1: Empathy Assessment - There is a way in one can read and interpret an opponent’s inner beliefs. This theme was supported by interview data from 8 of the 9 participants. Participant 7 mentions empathy as reading gestures in opponents: So, you're reading, at times you're reading the immediate emotional reaction in the face of the opponent. At the same time, you're reading the board to know where the possible game is headed based on both... While participant 8 matched the interviewer’s given definition of empathy as assessing your opponent’s inner world and related the ability to do so as increasing with higher level chess players:
  • 147.
    141 Well, yes, Ithink we're always accessing our opponent’s inner world. If you can't access your opponent’s inner world, you're in big trouble. And very often that's why you see such lopsided results, like let's say a grand master versus an amateur. Here participant 8 speaks of empathy but associated with a type of cognitive reasoning: Okay. Well then, yes, absolutely. That's why chess is not easy because you have to think for yourself and you have to put yourself in that person's shoes. What do they want? Why did they make this move? I know what they want, they want to beat me, they want to checkmate me or take all my stuff and make me resign. So, I know what they want, now what? Does this move serve that purpose? And that's the difference between good players and weak players, good players, their moves serve a purpose, usually multifunctional, more than one. Or sometimes just one, direct attack against the King, sacrifice the exchange, open up the King's side, attack. A few definitions of empathy included asking why an opponent is making their choice in moves. These came from interviewer prompts on cognitive empathy but seemed overall less satisfactorily to match what cognitive empathy might mean. The interviewer attempted to code for words, even if it meant partial phrases from whole sentences, that seemed to reflect, and be drawn from their definite rumination in the moment on that cognitive quality asked to be defined. Participant 6 defined empathy as an imagined conception of the opponent’s personality: It's one of those things where every person you see, you want to pigeonhole them in some category, right? You want to look at your opponent and figure out what player you think they are, right? And assume they're going along with your imagined personality of them.
  • 148.
    142 He went onto describe this condition as being a steady state awareness maintained throughout a game once it is surmised, again broken down as most participants often did between strong and weak players: “But I feel like in most games, there's a mental thing of, "I'm the better player, I'm the worst player." Sub-Theme 2: Conscious Denial of Empathy. This sub-theme was support by 1 of 9 participants. Participant 9 also paralleled the strict definition of cognitive empathy as something he is aware of, intentions, but does not heed it for strategy decision making: “I may have had a slight feeling of what their intentions are, but usually I don't concern myself with their intentions or their feelings or thoughts.” And: “I kind of turn myself off to their feelings… I personally try to keep my feelings out of it and try to be logical.” Researchquestion 2. How do chess players use various cognitive processes such as Theory of Mind, Spatial assessment, and memory to formulate strategy during game play? Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy emerged from analysis of interview questions as a theme from questions like “Do you feel like you have a specific strategy or sets of strategies you use while playing chess?”, “What are the key concepts, method, ways you pick a strategy before or during gameplay?”, “Has your impression of strategy changed as you aged?” Connections between spatial assessment and cognitive empathy emerged as a theme through analysis of interviews questions such as “Are there any uncommon strategies or cognitive processes that you use or felt others have used when they play chess against you?” “If
  • 149.
    143 you have anawareness of it, how would you describe spatial relation and assessment of spatial areas and possibilities as related to strategic choice in chess between you and your opponents?” “Do you ever feel strong shifts in awareness of who is in a superior position during gameplay, and thus how to change, if you do, your calculations of the game, and what perhaps led to that point and what perhaps you could use a strategy from that point?”. Overall, memory recall a face value seemed the dominant mode coded as a cognitive process used during chess gameplay. This not in code frequency, but more so in length of descriptions and reliance as a primary tool in the chess player’s cognitive arsenal to be verified and relied upon during gameplay. Since much of chess is capable of being studied through patterns learned in books, memory recall was an obvious skill source. Spatial understanding seemed to divert, not in frequency of mentions, but in length of description and as well-being more personalized in understanding to each participant. The language repeated less, such as where anything that was not memory recall was often called by several participants “going out of book” – spatial understanding felt more nebulous, like intuition, where it at times functioned as a conceptual overlay, intuitively grasped, and other times as a concrete form of positional piece analysis. Memory recall was generally equated to learned chess strategies from books or experiences. Specifically, it was often mentioned as the cognitive process used in the opening of a game when the first series of moves set up predictable patterns and positioning of pieces on the gameboard. Spatial understanding defined itself in participant descriptions as formations of pieces on the chess board being strong or weak, familiar or unfamiliar, and where individual or combinations of pieces could end up based on movement capacities and relationships to the rest, or partial sets of pieces on the board. All these definitions closely matched what was outlined in
  • 150.
    144 the literature. Threecoding categories were added due to thematic overlaps. These being language that at once seemed to be describing intuition and memory recall, then spatial understanding and memory recall, and finally intuition and spatial understanding. There were as well several times that intuition code overlapped with empathy, but not enough to create a separate color coordinated code. Overall intuition overlapped with the most frequency in codes of the other three thematic categories. Sub-Theme 1: Memory is Primary. This superordinate theme was validated by 9 of 9 participants. Memory recall is often the primary understood source of strategy formation for chess players. Often memory recall was defined by participants as a form of calculation often based on prior study of chess strategy. This statement by participant 7 seems to account for memory of patterns and some spatial awareness of how interacting movements coordinate differing strategic futures: For example, something that I'm very aware of. It's the position of the piece in the particular position. And when I start doing some calculations, for example, "Okay, pawn takes pawn, and rook takes..." and so on, the position transforms somehow. And you need to understand if all this change in the position will lead to an advantage or that position, the transformation of the position would be bad for me when I'm playing. Participant 5 discusses the role of memory recall for strategic decision making as often, from account of multiple participants, related to the opening portion of a chess game: I believe that the opening is fairly heavy upon memory, right? My opponent is playing this particular move here. Okay, what's the theory on this? What's the actual play that needs to be done here, that sort of thing and so I think that the opening kind of consists a little bit more of memory. The endgame has some memory in the idea that very often
  • 151.
    145 you'll come toa situation where you're like, okay, "This is my rook and pawn versus rook ending here. What exactly do I want to be doing at this point? How is it that I can work it out?" And again participant 5 elaborates on the role of memory: I've got some time to think. I got some time to consider. I can play my opening kind of quickly because I played it before. It's a memory sort of thing. He does this, I do this. He does this. I do this. That you get it sort of set up there. Participant 4 discusses memory as related to the tactical strategy of piece sacrifice and defense: Well, a sacrifice is when you give up a piece or compensation. It doesn't have to be immediate. It could be long-term, or it can be immediate. I've seen some opponents sacrifice their pieces against me and it ended up not working because I calculated the sacrifice before they've done it. Participant 2 defines memory recall as calculating the pieces on the board in opposition to playing the awareness level of the opponent: “never been one to try to play my opponent” And: “playing to some key fundamentals” And: “opening, and you're like, "Crap. I forgot which line I should do now." Yes. Memory is definitely huge in this. But I don't know how to describe it though.” And that memory is: “It's just a high chess intelligence”
  • 152.
    146 Participant 8 refersto the concept of a checklist mentality, referenced as well by other participants, as a form of memory and strategic calculation based on summation of game knowledge: But I try to start with the most concrete first, so there's a certain hierarchy and structure of whenever my opponent makes a move there are certain checklists and things that you go through, right? And so, you check off all these aspects of a position, King safety, material development, threats, am I about to get checkmated? What does my opponent want? Why did they do this? Right? That's the first thing that I try to do, and the more experienced chess players do this stuff very quickly. And then you start, like, "Okay, I'm not in danger. What are the threats? Are they real threats? Do I have to deal with them, or can I ignore them and make threats of my own?" Things like checks, captures, threats to capture, threats of made in one, this kind of hierarchy of thinking and organizational method, like the reconnaissance. Participant 1 equates playing a well memorized game with strength and victory to “create multiple attacks and impose my will” and “creating uh, opportunities for yourself”. And again principles – participant 1, “principles have to be the guiding force and then you can work within it.” And memory as more reliable than spatial understanding, and possible intuition, in chess strategy decision making: principles and strategy on that, I think that is a huge part and I would say it would overtake originality because, because you may not understand the spatial relations of things.
  • 153.
    147 Participant 4 discussesmemory recall as critical to his strategy during the ending phase of a chess game: “I know a lot of end game strategies, where there's less pieces on the board. So, I think towards the end of the game, I'll go to more of my recall” Participant 6 leans heavily on memory recall as a playing at the highest level of strategic awareness, “I'm calculating and I've got it in my head” and, “I'm trying to sometimes figure out how to think like a computer, if that makes sense?” and “But more let's simplify it and maybe I can calculate one more move than they can”. Sub-Theme 2: Memory and Space. That memory and space trigger strategic associations was validated by 7 of 9 participants. Participant 2 continues to begin the connection between memory recall and spatial understanding: And so, it's almost like, well, he's probably going to do this, rather than doing this. But then let me use my spatial temporal, and I guess memory skills, to be able to maximize on that weakness. Yet also defines, as seen earlier with participants 5 and 7, that movement of pieces creates a new board or strategic understanding after each play that may have to be accounted for by more cognitive awareness processes than just memory recall (as well referencing current World Chess Champion Magnus Carlson (Thayqua, 2018): I think, I think more in terms of tactics rather than strategy because I ... Magnus said, and I heard him say, I don't know if it was an interview or whatever, but he said that almost with each time it's his turn again, it's a completely new position. Participant 9 indicates awareness of position of pieces on the board sparks memory recall:
  • 154.
    148 “So, well, therecall, I remember certain patterns from before, so I say, "Oh yeah, this looks like I can complete this attack based on what I know from before." And in a rational description of strategic logic: “Understanding means you know the game, it's not a feeling or a gut feeling, it's like a logical understanding.” Though sometimes what sparks pattern recognition recall could be incomplete information, thus possibly indicating cognitive empathy or chess intuition: “Similar enough that I say I should try it even though I can't figure out every move possibility that the pattern looks good enough for me to try it on recall.” Sub-Theme 3: Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations. That spatial assessment and cognitive empathy are related at times in strategic choice making during chess gameplay was verified by 5 of 9 participants. Participant 8 goes on to contrast memory, as often mentioned by participants as principles, and some more subtle cognitive understanding, perhaps intuition or cognitive empathy: So, these general principles, these general guidelines, these things that we follow, but when do you not follow them? And I think that's the difference between very strong players, really strong, super G... All right, grand masters and non-grand masters, right? Is that they are not bound... Because we seek comfort, I'm guilty of this, I seek comfort in rules and regulations and things that I know are true and when I have to stray outside of those things it's like going out into the wild forest, like now I'm on my own and this is where your chess skill and chess thinking, and chess culture and chess stability are tested. That's why-
  • 155.
    149 Participant 1 suggestsknowing an opponent accumulates with time and space progression of game pieces on the board, “factors that reveal themselves both on the board and outside the board with the person. So, you know prior games with this person. They really liked bishops. Subject 7 suggests chess piece moves spark cognitive empathy assessments: When you do your move, you can see the expression of your opponent’s face will be like, “Oh, okay.” Or just, “Hmm, I don’t know what’s going on.” And sometimes when you’re playing in the real, like, face to face, you can tell how this difference (affects things). And when you do a move, and this upsets your opponent. So, you can sense it, I look at that and say, “Okay, that was a good one. My opponent has some pressure now. Now I can keep pressing on… so you’re reading, at times you’re reading the immediate emotional reaction in the face of the opponent. At the same time, you’re reading the board to know where the possible game is headed based on both…” Participant 4 speaks of piece movements revealing the goals of the inner mind of the opponent: Absolutely. Whenever your opponent moves any piece, the first question that you should ask yourself is “Why?” Why did they do that?” Then you can think where they’re coming from. What kind of goals they have in mind, and then use that to defend, but if you’re not thinking about your opponent when they make a move and just thinking about your own plans? It’s not going to be good because then you may very easily overlook some threats. Participant 5 states awareness of opponent’s skill at cognitive empathy as chess piece progression continues in gameplay:
  • 156.
    150 I think otherpeople have just a little bit more of this intuitive idea where you see the move and immediately, you’re like, “Okay, he’s trying to do this. I need to be doing this. I need to be working this around or doing something different or playing this way.” Sometimes you might be thinking, my opponent must think I’m an idiot if they don’t see, that I see exactly what it is they’re doing. I’m going to be able to counter that fairly simple. This is an attack that really has no teeth to it that kind of thing. But then sometimes, you might go at that with an attitude and then your opponent plays something else and you’re like, “Oh, okay. I didn’t see that, so my opponent probably was correct that I am an idiot and I didn’t quite get that sort of thing.” Participant 7 echoes this idea that when an opponent’s emotional reaction seems calm in what participant 7 believed was a superior position for himself, then perhaps he is missing some key strategic assessment: Definitely, definitely. I believe that. For example, when you are playing a particular opening with some tactical motifs, but you know that some tensions start to happen in the game. For example, you want to push E5 and your opponent wants to avoid it, but then your opponent may oversee a tactical motif, this makes you feel how comfortable you are with this, with that moves that you just did. So, I remember also there’s another game that I as with a very lack of understanding of the position that was going on. And I believed, in my point of view, that I was better, but it was funny though, because I don’t really understand what was going on there. And my opponent was just exchanged some pawns and he was quite calm. But it was funny though, because I thought I was with a nice position and I reading the board, and I was looking at position and I get very anxious
  • 157.
