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SAP CUA as
an SAP Attack Vector
Dmitry Gutsko
Business System Security Assessment Group
Positive Technologies
PHDays IV
Agenda
― What is SAP CUA?
― Deployment schemes
― SAP CUA user privileges
― Attack vectors
• Compromising a child system
• Analysis of network packets
― Protection/Countermeasures
What is SAP CUA?
SAP HCM
SAP CRM
SAP ECC
SAP BW
SAP FI
SAP CUA
What is SAP CUA?
SAP CUA
Central
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
SAP CUA deployment
SAP CUA deployment
(trusted connections)
SAP CUA User Privileges
(SAP Recommendations)
― Client side (SAP CUA child system)
• SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CLIENT
• SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT
― Server side (SAP CUA central system)
• SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL
• SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL_BDIST
• SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL
SAP CUA User privileges
SAP CUA User privileges
SAP CUA User privileges
Attack vectors
― Compromising SAP CUA central system
No comments
― Compromising a child system
1. Bypassing a SAP CUA child system’s restrictions
2. Escalation of privileges in the SAP CUA model
3. Gathering information in the SAP CUA model
― Compromising a network
4. Intercepting data sent between child and central systems
SAP CUA
Central
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
Attacker
Child
System
Attack vectors
Attack Target
SAP CUA
Central
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
Attacker
Child
System
Attack vectors
Attack Target
1. Central system compromising
2. Escalation of privileges at the central system
3. Creating account in a child system
1
2
3
SAP CUA
Central
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
Attacker
Child
System
Attack vectors
Attack Target
1
1. Another child system compromising
2. Escalation of privileges in the CUA model
3. Creating account in a child system
2 3
Bypassing a SAP CUA child system’s restrictions
― Create a user
― Change a password
― Assign a profile
Bypassing a SAP CUA child system’s restrictions
(video)
Bypassing a SAP CUA child system’s restrictions
― Create a user: Execute FM BAPI_USER_CREATE1 (transaction
SE37) in a child system
― Change a password:
Edit the USRFLDSEL table (transaction SE16n) in a child system
― Assign a profile/role:
Edit the USRFLDSEL table (transaction SE16n) in a child system
SAP CUA
Central
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
Attacker
Child
System
Child
System
Escalation of privileges in the SAP CUA model
SAP CUA
Central
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
SAP CUA users
SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CLIENT
SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL
SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL_BDIST
SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL
RFC Connection to the
central CUA system
RFC Connection to a child
CUA system
Attacker
RSECTAB, RFCDES tables = User credentials
SE37 transaction = FM remote execution
Escalation of privileges in the SAP CUA model
(video)
Escalation of privileges in the SAP CUA model
― Reassign a User-System:
Execute FM BAPI_USER_SYSTEM_ASSIGN (SE37)
(Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL)
― Assign a profile:
Execute FM BAPI_USER_LOCPROFILES_ASSIGN (SE37)
(Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL)
― Assign a role:
Execute FM BAPI_USER_LOCACTGROUPS_ASSIGN (SE37)
(Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL)
― Gather information (continued)
Gathering information about the SAP CUA model
― CUA Users/hashes:
Execute in the central system
FM RFC_READ_TABLE (USR02, USH02, …)
(Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL)
― The CUA model:
Locally execute Transaction SCUA
Execute in a central system
FM RFC_READ_TABLE (USZBVSYS, …) = CUA logs
Read local tables RFCDES, RSECTAB = RFC destinations
SAP Security Note 1997455
Central
System
SAP CUA
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
Child
System
RFC/IDoc (compressed)
Usr02.Bname: PHD-USER
Usr02.Bcode: 283D7893C91674A0
Usr02.Ustyp: A
Usr02.Uflag: 0
User Accounts
RFC User Account
to Child System
RFC User Account
to Central System
Hacker
Intercepting data sent between child and
central systems
RFC/IDoc
User Creation Confirmation
Sending user credentials to a child system
RFC account password recovery
UserID
Encrypted password
Length
For gamma
generating
XORed
password
Password
Sending user credentials to a child system
User credentials data recovery
Obtained account sent to a child system
― Get user list:
Execute FM BAPI_USER_GETLIST (SE37)
(Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT)
― Create users:
Execute FM BAPU_USER_CREATE1 (SE37)
(Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT)
― Assign privileges:
Execute FM BAPI_USER_PROFILES_ASSIGN (SE37)
(Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT)
― Lock/Unlock users:
Execute FM BAPI_USER_LOCK/BAPI_USER_UNLOCK (SE37)
(Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT)
Protection/Countermeasures
― Do not combine SAP systems of various security classifications in
a single CUA model
― Delete SETUP roles for CUA users
― Apply Note 1997455 or modify SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL role
― Activate table logging (USRFLDSEL)
― Enable SNC encryption for RFC connections
― Use trusted connections; assign S_RFC, S_ICF, S_RFCACL
authorization objects to system users
― Control access to critical transactions: SM49, SE37, SCUA, ST04,…
― Configure ACL for SAP Gateway
― Do not forget about other clients
Thank you for your attention!
Additional information
Transactions:
SCUA– Display System Landscape (CUA model)
SCUL– Log Display for Central User Administration
SCUM – User Distribution Field Selection
SCUG – Central User Administration Structure Display
SE37- ABAP Function Modules
Notes:
492589 – Minimum authorizations for communication users
333441 - CUA: Tips for problem analysis
376856 - Password synchronization - Single Sign-On/CUA
1997455 - Potential information disclosure in BC-SEC-USR-ADM
Tables:
USZBVSYS - CUA: Assignment of Systems to Users
USRFLDSEL- CUA: Field Attributes
Вектор атаки на SAP — система CUA

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Вектор атаки на SAP — система CUA

  • 1.
