Don L. Rondeau - Missing Children Task Force Leadership Don L Rondeau
Don L. Rondeau - Certificate of Appreciation from Maryland Delegate Jill P. Carter. Rondeau led a missing children task force that resulted in the increased awareness and Maryland missing childrens' law " Phylicia's Law" . Don led searches and drafted legislation that became law. Don also organized testimony and coordinated media efforts. Maryland's children are a bit safer due to Rondeau's leadership.
Title United States. The National Strategy for Homeland Security .docxjuliennehar
Title: United States. The National Strategy for Homeland Security - Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS
Terrorists are opportunistic. They exploit vulnerabilities we leave exposed, choosing the time, place, and method of attack according to the weaknesses they observe or perceive. Increasing the security of a particular type of target, such as aircraft or buildings, makes it more likely that terrorists will seek a different target. Increasing the countermeasures to a particular terrorist tactic, such as hijacking, makes it more likely that terrorists will favor a different tactic.
Protecting America's critical infrastructure and key assets is thus a formidable challenge. Our open and technologically complex society presents an almost infinite array of potential targets, and our critical infrastructure changes as rapidly as the marketplace. It is impossible to protect completely all targets, all the time. On the other hand, we can help deter or deflect attacks, or mitigate their effects, by making strategic improvements in protection and security. Thus, while we cannot assume we will prevent all terrorist attacks, we can substantially reduce America's vulnerability, particularly to the most damaging attacks.
All elements of our society have a crucial stake in reducing our vulnerability to terrorism; and all have highly valuable roles to play. Protecting America's critical infrastructure and key assets requires an unprecedented level of cooperation throughout all levels of government-with private industry and institutions, and with the American people. The federal government has the crucial task of fostering a collaborative environment, and enabling all of these entities to work together to provide America the security it requires.
What must we protect? The USA PATRIOT Act defines critical infrastructure as those "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." Our critical infrastructures are particularly important because of the functions or services they provide to our country. Our critical infrastructures are also particularly important because they are complex systems: the effects of a terrorist attack can spread far beyond the direct target, and reverberate long after the immediate damage.
America's critical infrastructure encompasses a large number of sectors. Our agriculture, food, and water sectors, along with the public health and emergency services sectors, provide the essential goods and services Americans need to survive. Our institutions of government guarantee our national security and freedom, and administer key public functions. Our defense industrial base provides essential capabilities to help safeguard ...
Don L. Rondeau - Missing Children Task Force Leadership Don L Rondeau
Don L. Rondeau - Certificate of Appreciation from Maryland Delegate Jill P. Carter. Rondeau led a missing children task force that resulted in the increased awareness and Maryland missing childrens' law " Phylicia's Law" . Don led searches and drafted legislation that became law. Don also organized testimony and coordinated media efforts. Maryland's children are a bit safer due to Rondeau's leadership.
Title United States. The National Strategy for Homeland Security .docxjuliennehar
Title: United States. The National Strategy for Homeland Security - Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS
Terrorists are opportunistic. They exploit vulnerabilities we leave exposed, choosing the time, place, and method of attack according to the weaknesses they observe or perceive. Increasing the security of a particular type of target, such as aircraft or buildings, makes it more likely that terrorists will seek a different target. Increasing the countermeasures to a particular terrorist tactic, such as hijacking, makes it more likely that terrorists will favor a different tactic.
Protecting America's critical infrastructure and key assets is thus a formidable challenge. Our open and technologically complex society presents an almost infinite array of potential targets, and our critical infrastructure changes as rapidly as the marketplace. It is impossible to protect completely all targets, all the time. On the other hand, we can help deter or deflect attacks, or mitigate their effects, by making strategic improvements in protection and security. Thus, while we cannot assume we will prevent all terrorist attacks, we can substantially reduce America's vulnerability, particularly to the most damaging attacks.
All elements of our society have a crucial stake in reducing our vulnerability to terrorism; and all have highly valuable roles to play. Protecting America's critical infrastructure and key assets requires an unprecedented level of cooperation throughout all levels of government-with private industry and institutions, and with the American people. The federal government has the crucial task of fostering a collaborative environment, and enabling all of these entities to work together to provide America the security it requires.
What must we protect? The USA PATRIOT Act defines critical infrastructure as those "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." Our critical infrastructures are particularly important because of the functions or services they provide to our country. Our critical infrastructures are also particularly important because they are complex systems: the effects of a terrorist attack can spread far beyond the direct target, and reverberate long after the immediate damage.
America's critical infrastructure encompasses a large number of sectors. Our agriculture, food, and water sectors, along with the public health and emergency services sectors, provide the essential goods and services Americans need to survive. Our institutions of government guarantee our national security and freedom, and administer key public functions. Our defense industrial base provides essential capabilities to help safeguard ...
WORK & STRESS, 1998, VOL. 12, NO. 3 293-306 Achieving a sa.docxambersalomon88660
WORK & STRESS, 1998, VOL. 12, NO. 3 293-306
Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice
JAMES R E A S O N
Department of Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
Keywords: Safety culture; Accidents; Organizational factors; H u m a n error.
This paper discusses four topics relating to safety culture, three theoretical and one practical. The first
considers why it is that an unsafe culture is more likely to be involved in the causation of organizational
rather than individual accidents. It is the pervasive nature of culture that makes it uniquely suitable
for creating and sustaining the co-linear gaps in defences-in-depth through which an accident
trajectory has to pass. The second topic relates to pathological adaptations, and discusses two
examples: the Royal Navy of the mid-nineteenth century and the Chernobyl reactor complex. The
third issue deals with recurrent accident patterns and considers the role of cultural drivers in creating
typical accidents. The final topic is concerned with the practical question of whether a safety culture
can be engineered. It is argued that a safe culture is an informed culture and this, in turn, depends upon
creating an effective reporting culture that is underpinned by a just culture in which the line between
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is clearly drawn and understood.
1. Introduction
Although there is no universally accepted definition of safety culture, there can be little
doubt that it is a concept whose time has come. Since the beginning of 1997, there have been
well-attended meetings and workshops devoted exclusively to this topic, and the interest
extends across many work domains. For example, the US National Transportation Safety
Board’s (NTSB) symposium on ‘ Corporate Culture and Transportation Safety ’ in April
1997 attracted some 550 delegates from all of its constituencies : aviation, railroads,
highways, the marine world, pipelines and the safety of hazardous materials. The
symposium was convened because the NTSB’s accident investigators were increasingly
conscious of the crucial role played by cultural factors in creating bad events (see, for
example, NTSB/AAR 1994, 1997, NTSB/RAR 1996).
The high level of concern with organizational culture in the world of hazardous
technologies poses both a challenge and an opportunity for those academics involved in the
safety-related sciences. W e need to develop a clearer theoretical understanding of these
organizational issues to create a principled basis for more effective culture-enhancing
practices. To this end, the paper presents arguments dealing with four culture-related issues,
three largely theoretical and one with more directly practical applications.
First, are modern, high-tech, well-defended technologies-such as nuclear power plants,
chemical process plants and commercial aviation-more vulnerable to the effects of a poor
safety culture than traditional industries involv.
Chapter 11
The Threat Matrix
In this chapter, we describe the evolution of terrorist activities and various crimes perpetrated within the aviation system. Aviation security practitioners must be able to detect and deter future unconventional terrorist and criminal acts. The security industry is responsible for designing resiliency into aviation security systems such that responses are rapid and effective. Therefore, here we discuss existing and emerging threats to the aviation system and methods for mitigating, preparing, responding, and recovering from terrorist and extreme criminal attacks. This chapter examines practical strategies and tactics for accomplishing these requirements against current and future threats against aviation security.
*
Introduction
The United States has expended significant monetary resources since 9-11 to "fix" the aviation security system; however, as a nation the United States has much more work ahead in developing security systems that can mitigate future threats.
Although part of our responsibility is to detect and deter terrorist and criminal acts, it is also part of our responsibility to build resiliency into the aviation security system such that responses are rapid and effective when a terrorist or criminal act occurs.
Terrorism is a way to inflict harm on a country or entity with little risk to the infrastructure of the terrorist organization. Whenever a citizen sees heightened security, he or she is reminded of the attack that caused the new procedures and may continue to fear another attack.
*
Threat Matrix Introduction
Modern terrorism uses the Internet and other highly advanced technologies along with unconventional forms of implementing an attack.
