A summary of insights and outcomes from the UNFCCC COOP20 (Lima)

1. SBA
@
COP20
A
Synthesis
Report
Issues
&
Outcomes
from
the
UNFCCC
COP
20
-­‐
CMP
10,
Lima
Sustainable Business Australia

2. Contents
COP
20
3
-­‐
In
Summary
4
-­‐
Decisions
&
Outcomes
The
Lima
Call
for
Climate
AcJon
5
-­‐
In
Summary
6
-­‐
Australia
at
COP
7
-­‐
What
it
means
for
business
SBA
@
Lima
8
-­‐
WBCSD,
Engagement
9
–
Statement
2015
10
-­‐
The
Road
to
Paris

3. COP20
In
Summary
RepresentaJves
of
196
naJons
assembled
(Dec
1-­‐
12
2014)
in
Lima,
Peru
for
the
annual
Conference
of
the
ParJes
to
the
United
NaJons
Framework
ConvenJon
on
Climate
Change
(UNFCCC)
brought
together
over
11,000
parJcipants,
including
approximately
6,300
government
officials,
4,000
representaJves
from
UN
bodies
and
agencies,
intergovernmental
organizaJons
and
civil
society
organizaJons,
and
900
members
of
the
media.
NegoJaJons
focused
on
outcomes
necessary
to
advance
towards
an
agreement
in
Paris
at
COP
21
in
2015,
including
elaboraJon
of
the
informaJon,
and
process,
required
for
submission
of
intended
naJonally
determined
contribuJons
(INDCs)
as
early
as
possible
in
2015
and
progress
on
elements
of
a
dra`
negoJaJng
text.
Following
lengthy
negoJaJons
on
a
dra`
decision
for
advancing
the
Durban
Plaaorm
for
Enhanced
AcJon,
COP
20
adopted
the
‘Lima
Call
for
Climate
AcJon,’
which
sets
in
moJon
the
negoJaJons
in
the
coming
year
towards
a
2015
agreement,
the
process
for
submidng
and
reviewing
INDCs,
and
enhancing
pre-­‐2020
ambiJon.
Key
issues
that
framed
the
COP
outcome
are
canvassed
below.
Momentum
In
the
months
leading
up
to
the
COP
climate
commitments
from
key
economies
have
given
a
welcome
sJmulus
to
the
long-­‐standing
climate
negoJaJons.
In
October,
the
European
Union
adopted
a
package
of
measures
designed
to
cut
greenhouse
gases
by
at
least
40
percent
by
2030.
Then
in
November,
the
United
States
and
China
reached
a
landmark
deal
that
commits
the
U.S.
to
emissions
reducJons
between
26
to
28
percent
below
2005
levels
by
2025,
and
commits
China
to
reach
peak
emissions
before
2030.
Given
these
developments,
negoJators
were
hopeful
that
the
global
community
was
ready
to
build
a
lasJng
framework
for
decarbonizaJon.
Long
Term
Vision
In
order
to
hold
global
mean
temperature
rises
to
less
than
2°C
by
the
end
of
this
century
—
and
thereby
avoid
the
most
dangerous
impacts
of
climate
change
—
we
need
a
long-­‐term
vision
of
decarbonizaJon.
NegoJators
had
begun
to
submit
text
that,
if
adopted,
would
have
moved
all
countries
to
enhance
emissions
reducJons
consistent
with
carbon
neutrality,
or
“net
zero”
emissions,
by
2050.
For
years,
business
has
been
calling
for
climate
policies
that
are
forward-­‐looking,
stable,
and
long-­‐
term.
OrganizaJons
such
as
the
BSR,
WBCSD
and
We
Mean
Business
coaliJon
have
argued
that
the
more
certainty
policymakers
provide,
the
more
confidently
companies
can
invest
and
conJnue
to
unleash
a
wave
of
innovaJon
in
low-­‐carbon
technologies:
creaJng
new
products
and
services,
generaJng
employment,
reducing
energy
consumpJon,
and
increasing
savings.
Ambi8on
Level
for
Emissions
Reduc8ons
Early
next
year,
countries
will
submit
their
climate-­‐acJon
plans
as
formal
“contribuJons”
to
be
captured
in
the
Paris
agreement.
It
is
already
clear
that
these
contribuJons
will
not
contain
sufficient
ambiJon
to
close
the
emissions
gap
tracked
by
the
United
NaJons
Environment
Programme
(UNEP)
in
annual
reports.
In
other
words,
there
will
sJll
be
a
shoraall
between
what
countries
are
willing
to
do
and
what
science
says
is
needed
to
stabilize
the
global
climate.
The
challenge
therefore
is
to
think
creaJvely
about
complementary
measures
that
will
integrate
higher
ambiJon
from
the
beginning.
The
U.S.
role
In
his
speech
to
the
COP,
Secretary
of
State
John
Kerry
acknowledged
that
the
United
States
and
other
wealthy
naJons
bear
a
greater
moral
responsibility
for
addressing
climate
change.
He
cited
the
White
House’s
“ambiJous”
pledge
to
reduce
U.S.
carbon
emissions
as
well
as
a
recent
$3
billion
pledge
to
a
$10
billion
“green
climate
fund”
to
help
developing
countries
cope
with
the
effects
of
global
warming.
