Upon proposal of the East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, a selection of Slovakian experts commented on the probable changes in Slovakia’s foreign policy, especially with respect to the Visegrad Group, the Eastern Partnership, the European Union, NATO, Ukraine, and Russia.
Reciprocal trade sanctions by Russia and the EU should not last longer than 3 months, as both economies will feel they can’t afford that, according to experts from Denmark’s largest bank, Danske Bank.
French presidential elections showed a strong following for anti-eurozone candidates, and even stronger for anti-austerity only EU/ECB policy.
This will have consequences for th futre of the euro in a context where the Europe is heading back in recession and Spain is in deep trouble. France is also facing very strong social and economic challenges ahead.
European tourism 2016 trends and prospects q3Alex Kornfeind
International tourist arrivals to Europe grew by 3% in the first half of the year compared to the same period last year. European tourism continues its positive trend and shows exceptional resilience to geopolitical and safety and security challenges
Reciprocal trade sanctions by Russia and the EU should not last longer than 3 months, as both economies will feel they can’t afford that, according to experts from Denmark’s largest bank, Danske Bank.
French presidential elections showed a strong following for anti-eurozone candidates, and even stronger for anti-austerity only EU/ECB policy.
This will have consequences for th futre of the euro in a context where the Europe is heading back in recession and Spain is in deep trouble. France is also facing very strong social and economic challenges ahead.
European tourism 2016 trends and prospects q3Alex Kornfeind
International tourist arrivals to Europe grew by 3% in the first half of the year compared to the same period last year. European tourism continues its positive trend and shows exceptional resilience to geopolitical and safety and security challenges
Russia and the Visegrad Group: The Ukrainian ChallengeRussian Council
The Eastern Partnership policy that triggered the Ukrainian crisis has provided ample opportunity to reflect on Russia–EU relations, alongside with evaluating cooperation between Russia and the Visegrad Group countries (also called the Visegrad Four or V4). The Visegrad Four have taken on responsibility for the eastward enlargement of the European Union having become its members.
This report is the result of a series of brainstorming sessions between American, Russian, and European
experts funded by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
The Atlantic Council is grateful for the leadership of the Honorable Ellen Tauscher and Minister Igor Ivanov,
who led the team in an effort to keep the dialogue open and frank at a challenging time for European
security, as 2014 events in Ukraine unravelled the post-Cold War security order. The Council wishes to
acknowledge the contributions of American experts: Walter Slocombe, Hans Binnendijk, Paul Fritch, and
those who have wished to remain unnamed, as well as the European experts: Lukasz Kulesa, Markus Kaim,
and Paal Hilde, who worked under the leadership of Ian Kearns and the European Leadership Network
(ELN). The Council also thanks the group of Russian experts: Andrey Kortunov, Andrei Zagorski, and Irina
Busygina, who worked under the leadership of the Russian International Affairs Council to contribute
the Russian perspective; and, fially, the Director and coordinator of the project, Isabelle François, for the
diffiult task of bringing diverging views together into one fial publication.
The Atlantic Council offered a platform to keep channels of communication open and for different
views to be expressed. Not surprisingly, in the months that followed events in Ukraine, it proved
impossible to narrow the differences and develop a common, action-oriented approach to the challenge
of rebuilding the European security order. We aimed instead for a necessary fist step of listening to each
other and reflcting on the signifiant differences in the Western and Russian approaches. Our debates
focused on a possible way forward by gaining clarity on the interests at stake, from the US, European,
and Russian perspectives, in order to better defie whether and where common interests may still lie
and how best to advance them. The need for managing our differences in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis
will continue to require signifiant efforts on the part of decision-makers, experts, offiials, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, and will likely take time and strategic patience.
We hope that this report will contribute to a better understanding and appreciation for the differences
in terms of the respective US, European, and Russian positions, in order to better prepare, when the time
comes, for bridging the gap and bring back stability, security, and prosperity to the whole of Europe.
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Arab Republic of Egypt: Op...Russian Council
Working paper prepared by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) within the project «Middle East: Political Dynamics and Russia’s Interests». The authors examine the main trends in the development of the political and economic situation in Egypt, analyze the state of Russian-Egyptian relations, lead recommendations for their further development, examine the role of Egypt through the prism of the exacerbation of regional conflicts and threats in the Middle East, analyze the prospects for Russian-Egyptian cooperation in addressing regional problems.
This paper presents forecasts for the Financial Stress Index (FSI) and the Economic Sensitivity Index (ESI) for the period 2015-2015 for six countries in the region, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. It is a continuation of the endeavor to construct synthetic indices measuring financial stress and economic sensitivity for twelve Central and East European countries using the Principal Component Analysis. In order to obtain forecasts of the FSI, we estimated Vector Autoregression (VAR) models on monthly data for the period 2001-2012 separately for all the countries. Using quarterly historical values of ESI and FSI, we estimated Dynamic Panel Data Model for the complete sample of countries. Parameters of the model were later used for forecasting the ESI. Obtained results suggest that the FSI will start to rise in 2014 in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Estonia. For Latvia and Hungary, we observed a conversion in the trend, i.e. at the beginning of 2015, when the index should start to fall. According to our forecasts, the ESI will be rising in the next two years, except for Hungary, where we predict a continuous decrease in economic sensitivity.
Authored by: Maciej Krzak and Grzegorz Poniatowski
Published in 2014
The Current State of Russia-United Kingdom RelationsRussian Council
The Working Paper is prepared in the framework of the RIAC research project “A New Agenda for Russia-United Kingdom Relations”. The Working Paper analyzes the main trends in British domestic and foreign policy, current Russia-UK relations. Russian–British relations have always shown great potential. The areas of common interest pointed out in this paper allow for the practical implementation of tracks working systematically at the same time – the Track One-and-a-Half and the Track II.