Therefore, threats can no longer be eliminated through military power. Defeating current and future threats to our global aviation system requires strategies that combine military force where applicable and the construction of a resilient infrastructure.
The most dangerous threat to aviation is perhaps the belief that a threat is unstoppable.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Threat Matrix
Threat is unstoppable
GA and the use of GA aircraft
"Isn't it easier to rent a truck and fill it with explosives than it is to rent or steal an aircraft?"
Suicide bombers
"You cannot stop someone who is totally committed to attacking you and killing themselves in the process."
The most dangerous threat to aviation is perhaps the belief that a threat is unstoppable.
The first statement is in regard to GA and the use of a GA aircraft to facilitate a terrorist attack. The statement goes something like "Isn't it easier to rent a truck and fill it with explosives than it is to rent or steal an aircraft?" The second statement relates to suicide bombers. The statement goes something like "You cannot stop someone who is totally committed to attacking you and killing themselves in the process."
Although commonly believed, ne ...
HM502
Unit 5 DQ
Topic 1: Infrastructure Protection
A detailed discussion of threats to and the process of protecting critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) sectors from man-made and natural disasters are essential for understanding one of the main missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In detailed analysis of threats and protection challenges, several CI/KR sectors have emerged that require the attention of DHS professionals. These sectors include:
· Agriculture and Food
· Banking and Finance
· Communications
· Defense Industrial Base
· Energy
· Information Technology
· National Monuments and Icons
· Transportation Systems
· Water
What are some of the major threats to the CI/KR sectors identified above? Discuss some of the critical vulnerabilities of these CI/KR sectors. What are some of the prime consequences if these CI/KR sectors are damaged or destroyed? Describe DHS plans to deter threats, mitigate vulnerabilities, and minimize consequences.
Topic 1 Student Response #1 (Respond to Jeffery)
Jeffery Bailey
Hello classmates/Professor
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the Nation’s CIKR. The act assigns DHS the responsibility for developing a comprehensive national plan for securing CIKR and for recommending the “measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with State and
local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. (Chertoff, 2009) The NIPP defines the organizational structures that provide
the framework for coordination of CIKR protection efforts at all levels of government, their framework includes the action of setting goals and objectives, Identify Assets, Systems and Networks, Assess Risk, consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats. Prioritize, Implement Programs and Measure effectiveness.
The NIPP Conducts research and development and using technology to improve CIKR protection-related capabilities to ensure refined risk assessments for many years into the future. The NIPP assistance programs offers Federal grant assistance to State, local, tribal, and territorial entities; and complement relevant private sector activities. Part of their mission is to make America safer and more secure from cyber attacks and also both man made and natural disasters. Together, the NIPP and SSPs provide the mechanisms for identifying critical assets, systems, and networks, and their associated sectors. In dealing with risk and emergencies the NIPP has Sector Specific Agencies that are assigned certain areas of responsibilities such as Agriculture, Food, Energy and Water. Banking and Finance Communications, in dealing with the potential risk that may befall any of these entities the NIPP takes critical steps to assess, mitigate, protect, and plan for futur ...
2006 StrongAngel III - integrated disaster response demonstration in San Diego. Directed by mentor Dr. Eric Rasmussen,MD,MDM,FACP http://about.me/EricRasmussenMD
Justin BennettTerrorism is one of the six strategic risk that is.docxtawnyataylor528
Justin Bennett
Terrorism is one of the six strategic risk that is found in the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Ever since the catastrophic events that occurred on September 11, 2001, the entire outlook on terrorism has changed and the security of the nation is ever changing to fulfill terrorist tactics. According to the 2014 QHSR, the terrorist threat is evolving and remains significant as attack planning and operations become more decentralized (2014). On that note, United States critical infrastructure has always been a major target towards terrorism. It is essential that it is protected at all times. The nation’s critical infrastructure is extremely vital to the country. “Critical Infrastructure” is defined as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on the security, national economic security, national health or safety, or any combination of those matters (DHS 2013).If the terrorist threat is not handled properly at the national level, there will be severe consequences.
To begin with, the majority of critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector but it is the job of the federal, state, local, and private sectors to all collaborate to achieve the goal and remain resilient against terrorist activity. Terrorist activity has major impacts on the country in a general sense and an even greater impact against critical infrastructure. Some of the major consequences at the national level would include physical, psychological, economical issues within the country. The physical consequences would include the damage against the infrastructures that where struck and the innocent citizens who may of possibly been killed by the terrorist. Further, the psychological consequences would include those who were impacted by the terrorist attack ranging from the people who were actually at the scene, the family members of the attacked individuals, the critical infrastructure employees, the government officials dealing with the situation and many more. Moving on, economic consequences can impact the entire nation as well depending on the amount of physical damage done and which critical infrastructure was impacted. In addition, an attack one of the nation’s critical infrastructure assets can impact other critical infrastructure. For instance, if the Energy Sector is taken out, the Communications sector may have problems along with the Financial Sector because both of those sectors need the resources provided by the Energy Sector.
In my opinion, I believe the risk of terrorist attacks are being adequately addressed. The reason why I believe so is there hasn’t been a successful major terrorist attack as catastrophic as 9/11 since that day. Yes, there has been several lone wolf attacks that have succeeded but those are extremely hard to stop due to its unpredictability. Overall, the majority off attacks that hav ...
Invest in Infrastructure throughout its Life CycleBob Prieto
Infrastructure is a system—not just the physical system but the processes, training, operation, and maintenance of that system. Post-disaster, you might have two or three different ways to build out a system so that it’s able to resist, respond, and recover. And each of those approaches will have different levels of inherent resilience.
More complex systems may have less inherent resilience, because in complexity there are risks as well as opportunities to fail that are not immediately obvious. Unanticipated events—black swans—love complexity; they invest and breed in complexity.
So resilience to me is a system-level property. Therefore, less complex, more transparent, easier to understand, more flexible, more adaptable, responsive systems will have higher levels of resiliency.
Every day, our country’s infrastructure is becoming less resilient for two high-level reasons. The more important one is that our investments in sustaining the operability and maintenance of our infrastructure do not keep up with the amount of decay and degradation that our infrastructure incurs. We do not invest sufficiently in sustaining our current infrastructure—especially throughout its entire life cycle. air and water pollution as well as more frequent instances of natural and manmade events of scale.
The good news is some of our infrastructure was designed to be fairly resistant to those attacks—and some of our newer infrastructure systems and operating and maintenance practices are incorporating more resilience. But on average, the resilience of our infrastructure systems is diminished with every passing day.
We always talk about having a lifecycle focus, but we’re going to have to reflect that in our codes and standards. We need to design, build, operate, and maintain infrastructure more holistically.
I think that’s an important
mental shift.
Similarly, how we fund these things is going to have to be on a lifecycle basis. We’ll go out and assemble money to build the new bridge. But having built the new bridge, have we put in place the funding to actually sustain the new bridge, to maintain it properly so that we don’t have to replace it after 40 years? Can it be operated with the same level of safety and quality and inherent resilience that it had on the day it was originally delivered, or are we going to accept degraded infrastructure?
And then the question becomes, “Do we understand the cost of that degraded infrastructure to our economic output?” The short answer is, “No, we don’t.”
Follow directions or I will dispute!!!Please answer original f.docxkeugene1
Follow directions or I will dispute!!!
Please answer original forum with a minimum of 500 word and respond to both students separately with a minimum of 250 words each
page 1 Original Forum with References
page 2 Desmond response with references
page 3 Chris response with references
Original Forum
What are the roles and strategies of private sector security in homeland security? Does the US Department of Homeland Security need to facilitate enhanced protection for office buildings, residential locations, and houses of worship? Do other types of facilities require more attention by the US Department of Homeland Security? Why or why not?
Student Responses
Desmond
After the passing of the Homeland Security act of 2002 and the creation of The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) most people might not think about the importance of private sector security in matters of homeland security. Especially considering that in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks, the role of private sector security in homeland security was drastically reduced. These attacks led to the creation of the Transportation Security Administration(TSA) in 2002 and removed private sector security from U.S. airports (Hunter & Lambert, 2016, p. 37), which are arguably one of the most important public targets for terrorists. Despite this change, private security organizations do still hold a key role in our nation’s security, because they are responsible for the security of most of our nation’s soft targets for terror attacks. Unfortunately, many of these security groups are still not prepared to deal with a terror attack.
