SlideShare a Scribd company logo
“Security by the numbers“
セキュリティ 統計
OWASP Sendai
Hello! こんにちは
Eoin Keary
edgescan CEO & Founder
OWASP Global Board Member 2009-2015
Developer
Breaker / Hacker
@eoinkeary
@edgescan
ここにグレート (Koko ni gurēto)
Contents
• Fullstack Security
• Vulnerability Statistics
• Conclusions
Introducing edgescan™
• edgescan™ is a sophisticated,
enterprise-grade vulnerability
assessment and management
solution that gives you the tools
you need to control and manage
IT security risk
• edgescan™ helps from small &
medium-sized to large
enterprises identify and
remediate known vulnerabilities
in any platform
or web application
• edgescan™ is a cloud based
SaaS which provides a unique
combination of technology and
human expertise to assist you
with maintaining a strong
security posture
4
How we get the Statistical model
• 1000’s of vulnerability
assessments globally.
• #Fullstack view of security
• False positive free (99%) 
• Industries: Media, Energy,
Government, Pharma,
Finance, Software etc….
Fullstack
Agile Risk Model
Fail Early – Fail Often
“Push Left”
Spread-Risk
Risk Dispersion
73% of all vulnerabilities are not in the application
layer .
Which has more risk/weakness? Network or Web
Application?
What does this mean?
• We are finding more vulnerabilities in the non Web layer but
here’s where it gets interesting…
Web Application Layer (Layer 7)
Lots of high or critical risk issues!!
Easily exploitable
Very Damaging
Very Bad
Infrastructure Layer (Non Web app)
Lots of vulnerabilities!!
Not many high or Critical Risk.
More problems but less
vulnerable
What does this mean?
• Even though we are finding MORE issues in the NETWORK
layer, MOST serious / high risk issues are in the web application
layer.
• The web application layer has a higher “Risk Density”
More Detail
SSL is Dead. June 30th 2018 SSL and TLS 1.0
need to be killed off. – Payment Card Industry
(PCI)
Patching is still a big issue.
Some CVE’s are common and easily exploitable.
More Detail
System configuration and secure deployment is a big issue.
Client-Side security: XSS, HTML Injection, Browser based
issues are still very common.
Insecure JavaScript Libraries are common.
Version control of software components is required.
Known Vulnerabilities - age
Patching and version maintenance is
still a key part of maintaining a secure
posture.
Known Vulnerabilities (CVE)
Vulnerabilities: Still finding issues from
1999
The most common issue found in 2017 is
from 2004
34% of all systems had two (or more) CVE’s
How do we improve?
• Automation?
• Visibility?
Coverage is King!
• Automation is very useful.
• It works with DevSecOps.
• Helps us scale and “move quickly”.
• It has many challenges and can result in poor assessment
coverage and poor security!
Pitfall Explanation Solution
CSRF Tokens Preventing
Crawling
Cross-Site-Request Forgery tokens need to be resent with
every request. If the token is not valid the application may
invalidate the session. Tokens can be embedded in the
HTML and not automatically used by the scanner. This
results in the scanner not crawling or testing the site
adequately.
Using tools which can be configured to
“replay” the appropriate token with the
request.
Not all tools are capable of this. In some
cases multiple tools require to be
“chained” in order to satisfy this
restriction. Macros need to be written.
Tools running a virtual browser.
DOM Security
Vulnerabilities
Client-Side security issues which do not generate HTTP
requests may go undiscovered due to tools only testing the
application via sending and receiving HTTP requests. DOM
(Document Object Model) vulnerabilities may go
undiscovered as the tool does not process client side scripts.
Using tools which can provide virtual
browser capability solves this issue as
dynamic scripts in the browser are
processed and tested by the security tool.
This is also important in relation to
systems built using client-side frameworks
(Angular, Node.js etc) and detects issues
such as DOM XSS. Taint analysis of
JavaScript code is also important to help
discover client-side security issues.
Pitfall Explanation Solution
Dynamically Generated
Requests
Contemporary applications may dynamically generate HTTP requests
via JavaScript functions and tools which crawl applications to establish
site maps may not detect such dynamic links and requests.
Using tools which leverage virtual browsers solve
this problem as the JavaScript is executed as per a
regular users usage of the application. This results
in adequate coverage and detection of dynamic
page elements.
Recursive Links - Limiting
Repetitive Functionality
Applications with recursive links may result in 1000’s of unnecessary
requests. An example of this could be a calendar control or search
result function. This may result in 1000’s of extra requests being sent
to the application with little value to be yielded.
Example:
/Item/5/view
/Item/6/view
Some tools have the ability to limit recursiveness
and depth of requests such that if the tool starts to
crawl a link with 1000’s of permutations of the
same page it will stop the unnecessary resource
and time spent for both the assessment and the
hosting environment to service the assessment.
SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities Many tools which are designed to detect cryptographic issues simply
do it incorrectly. We have worked with some major tool vendors to
assist them with bug fixes in this area.
Using multiple tools to detect the same issue
results in clarity if the issues is present or it’s a false
positive.
Non Standard Protocols Some protocoals simply are not handled by certain tools. If protocols
wuch as Websockets, CORS, AMT, GWTK are not supported they will
not get adequately tested
Using multiple tools in this case helps with
coverage. The tools chosen to deliver the
assessment are based on initial manual
enumeration of the target system.
Insufficient Testing vectors used All tools test for defined vulnerabilities using a defined set of vectors.
Other tools also include tests for “known” vulnerabilities. Using one
scanning engine may result in not testing for security vulnerabilitys
adequately due to a restricted list of testing vectors used.
Leveraging multiple tools to test for particular
vulnerabilities results in more test cases and a
larger set of vectors being sued to test to the
vulnerability.
Pitfall Explanation Solution
Non Standard 404 Some sites will use the standard 404 handler, but many have
started to customize them to offer a better user experience.
Custom 404 that response as a 200. This is the simple one,
but many scanners will get caught by this
Using tools which can be configured to
recognise custom errors is important in
order to avoid false positives.
Session Management It is a challenge for any tools stay logged into an application.
The scanner must avoid logout functions, must properly
pass along session tokens wherever they happen to be at
the moment (sometimes cookies, sometimes on the URL,
sometimes in hidden form field) and adjust to multiple
possibilities taking place on a single app.
The scanner must also properly identify when it has lost its
session, and then be able to re-login (requires automated
login process mentioned above) to continue its scan.
Using multiple tools assists with this as not
all tools can be configured reliable to
maintain session state. Not having a reliable
session state or locking out accounts results
in poor coverage and disruption to the
engagement.
Ability to Test Web 2.0
(AJAX), Web Services and
Mobile
Related to a number of pitfalls above; application with
dynamic API calls via JavaScript, Restful requests etc can go
undiscovered and not get invoked at all.
Using multiple tools avoids configured with
REST-awareness can avoid missing area of
the application leaving it untested or
requiring that entire section to tested by
hand.
Automation
• So Automation is not always easy and has challenges…
Conclusion
THANKS!
edgescan™ 2018 Vulnerability Stats Report:
Available now on:
edgescan.com
eoin@edgescan.com
@eoinkeary
NO
ANNOYING
REGISTRATION
NECESSARY!