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 6, June 2016Lina Grau
The Newsletter Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates is produced by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The programme is part of the FES/APE “Foreign Policy Dialogues” Project. The content can be reproduced by mentioning the source. The materials are realized by Lina Grau, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator with APE.
Topics of the edition:
1. Signe Burgstaller: The systemic high level corruption is a major obstacle for the political and economic development
2. Nicu Popescu: Brexit - any internal weakening of the EU has a negative effect on the Eastern European geopolitics
3. Iulian Groza: The current political climate is not favouring an advancement in the relations with the EU
The Postulates on Russia’s Foreign Policy developed with the participation of the Russian International Affairs Council’s members and experts discuss Russia’s position in the international arena, the role of global challenges in shaping the foreign policy agenda and outline foreign policy priorities for the period from 2012 to 2018. The main purpose of the Postulates is to encourage a public discourse about new contours and orientation of Russia’s foreign policy and to devise the solutions to be protected against traditional and emerging security challenges.
Geopolitical Risks - Pandemic - Canada and the World - WE April 2, 2022.pptxpaul young cpa, cga
Summary
COVID variances continue to evolve
Global GDP growth is facing many challenges
High household debt default is at risk due to potential hiking of interest rates
More and more people are looking at their health and wellness
Too much focus is being put on climate change
On September 2015, Russian Gazprom and list of European energy giants announced an agreement on further constructing of the Nord Stream 2 (NS 2) – another one gas pipeline from Russia under the Baltic Sea landing in Germany. At once it became clear, that constructing the pipeline is a kind of a threat for Ukraine who now is a crucial important gas transporter from Russia to the European Union (EU) member states and thereafter would undermine Ukrainian positions bringing economic losses, political and security threats .
From Ukrainian prospective the Nord Stream 2 is treated as a mostly politically driven project, at somehow aimed against Ukraine, which will also increase dependence of the EU states on Russian gas, and consequently make those more vulnerable to Russia’s policy in future. Such arguments are widely used by Ukrainian politicians and in official statements.
However, such perception does not take into consideration arguments and befits of those EU member states, who support the project and current internal political conditions. At final extent, such approach brings to a kind of misunderstanding between supporters and opponents of the Nord Stream 2 construction and achieving of the Ukrainian aim is rather questionable.
Nord Stream 2 problem in general consist of two dimensions: economic and political. Those are at somehow contradictory for the project’s actors. The first one is based on benefits that some countries (first of all Russia and certain EU member states) expect to gain with the NS 2 project. The political one is in the domain contradiction of supporting Russia in its energy business during its violating of the international law, threats for Ukraine and its concerns regarding loosing gas supply interdependence with the EU. Current ways and attempts to impact on the NS 2 development do not manage to bundle both those dimensions to find a solution that will acceptable for all parties involved in all developments and outcome related to construction and future operation of the NS 2 pipeline.
Future of the Nord Stream 2 is not clear yet and this means necessity for Ukraine to continue taking steps aimed on protecting its own position. This paper aims to describe main drivers and benefits for parties, involved in supporting the NS 2 comparing to Ukrainian perceptions and official statement on this matter.
However, NS 2 is not a unique threat for Ukrainian gas transit capabilities and corresponding resulting benefits. This drives not only necessity of efforts to cope with the NS 2, but also strengthening Ukrainian gas transit capabilities and energy security in general. Authors offered (Final remarks chapter) for Ukraine and its main ally in energy security – US actions frameworks to contain Russia regarding the NS 2 project, strengthen and secure Ukraine
Moldovan experts commented on the practical implications of Kyiv decision of May 2015 to ban transit of Russian troops; prospects for the Ukrainian initiative to replace Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria with the international mission, and perspectives of the Chisinau initiative to adopt a reintegration timetable for Transnistria.
Russia and the Visegrad Group: The Ukrainian ChallengeRussian Council
The Eastern Partnership policy that triggered the Ukrainian crisis has provided ample opportunity to reflect on Russia–EU relations, alongside with evaluating cooperation between Russia and the Visegrad Group countries (also called the Visegrad Four or V4). The Visegrad Four have taken on responsibility for the eastward enlargement of the European Union having become its members.
This report is the result of a series of brainstorming sessions between American, Russian, and European
experts funded by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
The Atlantic Council is grateful for the leadership of the Honorable Ellen Tauscher and Minister Igor Ivanov,
who led the team in an effort to keep the dialogue open and frank at a challenging time for European
security, as 2014 events in Ukraine unravelled the post-Cold War security order. The Council wishes to
acknowledge the contributions of American experts: Walter Slocombe, Hans Binnendijk, Paul Fritch, and
those who have wished to remain unnamed, as well as the European experts: Lukasz Kulesa, Markus Kaim,
and Paal Hilde, who worked under the leadership of Ian Kearns and the European Leadership Network
(ELN). The Council also thanks the group of Russian experts: Andrey Kortunov, Andrei Zagorski, and Irina
Busygina, who worked under the leadership of the Russian International Affairs Council to contribute
the Russian perspective; and, fially, the Director and coordinator of the project, Isabelle François, for the
diffiult task of bringing diverging views together into one fial publication.
The Atlantic Council offered a platform to keep channels of communication open and for different
views to be expressed. Not surprisingly, in the months that followed events in Ukraine, it proved
impossible to narrow the differences and develop a common, action-oriented approach to the challenge
of rebuilding the European security order. We aimed instead for a necessary fist step of listening to each
other and reflcting on the signifiant differences in the Western and Russian approaches. Our debates
focused on a possible way forward by gaining clarity on the interests at stake, from the US, European,
and Russian perspectives, in order to better defie whether and where common interests may still lie
and how best to advance them. The need for managing our differences in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis
will continue to require signifiant efforts on the part of decision-makers, experts, offiials, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, and will likely take time and strategic patience.