A survey conducted by Rigakos, Davis, Ortiz, Blunt, & Broz has shown several unsettling trends when it comes to security at some of the nations largest shopping mall. This survey found that half of security directors did not believe that their security staff was prepared for a terror attack, and that few concrete changes had been made to security spending or protocol since 9/11 (Rigakos, Davis, Ortiz, Blunt, & Broz, 2009, p. 286). These issues are componded by the prevalance of shopping mall bombings, there were over 60 mall bombings between 1998 and 2006, and the tendancy of mall security to focus on petty crimes like shoplifiting instead of homeland security objectives (Button, 2008, p. 129). This evidence shows that many of the private security organizations that provide shopping mall security do not have much of a plan or a strategy for dealing with homeland security.
But his unpreparedness is not entire the fault of these organizations, because of the importance and vulnerabilities of most of our nations soft targets DHS should be more heavily involved in their security. I am not saying that DHS agents need to be stationed in every mall, church, and office building in the country, but I do think that they should at least offer to help these security companies provide better training and by sharing more threat intelligence. And.
REPLY TO EACH RESPONSE 100 WORDS MIN EACH1. As I menti.docxchris293
**REPLY TO EACH RESPONSE 100 WORDS MIN EACH**
1. As I mentioned in my introduction week 1, I'm a resident of the great state of Wisconsin. While we're known as "America's Dairyland", we also have a great deal of other agriculture in the state, most notable corn (maize). I actually just this morning watched a tractor till up the cornfield that my house backs up to! With that said, agriculture is near and dear to my heart, and I've learned more than I bargained for about the industry in my time living here. I'm inclined to agree with Tommy Thompson that it is amazing nobody has attempted to attack our nation's food supply, and I firmly believe that when that attack finally does come, it will be on our nation's corn crops. The reason I am so convinced the attack would come against corn crops is that corn has become absolutely ubiquitous. If you name a critical food staple, I'll explain to you how corn contributes to its production. The field behind my house, for example, grew feed corn this year. Both beef and dairy cows (Yes, they are different breeds, and you wouldn't want to eat a dairy cow!) eat corn-based feed products. If you destroy a feed corn crop, you not only decrease the dairy cow's output, but you may kill off some of the population due to hunger, and the same is true of beef cows. In addition to those issues, there's also the glaring problem of corn grown for human consumption being destroyed. This would not only affect corn sold on the cob, frozen, and in cans, but corn that is then refined into products like corn meal and high-fructose corn syrup. If we lose the corn crop, your favorite soda will likely go with it! Another consideration is that corn is also commonly grown for energy. Ethanol, a corn-based alcohol, is found in the majority of gasoline nowadays. While E85, an 85% ethanol-15% gasoline mixture, is somewhat less popular than it was circa 2010, it's not uncommon to see up to 15% ethanol in gasoline pumps. It's particularly common in higher concentrations in premium, higher-octane fuels used in premium and high performance vehicles because it is a cost-effective way to boost fuel's octane rating. This is why you will often see mid-grade gasoline being sold cheaper than regular, because it has a higher ethanol content. Overall, I think it's very easy to see why corn crops would be such a valuable target for potential agroterrorists. While corn has become an extremely useful crop, our dependence on a single crop for so much of our food supply and energy supply definitely opens up the possibility for wide-spread damage to the economy should that crop fail due to an agroterrorism attack.
2. When people think of a terrorist attack, images of explosions or 9/11 flash through their minds. When people think of CBRN attacks, they think of people gasping for breath or think of recent pictures of chemical attacks in Syria. But few people think about potential attacks against agriculture, or Agroterrorism. Agroterrorism is .
Running head Critical infrastructure and key resources1.docxsusanschei
Running head: Critical infrastructure and key resources 1
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
Wilmington University
Shashank Pitla
Table of Contents
Introduction3
Identifying Critical Assets:4
Three important and CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES (CIKR)5
Agriculture5
Government Facilities5
Health Care Sector5
Banking6
Responsibilities and risk assessment6
Information Sharing8
Conclusion10
Works Cited11
Introduction
Critical infrastructure is here after preferred as CI is which has predefined as frameworks and resources, physical or virtual, so basic to the United States that the insufficiency or demolition of such systems and assets would incapacitating influence security, national fiscal security, national general prosperity and prosperity, or any blend of those matters.
PDD-63, distinguished exercises whose basic frameworks ought to be secured data and correspondences, keeping money and fund, water supply flying, expressways, mass travel, pipelines, rail administrations. The following research paper can help in identifying of how can we recognize the basic foundation around us or in a group and what are the obligations that must be taken amid catastrophe in group and which particular office is mindful, how impart the data all through the procedures (GOV, 2009)
The exercises that are so specific are key to the everyday working and security of the nation for instance, transportation of merchandise and individuals, correspondences, saving the financial state, the supply and dispersion of power and water. Residential security and our capacity to observe, low in count of the antagonistic acts additionally rely on upon some of these exercises and in addition other more particular exercises like insight assembling and summon and control of public safety and military strengths. A genuine interruption in these exercises and abilities could indirectly impact on the Nations security and even the capacity of the variety of resources, capacities, data, all personal information, and frameworks/ structure of the system, shaping what has been known as the country's basic foundations. These foundations have developed mind boggling and interconnected, implying that an interruption in one may prompt disturbances in others (GOV, 2009)(Security, NIPP 2013, 2013).Identification of CA:
DHS is also referred as Department of Homeland Security, through different components, by including through state country security authorities and lead organization authorities, looks to recognize framework resources that fit the meaning of basic foundation. The National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program here after is referred as NCIPP and the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative that is referred as CFDI , bolstered with evaluation and analysis from the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center and the Office of Infrastructure Analysis, recognize those benefits by including in the country and even in the foreign countries ...
Don L. Rondeau - Federal Air Marshall Letter of Appreciation Don L Rondeau
Don L. Rondeau - Led a federal intelligence training effort that focused on criminal behavior profiling as a component of the intelligence analysis process.
Don L. Rondeau - DHS Letter of Appreciation EgyptDon L Rondeau
Don L. Rondeau received a letter of appreciation from DHS leadership for forecasting the events that occurred during the so called " Arab Spring " . On behalf of DHS, Don briefed the nations critical infrastructure stakeholders on the conflict in the middle east . Don led the analysis, liaise and facilitation efforts .
WORK & STRESS, 1998, VOL. 12, NO. 3 293-306 Achieving a sa.docxambersalomon88660
WORK & STRESS, 1998, VOL. 12, NO. 3 293-306
Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice
JAMES R E A S O N
Department of Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
Keywords: Safety culture; Accidents; Organizational factors; H u m a n error.
This paper discusses four topics relating to safety culture, three theoretical and one practical. The first
considers why it is that an unsafe culture is more likely to be involved in the causation of organizational
rather than individual accidents. It is the pervasive nature of culture that makes it uniquely suitable
for creating and sustaining the co-linear gaps in defences-in-depth through which an accident
trajectory has to pass. The second topic relates to pathological adaptations, and discusses two
examples: the Royal Navy of the mid-nineteenth century and the Chernobyl reactor complex. The
third issue deals with recurrent accident patterns and considers the role of cultural drivers in creating
typical accidents. The final topic is concerned with the practical question of whether a safety culture
can be engineered. It is argued that a safe culture is an informed culture and this, in turn, depends upon
creating an effective reporting culture that is underpinned by a just culture in which the line between
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is clearly drawn and understood.
1. Introduction
Although there is no universally accepted definition of safety culture, there can be little
doubt that it is a concept whose time has come. Since the beginning of 1997, there have been
well-attended meetings and workshops devoted exclusively to this topic, and the interest
extends across many work domains. For example, the US National Transportation Safety
Board’s (NTSB) symposium on ‘ Corporate Culture and Transportation Safety ’ in April
1997 attracted some 550 delegates from all of its constituencies : aviation, railroads,
highways, the marine world, pipelines and the safety of hazardous materials. The
symposium was convened because the NTSB’s accident investigators were increasingly
conscious of the crucial role played by cultural factors in creating bad events (see, for
example, NTSB/AAR 1994, 1997, NTSB/RAR 1996).
The high level of concern with organizational culture in the world of hazardous
technologies poses both a challenge and an opportunity for those academics involved in the
safety-related sciences. W e need to develop a clearer theoretical understanding of these
organizational issues to create a principled basis for more effective culture-enhancing
practices. To this end, the paper presents arguments dealing with four culture-related issues,
three largely theoretical and one with more directly practical applications.