More Related Content

What's hot

Acunetix Training and ScanAssist
Acunetix Training and ScanAssistAcunetix Training and ScanAssist
Acunetix Training and ScanAssist
Bryan Ferrario
 
React security vulnerabilities
React security vulnerabilitiesReact security vulnerabilities
React security vulnerabilities
AngelinaJasper
 
Unisys_AppDefender_Symantec_CFD_0_1_final
Unisys_AppDefender_Symantec_CFD_0_1_finalUnisys_AppDefender_Symantec_CFD_0_1_final
Unisys_AppDefender_Symantec_CFD_0_1_final
Koko Fontana
 
Step by step guide for web application security testing
Step by step guide for web application security testingStep by step guide for web application security testing
Step by step guide for web application security testing
Avyaan, Web Security Company in India
 
Web Application Security 101
Web Application Security 101Web Application Security 101
Web Application Security 101
Cybersecurity Education and Research Centre
 
Security-testing presentation
Security-testing presentationSecurity-testing presentation
Security-testing presentation
Ezhilan Elangovan (Eril)
 
Prevention of SQL Injection Attacks having XML Database
Prevention of SQL Injection Attacks having XML DatabasePrevention of SQL Injection Attacks having XML Database
Prevention of SQL Injection Attacks having XML Database
IOSR Journals
 
Security For Application Development
Security For Application DevelopmentSecurity For Application Development
Security For Application Development
6502programmer
 
Oh, WASP! Security Essentials for Web Apps
Oh, WASP! Security Essentials for Web AppsOh, WASP! Security Essentials for Web Apps
Oh, WASP! Security Essentials for Web Apps
TechWell
 
From the Frontline of RASP Adoption
From the Frontline of RASP AdoptionFrom the Frontline of RASP Adoption
From the Frontline of RASP Adoption
Goran Begic
 
The bare minimum that you should know about web application security testing ...
The bare minimum that you should know about web application security testing ...The bare minimum that you should know about web application security testing ...
The bare minimum that you should know about web application security testing ...
Ken DeSouza
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application Security
Abdul Wahid
 
OWASP TOP 10 & .NET
OWASP TOP 10 & .NETOWASP TOP 10 & .NET
OWASP TOP 10 & .NET
Daniel Krasnokucki
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application Security
Colin English
 
Parameter tampering
Parameter tamperingParameter tampering
Parameter tampering
Dilan Warnakulasooriya
 
Application Security Workshop
Application Security Workshop Application Security Workshop
Application Security Workshop
Priyanka Aash
 
Owasp Top 10
Owasp Top 10Owasp Top 10
Owasp Top 10
Shivam Porwal
 
Application Security
Application SecurityApplication Security
Application Security
Reggie Niccolo Santos
 
Web Application Penetration Testing Introduction
Web Application Penetration Testing IntroductionWeb Application Penetration Testing Introduction
Web Application Penetration Testing Introduction
gbud7
 
Mobile application security Guidelines
Mobile application security GuidelinesMobile application security Guidelines
Mobile application security Guidelines
Entersoft Security
 

What's hot (20)

Acunetix Training and ScanAssist
Acunetix Training and ScanAssistAcunetix Training and ScanAssist
Acunetix Training and ScanAssist
 
React security vulnerabilities
React security vulnerabilitiesReact security vulnerabilities
React security vulnerabilities
 