    151 about, “Okay, what’sgoing on here?” Because it seems to me that I’m winning and he is quite calm and playing confidently, and he created a strong attack that I didn’t see. Researchquestion 3. How do chess players chess use pattern awareness as a separate construct from intuition, spatial calculation, or cognitive empathy, to make decisions about piece movements and strategy during game play established the theme that Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies. Interview questions that established for RQ3 during implementation of protocols with participants include, “Do you feel you have a specific strategy or sets of strategies you use while playing chess? Do you ever get a sense of your opponent’s inner world? As if you know or understand something about his conception of strategy intuitively? What are key concepts, methods, ways you pick strategy before or during game play? What natural skills or ways of knowing, or thinking do you use during game play to pick strategy? Does memory relate to spatial reasoning in your experience? If you do use it, does using intuition or empathy mean you have made a conscious choice to use those strategic methods as opposed to reason, pattern recognition, or memory recall? Overall, the research questions were provided enough data and analysis to create effective and understandable codes that reflected actual thematic constructs of cognitive processes that were directly derived or detailed from the literature. These effectively breaking down into the four themes of intuition, empathy, spatial understanding, and memory recall. Each directly related to specific, or closely associated cognitive processes quantifiably defined from the literature. The language gained by participant interviews adds a unique dimension to the large amount of quantitative data on these cognitive themes (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). The
  • 158.
    152 first-person accounts weresufficient to saturate thematic coding through qualitative obtainment of interview responses, analysis, and described data (Abayomi, 2017; Hurserl, 1931). Sub-Theme 1: Memory Stands Alone. Pattern awareness through memory recall was established as distinct from incorporating intuition, spatial calculation and assessment, and/or cognitive empathy by 5 of 9 participants. Participant 5 discussed the feeling that certain strategic conclusions are inevitable: I'm trying to do as much as I can here, but it is simply this inevitable movement where we at the level where we are at, now, obviously if I were that much better and I was playing someone who wasn't, you might be able to still beat them in that situation there. But on this level and all that it was inevitable that he was just going to kind of come down. Participant 4 discussed spatial understanding as an awareness of the positions, spaces, on the board, not necessarily the pieces: Yeah, I mean, I try my best to take command of the game as far as base, like conquering territory within the board. I want to do as much as I can to get as much space as I can, center control. It's very important. I want to try to take that space more than my opponent. That's really one of the main strategies of the game, space control. Participant 4 suggests a simple chess strategic philosophy that perhaps reduces to one or two cognitive abilities or expands to a definition of intuition as complete chess conception: “just using the pieces to manipulate the king into a checkmate position.” Participant 9 suggest spatial awareness and intuition for strategic assessment as he surveils a potential board position: “And I say, "Well, look, that just doesn't look right.”
  • 159.
    153 Participant 9 surmisesa pure state of understanding, possibly an intuition, when asked of spatial awareness: “I would consider that pure understanding of what's going on - on the board.” And: “Not anything that I know logically, it's just the “spatialness” of it.” Participant 6 suggests intuition and spatial awareness are more difficult to obtain than the calculation of memory recall: “So, I depend a lot on calculation, just using brain power. I've actually struggled to develop more of a natural feel for the game.” Participant 5 implies intuition as some cumulatively from experience that comes out automatically as other cognitive development and actualize: I just feel as though it is much more of just this kind of natural thing that comes, for that the more you play and the more you have all this stuff internalized, the more that it just sort of comes out that way. Does that make sense? I'm not sure if that answered your question. Participant 5 opposes intuition as to calculations memorized from chess strategy books: Yeah, I'd say so. I mean, once you get out of theory, you have to think on your own. No more relying on the book (and…) I think intuition has a lot more to do with experience and you kind of get feel, like a gut move of what the right move should be, and then you can think to back that up. Sub-Theme 2. Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory. That perceiving sense of space on the chess board, or piece movement progression, connects to feelings that might be perceived by opponents or forces fall back reliance on strategy choose from memory was
  • 160.
    154 affirmed by 7of 9 participants. Participant 2 mentioned feeling space constrict in the game in a visceral way: “I feel like I'm getting suffocated” Participant 8 speaks of awareness of ramification of decision-making: Now as another Grandmaster told me, and I understand this, I don't look for what's good about the move, I know what's about the move. If I didn't think it were good, I wouldn't be considering it. But now you start looking for what's wrong with the move. What am I missing? What's the drawback? And so conversely, when my opponent plays a move, the first thing... Well, obviously checks, captures, threats to capture, threats to made in one, are there any threats, et cetera, et cetera, that I have to deal with. But then you start looking for what's wrong with it. Like, "Really?" Especially if it surprises you, "Really, are you sure about that? What's wrong with this? Is there something wrong?" There might not be anything wrong with it and they're just much better than you and they're going to crush you because they understand chess much better than you do. Participant 1 echoes previous participant’s sense that space awareness relates to mood: “Well taking up space is taking up territory on the board” Or: “play cramped” He contrasts pattern recognition, or memory recall, to intuition: So, you know and then when you are out of book as I mentioned before then you have to rely on, on pattern recognition from books that you studied in the past and intuition. Then participant 2 describes an opponent’s ability for spatial recognition:
  • 161.
    155 Spatial recognition. Heis able to take a series of moves that would take me many many more minutes and make them than such rapid progression because he knows where he is supposed to wind up. Or similar, defining spatial relationship as something keen strategy imposes on a weaker opponent: Well, with the space, with the spatial relationships again when you have been denied space to the opponent, then they, then they wind up making more passive moves. And so, anytime you can uh, chew up more of the board, then that gives you more attacking possibilities and to play cramped is to try to fight for the opponent, is to try to fight in a phone booth compared to you being outside of that phone booth to be able to punch in. Participant 2 goes on to describe temporospatial awareness as a visualization process of combing chess pieces in the mind as coordinating around some future strategic position, chess square, on the gameboard: spatial, temporospatial awareness, I guess, I think it is huge. It's like as the game develops and the black side, my castle king side, and you're like, "All right," you identify the F7 square. And then the whole time, your kind of visualizing how to get your team over to that F7 and line up everything and get the queen over to C3… he or she castles one side or the other. But the spatial, temporal, I guess skill or ability is just huge. And participant 2 continuing: I would try to just call out a square in my head, and then make myself visualize what color it is and where it is on the board. And I might try to visualize mating patterns, just like simple rook, king, to king patterns. I don’t know. And then also, I might just try to do
  • 162.
    156 the patterns inmy head, just play a game in my head. A game of blindfold chess I feel like helps a lot with that. Participant 2 then makes a possible connection between and memory recall as strategic decision-making combination: And so, it's almost like, well, he's probably going to do this, rather than doing this. But then let me use my spatial temporal, and I guess memory skills, to be able to maximize on that weakness. Participant 1 discussed relationship between spatial awareness of the board, time and known strategic memory choice progression: Spatial recognition (skilled at this)… He is able to take a series of moves that would take me many many more minutes and make them at such rapid progression because he knows where he is supposed to wind up… (Spatial awareness) Yeah it plays a component because you are, you are looking through, you are looking through what you have covered in the past and then you start recognizing patterns. And so, you are seeing okay, how can I create that pattern that I have studied that I know works, and put that in, into the plan. Participant 2 suggests that opponents sometimes move poorly in piece progression on the space of the game board to deceive the eye from seeing certain spaces and strategies that exist on the game board: Or it’s a blunder with the intention to try to cause you to make a bad move as well, like draw your attention away from a focal point, focal square, or region of the board. Participant 7 suggest connections between space and memory:
  • 163.
    157 At the sametime, you’re reading the board to know where the possible game is headed based on both (space and memory)… Okay, how can I do that? I need to attack his knight that maybe is defending the F7 pawn, or the queen or something else. That leads me to something like to correlate this trap and at least try to think about the tactical motifs that can appear from that position. So, I believe that strategy plays a very important role in some types of openings. Right now, I can understand that there are positional openings and more openings that lead to tactical motifs instead of a more closed positional one. And depending on the strategy of the opening, it’s like queen’s gambit is a very positional one and you need to understand very well what’s going on in the middle game. So, understanding that the positioning of the piece and how to attack, how can you do that? And so, you need to have a very good strategy and understanding of what’s going on in the middle game. Participant 9 insists that commanding space on the chess board can be related to seeing something in the piece position that triggers and awareness of need for strategic evaluation without an obvious logical perspective immediately noticed: That spatial thing might actually come into play because I recognize the queen move is not really placed in the best place, for example, my opponent’s queen move… and I say, “Well, look, that just doesn’t look right. Not anything that I know logically, it’s just the spatialness of it. It doesn’t look like the queen can do what it needs to do in the space that it has or in a space that it needs to have and I’m thinking, “Well, if that’s the case, then what would I follow up with?” And then I look at what I can follow up with based on, say, his queen positioning on that last move, say. And I say, and then following moves, same thing. Queen still doesn’t seem placed right on the board and stuff, just not doing
  • 164.
    158 what it needsto command... No, it wouldn’t be instinct because it’s clear, to me it’s clear that the queen is misplaced or doesn’t have spatial command that it needs. I would consider that pure understanding of what’ going on on the board. Actually, probably the space will come out as initial thought and say, “Well, let’s see the space.” And then once I see the space and the command of the men, then I start addressing the possible love variations that I can go with. And based on placement of the opponent’s men, I say, “Okay, let’s see what’s going on?”. If I see these men are placed here, I can see what command they have with the board and what command they don’t. I’m thinking, “Well, here’s the file. I need to take command of the file.” Participant 4 notes that piece movement and aggression force strategic evaluations drawn and based in memorized strategy. Well, if I notice the opponent is being very aggressive and just coming at my kingside, I’ll make sure I don’t get checkmated early in the game, so I might take a step back and defend a little, but it really does depend on the position… It’s very hard, it’s one of the hardest ones, to know, but once you get that you can understand a relationship between those three pieces that you can implement in the middle game and even earlier on. Participant 5 suggests spatial pattern recognition recalls memories of prior strategy and a suggestion of increased awareness through cognitive empathy that the opponent is conceiving the game differently from oneself: A lot of times it is sort of this idea of a pattern. I recognize this situation. I’ve seen this in a chessboard previously. I know how I have played that. I know how opponent has played that and therefore, you know…. (Also knowing the) Opponent is having a different way of thinking about the game.
  • 165.
    159 Sub-Theme 3. IntuitionExists. That intuition is acknowledged as a skill used to choose chess strategy was affirmed by 9 of 9 participants. Participant 7 on speaking of intuition mentions a forward-thinking element that combines with memory recall and advances positions or understands how movement and time effect strategy, akin to a form of intuition: For example, something that I'm very aware of. It's the position of the piece in the particular position. And when I start doing some calculations, for example, "Okay, pawn takes pawn, and rook takes..." and so on, the position transforms somehow. And you need to understand if all this change in the position will lead to an advantage or that position, the transformation of the position would be bad for me when I'm playing. And that this effect might possible be: deep calculation… I also believe that intuition could be related to some still unknown aspect of the mind that are probably associated with positional/space awareness of the board and the understanding of pieces arrangement on the board that creates particular motifs (e.g., castle king-side or queen-side, bishop fianchetto, and so on). However, how to use all this knowledge will depend on experience, I guess! Participant 2 suggests intuition is a quality one feels an opponent has and is implementing: I feel like I can sense that someone's doing that (and…) I feel like that this player, where it's almost like every move he or she makes is just slightly better than mine (and…) For some reason, what comes to mind is that I feel that he might not have a long-term plan. He may be just looking at the board, each individual move, and just saying, "Hey, what's the best way I could improve my position in this position?" One thing that comes to mind
  • 166.
    160 whenever that happens,it's always like a pawn push. It's not like the queen comes down suddenly, or something like that. Participant 2 also echoes, with another Magnus Carlson quote (Karolyi, 2018) the sense of other participants that intuition, and maybe spatial assessment, is a comprehensive quality that changes with each piece moves and changes the order of the future possibilities: I think, I think more in terms of tactics rather than strategy because I ... Magnus said, and I heard him say, I don't know if it was an interview or whatever, but he said that almost with each time it's his turn again, it's a completely new position. He also suggests intuition is most useful against weaker opponents: If I use intuition, then it's usually against someone that I know is a weaker player, or is playing as a weaker player (and…) And so, I think there's times where you're thinking, "Okay. I think he's going to do this," which may be considered intuition. But then I've learned not to do that because with good players, I don't think that they necessarily mask their moves. But I think that they're just playing on a different level than I am. Participant 2 goes on to suggest opponents confuse his intuition play for strategy derived from memory calculations: But then after we'd played a little bit, he said that he felt like I was then making those calculations in my head. It was just doing whatever I was doing (and…) again, it seems to be more with weaker players than I am. You just feel that, and it can almost be at the very beginning of an opening, where they go out of book so early that you know, or you highly suspect that they're a weak person. Participant 8 echoes similar sentiments:
  • 167.
    161 So, the resultis it's like the man who has nothing to lose, nothing more dangerous, and that's when I've had my best results. Now, is that an optimal way to play? I don't know. I think a combination of my liberation and their underestimation also had something to do with it (and…) Just reality, right? So, the things that you practice over and over and over and over, and the work that you put in, the blood, sweat, and tears that you put in practice so that you don't bleed in the fight, that's the saying. And everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth, like (Iron Mike) Tyson would say, like you have a plan but all of a sudden, your opponent does this, now what? Well, now you're on your own. Now your chess ability and your chess skill comes through. How much tactics? How many end games? What have you been doing and how do you understand chess? And people understand chess differently, you could show this same position to two different kinds of players and one would play this, and one would play that and they would both give you reasons why it's correct for them. Participant 1 implies intuition as a warning that something big strategically has taken shape: You get a feeling as you are playing you may not be able to see the entirety, but you feel something coming on and you know when that big moment is there and you recognize that you have got to respond to it. (and…) fever pitch at that moment and you know either you are going to be able to burst through or if you do not respond to it, (and…) So, so it is a, uhm, it is just a feeling, it is kind of like playing an instrument. You just know you, you, you know that measure is coming and, and you have to anticipate it, you do not know exactly when you just know it is, it is happening right at that moment. You respond too early or too late. The magic is recognizing it and addressing it right then and there.
