The Republic of Dubrovnik was able to preserve its freedom and independence for centuries through skilled diplomacy rather than military might, as it had only a small army. It realized early on that as a small state, it needed powerful allies for protection but had to balance relations between neighbors to remain neutral. Dubrovnik cultivated talented individuals for its diplomacy and sometimes had to use deception to survive as a small player among larger powers. When under Venetian rule from 1205-1358, Dubrovnik was able to maintain some autonomy through agreements that regulated political, economic and trade relations, while expanding its territories through strategic alliances and diplomatic maneuvers.

1. RAGUSAN DIPLOMACY
Freedom as a base for the existence, continuation, development, political, cultural and
economic growth was by all means the main pillar of Dubrovnik. The Republic of Dubrovnik,
in its relatively long history, succeeded on numerous occasions in preserving its freedom not
by virtue of the blood spilt by its small army but by reasoning of its diplomacy and the sweet
of its diplomats. To clarify it I will quote Napoleon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Charles-
Maurice Talleygrand-Perigord, in his instructions given to the French Chargee d’Affaires in
Dubrovnik in 1806. He described the situation of Dubrovnik in all but a few words:
‘Dubrovnik is already too weak to defend itself, thus is always seeking protection from
foreigners. Its system has bowed down before the stronger, and through political events has
come about not to participate with them.’1
People of Dubrovnik realized their position very early. Therefore, they played a role
that was only possible one. They played it according to the maxim: if you want to be free,
there is but one way; it is to guarantee an equally full measure of liberty to all your
neighbours. There is no other.
Dubrovnik never equipped itself or held an army, which would have been able to lead
a conquering war against its neighbours. Without any significant armed force Republic had to
find other ways to preserve its freedom. Deep-rooted awareness that the small states in
complex international relations could not hold long with their own forces meant that
Dubrovnik needed a strong protector with great power. The republic of Dubrovnik over time
had a number of powerful protectors starting with Byzantium, Venetians, later Croatian-
Hungarian Kingdom, The Pope, the Spanish King, and finally, the Turks. For this kind of
protection Dubrovnik was paying levies that are characterized as limiting of its own
independence and a sign of weakness. Maybe we can agree with this statement, but we have
to take into consideration that paying these levies cost less than having to maintain a much
bigger national military force, which in any case, would not be sufficient enough to fight
against much stronger military force. Nevertheless, significant benefits were gained especially
on the trade provisions because of the fact that Dubrovnik was paying for the protection and
1
M. Gavrilovic, Writings, from Parisian Archives, Belgrade 1904, p. 41

2. therefore in the wartime was considered as a neutral state. By being a neutral state Dubrovnik
had an open route to trade with both war sides when it was not possible to the others.
This would not be possible without having a clear picture of what they were, what do
they wanted and to who they would bound in order to get it. Thus, it was essential to have a
structure that gives the state opportunity to analyze the circumstances that surrounded it. In
turbulent times, in which Republic existed, it was not easy to keep order within the boundaries
of a small but wealthy state. Balancing on a thin line between East and West, between mighty
and frequently unfriendly neighbours, made the small state of Dubrovnik a diplomatic
tightrope walker expert in maintaining an upright position. Preservation of neutrality in
international conflicts and the defence of its borders were mainly in the hands of diplomatic
representatives. It is remarkable fact that at the times of great political difficulties, which I am
going to describe in following chapters, Dubrovnik had people who were in some certain
matter fit for the tasks that have been given to them. Throughout history Dubrovnik’s
individuals of exceptional capability dealt with the matters of politics and diplomacy. It is
significant that most of them had an aristocratic background, although some of them were of
other origins.
Sometimes, especially in complex and difficult situations, Dubrovnik’s diplomats
were instructed to use falsity or even lie for the Republic. By being a small player in the game
of big players sometimes ‘…you have to pretend that you don’t know what you know very
well, and make out that you know what infact you did not actually know; make out that you
understand what you do not and that you do not understand what you actually understand very
well; transform power outside your own power; speak of the need to preserve secrets where
there is no secrecy; look deeply down when you have nothing to say; to pretend to be very
important person…’.2
To survive in the game of big players for such a long time was an art of
itself. It was, without any doubt, the ‘art of possible’.
DUBROVNIK UNDER VENETIAN RULE (1205-1358)
2
P.-A. Beaumarchais, Le marriage de Figaro, III, 5