India’s
role
The
Indians
are
said
to
be
feeling
a
bit
bruised
a`er
their
great
ally,
China,
seems
to
have
sided
with
the
US.
But
climate
change
is
expected
to
be
an
important
component
of
the
India
–
US
engagement
during
President
Obama’s
visit
to
India
in
January
2015.
Prime
Minister
Narendra
Modi
and
President
Obama
are
expected
to
take
forward
the
partnership
in
the
area
of
clean
energy,
first
outlined
in
Washington
in
September
2014.
The
2015
announcement
is
likely
to
include
an
‘aspiraJonal’
peaking
year
for
India’s
greenhouse
gas
emissions.
India
could
be
considering
pudng
forward
this
month
a
peak
year
for
emissions
between
2035
–
2050,
which
–
depending
on
the
level
at
which
this
peaks
occurs
–
could
be
consistent
with
a
2C
pathway.
China’s
role
If
China
fully
implement
their
new
post-­‐2020
plans,
they
would
limit
global
temperature
rise
to
around
3C
by
2100,
which
is
between
0.2C
and
0.4C
lower
than
it
would
have
been.

4. COP20
Decisions
&
Outcomes
FRAMEWORK
OF
DEAL
1. The
2015
Agreement
will
have
legal
force
under
the
ConvenJon.
This
is
important
as
it
embraces
the
provisions
and
principles
of
the
convenJon
including
that
of
differenJaJon
–
that
is
there
is
a
fundamental
difference
between
developed
and
developing
country
capacity
to
undertake
climate
acJon.
2. The
legal
nature
of
the
2015
Agreement
remains
open
as
to
whether
a
protocol
to
the
ConvenJon
or
a
new
instrument
or
outcome.
3. Re-­‐
emphasised
the
need
to
chart
an
emissions
reducJon
pathway
consistent
with
below
2oC
global
average
temperature
rise
above
pre-­‐industrial
levels
4. That
the
core
elements
of
the
2015
Agreement
will
be:
§ MiJgaJon;
§ AdaptaJon;
§ Finance;
§ Technology
development
and
transfer;
§ Capacity
building;
and
§ Transparency
(read
as
monitoring,
reporJng
and
verificaJon).
5. That
all
countries
need
to
submit
INDCs
that
have
commitments
covering
all
of
the
above
elements
and
that
are
more
ambiJous
than
current
commitments
including:
• developed
country
finance
to
developing
naJons
in
support
of
enhancing
their
miJgaJon
and
adaptaJon
acJons,
• a
call
for
INDCs
to
be
submired
by
all
parJes
by
the
1st
Qtr
of
2015
(or
at
least
“well
in
advance”
of
COP21),
and
• in
a
manner
that
allows
the
UNFCCC
Secretariat
to
aggregate
all
miJgaJon
commitments
by
November
2015
to
see
what
the
2oC
shoraall
in
miJgaJon
ambiJon
is.
6. Support
for
legal
negoJaJng
text
to
be
made
ready
for
all
parJes
by
May
2015
(noJng
that
there
could
be
two
addiJonal
ADP
meeJngs
in
February
and
April
to
achieve
this).
Shortly
before
2
a.m.
on
Sunday
14
December
2014,
a`er
more
than
36
straight
hours
of
negoJaJons,
the
officials
from
192
naJons
agreed
to
the
first
deal
commidng
every
country
in
the
world
to
reducing
the
fossil
fuel
emissions
that
cause
dangerous
climate
change.
The
driving
force
behind
the
new
deal
was
not
the
threat
of
sancJons
or
other
legal
consequences.
It
was
global
peer
pressure.
Over
the
ensuing
months,
it
will
start
to
become
evident
whether
the
scruJny
of
the
rest
of
the
world
is
enough
to
pressure
world
leaders
to
push
through
new
commitments
from
New
Delhi
to
Moscow
or
if,
as
a
poliJcal
force,
internaJonal
reproach
is
impotent.
By
requiring
acJon
from
every
country,
the
Lima
framework
will
fundamentally
change
the
old
world
order
that
stymied
earlier
climate
change
talks.
This
approach,
asking
countries
to
put
forward
plans
shaped
by
their
own
economies
and
domesJc
poliJcs,
rather
than
a
‘top-­‐down’
approach
will
not
rely
penalty
or
sancJon,
but
geo-­‐poliJck
peer
group
pressure,
possibly
through
‘name
and
shame’.

5. The
Lima
Call
for
Climate
AcJon
In
Summary
At
its
core,
the
4-­‐page
text
coming
out
of
the
Conference,
called
Lima
Call
for
Climate
Ac8on,
requires
every
naJon
to
put
forward,
over
the
next
six
months,
a
detailed
domesJc
policy
plan
to
cut
its
emissions
of
planet-­‐warming
greenhouse
gases
from
coal,
gas
and
oil.
Those
plans,
which
would
be
published
on
a
United
NaJons
website,
would
form
the
basis
of
the
accord
to
be
signed
next
December
and
enacted
by
2020.
That
basic
structure
represents
a
breakthrough
in
the
impasse
that
has
plagued
the
United
NaJons’
20
years
of
efforts
to
create
a
serious
global
warming
deal.