  • 168.
    162 And suggest thisquality is somehow related to the body, perhaps like reading someone with cognitive empathy: “body is a, uh, uh, it gives you a, it tells a story about you.” Participant 1 concludes intuition as a feeling one trusts based on a sort of blind faith and even later defines intuition as a sort of courage: I do not see, I do not see the answer, but you know what, my gut tells me I need to do this and so, you go in a feeling at times. I do not like doing that but sometimes it comes to the point where you go on a feeling. It is, this, this just feels like the strongest move. I do not see a better one and I realized that if I play a passive one, I am just giving him another opportunity for another tempo. I have got to do it. And: “No guts. No glory. So, let us just go ahead and do this.” Participant 4 suggests intuition as his primary strategy that comes from his head: but I think more of my strategy comes from being intuitive, to where I'm seeing the position and I'm kind of using my head and seeing what works, (and…) What I mean by intuition is, rather than just always making whatever, say the engine, whatever move the engine would say would be the best, using my own head and I guess sort of seeing what I think would work and what move comes to me first. Like the first thing that pops into my brain. And then, I think like, "Would that move work?" Or... "This looks good." I say like, "This looks..." I don't know if it's from my subconscious telling me like, "Oh, I've seen this position before and I know this is good for me," or how exactly it works, but... I almost want to say it's more of a feeling almost because I kind of look at it and some
  • 169.
    163 positions, I'll... I'mnot the best chess player, so I'll just be like, "This feels good for me." And I can't see any other moves, and I'm like, "This has to be good," almost. Participant 4 suggest intuition is the primary thinking cognitive function that makes up for his lack of memorized strategy from book learning: I think when I'm thinking, I'm also using my intuition a lot, especially because I don't know a ton of strategy with the game… I'll tend to try to use my head a lot more… I'd say I use cognitive thinking He also implies that knowledge of the other player, perhaps assessed through cognitive empathy, allows for more use of intuition: If you know a lot about the player and you know how to play against them, you would just intuitively make certain moves against them that you wouldn't make against someone else. And as well echoes other participants’ idea that intuition relates to the moveable adjustment of multidimensional reconfigurations of possible strategic combination that materialize after each single piece move: “Yeah. Every move, I'll try to be adjusting the position to have it favorable. Let's see, where am I going with this?” Participant 9 suggest intuition as a form of instinct: And then the instinct, of course, I guess it's kind of like that because the instinct, even though I can't recall the pattern, maybe it's not a recall, but just looks right based on what I've done before as looks like the right thing to… Things happen or are caused to happen by a certain move. And I say, "Well, those are all good instinct, even though I can't figure
  • 170.
    164 out all thefollowing moves sequence." Let's see what else… Intuition. Intuition, instinct, wouldn't they be very close to each other? Though participant 9 confirms what many chess experts (Coates, 2013) say that intuition is a higher-level player quality rather than a lower: Probably somebody with not so much experience wouldn't have that intuition or instinct, but once you played 60 years or something like that, so 50, 60 years. Participant 6 suggest intuition as something that needed to be cultivated from early learning onward and as well a free-wheeling sort of natural skill: enough to know it's a little late to get that innate chess sense… But doesn't depend quite as much on naturally knowing where to put things and naturally what the position feels like… And I used to play a lot more haphazard than I do now. Sometimes I wonder if I need to play a little bit more haphazard, if I'm going to get back to where I was. Evaluation of the Findings Cognitive empathy (RQ1), spatial assessment (RQ3), memory recall (RQ2), and intuition (RQ3) have all been found by the literature to be cognitive mechanism used to decide chess strategy (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Qualitative, semi-structure interviews with 9 experienced chess players confirmed through their definitions that each of these cognitive mechanisms was understood as used to determined chess strategy decisions-making. At times thematic definitions of intuition and cognitive empathy resembled each other. Since intuition is less verified quantitatively than cognitive empathy in the literature, yet intuition is more commonly claimed by chess experts to be a high skills of experienced chess players, then it is possible these qualities have similar properties and implications (Coates, 2013; Ciaramelli, Bernardi, & Moscovitch,
  • 171.
    165 2013). Still, intuition,though strongly cited by several participants overall remained more elusive of definition even than cognitive empathy. Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy had the most words used by participants to define this quality that seemed to be generally accepted as calculation learned from chess experience, book learning, and chess lessons. Participant facility in seeming to agree on a general idea of the function of memory recall allowed the researcher to adapt his protocol approach as to not provide elaborate definitions of memory recall during question prompts. To a slightly lesser degree participants defined assessment of spatial relationships as a chess strategy quality and this allowed for the researcher to reduce prompted definitions of this cognitive mechanisms during the semi-structured interview and instead follow up with linking questions on how the four cognitive modalities studied were perhaps interrelated and experienced by chess players. These led to thick, rich descriptions of various cognitive mechanism discussed in the literature and revealed thematically in interviews. Overall, cognitive mechanisms discussed in the literature as active during chess strategy were matched what themes in the interviews revealed, even to the point of intuition being consistently, yet somewhat vaguely asserted as a primary skill of advanced chess players, and certainly that memorized strategies patterns figure greatly at all levels of chess strategy formulation. That chess has been found to be a male, middle-class, and professional competitive, hobby was confirmed by all of the participants who applied for the study as being from that precise demographic. Chess as a constrained task environment with higher ecological validity (Conner & Campitelli, 2014) was demonstrated as trustworthy due to the consistent rich, thick descriptions of each of the participants. That cognitive empathy is a concept familiar to chess players, as knowing the inner world of opponents, was confirmed by most participants
  • 172.
    166 (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, &Moscovitch, 2013). These findings developed the sub-theme of Empathy Assessment. That chess players could read intentions and strategic motives from opponent’s faces, as suggested by Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, and Crowley (2018), was confirmed by more than one participant. Though trickery was acknowledged by several participants as a ploy used by opponents there was little thematic definition of Buhren and Frank’s (2012) assertion of the usefulness of game theory as applying non-logical moves to shift power balance of games, though something akin to this idea was discussed by topics of intuition and sacrificing higher level chess pieces at unpredictable moments. Buhren and Frank’s (2012) statement that higher level chess players use intuition was confirmed by several participants but denied by a few others who saw it as a quality of weaker players. This was associated with the development of the sub-theme Conscious Denial of Empathy. Atashpendar, Schilling and Voigtmann (2016) assertion of the vastness of potential spatial combinations and movements during chess game play was generally affirmed by all participants, though some mentioned a distinctive narrowing of vision during overwhelming strategic challenges. This supported the sub-theme, Memory and Space, as cognitive mechanisms that trigger strategic associations. Postal’s (2012) finding that there is no need to inhibit possible irrelevant cognitive processes while using memory to choose chess strategy could be an indication that some of these perceived irrelevant processes actually have connection to the studied complimentary cognitive processes of spatial assessment, intuition, and cognitive empathy. Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, and Garcia-fin Ana (2017) finding that chess players inhibiting their own experience while evaluating mental states of others, and visual assessments, could be considered confirmed by some of the participative and thematic descriptions of study participants. Slezak et al. (2018) assertation that chess players
  • 173.
    167 do not attemptto over-analyze all possible movements before picking a strategy was generally verified by most participant reports. These aspects of theory were developed in the thematic descriptions of Empathy Assessment and Memory and Space as well as Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations as predicting a relationship between cognitive functions that trigger spatial assessments and cognitive functions that trigger empathy as having some possible interdependence. This supported the overall theme of Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies. That chess has a distinctive culture formed around common language and concepts strongly affirmed Etel & Yagmurlu’s (2015) that such concepts often create a symbolic language that forms the basis for Theory of Mind is suggested. This portion of theory is supported by the data collected to form the sub-theme Empathy Assessment. As well this portion of theory was developed by the theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies. Cognitive empathy has been found to give competitive advantage in chess games (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). Results indicated a majority of participants were familiar with cognitive empathy while playing chess, though some choose to ignore it in favor of other cognitive mechanisms. This developed in the sub-theme Empathy Assessment. One or two participants actively tried to suppress cognitive empathy as something that might get in the way of strategy chosen from the logic of memory recall and/or spatial awareness. This developed in the sub-theme Conscious Denial of Empathy.
  • 174.
    168 There was strongindication from similar thematic language in large portions of all participant interviews suggesting a uniformed chess culture. There were as well indications of linguistic and thematic saturation within the 9 participants. Saturation was thus justified since no new emergent themes or perspectives revealed themselves (Abayomi, 2017) and did not seem to begin any indication of new emergent themes. Data was continually analyzed as it is gathered to insure thus. Overall, there was a lot of consistency in the data as reported. Repeated and thorough deep reading of the data, Nvivo12 analysis allowed for revelation of distinct and holistic themes (Holroyd, 2001). This was the first form of triangulation (Arksey & Knight, 1999). A profile of meaning-statements (Bartholomew et al., 2019) was used to analyze if experience contributes to theory in relation of chess players reports of cognitive processes as defined by ToM. Referents (Richards, 2015) were extracted to compile evidence of specific aspects of cognitive processes being reported by participants. Finally, a synthesis was obtained from the analysis of extended description. Trustworthiness was established through prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, and referential adequacy (Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Each participant was asked the same set of questions. Participants were allowed to review data collected, member-checking, and its interpretation. The essence of this study is transferability in that chess is used to explore established theories of cognitive processes and consciousness, simply because thought and being are involved in chess and no one has yet asked these exact questions of perceptions of cognitive process shifts from chess players themselves. This though experimental studies vastly indicate they exist in brainwave changes during play (Powell, Grossi, Corcoran, Gobet, & Garcia-fin Ana, 2017).
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    169 ToM includes forinteractive behavioral tasks that utilize a great deal of anticipatory looking and facial emotion recognition (Zwick & Wolkenstein, 2017). The basic definition of Theory of Mind (ToM) is that of a process of mind that allows one to understand the thoughts and intentions of others (Colle et al., 2019; Preckel et al., 2018). The idea of self-other distinction, Hajduk et al. (2018), in Theory of Mind was strongly described by participants as each seemed hyper-aware of their own individuality and the competitive difference of their opponent as another participant. These aspects of theory were well affirmed under the data collected which formed the theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies, the sub-theme Empathy Assessment, and the sub-theme Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory that developed the idea that sense of space and movement during chess play connected somehow to feelings of perception of the opponent’s strategy. Each participant seemed to have a definite awareness of self-other in regard to life in general, and specifically to the competitive nature of opponent each using differing, or similar, chess strategies during gameplay as to prove who was ultimately superior in their strategy choice, awareness and implementation. Still, there was a clear preference in most all participants for memory recall and then spatial awareness as the style choice of choosing strategy over intuition and cognitive empathy. This portion of theory well supported by the data that formed the sub-theme Memory Stands Alone, Memory and Space, Memory is Primary, and the overall theme of Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy. It seemed as if many participants trusted memorized strategy over intuitive leaps and often suggested that superior players knew how to develop and use intuition, though a few insisted that intuition is relied upon by weaker players.
  • 176.
    170 This portion oftheory began to be developed under the sub-theme Intuition Exists and as well a few times supported the sub-themes Memory Stands Alone and Conscious Denial of Empathy. Researchers have proposed chess players use a variety of methods to pick tactics and strategy such as instinct, analysis, intuition, logic, feeling, tactic, envisioning, pattern recognition, reasoning and problem solving (Lane & Chang, 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). Laws (2014) that each game can become its own unique conception without reference to prior games or understanding at times seemed affirmed by some participant’s description of competitive complexity suddenly appearing in a game (Kulke, Johannsen, & Rakoczy, 2019). Affirmations that intuition, and ToM processes, operate automatically like instinct, was affirmed by more than one participant. These portions of theory were well supported by thematic development of Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies and the sub-themes Intuition Exists, Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations, Memory and Space, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory. GM, the alternative theory in this study, compliments ToM in the study of decision- making through chess as it relies on complex mathematics for its structural underpinnings that calculates choice for greatest utility, and not necessarily from the furthest point of comprehended logic, hence decisions can be called intuitive (Chakravarty, Manipushpak, & Sarkar, 2015; Young, Peyton, & Zamir, 2015). Intuition has been numerously, yet vaguely, assigned as a quality of superlative chess players tactical and strategic decision game move choices (Buhren & Frank, 2012; Coates, 2013). This portion of theory got some support from the data collected under the thematic development of Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or
  • 177.
    171 Cognitive Empathy CanFunction Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies and the sub-theme Intuition Exists. Summary This study utilized a qualitative, phenomenological method that relied on data collection from semi-structured interviews. Chess strategy has been demonstrated in the literature to derive from several cognitive mechanisms (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). IPA methodology was determined to be the best way to code these mechanisms into linguistic themes. Essential points of this study include utilizing phenomenological interviews with chess players to gain data on their qualitative experiences of internal cognitive processes during gameplay. Chess offered a suitable mechanism of study to apply coded themes from phenomenological methods to identify and develop any common awareness or usage of various cognitive processes during gameplay. Similarly, other intuitive processes, said to be common in chess (Buhren & Frank, 2012), revealed other predictive methods of strategic game choices that speculates on incomplete, or inferred knowledge, like GM theory discount choices, mindreading, intuition, and empathy as used, but ill-defined method of game play decisions that produce variance in outcomes. IPA, alongside Nivio12 application, provided a strong method for gathering and interpreting data. Traditional IPA criteria like saturation and trustworthiness (Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Guest, et al., 2006; Lincoln & Guba, 1985) were applied to the analysis of the data. Specific cognitive processes were described by chess players and IPA was able to discern and allow for elaboration of these themes. The significant gap in the current research of any qualitative interviewing of chess players was narrowed as significant unreported,
  • 178.