First, are modern, high-tech, well-defended technologies-such as nuclear power plants,
chemical process plants and commercial aviation-more vulnerable to the effects of a poor
safety culture than traditional industries involv.
Chapter 11
The Threat Matrix
In this chapter, we describe the evolution of terrorist activities and various crimes perpetrated within the aviation system. Aviation security practitioners must be able to detect and deter future unconventional terrorist and criminal acts. The security industry is responsible for designing resiliency into aviation security systems such that responses are rapid and effective. Therefore, here we discuss existing and emerging threats to the aviation system and methods for mitigating, preparing, responding, and recovering from terrorist and extreme criminal attacks. This chapter examines practical strategies and tactics for accomplishing these requirements against current and future threats against aviation security.
*
Introduction
The United States has expended significant monetary resources since 9-11 to "fix" the aviation security system; however, as a nation the United States has much more work ahead in developing security systems that can mitigate future threats.
Although part of our responsibility is to detect and deter terrorist and criminal acts, it is also part of our responsibility to build resiliency into the aviation security system such that responses are rapid and effective when a terrorist or criminal act occurs.
Terrorism is a way to inflict harm on a country or entity with little risk to the infrastructure of the terrorist organization. Whenever a citizen sees heightened security, he or she is reminded of the attack that caused the new procedures and may continue to fear another attack.
*
Threat Matrix Introduction
Modern terrorism uses the Internet and other highly advanced technologies along with unconventional forms of implementing an attack.
Therefore, threats can no longer be eliminated through military power. Defeating current and future threats to our global aviation system requires strategies that combine military force where applicable and the construction of a resilient infrastructure.
The most dangerous threat to aviation is perhaps the belief that a threat is unstoppable.
*
Practical Aviation Security – Chapter 11
Threat Matrix
Threat is unstoppable
GA and the use of GA aircraft
"Isn't it easier to rent a truck and fill it with explosives than it is to rent or steal an aircraft?"
Suicide bombers
"You cannot stop someone who is totally committed to attacking you and killing themselves in the process."
The most dangerous threat to aviation is perhaps the belief that a threat is unstoppable.
The first statement is in regard to GA and the use of a GA aircraft to facilitate a terrorist attack. The statement goes something like "Isn't it easier to rent a truck and fill it with explosives than it is to rent or steal an aircraft?" The second statement relates to suicide bombers. The statement goes something like "You cannot stop someone who is totally committed to attacking you and killing themselves in the process."
Although commonly believed, ne ...
HM502
Unit 5 DQ
Topic 1: Infrastructure Protection
A detailed discussion of threats to and the process of protecting critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) sectors from man-made and natural disasters are essential for understanding one of the main missions of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In detailed analysis of threats and protection challenges, several CI/KR sectors have emerged that require the attention of DHS professionals. These sectors include:
· Agriculture and Food
· Banking and Finance
· Communications
· Defense Industrial Base
· Energy
· Information Technology
· National Monuments and Icons
· Transportation Systems
· Water
What are some of the major threats to the CI/KR sectors identified above? Discuss some of the critical vulnerabilities of these CI/KR sectors. What are some of the prime consequences if these CI/KR sectors are damaged or destroyed? Describe DHS plans to deter threats, mitigate vulnerabilities, and minimize consequences.
Topic 1 Student Response #1 (Respond to Jeffery)
Jeffery Bailey
Hello classmates/Professor
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the Nation’s CIKR. The act assigns DHS the responsibility for developing a comprehensive national plan for securing CIKR and for recommending the “measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States coordination with other agencies of the Federal Government and in cooperation with State and
local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. (Chertoff, 2009) The NIPP defines the organizational structures that provide
the framework for coordination of CIKR protection efforts at all levels of government, their framework includes the action of setting goals and objectives, Identify Assets, Systems and Networks, Assess Risk, consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats. Prioritize, Implement Programs and Measure effectiveness.
The NIPP Conducts research and development and using technology to improve CIKR protection-related capabilities to ensure refined risk assessments for many years into the future. The NIPP assistance programs offers Federal grant assistance to State, local, tribal, and territorial entities; and complement relevant private sector activities. Part of their mission is to make America safer and more secure from cyber attacks and also both man made and natural disasters. Together, the NIPP and SSPs provide the mechanisms for identifying critical assets, systems, and networks, and their associated sectors. In dealing with risk and emergencies the NIPP has Sector Specific Agencies that are assigned certain areas of responsibilities such as Agriculture, Food, Energy and Water. Banking and Finance Communications, in dealing with the potential risk that may befall any of these entities the NIPP takes critical steps to assess, mitigate, protect, and plan for futur ...
2006 StrongAngel III - integrated disaster response demonstration in San Diego. Directed by mentor Dr. Eric Rasmussen,MD,MDM,FACP http://about.me/EricRasmussenMD
Justin BennettTerrorism is one of the six strategic risk that is.docxtawnyataylor528
Justin Bennett
Terrorism is one of the six strategic risk that is found in the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Ever since the catastrophic events that occurred on September 11, 2001, the entire outlook on terrorism has changed and the security of the nation is ever changing to fulfill terrorist tactics. According to the 2014 QHSR, the terrorist threat is evolving and remains significant as attack planning and operations become more decentralized (2014). On that note, United States critical infrastructure has always been a major target towards terrorism. It is essential that it is protected at all times. The nation’s critical infrastructure is extremely vital to the country. “Critical Infrastructure” is defined as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on the security, national economic security, national health or safety, or any combination of those matters (DHS 2013).If the terrorist threat is not handled properly at the national level, there will be severe consequences.
To begin with, the majority of critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector but it is the job of the federal, state, local, and private sectors to all collaborate to achieve the goal and remain resilient against terrorist activity. Terrorist activity has major impacts on the country in a general sense and an even greater impact against critical infrastructure. Some of the major consequences at the national level would include physical, psychological, economical issues within the country. The physical consequences would include the damage against the infrastructures that where struck and the innocent citizens who may of possibly been killed by the terrorist. Further, the psychological consequences would include those who were impacted by the terrorist attack ranging from the people who were actually at the scene, the family members of the attacked individuals, the critical infrastructure employees, the government officials dealing with the situation and many more. Moving on, economic consequences can impact the entire nation as well depending on the amount of physical damage done and which critical infrastructure was impacted. In addition, an attack one of the nation’s critical infrastructure assets can impact other critical infrastructure. For instance, if the Energy Sector is taken out, the Communications sector may have problems along with the Financial Sector because both of those sectors need the resources provided by the Energy Sector.
In my opinion, I believe the risk of terrorist attacks are being adequately addressed. The reason why I believe so is there hasn’t been a successful major terrorist attack as catastrophic as 9/11 since that day. Yes, there has been several lone wolf attacks that have succeeded but those are extremely hard to stop due to its unpredictability. Overall, the majority off attacks that hav ...
Invest in Infrastructure throughout its Life CycleBob Prieto
Infrastructure is a system—not just the physical system but the processes, training, operation, and maintenance of that system. Post-disaster, you might have two or three different ways to build out a system so that it’s able to resist, respond, and recover. And each of those approaches will have different levels of inherent resilience.
More complex systems may have less inherent resilience, because in complexity there are risks as well as opportunities to fail that are not immediately obvious. Unanticipated events—black swans—love complexity; they invest and breed in complexity.
So resilience to me is a system-level property. Therefore, less complex, more transparent, easier to understand, more flexible, more adaptable, responsive systems will have higher levels of resiliency.
Every day, our country’s infrastructure is becoming less resilient for two high-level reasons. The more important one is that our investments in sustaining the operability and maintenance of our infrastructure do not keep up with the amount of decay and degradation that our infrastructure incurs. We do not invest sufficiently in sustaining our current infrastructure—especially throughout its entire life cycle. air and water pollution as well as more frequent instances of natural and manmade events of scale.
The good news is some of our infrastructure was designed to be fairly resistant to those attacks—and some of our newer infrastructure systems and operating and maintenance practices are incorporating more resilience. But on average, the resilience of our infrastructure systems is diminished with every passing day.
We always talk about having a lifecycle focus, but we’re going to have to reflect that in our codes and standards. We need to design, build, operate, and maintain infrastructure more holistically.
I think that’s an important
mental shift.
