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SAFE HASKELL
  David Terei           Simon Marlow
 David Mazières       Simon Peyton Jones

Stanford University   Microsoft Research
MOTIVATION

Haskell is a great language for building secure systems in:

•Information flow control
•Capabilities
•Computations on encrypted data
But all this work can’t secure untrusted code in the real world!
MOTIVATION

Running Example:

Build in Haskell a website that can run untrusted third-party
plugins:

•Users can upload plugins in source form
•Any user can install an uploaded plugin against their account
MOTIVATION

How?

•Carefully craft plugin interface to restrict functions that a
 plugin can execute

  •e.g Only pure functions
•Need type safety guarantees for this to work
MOTIVATION
  f :: a -> a
MOTIVATION
       f :: a -> a


f a = unsafePerformIO $ do
        _ <- send_credit_card
        return a
SOLUTION?
SOLUTION?




Safe Haskell !
SAFE HASKELL

• Safe   subset of Haskell that provides ‘enough’ guarantees

•A   safe import extension

•A   definition of trust that applies to modules and packages
SAFE LANGUAGE
•Safe language (enabled with -XSafe) provides:
    •Type safety
    •Guaranteed module boundaries
    •Semantic consistency
•These are the properties that we usually think about Haskell
 having

•Safe language is a subset of Haskell
-XSAFE RESTRICTIONS
• FFI   imports must be in the IO monad

• Can’t   define RULES

• No Template    Haskell

• No    GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving

• No    hand crafted instances of Data.Typeable, only derived

• Overlapping
            instances can only overlap instances defined in
 the same module

• Can    only import other ‘trusted’ modules
REVISITING THE EXAMPLE

•So for untrusted plugins, compile with -XSafe
•Can craft a plugin interface that uses types carefully to control
 functions a plugin can execute



                              Done?
TURTLES ALL THE WAY DOWN

• -XSafe   compiled modules can only import trusted modules

• So   far -XSafe is only way to create trusted modules

• What    about modules like Data.ByteString?

 • Want    to allow untrusted code to use Data.ByteString

 • Unsafe    internals but safe API
-XTRUSTWORTHY

Allows a module author to declare:

‘While module M may use unsafe functions internally, it only
exposes a safe API’
-XTRUSTWORTHY

• No   restrictions on Haskell language

• Marks   a module as trusted though

• Moduleauthor should assure that type safety can’t be violated
 by importing their module

• Enables   a small extension called safe imports
WHAT IS TRUST?

• What   determines if a module is considered ‘trusted’?

 • -XSafe   compiled modules

 • What    about -XTrustworthy modules?
WHAT IS TRUST?
•   -XTrustworthy allows a module author to mark any module as
    potentially ‘trusted’
•   Very easy to abuse
•   So we require that the client (person running the compiler) assert
    that they trust the module author by stating they trust the package
•   For example:
    •   Don Stewart marks Data.Bytestring as Trustworthy
    •   Untrusted plugin author imports and uses Data.Bytestring
    •   Website administrator marks the bytestring package as trusted
WHAT IS TRUST?

• For   -XSafe:

  • trust   provided by compiler

• For   -XTrustworthy:

  • trust   of module stated by module author

  • trust
        of module author provided by client by trusting the
   package the module resides in
TRUST IS TRANSITIVE
{-# LANGUAGE Safe #-}   •For A to be trusted package
module A                 P must be trusted
...
                        •An -XSafe module may bring
                         in a package trust requirement

                        Package P

                            {-# LANGUAGE Trustworthy #-}
                            module B
                             ...
PACKAGE TRUST

• ghc-pkg   trust <pkg>

• ghc-pkg   distrust <pkg>

• ghc   -trust <pkg> ...

• ghc   -distrust <pkg> ...

• ghc   -distrust-all-packages ...
SAFE IMPORTS

•One extension to the Haskell language:
                         import safe M

•Allows module author to specify that M must be trusted for
 the import to succeed

•Under -XSafe all imports are safe imports (keyword implicit)
•Under -XTrustworthy the module author can choose
PROBLEMS WITH 7.2


• Current    description is of Safe Haskell in 7.2

• Issue   with operation of package trust

  • Causes    Safe Haskell to be invasive, infect the world!
BUILD ERRORS


“I'm running into a lot of issues like the following:

libraries/hoopl/src/Compiler/Hoopl/Collections.hs:14:1:

   base:Data.List can't be safely imported! The package (base)
the module resides in isn't trusted.”
PACKAGE TRUST REIFIED

• In
  7.4, we won’t require that the package a Trustworthy
 module resides in be trusted for the compilation to succeed

• -XTrustworthy     modules will simply be trusted by default

• New     -fpackage-trust flag to enable old behavior of 7.2

  • This   flag should always be used if you are compiling
       untrusted code
SAFE INFERENCE

Unreasonable to expect the Haskell world to all start putting
explicit -XSafe and -XTrustworthy pragmas in their files.