    172 unclassified, cognitive phenomenonoccurring in tactical or strategic decision was richly defined in occurrence and description. The themes of cognitive empathy, intuition, memory recall, and spatial awareness were all robustly illustrated in participant’s thick, descriptive language. Interpretation and synthesis between themes were allowed for by the amount, and precision, of data collected in the semi- structured interviews. Nine participants were interviewed to the point of theme saturation (Abayomi, 2017). Overall, the interviews seemed to verify Binet’s (1966) early assertation that a multiplicity of cognitive mechanism overlap in complex and varied ways to form the mechanisms by which elegant chess strategy is surmised during what has been called The Royal Game (Fine, 2015). The study, through semi-structured interviews, confirmed through thematic language of experienced chess players many of the quantitative findings of other studies related to various cognitive mechanisms being active during chess gameplay (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Memory recall seemed to prevail as the dominant choice of established intermediate chess players, followed by assessment of spatial awareness for strategy decision making during gameplay. Intuition was acknowledged as a skill used for strategy formation, often interpreted as something higher level players have access to, though some participant claimed it was a quality that weaker players used. Definitions of intuition were earnest, if at times mysterious, though overall useful to defining a solid thematic category. Cognitive empathy was generally recognized as a mechanism active during chess, but often relied on for partial assessment, or temporary assessment of strategy formation and implementation. Some participants actively
  • 179.
    173 rejected cognitive empathyas something they were aware of but preferred to “turn off” during gameplay as to rely on the superior quality of rote memory recall of strategic patterns and implementations.
  • 180.
    174 Chapter 5: Implications,Recommendations, and Conclusions There are several cognitive processes verified in the literature, and in this study’s findings, that work indicated processes that independently, or combine, to formulate and implement strategic decision making (Guntz et al., 2018; Hajduk et al., 2018; Hangii et al., 2014; Powell et. al, 2017). The Problem addressed in this study was the gap in understanding how chess players experience cognitive processes that reference social reasoning traits related to interpersonal strategy decision-making (Guntz et al., 2018; Powell et. al, 2017). For instance, cognitive empathy has been found to reveal accurate perception of other’s states of mind (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). If chess players rely on cognitive empathy to pick strategy, then descriptive narratives may address at what point in strategic decision making these systems activate or the individual is aware of their activation and influence. Ultimately, the Problem to be addressed in this study was how chess players would use descriptive narratives to elaborate on how ToM is used as a social reasoning tool during gameplay to make strategic decisions. The Purpose of this qualitative phenomenological study was to investigate the gap in descriptive narratives of chess players as to their perceptions of what influences tactical and strategic moves. This phenomenological study collected data in approximately one hour long, one-on-one, remote through Zoom online, semi structured interviews with 9 chess players (Abayomi, 2017). Players were recruited from open online chess forums and through Facebook, and data collection took place by the researcher and saturation was effectively achieved with 9 participants (Guest et. al., 2006). Participants were screened to self-report they met inclusion criteria: they had played chess at least once per month for the last three months, could communicate effectively in English, and were over 18 years of age. All
  • 181.
    175 interviews were conductedusing Zoom and recorded with Zoom video option. Video were sent to Rev.com and transcribed. Results of this study identified four thematic codes, their places of synthesis and interdependence, the content of specific interviews, and indications of style and flavor of thinking of individual participants. Much of the thick, rich descriptions collected in the semi- structured interviews well defined the dominant themes and cognitive processes of spatial assessment, intuition, cognitive empathy, and memory recall. These were subsequently divided into more precise sub-themes that reflected data and interpretation which aligned with the research questions. The data collected in interviews was thick and rich, and allowed for saturation (Abayomi, 2017). This was the hope and why the semi-structured interview was chosen as to allow for the researcher to give prompts toward participants further describing theoretical gaps. All participants were found to be articulate enough to compile satisfactory interview data. Participant’s age did not affect their ability for thick, rich vocabulary descriptions. Older participants were not necessarily found to have a stronger command of vocabulary. Self- reporting is not always accurate, and memory can be erratic (Holroyd, 2001). Still, interviews seemed robust and each participant had a fluency and mindful, conscious awareness of chess strategy that seemed deep and comprehensive. Time constraints did not seem to be an issue as most data was collected between 30 and 45 minutes and provided thick, rich descriptions. Much of the data was dominated by the cognitive processes that are easier to recall, this primarily being memory recall. The small sample size included for some inherent limitations to transferability to specific sub-groups within the chess community; however, that may help make this research
  • 182.
    176 further flourish. Forthe current study it can be viewed as a general assessment of the generated themes among the most common chess player grouping. As well repeating the study with various sub-groups of chess players could be of interest. Additionally, in IPA studies there is the limitation of the subjective and temporary nature of the data collected (Smith & Osborn, 2015). Researcher bias is always a factor in such qualitative designs and repeatability could have variations due to different researcher approach, tone, subject rapport, and interview protocol interpretations. Participants generally represented intermediate to high level intermediate chess players and novice or highly expert chess players were not interviewed for this study. Further, only male participants volunteered for this study. It is possible results might be different for a repetition of this study with all female chess players. All participants as well lived within only the United States. Implications The results of the thematic codes counted for the four cognitive qualities used during chess strategy formation and implementation, of the nine interviews. While intuition, memory recall, and spatial understanding had code frequency that was similar, cognitive empathy was referenced less than half as often as these other thematic and cognitive qualities. There are overall implications of the findings and specific ones related to each research question that are worth examining in some depth. First, there are implications related to the definition of the term “empathy”. That the theme of cognitive empathy was well defined by chess player participants as a cognitive process used to discern strategy was strong indication that cognitive empathy, as a ToM quality, was prominent in chess play. For instance, some participants questioned the definition of empathy as contrasted between feeling care for another’s feelings, or even experiencing another’s pain, until it was explained by the researcher that cognitive empathy, in
  • 183.
    177 Theory of Mind,related to a certain knowing, cognitively inferred, of another’s intents and beliefs. Generally, Theory of Mind relates to how individuals discern and know there is a difference in consciousness perspective taking between ourselves and others. A few times in the data collected through semi-structured interviews this quality was considered by participants to be very similar to intuition, but most often intuition defined itself by participants as a separate quality related to an overall apprehension of the strategy situation in a particular chess game that transcended either memory recall or spatial understanding. Sometimes intuition was seen as an extension of memory recall and/or spatial understanding. This could suggest validity of Coates (2013) assertation that intuition in chess is like the abstraction of finding a geometrical proof. Theory of Mind skills were studied and used in interviews to infer other’s beliefs, intents, desires, and knowledge (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), at times by the researcher to progress the interviews by assessing meaning from the intents of their statements. This method was used until trust was deepened into the interview as alliances of common appreciation of chess and participant experience were firmly affirmed by the interviewer’s tone, manner, and style of follow up questioning. Then a common language was developed for each interview as to the parameters of the intent of the study. Raphael’s (2011) proposition of chess as a technical resource able to analyze social dimensions of human affairs was often a distinct feeling felt by the researcher during the study from the participants as it kept circling around the competitive aspects of competence in chess strategy. This sense did shift when aspects of pure strategy were discussed during the current study interviews, and participants viewed opponent’s moves as independent of their personality features. Indeed, overall, much of evidence that developed the themes of Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess, Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations, Memory and Space, Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation,
  • 184.
    178 and/or Cognitive EmpathyCan Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory heavily support the specific characteristics of Theory of Mind and how cognitive processes work within the brain system and extrapolate well to general theory. In essence participants seemed to want to be judged fairly for their knowledge and skill levels, but in no way wanted to be underestimated by the researcher or opponents. The presumed need being that of the other being able to pick a winning strategy and not display some operant context of self that revealed strategically compromising information. It is possible that some participants derived strategy from assessing of the spatial assessment and language specialization inherent in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as there was a distinct difference between participants who allowed for interpretations of the opponent’s manner and those who strictly played by chess theory, or playing the board, not the person. Development of the themes of Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess, Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations, Memory and Space, Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory, Memory Stands Alone, Intuition Exists, Memory is Primary, and Conscious Denial of Empathy during interviews all gave varied, yet distinct indications that cognitive processes were used that relied both on internal knowledge and memory and as well external perception of the opponents ideas or feeling for strategy formation. Much of this supporting the relationship between ToM and the TPJ cognitive functions (Powell et al., 2017; Saxe, 2003). Another implication of using the themes of cognitive empathy or intuition in reading an opponent was the danger of over-reaching into interpretating the other’s strategy. One caution that came up from several participants is the fear of seeing “ghosts” or rather inferring too great a
  • 185.
    179 foresight and strategyskill plan of an opponent and thus overthinking the current strategic state of any given chess game. Powell et. al. (2017) did find that spatial problems, active TPJ, and ToM functions, did activate empathy during chess strategic decision-making. Additionally, chess and ToM were found to inhibit one’s own awareness of self to evaluate the state of other and visual awareness of action, thus as well increased TPJ activation. One aspect of the interviews that could develop further, and may not have been answered, is at what point in game play certain memories are activated that relate to strategic choice. The interviewer got the sense that the conversation about chess strategy was taking place in the present time as reflecting of qualities and theory of chess, and not necessarily reliving chess experience with the feeling of living in the past game play and talking about it. Research Question 1. RQ 1 - What was the experience of cognitive empathy for chess players during game play? Hence RQ1 endeavored to know if cognitive empathy could be described by chess players as a cognitive process, they were aware of using for strategic decision making while they played chess. That cognitive empathy was generally affirmed by most participants (8 of 9) suggests that Theory of Mind skills are used during chess to infer the intents and beliefs an opponent has regarding chess strategy. That empathy was used and known as a conscious strategy was developed from the data and created Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy as a superordinate theme within RQ1. Though at times intuition seemed to conflate with cognitive empathy, more times than not it was defined as a distinct cognitive construct. This implies that two cognitive awareness’s that chess players reference, cognitive empathy and often cited intuition (Coates, 2013), differ from each other in how they are perceived by chess players and possibly how they originate as cognitive mechanisms. Often cognitive empathy was associated with reading the body or facial features
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    180 and expressions ofan opponent. This implication suggests it relates to visual awareness and possibly spatial awareness in that motion detection and interpretation is suggested. There were further suggestions that cognitive empathy is a cognitive mechanism that reaches beyond just reading of another’s body and facial expressions and that it could be a deeply ingrained cognitive mechanism inherent and developed though biological and social processes and reinforcements as well as alternating brain mechanisms and functions. The implication here is that cognitive empathy could be ascertained from a perceptual base beyond the five senses and originate as an internal cognitive function that perceives eternal phenomenon. Cognitive empathy was as well associated with some frequency from the data with comparing or reading simultaneously predictions of where strategy was headed on the board. This tends to verify the assertion that ToM qualities, cognitive empathy included, are self-evident in that it is impossible not to prove there is an innate awareness of self and other in human beings and their societies (Baron-Cohen, 1991). This could mean an overlap of spatial assessment, or even memory recall, or both with the use of cognitive empathy. Overall, the findings reinforced the implications of the first sub-theme of RQ1 that of Empathy Assessment as a valid cognitive mechanism chess player use, are aware of, and can describe on reflection of chess strategy. This in turn supports the ToM research that cognitive empathy is a strategic process used during chess and other activities (Colle et al., 2019; Guntz et al., 2018; Zwick, 2017. A future design would allow for interpretations of how chess players experience cognitive empathy during game play itself. Strategy does assume another has opposing needs to one’s own and thus there is a competition between distinct realities that ToM can reveal on reflection and during game play. Overall, this formation of the concept would be akin to Theory-theory derivations of ToM
  • 187.
    181 origins (Carruthers, 1996;Dennett, 1987). Simulation derivations of ToM origins suggest all experience is a social construct and indeed in chess when relying on rote memory recall of traditional game moves one is operating within a construct of rules. Often the strict definition of reading an opponent’s inner world as the ToM quality directly associated with cognitive empathy was affirmed. Again, these findings affirmed the implications of the superordinate theme of RQ1 and the first sub-theme of Empathy Assessment that the ToM quality of empathy assessment is utilized during chess strategy. The implication here is that there are, as this study set out to determine, cognitive mechanisms of social reasoning that can be accessed to construct strategic choices during game play. The relation between assessing cognitive empathy and predicting or anticipating future strategy positions was developed through the interviews and indicated to be related, or even interdependent, from other cognitive mechanisms such as memory recall. The implication is that the various cognitive mechanisms that contributed to the development of the four dominant themes, and their sub-themes, could in fact be working in tandem or sequential order to filter perceptions and determine strategic choices. Developmental psychology suggests that ToM skills begin as infants imitate others through perspective taking and empathy (Laghi et al., 2016). There was further indication from the data of expanded awareness of cognitive empathy into an imagined full construction of what the opponent’s personality might be like as a whole, and thus what their capabilities or predilections for strategy might be or lean toward. This findings in this study related to empathy as a cognitive mechanism used for strategy assessment and implementation is an innate skill as suggested by Theory of Mind (Zwick, 2017). This imagined construction of an opponent’s personality
  • 188.