Unisys_AppDefender_Symantec_CFD_0_1_final
Unisys_AppDefender_Symantec_CFD_0_1_finalUnisys_AppDefender_Symantec_CFD_0_1_final
Unisys_AppDefender_Symantec_CFD_0_1_final
 
Step by step guide for web application security testing
Step by step guide for web application security testingStep by step guide for web application security testing
Step by step guide for web application security testing
 
Web Application Security 101
Web Application Security 101Web Application Security 101
Web Application Security 101
 
Security-testing presentation
Security-testing presentationSecurity-testing presentation
Security-testing presentation
 
Prevention of SQL Injection Attacks having XML Database
Prevention of SQL Injection Attacks having XML DatabasePrevention of SQL Injection Attacks having XML Database
Prevention of SQL Injection Attacks having XML Database
 
Security For Application Development
Security For Application DevelopmentSecurity For Application Development
Security For Application Development
 
Oh, WASP! Security Essentials for Web Apps
Oh, WASP! Security Essentials for Web AppsOh, WASP! Security Essentials for Web Apps
Oh, WASP! Security Essentials for Web Apps
 
From the Frontline of RASP Adoption
From the Frontline of RASP AdoptionFrom the Frontline of RASP Adoption
From the Frontline of RASP Adoption
 
The bare minimum that you should know about web application security testing ...
The bare minimum that you should know about web application security testing ...The bare minimum that you should know about web application security testing ...
The bare minimum that you should know about web application security testing ...
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application Security
 
OWASP TOP 10 & .NET
OWASP TOP 10 & .NETOWASP TOP 10 & .NET
OWASP TOP 10 & .NET
 
Web Application Security
Web Application SecurityWeb Application Security
Web Application Security
 
Parameter tampering
Parameter tamperingParameter tampering
Parameter tampering
 
Application Security Workshop
Application Security Workshop Application Security Workshop
Application Security Workshop
 
Owasp Top 10
Owasp Top 10Owasp Top 10
Owasp Top 10
 
Application Security
Application SecurityApplication Security
Application Security
 
Web Application Penetration Testing Introduction
Web Application Penetration Testing IntroductionWeb Application Penetration Testing Introduction
Web Application Penetration Testing Introduction
 
Mobile application security Guidelines
Mobile application security GuidelinesMobile application security Guidelines
Mobile application security Guidelines
 

Similar to Security by the numbers

Hide and seek - Attack Surface Management and continuous assessment.
Hide and seek - Attack Surface Management and continuous assessment.Hide and seek - Attack Surface Management and continuous assessment.
Hide and seek - Attack Surface Management and continuous assessment.
Eoin Keary
 
Security engineering 101 when good design & security work together
Security engineering 101  when good design & security work togetherSecurity engineering 101  when good design & security work together
Security engineering 101 when good design & security work together
Wendy Knox Everette
 
Mike Spaulding - Building an Application Security Program
Mike Spaulding - Building an Application Security ProgramMike Spaulding - Building an Application Security Program
Mike Spaulding - Building an Application Security Program
centralohioissa
 
Building an AppSec Team Extended Cut
Building an AppSec Team Extended CutBuilding an AppSec Team Extended Cut
Building an AppSec Team Extended Cut
Mike Spaulding
 
The Web AppSec How-To: The Defender's Toolbox
The Web AppSec How-To: The Defender's ToolboxThe Web AppSec How-To: The Defender's Toolbox
The Web AppSec How-To: The Defender's Toolbox
Checkmarx
 
C01461422
C01461422C01461422
C01461422
IOSR Journals
 
EISA Considerations for Web Application Security
EISA Considerations for Web Application SecurityEISA Considerations for Web Application Security
EISA Considerations for Web Application Security
Larry Ball
 
Demand for Penetration Testing Services.docx
Demand for Penetration Testing Services.docxDemand for Penetration Testing Services.docx
Demand for Penetration Testing Services.docx
Aardwolf Security
 
Injecting Security into Web apps at Runtime Whitepaper
Injecting Security into Web apps at Runtime WhitepaperInjecting Security into Web apps at Runtime Whitepaper
Injecting Security into Web apps at Runtime Whitepaper
Ajin Abraham
 
Survey Presentation About Application Security
Survey Presentation About Application SecuritySurvey Presentation About Application Security
Survey Presentation About Application Security
Nicholas Davis
 
web security
web securityweb security
A security note for web developers
A security note for web developersA security note for web developers
A security note for web developers
John Ombagi
 
Elementary-Information-Security-Practices
Elementary-Information-Security-PracticesElementary-Information-Security-Practices
Elementary-Information-Security-Practices
Octogence
 
Core defense mechanisms against security attacks on web applications
Core defense mechanisms against security attacks on web applicationsCore defense mechanisms against security attacks on web applications
Core defense mechanisms against security attacks on web applications
Karan Nagrecha
 
Using Analyzers to Resolve Security Problems
Using Analyzers to Resolve Security ProblemsUsing Analyzers to Resolve Security Problems
Using Analyzers to Resolve Security Problems
kiansahafi
 
2 . web app s canners
2 . web app s canners2 . web app s canners
2 . web app s canners
Rashid Khatmey
 
Cybersecurity update 12
Cybersecurity update 12Cybersecurity update 12
Cybersecurity update 12
Jim Kaplan CIA CFE
 