3. The Pope, Inocent III, had sought a new Crusade, actually the fourth one, in which the
combined strength of Western and Eastern Christendom should be brought to bear against
Infidel. Venice for its part wanted to punish Byzantium for its past obduracy, exclude rivals
from trade and secure a dominant position on Levant. With great naval capability Venice had
a unique opportunity to get significant gains from the organizers of the crusade in exchange
for agreeing to transport crusaders to Holy Land. The organizers promised to Venetians
impossibly large sum for the transport.
In 1202, after postponing demands for payment, the Venetians persuaded the knights
to seize Zadar for them from Hungary. The following year, after the failure of the negotiations
and various upheavals within the Constantinople knights seized and plundered the city. Of
course, Venetian navy transported knights. Since Venetians had still not been paid they
demanded recompense. They obtained three-eighths share of Byzantium territories. Venetian
Tommaso Morosini was made a Patriarch of Constantinople. In 1205, on the way back from
Constantinople he was the one who secured the submission of Ragusa to Venetian rule. The
rift within Ragusan government made this task much easier.
The terms that Venice imposed to Ragusa were simply designed to ensure Venetian
continuing political hold. For instance, three times a year laudes in honour of the Doge and
Patriarch would be sung in the Cathedral, all Ragusans of thirteen years and over must take an
oath of loyalty to the Doge, and to each new count every ten years, each year twelve hostages
from most respectful noble families would be chosen and they would stay in Venice, Ragusa
would choose its archbishop from among Venetian clerics etc.
The new terms also regulated military and trade relations. Particularly significant ones
were provisions related to trade. On goods brought to Venice from all over Romania3
the
Ragusans were to pay dues of 5 per cent by value, from Sicily 2.5 percent and from Egypt,
Tunisia and Barbary Coast 20 percent. Nevertheless, the most important provisions were that
on the goods from Slavonia.4
The Ragusans were not obliged to pay custom dues at all. In the
Venice itself the Ragusans were not permitted to do business with foreigners.
3
The lands of the defunct Byzantine Empire
4
The lands of Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia and Dalmatia

4. These conditions, on which Dubrovnik once more acknowledged rule by Venice, are
revealing of the latter’s intentions during the whole period up to 1358, and to some extent
beyond. Venice showed no desire of sending Venetian nobles or soldiers to Ragusa. It gives
us a clear picture about Venice not being classical imperial power. Venice allowed Ragusans
enough political space to form their own sense of identity and even to form their own
institutions although the Count and Archbishop were Venetians and therefore formally
regarded as the supreme political and ecclesiastical authorities in the town. Behind this mostly
theoretical façade, however, reality was shifting. The Count’s power waned inevitably in the
course of thirteenth century, and his position had become largely ceremonial later. On 29 May
1272 in the public square, the codification of Ragusa’s laws5
was promulgated. It was a
framework, consisted of six books, within which political powers were deployed and secured.
Mainly it was written on the basis of the Venetian Statute.
During this period Ragusa had to deal with its hinterland not only on the field of trade
but also in ensuring its security. It was a time of many diplomatic turnovers, which, at the end,
resulted with the peace treaty in 1254, signed with King Stefan Uros I (1243-1276). From
1254 to 1268 Ragusa negotiated the provisions of this treaty and ended up with the treaty in
which both sides instituted so called Svetodimitarski dohodak (St Demetrius Revenue),
whereby the Ragusans undertook to pay Serbian king 2000 hyperperperi a year for the
security guaranteed to its merchants all over hinterland under Serbian rule. This kind of
tribute later passed into the hands of the kings of Bosnia and then lapsed after the Ottoman
conquest of the Balkans. Just to mention, this was not only tribute that Ragusans paid at that
moment. They paid tributes to Venetians too.
During this period Ragusa’s territories expanded. In 1301 Ragusa established full
control of the island of Mljet. The most important victory won on the diplomatic battlefield
was the one in which the Ragusa acquired territory of peninsula of Peljesac in 1333. This was
the first occasion when Ragusa fully demonstrated what would be regarded as its almost
legendary diplomatic virtuosity, by dabbling in other powers’ conflicts to advance its
interests. Ragusa, or at that time already known as Dubrovnik, found someone with whom it
could deal. Namely, King Stefan Uros IV Dusan (1331-1355) had his interests lay in
expansion towards the south rather than in drawn-out conflict over Peljesac between local
5
Liber Statutorum, popularly known as a Statute of Dubrovnik.