Similarly, how we fund these things is going to have to be on a lifecycle basis. We’ll go out and assemble money to build the new bridge. But having built the new bridge, have we put in place the funding to actually sustain the new bridge, to maintain it properly so that we don’t have to replace it after 40 years? Can it be operated with the same level of safety and quality and inherent resilience that it had on the day it was originally delivered, or are we going to accept degraded infrastructure?
And then the question becomes, “Do we understand the cost of that degraded infrastructure to our economic output?” The short answer is, “No, we don’t.”
Follow directions or I will dispute!!!Please answer original f.docxkeugene1
Follow directions or I will dispute!!!
Please answer original forum with a minimum of 500 word and respond to both students separately with a minimum of 250 words each
page 1 Original Forum with References
page 2 Desmond response with references
page 3 Chris response with references
Original Forum
What are the roles and strategies of private sector security in homeland security? Does the US Department of Homeland Security need to facilitate enhanced protection for office buildings, residential locations, and houses of worship? Do other types of facilities require more attention by the US Department of Homeland Security? Why or why not?
Student Responses
Desmond
After the passing of the Homeland Security act of 2002 and the creation of The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) most people might not think about the importance of private sector security in matters of homeland security. Especially considering that in the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks, the role of private sector security in homeland security was drastically reduced. These attacks led to the creation of the Transportation Security Administration(TSA) in 2002 and removed private sector security from U.S. airports (Hunter & Lambert, 2016, p. 37), which are arguably one of the most important public targets for terrorists. Despite this change, private security organizations do still hold a key role in our nation’s security, because they are responsible for the security of most of our nation’s soft targets for terror attacks. Unfortunately, many of these security groups are still not prepared to deal with a terror attack.
A survey conducted by Rigakos, Davis, Ortiz, Blunt, & Broz has shown several unsettling trends when it comes to security at some of the nations largest shopping mall. This survey found that half of security directors did not believe that their security staff was prepared for a terror attack, and that few concrete changes had been made to security spending or protocol since 9/11 (Rigakos, Davis, Ortiz, Blunt, & Broz, 2009, p. 286). These issues are componded by the prevalance of shopping mall bombings, there were over 60 mall bombings between 1998 and 2006, and the tendancy of mall security to focus on petty crimes like shoplifiting instead of homeland security objectives (Button, 2008, p. 129). This evidence shows that many of the private security organizations that provide shopping mall security do not have much of a plan or a strategy for dealing with homeland security.
But his unpreparedness is not entire the fault of these organizations, because of the importance and vulnerabilities of most of our nations soft targets DHS should be more heavily involved in their security. I am not saying that DHS agents need to be stationed in every mall, church, and office building in the country, but I do think that they should at least offer to help these security companies provide better training and by sharing more threat intelligence. And.
REPLY TO EACH RESPONSE 100 WORDS MIN EACH1. As I menti.docxchris293
**REPLY TO EACH RESPONSE 100 WORDS MIN EACH**
1. As I mentioned in my introduction week 1, I'm a resident of the great state of Wisconsin. While we're known as "America's Dairyland", we also have a great deal of other agriculture in the state, most notable corn (maize). I actually just this morning watched a tractor till up the cornfield that my house backs up to! With that said, agriculture is near and dear to my heart, and I've learned more than I bargained for about the industry in my time living here. I'm inclined to agree with Tommy Thompson that it is amazing nobody has attempted to attack our nation's food supply, and I firmly believe that when that attack finally does come, it will be on our nation's corn crops. The reason I am so convinced the attack would come against corn crops is that corn has become absolutely ubiquitous. If you name a critical food staple, I'll explain to you how corn contributes to its production. The field behind my house, for example, grew feed corn this year. Both beef and dairy cows (Yes, they are different breeds, and you wouldn't want to eat a dairy cow!) eat corn-based feed products. If you destroy a feed corn crop, you not only decrease the dairy cow's output, but you may kill off some of the population due to hunger, and the same is true of beef cows. In addition to those issues, there's also the glaring problem of corn grown for human consumption being destroyed. This would not only affect corn sold on the cob, frozen, and in cans, but corn that is then refined into products like corn meal and high-fructose corn syrup. If we lose the corn crop, your favorite soda will likely go with it! Another consideration is that corn is also commonly grown for energy. Ethanol, a corn-based alcohol, is found in the majority of gasoline nowadays. While E85, an 85% ethanol-15% gasoline mixture, is somewhat less popular than it was circa 2010, it's not uncommon to see up to 15% ethanol in gasoline pumps. It's particularly common in higher concentrations in premium, higher-octane fuels used in premium and high performance vehicles because it is a cost-effective way to boost fuel's octane rating. This is why you will often see mid-grade gasoline being sold cheaper than regular, because it has a higher ethanol content. Overall, I think it's very easy to see why corn crops would be such a valuable target for potential agroterrorists. While corn has become an extremely useful crop, our dependence on a single crop for so much of our food supply and energy supply definitely opens up the possibility for wide-spread damage to the economy should that crop fail due to an agroterrorism attack.
2. When people think of a terrorist attack, images of explosions or 9/11 flash through their minds. When people think of CBRN attacks, they think of people gasping for breath or think of recent pictures of chemical attacks in Syria. But few people think about potential attacks against agriculture, or Agroterrorism. Agroterrorism is .
Running head Critical infrastructure and key resources1.docxsusanschei
Running head: Critical infrastructure and key resources 1
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
Wilmington University
Shashank Pitla
Table of Contents
Introduction3
Identifying Critical Assets:4
Three important and CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES (CIKR)5
Agriculture5
Government Facilities5
Health Care Sector5
Banking6
Responsibilities and risk assessment6
Information Sharing8
Conclusion10
Works Cited11
Introduction
Critical infrastructure is here after preferred as CI is which has predefined as frameworks and resources, physical or virtual, so basic to the United States that the insufficiency or demolition of such systems and assets would incapacitating influence security, national fiscal security, national general prosperity and prosperity, or any blend of those matters.
PDD-63, distinguished exercises whose basic frameworks ought to be secured data and correspondences, keeping money and fund, water supply flying, expressways, mass travel, pipelines, rail administrations. The following research paper can help in identifying of how can we recognize the basic foundation around us or in a group and what are the obligations that must be taken amid catastrophe in group and which particular office is mindful, how impart the data all through the procedures (GOV, 2009)
The exercises that are so specific are key to the everyday working and security of the nation for instance, transportation of merchandise and individuals, correspondences, saving the financial state, the supply and dispersion of power and water. Residential security and our capacity to observe, low in count of the antagonistic acts additionally rely on upon some of these exercises and in addition other more particular exercises like insight assembling and summon and control of public safety and military strengths. A genuine interruption in these exercises and abilities could indirectly impact on the Nations security and even the capacity of the variety of resources, capacities, data, all personal information, and frameworks/ structure of the system, shaping what has been known as the country's basic foundations. These foundations have developed mind boggling and interconnected, implying that an interruption in one may prompt disturbances in others (GOV, 2009)(Security, NIPP 2013, 2013).Identification of CA:
DHS is also referred as Department of Homeland Security, through different components, by including through state country security authorities and lead organization authorities, looks to recognize framework resources that fit the meaning of basic foundation. The National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program here after is referred as NCIPP and the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative that is referred as CFDI , bolstered with evaluation and analysis from the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center and the Office of Infrastructure Analysis, recognize those benefits by including in the country and even in the foreign countries ...
Don L. Rondeau - Federal Air Marshall Letter of Appreciation Don L Rondeau
Don L. Rondeau - Led a federal intelligence training effort that focused on criminal behavior profiling as a component of the intelligence analysis process.
Don L. Rondeau - DHS Letter of Appreciation EgyptDon L Rondeau
Don L. Rondeau received a letter of appreciation from DHS leadership for forecasting the events that occurred during the so called " Arab Spring " . On behalf of DHS, Don briefed the nations critical infrastructure stakeholders on the conflict in the middle east . Don led the analysis, liaise and facilitation efforts .
Don L. Rondeau - Letter from Maryland Attorney General_cert_001Don L Rondeau
Letter of Appreciation from the Maryland Attorney General leading a missing children task force and drafting missing children legislation that became law. The law is thought to be a civil rights first as it is perceive to be the first US law of its kind named after a minority .
Have you ever wondered how search works while visiting an e-commerce site, internal website, or searching through other types of online resources? Look no further than this informative session on the ways that taxonomies help end-users navigate the internet! Hear from taxonomists and other information professionals who have first-hand experience creating and working with taxonomies that aid in navigation, search, and discovery across a range of disciplines.