Evaluating Web App, Mobile App, and API Security - Matt Cohen
Evaluating Web App, Mobile App, and API Security - Matt CohenEvaluating Web App, Mobile App, and API Security - Matt Cohen
Evaluating Web App, Mobile App, and API Security - Matt Cohen
Inman News
 
Software Security Testing
Software Security TestingSoftware Security Testing
Software Security Testing
ankitmehta21
 
CODE INSPECTION VIMRO 2015 MHF
CODE INSPECTION VIMRO 2015 MHFCODE INSPECTION VIMRO 2015 MHF
CODE INSPECTION VIMRO 2015 MHF
FitCEO, Inc. (FCI)
 

Similar to Security by the numbers (20)

Hide and seek - Attack Surface Management and continuous assessment.
Hide and seek - Attack Surface Management and continuous assessment.Hide and seek - Attack Surface Management and continuous assessment.
Hide and seek - Attack Surface Management and continuous assessment.
 
Security engineering 101 when good design & security work together
Security engineering 101  when good design & security work togetherSecurity engineering 101  when good design & security work together
Security engineering 101 when good design & security work together
 
Mike Spaulding - Building an Application Security Program
Mike Spaulding - Building an Application Security ProgramMike Spaulding - Building an Application Security Program
Mike Spaulding - Building an Application Security Program
 
Building an AppSec Team Extended Cut
Building an AppSec Team Extended CutBuilding an AppSec Team Extended Cut
Building an AppSec Team Extended Cut
 
The Web AppSec How-To: The Defender's Toolbox
The Web AppSec How-To: The Defender's ToolboxThe Web AppSec How-To: The Defender's Toolbox
The Web AppSec How-To: The Defender's Toolbox
 
C01461422
C01461422C01461422
C01461422
 
EISA Considerations for Web Application Security
EISA Considerations for Web Application SecurityEISA Considerations for Web Application Security
EISA Considerations for Web Application Security
 
Demand for Penetration Testing Services.docx
Demand for Penetration Testing Services.docxDemand for Penetration Testing Services.docx
Demand for Penetration Testing Services.docx
 
Injecting Security into Web apps at Runtime Whitepaper
Injecting Security into Web apps at Runtime WhitepaperInjecting Security into Web apps at Runtime Whitepaper
Injecting Security into Web apps at Runtime Whitepaper
 
Survey Presentation About Application Security
Survey Presentation About Application SecuritySurvey Presentation About Application Security
Survey Presentation About Application Security
 
web security
web securityweb security
web security
 
A security note for web developers
A security note for web developersA security note for web developers
A security note for web developers
 
Elementary-Information-Security-Practices
Elementary-Information-Security-PracticesElementary-Information-Security-Practices
Elementary-Information-Security-Practices
 
Core defense mechanisms against security attacks on web applications
Core defense mechanisms against security attacks on web applicationsCore defense mechanisms against security attacks on web applications
Core defense mechanisms against security attacks on web applications
 
Using Analyzers to Resolve Security Problems
Using Analyzers to Resolve Security ProblemsUsing Analyzers to Resolve Security Problems
Using Analyzers to Resolve Security Problems
 
2 . web app s canners
2 . web app s canners2 . web app s canners
2 . web app s canners
 
Cybersecurity update 12
Cybersecurity update 12Cybersecurity update 12
Cybersecurity update 12
 
Evaluating Web App, Mobile App, and API Security - Matt Cohen
Evaluating Web App, Mobile App, and API Security - Matt CohenEvaluating Web App, Mobile App, and API Security - Matt Cohen
Evaluating Web App, Mobile App, and API Security - Matt Cohen
 
Software Security Testing
Software Security TestingSoftware Security Testing
Software Security Testing
 
CODE INSPECTION VIMRO 2015 MHF
CODE INSPECTION VIMRO 2015 MHFCODE INSPECTION VIMRO 2015 MHF
CODE INSPECTION VIMRO 2015 MHF
 

More from Eoin Keary

IISF-March2023.pptx
IISF-March2023.pptxIISF-March2023.pptx
IISF-March2023.pptx
Eoin Keary
 
Validation of vulnerabilities.pdf
Validation of vulnerabilities.pdfValidation of vulnerabilities.pdf
Validation of vulnerabilities.pdf
Eoin Keary
 
Does a Hybrid model for vulnerability Management Make Sense.pdf
Does a Hybrid model for vulnerability Management Make Sense.pdfDoes a Hybrid model for vulnerability Management Make Sense.pdf
Does a Hybrid model for vulnerability Management Make Sense.pdf
Eoin Keary
 
Edgescan 2022 Vulnerability Statistics Report
Edgescan 2022 Vulnerability Statistics ReportEdgescan 2022 Vulnerability Statistics Report
Edgescan 2022 Vulnerability Statistics Report
Eoin Keary
 
Edgescan 2021 Vulnerability Stats Report
Edgescan 2021 Vulnerability Stats ReportEdgescan 2021 Vulnerability Stats Report
Edgescan 2021 Vulnerability Stats Report
Eoin Keary
 
One login enemy at the gates
One login enemy at the gatesOne login enemy at the gates
One login enemy at the gates
Eoin Keary
 
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2020
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2020Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2020
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2020
Eoin Keary
 
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2018)
 edgescan vulnerability stats report (2018)  edgescan vulnerability stats report (2018)
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2018)
Eoin Keary
 