    182 could be anadvanced form of perspective taking contrived from cumulative ToM assessments of that opponent. Some of the themes identified from the semi-structured interviews indicated this “personality” once identified was a somewhat locked phenomenon that regulated most all of the opponent’s possibilities and came with very definite and inflexible structures. For instance the theme of Cognitive Empathy as a Mechanism for Choosing Chess seemed to indicate a personal preference and even perhaps a personality disposition for using cognitive empathy, a ToM quality, for strategic decision making. Further indications from the themes of Empathy Assessment or Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy were so ingrained in belief of the participants that it seemed like extensive training or even ingrained disposition made them conditioned and predisposed to using these cognitive mechanisms. Overall descriptions of these kinds seemed directly correlated to potential skills levels of chess gameplay. This could indicate that empathy identifies fixed aspects of identity in others that are hardwired portions of their personality. Identity for many participants seemed linked to who is better and who is worse at chess on a fundamental level, almost as if intelligence and or self-esteem was greatly affixed to one’s level of strategic capability and this quality was generally fixed at a specific point of weak or strong player status. The implication here is that empathy might be used to infer hierarchical group standing and dominance ranking of individuals in a group. Chess as a culture provides cumulative conversations through differentiation of roles and desires between various opponents over time. If ToM is developed in chess through similar process then it would follow Moore, Pure, and Furrow’s (1990) assertion that these differentiations are what formed abilities such as cognitive empathy to develop. The implication is that through compiling of qualitative
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    183 interviews of strategicperception a series of categories can be discerned that lead to what type of communication forms, activates, and advances the various cognitive mechanism and ToM skills used in strategic formulation and implementation. These could be fixed qualities like aspects of personality or as several participants indicated, including the most experienced ones, there are rare moments when the inspiration of intuition can propel a player beyond his fixed skill level. The TPJ brain function is involved in language acquisition and does contain specialization in facial and voice recognition as well as biological motion (Saxe, 2003). This implies a direct connection to empathy as connected to visual recognition. The TPJ is often related to ToM qualities and thus could complement or reduce cognitive empathy to a form of reading expressions or body language based on specific functions within the brain. Zwick’s (2017) studies acknowledged that ToM skills generally include for interactive behavioral tasks that use a great deal of anticipatory looking and facial emotion recognition. Another theory on how ToM is developed includes for developing skills and perceptions as children are told what certain words mean and associate accompanying concepts and emotions (Nippold, 2009), thus if in chess ToM is being applied in such a developmental fashion than both language learning of strategy and as well spatial understanding, another function propelled by the TPJ, maybe combining to inform cognitive strategic choices in chess gameplay. This implies there is a strong social learning component to strategic decision making. Powell et al. (2017) did find that novice chess players activate ToM tasks to know opponent’s inner state more than memory recall which reinforces some participants claim that knowing inner states is a lessor form of strategy than memory pattern recollection. It is possible that empathy separates in expert players in its cognitive form (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014)
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    184 and then itsaffective form in novice players, which could explain the differences in reliance and belief of effectiveness on empathy as a skill in chess strategy from the various participant interviews. This could imply that empathy is a secondary strategy assessment skill developed by individuals with weaker cognitive memory recall abilities. The second sub-theme of RQ1 was Conscious Denial of Empathy, which was strongly affirmed by 1 of 9 participants, and tangentially affirmed on occasion by a few others (3 of 9), in that there is strategic benefit in shutting down awareness’s of the opponent’s feelings, thoughts, movements, intents, and/or beliefs. This sub-theme was referred to when participants strongly empathized heavy reliance on pattern recognition from memorized strategy and thus actively shut down any strategic perceptions gleaned or initiated by cognitive empathy. This implies that someone with strong memory recall does not have to default to empathy assessment to choose their strategy and that they may know the game framework better than individuals who rely on other social instincts, like empathy, for strategic decision making. Research Question 2. RQ2 - How did chess players use various cognitive processes such as Theory of Mind, Spatial assessment, and memory to formulate strategy during game play? The themes developed seemed to indicate that spatial assessment and memory can have related, or complimentary, functions under sub-themes Memory and Space and theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies which contained the sub- theme Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory. All participants affirmed the superordinate theme of RQ2: Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy in chess strategic decision making. Memory as a strategic tool was a dominant theme within the literature (Conner & Campitelli, 2014; Powell et al., 2017; Sigirtmac, 2016). As
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    185 well there wassome indication that some researcher conclusions from the literature review, that spatial awareness triggers memory recall and this as a pattern of strategic choice seemed validated by indicating piece positions triggers specific “calculations”. ToM has been found to overlap with processes that pertain to episodic memory (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, and Moscovtich, 2013). This could imply that aspects of cognitive memory function and cognitive ToM function trigger each other, or interact, in some mechanistic and significant way. It is possible that specific spatial awareness triggers access to memory of prior strategic learning. Often participants discussed rote strategy from memory recall as pertaining to the opening third of the game where pieces move in turn from their starting positions and take key squares that set up strategic gambits. This seems to verify that some aspect of Chunking Theory of memory where models are recognized and reacted to in strategic play is a cognitive mechanism of recall active in chess (Gobet, Lane, & Lloyd-Kelly, 2015; Simon & Gilmartin, 1973). There is a possible implication that specific chunks of memory have magnitude of effect for where and how strongly they trigger strategic decision and correlating processes related to ToM and spatial assessment. The research of Gobet et al. (2015) and Simon & Gilmartin (1973) both make this suggestion. This process is considered to function with a conscious awareness and much of the participant thematic language supports this. The idea could be expanded to explore possible varieties in the dimensions of individual memory, and how it is formed, as related to outcome of intelligence and strategic decision-making variety of options. Perhaps the wider perception of visual awareness indicates deeper, or wider memory banks. The overall implications as to how individuals learn, how deeply individuals choose to learn, and what individuals choose to learn is that experience may trigger necessities of memory, perhaps like a pressure point activating a button, where commonality
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    186 of experience, asperceived, activates areas of the brain that hold specific memories and unfolding processes activated by those memory trigger. Overall, the superordinate theme of Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy and the first sub-theme of RQ2 of Memory is Primary indicate memory as a powerful force between experience, knowledge retention, and/or action. The language describing checklists and going through a series of various processes to rule in or out strategic choices, often described by participants, further supports chunking theory’s grouping of compressed, but finite datasets of knowledge into meanings with distinct valence (Bor, 2012; Wegener, 2001). What as well becomes interesting is if some processes, like those revealed in the themes of Empathy Assessment and Intuition Exists, somehow bypass any linear process of experience to action. They then somehow would omit the need for knowledge retained and accessed, and substituting any recall processing for creative invention, original ascertainment, or knowledge through perception of what another knows, yet oneself does not yet know. Or simply some intuitive process that bypasses the known linear mechanisms for knowledge retrieval and matches a perceived experience with some using knowing, buried deeper in “memory”. Some ToM qualities indicate such possibilities, such as cognitive empathy (Artinger et al., 2014), as well as some theme development in this study. Reconstructive memory that processes memory over time reminds of theory from the literature of synchronic elements of language providing a sense of consistency, even when language differs to degree. Much of this research suggests that key conceptual and mechanistic components, once described independently in the literature, could in fact be the same process or aspects of the same process. This also has meaning in that the abstraction of meaning built through language over time as a method of learning strategy, ToM based in one
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    187 essence, could contradictthe ToM quality of cognitive empathy as perhaps an immediate assessment of knowing, one that needs no abstraction. The quantitative chain of links is there in the literature as ToM has been linked to more than one type of memory function (Cohen et al., 2014) and spatial understanding, while ToM is less associated with representational, language-based, memory than ruled-based, mental states. Interpretation of this study’s themes supports this. Still, if chess learning of strategy is reinforced by language that creates emotional associations to strategic outcomes, then the validity of participant responses to qualitative interviews as to discern cognitive processes has greater validity (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018; Salvaggio, 2018). The possibility exists that certain language, or ordering of language, can prove to be better or faster for learning cognitive abilities or at least match up uniquely in types of language with styles of learning or even personality or brain components. Chess players have been found to have better long range-memory corrections (Salvaggio, 2018). The established sub-theme of Memory is Primary and that of Memory and Space indicate that perception of space somehow affects memory and possibly that memory influences how individuals perceive space, all combining to form some sense of strategic vision. The implication from this research is that the power of memory might go deeper than expected in learning cognitive strategies and might in fact regulate other known cognitive processes like empathy inference, intuition, and spatial recognition and understanding. These processes, and what effect choice has on them, could derive from Eredita and Ferro (2015) construction and deconstruction of configural concepts that are sensuous mental operations brought into reality by continued generalizations. The sub-theme of Memory and Space was affirmed by 7 of 9 participants under RQ2, results that added support to aspects of the literature that suggest
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    188 there are connectionto cognitive processes of memory and spatial assessment (Atashpendar et al., 2016; Colle et al., 2019). The great implication here is the furthering of the little understood relation between sense perception and internal inference processes that discern external data. Sense of perception and cognitive processing are two powerful information gathering and interpreting systems that need further study to determine any interrelationships or cause and effect dynamics between the two. Some data indicated surmising what the opponent’s strategy might be, perhaps from cognitive empathy, leads to some combination of spatial awareness of piece positions and memory recall as to how these intended belief strategies of the opponent can and will be counteracted based on his chess logic and strategic choice making from learn pattern recognitions. This somewhat sound like a “sensuous”, if not intimate, process between self and opponent as Brock et al. (2017) indicated ToM tasks as being automatic and unconscious as well as Andrews (2001) indication that ToM tasks operate without direct verbal measures or prompts. The quality seems to be a deep biological instant social judgment mechanism (Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017), possibly hardwired as a survival mechanism from the days of early humanity. In most cases participants acknowledged chess as a multidimensional game, one that is very fluid, and though it has predictable aspects there is the need of constant strategic vigilance as surprises and turns of events can reverse the fortune of any particular players in various moments of gameplay, especially between players of nearly equivalent talent. This data began to affirm the third sub-theme of RQ2, that of Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations which indicated that spatial assessment and cognitive empathy have some correlation in strategic choice making. Overall, a majority of participants verified that spatial awareness and cognitive empathy were somehow inter-related as strategic mechanisms during
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    189 chess game play.This could be the beginning of evidence suggesting sense perception and cognitive summations are interactive processes. Intuition is known to pull from all relevant memory process and perceptions of the immediate surrounding environment (Betsch & Glocker, 2010). Zwick (2017) explored how intuition and body reactions interact. These are two just of the possible many pieces of these aspects of cognitive process mapping to expound upon. Powell et al. (2017) quantitatively found that when chess players were asked to imagine spatial moves that would provide positive outcomes then cognitive empathy and ToM regions of the brain were activated. So, it is significant that the themes of Memory and Space, Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory provide that there is direct evidence that utilizing spatial assessment cognitive mechanisms in the brain activate cognitive empathy mechanisms in the brain. This could imply a process of like an alternator in a car which sparks the start of the more powerful engine, indeed perhaps the depth of information processes within cognitive empathy and ToM mechanisms is only scratching the surface of our evolutionary possibility as memory and spatial assessment has been deferred, or relied upon, so significantly thus far. Essentially, expanding on known research, it may be the case that awareness of spatial dimensions and connections of objects perceived outside the body may trigger, or even formulate, inner knowledge of strategic value known more often as empathy or intuition. Overall, themes, Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy and Intuition Exists, indicated that some players stick to comfort zones of results through implementation of patterned strategies, or at times take risks and go “out of book” and invent, or try, some innovative move seemingly based on an intuition. The
  • 196.