So in 7.4:

•Safe status of a module will be inferred
•New -XUnsafe flag to explicitly mark a module as unsafe
  so that it can’t be imported by untrusted code
RUNNING EXAMPLE
{-# LANGUAGE Unsafe #-}
module RIO.Unsafe ( RIO(..) ) where

newtype RIO a = UnsafeRIO { runRIO :: IO a }
instance Monad RIO where
      return = UnsafeRIO . return
      (UnsafeRIO m) >>= k = UnsafeRIO $ m >>= runRIO . k


{-# LANGUAGE Trustworthy #-}
module RIO.FileAccess ( rioReadFile, rioWriteFile ) where
...
pathOK f = {- Implement some policy -}


rioReadFile :: FilePath -> RIO String
rioReadFile f = UnsafeRIO $ do
      ok <- pathOK f
      if ok then readFile f else return “”


rioWriteFile :: FilePath -> String -> RIO ()
rioWriteFile f s = ...
RUNNING EXAMPLE
{-# LANGUAGE Trustworthy #-}

module RIO ( RIO() , runRIO, rioReadFile, rioWriteFile ) where

import RIO.Unsafe

import safe RIO.FileAccess



{-# LANGUAGE Safe #-}

module UntrustedPlugin ( runPlugin ) where

import RIO



runPlugin :: RIO ()

runPlugin = ...
SUMMARY
•   New language flags: -XSafe, -XTrustworthy, -XUnsafe
•   New option flag: -fpackage-trust (7.4)
•   Safe status of a module will be inferred (7.4)




                         Trust your types!
FUTURE WORK
•   Prove safety guarantees
•   Establish clearer definition of safe and what guarantees
    trustworthy modules should provide
    •   Machine checking possible here?
•   Do a retake on Safe language but by starting with a small,
    proven correct core and expanding out.
    •   Inclusion in the Safe language could be used as a quality bar
        for new Haskell extensions.
    •   Require formal semantics and proofs
SAFE HASKELL
                    In GHC 7.2