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2019)
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2019) edgescan vulnerability stats report (2019)
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2019)
Eoin Keary
 
Full stack vulnerability management at scale
Full stack vulnerability management at scaleFull stack vulnerability management at scale
Full stack vulnerability management at scale
Eoin Keary
 
Vulnerability Intelligence - Standing Still in a world full of change
Vulnerability Intelligence - Standing Still in a world full of changeVulnerability Intelligence - Standing Still in a world full of change
Vulnerability Intelligence - Standing Still in a world full of change
Eoin Keary
 
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2019 - h-isac-2-2-2019
Edgescan   vulnerability stats report 2019 - h-isac-2-2-2019Edgescan   vulnerability stats report 2019 - h-isac-2-2-2019
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2019 - h-isac-2-2-2019
Eoin Keary
 
Online Gaming Cyber security and Threat Model
Online Gaming Cyber security and Threat ModelOnline Gaming Cyber security and Threat Model
Online Gaming Cyber security and Threat Model
Eoin Keary
 
Web security – everything we know is wrong cloud version
Web security – everything we know is wrong   cloud versionWeb security – everything we know is wrong   cloud version
Web security – everything we know is wrong cloud version
Eoin Keary
 
Cybersecurity by the numbers
Cybersecurity by the numbersCybersecurity by the numbers
Cybersecurity by the numbers
Eoin Keary
 
Ebu class edgescan-2017
Ebu class edgescan-2017Ebu class edgescan-2017
Ebu class edgescan-2017
Eoin Keary
 
Vulnerability management and threat detection by the numbers
Vulnerability management and threat detection by the numbersVulnerability management and threat detection by the numbers
Vulnerability management and threat detection by the numbers
Eoin Keary
 
14. html 5 security considerations
14. html 5 security considerations14. html 5 security considerations
14. html 5 security considerations
Eoin Keary
 
04. xss and encoding
04.  xss and encoding04.  xss and encoding
04. xss and encoding
Eoin Keary
 
03. sql and other injection module v17
03. sql and other injection module v1703. sql and other injection module v17
03. sql and other injection module v17
Eoin Keary
 

More from Eoin Keary (20)

IISF-March2023.pptx
IISF-March2023.pptxIISF-March2023.pptx
IISF-March2023.pptx
 
Validation of vulnerabilities.pdf
Validation of vulnerabilities.pdfValidation of vulnerabilities.pdf
Validation of vulnerabilities.pdf
 
Does a Hybrid model for vulnerability Management Make Sense.pdf
Does a Hybrid model for vulnerability Management Make Sense.pdfDoes a Hybrid model for vulnerability Management Make Sense.pdf
Does a Hybrid model for vulnerability Management Make Sense.pdf
 
Edgescan 2022 Vulnerability Statistics Report
Edgescan 2022 Vulnerability Statistics ReportEdgescan 2022 Vulnerability Statistics Report
Edgescan 2022 Vulnerability Statistics Report
 
Edgescan 2021 Vulnerability Stats Report
Edgescan 2021 Vulnerability Stats ReportEdgescan 2021 Vulnerability Stats Report
Edgescan 2021 Vulnerability Stats Report
 
One login enemy at the gates
One login enemy at the gatesOne login enemy at the gates
One login enemy at the gates
 
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2020
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2020Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2020
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2020
 
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2018)
 edgescan vulnerability stats report (2018)  edgescan vulnerability stats report (2018)
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2018)
 
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2019)
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2019) edgescan vulnerability stats report (2019)
edgescan vulnerability stats report (2019)
 
Full stack vulnerability management at scale
Full stack vulnerability management at scaleFull stack vulnerability management at scale
Full stack vulnerability management at scale
 
Vulnerability Intelligence - Standing Still in a world full of change
Vulnerability Intelligence - Standing Still in a world full of changeVulnerability Intelligence - Standing Still in a world full of change
Vulnerability Intelligence - Standing Still in a world full of change
 
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2019 - h-isac-2-2-2019
Edgescan   vulnerability stats report 2019 - h-isac-2-2-2019Edgescan   vulnerability stats report 2019 - h-isac-2-2-2019
Edgescan vulnerability stats report 2019 - h-isac-2-2-2019
 
Online Gaming Cyber security and Threat Model
Online Gaming Cyber security and Threat ModelOnline Gaming Cyber security and Threat Model
Online Gaming Cyber security and Threat Model
 
Web security – everything we know is wrong cloud version
Web security – everything we know is wrong   cloud versionWeb security – everything we know is wrong   cloud version
Web security – everything we know is wrong cloud version
 
Cybersecurity by the numbers
Cybersecurity by the numbersCybersecurity by the numbers
Cybersecurity by the numbers
 
Ebu class edgescan-2017
Ebu class edgescan-2017Ebu class edgescan-2017
Ebu class edgescan-2017
 
Vulnerability management and threat detection by the numbers
Vulnerability management and threat detection by the numbersVulnerability management and threat detection by the numbers
Vulnerability management and threat detection by the numbers
 
14. html 5 security considerations
14. html 5 security considerations14. html 5 security considerations
14. html 5 security considerations
 
04. xss and encoding
04.  xss and encoding04.  xss and encoding
04. xss and encoding
 
03. sql and other injection module v17
03. sql and other injection module v1703. sql and other injection module v17
03. sql and other injection module v17
 