We hope that this report will contribute to a better understanding and appreciation for the differences
in terms of the respective US, European, and Russian positions, in order to better prepare, when the time
comes, for bridging the gap and bring back stability, security, and prosperity to the whole of Europe.
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Arab Republic of Egypt: Op...Russian Council
Working paper prepared by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) within the project «Middle East: Political Dynamics and Russia’s Interests». The authors examine the main trends in the development of the political and economic situation in Egypt, analyze the state of Russian-Egyptian relations, lead recommendations for their further development, examine the role of Egypt through the prism of the exacerbation of regional conflicts and threats in the Middle East, analyze the prospects for Russian-Egyptian cooperation in addressing regional problems.
This paper presents forecasts for the Financial Stress Index (FSI) and the Economic Sensitivity Index (ESI) for the period 2015-2015 for six countries in the region, namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. It is a continuation of the endeavor to construct synthetic indices measuring financial stress and economic sensitivity for twelve Central and East European countries using the Principal Component Analysis. In order to obtain forecasts of the FSI, we estimated Vector Autoregression (VAR) models on monthly data for the period 2001-2012 separately for all the countries. Using quarterly historical values of ESI and FSI, we estimated Dynamic Panel Data Model for the complete sample of countries. Parameters of the model were later used for forecasting the ESI. Obtained results suggest that the FSI will start to rise in 2014 in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Estonia. For Latvia and Hungary, we observed a conversion in the trend, i.e. at the beginning of 2015, when the index should start to fall. According to our forecasts, the ESI will be rising in the next two years, except for Hungary, where we predict a continuous decrease in economic sensitivity.
Authored by: Maciej Krzak and Grzegorz Poniatowski
Published in 2014
The Current State of Russia-United Kingdom RelationsRussian Council
The Working Paper is prepared in the framework of the RIAC research project “A New Agenda for Russia-United Kingdom Relations”. The Working Paper analyzes the main trends in British domestic and foreign policy, current Russia-UK relations. Russian–British relations have always shown great potential. The areas of common interest pointed out in this paper allow for the practical implementation of tracks working systematically at the same time – the Track One-and-a-Half and the Track II.
Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates, Nr. 6, June 2016Lina Grau
The Newsletter Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates is produced by the Foreign Policy Association of Moldova in partnership with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The programme is part of the FES/APE “Foreign Policy Dialogues” Project. The content can be reproduced by mentioning the source. The materials are realized by Lina Grau, foreign policy expert and programme coordinator with APE.
Topics of the edition:
1. Signe Burgstaller: The systemic high level corruption is a major obstacle for the political and economic development
2. Nicu Popescu: Brexit - any internal weakening of the EU has a negative effect on the Eastern European geopolitics
3. Iulian Groza: The current political climate is not favouring an advancement in the relations with the EU
The Postulates on Russia’s Foreign Policy developed with the participation of the Russian International Affairs Council’s members and experts discuss Russia’s position in the international arena, the role of global challenges in shaping the foreign policy agenda and outline foreign policy priorities for the period from 2012 to 2018. The main purpose of the Postulates is to encourage a public discourse about new contours and orientation of Russia’s foreign policy and to devise the solutions to be protected against traditional and emerging security challenges.
Geopolitical Risks - Pandemic - Canada and the World - WE April 2, 2022.pptxpaul young cpa, cga
Summary
COVID variances continue to evolve
Global GDP growth is facing many challenges
High household debt default is at risk due to potential hiking of interest rates
More and more people are looking at their health and wellness
Too much focus is being put on climate change
On September 2015, Russian Gazprom and list of European energy giants announced an agreement on further constructing of the Nord Stream 2 (NS 2) – another one gas pipeline from Russia under the Baltic Sea landing in Germany. At once it became clear, that constructing the pipeline is a kind of a threat for Ukraine who now is a crucial important gas transporter from Russia to the European Union (EU) member states and thereafter would undermine Ukrainian positions bringing economic losses, political and security threats .
From Ukrainian prospective the Nord Stream 2 is treated as a mostly politically driven project, at somehow aimed against Ukraine, which will also increase dependence of the EU states on Russian gas, and consequently make those more vulnerable to Russia’s policy in future. Such arguments are widely used by Ukrainian politicians and in official statements.
However, such perception does not take into consideration arguments and befits of those EU member states, who support the project and current internal political conditions. At final extent, such approach brings to a kind of misunderstanding between supporters and opponents of the Nord Stream 2 construction and achieving of the Ukrainian aim is rather questionable.
Nord Stream 2 problem in general consist of two dimensions: economic and political. Those are at somehow contradictory for the project’s actors. The first one is based on benefits that some countries (first of all Russia and certain EU member states) expect to gain with the NS 2 project. The political one is in the domain contradiction of supporting Russia in its energy business during its violating of the international law, threats for Ukraine and its concerns regarding loosing gas supply interdependence with the EU. Current ways and attempts to impact on the NS 2 development do not manage to bundle both those dimensions to find a solution that will acceptable for all parties involved in all developments and outcome related to construction and future operation of the NS 2 pipeline.
Future of the Nord Stream 2 is not clear yet and this means necessity for Ukraine to continue taking steps aimed on protecting its own position. This paper aims to describe main drivers and benefits for parties, involved in supporting the NS 2 comparing to Ukrainian perceptions and official statement on this matter.