5. noble families. Meanwhile, Dubrovnik used its friends at the Serbian ruler ‘s court to
somehow influence the King. Finally, King Dusan agreed to yield to Dubrovnik his rights to
Peljesac, to the strategically important little island of Posrednica lying off the mouth of the
Neretva, and to Primorje, all in exchange for a cash payment of 8000 hyperperi and an annual
tribute of 500 Venetian ducats. The Bosnian ban, Stjepan Kotromanic, yielded to Dubrovnik
the rights he claimed over Peljesac6
in exchange for an annual tribute of 500 ducats. But he
refused to relinquish his rights to Posrednica and the coast from Neretva to Astarea, which
meant that Dubrovnik would have to try to defend and settle the Peljesac peninsula without
having overland access to it. But, for the time being Dubrovnik was, at least, in control of the
peninsula. After some 25 years later Dubrovnik made an acquisition of the heights of Zupa
just one year before the end of Venetian rule in Dubrovnik.
In the middle of the fourteenth century events have been taking place along the
Dalmatian coast, where Venice and Hungary were locked in the struggle that was approaching
its climax. The key to the conflict was the city of Zadar. A particularly virulent revolt against
Venetian rule broke out in 1345 and the Hungarian king Louis I of Anjou, sent troops to the
city to support it. Venice regained control over Zadar, but not for a long time. Venice’s
military position rapidly deteriorated with the renewal of the hostilities, as the Dalmatian
towns fell one by one into Hungarian hands. Dubrovnik was somehow different story. After
the news that the war along the Dalmatian coastline had resumed Ragusans pressed the
Venice. They wanted the Venetians to concede to Dubrovnik the right to choose its own count
and to accord greater economic privileges to Ragusan merchants, placing them on an equal
footing with those of Venice. In January 1358 Venetians granted Ragusans what they have
always previously refused, namely all the civic and commercial rights enjoyed by its own
citizens.
Instead of revolt against Venetian rule Ragusans made this transition from Venice to
Hungary in more diplomatic way. The strategy was to distinguish Dubrovnik in Venetian eyes
from the other ‘proud and rustic’ Dalmatians who had rudely ejected Venice’s representatives.
It meant that the Venetian count was sent off in a friendly fashion. The Ragusans even sent an
envoy to Venice to minimize the rift. Sending an envoy to Venice clearly distinguished
Ragusans from the Dalmatians. Many historians agree that envoy has been sent to reinforce
6
Actually the Bosnian ban did not in practice hold the peninsula itself, but he did hold Posrednica
and the coast from the Neretva to Dubrovnik Astarea

6. the distinction that the Ragusans hoped might yield future commercial benefits. During the
ages of Serenissima Dubrovnik acquired several territories, improved its civic institutions and
became a significant trade force on the Adriatic and Levant.
After being a part of Venetian-controlled Dalmatia Dubrovnik faced a rare opportunity
to negotiate its future position. The Ragusans went to talk with King Louis I of Anjou. This
time they were faced with the biggest challenge. It was the moment to achieve both effective
self-government and protection. This time they had to bow down to the crown of St Stephen.
DUBROVNIK’S AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT
UNDER HUNGARIAN SUZERAINTY
(1358-C. 1433)

7. On 18 February 1358 in Zadar Venice renounced in Hungary’s favour all its claims to
Dalmatia from the Kvarner to Durres. The names of each of the Dalmatian coast islands,
territories and towns were specified. Dubrovnik was no exception. Although Dubrovnik was
considered as a part of Venetian-controlled Dalmatia it has never been within Hungarian-
controlled Dalmatia. Unlike the other Dalmatian towns Dubrovnik had the cohesiveness of its
patriciate that had never been split by struggles between pro-Hungarian and pro-Venetian
factions. In the book Dubrovnik: A History Robin Harris mentioned:
It is on the face of it uprising, therefore, that Dubrovnik accepted so easily the
Hungarian claim to it as part of the newly conquered Dalmatia. It seems likely, however, that
what mattered to the Ragusans at this stage was reality not theory, and that realism suggested
giving an immediate warm welcome to the assertion of Hungarian claims. Dubrovnik always
needed outside protection and was always ultimately prepared to swallow its pride and pay
real or symbolic tribute to one or other great power in order to obtain it. Moreover, the easiest
power to deal with was – as it had been with Byzantium in the past and was with Hungary
now – one both sufficiently distant and sufficiently differently not be always intervening in
Ragusan business.7
The negotiations were to be held in Visegrad at the Hungarian royal court in 1358-
1359. It took two months of big debates in Dubrovnik’s Great Council until final position of
Dubrovnik’s negotiators was reached. In the instructions given to its ambassadors Dubrovnik
authorized them to recognize Hungarian king as its lord. In order to get widest autonomy as
regards its administration and internal security and the right to collect all its revenues for the
city own use Dubrovnik authorized its ambassadors to offer to Hungarian king a tribute.
These claims went so far that ambassadors sought confirmation for the existing territories that
Dubrovnik had and even for the territories of Primorje, Cavtat, Konavle, Dracevica and
Trebinje. Cunningly playing upon king’s presumed ignorance of local history and geography
they argued that these territories had been attached to ancient Epidaurum, of which their little
state was the proud successor. The embassy entrusted to negotiate was a distinguished and
impressive one.
7
Robin Harris, Dubrovnik: A History, Saqi Books, London 2003, pp.62-63.