Recently uploaded

Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdfMonitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Tosin Akinosho
 
Skybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoption
Skybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoptionSkybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoption
Skybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoption
Tatiana Kojar
 
GNSS spoofing via SDR (Criptored Talks 2024)
GNSS spoofing via SDR (Criptored Talks 2024)GNSS spoofing via SDR (Criptored Talks 2024)
GNSS spoofing via SDR (Criptored Talks 2024)
Javier Junquera
 
Nordic Marketo Engage User Group_June 13_ 2024.pptx
Nordic Marketo Engage User Group_June 13_ 2024.pptxNordic Marketo Engage User Group_June 13_ 2024.pptx
Nordic Marketo Engage User Group_June 13_ 2024.pptx
MichaelKnudsen27
 
Digital Banking in the Cloud: How Citizens Bank Unlocked Their Mainframe
Digital Banking in the Cloud: How Citizens Bank Unlocked Their MainframeDigital Banking in the Cloud: How Citizens Bank Unlocked Their Mainframe
Digital Banking in the Cloud: How Citizens Bank Unlocked Their Mainframe
Precisely
 
Astute Business Solutions | Oracle Cloud Partner |
Astute Business Solutions | Oracle Cloud Partner |Astute Business Solutions | Oracle Cloud Partner |
Astute Business Solutions | Oracle Cloud Partner |
AstuteBusiness
 
Freshworks Rethinks NoSQL for Rapid Scaling & Cost-Efficiency
Freshworks Rethinks NoSQL for Rapid Scaling & Cost-EfficiencyFreshworks Rethinks NoSQL for Rapid Scaling & Cost-Efficiency
Freshworks Rethinks NoSQL for Rapid Scaling & Cost-Efficiency
ScyllaDB
 
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
DanBrown980551
 
Biomedical Knowledge Graphs for Data Scientists and Bioinformaticians
Biomedical Knowledge Graphs for Data Scientists and BioinformaticiansBiomedical Knowledge Graphs for Data Scientists and Bioinformaticians
Biomedical Knowledge Graphs for Data Scientists and Bioinformaticians
Neo4j
 
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup SlidesProgramming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Zilliz
 
Taking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdf
Taking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdfTaking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdf
Taking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdf
ssuserfac0301
 
Energy Efficient Video Encoding for Cloud and Edge Computing Instances
Energy Efficient Video Encoding for Cloud and Edge Computing InstancesEnergy Efficient Video Encoding for Cloud and Edge Computing Instances
Energy Efficient Video Encoding for Cloud and Edge Computing Instances
Alpen-Adria-Universität
 
Mutation Testing for Task-Oriented Chatbots
Mutation Testing for Task-Oriented ChatbotsMutation Testing for Task-Oriented Chatbots
Mutation Testing for Task-Oriented Chatbots
Pablo Gómez Abajo
 
Essentials of Automations: Exploring Attributes & Automation Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Exploring Attributes & Automation ParametersEssentials of Automations: Exploring Attributes & Automation Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Exploring Attributes & Automation Parameters
Safe Software
 
“Temporal Event Neural Networks: A More Efficient Alternative to the Transfor...
“Temporal Event Neural Networks: A More Efficient Alternative to the Transfor...“Temporal Event Neural Networks: A More Efficient Alternative to the Transfor...
“Temporal Event Neural Networks: A More Efficient Alternative to the Transfor...
Edge AI and Vision Alliance
 
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success StoryDriving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Safe Software
 
Principle of conventional tomography-Bibash Shahi ppt..pptx
Principle of conventional tomography-Bibash Shahi ppt..pptxPrinciple of conventional tomography-Bibash Shahi ppt..pptx
Principle of conventional tomography-Bibash Shahi ppt..pptx
BibashShahi
 
Fueling AI with Great Data with Airbyte Webinar
Fueling AI with Great Data with Airbyte WebinarFueling AI with Great Data with Airbyte Webinar
Fueling AI with Great Data with Airbyte Webinar
Zilliz
 
Crafting Excellence: A Comprehensive Guide to iOS Mobile App Development Serv...
Crafting Excellence: A Comprehensive Guide to iOS Mobile App Development Serv...Crafting Excellence: A Comprehensive Guide to iOS Mobile App Development Serv...
Crafting Excellence: A Comprehensive Guide to iOS Mobile App Development Serv...
Pitangent Analytics & Technology Solutions Pvt. Ltd
 
JavaLand 2024: Application Development Green Masterplan
JavaLand 2024: Application Development Green MasterplanJavaLand 2024: Application Development Green Masterplan
JavaLand 2024: Application Development Green Masterplan
Miro Wengner
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdfMonitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
 
Skybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoption
Skybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoptionSkybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoption
Skybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoption
 
GNSS spoofing via SDR (Criptored Talks 2024)
GNSS spoofing via SDR (Criptored Talks 2024)GNSS spoofing via SDR (Criptored Talks 2024)
GNSS spoofing via SDR (Criptored Talks 2024)
 
Nordic Marketo Engage User Group_June 13_ 2024.pptx
Nordic Marketo Engage User Group_June 13_ 2024.pptxNordic Marketo Engage User Group_June 13_ 2024.pptx
Nordic Marketo Engage User Group_June 13_ 2024.pptx
 