    190 implication here isthat some people believe there is more glory, or proof of individual strategic “genius” when they invent a strategy move from seemingly thin air. Expanding on current literature, there is also the implication that memory association might be the easier “muscle” to develop and that factors like empathy inference and intuition just take more daring and practice to develop (Lane & Chang, 2018; Linhares, Freitas, Mendes, & Silva, 2012; Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). This could be encouraged by research and learning. Still some participant data affirmed a more common sense that “understanding” chess strategy is a logical intelligence based on study of pattern progressions and not a “gut feeling”. This was the beginning of affirmations of RQ3’s superordinate theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies and one of its sub-themes Intuition Exists that affirmed intuition as a valid cognitive mechanism chess player was aware of, used, and could describe as a strategic function while reflecting on game play. The overall implication being that there is the possibility that whatever drives an individual to learn and develop certain cognitive systems could be expanding to include assess to more cognitive systems. At times, as the theme of Intuition Exists developed, it was a like hearing of the mystical holy grail, something powerful that is indicated, but not fully trusted. Then a few participants would imply, if I could only be brave enough to trust my intuition, then I would be a much greater chess player. Betsch and Glockner (2010) contention that intuition is said to need to pull from all relevant sets of memory processes and perceptions of the immediate environment remains a broad definition of the quality that allows for the various thematic descriptions from participants. The implication is that intuition is the definition of one’s total
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    191 cognitive processing abilities,diverse and combined as they may be. Myers-Briggs (2016) access that individuals possess varying degrees and types of intuition which could account for the diverse explanations of this quality in participant interviews. There is a possibility that intuition is like a rudder, or guidance system, steering individual between cognitive processes for strategic choice making, a guidance system that may have its own cognitive mechanisms yet defined. Research Question 3. RQ3 - How did chess players chess use pattern awareness as a separate construct from intuition, spatial calculating, or cognitive empathy, to make decisions about piece movements and strategy during game play? The theme Memory Stands Alone established that memory is a powerful cognitive process that can offer a complete mechanism for strategic decision making that would not have to rely on other cognitive processes from ToM, intuition, or spatial assessment. The superordinate theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies indicated results suggesting some participants access aspects of cognitive empathy, spatial assessment, and/or intuition at times uniquely and at other times conjointly with memory to form strategic decisions. Themes recurringly indicated participants’ sense of inevitable movement when two players use their talent and cognitive mechanisms to the best of their abilities and the strategic game plays out in a predictable fashion. Overall, the sub-theme Memory Stands Alone indicated memory as a powerful strategic tool, perhaps the most valuable and consistent one, that participants would prefer to rely on, and develop, as a cognitive decision-making mechanism for chess strategy. White being the piece side that always moves first gives an advantage in space reclamation and tactical tempo. Technically, as computer chess programs
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    192 indicate, if bothplayers follow rote logic from this point on the game can often have a mechanical feel in outcomes (Larson, 2018). Such data adds in significance to the creation of statistical probability outcomes when matching types of cognitive strategic functions to types of competitions and arenas of enterprise be it science, economics, politics, or strategic games. In chess, control of the center spaces is most often considered key to effective piece placement and winning outcomes (Silman, 1988). There was some indication from the developed themes that indicated awareness of who is controlling the center becomes an overall sense that possibly even transcends which specific pieces are taking up central positions. This could be akin to a “gut feeling” of which player is better placed and in the stronger position overall and an intuitive sense of where future game piece positions will likely most benefit simply based on overall sense of space and board and not individual piece placement. Space was often described, by participants 1, 2, 4, 7, and 9, as a quality of positioning that gives the player a feeling of freedom and power or limitation and “suffocation”. The expanding of cognitive mechanisms for strategic choice has significance in that so what is originated from these mechanisms has the possibility of creating new strategic and tactical combinations, directions, and patterns that have not been explored before. Sub-theme 2 of RQ3, Sense of Space Relates to Feelings and Memory in strategic choice making during chess was affirmed by 7 of 9 participants. Indeed, spatial problems in interpreting best chess strategy might trigger cognitive empathy activation and the TPJ (Powell et al., 2017). This too was at times described as a general sense and not necessarily an assessment of tactical positions of each piece as they relate to the whole. The importance of the developed themes in this research is to begin and further the developments of individual
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    193 experiences through languageof awareness of these cognitive processes. Indeed, language might be found as the mechanism that enhances, develops, and structures some of the cognitive processes themselves. It could be found as a solid tool as well for replicating authenticity in these processes into fields like artificial intelligence and game theory strategic choice making. What vision of this might be computers that are programmed directly by language input. Developed themes of this study indicated temporospatial awareness as a process of imagining pieces of perceptual data combining at some future point that gives or takes away strategic advantage. This process would, in a way, transcend the simple logic of predicting a piece-by-piece progression through some linear process and rather offer an overall, gestalt, sense of where the game between two opponents sits and where differing strategies inevitably is taking the game. The implication here is that at any point of strategic process there may be a way to access an overall, and overarching, summary and direction of where strategic choices are leading to. Indeed, there may be a distinct holistic level of knowing for each dataset within any given cognitive process, be it intuition, empathy inference, memory recall, and spatial assessment. Themes did indicate that curiosity about opponent’s moves as to double check a sense of a poor move, for perhaps a superior strategic “understanding” that is underpinning that move, but that one is blind toward. This implies cognitive empathy may be vital to strategic assessment. Sense of touch, haptic, is associated with verbal coding of perceptual knowledge while visual representations of space are a different process and learning dynamic (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Balata et al., 2015). Hence cognitive theories related to differences mechanism might have different sense data input channels. Knowing the differing routes suggests differing learning strategies are available.
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    194 Research suggests thata perception of an opponent’s strategy enhances cognitive strategic thinking (Atashpendar, Schilling, & Voigtmann, 2016; Powell et al., 2017). Some theme development strongly indicated pattern recognition as distinct from intuition. Themes did indicate superior players making moves faster because they can assess where space on the board will be taken up after a series or combination of moves between opponents. Some results from participants and which formed thematic categorization strongly indicated taking up space on the board inherently limits what options the opponents have for strategic motion and thus they are turned into a more “passive” player. Some themes tied intuition to the end game, as other participants had mentioned, in that what push of pieces toward the opponent’s King piece where presumably corner it and remove all options for further King movement, which is the checkmate and end of the game. This and subsequent sub-themes of Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory and Intuition Exists. So, what overall is important is the implication to a primary characteristic of humanity, that being it is a pattern seeking animal. Pattern awareness being key to such concepts like mental health, strategic decision making, global political and economic decision-making, successful science and experimental analysis, and engineering on the physical and genetic levels. Pattern awareness can even be a mental health issues when overactive. Building on studies such as this one allows for researchers the possibility of precisely defining the cognitive processes that lead to various forms of pattern awareness. The synergistic exploration of qualitative studies such as this one in such regards as to where and how to look for participate explanation and perception of pattern awareness, then combined with the precision of qualitative research would be of great use. Results from developed themes, Memory and Space Pattern Awareness,, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently
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    195 as Cognitive ChessStrategies, Intuition Exists, and Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory, suggested that the look of piece configuration on the board can “look right” or “not look right” and thus senses of spatial awareness and intuition are guides to inform players how strong their strategic position is at any given point in a game. The implication being there is an entire possible heuristic available to our understanding and use of strategic decision-making that could speed up both robotic and human endeavors which otherwise might have been more costly in time and resources. Participant 9 called this “pure understanding” and not logical, but rather a sense of “space”. This indicates TPJ and ToM aspects at work (Atashpendar et al, 2017 Hironaga et al., 2017; Powell et al. , 2017). The literature review was full of spatial awareness as a definite cognitive quality measured and able to be extrapolated as a mechanism for strategic decision-making (Guntz, Balzarini, Vaufreydaz, & Crowley, 2018; Rocha, Ribeiro Da Silva, Goncalves Cesar, Giraldi, & Thomaz, 2017). Participant 6 suggested intuition and spatial awareness as a “natural feel for the game” that is more difficult to develop than calculation through raw “brain power”. Some participants make the suggestion that intuition is merely the cumulative experience of pattern recognition coming out in conscious and unconscious decisions with varying degrees of effectiveness. This seemed to extend back to the possibility of sub-theme 1 that Memory Stands Alone as a cognitive and strategic mechanism. These results indicate a refutation of ToM and cognitive empathy as a cognitive strategic mechanism. Then other participants call this intuition a “gut move” that has nothing to do with any previous recognized pattern. This further developed third the sub-theme of RQ3 that Intuition Exists as a strong and viable strategic and cognitive process during chess game play. Overall, the dichotomies of mind/body, reason/intuition, and science/religion, among others, could greatly benefit from a
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    196 more precise understandingof how cognitive processes work independently or collectively. Goffman, Lemert, and Branaman (1997) do suggest that chess players may repress strategic thinking for a form of rule-based thinking, this could be substituting intuition for memory recall. So, there may be a whole new stratum, like new playbooks or instructions, on how perception and cognitive processing create outcomes through strategic decision-making. Some results suggested some players play the immediate position of the pieces on the board, thus intuitively without prior pattern references, and thus do this so well that they always make superior moves that force him to the weaker position – for each piece movement after movement, strongly affirming Intuition Exists. This could indicate aspects of ToM at work like cognitive empathy where beliefs and intentions of others are immediately ascertained (Powell et al., 2017). Other results suggested that when one player imposes a superior memorized tactic the other players feel disrupted and thus is forced to make a guessing move that most likely will not work in their favor, again affirmations of Conscious Denial of Empathy, and Memory Stands Alone. A general refutation of ToM. Players who rely and trust memorized strategic do well in chess (Silan, 1988). Participants who affirmed the themes of Conscious Denial of Empathy, and Memory Stands Alone were superiorly skilled players. Cognitive empathy, and certainly intuition, can be a nebulous concept (Coates, 2013; Powell et al., 2017). The overall implication is there is a possible default hierarchy to which cognitive process is used for strategy and then so it could be studied to find what events, their effect, and responses of various types of individuals and situations affect such hierarchies. There is participant 1’s description of intuition as the sense that something big strategically is coming soon to the game that one is not aware of precisely, yet one knows it is coming. He concludes that when to react, the timing of response, to this big
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    197 moment makes allthe difference in success or failure of strategic outcome. These he calls the “no guts, no glory” moments, thus suggesting Intuition Exists or Empathy Assessment as strong and viable themes and cognitive mechanisms. It also implies a conscious awareness of such cognitive process choices and hence a control over when one is selected over another. Learning how to time such switches in process could be valuable in creating more successful strategies. Some results indicated intuition can be relied upon as the first instinct that pops into a participant’s head during a strategic moment of play that possibly could originate in the subconscious from memories of prior outcomes, but more likely is an original feeling based on creating strategy in the moment for that specific game at that specific time with that specific set of piece placements. This implies the unconscious maybe a field of strategic processes waiting to be accessed and mastered. Other results contrasts definitions as saying use of intuition is most often because there not a lot of strategy memorized and thus is playing from the “head” using cognitive thinking is relied upon, which would be the same as intuition. This implies that learning by conscious information assimilation is the most advantageous way to master strategy. Developed themes then suggested that using cognitive empathy to know a lot about an opponent’s strategic styles translates into making intuitive strategic piece movements specific to the knowledge of that player’s inner beliefs and intentions toward the chess strategy. This affirmed ToM as an active strategic decision-making process in chess (Powell et al., 2017). These results establish the superordinate theme of Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies, and sub-themes of Empathy Assessment and
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    198 Intuition Exists. Therelationship between empathy and intuition may be more hierarchical and complimentary than exclusive. Sigirtmac (2016) did find that children with chess training have higher scores in creative thinking and ToM skills than those without. That some participants in this study bemoaned not having studied chess from an early age and felt that they would never get certain natural or intuitive skills because of this fact is thematic confirmation in the language that some of ToM processes that are fundamental and primary from early development may indeed have limitations for further development in adulthood (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Call, 1998; Etel & Yagmurlu, 2015; Gagliardi et al., 1995; Meltzoff, 2003). Early strategy study may develop cognitive processes in ways that further could be understood. Further research could open up investigations into the cross-validity of these ideas and the sub-themes Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations, Empathy Assessment, Sense of Space relates to Feelings and Memory, and the theme Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies. This especially since the literature intersects often on these topics between cognitive strategy and ToM qualities. Two major influences that consistently connect with the intersection of cognitive strategy and ToM qualities are the theoretical predictions of how memory and spatial assessment coordinate within the cognitive mechanisms of cognitive strategy formation and implementation and ToM abilities. In the sense that determining if cognitive aspects of memory and spatial assessment are subordinate processes within ToM, which ToM accounts for, or if they are somehow larger mechanisms needing to be related to a wider theory, one that incorporates the whole scope of ToM and is possibility further dominated by memory mechanisms and spatial assessment abilities, is speculated upon yet remains undetermined within the scope of this study.
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    199 Further implications ontheory. Findings related to the themes developed in this paper regarding spatial assessment, empathy, intuition, and memory recall has numerous implications to existing theory, future practice, and future research. Considering the alternative theory of game theory in this study, several participants indicated that tempo, first move privilege, and other tactical concerns create conditions where the second player generally responds with optimal move to the next worst payoff (Menon, Sasidevan, & Sinha, 2018). Game Theory essentially states that in any strategic scenario participants choose from a series of logical to less logical choices to estimate outcomes (Artinger et al., 2014). The uncertainty of who is in a superior position at differing points of any given game was a common theme, Memory and Space, most participants mentioned. This could relate to Game Theory’s non-equilibrium and equilibrium moves, but would require further investigation (Kline, 2017). That chess players often reported tactics and strategies involving deception and creation of original gambits that relied on moves that initially appear sub-optimal corresponds with like concepts from game theory. The implication of using chess to further study game theory is strongly indicated by the developed themes from initial findings in this paper. The further overall implication here of the themes Space and Cognitive Empathy Associations and Pattern Awareness, Intuition, Spatial Calculation, and/or Cognitive Empathy Can Function Independently or Interdependently as Cognitive Chess Strategies, is that perhaps spatial awareness processes trigger, or enhance, other cognitive strategic mechanisms analyzed in this study under the themes of empathy, intuition, and memory recall. The implication on interpersonal communication dynamic, psychoanalytic theory, and organization strategy that the concept of the unconscious might be built upon, developed, and activated by the cognitive processes of empathy, intuition, spatial assessment, and memory recall could be significant.