UnJl
now,
negoJaJons
had
followed
a
divide
put
in
place
by
the
1997
Kyoto
Protocol,
which
required
that
developed
countries
act
but
did
not
require
anything
of
developing
naJons,
including
China
and
India,
two
of
the
largest
greenhouse
gas
polluters.
The
structure
is
reflected
in
2
important
documents,
their
contents
being:
1. 'Decision
text'
called
Lima
Call
for
Climate
Ac/on
focusing
on
the
nature
of
the
INDCs,
represenJng
a
county’s
climate
acJon
commitments
(including
emission
reducJon
targets)
2. ‘Elements
text’
that
has
been
made
an
Annex
to
the
above
document
with
the
core
elements
being:
• MiJgaJon
• AdaptaJon
• Finance
• Technology
development
and
transfer
• Capacity
building
• and
Transparency
(read
as
monitoring,
reporJng
and
verificaJon).
COMMENT:
WHAT
IS
MISSING
FROM
THE
TEXTS
?
Legal
form
of
the
Paris
Agreement
The
parJes
also
avoided
any
serious
discussion
of
what
form
the
2015
Paris
agreement
would
take.
The
opJons
range
from
a
legally
binding
Paris
Protocol
to
an
‘agreed
outcome
with
legal
force’,
which
might
entail
a
mostly
aspiraJonal
agreement
but
with
a
commitment
by
the
parJes
to
give
domesJc
‘legal
force’
to
their
INDCs.
Finance
While
the
parJes
achieved
the
$10
billion
threshold
for
climate
finance,
there
was
no
clear
pathway
agreed
as
to
how
the
required
$100
billion
would
be
raised
by
2020.
INDCs
The
absence
of
any
review
mechanism
of
the
parJes’
miJgaJon
targets
included
in
their
INDCs
for
the
post-­‐2020
period.
This
was
largely
at
the
insistence
of
the
Like-­‐Minded
Group
of
Developing
countries
(which
included
China
and
India).
The
review
would
have
entailed
an
analysis
of
whether
these
targets,
when
aggregated,
were
sufficient
hold
warming
below
the
2Odegrees
guardrail,
and
whether
each
contribuJon
was
fair,
thus
creaJng
pressure
for
a
further
ramping
up
of
ambiJon.
Instead,
parJes
are
merely
called
upon
to
make
their
own
case
as
to
why
they
think
their
INDCs
are
‘fair
and
ambiJous,
in
light
of
its
naJonal
circumstances,
and
how
it
contributes
towards
achieving
the
objecJve
of
the
ConvenJon’.
The
UNFCCC
will
provide
a
synthesis
report
by
the
first
of
November
2015,
but
there
will
be
no
formal
peer
review,
and
lirle
Jme
for
informal
review
before
Paris.
Pre-­‐2020
Mi8ga8on
Ambi8on
The
ParJes
avoided
any
commitment
to
raise
pre-­‐2020
miJgaJon
ambiJon.
This
means
that
the
parJes
are
under
no
pressure
to
raise
the
nonbinding
miJgaJon
pledges
they
made
in
the
immediate
a`ermath
of
the
Copenhagen
conference
in
2009.
As
far
as
the
raJficaJon
of
the
second
commitment
period
to
the
Kyoto
Protocol
(also
called
the
‘Doha
amendment’)
is
concerned,
only
21
parJes
have
so
far
raJfied
leaving
another
144
required
to
bring
it
into
force.
This
means
that
some
90%
of
emissions
remains
outside
of
the
Kyoto
Protocol
rendering
it
almost
superfluous
in
driving
global
miJgaJon,
and
emphasizes
the
importance
of
delivering
a
successful
2015
Agreement
with
the
necessary
deep
emission
reducJon
commitments
of
all
parJes.

6.
The
Lima
Call
for
Climate
AcJon
Australia
at
COP
Australia’s
performance
at
the
COP
was
profoundly
puzzling.
Ignoring
the
earlier
atmospherics
of
the
tussle
between
the
PM
and
Foreign
Minister
Bishop,
and
the
presence
of
Trade
Minister
Andrew
Robb,
more
interesJng
was
the
coherent
narraJve
they
are
establishing
–
prepared
and
reinforced
by
their
negoJators
on
the
ground.
They
appear
to
be
sedng
unachievable
hurdles
for
the
Paris
COP,
which
may
then
provide
the
Abbor
government
with,
a
‘told
you
so’
moment,
and
grounds
for
walking
away
from
a
‘failed’
treaty
next
year.
The
evidence
for
this
is
that
Minister
Bishop
has
indicated
that
Australia
is
looking
for
a
‘legally
binding
agreement’
next
year,
and
pushing
for
an
end
to
differenJal
obligaJons
for
developing
and
developed
countries
when
it
comes
to
internaJonal
climate
treaJes.
Both
elements
are
unachievable.
Every
negoJator
in
the
place
knows
that
the
US
and
China
will
not
support
such
an
outcome
and,
despite
the
EU’s
formal
commitment
to
this
outcome,
there
is
no
longer
any
real
ambiJon
in
the
negoJaJons
to
achieve
this
goal.