8. The negotiations at Visegrad were friendly and productive. Hungarian crown raised no
objection to treating with Dubrovnik separately or to envisaging a diminution of the rights
previously enjoyed by Venice over the city’s affairs. Of course, king had his own
requirements that have been put into the documents that followed. For the most of these
requirements the Ragusans were prepared to accept but on the question of the appointment of
the count. Namely, the Ragusans wanted that the Ragusans themselves ‘from among faithful
subjects of the king’ choose the count. King would simply confirm their choice. Dubrovnik’s
Great Council would elect both the Senate and the count’s Small Council. The king was
persuaded and he made the concession upon this matter. Therefore, after the year 1358
Dubrovnik had for the first time to face up to the full implications of de facto independence.8
During the ages that followed Dubrovnik was chiefly preoccupied with its neighbours.
Firstly with Vojislav Vojinovic, lord of Trebinje and Konavle, then Nikola Altomanovic, the
nephew of Vojislav who ruled after his death. To maintain peace with them, although peace
was more than unstable, Dubrovnik agreed to pay a tribute.
With the subsequent destruction of Altomanovic, it was the ruler of Bosnia who
became Dubrovnik’s most powerful neighbour. Ban Tvrtko I (1353-1391) of Bosnia and
Dubrovnik for the most of the time maintained good relations. These relations were mostly
based on mutual economic interests. In 1367 the Bosnian ruler visited the city himself. This
has become more important after Tvrtko conquered Trebinje and Konavle and in 1377 had
himself crowned king. The following year Dubrovnik and Tvrtko negotiated a treaty by which
Dubrovnik agreed to pay him symbolically important tribute of the Revenue of St Demetrius,
which was taken as implying recognition of Bosnian rule over Trebinje and Konavle. The
Ragusans for their part were assured of the right to trade throughout Tvrtko’s lands while
paying the proper custom dues.
On 16 September 1382 Louis of Anjou died.9
After his death, Dubrovnik duly swore
allegiance to the two Hungarian queens and engaged their support in the city’s opposition to
Tvrtko’s attempts to build up his town of Novi as an alternative market for salt and wine.
8
Harris, op.cit., pp. 66-67.
9
Louis of Anjou died without having male heirs. A bloody and complicated war broke out between
rival contenders for the crown, Sigismund of Luxemburg, who had married Louis’s daughter Maria
and Charles of Naples, the closest male relative of the dead king Louis and later his son Ladislas.
The Bosnian king Tvrtko seized the opportunity of this struggle to break free of Hungarian
suzerainty altogether and then under cover of support for the House of Naples grabbed a cover of
Dalmatia. Later, his heir, Duke Hrvoje submitted to Sigismund

9. During this period Dubrovnik tried to defend its existing possessions, acquire whatever
further territory it thought would be commercially or strategically valuable, and seize every
occasion to expand its trade and increase its revenues. To achieve this it struck up alliances
with whichever of its neighbours seemed most useful, though at the same time it generally
honoured its obligations to the Hungarian crown. The Ragusans recognized and stayed loyal
to Sigismund of Luxemburg, son of Charles IV, King of Bohemia and Emperor of Germany,
after his coronation in 1387. Sigismund reigned for a long time, almost fifty years, up till
1437.
In 1391 Tvrtko died and Bosnian magnate Hrvoje Vukcic Hrvatinic emerged as a
strongest figure and together with his brother Vuk was appointed joint bans of Croatia and
Dalmatia. Dubrovnik friendship with Hrvoje was extremely useful as he was who persuaded
the Bosnian king Stjepan Ostoja to grant Dubrovnik the lands of Primorje,10
which at last
permitted the Ragusans uninterrupted access by land between Astarea and Peljesac. On 15
January 1399 after many months of hard bargaining Dubrovnik acquired Primorje. This time
it avoided having to pay a continuing tribute for the lands acquired. Instead, it simply
rewarded Ostoja and Hrvoje with membership of the Ragusan nobility, houses in the city
worth 1500 ducats and property in Primorje itself. This was not the end of the attempts to
acquire more territories. The Ragusans tried to acquire islands of Korcula, Hvar and Brac. In
June 1413 the Ragusans persuaded Sigismund to grant it possession of the three islands. But,
the realities of local obstructionism proved more than a match for Dubrovnik’s best efforts at
effective government. Finally, in September 1416, Sigismund simply removed the islands
from Dubrovnik and granted them to one of his courtiers. Nevertheless, the Ragusans had far
more important objective. The real objective was to acquire Konavle, region almost fertile as
Zupa Dubrovacka. This region had a powerful sentimental value for the Ragusans because it
was considered as a Ragusa’s birthplace. The problem with Konavle was that this region had
been under Bosnian authority. After the death of the Bosnia’s King Tvrtko I the Ragusans
quickly dispatched an embassy to the brothers of Radic and Beljak Sankovic who held
Konavle at the time and secretly bought it from them for an annual tribute of 1000 hyperperi.
But the barons of Bosnia were outraged and utterly refused to accept this alienation of
Bosnian land. The Sankovici were driven from Konavle and Dubrovnik was left frustrated.
After having failed at the Bosnian Court the Ragusans transferred their attention to
10
Dubrovnik entered into possession of the newly acquired 27,735 hectares of what were called the
new territories (terre nuove).