Sharpen existing tools or get a new toolbox? Contemporary cluster initiatives...Orkestra
UIIN Conference, Madrid, 27-29 May 2024
James Wilson, Orkestra and Deusto Business School
Emily Wise, Lund University
Madeline Smith, The Glasgow School of Art
0x01 - Newton's Third Law: Static vs. Dynamic AbusersOWASP Beja
f you offer a service on the web, odds are that someone will abuse it. Be it an API, a SaaS, a PaaS, or even a static website, someone somewhere will try to figure out a way to use it to their own needs. In this talk we'll compare measures that are effective against static attackers and how to battle a dynamic attacker who adapts to your counter-measures.
About the Speaker
===============
Diogo Sousa, Engineering Manager @ Canonical
An opinionated individual with an interest in cryptography and its intersection with secure software development.
Acorn Recovery: Restore IT infra within minutesIP ServerOne
Introducing Acorn Recovery as a Service, a simple, fast, and secure managed disaster recovery (DRaaS) by IP ServerOne. A DR solution that helps restore your IT infra within minutes.
This presentation by Morris Kleiner (University of Minnesota), was made during the discussion “Competition and Regulation in Professions and Occupations” held at the Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 10 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at oe.cd/crps.
This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.
Doctoral Symposium at the 17th IEEE International Conference on Software Test...
Rondeaupanel2009spring (1)
1. Vol.15, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
www.iacsp.com
Vol.15, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
30
National Operations Center
Panel
DiscussionHow Do We Protect
The Critical Infrastructure
Within The United States?
2. Panel Discussion
Mr. Rondeau:
First and foremost, thank you all
for your outstanding contributions
to securing our homeland and its
valuable resources. I am extremely
privileged to have such a stellar
team of thought leaders and ex-
perts to offer as a resource to both
our clients at TSSI and its parent
company, Macfadden. Several of
our panelists are currently serv-
ing as members of TSSI’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Strategic
Advisory Group and we also have
our team of trainers in our midst
who specialize in the transportation
sector and are here
to provide valuable
threat and vulner-
ability assessment
expertise.
As each of you is
aware, there is a
tremendous level
of interdependency
among the various
sectors of critical
infrastructure. The
cascading affect of a
naturaldisasterorter-
rorist attack is inevi-
table due the nature
of these dependen-
cies. How does this
interdependency af-
fectourabilitytoplan
and prepare for these
types of events?
Major General
(Ret) Arnold:
The interdependen-
cy piece will always be
there and there is no way to
really get around that. Today,
all of the parts and pieces are
brought together through our
Editor’s Note: Critical infrastructure is the backbone of our national economy and is essential to
the health, security, safety and economic well-being of our nation. Don L. Rondeau, President and
CEO of Total Security Services International, Inc. (TSSI), IACSP Board member and President of the
IACSP’s Washington DC chapter, recently gathered a team of national homeland security experts and
professionals to discuss the current challenges faced in protecting critical infrastructure within the
United States. In this dynamic and thought-provoking roundtable discussion, these leaders discuss
how to identify and assess emerging threats and how our nation can enhance its ability to protect
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) whose destruction, incapacity, or degradation would
have a debilitating impact on our nation’s safety and security.
Don L.
Rondeau
Moderator
As President
and CEO of TSSI (www.tssi-inc.
com), Don L. Rondeau oversees the
development of new business op-
portunities in the homeland security
arena, focusing on transportation
safety,assetprotection,contingency
planningandconflictmitigation.Mr.
Rondeau also serves as Senior Vice
President of Critical Infrastructure
at Macfadden, parent company of
TSSI.Mr.Rondeau’sexpertisespans
a broad and dis-
tinguished ca-
reer in the area
of critical infra-
structureprotec-
tion.
Panelists:
Joe M.
Allbaugh
JoeM.AllbaughservedasDirectorof
theFederalEmergencyManagement
Agency(FEMA)from2001through
2003. As head of FEMA, Allbaugh
coordinated the Nation’s $8.8 billion
response and recovery efforts in the
traumatic days following 9/11 and
received much public acclaim for
his leadership of FEMA. He is also
afoundingmemberofthePresident’s
Homeland SecurityAdvisory Coun-
cil. Mr.Allbaugh currently serves as
President of Allbaugh International
Group, LLC.
Major
General
(Ret)
Wallace
Arnold
Major General
(Ret) Arnold
possesses a wealth of leadership,
command and operational experi-
ence. Culminating his Army career
as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
forPersonnel,hehascontinuedasuc-
cessfulprivatesectorcareersincehis
retirement in 1995. Major General
(Ret)Arnoldservedasdirectorofthe
Hampton University Data Conver-
sion and Management Laboratory,
and as Interim President, Cheyney
University of Pennsylvania. He re-
ceivedanHonoraryDoctorateofLaw
from Campbell University.
Stephen J. McHale
S t e p h e n J .
McHale is co-
chair of Patton
Boggs, LLP,
Homeland Se-
curity, Defense
and Technol-
information and communications
systems. Into the future, it will be
critical to recognize this interde-
pendence. Through communica-
tions and information we can allow
that interdependency to become
more transparent.
I would also like to point out that
when we speak about critical as-
sets, the most critical asset that I
think of is our people. We don’t
normally think about people as an
infrastructure resource, but people
are the most important resource
that we have. It takes people to do
everything else.
Capt. Brown:
Our country is absolutely transpor-
tation and information dependent
and there is virtually nothing that
can be done in isolation the way our
economy and our industrial base is
set-up. We are dependent on just in
time stocking, and as such, we are
never really more than 3 to 4 days
away from food riots. For example,
if our transportation systems were
to break down, or trucks stopped
for inspections and not permitted
to move, the implications would
be devastating. Furthermore, our
critical infrastructure tends to have
endpoints within very populous
areas. As a result, what affects
one area, affects oth-
ers. It’s really not just
what may happen in
a given industry, or to
a given structure, but
what happens near it,
in it or around it.
Mr. McHale:
I think we’ve come
a long way over the
course of the past 7
years. In looking at
the interdependen-
cies we’ve uncovered
many dependencies
we had never known
to exist. We also have
a much greater under-
standing of the nature
of the terrorist threat.
Mr. Beatty:
The key to protecting
critical infrastructure
and ensuring continu-
ous delivery of ser-
vices is identifying single
points of failure. Often imple-
menting a redundant capability
is a more economical and ef-
ficient response. For example,
I would also like to point out that
when we speak about critical
assets, the most critical asset that
I think of is our people. We don’t
normally think about people as an
infrastructure resource, but people
are the most important resource
that we have. It takes people to do
everything else.
3. Vol.15, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
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Vol.15, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
32
while working as a consultant with an emergency
servicescommandcenterinachallengingenviron-
ment with difficult terrain, we found there was no
back-up or failover system in place. The cost of
hardeningthissinglepointoffailurewasexcessive,
butthecostofcreatingredundancyoranalternative
capabilitywassignificantlylessthanprotectingthe
single site of infrastructure itself. Sometimes even
after spending millions of dollars on high-end se-
curity solutions, you may have done all you can to
reasonably protect site “A” when what you really
need is an alternative site “B”.
Mr. Allbaugh:
We cannot ignore our infrastructure. It is the key
to our economy, key to our freedom and key to
our mobility and our security. We are at risk, and
the most important thing that we as Americans
can do is to not become complacent. We have to
reach out and make sure that our employees are
involved with this effort from the private sector
to interact with appropriate government agen-
cies to make sure there is a proactive approach
to understanding our infrastructure and devising
ways to protect our weakest components.
Mr. Rondeau:
Single point vulnerabilities are a fundamental
concern when evaluating infrastructure vulner-
abilities. How can we avoid having an Achil-
les’ heel or single point of failure within our
infrastructure?
Capt. Brown:
We must avoid a single point of failure by build-
ing in alternate sources or back-up redundancies.
Unfortunately, all too often this point of failure
does exist. Sometimes it’s a technology or me-
chanical aspect – sometimes a location.
Major General (Ret) Arnold:
I’m not sure that we have a single point of weak-
ness. If there is one, it’s probably between the
connectivity of our communications systems
– being able to communicate on key aspects of
infrastructure vulnerability and risk to certain
things.The more we improve our communication
the better off we can be. We can reduce risks and
be able to react better to our planning processes if
we obtain information in a timely manner.