Digital Banking in the Cloud: How Citizens Bank Unlocked Their Mainframe
Digital Banking in the Cloud: How Citizens Bank Unlocked Their MainframeDigital Banking in the Cloud: How Citizens Bank Unlocked Their Mainframe
Digital Banking in the Cloud: How Citizens Bank Unlocked Their Mainframe
 
Astute Business Solutions | Oracle Cloud Partner |
Astute Business Solutions | Oracle Cloud Partner |Astute Business Solutions | Oracle Cloud Partner |
Astute Business Solutions | Oracle Cloud Partner |
 
Freshworks Rethinks NoSQL for Rapid Scaling & Cost-Efficiency
Freshworks Rethinks NoSQL for Rapid Scaling & Cost-EfficiencyFreshworks Rethinks NoSQL for Rapid Scaling & Cost-Efficiency
Freshworks Rethinks NoSQL for Rapid Scaling & Cost-Efficiency
 
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
 
Biomedical Knowledge Graphs for Data Scientists and Bioinformaticians
Biomedical Knowledge Graphs for Data Scientists and BioinformaticiansBiomedical Knowledge Graphs for Data Scientists and Bioinformaticians
Biomedical Knowledge Graphs for Data Scientists and Bioinformaticians
 
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup SlidesProgramming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
 
Taking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdf
Taking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdfTaking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdf
Taking AI to the Next Level in Manufacturing.pdf
 
Energy Efficient Video Encoding for Cloud and Edge Computing Instances
Energy Efficient Video Encoding for Cloud and Edge Computing InstancesEnergy Efficient Video Encoding for Cloud and Edge Computing Instances
Energy Efficient Video Encoding for Cloud and Edge Computing Instances
 
Mutation Testing for Task-Oriented Chatbots
Mutation Testing for Task-Oriented ChatbotsMutation Testing for Task-Oriented Chatbots
Mutation Testing for Task-Oriented Chatbots
 
Essentials of Automations: Exploring Attributes & Automation Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Exploring Attributes & Automation ParametersEssentials of Automations: Exploring Attributes & Automation Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Exploring Attributes & Automation Parameters
 
“Temporal Event Neural Networks: A More Efficient Alternative to the Transfor...
“Temporal Event Neural Networks: A More Efficient Alternative to the Transfor...“Temporal Event Neural Networks: A More Efficient Alternative to the Transfor...
“Temporal Event Neural Networks: A More Efficient Alternative to the Transfor...
 
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success StoryDriving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
 
Principle of conventional tomography-Bibash Shahi ppt..pptx
Principle of conventional tomography-Bibash Shahi ppt..pptxPrinciple of conventional tomography-Bibash Shahi ppt..pptx
Principle of conventional tomography-Bibash Shahi ppt..pptx
 
Fueling AI with Great Data with Airbyte Webinar
Fueling AI with Great Data with Airbyte WebinarFueling AI with Great Data with Airbyte Webinar
Fueling AI with Great Data with Airbyte Webinar
 
Crafting Excellence: A Comprehensive Guide to iOS Mobile App Development Serv...
Crafting Excellence: A Comprehensive Guide to iOS Mobile App Development Serv...Crafting Excellence: A Comprehensive Guide to iOS Mobile App Development Serv...
Crafting Excellence: A Comprehensive Guide to iOS Mobile App Development Serv...
 
JavaLand 2024: Application Development Green Masterplan
JavaLand 2024: Application Development Green MasterplanJavaLand 2024: Application Development Green Masterplan
JavaLand 2024: Application Development Green Masterplan
 