When
asked,
in
a
side
event,
what
the
terms
and
condiJons
of
compliance
with
such
a
legally
binding
agreement
might
be,
Bishop
side-­‐stepped
a
direct
response.
WHAT
THE
LIMA
OUTCOME
MEANS
FOR
AUSTRALIA
The
final
text
does
require
parJes
to
provide
the
necessary
informaJon
to
enable
others
to
judge
the
fairness
and
adequacy
of
INDCs,
plus
a
requirement
that
there
must
be
a
progression
beyond
previous
commitments
–
in
short,
no
backsliding.
The
Foreign
Minister
announced
at
the
COP
that
Australia’s
Prime
Minister’s
Office
would
establish
an
inter-­‐departmental
taskforce
on
deliberaJons
around
developing
Australia’s
post-­‐2020
commitment,
and
that
its
output
would
be
released
someJme
in
the
1st
quarter
of
2015.
Given
that
Australia’s
energy
supply
and
demand
profile
is
in
a
state
of
flux,
even
since
even
the
deliberaJons
made
by
the
Climate
Change
Authority
earlier
in
2014,
Australia
post-­‐2020
commitment
could
be
influenced
by
a
very
different
set
of
factors.
Also,
Trade
and
Investment
Minister
Robb
also
made
it
clear
that
our
commitment
would
be
subject
to
appraising
the
commitments
put
forward
by
Australia’s
compeJtors.
It
appears
certain
Australia
won’t
release
its
post-­‐2020
naJonal
target
unJl
it
has
been
defined,
costed
and
compared,
by
the
Department
of
Prime
Minister
and
Cabinet,
with
the
INDCs
of
other
naJons.
How
consultaJve
this
process
will
be,
and
when
it
will
report,
remain
unclear.
What
is
apparent,
at
least
at
this
stage,
is
that
the
established
insJtuJonal
mechanism
for
such
review
–
the
Climate
Change
Authority
–
is
being
bypassed.
IndicaJons
given
by
Ministers
Bishop
and
Robb
are
that
Australia’s
target
will
not
be
announced
unJl
around
June
2015
a`er
most
other
countries
have
announced
theirs
–
so
ensuring
Australia
is
well
placed
to
recalibrate
its
level
of
ambiJon
so
that
it
does
not
lose
out
its
compeJJve
posiJon,
as
Minister
Robb
called
it.
When
the
Abbor
government
finally
reveals
its
INDCs
around
mid-­‐2015,
it
will
be
interesJng
to
see
its
defence
of
fairness
and
ambiJousness
–
two
issues
that
it
has
steadfastly
ignored
thus
far.

7. The
Lima
Call
for
Climate
AcJon
What
it
means
for
business
The
final
text
has
pulled
all
countries
in
the
same
direcJon
towards
providing
their
miJgaJon
pledges
in
Jme
for
Paris.
The
text
makes
compromises
in
including
more
emphasis
on
adaptaJon
and
Warsaw
InternaJonal
Mechanism
for
Loss
&
Damage
in
the
INDCs
,
rather
than
on
miJgaJon
per
se.
Another
key
development
is
that
a
number
of
countries
have
provided
funds
for
the
Green
Climate
Fund
for
which
the
total
amount
of
pledges
exceeded
USD10
billion.
For
the
first
Jme
“non-­‐state
actors”
(including
business)
were
given
a
formal
role
in
the
Plenary
meeJng.
The
inclusion
of
the
Lima
Paris
AcJon
Agenda
in
the
agreement
and
the
establishment
of
the
Non-­‐state
Actor
Zone
for
Climate
AcJon
(NAZCA)
provide
important
plaaorms
for
non-­‐state
acJons
to
be
acknowledged.
Emissions
reducJons
through
low
carbon
technology
investment
and
experiences
gained
by
implemenJng
smart
policy
opJons
to
scale
up
technology
deployment
will
demonstrate
the
climate
acJon
opportuniJes
within
reach
of
all
countries.
On
country
ambi8on
China
and
the
U.S.
raised
the
bar
in
terms
of
resedng
the
agenda
on
this
issue,
not
only
in
respect
of
their
targets
but
also
for
their
willingness
to
bring
forward
their
announcement.
There
is
pressure
now
on
Japan,
Brazil
India
and
South
Africa,
and
no
doubt
also
on
Canada
and
Australia.
Given
the
recent
climate
announcements
by
the
U.S.,
the
EU,
China,
and
to
South
Korea,
it
will
be
interesJng
to
see
against
whom
Australia
actually
benchmarks
its
commitment.
For
business
which
o`en
operates
in
and
across
mulJple
domesJc
markets
the
next
few
months
will
be
an
interesJng
Jme
in
understanding
the
potenJally
complex
means
by
which
each
country
realizes
its
ambiJons.
For
business
operaJng
in
Australia,
it
is
unlikely
that
the
last
5
–
7
years
of
climate
policy
will
be
nadir
of
uncertainty.
On
clean
technology
The
US
/
China
announcement
arguably
meant
more
than
any
decisions
at
Lima.
While
there
has
been
iniJal
skepJcism
that
China
will
enact
its
commitment,
and
that
the
U.S.
would
be
able
to,
due
to
a
hosJle
Senate,
there
was
a
feeling
coming
out
of
this
COP
that
both
countries
may
in
fact
be
able
to
achieve
their
ambiJons.