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    200 Results established themesthat created an effective picture of independent and interdependent cognitive processes involved in chess strategy formation and implementation. Further perceptual and mechanistic evidence of intuition and spatial awareness corresponding to known memory mechanisms could give substance to abstract notions within psychoanalytic theory such as introjections and libidinal drives, signal noise and encoder/decoder translations from communication theory could have more flushed out explanations, and labor roles within organizational theory could have greater fluidity and variety (Loewalk, 2017; Lounsbury and Ventesca, 2003; McQuail, 2010). That chess players chunk strategy into finite datasets (Lane & Chang, 2018) was often affirmed by the theme of Memory Recall as a Primary Mechanism for Choosing Chess Strategy. Various theories of memory are supported by results. Postal (2012) found that chunks of memory do form conceptual templates that predict chess outcomes from perceptions of various spatial configurations. This implies that assessment of spatial elements might have an array of skill levels that prompt more known cognitive assessment processes through logic and memory recall. Sigirtmac (2016) found that ToM influence modulates between cognitive and affective memory, thus cognitive empathy might be influences deeper and wider aspects of formal memory than first considered. More skilled players have better command of descriptive language, memory of patterns, and intuition so it is possible that higher overall intelligence leads to higher ToM, cognitive empathy, and intuition skills as opposed to some bifurcated world between the “emotionally intelligent” and the “intellectually intelligent”. Ciaramelli et al. (2013) finding that episodic memory is association with ToM could indicate that cognitive empathy is a process or mechanism for finding specific memory banks within the brain that hold information to the current strategic needs. Expanding on other research would suggest that ToM might seek
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    201 specific fragments ofemotional memory to interpret for strategic advantage (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018; Salvaggio, 2018). This could indicate a connection between cognitive empathy and reconstructive memory theory (Salavaggio, 2018). The overall implication that memory recall is triggered or enhanced by spatial assessment has significance in the further study of developmental learning theory, psychological developmental theory, strategic processing capabilities, and cognitive mechanism processing in biological systems. The idea of chess as a social instinct was suggested by the theme of Empathy Assessment (Cohen, Sasaki, & German, 2015). Overall, some unique language was created by participants to describe chess strategy, but more often combinations of common and familiar terms was used to talk chess strategy. Data of interest to both linguistic theories and social structure theories were indicated in the result. The implication for the social and political sciences of what is a natural and most optimal state of cognitive decision making for individuals and groups regarding primacy and application of qualities such as empathy and intuition could enhance functioning and harmony within said individuals and groups. The strong, yet ill-defined manner in which most participants identified intuition as an important skill in chess strategy choices may indicate that as Markovits, de Chantal, Brisson, and Gagnon-St-Pierre, (2019) suggest, that it is not linked to any physiological-cognitive processes, but rather an order or combination of other cognitive processes. This implies cognitive biology theory that seeks to reveal the structural complexity embodied in organisms would find the results of this study of interest (Kovac, 2000). A primary principal of cognitive biology theory being examining the physical junctions of where a trait meets an effect in obvious and simple representation. Additionally, the indication that higher states of awareness are possible and developed through some combination of the themes explored in this paper is of
  • 208.
    202 interest so alsotheories of consciousness and levels of consciousness could benefit from an analysis of the results (Bor, 2012; Haladjian, H., & Montemayor, 2016; Oizumi et al., 2014). The implication that some access and combination of intuition, memory recall, spatial assessment, and empathy creates higher order strategic decision-making methods and outcomes is significant. Some participant’s resistance to using empathy, reading the opponent, as a ToM skill could relate to their concerns of being affected by the other emotions, either positive or negative as suggested by Preckel, Kanske, and Singer (2018), rather than choosing strategic from pure theory of memory recall. Indeed, interviews suggested so. Generally higher ranked participants did give richer descriptive detail, but not with as a great variation as might be expected by the literature (Coates, 2013; Nippold, 2009; Powell et al., 2017). This could relate to memory recall, spatial assessment, and intuition. There are implications that language ability and portions of the brain related to language had direct consequence on strategic decision-making ability and this connection would be significant to further explore. In all participants many points of description had a striving quality as if talking chess strategy has some innately elusive, or difficult qualities. The implication here is that language that seems indistinct could at times be indications of deeper, less clear cognitive processes and at other times of strategic confusion. Gaining clarity between to the two would be significant. That episodic memory is more accurate in relation to spatial location than temporal order (Pathman, Couglin, & Ghetti, 2018) was indicated in several interviews where awareness of space and piece positioning on the board was said by participants to spawn a strategy knowing. This suggested some relation between the themes of spatial assessment and memory recall. Yet, a distinct preference for choosing strategy from chess theory in temporal
  • 209.
    203 order was oftensuggested, especially by the most experienced or skilled participants. It could be that intuition levels were somehow a dividing line on these skill sets. That chess is a social group with commonalities bonded through language was generally, and strongly, affirmed between participant interviews (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2013), though that this culture is unconscious was less indicated as compared to the common repetition of chess theory phrases espoused by most participants. This seemed to most affirm the theme of memory recall. That one could be surprised by a sudden strength of a weaker player was a theme, but not a common one between participants and seemed the exception rather than the predictable rule (Brock, Kim, & Kelly, 2017; Markovits et al., 2019). Again, possible due to memory recall, or then again perhaps as well intuition. Overall, the implication that types of memory relate to understanding of space and time judgments differently is interesting. Exploring how the cognitive themes of empathy and intuition influence perceptions of time and space in strategy assessment could be explored through analysis of language, memory, and spatial assessment cognitive processing interactions. Fehr and Huck (2016) noted that beliefs change when participants know they are in a game, throughout the participant interviews the chess participants seemed as if the researcher alternated between ally and inquisitor who somehow could measure their intellect which they guarded with a great deal of pride. They in turn at times attempted to challenge or belittle the researcher as to regain some balance or upper hand. It was as if being in a game within a game aspect was occurring that turned on when participants felt their chess knowledge challenged and they often came up with creative answers, drawing metaphors from science, history and more – participant 8 stated “and if you're going to attack you better attack, there's no, ‘Timeout.’ Like Napoleon said, ‘If you're going to take Vienna, take Vienna.’” The
  • 210.
    204 implication here beingtheories related to general social competitiveness could benefit by results of this study. The three main criteria of social competition theorists somewhat elucidated in the interviews, these being social hierarchies form spontaneously as resources become scarce, social rank in the human hierarchy depends in part on attention-holding, and depression constitutes involuntary responses to low social rank, entrapment, and defeat (Fournier, 2009). Essentially as the interviews got into contentious points, questions of skills level, choices between strategic methods, and who had more expertise, the interviewer or interviewee, often the dialogue became terse even though the interviewer used extreme care to be objective and diplomatic. This could be a byproduct of how competitive chess players are (Coates, 2013) and/or what occurs when strategic mechanism is discussed in depth. Recommendation for Practice This study opens up options for further qualitative and quantitative studies. It as well connects diverse themes from the literature on the functions of the TPJ parts of the brain that may not have been as fully connected prior in the literature and tied to specific cognitive processes within a strategic domain, especially chess. Further, it securely develops initial thematic language for how intuition, cognitive empathy, memory recall, and spatial relations may interact independently and in various conjunctions during chess gameplay as strategic processes and resources. In the area of neuroscience how the functions of the TPJ contribute to ToM and strategic decision-making by further mapping out linguistic themes that match cognitive processes that originate in the TPJ is of interest (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014; Salavaggio, 2018). This relates to the cognitive process question of how inferences are generated in the mind and acted upon with corresponding process and outcomes. Then how are these processes related to what has been traditionally defined as the unconscious
  • 211.
    205 (Andersen, 2014). Thefindings under the themes related to empathy and intuition could add to psychoanalytic and neuroscientific understanding of how, when, why, and where in the brain itself as mechanism the unconscious operates and defines itself. There additionally is the verification from previous research that linguistic conceptualization has correspondence to the TPJ region and possibly empathy, sense of movement, and spatial awareness (Hironaga et al., 2017; Powell et. al. 2017) hence further qualitative interviews, through IPA methodology have value in adding results and context. These results could have application toward counseling psychology, medical health in post-trauma cause and effect understanding, what constitutes healthy psychological and physical development, and the mechanical processes of how perceptions are turned into cognitions within the human system. That the TPJ region has influence over affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all ToM tasks) there is strong indication that the field of artificial intelligence could benefit from further exploration of linguistic connections and mechanistic processes related to as such. If it is understood how humans collect perceptions and then turn them into cognitive judgments through specific routes of data processing and interpretation, then the replication of such processes through artificial intelligence design and robotics could be enhanced. Further the TPJ shows increased activation during spatial processing, hence if an AI device could learn nuance from language, mimic empathy, and associate decision making through simulated cognitive process that mimic brain mechanistic functions of ToM, language processing, spatial assessment, and cognitive empathy (all strongly indicated as active in the TPJ during strategic decision-making) then the output experience could be more strategically relevant, effective, and seemingly authentic. Computers can think ahead but simulating a feeling that they are reading the opponent in real time, an aspect of cognitive empathy, could add much more enjoyment,
  • 212.
    206 realism, and interestto AI (Larson, 2018; Matros, 2016). Cybernetic processes that alternate between temporal and spatial strategic judgments, as occur in TPJ and ToM inference processes, could be key in advancing AI to new levels of sophistication. An awareness of the opponent in AI, that then directs state-space decision branch procedures, would be more interesting, and presumably more of a genuine “human” experience, than pure logic as determining factor (Atashpendar et al, 2017). An AI that ran through the procedures of visual assessment, spatial recognition, memory recall, and intuitive/empathic possibility could coordinate the program of robotics with simulated reflexes and processes that more accurately reflect human social and strategic interactions (Fecher et. al., 2016; Duijivenvoorde, 2016). Wichary and Smolen (2016) indicate stress responses are key to making strategic process decision, hence perhaps the direction of better AI lies in adding frailties to systems rather than the perfection of logic. This resonates with the work on nervous system effect on strategy perception (Davash & Shamay- Tsoory, 2014; Muppidi & Miglis, 2017). Ultimately, developing AI that could learn from play and human counterparts from sensory data and even haptic (touch) learning of chess piece movements would be a major breakthrough in technology (Davash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014; Muppidi & Miglis, 2017). Chess players and coaches could extensively benefit from the findings of the study. Specially, some chess players may be able to access cognitive skills of empathy assessment and intuition that formerly they were not aware of as viable strategic mechanisms. Additionally, players could learn how and when to use memory instead of perception of the opponent to formulate effective strategy. Finding one’s own ration, cognitive mixture, of strategy assessment capabilities is enhance from hearing how other’s cope and invent with strategic dilemmas.
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    207 Additionally, chess coachescould become versed in the various cognitive processes that form strategic decision-making. Chess players could be evaluated for which processes they have developed. Then exercises, and computer programs, could be designed and administered that increase capabilities in the various cognitive strategic making mechanisms. Controlling, or developing and strengthening how these processes interact with each other within an individual, and perceiving how an opponent is using them, could add competitive advantage and increase skill levels of chess players. Chess coaches and players could benefit from increased flexibility instead of dichotomy when evaluating optimum strategy based on spatial problem-solving (Nazareth, 2019). This partially evidenced by the suggestion that advanced statistical algorithms will be more useful than further empirical study of eye-tracking when determining factors of strategy. Understanding patterns of strategic thinking is at least as important to improving strategy as awareness of the opponent’s intents and body dynamics. The advantages to artificial intelligence research from analysis of this study’s data is palpable. Eventually AI that learns from such processes fulfills Andersen et al.’s (2014) research implying that development is shaped by strategic experience over time. This to the point that there is a feedback process linking those experiences with chemical-cognitive shifts again the key frontoparietal network (Powell et al., 2017). Taillan, Dufau, and Lemaire (2015) note that strategies are selected differently by populations from various cognitive domains factored through education, memory, reasoning, decision making, and language. As is known some cognitive processes are chosen and others automatically chosen. Empathy, and intuition, themselves might have both chosen and automatic processes (Coates, 2013). Indeed, if AI can simulate alternating processes of
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    208 strategic decision-making, thatsimulate a sense of uncertainty of choice, then the experience for the human participant might seem more real (Hanaki et al., 2016). Recommendations for Future Research There are several viable avenues for future research. If decisions of significance are being made in any game based on non-rational, unconscious processes research has an interest in defining these qualities (Andersen, 2014). Many participants articulated definite, yet hard to define processes of strategy awareness often related to ToM qualities, cognitive empathy, and intuition. The intersections of personality and chess strategy is another area worthy of further research. More study of types of intuition based on Myers-Briggs (2016) introverted and extroverted intuition. Ultimately it is unclear at what point, or what triggers, memory and ToM skills to create inferences that see opportunity for chess players to make a strategic choice, though inference is the common denominator in both skills sets (Artinger, Exadaktylos, Koppel, & Saaksvuori, 2014; Salavaggio, 2018). Further qualitative and quantitative studies on ToM, TPJ, and cognitive empathy would be welcomed to form more conclusions in this area of thought (Powell et al., 2017). Additionally, qualitative studies where participants are interviewed during chess gameplay could more precisely define moments where the various cognitive processes are activated by specific strategic conditions on the gameboard or reactions to their opponents. The use of online chess as an opponent could as well add dimensionality to data collection and player feedback in real time without the complications of securing privacy between players as they vocalize strategic thinking during gameplay. It was shown that definitive links exist between chess, empathy, memory, and spatial relationships (Astashpendar et al., 2016; Ciaramelli et al., 2013; Powell et al., 2017).
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    209 Again, Phenomenology mayprove enlightening as textural and structural, descriptions of participant experience are analysis for the consciousness they contain, or create, directed toward the object of a winning strategic chess move (Creswell & Poth, 2018). The primary initial and ideal follow up study would be placing participants in live chess matches where one participant has a hearing blocking device and the other describes his strategic thinking in rich, thick detail as the game play progresses. Then two more sets of participants would play either a computer program and vocalize their strategy and a remote chess player through a computer program, neither knowing if they were playing a real player or a computer. All three sets of data would be compiled, analyzed, and compared for consistencies and contrasts in the initial thematic categories of memory recall, spatial assessment, and especially intuition and cognitive empathy. A variation on this design would include target sampling (Emerson, 2015) from participants of various Elo rankings and as well with distinct personality traits/disorders that have shown variation in ToM skills from the norm (Gillespie, 2018; Ghiasi, Mohammadi, and Zarrinfar (2018). Researchers could code for participant vocalization of reactions to body movements of opponents which could add to the thematic results of intuition and cognitive empathy. Further understanding of the differences between cognitive empathy and intuition in chess strategy would be useful since participants at times seemed to conflate these concepts. Also, how intuition might be an extension of memory and/or spatial understanding was a connection that several participants suggested but needs further examination. Additionally, what cues to strategy choice or what information on strategy decision making is influenced by reading body language and how this perhaps connects to cognitive empathy and/or intuition would be useful since some participant answers indicated such connections. Specific relations between the TPJ brain system and strategy formation through spatial awareness, linguistic
  • 216.