Security by the numbers

  • 1. “Security by the numbers“ セキュリティ 統計 OWASP Sendai
  • 2. Hello! こんにちは Eoin Keary edgescan CEO & Founder OWASP Global Board Member 2009-2015 Developer Breaker / Hacker @eoinkeary @edgescan ここにグレート (Koko ni gurēto)
  • 3. Contents • Fullstack Security • Vulnerability Statistics • Conclusions
  • 4. Introducing edgescan™ • edgescan™ is a sophisticated, enterprise-grade vulnerability assessment and management solution that gives you the tools you need to control and manage IT security risk • edgescan™ helps from small & medium-sized to large enterprises identify and remediate known vulnerabilities in any platform or web application • edgescan™ is a cloud based SaaS which provides a unique combination of technology and human expertise to assist you with maintaining a strong security posture 4
  • 5. How we get the Statistical model • 1000’s of vulnerability assessments globally. • #Fullstack view of security • False positive free (99%)  • Industries: Media, Energy, Government, Pharma, Finance, Software etc….
  • 7. Agile Risk Model Fail Early – Fail Often “Push Left” Spread-Risk
  • 8. Risk Dispersion 73% of all vulnerabilities are not in the application layer . Which has more risk/weakness? Network or Web Application?
  • 9. What does this mean? • We are finding more vulnerabilities in the non Web layer but here’s where it gets interesting…
  • 10. Web Application Layer (Layer 7) Lots of high or critical risk issues!! Easily exploitable Very Damaging Very Bad
  • 11. Infrastructure Layer (Non Web app) Lots of vulnerabilities!! Not many high or Critical Risk. More problems but less vulnerable
  • 12. What does this mean? • Even though we are finding MORE issues in the NETWORK layer, MOST serious / high risk issues are in the web application layer. • The web application layer has a higher “Risk Density”
  • 13. More Detail SSL is Dead. June 30th 2018 SSL and TLS 1.0 need to be killed off. – Payment Card Industry (PCI) Patching is still a big issue. Some CVE’s are common and easily exploitable.
  • 14. More Detail System configuration and secure deployment is a big issue. Client-Side security: XSS, HTML Injection, Browser based issues are still very common. Insecure JavaScript Libraries are common. Version control of software components is required.
  • 15. Known Vulnerabilities - age Patching and version maintenance is still a key part of maintaining a secure posture.
  • 16. Known Vulnerabilities (CVE) Vulnerabilities: Still finding issues from 1999 The most common issue found in 2017 is from 2004 34% of all systems had two (or more) CVE’s
  • 17. How do we improve? • Automation? • Visibility?
  • 18.
  • 19. Coverage is King! • Automation is very useful. • It works with DevSecOps. • Helps us scale and “move quickly”. • It has many challenges and can result in poor assessment coverage and poor security!
  • 20. Pitfall Explanation Solution CSRF Tokens Preventing Crawling Cross-Site-Request Forgery tokens need to be resent with every request. If the token is not valid the application may invalidate the session. Tokens can be embedded in the HTML and not automatically used by the scanner. This results in the scanner not crawling or testing the site adequately. Using tools which can be configured to “replay” the appropriate token with the request. Not all tools are capable of this. In some cases multiple tools require to be “chained” in order to satisfy this restriction. Macros need to be written. Tools running a virtual browser. DOM Security Vulnerabilities Client-Side security issues which do not generate HTTP requests may go undiscovered due to tools only testing the application via sending and receiving HTTP requests. DOM (Document Object Model) vulnerabilities may go undiscovered as the tool does not process client side scripts. Using tools which can provide virtual browser capability solves this issue as dynamic scripts in the browser are processed and tested by the security tool. This is also important in relation to systems built using client-side frameworks (Angular, Node.js etc) and detects issues such as DOM XSS. Taint analysis of JavaScript code is also important to help discover client-side security issues.
  • 21. Pitfall Explanation Solution Dynamically Generated Requests Contemporary applications may dynamically generate HTTP requests via JavaScript functions and tools which crawl applications to establish site maps may not detect such dynamic links and requests. Using tools which leverage virtual browsers solve this problem as the JavaScript is executed as per a regular users usage of the application. This results in adequate coverage and detection of dynamic page elements. Recursive Links - Limiting Repetitive Functionality Applications with recursive links may result in 1000’s of unnecessary requests. An example of this could be a calendar control or search result function. This may result in 1000’s of extra requests being sent to the application with little value to be yielded. Example: /Item/5/view /Item/6/view Some tools have the ability to limit recursiveness and depth of requests such that if the tool starts to crawl a link with 1000’s of permutations of the same page it will stop the unnecessary resource and time spent for both the assessment and the hosting environment to service the assessment. SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities Many tools which are designed to detect cryptographic issues simply do it incorrectly. We have worked with some major tool vendors to assist them with bug fixes in this area. Using multiple tools to detect the same issue results in clarity if the issues is present or it’s a false positive. Non Standard Protocols Some protocoals simply are not handled by certain tools. If protocols wuch as Websockets, CORS, AMT, GWTK are not supported they will not get adequately tested Using multiple tools in this case helps with coverage. The tools chosen to deliver the assessment are based on initial manual enumeration of the target system. Insufficient Testing vectors used All tools test for defined vulnerabilities using a defined set of vectors. Other tools also include tests for “known” vulnerabilities. Using one scanning engine may result in not testing for security vulnerabilitys adequately due to a restricted list of testing vectors used. Leveraging multiple tools to test for particular vulnerabilities results in more test cases and a larger set of vectors being sued to test to the vulnerability.
  • 22. Pitfall Explanation Solution Non Standard 404 Some sites will use the standard 404 handler, but many have started to customize them to offer a better user experience. Custom 404 that response as a 200. This is the simple one, but many scanners will get caught by this Using tools which can be configured to recognise custom errors is important in order to avoid false positives. Session Management It is a challenge for any tools stay logged into an application. The scanner must avoid logout functions, must properly pass along session tokens wherever they happen to be at the moment (sometimes cookies, sometimes on the URL, sometimes in hidden form field) and adjust to multiple possibilities taking place on a single app. The scanner must also properly identify when it has lost its session, and then be able to re-login (requires automated login process mentioned above) to continue its scan. Using multiple tools assists with this as not all tools can be configured reliable to maintain session state. Not having a reliable session state or locking out accounts results in poor coverage and disruption to the engagement. Ability to Test Web 2.0 (AJAX), Web Services and Mobile Related to a number of pitfalls above; application with dynamic API calls via JavaScript, Restful requests etc can go undiscovered and not get invoked at all. Using multiple tools avoids configured with REST-awareness can avoid missing area of the application leaving it untested or requiring that entire section to tested by hand.
  • 23. Automation • So Automation is not always easy and has challenges…
  • 25. THANKS! edgescan™ 2018 Vulnerability Stats Report: Available now on: edgescan.com eoin@edgescan.com @eoinkeary NO ANNOYING REGISTRATION NECESSARY!

Editor's Notes

  1. Put in guide pics
  2. Ek – client side security. Threats and risks
  3. Threats and risks