If
this
were
the
case
then
the
cleantech
sector
looks
set
to
undergoing
a
significant
transformaJon,
and
potenJal
interest
in
investment.
Impacts
on
Pre-­‐2020
domes8c
liability
While
commitment
to
the
Kyoto
Protocol
is
now
arguably
superfluous,
its
ongoing
relevance
lies
in
the
important
insJtuJonal
arrangements
that
have
been
established
(including
for
CCS)
and
so
it
will
be
important
to
maintain
many
of
the
Protocol’s
modaliJes,
procedures
and
systems
in
the
post‑2020
period.
In
the
meanJme
ongoing
negoJaJons
around
the
use
of
Kyoto
Credits
into
the
2nd
commitment
period
probably
means
there
is
lirle
addiJonal
cost
penalty
to
Australia,
therefore
pudng
lirle
addiJonal
pressure
on
the
1st
phase
of
the
ERF
reverse
aucJon
prices.
On
Finance
The
milestone
that
the
Green
Climate
Fund
(GCF)
reached
the
$10bn
milestone
has
led
a
number
of
commentators
to
wonder
what
further
possibiliJes
might
now
be
open
to
private
sector
parJcipaJon.
Of
note
is
that
the
GCF
was
urged
to
ensure
eligible
enJJes
under
the
private
sector
facility
are
accredited
in
2015,
including
private
sector
enJJes
and
public
enJJes
with
relevant
experience
working
with
the
private
sector.
On
market
mechanisms
Perhaps
one
of
the
more
disappoinJng
results
in
Lima
was
the
controversy
over
the
future
use
of
market
mechanisms
in
order
to
facilitate
deep
and
enduring
levels
of
miJgaJon
ambiJons.
Primarily
driven
by
Brazil
(but
supported
by
China,
India,
Ecuador
and
Paraguay),
there
was
a
push
to
halt
all
work
on
markets
unJl
further
guidance
could
be
sought
on
how
markets
will
be
treated
in
the
2015
Agreement.
Also,
the
world’s
only
internaJonal
carbon
market
mechanism,
the
CDM,
remains
in
a
parlous
state.
The
price
of
the
cerJfied
emission
reducJon
units
fell
from
a
high
of
slightly
more
than
US$20
a
ton
in
2008
to
a
historical
low
of
31
cents
four
years
later.
Whilst
elements
of
the
CDM
are
sJll
valuable
and
could
be
saved,
it
is
highly
unlikely
the
CDM
will
be
called
that
by
the
Jme
this
year’s
agreement
goes
into
effect
in
2020.
And
while
it
was
envisaged
prior
to
the
COP
that
recommendaJons
would
be
forwarded
to
IT
for
adopJon
on
FVA
(a
common
framework
to
link
naJonal
trading
schemes
among
other
instruments),
no
consensus
could
be
reached
and
so
no
outcome
recorded
in
Lima.
It
remains
unclear
what
the
Jming
will
be
for
the
adopJon
of
future
recommendaJons
on
these
issues.
Perhaps
for
recommendaJons
someJme
in
2016
or
2017.
SJll,
the
ADP’s
‘Element
text’
includes
some
language
in
which
to
provide
for
important
contribuJons
by
markets.
At
Lima
many
observers
heard
and
were
impressed
with
the
detailed
acJon
plan
by
China
to
introduce
a
NaJonal
Carbon
Market
by
2020.
Also
heard
at
COP
Side
Event
were
representaJves
from
internaJonal
agencies,
such
as
the
World
Bank’s
Rachel
Kyte,
indicaJng
that
they
will
be
pushing
for
language
in
the
Paris
Agreement
that
flags
the
need
for
market
mechanisms
to
be
introduced
over
Jme
in
all
countries
So
the
prospect
of
the
return
to
a
discussion
about
the
role
of
a
carbon
price
in
Australia
within
the
next
2
–
3
years
cannot
be
discounted.

8. SBA
@
Lima
WBCSD,
Engagement
This
is
first
COP
that
SBA
has
been
associated
with
the
acJviJes
of
the
World
Business
Council
for
Sustainable
Development.
The
WBCSD
had
a
strong
voice
at
COP20
in
Lima
where
there
were
a
range
of
opportuniJes
for
COP
delegates
to
hear
the
views
of
business
both
in
the
UNFCCC
meeJngs
and
outside.
WBCSD
brought
a
large
group
of
business
representaJves
with
about
40
members
arending
across
the
two
weeks.
This
year,
the
WBCSD
took
a
collaboraJve
approach
to
events
at
the
COP.
They
co-­‐organised
and
supported
some
very
well
received
events
spanning
energy
soluJons
for
a
low
carbon
future
with
the
IEA
and
two
carbon
pricing
events
with
IETA
and
the
World
Bank
Carbon
Pricing
Leadership
CoaliJon
during
which
we
reiterated
our
call
for
a
global,
robust
and
stable
carbon
price.
A
key
highlight
was
the
launch
of
the
partnerships
for
low
carbon
business
and
technology
soluJons
with
SDSN,
IEA
and
IDDRI
-­‐
known
as
our
Road
to
Paris.