  • 2. SAP CUA as an SAP Attack Vector Dmitry Gutsko Business System Security Assessment Group Positive Technologies PHDays IV
  • 3. Agenda ― What is SAP CUA? ― Deployment schemes ― SAP CUA user privileges ― Attack vectors • Compromising a child system • Analysis of network packets ― Protection/Countermeasures
  • 4. What is SAP CUA? SAP HCM SAP CRM SAP ECC SAP BW SAP FI SAP CUA
  • 5. What is SAP CUA? SAP CUA Central System Child System Child System Child System
  • 8. SAP CUA User Privileges (SAP Recommendations) ― Client side (SAP CUA child system) • SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CLIENT • SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT ― Server side (SAP CUA central system) • SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL • SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL_BDIST • SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL
  • 9. SAP CUA User privileges
  • 10. SAP CUA User privileges
  • 11. SAP CUA User privileges
  • 12. Attack vectors ― Compromising SAP CUA central system No comments ― Compromising a child system 1. Bypassing a SAP CUA child system’s restrictions 2. Escalation of privileges in the SAP CUA model 3. Gathering information in the SAP CUA model ― Compromising a network 4. Intercepting data sent between child and central systems
  • 14. SAP CUA Central System Child System Child System Child System Attacker Child System Attack vectors Attack Target 1. Central system compromising 2. Escalation of privileges at the central system 3. Creating account in a child system 1 2 3
  • 15. SAP CUA Central System Child System Child System Child System Attacker Child System Attack vectors Attack Target 1 1. Another child system compromising 2. Escalation of privileges in the CUA model 3. Creating account in a child system 2 3
  • 16. Bypassing a SAP CUA child system’s restrictions ― Create a user ― Change a password ― Assign a profile
  • 17. Bypassing a SAP CUA child system’s restrictions (video)
  • 18. Bypassing a SAP CUA child system’s restrictions ― Create a user: Execute FM BAPI_USER_CREATE1 (transaction SE37) in a child system ― Change a password: Edit the USRFLDSEL table (transaction SE16n) in a child system ― Assign a profile/role: Edit the USRFLDSEL table (transaction SE16n) in a child system
  • 20. SAP CUA Central System Child System Child System Child System Child System SAP CUA users SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CLIENT SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL_BDIST SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL RFC Connection to the central CUA system RFC Connection to a child CUA system Attacker RSECTAB, RFCDES tables = User credentials SE37 transaction = FM remote execution
  • 21. Escalation of privileges in the SAP CUA model (video)
  • 22. Escalation of privileges in the SAP CUA model ― Reassign a User-System: Execute FM BAPI_USER_SYSTEM_ASSIGN (SE37) (Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL) ― Assign a profile: Execute FM BAPI_USER_LOCPROFILES_ASSIGN (SE37) (Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL) ― Assign a role: Execute FM BAPI_USER_LOCACTGROUPS_ASSIGN (SE37) (Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CENTRAL) ― Gather information (continued)
  • 23. Gathering information about the SAP CUA model ― CUA Users/hashes: Execute in the central system FM RFC_READ_TABLE (USR02, USH02, …) (Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL) ― The CUA model: Locally execute Transaction SCUA Execute in a central system FM RFC_READ_TABLE (USZBVSYS, …) = CUA logs Read local tables RFCDES, RSECTAB = RFC destinations
  • 24. SAP Security Note 1997455
  • 25. Central System SAP CUA Child System Child System Child System Child System RFC/IDoc (compressed) Usr02.Bname: PHD-USER Usr02.Bcode: 283D7893C91674A0 Usr02.Ustyp: A Usr02.Uflag: 0 User Accounts RFC User Account to Child System RFC User Account to Central System Hacker Intercepting data sent between child and central systems RFC/IDoc User Creation Confirmation
  • 26. Sending user credentials to a child system RFC account password recovery UserID Encrypted password Length For gamma generating XORed password Password
  • 27. Sending user credentials to a child system User credentials data recovery
  • 28. Obtained account sent to a child system ― Get user list: Execute FM BAPI_USER_GETLIST (SE37) (Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT) ― Create users: Execute FM BAPU_USER_CREATE1 (SE37) (Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT) ― Assign privileges: Execute FM BAPI_USER_PROFILES_ASSIGN (SE37) (Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT) ― Lock/Unlock users: Execute FM BAPI_USER_LOCK/BAPI_USER_UNLOCK (SE37) (Role SAP_BC_USR_CUA_SETUP_CLIENT)
  • 29. Protection/Countermeasures ― Do not combine SAP systems of various security classifications in a single CUA model ― Delete SETUP roles for CUA users ― Apply Note 1997455 or modify SAP_BC_USR_CUA_CENTRAL role ― Activate table logging (USRFLDSEL) ― Enable SNC encryption for RFC connections ― Use trusted connections; assign S_RFC, S_ICF, S_RFCACL authorization objects to system users ― Control access to critical transactions: SM49, SE37, SCUA, ST04,… ― Configure ACL for SAP Gateway ― Do not forget about other clients
  • 30. Thank you for your attention!
  • 31. Additional information Transactions: SCUA– Display System Landscape (CUA model) SCUL– Log Display for Central User Administration SCUM – User Distribution Field Selection SCUG – Central User Administration Structure Display SE37- ABAP Function Modules Notes: 492589 – Minimum authorizations for communication users 333441 - CUA: Tips for problem analysis 376856 - Password synchronization - Single Sign-On/CUA 1997455 - Potential information disclosure in BC-SEC-USR-ADM Tables: USZBVSYS - CUA: Assignment of Systems to Users USRFLDSEL- CUA: Field Attributes