       Please try out and provide feedback

http://www.scs.stanford.edu/~davidt/safehaskell.html

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Safe Haskell

  • 1. SAFE HASKELL David Terei Simon Marlow David Mazières Simon Peyton Jones Stanford University Microsoft Research
  • 2. MOTIVATION Haskell is a great language for building secure systems in: •Information flow control •Capabilities •Computations on encrypted data But all this work can’t secure untrusted code in the real world!
  • 3. MOTIVATION Running Example: Build in Haskell a website that can run untrusted third-party plugins: •Users can upload plugins in source form •Any user can install an uploaded plugin against their account
  • 4. MOTIVATION How? •Carefully craft plugin interface to restrict functions that a plugin can execute •e.g Only pure functions •Need type safety guarantees for this to work
  • 5. MOTIVATION f :: a -> a
  • 6. MOTIVATION f :: a -> a f a = unsafePerformIO $ do _ <- send_credit_card return a
  • 9. SAFE HASKELL • Safe subset of Haskell that provides ‘enough’ guarantees •A safe import extension •A definition of trust that applies to modules and packages
  • 10. SAFE LANGUAGE •Safe language (enabled with -XSafe) provides: •Type safety •Guaranteed module boundaries •Semantic consistency •These are the properties that we usually think about Haskell having •Safe language is a subset of Haskell
  • 11. -XSAFE RESTRICTIONS • FFI imports must be in the IO monad • Can’t define RULES • No Template Haskell • No GeneralizedNewtypeDeriving • No hand crafted instances of Data.Typeable, only derived • Overlapping instances can only overlap instances defined in the same module • Can only import other ‘trusted’ modules
  • 12. REVISITING THE EXAMPLE •So for untrusted plugins, compile with -XSafe •Can craft a plugin interface that uses types carefully to control functions a plugin can execute Done?
  • 13. TURTLES ALL THE WAY DOWN • -XSafe compiled modules can only import trusted modules • So far -XSafe is only way to create trusted modules • What about modules like Data.ByteString? • Want to allow untrusted code to use Data.ByteString • Unsafe internals but safe API
  • 14. -XTRUSTWORTHY Allows a module author to declare: ‘While module M may use unsafe functions internally, it only exposes a safe API’
  • 15. -XTRUSTWORTHY • No restrictions on Haskell language • Marks a module as trusted though • Moduleauthor should assure that type safety can’t be violated by importing their module • Enables a small extension called safe imports
  • 16. WHAT IS TRUST? • What determines if a module is considered ‘trusted’? • -XSafe compiled modules • What about -XTrustworthy modules?
  • 17. WHAT IS TRUST? • -XTrustworthy allows a module author to mark any module as potentially ‘trusted’ • Very easy to abuse • So we require that the client (person running the compiler) assert that they trust the module author by stating they trust the package • For example: • Don Stewart marks Data.Bytestring as Trustworthy • Untrusted plugin author imports and uses Data.Bytestring • Website administrator marks the bytestring package as trusted
  • 18. WHAT IS TRUST? • For -XSafe: • trust provided by compiler • For -XTrustworthy: • trust of module stated by module author • trust of module author provided by client by trusting the package the module resides in
  • 19. TRUST IS TRANSITIVE {-# LANGUAGE Safe #-} •For A to be trusted package module A P must be trusted ... •An -XSafe module may bring in a package trust requirement Package P {-# LANGUAGE Trustworthy #-} module B ...
  • 20. PACKAGE TRUST • ghc-pkg trust <pkg> • ghc-pkg distrust <pkg> • ghc -trust <pkg> ... • ghc -distrust <pkg> ... • ghc -distrust-all-packages ...
  • 21. SAFE IMPORTS •One extension to the Haskell language: import safe M •Allows module author to specify that M must be trusted for the import to succeed •Under -XSafe all imports are safe imports (keyword implicit) •Under -XTrustworthy the module author can choose
  • 22. PROBLEMS WITH 7.2 • Current description is of Safe Haskell in 7.2 • Issue with operation of package trust • Causes Safe Haskell to be invasive, infect the world!
  • 23. BUILD ERRORS “I'm running into a lot of issues like the following: libraries/hoopl/src/Compiler/Hoopl/Collections.hs:14:1: base:Data.List can't be safely imported! The package (base) the module resides in isn't trusted.”
  • 24. PACKAGE TRUST REIFIED • In 7.4, we won’t require that the package a Trustworthy module resides in be trusted for the compilation to succeed • -XTrustworthy modules will simply be trusted by default • New -fpackage-trust flag to enable old behavior of 7.2 • This flag should always be used if you are compiling untrusted code
  • 25. SAFE INFERENCE Unreasonable to expect the Haskell world to all start putting explicit -XSafe and -XTrustworthy pragmas in their files. So in 7.4: •Safe status of a module will be inferred •New -XUnsafe flag to explicitly mark a module as unsafe so that it can’t be imported by untrusted code
  • 26. RUNNING EXAMPLE {-# LANGUAGE Unsafe #-} module RIO.Unsafe ( RIO(..) ) where newtype RIO a = UnsafeRIO { runRIO :: IO a } instance Monad RIO where return = UnsafeRIO . return (UnsafeRIO m) >>= k = UnsafeRIO $ m >>= runRIO . k {-# LANGUAGE Trustworthy #-} module RIO.FileAccess ( rioReadFile, rioWriteFile ) where ... pathOK f = {- Implement some policy -} rioReadFile :: FilePath -> RIO String rioReadFile f = UnsafeRIO $ do ok <- pathOK f if ok then readFile f else return “” rioWriteFile :: FilePath -> String -> RIO () rioWriteFile f s = ...
  • 27. RUNNING EXAMPLE {-# LANGUAGE Trustworthy #-} module RIO ( RIO() , runRIO, rioReadFile, rioWriteFile ) where import RIO.Unsafe import safe RIO.FileAccess {-# LANGUAGE Safe #-} module UntrustedPlugin ( runPlugin ) where import RIO runPlugin :: RIO () runPlugin = ...
  • 28. SUMMARY • New language flags: -XSafe, -XTrustworthy, -XUnsafe • New option flag: -fpackage-trust (7.4) • Safe status of a module will be inferred (7.4) Trust your types!
  • 29. FUTURE WORK • Prove safety guarantees • Establish clearer definition of safe and what guarantees trustworthy modules should provide • Machine checking possible here? • Do a retake on Safe language but by starting with a small, proven correct core and expanding out. • Inclusion in the Safe language could be used as a quality bar for new Haskell extensions. • Require formal semantics and proofs
  • 30. SAFE HASKELL In GHC 7.2 Please try out and provide feedback http://www.scs.stanford.edu/~davidt/safehaskell.html