However, NS 2 is not a unique threat for Ukrainian gas transit capabilities and corresponding resulting benefits. This drives not only necessity of efforts to cope with the NS 2, but also strengthening Ukrainian gas transit capabilities and energy security in general. Authors offered (Final remarks chapter) for Ukraine and its main ally in energy security – US actions frameworks to contain Russia regarding the NS 2 project, strengthen and secure Ukraine
Moldovan experts commented on the practical implications of Kyiv decision of May 2015 to ban transit of Russian troops; prospects for the Ukrainian initiative to replace Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria with the international mission, and perspectives of the Chisinau initiative to adopt a reintegration timetable for Transnistria.
The Orange Revolution in the fall of 2004 built great hopes for a better future for Ukraine. However, three years later those hopes have been replaced by disappointment, frustration and confusion. Although progress in the areas of political freedom, pluralism, civil rights and freedom in the media remains unquestionable the record of economic, institutional and legal reforms is much more problematic. The key macroeconomic indicators are not better than they were few years ago and the business climate has barely improved. The WTO accession process remains incomplete. The perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration are continually subject to heated domestic political controversies. The political situation remains unstable, mostly due to the hasty constitutional changes that were adopted during the Orange Revolution.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the state of the Ukrainian economy at the end of 2007 and reflect upon what kind of reform program the Ukrainian government should consider, regardless of its political color. The reforms suggested in this paper involve a broad agenda of macroeconomic, social, structural and institutional measures. This agenda goes beyond the purely economic sphere and also addresses issues of legal, administrative and political reforms. The politics and political economy of any future reform effort will not be easy because the country is deeply divided in political, cultural, regional and ethnic terms. In such an environment, crucial reforms and strategic decisions will require a wider cross-party political consensus.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2007
This paper discusses the global financial crisis of 2008/9 in thirteen countries, the ten new EU members that previously were communist and the three countries of Western former Soviet Union. Their problems were excessive current account deficits and private foreign debt, currency mismatches, and high inflation, while public finances were in good shape. The dominant cause was fixed exchange rates. Many lessons can be drawn from this crisis. A dollar peg makes no sense in this part of the world. The five currency boards in the region have lacked credibility. By contrast, inflation targeting has worked eminently. The euro has proven credible both in the countries that officially adopted it and in the countries that adopted it unilaterally. With the exception of Hungary, all the countries in the region have displayed decent fiscal policies. No government should accept large domestic loans in foreign currency and they can be regulated away. The IMF has successfully returned to the original Washington consensus with relatively few conditions: a reasonable budget balance and a realistic exchange rate policy, while focusing more on bank restructuring. The most controversial issue is the role of the ECB. The ECB should facilitate the accession of willing EU members to the euro by relaxing the ERM II conditions.
Authored by: Anders Aslund
Published in 2009
The CIS region is of vital importance for the EU countries considering that both are interconnected through cooperation or membership in supranational political and economic institutions (OSCE, WTO, OECD, NATO, etc.), through transport and energy corridors, through investment, trade and migration trends.
The interests of EU member states in the region are very diverse and are sometimes pursued in contradiction to one another. The overarching interest is of an economic nature, given the large reserves of natural resources (particularly gas and oil) and due to the size of the CIS market of 277 million consumers. Security and immigration issues also rank high on the list, whereas EU countries are less concerned with democratisation trends in the CIS. Russia is the most important CIS partner for a majority of EU countries. Energy plays a disproportionally high role in EU member states (MS) - Russia relations and is also a strong determinant of the overall heterogeneity of EU MS policies towards Russia. The type of bilateral relations which the EU MS maintain with one sub-region of the CIS (particularly the EENP, but increasingly also Central Asia) also affects their relations with Russia. Cultural closeness and a common history still play a large part in the development of bilateral relations. The accession to the EU of Central and Eastern European states has altered the existing relations between them and their eastern CIS neighbours, thereby also modifying their interests in the region. Regrettably, the EU's policies towards Russia and the EENP region have not yet been able to provide a playing field able to compensate for this alteration.
Thus, the present report studies the various interests (political, security, economic, cultural) which underpin relations between the EU member states and the CIS countries and also discusses the latest developments in EU policies towards a specific CIS sub-region (Russia, the Eastern ENP and Central Asia), thereby providing a broad picture of the type of interests, how they are pursued by the EU member states and where these intersect or clash.
Authored by: George Dura
Published in 2008
Upon proposal of the EESRI Foundation, a selection of experts commented on the probable implications of the adopted “Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy” for establishing a more peaceful, stable and secure environment in the Eastern European region.
Warsaw Insight #4 - key policy developments in Poland - September 2014Lukasz Jachowicz
Monthly summary of key policy developments in Poland (for summer 2014) - changes in Polish government, summary of PM Kopacz's expose, legal developments since July 2014.
The paper examines economic and political challenges of joining the euro area in the case of Poland. After reviewing the economic developments since the pre-accession period and assessing economic convergence with the euro area the paper focuses on the political and institutional challenges of acceding to the euro zone. Special attention is given to the effect of the crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman brothers in September 2008 on both political and economic dynamics of the process. The developments in parameters related to the economic and legal criteria for joining the euro area are scrutinized in detail during the entire period before and after the crisis. The paper is concluded with the review of the status quo in mid-2010 as well as summary and recommendations.
Authored by: Przemsilaw Wozniak
Published in 2010
Hungary, soon 10 years in the European Union!Arnold Stellio
During these three months in Budapest to demonstrate the interest that you wear to the country and the city where we live, we'll focus on the results that is Hungary ago its integration into the European Union.
Similar to Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Priorities in 2016 (20)
Practical steps to implement the Integrated Chemical Safety and Security Program in Ukraine were proposed at Ukraine Chemical Security Forum, held in Kielce, Poland, on April 19, 2016, in the framework of CHEMSS2016.