This
iniJaJve,
is
now
officially
endorsed
by
the
French
Presidency
and
the
UNSG,
and
will
explore
pathways
to
scale
up
acJon
and
remove
technological
barriers,
clarify
financing
needs
and
formulate
clear
policy
asks
for
implementaJon
of
technologies
at
scale.
They
also
played
a
key
role
in
delivering
the
UNGC,
UNEP
and
UNFCCC
Caring
for
Climate
Business
Forum.
This
work
is
a
natural
extension
of
the
WBCSD’s
AcJon2020
Business
SoluJon.
Amongst
a
host
of
influenJal
bilateral
meeJngs
and
speaking
slots,
Peter
Bakker
represented
the
WBCSD
in
the
successful
Lima
Climate
AcJon
High
Level
Dialogue.
Alongside
UNSG
Ban
Ki-­‐Moon,
IPCC
Chair
Dr.
Rajendra
Pachauri,
Mr.
Felipe
Calderon,
former
President
of
Mexico
and
Chair
of
the
Global
Commission
on
the
Economy
and
Climate,
and
H.E.
Mr.
Ollanta
Humala,
President
of
Peru,
Peter
had
the
opportunity
to
call
all
negoJators
to
work
towards
an
agreement
in
Paris
which
will
provide
long-­‐term
certainty
and
the
appropriate
policy
framework
for
serious
climate
acJon.
MOBILISING
BUSINESS
ACTION
TOWARDS
2°C:
LAUNCH
OF
THE
BUSINESS
SOLUTIONS
AND
TECHNOLOGY
ROUNDTABLES
With
Paris
being
a
year
away,
almost
to
the
day,
the
IPCC
report
confirms
that
deep
decarbonisaJon
is
criJcal
to
stop
dangerous
climate
change.
Some
technologies
are
available
–
but
they
need
to
be
used
and
scaled
up
–
others
require
coordinated
RD&D
efforts
to
be
brought
into
commercial
stage
in
Jme.
WBCSD,
IDDRI
and
SDSN
have
come
together,
with
IEA
and
WEF
as
supporJng
partners,
to
bring
business
soluJons
and
public
private
partnerships
to
COP21
.
This
iniJaJve
will
idenJfy
technology
and
market
barriers,
and
policy
and
finance
needs,
for
each
of
six
technologies–
renewables,
CCS,
biofuels,
buildings,
mobility
and
forests-­‐
and
catalyse
private
public
partnerships
for
criJcal
RDD
areas
that
are
needed
for
deep
decarbonisaJon
pathways.
Speakers
included:
LAURENT
FABIUS,
Foreign
Minister,
France,
PETER
BAKKER,
President,
WBCSD,
JEFFREY
SACHS,
Director,
UN
Sustainable
Development
SoluJons
Network,
TERESA
RIBERA,
Director,
IDDRI
MARIA
VAN
HOEVEN,
ExecuJve
Director,
IEA
AUSTRALIAN
CLIMATE
POLICY
UPDATE
Australian
climate
policy
has
taken
some
sharp
twists
and
turns
over
the
last
few
years,
with
a
few
more
to
come.
Recently
the
government
secured
passage
of
legislaJon
for
its
$2.5
billion
Emissions
ReducJon
Fund
which
essenJally
expands
the
successful
Carbon
Farming
IniJaJve
and
helps
to
preserve
the
architecture
of
a
domesJc
offset
scheme.
The
legislaJon
also
commits
the
government
to
introduce
a
‘safeguard
mechanism’
which
will
put
baselines
on
large
emirers
to
limit
emissions
growth
in
the
economy.
SBA
was
part
of
the
side-­‐event,
including
the
prepared
speech
on
the
next
page.
Speakers
were:
Moderator:
PETER
CASTELLAS,
CEO,
Carbon
Market
InsJtute
HON
JULIE
BISHOP,
Foreign
Minister,
Australia,
ROB
FOWLER,
Australia
&
New
Zealand
RepresentaJve,
IETA,
ERWIN
JACKSON,
Deputy
CEO,
Climate
InsJtute
MARIA
TARRANT,
Deputy
Chief,
ExecuJve
Business
Council
of
Australia,
ANDREW
PETERSEN,
CEO,
Sustainable
Business
Australia
/
Australian
GNP
for
the
WBCSD

9. SBA
@
Lima
Statement
At
the
side
event
SBA
made
the
following
opening
statement:
“Paraphrasing
a
quote
from
the
French
Ambassador
for
Climate
Change
made
earlier
in
the
day
“[Australia]
needs
to
project
[itself]
into
what
will
be
a
very
different
future.”
Australia
was
making
a
down
payment
on
our
decarbonising
our
future
with
the
opera/on
of
the
carbon
pricing
mechanism,
but
we’ve
temporarily
suspended
payments.
