The document reflects on the 'National Covenant for Freedom' signed in 1980 as a nationalist alternative to President Marcos' administration, highlighting its relevance to today's political climate in the Philippines. It emphasizes the persistence of deep-seated issues such as poverty and corruption over the decades and calls for a unified opposition approach to address these challenges. The author argues that a new national covenant is needed to unify opposition forces and engage constructively with the current administration while warning against external influence on local political processes.

1. Remembering the “National Covenant for Freedom” 40 Years Later
Josef T. Yap
Buried in the heap of Martial Law history and largely forgotten is a document titled “A
National Covenant for Freedom”.1
Signed by 71 prominent politicians, activists, and civic
leaders on August 28, 1980, the Covenant provided a peaceful, credible, and nationalist
alternative to the administration of President Marcos. The signatories represented eight
political groups spearheaded by the Nacionalista and Liberal parties, which were led by
Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Senator Gerardo ‘Gerry’ Roxas, respectively. Exponents of
the Covenant consisted primarily of members of the “center” in the spectrum of political
ideologies at that time.
The Covenant has gained relevance in light of recent events in Philippine society. Some of
the values and institutions that were advocated 40 years ago are being threatened not only
by policies and actions of the current government but also by the global pandemic that has
wrought great pain and suffering. Many statements and concepts in the Covenant are
uncannily relevant today: “destroying our democratic institutions”; “profoundly dividing the
national community”; “rubber-stamp legislature”; “power and resources of the government at
the disposal of his own political party”; “instrument to acquire ownership and control of
information media”; “suppressing dissent”; “spawned organized crime often committed by
law-enforcement agents themselves”; “widespread economic hardship”; “created his own
economic oligarchy”; “the evils of corruption and bribery, of intimidation, torture, and
coercion, as well as the ineptitude, arrogance, and profligacy of the politically powerful”;
“concerned citizens and champions of civil liberties have now become the hunted ‘enemies’
of the state”.
It would be tempting to simply substitute the name of the current President for “Marcos” and
present the Covenant as a critique of the ills that prevail in current Philippine society. But
that generalization ignores the fact that many of the threats and problems confronting us
today have existed even before Martial Law. These are deep-seated structural issues that
have persisted because of the lack of fundamental change in our political, social, and
economic institutions. Some of the more nagging problems are patchy economic
development, poverty and inequality, inadequate social services, dominance of oligarchs,
lack of political representation, rampant corruption, and social injustice. Ironically, the
present administration rose to power because the electorate was seeking an unorthodox
alternative that could effectively address the aforementioned structural problems.
Meanwhile, readers should be aware of the nuances that surrounded the crafting of this
document. While laying the blame on President Marcos for the failures that were
enumerated, one of the key objectives of the Covenant was to provide his administration an
alternative program of government. The Covenant was eventually transformed into the
United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO). The analogy used by the UNIDO leadership was a
battery that could only function if it had a positive pole and a negative pole. The UNIDO
would be the opposite—or more accurately the complementary—pole of the Marcos
government and whichever side prevailed in free and fair elections, the country would be
assured of a flow of energy. This was assuming, of course, that the Marcos government
would institute the necessary reforms. A concrete and peaceful alternative would also assure
Marcos of a graceful exit if this was ever in his menu of options.

Former President, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS). The usual disclaimer applies.
1
The document is reproduced in full below.

2. If the events 40 years ago have any lessons for today’s politicians, activists, and civic
leaders, these have to be culled carefully. The most important is to adopt a unified approach
in addressing the major problems of Philippine society. There should be a modern-day but
more comprehensive National Covenant. Hopefully, the process will lead to a single
opposition presidential candidate in the 2022 elections. But the entire exercise would require
management of often bloated personal egos. Applying the framework of the New Institutional
Economics, a great deal of political entrepreneurship is required. In 1980, that role was
played by Speaker Laurel, Senator Roxas, and my father. The three had the support and
respect of the signatories of the Covenant.
Apart from the unified approach, the New Covenant has to be constructive in dealing with
the current Administration. My own observation is that while the various opposition groups
and the mainstream media have raised valid criticisms about the current administration,
there are times when the focus has been on creating “gotcha” moments. On the other hand,
the government has been intolerant of any form of criticism and in certain instances has
weaponized the law to intimidate and silence detractors. What is required is a reset on both
sides. This also requires political entrepreneurship which can be exercised by an elderly
statesman.
The story of the Covenant and UNIDO does not end well. Until his death in 2011, my father
believed that the process was hijacked by external forces. For this part, I quote from the
biography of my father:2
“The UNIDO had a golden opportunity when Marcos held presidential elections in
1981. Apa immediately drew up the basic platform of the party, stipulating that 1)
whoever won the election should immediately call for a constitutional convention; 2)
shortly after the Constitution was promulgated, national elections should be held
including that for the position of President; and 3) the winner of the 1981 elections
would not run in the elections under the new Constitution. Privately, Apa
recommended that Speaker Laurel be the standard-bearer of UNIDO. Being in the
twilight of his illustrious career but still intellectually sharp and possessing strong
charisma, Speaker Laurel was the ideal candidate.
“Alas, nefarious forces prevailed upon key leaders of UNIDO to boycott the 1981
elections. The main argument cited was that it would be futile to join a competition that
was rigged. Doy Laurel convinced his older brother Speaker Laurel to follow this cue.
Apa was devastated. To no avail, he pleaded with Speaker, arguing that electoral
victory was not important at all. What was essential was to trumpet UNIDO’s position
and in the process cement its stature as the main opposition to Marcos. The Filipinos
deserved to have a clear-cut alternative even if their choice would not be reflected in
the ballot-count.
“Apa was convinced that Doy Laurel had been pre-empted by ‘external forces.’ He also
suspected that Doy did not approve of his suggestion that the Speaker be UNIDO’s
standard-bearer in 1981.
2
J. Dalisay and J. T. Yap. Lessons from Nationalist Struggle: The Life of Emmanuel Quiason Yap. Mandaluyong
City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2016, pages 77-78. “Apa” is how Emmanuel Q. Yap’s children called him. “Tita Lett”
is his sister Angelita Yap Ledesma. Antonio Ledesma (Tito Tony) was a Jesuit before he left the priesthood to
marry Angelita. Doy Laurel is Senator Salvador H. Laurel who became Vice-President under Cory Aquino.

3. “Tita Lett and her husband Tito Tony (Antonio Ledesma) had an anecdote about a
meeting they had with Doy in 1985 in his Mandaluyong residence. At that time he
stubbornly refused to give in to Cory Aquino as standard bearer of the opposition for
the 1986 presidential snap election: ‘Walang atrasan ito!’ Their meeting was
interrupted by a telephone call for Doy from the American ambassador. After the
conversation, Doy announced his withdrawal as candidate for President.”
This biographical account explains why UNIDO was eventually marginalized and sheds light
on the emergence of a military-civilian takeover in 1986. Another lesson that can be learned
from the experience of the National Covenant for Freedom is that active intervention by a
foreign power can thwart all good intentions. For a reset between the current government
and opposition forces to be effective, no foreign government should be allowed to interfere.