Political Science Theories

1. International Relations Theory
Or “IR”
• Very complex. People
get PhDs in this stuff.
We have just three
hours to introduce you
to the basics.
• This language is
common in the policy
world, so you need to
be familiar with it.
• Don’t get confused by
language. “Liberal” has
a very specific meaning
here.
• IR is a theory of how
states behave in the
system. Not all Realists
agree with each other.
Not all Liberals agree.

2. Realism
• States will act in their
interests; states are the
central actors
• States see interest as
power
• States seek
sovereignty/security and
independence
• Force and war are
primary tools of the
international system
• Competition; world is a
zero-sum game
• Hobbesian view of human
nature
• States naturally seek allies
and balance of power
• Interest, not ideology
dominates
• States should make
cost/benefit analyses;
wars of choice usually not
worth the costs

3. Liberalism
• Globalism matters;
states are not the only
central actors
• States can (and do)
cede sovereignty
• Power and force are not
the only factors; world
can be driven by ideas
• Economic liberals
– War is bad for business
• Social (or democratic)
liberals; spread
democracy and contacts
as a way to reduce
tensions
• Institutional liberals
– UN, OSCE, EU, WTO, IMF,
ICC, World Bank, NGOs

4. Constructivism
• States act based on
their culture, their
history, their geography.
• Better accounts for
changes over time and
space.
• More difficult to
anticipate results.
• A North Korean nuke is
a threat to the US; a
British nuke is not. This
is primarily because the
US reads the British and
North Koreans through
different cultural and
historical lenses.

5. Best to Blend Theories
• I was responsible for designing our East Asian security strategy. China
had tripled its economy and was rapidly increasing its military
expenditures. I had participated in groups at Harvard and Aspen looking
at the East Asian balance. There was a great deal of concern about the
rise of Chinese power, and some voices advocated a policy of
containment before China became too strong. In my view, such an
approach would guarantee Chinese enmity and unnecessarily discount
possible benign futures. Yet treating China as a friend would not
guarantee friendship. We designed a strategy that drew upon both
realism and liberalism. From a realist perspective, the three key powers
in East Asia were the US, Japan and China. We first reinforced the US-
Japan security relationship, which was then in disrepair, as many
analysts regarded it as a Cold War relic and saw Japan as a geo-economic
threat. By re-establishing the security relationship with Japan, we
ensured that China could not play the Japan card against us. The second
part of the strategy relied on liberalism. We eschewed the language of
containment, opened markets with China and supported its accession to
the World Trade Organization. I have termed the policy ‘integrate, but
hedge’ – Joseph Nye, China advisor to Bill Clinton.