Mr. McHale:
There is ultimately no way we can have an open
society and open economy and not have areas of
vulnerability and risk. We don’t have resources
for 100% protection to prevent 100% of threats,
and we never will. Nor do we want to live in the
type of society that supports this. What we really
need to do is build a resilient system. We actually
have a pretty resilient infrastructure in place in
that there are very few real choke points that
can’t be worked around fairly quickly. However
there are still choke points.
Mr. Allbaugh:
Once you identify 100 points of weakness or
20 points of weakness, you have to prioritize
where these weaknesses are and immediately set
about executing a plan to make sure there is not
a single point of weakness anywhere. We have
to identify them and execute a plan immediately
to make sure that the weakness only becomes a
manageable vulnerability.
Mr. Rondeau:
What can we do to ease the cascading effect
of an attack or disaster that affects this infra-
structure?
Mr. McHale:
The biggest danger during the immediate after-
math is the danger of overreaction. For example,
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was
a lack of information and understanding about
what had happened. The entire aviation system
was shut down along with a number of other
measures taken. Tunnels were shut down; the
movement of hazardous materials on railways
was slowed.All sorts of unrelated and uncoordi-
nated actions severely affected both our economy
and our ability to respond.
In the immediate aftermath, we must have a plan
to prevent hurting ourselves more that we have
been hurt by the attack itself. In the longer term,
we must carefully reassess what vulnerabilities
have been uncovered and make sure they are
taken care of and prepare for whatever may be
coming at us next.
Mr. Allbaugh:
Now that we’re 5 years, 9 months beyond the
creation of the Department of Homeland Secu-
ogy Transfer Practice Group. Mr. McHale
brings 24 years of government service and
experience consulting clients on national and
homeland security matters.As the first deputy
administrator of the U.S. Transportation Se-
curityAdministration (TSA), he played a key
role in federalizing aviation security after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and has
played a key role in working with govern-
ment leaders to develop critical infrastructure
protection plans within the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
Jeff Beatty
As founder and former
president of TSSI’s prede-
cessor organization, Jeff
Beatty continues to serve as
a Special Senior Advisor to
President and CEO, Don L.
Rondeau atTSSI.Aformer Delta ForceAssault
Troop Commander and Operations Officer, Mr.
Beatty later served as an FBI SpecialAgent and
advisor to the national Hostage Rescue Team
(HRT) and as a CIA Counter-terrorism Center
Case Officer, where he successfully managed
anti-terrorism operations in Europe and the
Middle East.Arenowned anti-terrorism expert,
the U.S. Senate sought his testimony regarding
transportationsecurityissues,includingaviation,
following 9/11. He authored the Anti-terrorism
Action Plans for the American Trucking Asso-
ciation and theAmerican BusAssociation. Mr.
Beatty predicted the Atlanta Olympic Bomb
and warned all U.S. Airlines in 2000 to harden
cockpit doors and change procedures relating to
apparent hijackings.
Capt. Raymond
Brown (Ret)
Capt. Raymond Brown of-
fers specialized maritime
andlandsecurityexperience
and possesses unmatched
threat vulnerability and as-
sessment and security awareness training expe-
rience. A former Chief of Analysis in the U.S.
Coast Guard’s Intelligence Center and White
Housemilitaryaide,Capt.Brownhasdeveloped
several highly successful anti-terrorism training
programswithinthetransportationsector,includ-
ing courses for the American Bus Association,
the Massachusetts Turn-
pike Authority and Logan
Airport.
Col. John S.
Rogers (Ret)
Col. John S. Rogers has
extensivesecurityandforce
protection experience and
hasconductednumerousinternationalthreatand
vulnerabilityassessmentsinvolatileareasaround
the world during his service as a U.S. Marine
Corps officer, including Korea, Bosnia and
Kosovo. Additionally, Col. Rogers led training
coursedevelopmentfortheFederalMotorCarrier
SafetyAdministration’s (FMCSA) Safety Inves-
tigators and has conducted threat assessments on
behalf of the National Park Service and the USS
Constitution.An expert in security-related issues
Col. Rogers is adept at
identifying vulnerable
infrastructure and devel-
opingappropriatesecurity
plans.
Edward J.
Boekenkamp
A former U.S. Marine
Corps officer, Edward J. Boekenkamp has spent
more than 30 years leading numerous security
initiatives.Havingtrainedmorethan30,000indi-
vidualssince9/11,hehasabreadthofexperience
intheinternationalarenaandmaritimeoperations.
Hehasconductedcriticalvulnerabilityandthreat
analysisassessmentsforinternationalfirmsinad-
dition to state and federal infrastructure.
4. Vol.15, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
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Vol.15, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
34
rity, there’s been a mindset and reluctance to
share information. I think it is most important for
federal state and local governments to intersect
with private infrastructure to identify those weak
points and share that information. If we don’t
know where the weak points are, it is really hard
to devise a plan against nimble and agile terror-
ists. We have to start with that basic database.
There have been several attempts over the past
5 years, but not all of the information has been
shared properly. What people in Washington or
other federal sites around the country may think
is critical may not be the same as what the local
folks think. So there really has to be an agree-
ment on the database and then we must devise a
plan to protect those weaknesses.
Capt. Brown:
The most important thing is to recog-
nize that it can happen and be willing
to take time to not only plan for these
types of events, but also to train people
and actually exercise the plan. In many
industries, businesses, port authorities,
transportation authorities, etc., contin-
gency plans may or may not exist. If
they do, they may not have been up-
dated. In the wake of 9/11 and Katrina,
many were shaken out of their lethargy,
but as time goes on, people become
more concerned about the bottom line.
Ageneration ago, the mantra that safety
is everyone’s job became important.
The thing to do now is to be sure that a
new mantra evolves and that it becomes
part of everyone’s mindset that security
is everyone’s job.
Col. Rogers:
Our work within the transportation sec-
tor has helped understand the potential
impact of infrastructure damage. It
affects the entire economy. The key is help-
ing understand potential impact. We must help
people realize time is money and help them to
feel part of the solution.
Mr. Rondeau:
How can we more effectively identify threats
and risks and assess our vulnerabilities?
Capt. Brown:
We must always identify threats, most always
originate from the outside, and vulnerabilities,
or weaknesses from within. When your threats
meet your vulnerabilities that is when you have
a real problem. We must then work to identify
responses and prioritize vulnerabilities. Finally,
given that we can’t solve everything at once, we
must prioritize limited resources.
Most importantly, once we’ve done all of these
things, we need to teach people how to think
about safety and security. It’s a continuous loop,
you must keep revisiting it. It needs to become
a way of life, just like safety has become a way
of life for most industries in the U.S.
Major General (Ret) Arnold:
We have to build in as much redundancy as we
can to allow continued operations. It is essential
that we do not put all of our eggs into one basket.
We must look at alternative routes and means.
Modeling and simulation is key. We need to use
more simulated environments to train in. Future
systems should target key critical infrastructure
assets to replicate and then train against these.
Then see what you can do to make it “not hap-
pen” and prioritize what can reasonably be done
with limited resources.
Mr. Rondeau:
How can we better prioritize threats with limited
resources?
Mr. Beatty:
The best thing we can do is have a thorough
understanding of the threat and work with those
who have demonstrated a superior knowledge
of threat capabilities and our own capabilities.
Then we can better prioritize your limited dollars
to address the vulnerabilities that are most likely
“real” risks. It is important to understand
that you don’t have to make your security
perfect… By simply moving that vulner-
ability to the “too hard to do” category,
where the attacker cannot be certain of
success, we can significantly reduce our
vulnerability by making an attack not
worth the operational energy required
where there is no guarantee that the attack
will succeed. As a part of this strategy, we
can channelize the enemy into performing
certain necessary precursor “Operational
Acts” and put training and technologies in
place to detect those “Operational Acts.”
Thus giving security forces increased
opportunities to detect and defeat attacks
before they are pressed home...
Col. Rogers:
The most common challenge today is
always resources, whether lack of time,
money or people. There are many ways
to help protect against threats using tech-
nology or personnel. Sometimes simply
updating plans with security policies and
procedures that better protect critical assets
is a much more cost-effective alternative.
Major General (Ret) Arnold:
I don’t necessarily agree that resources are lim-
ited. We have access to fairly vast resources. It’s
more a matter of how we use those resources.