Experts from Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Poland and Ukraine commented on the current issues of the Baltic states security, including the threats of Russia’s hybrid and conventional aggression, NATO’s capabilities to secure the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Baltic states, and possible role of the “Belarus factor”, given its close military cooperation with Russia.
Statement delivered by Mr. Oleksandr Tytarchuk on behalf of the Board of Coordinators of the East European Security Research Initiative (EESRI) at the Advanced Research Workshop “Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Conflict Management: NATO, OSCE, EU and Civil Society.” Bratislava, Slovak Republic, 10 June 2015.
A set of recommendations for combating Russian propaganda in the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries, which has been distributed among the Members of the European Parliament and the EU officials with regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2015 calling for preparation of an action plan to counter Russia’s disinformation campaigns.
On 29 October 2015, in London, the Royal United Services Institute hosted a one day conference on the subject of “Military Influence” with a selection of speakers addressing different aspects. This is a summary from the on the record part of the day’s presentations.
Armenia’s strong dependence on Russia has now become not only a source of democratic deficit as well as of economic and demographic problems, but also a security threat for Armenia, as regional security risks continue to grow, and Yerevan may be dragged directly into the Russo-Turkish confrontation.
Joint Comments of FPRI and EESRI Foundation to the Questionnaire on Perceptions of the OSCE and Proposals for the Future Work of the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions. Presented by Mr. Oleksandr Tytarchuk, Member of the EESRI Foundation Board, during the Second OSCE Network’s Meeting held in Hamburg on February 24, 2016.
The Dutch referendum about the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine leads to uncharted waters on several fronts. April 6, 2016 is the first time when an electorate of one EU member state gets a direct say on an external EU agreement. This brief provides an overview of the referendum’s (i) legal and political background, (ii) state-of-play, including the argumentation of its main proponents and (iii) future prospects as the situation opens a range of new questions for the Netherlands, the EU and Ukraine in an unprecedented context.
Statement delivered by Oleksandr Tytarchuk at the International Conference “Autocratical challenge for the European project – what to do and not to do,” held by the Charter’97 Foundation with support of the International Visegrad Fund, in Warsaw, on May 25, 2016.
Statement delivered by Maksym Khylko at the International Conference “Autocratical challenge for the European project – what to do and not to do,” held by the Charter’97 Foundation with support of the International Visegrad Fund, in Warsaw, on May 25, 2016.
After tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan flared in April 2016, the international mediators stepped up again, but there is little hope that they would ever be interested in solving this problem. The patience of the Azerbaijani side that had been negotiating with no progress for 20 years is over; the uncertain situation around the Nagorno-Karabakh harms local population, regional stability and important international projects.
Like any other crisis, the Brexit simultaneously brings both risks and opportunities – for the United Kingdom itself, for the European Union and for third parties, including Ukraine. The positive/negative balance of the outcome largely depends on how skilfully international actors deal with the new situation.
Presentation delivered by Oleksandr Tytarchuk on behalf of the East European Security Research Initiative Foundation at the Workshop “Protracted Conflicts in the OSCE Region: Innovative Approaches for Co-operation in the Conflict Zones,” held by the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, in Vienna, Austria, on July 4, 2016.
Presentation by Oleksandr Tytarchuk and Maksym Khylko delivered on behalf of the East European Security Research Initiative Foundation at the Fourth IOS Annual Conference “Breaking the Ice of Frozen Conflicts? Understanding Territorial Conflicts in East and Southeast Europe,” held by IOS Regensburg, Germany, on June 30 – July 2, 2016.
An analysis of the serious problems arising from the so-called frozen conflicts in the post-soviet region forms the basis of this policy paper with particular reference to human security in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria. Despite many similarities among them, the entities are not entirely homogeneous and since the conflicts vary in severity and scope, an individualized approach is required in the provision of much needed human security in each.
More from East European Security Research Initiative (17)
Chatty Kathy - UNC Bootcamp Final Project Presentation - Final Version - 5.23...John Andrews
SlideShare Description for "Chatty Kathy - UNC Bootcamp Final Project Presentation"
Title: Chatty Kathy: Enhancing Physical Activity Among Older Adults
Description:
Discover how Chatty Kathy, an innovative project developed at the UNC Bootcamp, aims to tackle the challenge of low physical activity among older adults. Our AI-driven solution uses peer interaction to boost and sustain exercise levels, significantly improving health outcomes. This presentation covers our problem statement, the rationale behind Chatty Kathy, synthetic data and persona creation, model performance metrics, a visual demonstration of the project, and potential future developments. Join us for an insightful Q&A session to explore the potential of this groundbreaking project.
Project Team: Jay Requarth, Jana Avery, John Andrews, Dr. Dick Davis II, Nee Buntoum, Nam Yeongjin & Mat Nicholas
06-04-2024 - NYC Tech Week - Discussion on Vector Databases, Unstructured Data and AI
Discussion on Vector Databases, Unstructured Data and AI
https://www.meetup.com/unstructured-data-meetup-new-york/
This meetup is for people working in unstructured data. Speakers will come present about related topics such as vector databases, LLMs, and managing data at scale. The intended audience of this group includes roles like machine learning engineers, data scientists, data engineers, software engineers, and PMs.This meetup was formerly Milvus Meetup, and is sponsored by Zilliz maintainers of Milvus.
Explore our comprehensive data analysis project presentation on predicting product ad campaign performance. Learn how data-driven insights can optimize your marketing strategies and enhance campaign effectiveness. Perfect for professionals and students looking to understand the power of data analysis in advertising. for more details visit: https://bostoninstituteofanalytics.org/data-science-and-artificial-intelligence/
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Empowering the Data Analytics Ecosystem: A Laser Focus on Value
The data analytics ecosystem thrives when every component functions at its peak, unlocking the true potential of data. Here's a laser focus on key areas for an empowered ecosystem:
1. Democratize Access, Not Data:
Granular Access Controls: Provide users with self-service tools tailored to their specific needs, preventing data overload and misuse.