10. Sigismund, their sovereign and Bosnia;s principal enemy. The Ragusans constantly badgered
him to concede in its favour his rights to Konavle. Nearly for a decade Ragusan diplomats
south to exploit every opportunity to bend Sigismund to theirs will. At the end the Ragusans
realized that the substantial negotiation would have to be with the real controllers of Konavle,
the Bosnians. This time the Ragusans had a good card in the game. Namely, most of the
Bosnian lords, since they were in some kind of military dispute, wanted a place of refuge.
As Philip de Diversis put it:
Perhaps someone will ask why these lords sell their lands. I will answer him: from
love and from the great and constant favour which the Ragusan patriciate in every
circumstance shows towards them… for in case some mishap befalls them, and the security of
haven, their most reliable refuge… I have heard that this is how the saying arose the Slavs:
‘When the hare chased by the hunters goes to a safe place, it goes to Dubrovnik.’11
In January 1419 envoys from Sandalj Hranic and Petar Pavlovic came to Dubrovnik to
negotiate. After negotiations Duke Sandalj was persuaded, but Petar Pavlovic was not. After
some time, Dubrovnik’s Senate agreed to obtain Duke Sandalj’s part hoping that in the near
future it would be possible to obtain Pavlovic’s part. In the treaty Dubrovnik confirmed him,
his brothers and his nephew Stjepan Vukcic Kosaca as members of its nobility, gave them a
house in the city, granted them an estate in Zupa worth 3000 hyperperi and promised a yearly
tribute of 500 hyperperi. Most important payment that Ragusans undertook was a large cash
payment of 12000 ducats (36000 hyperperi). Half of this would be paid immediately. The
other half would remain on deposit in Dubrovnik until the Ragusans actually gained
possession of the territory. After the Ragusans turned their attention to the lord of the other
part of Konavle, Petar Pavlovic. The negotiations went very well and were almost finished
when Sandalj Hranic and a force of Ottoman Turks killed Petar Pavlovic. In the document of
30 May 1420 Sandalj Hranic claimed that he had acquired Petar Pavlovic’s part of Konavle as
a gift from the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed I and gave it to Dubrovnik in exchange for the house
and estate, a 500-hyperperi annual tribute and a cash payment of 30000 hyperperi. But it was
far away from being done with the acquisition. Namely, Petar’s brother Radoslav Pavlovic
resisted giving the land to the agents that have been sent by Dubrovnik to take control of the
11
Philipus de Diversis de Quartigianis de Lucca, Situs Aedificiorum, Politiae et Laudabilium
Consuetudinum Inclytae Civitatis Ragusii, ed. V. Brunelli, Zadar 1882, p.122.

11. land. Dubrovnik tried to influence Sandalj Hranic to force Radoslav to enter into negotiations
with the Ragusans. Pavlovic entered into negotiations in 1423. The Ragusans also kept up the
pressure on Radoslav by bribing his father-in-law and leading nobles of his household. We
have to be aware of the fact that this is taking place during big Turkish expansion on the
Balkans. Turkish attacks in 1426 also helped the Ragusans by making Radoslav desperate to
raise money to build a fortress from which to resist the onslaught. So it was that on 31
December 1426 and on terms very similar to those earlier agreed with Duke Sandalj,
Radoslav Pavlovic ceded the territory to Dubrovnik.
Years of persistent diplomacy, opportune bribery and judicious use of force had won
for the Ragusans what was to prove the final extension of their dominions. From this point on,
the Ragusans had to put their full attention to the new player in the game. And this player was
not a weak one. This time Dubrovnik had to bow down to the Dobri Nas Cace.12
DUBROVNIK WITHIN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (C. 1396-1526)
Dubrovnik had an altogether specific relationship with the Turks, who had already in
the earlier half of 14th century, captured grain-producing regions from the western part of
Asia Minor up to the Byzantium dominions. Foreseeing that such a dangerous enemy could
one day knock at their own doors, the people of Dubrovnik wished to discourage the Turks
whilst there were still far from its border, so they initially formed special trade agreements,
which proved to be of vital importance for their future, first with Sultan Orhan (1326-1359)
12
‘Good old dad’. This was an expression that the Ragusans often used to address Ottoman Sultan
in their diplomatic documents.