For example, we have a number of intelligence
gathering organizations but a number of them
are still stove piped and lack an essential cross
feed of information that would allow threats to
be recognized and allow analysts to work with
more information. We must continue to create
transparency and break down these information
silos. It’s not so much that we don’t have the
resources; it’s really how we bring them together
for a common good. We must share information
and establish standards.
Mr. McHale:
It’s always a question of getting timely, opera-
tional intelligence to law enforcement and others
who need to act on it. We need to get meaning-
Col. Rogers:
In the 21st century we know one of our greatest
threats is from terror. It’s also critical to take
an all-hazards approach and not just focus on
terrorism. For example, during natural disasters,
critical infrastructure is always vulnerable. The
key is to have a general idea of potential threats
and our own vulnerabilities and be cognizant
of whether those threats will actually exploit
our vulnerabilities. If the two marry, that’s
where you should put your resources. The best
thing to do is to start by conducting a threat and
vulnerability assessment. Realize that you have
vulnerabilities and look at the known threats.
The most common challenge today
is always resources, whether lack
of time, money or people. There
are many ways to help protect
against threats using technology
or personnel. Sometimes simply
updating plans with security policies
and procedures that better protect
critical assets is a much more cost-
effective alternative.
5. Vol.15, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
www.iacsp.com
Vol.15, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
36
ful, timely information out to industry
security officers and officials so they
are able to act on the information and
build it into their planning allowing
them to identify real risks and allocate
resources toward those risks. If we
justtellsomeonetoprotectthemselves
against all risks, they’re not going to
protect themselves very well against
anyrisk.Ifwetellthemtoprotectthem-
selves against particularized risks they
are much more likely to take effective
measures to protect themselves.
Mr. Rondeau:
How are technologies such as
modeling and simulation, among
others, improving our ability to
identify threats?
Capt. Brown:
One thing that concerns me is that
many organizations are selling tech-
nologysolutionsasthoughtheyarea
silver bullet. I personally don’t think
thereisone.Yes,therearegreattools
out there. It’s the American way to
look for a technological solution.
But when it comes down to it, the
human mind is our greatest weapon.
With extensive experience in critical
infrastructure and security, these
experts can take a hard look and see
what needs to be done. These tools
need to be evaluated for their intrin-
sic value, but it still takes trained
peoplewhoknowhowtothinkabout
threat and vulnerability.
Mr. Allbaugh:
I am so proud of the private sector
and their ingenuity. What is frustrat-
ing to me is that our government is
often extremely reluctant or just flat
outfailstoembracenewtechnologies
that are available. There has to be a
mechanism for these technologies to
come into our federal government
in order to be adopted, employed or
deployed. It takes a huge amount of
networkingtogetinfrontofdecision
maker – it takes time. A lot of folks
think that is good because it takes
timetohavethebesttechnologiesrise
to the top. I’m all in favor of the best
technologies becoming the cream of
the milk, but we have to balance that
with being expeditious and making
sure the latest and greatest technolo-
giesareusedtoprotectourinfrastruc-
ture, protect our services and protect
our citizens and our borders.
Mr. Rondeau:
Nearly 85 percent of our nation’s
critical infrastructure is presently
owned by the private sector. How
can we encourage and develop
partnerships between industry and
government? How are these part-
nerships central to the success of
our protection of critical assets?
Col. Rogers:
Our government has done a good
job taking steps to improve this.An
educational outreach program is re-
ally needed to help private industry
understand the interdependencies
of our infrastructure and understand
that we’re all in this together and
working toward a common goal.
Our work with the trucking in-
dustry within the transportation
sector has really heightened the
awareness of the potential impact
infrastructure damage can have on
the economy as a whole. We need
to help industry realize our infra-
structure is extremely interrelated
and help them feel like they are part
of the solution.
Mr. Allbaugh:
The consolidation of committees of
authority in Congress is a huge step
in the right direction. It is imperative
that Congress takes steps to ensure
that FEMA is able to perform and
act expediently without interruption.
That means FEMA should have the
authority to respond to man-made or
natural disasters with ability to per-
form emergency tasks and services at
the time of disaster without having to
gothroughtoomanylayersofbureau-
cracy. FEMAhastakentherightsteps
to reach out to the private sector and
organize critical partnerships. There
are programs being coordinated by
FEMAtoday,thatareverysuccessful
and that saves lives. However, with
more budget and personnel, it can
become even more successful. The
private sector holds the keys to the
information on the ground. Effective
actions by governmental agencies
rely,toalargeextent,onthisinforma-
tion. Greater cooperation between
both will lead to efficiency, and most
important, to saving lives.
Mr. Boekenkamp:
Ourbiggestpotentialforweaknessoc-
curswhenwefailtoinvolveAmerican
citizenship. Our work with the “First
Observer” trucking security program
inconjunctionwiththeTransportation
Security Administration is an excel-
lent example of the type of grassroots
efforts that can be very effective. No
we do not have all of the assets and
resources that we require and we
never will. Industry partnerships will
bekey,butwealsoneedtoextendour
efforts down to the level of our citi-
zenry. Observe and report.At the end
of the day, that’s what it comes down
to. We can have all of the security in
the world and all of the latest techno-
logical advances, but if the citizen’s
of our great country don’t feel part of
the dynamic process, we’re going to
lose something there.
Major General (Ret) Arnold:
There must be some policy break-
throughs. To achieve a level of real
collaboration we must establish
policies, procedures and standards
and then we can begin to create
transparency between the public
and private sector.
Capt. Brown:
The partnerships are being devel-
oped, but not to the extent neces-
sary. The federal government has
fostered partnerships through the
use of grants to benefit municipali-
ties, urban areas and various trans-
portation authorities. The private
sector has been hauled in at the
margins, but this is still embryonic
in the U.S. Through additional
grants, tax incentives and training
projects we can further develop
these partnerships.
Mr. McHale:
These partnerships are essential.
We must continue to remind people
and advise the private sector about
the types of risks they are likely to
face and let them know the cost of
not being prepared. Most impor-
tantly, we must continue to share
information. Unless, we get the
information out to those who need
it, we’re not getting the value from
the information.
Mr. Beatty:
We have to do more low-cost,
high-value things. We also can-
not paint civilian owners of criti-
cal infrastructure into a liability
corner. We must train people to
increase security awareness. In-
creasing the number of eyes and
ears is not overly burdensome.
Outreach is essential to educate
and sensitize people to understand
our new world. By giving them a
new awareness, we teach them to
observe and report things and alter
their default tendency to rationalize
irregularities and believe a reason-
able explanation must exist. The
new default position must be to
report ANY irregularity.
Mr. Rondeau:
What steps should we be taking to
continue enhancing our nation’s
preparedness?
Mr. Boekenkamp:
At TSSI we’ve laid down a pretty
good template. We have an envi-
able history of providing training
vulnerability analysis, identifying
vulnerabilities, and risk manage-
ment matrix and have tailored
solutions from here. We’re not
totally there yet nationwide, but it’s
going to be an ongoing endeavor as
threats continue to evolve.
I keep going back to the deterrent
value. If we can continue to exert
intelligent pressure, the results will
be incredible. By engaging people
we improve our preparedness.
Col. Rogers:
Our nation is really good at being
reactive, but we really need to be-
come more proactive. We are not
completely there yet, but national
efforts in the post - 9/11 period have
contributed to an enhanced ability
to proactively anticipate, deter and
defeat threats before those threats
manifest into actions that adversely
impact critical infrastructure and
key assets.
Major General (Ret) Arnold:
We need to continue to improve
our intelligence networks and have
resources be more transparent and
improve sharing of information. We
must continue to build redundancy
for critical systems and improve in-
ternational networking to facilitate a
real exchange of information.
Mr. Rondeau:
The reality is that we continue to be
surprised by disasters and terrorist
attacks more than we should. This
proven group of leaders is adept at
respondingtoterroristthreats,matters
of national security, high level strate-
gic training missions and has dem-
onstrated a unique ability to actively
engagetheprivatesector.Tocontinue
on a positive path toward improving
the security of our most valuable as-
sets, we must be more than program
managers and more than security ex-
perts.Weneedtocontinuetointegrate
best-in-class science and put critical
information in the hands of those in
charge of responding to an event. As
anation,wearecontinuallyimproving
our ability to analyze intelligence and
improve processes that save
lives, alleviate suffering and
protect our nation’s assets
and people.