    210 conceptualization, empathy, andsense of movement (Hironaga et al., 2017; Powell et. al. 2017; Saxe, 2003). All these perceptional systems are known to be influenced or triggered by the TPJ region. Work on empathy, trauma, personality issues, and types of perceptual difference, if randomly predicted for in artificial intelligence response programs could add the complexity, spontaneity, and some semblance of naturalness lacking in current simulations. Gillespie (2018) demonstrated through hierarchical regression that affective ToM (awareness of feeling states of others) predicted proactive aggression greater than influences from clinically rated psychopathic tendencies. As indicted brain networks could be linguistically mapped out for thematic, causative, and textural cues that proximate various cognitive and strategic responses (Andersen et al., 2014). Fehr and Huck (2016) note that beliefs change once one realizes they are in a game. Gathering data in real time of participants strategic calculation processes could further assess how belief changes during course of game play. Registering these changes experimentally with biofeedback and cognitive mechanism measuring devices would further advance the overall data (Andersen et al., 2014; Przybyszewki & Polkowski, 2017). Participant’s detailing of biological processes such as eye/visual recognition of piece position, imagining of piece future movements, assessments of spatial dimensions of the actual game board and piece configuration, and feelings of opponents beliefs and intents (ToM) could be categorized both thematically and experimentally then cross-calculated for process sequence and determination of strategic decision-making (Cohen et al., 2014; Markovits et al., 2019; McCabe et al. 2011; Salvaggio, 2018). Markovits et al. (2019) discussed belief-based cues that make rapid inferences. How things are inferred has meaning and purpose to strategic choices.
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    211 These processes asrelated to the themes of spatial assessment, intuition, memory recall, and cognitive empathy can be observed and analyzed with further study and design. Finally, that blind chess players create effective visuospatial working memory structure to choose chess strategy is of interest and worthy of further study (Balata, Mikovec, & Slavik, 2015). That ToM, and cognitive empathy, and pro-social behavior quantitatively have been found to have a positive relationship (Artinger et al., 2014) correlates interestingly to the interviewer impression that the more social, and verbal, participants, versus competitive and closed off, put forth cognitive empathy, and awareness of opponent, as a strategic quality known and used to them, while the most competitive participants often denied its existence, or usefulness, completely. The implications that various levels of social skill, recognition, and social evaluation of circumstances, and their corresponding cognitive processes relate to levels of skill and choice patterns in strategic decision-making is of interest. That how individuals use, interpret, and evaluate others through their linguistic descriptions and how that may categorize individuals on strategic style of an area of interest for further study. Conclusions This IPA study was based on 9 participant semi-structured interviews to gained thematic language on their perceptions of cognitive processes as they formed chess strategy during game play. Extension literature review identified four generally cognitive processes involved in chess strategy. These being intuition, cognitive empathy, spatial assessment, and memory recall. All these themes were affirmed by participant descriptive data and further broken down into several sub-themes.
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    212 The study addressedthe problem of the lack of supporting qualitative data for the expansive amount of experimental data on cognitive functions of the brain related to strategy formation and implementation. The data gathered was valuable in supporting quantitative claims and expanding areas for further research as it identified interdependent processes individually identified in the quantitative data but indicated further in the quantitative thematic development. There is enough new data from the qualitative interviews to suggests interrelated cognitive functionality during chess game play regarding strategic brain functions. Some essential points discerned from the study is that players are generally aware of both intuition and cognitive empathy as a strategy, cognitive mechanism active to access chess strategy during game play. While intuition remained elusive in definition, such as basically a gut feeling that when distinct, and trusted and acted upon, results in successful strategic choices roughly 80 percent of the time or better, yet with the difficulty of taking a level of experience and confidence to be aware of such intuition, and act upon it, which is rare. This while cognitive empathy gained more precises definitions revolving around the traditional definition of a knowing of other’s intentions and beliefs to a sense or reading of body language in an opponent. Memory recall proved to be a dominant theme largely associated with learning traditional chess theory from study or game playing experience. It seemed a trusted and integral part of all participants awareness and preference for chess strategy formations and implementation. An additional and corresponding element of cognitive mechanism that was frequently found in the literature and essentially confirmed by participant results was processes that are centered in the temporoparietal junction of the brain. This is the region between two of the four major sections of the brain.
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    213 What was foundinteresting is the TPJ regulations of functions related to language, spatial assessment, cognitive empathy, and self-other distinction awareness. All of these cognitive functions had emphasis, or heavy emphasis, in cognitive empathy, originating in Theory of Mind, spatial assessment, linguistic study of strategy, linguistic experimental design of chess strategy, (Balata et al., 2015; Nippold, 2009), and spatial calculations as related to interrelatedness, or even interdependence, between the dominant cognitive processes of the four themes was further affirmed. For instance, chunks of pattern recognition from memory form conceptual templates that predict outcomes from various spatial configurations of chess pieces during gameplay. Postal (2012) cited that there is a larger visual span for chess-related visual patterns. Empathy, ToM, and general chess strategic thinking was shown to have significant overlap (Powell et al., 2017). This seemed to indicate imagining spatial problems triggers brain processes that also activates empathy. These results seemed to synthesize with what is known about the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as responsible for processing affective sharing, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (all ToM tasks) as well as being an important cognitive region for spatial processing skills (Powell et al., 2017). This again being confirmed in increased activation of the Temporoparietal Junction during spatial processing (Powell et al., 2017). Overall, this study indicated further mixed studies, qualitative studies, and quantitative studies, indicated by participant observations, could add to the existing theory in Theory of Mind, possibly artificial intelligence creation, and interrelatedness of strategic cognitive functions.
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  • 240.
    234 Appendix A: RecruitmentFlyer Seeking Chess Players for Research Study Volunteers are needed for research on strategic decision- making during chess gameplay. To qualify for the study you must:  Have be actively playing chess at least once per month, for the last three months consecutively  Be an adult over the age of 18.  Be able to recall and communicate details of chess decision-making of strategy and/or tactics.  Be willing to sign a consent to participate. You will not qualify if you:  Have not been active playing chess at least once per month over the last three months.  Are under the age of 18  Are not able to sufficiently communicate details of chess decision-making strategy and/or tactic.
  • 241.
    235 Participating will involve: Attending 1 in-person recorded interview.  Consent to interviews being audio-recorded.  Answering questions about yourself, your background, and decision-making during chess gameplay.  The option of reviewing the initial results of the study and providing feedback through email This research is being done to fulfill a doctoral degree in psychology at Northcentral University. If you are interested in being part of this research project, please call (or send initial text message): Eric Smith 210-379-5961
  • 242.
    236 Appendix B: Screening/DemographicQuestionnaire Demographics Questions Researcher will ask: Name: ____________________________________ Telephone: ____________________ Email address: What would you like your alias name to be? __________________________________________ Year of Birth: _____________ Gender: Female  Male  Other _____ Race or Cultural background: _____________________
  • 243.
    237 Education level: __________________________ WorkStatus: ________________ (If you work, what do you do?) _____________________ Marital status: ____________________________ Researcher will ask - Tell me a little about yourself: Are you over 18 years of age? Do you play chess at least once per month? Have you played chess at least once per month during the last, previous, three months? Do you have an Elo rating? Is your Elo rating between 800 and 2000? Do you feel you can answer interview questions about your chess decision-making processes in English? Interview Protocol for Gaining participant’s Perceptions on Strategy Prompts Questions You were included in this study because you responded that you were an adult and active chess player. 1. Do you feel you have a specific strategy or sets of strategies you use while playing chess? 2. Do you ever get a sense of your opponent’s inner world? As if you know or understand something about his conception of strategy intuitively?
  • 244.
    238 So, the firstresearch question I hope to answer involves finding out: What are some of the conceptual qualities that go into your chess strategy? A conceptual quality could be reason, instinct, awareness, or memory recall. For example, some common challenges in chess, include surmising the opponent’s strategy, thinking moves ahead, seeing and seizing opportunities, and the like, so some of these qualities might be used to pick a strategy. Chess has been said to use many qualities to pick strategy from. Some of these are said to include spatial recognition and pattern memory awareness. Spatial recognition can 2. If you access your opponent’s inner world somehow, does how you access your opponent’s inner world, their ideas of chess strategy, determine which strategy you choose? 4. What feelings or thoughts about yourself, the game, or your opponent make you shift strategies, if you do shift strategies during game play? 5. What are key concepts, methods, ways you pick a strategy before or during game play? What natural skills or ways knowing, or thinking do you use during game play to pick strategy? 6. Are there any uncommon strategies or cognitive processes that you use or felt others have used when they play against you? 7. Has your impression of strategy changed as you aged?
  • 245.
    239 rely on seeing,in the abstract imagination, where pieces will end up as a result of certain strategic patterns or movements. I am looking for participants to put some of these abstract notions into words, if they experience them, and even common themes or definitive categories, that describe how your brain picks chess strategy, that your cognitive processes might revolve around. There can be more than one quality used or they can conflict or go in various sequences. Chess has been described by some as pattern awareness, recognition, and memory responses to learned chess strategic concepts. Some may contrast this to inner qualities like intuition and empathy where one surmises strategy internally or just knows certain answers that come up suddenly. Intuition implies a sudden knowing that comes upon one providing a strategic choice, or set of choices, that seem to promise to be effective. Empathy can be feeling or knowing what the opponent believes about the strategy in the chess game, or what they desire to use as strategy by reading something about this opponents’ feelings or beliefs and thus given you an advantage over this opponent. All methods of picking a strategy have strengths and weaknesses. 8. If you have an awareness of it, how would you describe spatial relation and assessment of spatial areas and possibilities as related to strategic choice in chess between you and your opponents. 9. Does memory relate to spatial reasoning in your experience? 8. Do you feel like you use intuition or empathy for strategic choice, if so which one,
  • 246.
    240 I hope tofind out more about these differing strategic modalities individuals use during game play. or both, and how do they differ from each other? 9. Do you ever feel strong shifts in awareness of who is in a superior position during gameplay, and thus how to do change, if you do, your calculations of the game, what perhaps led to that point and what perhaps you can use a strategy from that point. 10.. If you do use it, does using intuition or empathy mean you have made a conscious choice to use those strategic methods as opposed to reason, pattern recognition, or memory recall? Is there anything I didn’t ask about that you would like to tell me about your experiences related to strategy choice making during chess game play?
  • 247.
    241 Appendix C: ScreeningQuestions Have you taken chess lessons? Have you ever studied chess books? If you have one, what is your exact Elo rating? How often did you play chess in the last three months? Do you have a strategic style or famous player that you try to play like? Do you believe more than one method, way, or cognitive awareness is helping you pick your chess strategy?
  • 248.
    242 Appendix D: InformedConsent Form Introduction My name is Eric Smith. I am a doctoral student at Northcentral University and am conducting a research study on how chess players describe strategic decision making. I am seeking your consent to participate in this study. Your participation is completely voluntary, and I am here to address your questions or concerns at any point during the study. Activities In this study, participants will: Participate in a one on one approx. 1-hour interview with researcher Eligibility You are eligible to participate in this research if you: 1. Adult 18 years of age or older 2. Can complete a one-hour interview in English 3. Play chess at least once a month, at least for the last three months consecutively I hope to include 12 people in this research.
  • 249.
    243 Risks Some possible risksinclude: Loss of self-esteem from being asked questions that indicate researcher’s desire for thick, rich descriptions and somehow feeling they let themselves or the researcher down due to lack of linguistic felicity To decrease the impact of these risks, you can: participants can skip questions or stop participation at any time. They can ask for specific clarification of a question or the point of the overall study at any point. Benefits If you participate, there are no direct benefits to you. This research may increase the body of knowledge in the participant area of this study. Privacy and Confidentiality In this study, certain identifying/private information may be collected. Any information you provide will be kept confidential to the extent allowable by law. Some steps I will take to keep your information confidential are: Each participant will be identified by coded fake names as to not reveal their identity. participants names will not be asked for on the recorded interview. Researcher will not share any participants actual identity with other academics, the public, or researchers. The people who will have access to your information are: The Dissertation Chair and committee members will have some access to researcher’s participants as far as demographic backgrounds, but not specific names. The Institutional Review Board may also review my research and view your information. I will secure your information with these steps: All identifying data will be locked in filing cabinets as hard copy, and/or secured in computer through password encryption. Even with this effort, there is a chance that your identifying/private information may be accidentally released. I will securely store your data for 3 years. Then, I will delete electronic data and destroy paper data. Contact Information If you have questions, you can contact me at: Esmith at 210-379-5961 or e.smith0310@o365.ncu.edu My dissertation chair’s name is Dr. Michelle Ackerman. They work at Northcentral University and is supervising me on the research. You can contact them at: 334-467-8864 or mackerman@ncu.edu If you contact us, your information will not be linked to your responses if your study is otherwise anonymous. If you have questions about your rights in the research or if a problem or injury has occurred during your participation, please contact the NCU Institutional Review Board at irb@ncu.edu or 1-888-327-2877 ext. 8014. Voluntary Participation If you decide not to participate, or if you stop participation after you start, there will be no penalty to you: you will not lose any benefit to which you are otherwise entitled. Audiotaping
  • 250.
    244 I would liketo use a voice recorder to record your responses. You cannot still participate if you do not wish to be recorded. Please sign here if I can record you for the purposes of this study: Signature A signature indicates your understanding of this consent form. You will be given a copy of the form for your records. participant Signature Printed Name Date _____________________ _____________________ ____________ Researcher Signature Printed Name Date _____________________ _____________________ ____________