Data Catalogs: Implement robust data catalogs for easy discovery and understanding of available data sources.
2. Foster Collaboration with Clear Roles:
Data Mesh Architecture: Break down data silos by creating a distributed data ownership model with clear ownership and responsibilities.
Collaborative Workspaces: Utilize interactive platforms where data scientists, analysts, and domain experts can work seamlessly together.
3. Leverage Advanced Analytics Strategically:
AI-powered Automation: Automate repetitive tasks like data cleaning and feature engineering, freeing up data talent for higher-level analysis.
Right-Tool Selection: Strategically choose the most effective advanced analytics techniques (e.g., AI, ML) based on specific business problems.
4. Prioritize Data Quality with Automation:
Automated Data Validation: Implement automated data quality checks to identify and rectify errors at the source, minimizing downstream issues.
Data Lineage Tracking: Track the flow of data throughout the ecosystem, ensuring transparency and facilitating root cause analysis for errors.
5. Cultivate a Data-Driven Mindset:
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Machine learning and optimization techniques for electrical drives.pptx
Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Priorities in 2016
1. Dušan FISCHER, head of the International Se-
curity Program at the Slovak Foreign Policy As-
sociation
Q1: One month after the election it is difficult to predict
any changes in the Slovak foreign policy for the upcom-
ing period 2016-2020, mostly for two reasons. Firstly,
priorities in foreign policy have been vague so far. We
are yet to see a comprehensive plan addressing any chal-
lenges in foreign policy towards V4, EaP, EU or NATO.
Secondly, current government consists of parties that
most did not have a detailed political program focused
on foreign policy beyond simple phrases prior to the
elections in March. Two of the parties, Slovak National
Party (SNS) and Kotleba-People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽS
NS) are constantly questioning the need for EU member-
ship. They do not have a plan for alternative, let alone a
comprehensive plan for future of Slovakia’s engagement
within NATO which they also oppose.
There are, however, few conclusions we can draw from
the debate. Although being very sketchy, the foreign and
security policy did play a role during the election cam-
paign. The airtime was mostly filled with fear mongering
the issue of migration. This is expected to cease. Further,
SNS appointed Minister of Defense, retired General Pe-
ter Gajdos who, in spite of his ties to Russia, expressed
his views of Slovakia as a pro-European and pro-NATO
country. Next, from July to December 2016, Slovak for-
eign policy will be pre-occupied by the Presidency of the
EU. There is also certainty that the Slovak foreign policy
will be managed solely by the Ministry of Foreign and
European Affairs. Its core staff remains the same, so we
can expect continuation of foreign policy priorities and
policies.
Q2: I don’t think we should expect any dramatic changes.
The foreign policy towards Ukraine and Russia has two
dimensions – national level and European / NATO level.
When it comes to the foreign policy towards Ukraine and
Russia on bilateral level, the debate will be mainly con-
sisting of assurance and reassurance measures in energy
security sector and challenges posed by Russia’s behav-
ior in the region and influencing the stability of Eastern
Ukraine after the withdrawal of its forces from Syria. The
Russian invasion in Ukraine caused minimal shift in the
Slovak foreign policy so if there is no escalation of the
conflict there will be no change to the current policy.
In terms of security challenges from the east, NATO as-
surance measures such as strengthening its presence in
the East will be addressed by Russia. In this regard, Slo-
Slovakia’s Foreign Policy
Priorities in 2016
Upon proposal of the East European Security Research Initiative Foundation, a selection
of Slovakian experts commented on the probable changes in Slovakia’s foreign policy,
especially with respect to the Visegrad Group, the Eastern Partnership, the European
Union, NATO, Ukraine, and Russia.
Q1: What changes in Slovakia’s foreign policy are to be expected towards V4, EaP, EU and
NATO?
Q2: Should we expect changes in Slovakia’s politics towards Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine con-
flict and the issue of sanctions against Russia?
April 2016
COMMENT
EESRI
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EESRI COMMENT April 2016
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vakia should stand firmly as a pro-Atlantic ally. Regard-
ing sanctions, there will be some statements against the
sanctions, mostly from the representatives of the Slovak
National Party, but Slovakia mostly agrees and follows
EU policies. So in this view, there should be no change
and while the EU maintains compromise and consensus
among its members, Slovakia should continue to be on
board.
There should be an urge for more intense cross-border
cooperation to prevent trafficking and criminal incidents
at the border of the Schengen zone. It will be interesting
to see what impact will have a potential cabinet position
in the Ukrainian government for Slovakia’s former Min-
ister of Finances Ivan Mikloš.
Zuzana NOVAKOVA, visiting researcher at Jean
Monnet Centre of Excellence at the Kyiv-Mohyla
Academy and a junior researcher at Internation-
al Institute of Social Studies in the Hague
Q1: The incoming government consists of principally
divergent parties, yet its coalition priorities were agreed
in a surprisingly quick manner. This raises more doubts
than hopes. The priorities of the new government rhetor-
ically reaffirm continuity of pro-European and pro-At-
lantic orientation of the country, reinforcing of national
parliaments, plus an update of Slovakia’s security and
defense strategy.
In practice this comes in the atmosphere of an increas-
ing radicalization within the V4 region; with the group
diverging from other EU member states on questions of
solidarity (such as migration crisis or sanctions on Rus-
sia). Simultaneously, Hungary and Poland experience
strong illiberal backslash. Some voices already coin the
Visegrad group a “cohesive bloc of illiberal anti-Euro-
pean nationalist governments”. Even if such description
might seem overstated, it suggests a lot about the possi-
ble future foreign policy direction of the region.