If
we
accept
that
the
last
3
years
were
the
‘alpha
tes/ng’
phase
of
our
Na/onal
Carbon
Ac/on
1.0,
then
what
is
key
in
developing
the
na/onal
algorithmic
for
Carbon
Ac/on
2.0
is
to
learn
the
lessons
of
the
last
3
years:
• business
is
far
more
knowledgeable
(and
in
some
cases
quite
sophis/cated)
about
the
func/oning
of
the
carbon
cycle
within
their
opera/ons,
and
increasing
within
their
supply
chain,
so
the
movement
towards
a
policy
regime
that
doesn’t
harness
that
knowledge
and
realise
more
robust
emissions
reduc/ons
is
a
wasted
opportunity
• the
mere
presence
of
a
price
signal
with
the
introduc/on
of
the
carbon
pricing
mechanism,
produced
a
very
interes/ng
behaviour
–
namely
a
number
of
businesses
beSer
understood
their
carbon
footprint
and
put
in
place
abatement
measures
even
before
the
commencement
of
the
scheme,
so
that
they
came
under
the
threshold
of
being
a
liable
en/ty;
and
• a
new
service
sector
–
energy
efficiency
and
produc/vity
professionals
–
emerged
with
not
only
na/onal
skills
in
carbon
management
and
energy
program
reduc/on
skills,
but
interna/onals
skills
which
are
replicable
and
highly
transferable
Cri/cal
to
Carbon
Ac/on
2.0,
is
to
not
totally
lose
these
key
learnings,
and
in
some
cases
key
jobs
and
businesses
that
were
crea/ng
wealth
for
the
Australian
economy,
let
alone
taxes.
For
example,
Australia
is
a
leader
in
carbon
abatement
methodologies,
and
our
work
in
soil
carbon
is
world
reknown.
In
arguing
for
keeping
climate
change
off
the
G-­‐20
agenda,
some
in
Australia
were
saying
that
it
was
not
strictly
an
economic
issue
and
would
distract
from
goals
including
a
plan
to
boost
global
GDP
by
more
than
$2
trillion
over
five
years.
Well
if
its
not,
then
I
would
counter
this
argument
by
poin/ng
to
the
fact
that
both
our
Australia’s
Foreign
Affairs
and
Trade
Minister
and
Investment
Minister,
surely
2
of
the
most
important
geo
–
poli/cal
and
economic
por_olios
represen/ng
any
country.
On
the
issue
of
Australia’s
contribu/on
to
the
Global
Climate
Fund
SBA
welcomes
the
announcement
by
the
Foreign
Minister
that
Australia
would
commit
funds.
This
I
believe
counter
some
of
the
concerns
that
were
raised
in
the
interna/onal
community
before
the
start
of
the
COP
that
Australia’s
reluctance
to
contribute
to
the
fund
was
crea/ng
a
“nega/ve
dynamic”
in
nego/a/ons
with
large
developing
countries
including
China,
who
ask
why
they
should
be
expected
to
contribute
when
Australia,
one
of
the
richest
countries
per
capita,
won’t.
I
would
say
that
Australia’s
announcement
has
created
a
new
‘posi/ve
dynamic’.
But
responsible
forward
thinking
business
needs
clarity
on
Australia’s
climate
mi/ga/on
framework
going
forward.
No
policy
that
/me
limits
the
investment
of
public
funds
in
emission
reduc/on
projects
is
going
to
enable
business
to
do
the
heavy
licing
(and
poten/ally
those
major
companies
who
are
seeking
a
compe//ve
advantage,
the
financial
returns)
that
it
was
already
being
asked
to
undertake
through
the
carbon
pricing
mechanism.
We
agree
with
Prime
Minister
AbboS’s
statements
acer
his
recent
mee/ng
with
French
President
Francois
Hollande
that
it
is
“vital”
that
the
Paris
climate
change
conference
succeeds.
What
needs
to
be
challenged
is
his
statement
that,
“For
it
to
be
a
success,
we
can’t
pursue
environmental
improvements
at
the
expense
of
economic
progress.
We
can’t
reduce
emissions
in
ways
which
cost
jobs.”
While
we
agree
with
the
need
for
economic
ra/onale
in
our
delibera/ons,
our
frame
of
mind
must
be
about
finding
success
to
this
challenge,
not
finding
excuses.
Again,
in
the
words
of
the
Prime
Minister
when
announcing
the
contribu/on
to
the
Fund,
things
have
developed.
The
frame
of
mind
is
Australia
needs
to
stop
turning
its
back
on
climate
change,
and
instead
turn
to
face
the
pathway
to
ac/on
and
solu/ons.
The
silent
majority
of
business,
as
Unilever
CEO,
Paul
Polman,
said
yesterday
that
are
present
at
this
COP
and
represented
by
the
likes
of
the
WBCSD,
ICC,
and
SBA,
are
ready
for
a
universal,
ambi/ous,
and
balanced
climate
agreement
to
come
out
of
Paris.

10. 2015
The
Road
to
Paris
Throughout
2014,
every
sector
of
our
economy
felt
the
weight
of
climate
change.
More
significantly,
many
more
people
across
business
began
to
interweave
the
repercussions
of
a
changing
climate
with
issues
–
like
poverty,
urbanizaJon,
lifestyles,
economic
standards
and
community
development
–
that
had
previously
appeared
as
separate
prongs
on
any
impact
chart.
CorporaJons
like
Unilever
set
ever
more
aggressive
and
inclusive
goals
and
created
markeJng
plans
to
persuade
others
to
join.