12. and thereafter with Sultan Bayazit in 1397.13
While some powerful kingdoms surrendered to
Ottoman Empire, Dubrovnik, through these agreements with the Turks, not only ensured its
existence as an independent state, but also secured its trading security. Because of this, from
1458, it began to pay a levy to the Turks of 1000 ducats, which at the end of 15th century
stabilized at 12500 ducats.14
In exchange, they enjoyed complete freedom domestically, whilst
towards the exterior they obtained wide privileges in the whole of the Ottoman Empire and
the Sultan’s protection in the event of an external attack. But the Turks tried several times to
black-mail the Republic of Dubrovnik, in order to extract more money. That, it appears, lead
Dubrovnik to the conclusion that it, were possible, needed to have not one, but several
protector-states.
The harac15
was a substantial burden, and on top of it must be added the various large
bribes, which the Ragusan envoys had to distribute on their visits to Constantinople. But when
compared both with the fate of its neighbours and with the great wealth which was soon to
flow from the Ragusan’s merchants unique position in the Empire, it was worthwhile. During
this whole period relations between the Ottoman Empire and Dubrovnik were developing at a
level other than that of public diplomacy. Individual Ragusans established contacts with the
Turks, which both for better and worse, had an important impact on the Republic of
Dubrovnik. Ragusans who farmed Ottoman taxes acquired invaluable insights into the way
business was conducted within the Empire, and they could certainly make large profits. The
reigns of Sultans Bayazit II and Selim I (1512-1520) and the early years of Suleyman I the
Magnificent (1520-1566) saw first the restoration and then the further aggressive expansion of
the Ottoman Empire, which now reached its zenith. After the fall of Bosnia, and as Turks
controlled greater areas of Croatia and Hungary, the Ragusans were not longer on the
frontline of hostilities. They have moved wholly into the Ottoman sphere of influence and
adeptly managed their relations with successive Sultans so as to take maximum advantage of
that fact.
Although under the Ottoman protectorate The Republic lost its lucrative transit trade
of the silver produced in Bosnia and Serbia and exported to the West via Dubrovnik, it
13
Stjepan Krasic, ‘The Republic of Dubrovnik and Maintaining Neutrality During International
Conflicts’, International Symposium: Diplomacy of the Republic of Dubrovnik, Diplomatic Academy
Year-Book, Zagreb 1998, p. 89
14
The Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror wanted to increase levy much more than 12500 annually but
it never occurred for Mehmed died in 1481 before it could be put into effect and his less aggressive
successor Bayazit II (1481-1512) was satisfied with the annual payment of 12500 ducats.
15
This is a Turkish expression for the levy.

13. compensated the loss by extending its trade throughout the Balkans and gained almost
monopoly in its role in the export of such bulky goods as hides, lather, wool and wax to Italy.
For Dubrovnik, the tribute the city paid to the Ottomans proved a most profitable investment.
The city also benefited from the lowest custom rate of 2 per cent, while Muslims still had to
pay 3 and non-Muslims foreigners 5 per cent. However under the Conqueror the standard rate
for Dubrovnik became 4 per cent. On the basis of custom revenues chroniclers calculated that
the total volume of annual imports and exports amounted to half a million ducats during this
period. The actual figures must have been higher since the merchants invested part of their
profits in Italian banks to avoid paying duty in Dubrovnik.
The Republic maintained its own government without any interference. It appointed
consuls in Ottoman territory and foreign countries, received envoys and established
diplomatic relations with them, and minted its own coinage. Only two Ottoman officers had
residences in the city and represented the Ottoman governors of Bosnia and Hercegovina in
levying the specific dues.16
Along with its vital role as the commercial transit centre, Dubrovnik was also a centre
of information and transfer of Western technology17
for the Empire. Dubrovnik supplied
intelligence to the Ottoman government as well as to Papacy and other Christian
governments. As practical businessmen interested primarily in their own pursuits, the
Ragusans leaned towards those patrons, which seemed to appear the most successful in the
power struggle.
The break, after the battle of Mohacs in 1526, there was no prospect of the Ottoman
backed candidate for the Crown of St Stephen, Janos Zapolyai, demanding tribute from the
Republic, for the Sultan regarded Dubrovnik as now within his own, not Hungary’s, sphere of
influence. But, there were some other players that wanted to claim Ragusan allegiance. It was
the time for the Ragusans to play the role of real diplomatic finesse. This time they had to
cope with the Ottomans, the Habsburgs and the ‘old noble friends’, the Venetians.
16
Halil Inalcik, ‘Dubrovnik and the Ottoman Empire’, International Symposium: Diplomacy of the
Republic of Dubrovnik, Diplomatic Academy Year-Book, Zagreb 1998, p.121
17
The technology was primarily in gunnery and shipbuilding. The Balkan nations learned gunnery
through Dubrovnik in the 1380’s. After Dubrovnik became the center of gun making for the Balkan
nations. Also in constructing warships, experts from Dubrovnik worked in the Ottoman arsenal in
Constantinople.