The incoming government is most likely to follow this
path. Slovakia’s old-new Prime Minister Fico is a social
democrat, yet he finds a lot of common ground with
those conservative V4 partners. The presence of Slovak
National Party in the ruling coalition is likely to further
reinforce such convergence. While the other two coali-
tion parties (Most-Hid and Siet) stand for more liberal/
Euro-positive outlook, their influence on the foreign pol-
icy of the country is likely to remain marginal. By co-opt-
ing them into a coalition SMER remains the hegemon
setting the course of this government, hence there is lit-
tle change to be expected.
Slovakia will take over the rotating Presidency of the
EU Council from July 2016. While this role is foremost
a symbolic one, but in the volatile times of EU facing
multiple (security) crises it is likely to leave an imprint:
shaping further response to the refugee crisis, directing
the EU relations with Russia, potential facilitation of ne-
gotiations of Brexit. Let me remind again that despite
the government’s stated pro-European and pro-Atlantic
vocation, vast majority of parties in Slovak parliament
(incl. the two main coalition partners) remain openly
critical and actively opposed to some of the measures de-
fining contemporary European integration.
Q2: No. The ambivalent approach to Ukraine is most
likely to persist. On the one hand Slovakia will main-
tain its role as a reliable partner in energy security: by
providing the reverse stream option for gas as well as by
opposing the plans to enhance the Nordstream gas pipe-
line to Germany (ie. one which by-passes both Ukraine
and Slovakia, while increasing direct energy cooperation
between Germany and Russia). On the other hand the
old-new Prime Minister remains one of the fiercest op-
ponents to the EU sanctions on Russia; joining Czech
republic and Hungary in an outcry against the these and
actively opposing any enhancement of the sanctions re-
gime.
This ambivalent approach in high politics reflects the
general nature of the public discussion about the crisis,
where the public domain became a battleground of two
mutually exclusive main narratives, a “pro-Ukrainian”
and “pro-Russian” – reading the situation in a black and
white fashion.
Jozef ULIAN, PhD, former member of the Slovak
Mission to NATO and high-ranking official in the
Slovak MOD, active member of the UN Roster of
SSR Experts
Q1: The SR participated actively in decision-making of
the EU and NATO on all major issues. However, since
the beginning of election campaign, the FP has been
driven by political marketing to solve internal problems
followed by anti-Brussels propaganda. The Slovak diplo-
macy, fortunately only in that time, could be character-
ized as naive, passive and introvert in terms of refugee
crises and fight against terrorism. However, results of
parliamentary election in March 2016 finished one-party
rule and brought slightly different situation, but not too
much, indeed.
Nowadays coalition of the four political parties has
formed the Government that replaced the previous one.
3. The new Government is more consistent to conservative
governments in Hungary and in Poland, unlike the pre-
vious one. The coalition is in consensus on the European
and transatlantic orientation, so we may not expect large
changes of the Slovak FP. The main points of SK PRES
will particularly have included the EU internal relations
after the UK referendum, EU external relations to the
Eastern Partnership Policy (EaP) and Western Balkan
states.
Minister of Foreign Affairs is an experienced profes-
sional. After the long period of unqualified Ministers of
Defense, we have got the one with military background.
Both might have worked on a new National Security
Strategy and Defense Strategy to replace the obsolete
ones. It would be included in Manifesto of the Govern-
ment of the SR for the period 2016 to 2020.
In that sense, I expect more active attitude of the Slo-
vak FP towards EaP, a proactive attitude of the EU and
NATO in the effort of building a better European securi-
ty and counterterrorism paradigm during SK PRES. Par-
allel to that, the Slovak FP has got capacity and know-
how for improving role of V4 countries to form the better
future of the EU.
Q2: Slovakia, as a country on the eastern border of the
EU, pays high attention to situation in our neighbor
country. The FP through the Slovak aid assists as much
as it can discuss adequate steps and economic strategies
toward the developing situation in Ukraine. The Slo-
vak FP has not changed opinion: the conflict in eastern
Ukraine must be solved by diplomatic tools. Former Cro-
atian president Ivo Josipovič said: “Rather many years
to negotiate than a day to fight.”
Due to lack of sources, essential changes in Slovak FP
towards Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine conflict and sanctions
against Russia should not be expected.
Marek LENČ, PhD, assistant lecturer at the Fac-
ulty of Political Science and International Rela-
tions at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica
Q1: Despite the fact that former ruling party Smer-SD is
now joined in a coalition by 3 other partners, their influ-
ence on foreign-political agenda of the country is going
to be rather very limited and therefore the nature of the
Slovak foreign policy will most likely remain unchanged
when compared to the execution by the previous govern-
ment (2012-16). Excellent proof for this statement might
be the fact that current coalition negotiations brought no
changes either on the position of the Prime Minister of
the country (R. Fico), Minister of Foreign and Europe-
an Affairs (M. Lajčák), Minister of Finance (P. Kažimír)
or Minister of Interior (R. Kaliňák) – all four are nomi-
nees by the party Smer-SD. In this sense, the European
partners can expect certain predictability and continu-
ity with the style of politics execution by the previous
government. However, one should not forget that the
2nd Fico government was also characterized by quite a
significant ambivalence between his verbal statements
and more diplomatic (sometimes even contradictory)
approach taken by the Ministry of Foreign of European
Affairs of the Slovak republic.
Nevertheless, the decisive moment that is going to shape
Slovak domestic debate on European and global issues is
takeover of the Presidency in the Council of the EU in the
2nd half of this year. This fact as well as existing progress
in refugee and migration crisis (issue that heated Slovak
relations with European partners) will more likely soften
PM Fico rhetoric’s and lead to verbally less confronta-
tional and more cooperative foreign policy conduct with
EU MS in Brussels.