So
as
we
head
into
what
promises
to
be
the
most
tumultuous
year
yet
for
sustainable
business,
here
are
some
of
the
themes
you
can
expect
to
dominate
corporate
decisions
and
strategy
whiteboards.
The
‘big
picture’
for
a
‘big
year’.
More
businesses
recognise
that
climate
change
is
real
Expect
these
climate
risk
forecasts
(e.g.
Carbon
Disclosure
Project)
to
assume
pracJcal
proporJons
and
become
embedded
much
more
strategically
into
risk
management
and
business
development
plans.
At
the
same
Jme
the
investor
relaJons
department
and
the
chief
financial
officer
are
going
to
be
asking
more
quesJons.
Some
companies
are
already
pudng
an
internal
price
on
carbon,
for
instance,
to
educate
their
investments.
Others,
meanwhile
are
marrying
emissions
with
their
market
performance
(eg
Kering).
New
ReporJng
standards
are
beginning
to
emerge.
Companies
align
their
strategies
with
the
Sustainable
Development
Goals
The
next
phase
of
the
UN’s
Millennium
Development
Goals,
fidngly
termed
the
Sustainable
Development
Goals,
shi`
prioriJes
from
stand
alone
goals
like
reducing
poverty
and
increasing
hygiene
to
more
inclusive
and
integrated
ones
that
push
for
systemic
change
like
the
rule
of
law,
dignity
and
prosperity
for
all.
The
implicaJons
are
significant.
And
business
is
being
called
on
to
provide
acJve
support
for
the
first
Jme.
This
presents
an
unprecedented
opportunity
to
Je
businesses’
growth
to
their
communiJes
and
the
environment.
The
capitalists
are
being
welcomed
and
being
acJvely
recruited
to
the
table.
This
marks
a
key
acknowledgement
that
determining
our
path
forward
as
an
interconnected
economy
will
require
the
tensile
strength
of
every
single
sector.
How
will
this
happen
and
how
will
business
map
the
tangible
from
the
lo`y?
Scenario
planning,
at
the
very
least.
If
a
majority
of
your
supply
chain
works
in
Bangladesh,
for
example,
you’ll
need
to
ask:
Is
your
business
equipped
to
handle
disrupJons
from
hurricanes
and
floods
in
the
region
and
the
consequenJal
loss
of
life
and
infrastructure?
And
if
not,
then
perhaps
invesJng
in
water
conservaJon
or
employee
and
consumer
empowerment
iniJaJves
make
your
business
more
resilient?
This
type
of
scenario
planning
ensures
not
only
that
your
business
model
is
resilient,
but
also
that
your
employees,
customers
and
communiJes
will
play
a
criJcal
role
in
your
decisions.
Business
switch
from
advocacy
to
ac8vism
As
the
rhetoric
and
acJon
begin
to
align
across
boardrooms,
we
can
expect
more
business
leaders
to
step
out
to
spark
more
sustainable
business
pracJces,
whether
through
regulaJon
(e.g.
Nike
and
Starbucks
support
Obama’s
climate
rule)
or
through
well-­‐funded
lawsuits,
investor-­‐led
demands,
strategic
partnerships
or
remapped
business
models.
As
the
crescendo
for
more
acJon
builds,
some
companies
will
need
to
rebuild
their
narraJve,
remap
their
strategy
and
ensure
their
business
is
nimble
enough
–
and
able
to
collaborate
sufficiently
with
its
employees,
consumers
and
other
stakeholders
–
to
remain
an
acJve
parJcipant
in
the
next
25
years
of
economic
development.
The
Divestment
Movement
has
some
sectors
on
the
defensive.
More
big
supply
chain
disrup8ons
The
Rana
Plaza
fire
and
the
expose
of
forced
labour
in
electronics
factories
in
Malaysia
are
unlikely
to
be
one
offs.
You
can
expect
these
disrupJons
to
conJnue.
A
focus
on
future
proofing
How
will
an
organizaJon
use
the
next
12
months
to
ensure
its
long-­‐term
viability,
as
an
economic
contributor,
as
a
consumer,
as
an
employee,
as
a
leader
and
as
an
informed
decision
maker?
As
counJes
begin
the
task
of
pudng
their
future
economic
plans
in
the
context
of
climate
change
and
miJgaJon
strategies,
should
must
business.

11. Sustainable
Business
Australia
SBA
www.sba.asn.au.
was
established
in
Australia
in
1991,
and
is
the
peak
business
body
for
advocacy
for
sustainable
business
acJviJes
in
Australia,
and
appointed
Global
Partner
for
WBCSD
(World
Business
Council
for
Sustainable
Development)
in
2014.
Its
members
represent
leading
Australian
businesses
across
sectors
who
share
a
commitment
to
economic,
environmental
and
social
development.
SBA
represents
member
companies,
public
sector
enterprises
and
insJtuJons,
BINGOs
and
community
organisaJons
,
which
in
turn
represent
100,000
+
Australian
employees.
SBA
is
the
secretariat
for
the
Businesses
for
Clean
Economy
which
is
an
iniJaJve
of
over
400
business
signatories.
www.b4ce.com.au
t:
+61
(0)2
8267
5782
m:
+61
(0)412
545
994
w:
www.sba.asn.au
Sustainable Business Australia