14. DUBROVNIK BETWEEN HABSBURGS, VENICE AND THE PORTE
(1526-1667)
Given the new reality, Turkish presence in the Balkans and their inroads into Croatian
and Hungarian territory, Dubrovnik and its diplomacy could not ignore the new immediate
neighbour and, as of 1526, the Republic paid a rather substantial yearly tribute to the Porte.
The new reality meant also an end of the supremacy of Hungaro-Croatian kings and Austro-
German emperors. In such circumstances, which also involved the dynastic strife for the
Austrian crown, the Ragusan authorities and diplomacy were faced with challenges, which

15. had to be dealt with, and a new balance had to be established. It took some thirty years of
diplomatic inventiveness and manoeuvring in order to persuade Ferdinand I of Habsburg that
Dubrovnik could not pay a yearly tribute to him and to the Austrian rule. It meant that
Dubrovnik could not meet his constant requests for information on the Turks, protection of
the followers of the openly pro-Austrian orientation in Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik also had to
observe strict neutrality in the first anti-Turkish wars. The diplomatic emissaries of both sides,
the Ragusans in Vienna and the Austrians in the city and their activities bear witness to the
interwoven forces at play. For its part, Dubrovnik instructed its ambassadors to the Habsburg
court to remind the prince
…of the calamity18
which we have suffered for so many years past and which we still
suffer, our city is situated in the stony, sterile and arid place from which we cannot maintain
sustenance for two months for our subjects and inhabitants for the conservation of liberty and
Christianity…a very large tribute to the Great Lord Turk.
In order to make this hard luck story more convincing, the Ragusan ambassadors were
told to recount it with tears in their eyes. But Dubrovnik was a vital source of information at
the end, and the agents there supplied whatever was lacking in the intelligence, which the
Ragusan Senate itself found it prudent to transmit.
Through this rather prolonged period, the Ragusan diplomacy displayed all its well-
known traits: refined subtlety, restraint, sense of proportion, tactical skill, sacrifice for the
homeland, patriotic consciousness. The large number of archive sources, letters, reports,
instructions, intimate recordings, exchange of correspondence bears witness to the all-
embracing scope but also to the recurring thought in Dubrovnik’s diplomatic orientation to the
Habsburgs.
In dealing with the Porte, experience, which required the form of tradition,
prescription and even ritual, was just as important as Dubrovnik’s famed cleverness and
sinuosity in making the most of the relationship. In the approach to the Sultan the poklisari19
were urged by their government to adopt the grovelling appearance expected when dealing
with Eastern potentates, kissing his cloak, begging his favour, offering gifts. An equally
18
At that time the Plague spread all over Europe.
19
They were Dubrovnik’s emissaries to the Porte, mostly engaged in delivering yearly tribute to the
Sultan, so called harac.

16. important role, if not even more important, in contacts with the Turks was played by the
famous Ragusan dragomans,20
trained interpreters for Turkish. Some of them were able to
integrate themselves into the Turkish environment to such an extent that they were almost
considered to be natives.
The Venetians did not flinch before much in their relationship with the Republic of
Dubrovnik. They were already aware of their superiority to seek means other than force,
which was always close at hand for them. As a result, on numerous occasions, attempts were
made to wipe their small eastern neighbour off the map and thus remove it from the political
stage, using whatever excuse could be found. The complex international situation provided
for numerous such opportunities. It was enough for the Christian leaders to begin preparations
for war with the Turks, and especially if the war was already in progress, and the Venetians
immediately tried to involve the Dubrovnik Republic under this or that proclamation, or,
claiming they were protecting the Republic from the Turks and disallowing them to turn it
into one of their bases, tried to acquire it. Fate caused the small Republic of Dubrovnik to
experience this uncomfortable neighbour. The allegations against each other, both at the Papal
and the Sultan’s court, were almost daily events. Additionally, the Venetians were in
continual fear that the Turks should learn from the Republic of Dubrovnik of their political
and military plans against the Turks, just as they feared that it should come to the ears of the
Christian leaders what they were planning against them in collusion with the Turks. The
people of Dubrovnik had no less fear of the Venetians, who were wont not only to disclose
their eastern secrets, but also accuse them falsely, both in Constantinople and in Rome,
whether of being the enemies of Turks, or of being the enemies of Christianity and its
interests. Because of this, the Ragusans always warned their representatives at the Ottoman
Great Gate to be careful not to let the Venetians learn, through their Turkish informers, what
Dubrovnik in its relations with both its western and eastern neighbours had in mind to do.
This was particularly important during the periods of Holly Wars in the 16th and 17th
centuries, which were dominated by more or less continuous Holly War against Ottoman
infidel. The government of the Republic of Dubrovnik did not accept this kind of
20
The Ragusan Minor Council regularly published competitions for so-called ‘young men of the
language’ – students of Turkish. They were trained very practically and efficiently at the expense of
the state. The Turkish mullah taught them basic Turkish and Arabic in Dubrovnik. Then they went
to Constantinople (Istanbul), Edirne or another major city where they perfected their knowledge of
the language, Ottoman customs, culture and civilization with the assistance of experienced
dragomans, consuls and merchants. Thus trained they worked in the Turkish office in Dubrovnik
and abroad as ambassadors or their attendants.