V4 is going to stay Slovakia’s main platform for coali-
tion building potential within the EU and the Group will
concentrate besides political goals on development of
already existing energy security, transport and econom-
ic projects. Fico’s (he is 2nd longest serving PM among
V4 after V. Orban) and Lajčák’s contacts based on good
personal relations with leaders in Prague, Budapest as
well as in Warsaw are going to be crucial for the Slovak
contribution to this Group. The fact that Slovakia will be
chairing the EU will also lead to stronger emphasis of V4
(Central European) interests at the EU level - as V4 as
well as Central and East European countries can more
easily access the leaders in Bratislava than particular
Western governments.
In regard to the EaP Slovakia is keen on accelerating
“multi-speed” economic integration and further politi-
cal association between the Union and partner countries
(especially Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). Neverthe-
less, maintenance of pragmatic relations with Russia will
remain present for action of R. Fico’s 3rd cabinet.
In terms of government positions towards NATO poli-
cies, the new coalition is most likely to opt for more con-
servative approach as we have seen during the Ukraine
crisis (verbal criticism of Ukrainian, not Russian political
elites by PM, reluctance to strengthen NATO’s Eastern
flank in Eastern Europe or refusal towards deployment
of NATO military base on Slovak territory). These ele-
ments can now be enhanced by another coalition partner
– Slovak National Party, which profiles itself as „repub-
lican type of party“ that carries not only national posi-
3
EESRI COMMENT April 2016
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4. tions, Eurosceptic views towards Brussels policies, but
also certain amount of sentiment towards Russia present
within its electorate and party officials.
Q2: Slovakia is going to play a crucial role in the sec-
ond half of the year 2016 as the country takes over the
rotating presidency of the Council of the EU for the first
time in its history. This unprecedented challenge means
the Slovak diplomatic and political leadership will have
to give up on narrowly national topics and its domestic
interests and rather concentrate on leading negotiations
and moderation of the broad European debate among
all EU member states. From this point of view it is very
unlikely that Slovakia will be among the countries that
will advocate the debate for abolishment of the sanction
regime against Russia, even though Bratislava is most
likely to remain “friendly pragmatic” when it comes to
relations with Moscow under the current government.
Taking into account that prime minister Robert Fico
took some narrow domestic positions confronting major
European political powers (mostly Germany and France)
in the past when it came to migration and refugee crises
(also as a part of his domestic parliamentary campaign),
we expect him not to crusade anymore as he can rather
more wisely opt for improving his own image and coun-
try’s profile on European and international scene.
This, however, does not mean that Slovakia will give
up on its specific national interests, especially, when it
comes to energy security and energy transport issues
such as Nord-Stream II. In this case Slovak political
and diplomatic elites strongly advocate against the ex-
panding of the current capacity of the Nord Stream as
the project contradicts common European policy on
Ukraine. Therefore relations between Kyiv and Bratisla-
va (and many other Central European countries) will be
shaped by their joint refusal towards this project.
Kristina BOCKOVA, PhD, holds a Doctorate in
International Relations, Matej Bel University,
Slovakia and Master II in European Neighbor-
hood Policy, University of Reims Champagne-Ar-
dennes, France
Q1: I do not expect the major changes in Slovak foreign
policy, especially when it comes to the country’s western
orientation. Although the composition of the new gov-
ernment is a bit surprising, Robert Fico maintained his
leadership and the post of Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stays unchanged as well. The country’s pro-Atlantic ori-
entation and the smooth upcoming EU presidency are
the main foreign policy priorities of the new government.
Slovakia will try to show that it is a stable and relevant
partner at least at the EU policy playground. However, it
will be interesting to observe whether Fico (together with
V4 countries) maintains his strong anti-migrant policy
or he used it only as a part of his electoral campaign and
now he is able to show his better face in Brussels.
Q2: What concerns Russia, the Slovak position stays un-
changed – critical dialogue, but continuing cooperation.
Well, that is an official statement. In fact, Slovakia with
Robert Fico as a Prime Minister will never be construc-
tive critic towards Russia and its soft position is rather
expected.
When it comes to Slovak-Ukraine relations, Bratislava
upcoming EU presidency comes in a very difficult peri-
od. The Dutch referendum in April about ratifying the
Association Agreements is changing the EU positions to-
wards Ukraine from modernization and democratization
rather to stabilization and security related issues. I am
afraid that despite the Slovak long-term support to the
Ukrainian western integration, the discussion about our
eastern neighbor and its status will be pushed back and
Ukraine will stay at the end of the priority list.
Samuel GODA, PhD, head of the Security and
Defense Studies program at the Slovak Foreign
Policy Association, Assistant Professor at the Uni-
versity of Economics, Bratislava
Q1: In this regard, I do not expect a considerable change
in Slovak foreign policy in short term perspective. All po-
litical parties have agreed (before the elections) on con-
sensus to support the upcoming Slovak presidency of the
Council of the EU. Hence, the most important goal is to
successfully accomplish this mission.
In medium term there might occur some discrepancies.
There are personal changes in parliamentary commit-
tees dealing with foreign, security and defense policies
in favor of “anti-EU/NATO” parties. To some extent,
this applies to executive structures as well, especially to
the Ministry of Defense, which is under the influence of
the Slovak National Party. However, the coalition par-
ties seem to be not so radical in that regard (even though
there are some supporters within the Slovak National
Party).
The topic of EaP is currently taken over by the “migra-
tion crisis” issue, which will not change in upcoming
months in my opinion. The V4 level will be interesting
to follow – however, in the topic of “migration crisis” V4
countries are on the same page.
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EESRI COMMENT April 2016
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