17. interpretation of events and sought by all possible means to maintain the Republic’s neutrality
and thus its prosperity and security. The War of the Holly League (1538-1540), the War of
Cyprus (1570-1573), the defeat of the Turkish fleet at Lepanto (1571), the Long War between
Austrians and the Turks (1593-1606) were the most important, out of many events that
Dubrovnik’s diplomats had to cope with. Maintaining the neutrality was, as I have already
mentioned, like balancing on a thin line between East and West, between mighty and
frequently unfriendly neighbours. This made the small state of Dubrovnik a diplomatic
tightrope walker expert in maintaining an upright position.
During the period of nearly fifty years starting from the beginning of the 17th century
Dubrovnik was a target of several attacks. In 1603 the Venetians occupied the island of
Lastovo until 1606. More serious for Dubrovnik’s security was the event that happened on 5
June 1631 when the Venetians seized the island of Lokrum, which happens to be just in front
of the city itself.. Dubrovnik protested to the viceroy of Naples, informed the Spanish and
even won the support of Cardinal Richelieu of France. After negotiations the Venetians
recognized Dubrovnik’s rights over Lokrum but refused to pay any reparations for the damage
they had inflicted.
In 1645 the Sultan authorized a Turkish invasion of Crete, which was under Venetian
control, so precipitating the ‘War of Crete’ (1645-1669). This certainly helped Dubrovnik’s
economy for the simple fact that the Ottoman trade with the West was channelled, as before
1590,21
through Dubrovnik.
Dubrovnik managed to go through some rough times and still to maintain its
independence. Probably the best example how international community saw the Ragusans is
in the cynical remark made by the Frenchman who visited Dubrovnik in January 1658.22
He wrote:
The Turks they fear; the Venetians they hate; the Spaniards they love, because they are
useful; the French they suffer because their fame; and foreigners they spy on very much.23
21
This war damaged Venetian interests on the Adriatic when its flourishing entrepot of Split was
effectively closed down.
22
The inhabitants of the Republic of Dubrovnik were known as ‘the Ragusans of the sette bandiere
(seven flags)’ because they gave tribute to seven foreign rulers
23
Harris, op.cit., p.122.

18. It is possible to tell the history of the Republic of Dubrovnik entirely in the terms of
diplomacy. And diplomacy by all means was the part of life of each Ragusan. To tell the story
about the Ragusan diplomacy would be like telling the story about the sensibility with which
the Ragusans approached to the challenges and difficulties throughout their history. This
means that we have to tell the story about the means by which the people of Dubrovnik
secured their peace and maintained power without war. This story has to contain the most
ideal of all Dubrovnik’s practices.
Since nothing increases harmony and protects the states, towns and fortresses more
than respect for domestic and international peace, and nothing increases both general and
private wealth to a greater extent, particularly in towns oriented towards trade and, since the
outcome or end of war can only be justified by peace, so that people often sank into war in
order to have the peace, the people of Dubrovnik took great care and invested great efforts
into maintaining peace and harmony with everyone; they made efforts through intelligence,
money and patience for as long as they could. They really believed, with justification, that
maintaining peace, by whatever means, was more beneficial than seeking to recreate peace
damaged by injustice and pillage.
If sometimes they were driven more by instinct than reason, they undertook all
measures, steps and precautions in their own councils, the Small Council or the Great
Council, in order to destroy their greed, to tame their restlessness, to pacify them and prevent
any trouble. They sent envoys to speak fine words and bestow gifts even to those who
threatened trouble, thus strengthening peace and friendship. That is the fact that they have,
peacefully, without arms and without force or deception, subdued people and territories of
neighbouring suzerains, getting the gentry to surrender voluntarily. Whilst most other nations
attempted to increase their power by war, force, fighting, arms and deception, the
municipality of Dubrovnik increased its territory peacefully and amicably. We could describe
many other commendable customs of the Ragusan diplomacy, from which it would be clearly
seen that they maintained the best standards in times of both peace and war. Surely the people
who did this have discovered the secret of human progressiveness and must have kept
themselves steadily in the turmoil of the past. The secret of the Ragusan diplomacy lies in just

19. one lapidary phrase inscribed in the fortress of St Lawrence: Non bene pro toto libertas
venditur auro.24
24
Freedom cannot be sold for all the money in the world.